Mexican War on Drugs, Chabat, 2002

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DOI: 10.1177/000271620258200110

2002; 582; 134The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science Jorge Chabat

Mexico's War on Drugs: No Margin for Maneuver

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Mexico’s War on Drugs:No Margin for Maneuver

By JORGE CHABAT

Jorge Chabat is an associate professor in the Department of International Studies atthe Center for Research and Teaching in Economics in Mexico City. He is an expert on

US.-Mexican relations, drug trafficking, and national security issues. He has edited,with John Bailey, the book Transnational Crime and Public Security: Challenges toMexico and the United States (2002, University of California, San Diego). He is a regu-lar political commentator for Mexican newspapers and television.

ABSTRACT: Illegal drugs threaten the Mexican governance becauseof the corruption they generate. The Mexican government has been

fighting this threat for years in a context of institutional weaknessand strong pressures from the United States. The fact that Mexico isa natural supplier of illegal drugs to the biggest market in the world,the United States, puts the Mexican government in a very complexsituation with no alternatives other than to continue fighting drugswith very limited institutional and human resources. In this process,Mexico has no margin for maneuver to change the parameters ofthewar on drugs.


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I LLEGAL drugsaffect Mexico in

terms of both consumption and

traffic. However, although drugcon-

sumption has increased in Mexico

during recent years, it is far from be-

ing a serious social problem, and thelevels remain very low compared tothose of industrialized countries.

Therefore, traffic is the main prob-lem in Mexico because of the corrup-tion it generates. And since the traf-fic of illicit

drugsis

highly motivatedby the demands that exist in con-sumer countries, the problem in Mex-ico is influenced in an importantmeasure by the demand in theUnited States. At the same time, it isU.S. pressure on Mexico that propelsa very aggressive drug control policyin Mexico. The combination of U.S.

pressureand the role of Mexico as a

major point of transit of drugs enter-

ing the United States has generatedserious tension in Mexican law en-

forcement institutions. Since the

Mexican government is not able to

modify these parameters, it has verylittle margin for maneuver in the waron drugs, and it seems confined to

fighta

very costlywar that endan-

gers the Mexican transition to

democracy.Mexico has been fighting illegal

drugs for a century. In 1912, Mexico

supported the Hague International

Opium Convention, and during the

following years, the Mexican govern-ment prohibited trade of the main

illegal drugs:opium, cocaine, and

marijuana. During the first threedecades of the twentieth century, a

pattern emerged: Mexico became aproducer ofheroin and marijuana aswell as a provider to the United

States of these drugs. At the same

time, there were increasing pres-

sures from the American govern-ment on its southern neighbor to

develop a more effective strategyagainst drugs. Even before drug traf-

ficking was a national security issuein Mexico, there were some scandalsof drug corruption in the 1930s, likethe resignation of the minister ofthe

interior, Carlos Riva Palacio, in 1931

(Walker 1981).Notwithstanding, drug trafficking

was not an important topic on theMexican domestic or international

agenda until the 1980s. Althoughthere have been addicts since the

1920s when it was possible to find

opium smoking rooms in Mexicali onthe border with the United States, it

has not beena

social problem ofimportant dimensions, as in theUnited States. During the 1940s and1950s, the Mexican governmentdeveloped a punitive approachtoward illegal drugs, increasing the

penalties for drug traffickers and

signing all international agreementsto fight the traffic of illicit drugs. TheMexican

counterdrugefforts

provedto be efficient during the 1970s when

Operation Condor was implementedas a result of the pressure by theNixon administration in 1969. The

success achieved by the Mexican gov-ernment in the eradication of mari-

juana and opium were used by theU.S. government as an example ofwhat a country can do about fightingdrugs if there is political will. How-ever, the antidrug effort deterioratedduring the 1980s. Mexico appearedagain as an important supplier ofmarijuana and heroin to the United

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States and emerged as a point oftransit for the cocaine coming fromSouth America. The new role ofMex-

ico in the international chain of drugtrafficking provoked some frictionwith the United States, aggravatedby the traditional anti-U.S. feelingexisting in part of the Mexican popu-lation. The assassination of the DrugEnforcement Administration (DEA)

agent Enrique Camarena in Mexicoin 1985, with the complicity of theMexican Federal Police, was only the

tip of the iceberg of a growing prob-lem that was affecting Mexicandomestic politics as well as Mexico’s

foreign relations. Since then, drugtrafficking has become a national

security problem because of itsimpact on violence and corruption. Atthe same time, consumption of illicit

drugs emerged as a growing problemwith social repercussions. What isthe state ofthe drug problem in Mex-ico right now? What has the Mexican

government done? What are the fail-ures and the limits in this war? And

finally, what are Mexico’s options?

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

During the second half of the

1980s, Mexico became the source of70 percent of the marijuana and 25percent of the heroin imported by theUnited States, as well as the territorythrough which 60 percent of thecocaine entering the United Stateswas transported (Chabat 1994). Inthe 1990s, the situation did not

change, except for the fact that Mexi-can cartels became more powerful,according to DEA sources (U.S.Department of Justice; see also

Constantine 1996). The fact that

Mexican drug cartels were more pow-

erful hadan

impact interms

ofthe

levels of violence and corruption and,probably, in the levels of drugconsumption.

According to the DEA, by the endof the 1980s, traffickers from Mexicowere able to deliver drugs in theUnited States, replacing the Colom-bian drug organization. This ten-

dencywas

reinforcedin

themid-

1990s after the arrest of the Cali Car-

tel leaders. In 1996, DEA DirectorThomas A. Constantine denounced

the existence of a Mexican drug traf-

ficking federation made up of four

major cartels: the Tijuana Organiza-tion, the Sonora Cartel, the Juarez

Cartel, and the Gulf Group(Constantine 1996).

However, duringthe second half ofthe 1990s, the GulfCartel grew weaker due in part to thearrest of its leader, Juan Garcia

Abrego, in 1996. Some analysts have

speculated that the decline of theGulf Cartel was related to the fact

that the Salinas administration

(1988-1994) protected it, and thatthis protection vanished with thearrival of the Zedillo administration

(1994-2000). It is difficult to provethat assertion, but Garcia Abregohimself declared in testimony duringhis trial in the United States that his

cartel obtained the cocaine it smug-

gled into the United States from theseizures made by the attorney gen-eral’s office of other drug cartels.Whatever the reasons for this

decline, it was evident that the more

powerful cartels at the end of thedecade were the Tijuana and theJuarez Cartels. According to




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137

Mexican official sources, the appear-ance of a drug cartel in the Yucatan

peninsula (known as the CancunCartel) in the late 1990s was due tothe expansion of the Juarez Cartel.In any case, both cartels are well and

alive, even when the Juarez Cartelleader apparently died during plasticsurgery in July 1997. Independent ofthe veracity of this version, theJuarez mafia was able to reorganizeitself very quickly, and its allegednew leader, Vicente Carrillo Fuentes(brother of Amado Carrillo), has notbeen captured. In addition, the

Tijuana cartel has been operating for

many years, and does not show many

signs of weakening, despite the deathof its leader, Ramon Arellano Felix,and the arrest of his brother,Benjamin, in 2002. This situation

was denounced by the U.S. ambassa-dor to Mexico, Jeffrey Davidow, in

February 2000, when he said thatMexico had become a world head-

quarters for the drug trade.

Notwithstanding the growingpower of the Mexican drug mafias,there is no evidence that they areinvolved in other forms of organized

crime, like kidnappings or car thefts.The link between drug traffickingand other forms ofcommon criminal-

ity is difficult to prove (for this dis-cussion and the case of Mexico, see

Bailey and Chabat 2001). However,there is a correlation between the

rise in crime rates in Mexico and the

strengthening of drug traffickingcartels in the mid-1990s.

In terms of production, the figuresfor marijuana and opium-the onlytwo illicit crops developed in Mexicanterritory-have been quite stableduring the 1990s. By 2000, Mexico

was still an important supplier ofboth drugs to the United States, even

though Mexican production ofopiumrepresents less than 2 percent of theworld’s production. In 2000, accord-

ing to the U.S. State Department(2001), Mexico was also the point oftransit of 55 percent ofcocaine enter-

ing the United States.

It is difficult to have an exact fig-ure for the money that drug traffick-

ing generates in Mexico, but most of

the calculations places it between $6billion and $15 billion annually, rep-resenting between 1 percent and 3

percent of Mexico’s GDP. However,taking into consideration the volumeof cocaine transported through Mex-ico as well as the volume of mari-

juana and heroine produced in the

country, it is very feasible to think of

a figure ofabout $3 billion per year. Itis also difficult to give a reliable fig-ure of the number of people involvedin drug trafficking. However, sincethe cultivation of both marijuanaand opium requires the labor of manypeasants, it is not an exaggeration tothink ofmany thousands involved in

the production and distribution of

these drugs. Notwithstanding, giventhe population of the country (100million people), it is difficult to saythat drug trafficking generates animportant part ofthe employment inMexico. Nevertheless, the economic

impact is concentrated in a fewregions in Central and NorthernMexico, particularly the states of

Michoacan, Sinaloa,and Chihuahua.

Regarding consumption, the latestofficial figure available shows that in

1998,1.23 percent of the urban popu-lation were regular consumers (thosewho used some illegal drug during




6/16

138

the past year), that is, approximately600,000 people. Even though this fig-

ure is very low compared with the fig-ures in the United States, consump-tion of illegal drugs in Mexicoincreased 30 percent from 1993 to1998 (Mexico, Secretaria de Salud

1999). There are several causes forthis increase. The process of eco-

nomic modernization that Mexico

has experienced during the past twodecades is an

importantfactor to

explain the increase in the use of ille-gal drugs in the main cities of Mexico.

However, the fact that during recent

years, the drug cartels paid drugsmugglers for their services withdrugs has contributed to the expan-sion of Mexican demand for illicit

drugs. In any case, it is important to

point out that although drug con-

sumption is increasing in Mexico, themain problem with drugs is cultiva-tion and traffic. This characteristic

directly determines the interests and

options of Mexico vis-a-vis illegaldrugs.

THE COSTS OF DRUG

TRAFFICKING: VIOLENCE

AND CORRUPTION

Although violence has increased

during recent years, it remains con-fined to some regions and basicallyaffects only those who are involved inthe business or in law enforcement

activities. In this regard, there is noevidence that drug-related violenceconstitutes a threat to governance in

Mexico. Notwithstanding, there aresome notorious cases of murders of

policemen, journalists, and politi-cians. Among these cases are the kill-

ing of Tijuana Police Chief Federico

Benitez Lopez in April 1994; theassassination of former federal pros-

ecutor Arturo Ochoa Palacio in 1996;the killing of Ernesto Ibarra Santes,the newly named head of federal

police operations in Baja Californiain 1996; and the murder ofBaja Cali-fornia State Prosecutor Hodin

Gutierrez in 1997. Drug-related vio-lence rose significantly in some citiesin Northern Mexico, principally

Tijuanaand Ciudad Juarez. In

1997,the Mexican authorities reported the

disappearance of 100 people inCiudad Juarez, most of them proba-bly related to drug trafficking. The

drug-related violence also reached a

prominent journalist, Jesus

Blancornelas, Zeta newspaper editor,who survived an assassination

attemptin November 1997, and the

governor of the Mexican state of Chi-

huahua, Patricio Martinez, who alsosurvived an assassination attempt in

February 2001, although in this casethe drug connection has not been

clearly established. There are also

suspicions that drug trafficking wasinvolved in the assassination of Rev-

olutionary Institutional Party (PRI)presidential candidate Luis DonaldoColosio in 1994 and Cardinal Jesus

Posadas Ocampo in 1993, but there isno clear evidence of this link.

Corruption has been present inthe Mexican government during the

past two decades and has been asource of friction between Mexico

and the United States. The most

notorious case was that of GeneralJesus Gutierrez-Rebollo, the head ofthe National Institute for the Com-

bat of Drugs, arrested in 1997 for col-

laborating with the Juarez Cartel.There also were cases of corruption




7/16

139

in the Salinas and the Zedillo admin-

istrations. According to the media,

high officers of the Salinas adminis-tration were involved with drug traf-

ficking, including Salinas’s chief ofstaff Jose Cordoba and his brother

Raul Salinas de Gortari. Some Amer-

ican newspapers suggested thatmembers of Zedillo’s cabinet, includ-

ing the secretary of defense, General

Enrique Cervantes, and the private

secretary of the president, LiebanoSaenz, were linked to drug traffick-

ing. The New York Times suggestedin February 1997 that the governorsof the Mexican states of Sonora and

Morelos, Manlio Fabio Beltrones and

Jorge Carrillo Olea, were involved in

drug trafficking. In February 1998,the Washington Times accused Fran-

cisco Labastida, at that time secre-tary of the interior (Gobernacion)and in 2000 presidential candidate ofthe PRI, of collaborating with drugtraffickers when he was governor of

the Mexican state of Sinaloa in the

late 1980s and early 1990s. In allthese cases, there was no legal actionagainst these officials. If these accu-

sations are at least partially true,drug trafficking really is posing athreat to the Mexican state’s abilityto govern.

One example of the corruptingability of drug traffickers is theescape from a high-security prison ofthe Mexican drug lord Joaquin&dquo;Chapo&dquo; Guzman in January 2001.

This event shows the degree of cor-

ruption that has pervaded theMexican government, as was

acknowledged by Under Secretary ofPublic Security Jorge Tello Peon.

Another corrupting influence of

drug trafficking is the possible pres-ence of

drug moneyin

politicalcam-

paigns. Although some analysts sug-gested that there has been some drugfinancing in the Zedillo campaignand perhaps some other local cam-

paigns, there is no clear evidence ofthat (see Lupsha 1995). Also, it seemsthat drug traffickers have no politi-cal preference. They try to influence

politicians of all parties, not onlythose belonging to the PRI, which hasheld the Mexican presidency since1929 and has dominated the Mexican

political system since then.

MEXICAN

COUNTERDRUG EFFORTS

During the past decades, the Mexi-can government has dedicated

important economic and human

resources to fight drugs. In terms ofthe combat of the traffic of illicit

drugs, the Mexican government hasbeen using the Federal JudicialPolice for years, but the results have

been quite disappointing. Corruptionhas made the Mexican

police veryinefficient. I have already mentionedsome examples of drug-related cor-ruption. This is the reasonwhy Presi-dent Zedillo decided to send the armyto fight drug traffickers in the begin-ning of his administration. Since the1950s, the Mexican army has been

collaborating in the eradication ofillicit crops, but it had no responsibil-ity in law enforcement. In that sense,the use of the army to collaborate inthe arrest of drug traffickers repre-sents an important change in theMexican counterdrug efforts.




8/16

140

The effectiveness of the Mexican

army in fighting drugs is mixed. The

armyhas been effective in the

cap-ture ofsome drug traffickers, such as&dquo;El Guero&dquo; Palma in June 1995, but itcould not arrest the Juarez Cartel

leader Amado Carrillo in 1997, prob-ably because the Mexican drug czarGeneral Gutierrez Rebollo alerted

the drug lord. These failures andcases of corruption have fueled criti-cisms of the army’s new role, but thetruth is that nobody has been able toshow a clear alternative, given thedeterioration of the police forces inMexico. Discussion about the appro-

priateness of using the army in fight-ing drug trafficking shows how seri-ous narco-corruption is in Mexicoand that no one is immune to it.

There was little variation of sei-

zures and eradication during the1990s (see U.S. State Department2000). There was some progress in

marijuana and heroin seizures, butnot in cocaine. In any case, the gen-eral tendency does not allow us totalk about any significant change,despite the efforts announced by theMexican government and in

response to U.S. pressure.

The results of efforts to dismantle

criminal organizations is also mixed.Some important drug lords havebeen arrested, but the cartels con-tinue operating. As has been men-tioned, in 1995, the Mexican armycaptured El Guero Palma, leader ofthe Sinaloa Cartel. However, the

most notorious case was the arrest of

Juan Garcia Abrego, leader of theGulf Cartel, who was deported to theUnited States in January 1996because he was a U.S. citizen. Zedillo

also arrested two important mem-bers of the Tijuana Cartel as well as alieutenant to the Gulf Cartel leader.

Until May 2000, the Zedillo adminis-tration had captured 451 members of

drug trafficking organizations.Zedillo also implemented in 1998 theso-called Maxi-proceso, an operationthat attacked the Juarez Cartel and

that led to the arrest of some busi-

nessmen and the prosecution ofMario Villanueva Madrid, governorof the Mexican state ofQuintana Roo.This was the first time in modern

Mexican history that an acting gov-ernor had an arrest order. Unfortu-

nately, it was not enforced becauseVillanueva escaped some days beforethe end of his term. He was finallycaptured in May 2001 by the Foxadministration.

Zedillo also arrested, in 2000,other high military officers like Gen-eral Arturo Acosta Chaparro, a one-star general, and General Francisco

Quiros Hermosillo, a three-star gen-eral accused of collaborating with theJuarez Cartel. In 1997, General Alfredo Navarro Lara was arrested,accused of having links with the

Tijuana Cartel. Also, there weresome arrests of police officers, includ-

ing that of the former director of theFederal Judicial Police, AdrianCarrera Fuentes,who was allowed bythe Mexican government to testify inthe United States. By May 2000,there were 3,060 law enforcementofficers suspended for corruption.

The Fox administration also

attacked the drug cartels. In May2001, the Mexican governmentarrested Adan Amezcua, one of theleaders of the Colima Cartel, dedi-




9/16

141

cated to the production of

methamphetamines. Also, in Febru-

ary 2001, Fox ordered the arrest ofallofficials in the attorney general’soffice in the Mexican state ofChihua-

hua, accused of collaborating withthe Juarez Cartel. In April 2001, Foxarrested nineteen members of the

Gulf Cartel, including a traffickerknown as &dquo;El June.&dquo; In May 2001, asit has been mentioned, Fox also

arrested

fugitiveMario

Villanueva,former governor ofQuintana Roo. On7 June 2001, an important drug lordfrom the Gulf Cartel, Juan Garza,surrendered himself to U.S.

authorities.

During recent years, particularlyin the 1990s, the Mexican govern-ment has made important institu-tional and

legalreforms to

improvethe capacity of the Mexican state to

fight drugs. Following the CardinalPosadas assassination in 1993, theSalinas administration created the

National Institute for the Combat of

Drugs to better coordinate the fightagainst drug trafficking. In Decem-ber 1993, the criminal code wasreformed to increase the

lengthof

sentences for drug traffickers andthe number ofdays they can be main-tained in custody. These reforms alsofacilitate the confiscation and sale of

goods belonging to drug traffickersand the government’s access to infor-mation about drug trafficking. InJuly 1993, the Mexican governmentmodified the federal fiscal code,establishing reporting for the entryof foreign exchange in amounts ofmore than U.S.$10,000 into Mexicanterritory. Since 1990, money launder-ing has been defined as a felony.

The Ernesto Zedillo administra-

tion continued the tendency showed

by Salinas de Gortari to improve theindicators in the fight against drugs.Concerning institutional reforms,Zedillo enacted a new law againstorganized crime in December 1996.This law strengthened the penaltiesagainst organized crime and targetscriminal association, similar to the

Racketeering Influence and Corrupt

Organizations (RICO)law in the

United States. The new law allowed

telephonic interception, protection of

witnesses, covert agents, and sei-zures of goods. To enforce this law,Zedillo created the Special Unit

against Organized Crime. Zedilloalso established a Special Unitagainst Money Laundering. In 1997,after the arrest of its

director,Zedillo

abolished the National Institute for

the Combat ofDrugs and created the

special attorney for Crimes AgainstHealth post inside the attorney gen-eral’s office. In 1997, the Zedilloadministration promoted constitu-tional reforms to make the fightagainst crime more efficient. Thesereforms were

approvedin March

1999. In August 1998, Zedillolaunched the National Crusade

against Crime, whose purpose was tomodernize the fight against crime. InDecember of that year, Zedillo cre-

ated the federal preventive police,which absorbed some other federal

police forces, such as the highwaypolice, the fiscal police, and the

migration police. In 1999, the Mexi-can government launched the so-called Operaci6n Sellamiento de laFrontera (Sealing the Border Opera-tion), aimed at stopping drugs before




10/16

142

they enter Mexican territory. TheMexican government announced an

additional expenditure of around

$500 million during two years. This

operation dedicated most of the bud-

get to high-tech hardware, includingX-ray machines to inspect trucks

coming from Central America, high-speed boats, and small surveillanceplanes. The Zedillo governmentarrested 63,645 persons, a substan-tial decline from the Salinas de

Gortari administration (more than

100,000 persons).It is also worth mentioning that

the Mexican government has been

dedicating important amounts of

money to fight drug trafficking dur-

ing the past decade. In 1991, theamount of money dedicated to fightdrug trafficking was about U.S.$100

million. According to nonofficialsources, the amount the Mexican

government spent annually in fight-ing drugs was calculated by the endof 1994 at around $500 million (DrugStrategies 1994). However, this fig-ure could have been affected by thedevaluation of the peso in December

1994. In 1997, official sources said

that the antidrug budgetwas

around$1 billion.2 By 1998, the antidrugmoney represented one-third of thetotal budget of the attorney general’soffice.

THE AMERICAN FACTOR:

THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS

Since the beginning of the twenti-eth century, the Mexican counter-

drug efforts have been influenced bythe United States either in a direct

way or through the international

agreements in which the American

governmenthas played an importantrole. American pressure increased

significantly in the 1970s, paving the

way to the successful Operation Con-dor. However, the pressure becamemuch stronger in the 1980s, espe-cially after Camarena’s assassina-tion in 1985. In part as a result ofthis

event, in 1986, the U.S. government

implemented the certification pro-cess, which established the legal obli-

gation of the U.S. president to inform

Congress about the performance ofcountries involved in the productionor transit of drugs in fighting illegaldrugs. While full certification hasbeen granted to Mexico every yearwithout exception since 1986, it hasbeen a source of public frictionbetween both countries. It has

become almost a ritual every year, in

the weeks before the certification, forthe Mexican authorities to invoke

the defense of sovereignty to con-demn this process as unilateral and

unfair. And since the certification

process measures basically politicalwill and not necessarily final resultsin terms of real reduction of the flow

of drugs, it has been used more as a

political instrument than as an effec-tive mechanism to reduce drug traf-

ficking or consumption (see Reuterand Ronfeldt 1992). The elements

taken into account to grant certifica-tion have provoked the Mexican gov-ernment to dedicate much of its

energy to fulfill these indicators. The

criteria for granting certification are

( 1 ) a budget dedicated to fight drugtrafficking, (2) seizures and eradica-tion of shipments, (3) the number of

arrests, (4) legal and institutionalreforms aimed to strengthen the

fight against drugs, (5) the signing of




11/16

143

international agreements, and (6)

acceptance of U.S. collaboration.3 I

have alreadymentioned the efforts

made by the Mexican government interms ofthe budget dedicated to fightdrugs, seizures and eradication,arrests, and legal and institutionalreforms. Let us see now how collabo-

ration with the United States has

been carried out.

During the Salinas administra-

tion,the U.S.-Mexico collaboration on

the issue of drugs improved substan-

tially, despite some minor friction. In

1992, for example, as a reaction to theU.S. Supreme Court decision autho-rizing kidnapping in foreign territoryof persons prosecuted by American

justice, the Mexican governmentimplemented a bill aimed to regulatethe &dquo;temporary stay of agents repre-senting foreign governments officesthat are in their country in charge of

police, inspection or surveillancefunctions in law enforcement, as wellas specialized technicians&dquo; (Govern-ment of Mexico 1992, 2). Also, as a

way of protesting the U.S. SupremeCourt decision, the Salinas govern-ment rejected, in 1992, the financialassistance channeled by Washingtonthrough the International NarcoticsControl Program.

Nevertheless, in 1990, both coun-tries launched the Northern Border

Response Force, known in Spanish asOperaci6n Halc6n. Although thisprogram was evaluated poorly in aGeneral Accounting Office report, in

May 1993, it was reported in the 1994and 1995 International Narcotics

Control Strategy Report, released bythe U.S. Department of State, as the

&dquo;centerpiece&dquo; of U.S.-Mexican lawenforcement cooperation and the

&dquo;focus of bilateral interdiction

efforts.&dquo; Its interest in collaboratingwith the United States moved the

Mexican government to increase its

involvement in antinarcotics opera-tions in Central America and to col-

laborate with the Hemispheric Sys-tem ofInformation. At the same time,the Salinas government improvedradar surveillance in Mexican terri-

tory to detect planes carrying drugs,but there were some criticisms in the

media alleging that this radar sys-tem had some blanks through which

drug traffickers could penetrate intoMexico.

Zedillo took significant stepstoward the creation of an alliance

with the United States on the issue of

drugs. In 1996, both governmentsestablished the High-Contact Level

Group that was aimed to facilitatethe exchange of information betweenthe United States and Mexico and

prevent a major diplomatic crisis.This collaboration produced jointoperations, like the FBI investiga-tion of the graves that were found in

Ciudad Juarez on the U.S.-Mexican

border at the end of 1999. In 1997,President Zedillo agreed to tempo-rary extradition of drug traffickers tothe United States. By May 2000,Mexico had extradited six Mexicans

accused ofdrug trafficking, and therewere another seven persons awaitingextradition, pending appeals courtrulings. ByMay 2000, there were fiveMexican citizens in the process of

being extradited to the United States(White House 1998; Mexico, Attor-

ney-General Offices 2000). We can

expect more extradition cases in the

future, especially after the MexicanSupreme Court ruled in January




12/16

144

2001 that the extradition of Mexi-

cans to other countries is legal.Zedillo also

acceptedthat U.S.

shipsand planes have access to Mexican

airports and ports. There were also

newspaper accounts of DEA agents’being allowed to carry guns in Mexi-can territory, but this has beendenied officially by the Mexican gov-ernment. It is also worth mentioningthat the U.S. government is closelycollaborating with the Mexican gov-ernment in the training and selectionof the members of the new Mexican

antidrug unit created under Zedillo.President Fox increased collabora-

tion with the United States and has

announced the creation of a Mexican

Federal Agency of Investigations (aMexican FBI), starting in December

2001, that will include an FBI train-

ing academy in Mexican territory.That clearly demonstrates a signifi-cant difference in the level of collabo-

ration with the United States by theMexican government compared tothe past.

THE INEFFICIENT WAR

Despite all of the above-men-tioned efforts, there are many weak-nesses in the Mexican mechanisms

to fight drugs. We can see this weak-ness in attempts to capture druglords or corrupt officers. As has been

mentioned, in January 1997, theZedillo administration almost cap-

tured the Juarez Cartel leader Amado Carrillo, who escaped twentyminutes before the military arrivedat his sister’s wedding. In February1997, one day before certification by

the U.S. government was announced,Humberto Garcia Abrego, brother ofthe Gulf Cartel leader Juan Garcia

Abrego, escaped from the Mexico

City attorney general’s headquarterswithout any logical explanation fromthe Mexican government. In this

case, the Mexican government did

not report this incident until the cer-tification of Mexico was announced

by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine

Albright. In June 1997, there wasanother scandal: four hundred kilos

of seized cocaine disappeared from alocal attorney general’s office inSonora along with the police whowere in charge of the surveillance. In

May 1999, Adan Amezcua, the meth-

amphetamine czar, was releasedfrom prison because the judge ruledthat the money laundering charges

against him were not valid under thelaw at the time ofthe alleged offense.However, the most scandalous sign ofinstitutional weakness was the

escape from a maximum-securityjailof Joaquin Chapo Guzman in Janu-ary 2001. All these cases show how

difficult the combat of drugs is inMexico and the need to improve the

performance of law enforcementinstitutions in Mexico.

POLICY OPTIONS

Given the institutional limita-

tions that the Mexican governmenthas in fighting drugs and the cor-

rupting ability of the drug mafias,Mexico’s options are limited. Thefirst option is to do more ofthe same.This means combating drug traffick-

ing with the same tools and with the




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same limitations as in the past. This

option would imply the maintenance

of thesame

levels of violence andcor-

ruption. In this sense, even when vio-lence is not challenging Mexican gov-ernance, the threat coming from

corruption could be more

destabilizing. More of the same is

supported by those who obtain bene-fits from the status quo: police offi-cers and some Mexican politicians.The U.S.

government supportsthis

option only partially since it is con-scious of the danger of having highdegrees of corruption. Some of the

supporters of this option are trulybelievers in the state’s strength andthink that drug traffickers can betreated like any other criminals and

punished by the government. How-ever, given the serious problems of

corruption that the present strategyhas not been able to solve, this policyoption, without any modification, isdifficult to support. But if this optionis accompanied by a serious processof police and judicial reforms, it mayreceive more support if people per-ceive some degree of success. Theproblem is that these kinds of

reforms take time to be imple-mented, and in the interim, theeffects ofcorruption can be very dam-

aging. At the same time, a questionarises: if the Mexican state strength-ens its offensive capabilities, it mayprovoke a reaction from the druggangs that can transform drug-related violence into a real threat to

governance in Mexico.The second option is the Mexican

state’s declaring total war on drugs,without having the institutions capa-ble of dealing with a virulentresponse of drug traffickers. This

option would work only if the Mexi-can government’s pressure forced

drugtraffickers to move to other ter-

ritories, as former attorney generalJorge Madrazo suggested in 1998.While this scenario is quite possible,and there is evidence that drug traf-ficking in the Caribbean hasincreased during recent years(Massing 2000), it is reasonable to

expect higher levels of violence inMexico if the option of total war is

implemented. If we look at the vol-umes of drugs produced or trans-

ported through Mexico, the limitedviolence that drug trafficking gener-ates in Mexico is quite surprising,compared to violence in other coun-tries affected by the same phenome-non, such as Colombia. One possibleexplanation is that the Mexican statehas purportedly maintained limitedlevels of confrontation with the druggangs to maintain low levels of vio-

lence.44

A third option is to maintain the

present antidrug strategy but do less.This option could be very attractivefor a government that is in the midst

of a political transition and needs

high levels of stability. However, U.S.pressures could make this option dif-ficult for the Fox administration,especially after the terrorist attacksin New York and Washington. In thiscontext, it is quite reasonable toexpect more pressures from Wash-

ington for security controls imple-mented by the Mexican government.

Finally, a fourth option is to modifyin a radicalway the present approachand, consequently, the presentcounterdrug strategy. That implieseither the decriminalization of drugconsumption or even the legalization




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of consumption, trafficking, and pro-duction of drugs. The option ofdecriminalization does not

appeara

good one for countries such as Mex-

ico, which are still mainly producersor transit countries. Decriminaliza-

tion would solve the problem of pros-ecuting millions of consumers incountries such as the United States,but it will not solve the challengesposed by drug traffickers in producerand transit countries. Legalizationwill clearly solve that problem, but itwill probably aggravate the problemof consumption, which explains, in

part, the United States’ reluctance totalk about this possibility. The factthat the U.S. government is opposedto both legalization and decriminal-ization nullifies these options, in

practical terms, for the next years. At the present time, the most via-

ble option is probably the first one: tomaintain the present strategy of

combating drugs while institutionsare strengthened. If the process ofinstitution building is successful, it ispossible to think of the second option,a total war, as viable to force drugtraffickers to move to other territo-

ries. Obviously, in this scenario, thesolution of the problem for Mexicowould mean a new problem for someother country.

CONCLUSIONS

Mexico’s war on drugs has beendetermined by an international

punitive regime constructed duringmany decades, U.S. pressures, theweakness of domestic law enforce-

ment institutions, and the drug car-tels’ tremendous ability to corrupt.

All these factors paint a very complex

panorama for the Mexican govern-

ment, with no margin for maneuver.Even

though drugsdo not

representa serious threat to Mexico in terms ofdomestic consumption or violence,the panorama gets darker when wetalk about corruption. The possibilitythat corruption affects the ability ofthe Mexican state to guarantee the

personal security of its citizens isvery high. It is quite possible that

drug-related corruption affects Mex-ico’s ability to guarantee nationaland international security in a con-text of terrorist threats to the West-

ern countries. In this perspective, itis feasible to expect strong U.S. pres-sures on the Mexican government to

strengthen its ability to combat orga-nized crime. This will probably leadto a closer collaboration between

both countries in security mattersthat will make the U.S. government

coresponsible for the failures andsuccesses of the Mexican war on

drugs. This collaboration will take

place in the context of a rapid eco-nomic and cultural integrationbetween both countries where there

is little room for the historical anti-

U.S. feelings. In the short run, it isdifficult to expect big achievementsin the combat of drugs. However, inthe long run, if the process of institu-tion building succeeds, drugs maybecome a health as well as a publicsecurity problem that does not chal-lenge Mexico’s governance. Mean-while, the Mexican state has to dealwith

this problemin

thebest

wayit

can.

Notes

1. The Economist mentioned the figure of$6 billion, quoting American drug czar Barry




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McCaffrey (Drugs in the Americas 1997, 44).However, Latin Trade magazine said that ac-

cording to U.S. and Mexican investigators, the

profitsof the

drugtrade laundered in Mexico

are between $10 billion and $15 billion peryear (Dirty laundry 1997).

2. In a press conference on 13 November

1997, Mexican Secretary of Foreign AffairsJosé Angel Gurría said that Mexico was spend-ing around $1 billion per year (see Vargas1997,5).

3. These criteria are based on the argu-ments used by the U.S. government to grantcertification every year.

4.

StanleyPimentel

suggestedthat there

have been arrangements between the state

and drug traffickers that can explain the lim-ited violence (see Pimentel 2000, 33-57).

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