Metaphysical realism

IntroductionThe broad definition of metaphysical realism would rest on two fundamental dimensions: existence and independence. Existence would be the claim that the world has intrinsic structures, which would have existed even if we had not. While independence could be related as the world and its features are as they are, not dependent on our beliefs, attitude and perceptions. As such, there is a world (reality) external to the mental or phenomenal realm of us (cognisors)1.

To understand the plausibility of a metaphysical reality, the essay will look into some stands of the metaphysical realists while addressing its limitations.

The 2 main arguments2 against the fundamental dimensions of metaphysical realism would be 1) To deny that anything exists at all and/ or 2) Even if things exist, neither their existence nor any of their features can be independent of the operations of a mind.

The first argument is inherently flawed. A view of non-existence is self-refuting in the sense that if one can claim nothing exists, then at the very least, the claim or belief must exist3.

As such, the main focus of argument against a metaphysical reality would concern the ontological status of things/entities (whether they can mind-independent), instead of their existence. For example, a metaphysical realist and anti-realist might agree that trees do exist but differ in their metaphysical import of such an existence.

Arguments and limitationsThe first instance of an independence nature of reality can be related to Plato’s concept of Forms which is considered to be the ideal archetypes or essences of everything that exist. Forms could also be seen as universals in which objects in our nature world exemplify or ‘participate’ in.

Universals are seen as repeatable or recurrent entities beyond the mind-dependent world that can be instantiated or exemplified by many particular things in our world. To have a mind-dependent reality or to have objects to interpret, there must exist an independent reality (universals) which we can relate our mind to, or to interpret from.

However, the definition of universals and the link between universals and reality faces several issues. A universal entity is caught between being divisible among all the places it is exemplified, or that it is indivisible but somehow present in multiple places at the same time. Furthermore, in trying to explain the relation of exemplification, an infinite regress arises4. The inherent problems of universals (definition and relation to reality) would show that it is not a sufficient condition to prove the existence of a mind-independent reality.

1 Ferralolo, William (2001). “Metaphysical Realism.” Diálogos 772 Smith, Deborah Colleen (1996). “Metaphysical realism and antirealism: an analysis of the contemporary debate.” Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington3 Lowe, E. Jonathan (2011). "Essentialism, Metaphysical Realism, and the Errors of Conceptualism."Philosophia Scientiae The Metaphysical Issue: 9-33.4 Donagan, Alan (1963). “Universals and Metaphysical Realism” Metaphysics Today The Monist, 47(2): 211-246

Another argument for a mind-independent reality could be summarised by John Nolt. In his argument for metaphysical realism, Nolt states the following 2 premises5:

1) The cosmos existed and had structure before we existed2) During some of this time, it was possible that we would never existFrom these premises it follows that1) The cosmos has structure that would have existed even if we never hadTherefore,2) The cosmos has structure that is independent of our cognition – i.e., intrinsic structure.

Nolt argues that it is evident the structure of cosmos is independent from human cognition as we knew that stars and evolving life had existed long before human beings, while human beings existence had hinged on a series of probable events (asteroid impact and various mutations). Since human nonexistence was physically possible, the cosmos and structure would have existed even if we did not. Effectively, cosmos existence could exist beyond/ independently of our existence and cognition.

However, a limitation to Nolt’s argument would be the interpretations of a distant past structured comos. An anti-realist would argue that the structure is actually a product of our current manipulative and interpretive activities. The structure of the comos, history and time is conceptually dependent on our cognition. Sense data of the cosmos, such as carbon-dating fossil records can only be understood in relation to history and time, which is cognitive dependent. As such, the universe does not exist independently of us in some objective expanse of time, but rather in an arrangement of sense data which is dependent on our cognitive understanding of time and space6.

In relation to Nolt’s argument, Smith states a common conflict between metaphysical realists and anti-realists.7

An argument often stated by realist such as Nolt would be that even if all minded individuals cease to exist, it would be intuitive to suppose entities and objects would continue to exist. This is problematic due to two presuppositions: Firstly, the intuition is based on the assumption that we are not mistaken by the genuine ontological status of mind independent entities that we pre-reflectively take to exist. Secondly, this assumption is further related to the assumption that we can succeed in making accurate references to independent entities.

These intuitions are based on beliefs that entities do exist. While beliefs are justified via knowledge that true ontological status exist and we have access to it. These two assumptions would require that we can acquire true knowledge within our current metaphysical state.

The anti-realist rebuttal could be summed by the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment whereby we could be brains kept in a vat and hooked up by a supercomputer which provides information about an external world to the vat. The brain-in-a-vat experiment could thus prove the point that the genuine ontological status of entities could be radically different and there is no way we can accurately refer to it.

Smith then goes on to state: ‘the truth of what I am or the truth about the way the world is impossible due to the fact that my mind’s constitution makes it impossible for me to acquire the relevant concepts’

5 Nolt, John (2004). "An Argument For Metaphysical Realism." Journal for General Philosophy of Science: 71-906 Nolt, John (2004). "An Argument For Metaphysical Realism." Journal for General Philosophy of Science: 71-907 Smith, Deborah Colleen (1996). “Metaphysical realism and antirealism: an analysis of the contemporary debate.” Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington

The synthesis from Smith brings out the importance of understanding the epistemic issues on a metaphysical reality. There would be no point in discussing a metaphysical reality if we do not understand its specifics, namely: 1) what is the ontological status of mind independent entities and 2) whether we can ever know it or make accurate references to these entities.

Scientific epistemology: issues of understanding a metaphysical reality

As the epistemology scope is indefinitely broad, the second part of my essay will assume that a mind-independent reality exist for simplicity. The essay also will focus mainly on the issues of scientific epistemology and whether it can bring to light what a metaphysical reality is.

The origins on the scepticism of whether scientific epistemology could be bring us knowledge of the world has been crystallised by Hume’s scepticism.

Hume has applied Descartes radical doubt to an empiricist framework whereby scientific knowledge is flawed as it is based on the belief that principles of universal causation and induction are true but there is no evidence to warrant the belief.

“I shall allow, if you please, that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other: I know, in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning. The connexion between these propositions is not intuitive.”

David Hume, from An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

Consider the statement, a fire can burn and hurt you. For someone who has not experienced putting his hands into flames, no amount of reasoning can provide justification for explaining the pain fire can cause. While, independently observing fire and pain does not allow one to discover whichever is the “cause” or “effect”. Therefore, understanding knowledge of the world via an empiricist framework of universal causation and induction is limited, since foundations of the belief is inherently flawed.

Immanuel Kant then reconciled the limitation by addressing the assumption which Hume had made – the passivity of a human mind. Instead Kant argues, the human mind is an active agent in constructing knowledge, using faculties of the mind to sort and organise the data from our sense experience. Universal causation and induction are part of the faculties of mind and an empiricist approach is viable towards understanding the world.

Kant would go on to state a transcendental idealist world which is essentially a metaphysical state that distinguishes between a world of appearances and a world of things in themselves. The world of appearance is constructed in the human mind via sensory matters that we receive passively and a prior forms that are supplied by our cognitive functions. However, this means we can only have a priori knowledge only about aspects of the sensible world that reflect the a priori forms supplied by our cognitive faculties. In Kant's words, “we can cognize of things a priori only what we ourselves have put into them”

Kant’s argument would be that even though a world of things exist (independent reality), we are limited by our a priori cognitive faculties to a world of appearances. Even though an empiricist approach could be relevant to understanding the world, the issue whether a scientific approach can be used to understand an independent reality or can only be limited to appearances, remains.

A contemporary version of the debate will be related to scientific realism.

Contemporary arguments and limitations

Scientific realism has many different definitions. It is generally a positive epistemic attitude towards the content of best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences. Observables relates to aspects of the world which we can perceive using unaided senses. For discussion purpose, we will assume that a scientific realist also hold the position that science aims to produce true description of things in the world (Independent reality), or approximately true description.

The two important propositions scientific realist would put forth would be the ‘miracle’ of science and its corroboration.

The ‘miracle’ of science8 states that the best of science theories can be seen to be true due to their astounding accuracy and intricate causal manipulations of relevant phenomena. That they are able to facilitate empirical predictions and explain subject matters of scientific investigation. This is further built on its sense of corroboration.

When an unobservable entity or property is putatively detected by by two or more different forms of detection such as the apparatuses employed and/or causal mechanisms and processes described, this may serve as an argument for realism. The fact that the same thing is revealed by distinct modes of detection suggests that it would be an extraordinary coincidence if the supposed target of these revelations did not exist. The greater the extent to which detections can be corroborated by different means, especially through theoretically independent means of detection, the stronger the argument for realism.

However, there are certain inherent limitations of scientific methodology that could lead to its biasness.

For example, the techniques of detection are often constructed and calibrated precisely with the intention of reproducing specific outputs9. Or they could be constructed based on certain scientific theories or within theory paradigms and thus could result in bias corroboration results.

While the inference to best explanation states that every theory has empirically equivalent rivals which could be determined by its explanatory superiority10 In order to judge that theory phenomenon explanatory superiority some criteria is used, on the basis of which the judgement is made. Criteria such as simplicity, consistency and coherence, scope and unity ….

However, the criteria brings across two issues. Firstly, what reason is there to think that a certain criteria is an indicator of truth? Thus, the ability to rank theories with respect to their likelihood of being true may be questioned. Secondly, theories usually come within a paradigm or as pools of theories. Even if criteria is reliable with respect to the truth, a true theory might still not be considered. One may simply, as van Fraassen notes11, end up with ‘the best of a bad lot’.

8 Brown, J. R., 1982, ‘The Miracle of Science’, Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 232–244.9 van Fraassen , B. C., 1985, ‘Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science’, in Churchland & Hooker (eds.), Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism, (with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen), Chicago: University of Chicago Press.10 Laudan, L., 1990, ‘Demystifying Underdetermination’, in C. W. Savage (ed.), Scientific Theories,Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 14, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.11 van Fraassen, B. C., 1989, Laws and Symmetry, Oxford: Clarendon.

Thomas Kuhn’s introduction of the ‘paradigm shift’ could sum up the issues scientific realism faces. Kuhn12 argued that periods of normal science, are punctuated by revolutions which lead scientific communities from one period of normal science into another.

Two different periods of normal science, he said, are “incommensurable” with one another, in such a way as to render the world importantly different after a revolution. Kuhn held that if two theories are incommensurable, they are not comparable in a way that would permit the judgement that one is epistemically superior to the other, because different periods of normal science are characterized by different ‘paradigms’

As a consequence, scientists in different periods of normal science generally employ different methods and standards, experience the world differently via “theory laden” perceptions, and most importantly, differ with respect to the very meanings of their terms.

A relation to neo-Kantian argument would be that paradigms function so as to create the reality of scientific phenomena, thereby allowing scientists to engage with this reality. To summarise, empirical reality has always been structured by scientific paradigms (techniques of detection, explanatory criteria …), and this violates the metaphysical commitment of realism to the existence of a mind-independent world.

That is to say, all logical rules and methodological values are part of the paradigm and cannot be used as evidence for it. While perception is always situated in and transformed by our paradigm or concepts. Hence we will be unable to find some rule of logic or scientific method that transcends all paradigms (independent reality) and can be defended outside of them.

Even though a scientific approach could be limited in finding a true reality, it still could be useful. Carnap argues we could retreat to an instrumentalist approach whereby scientific explanations of evidential consilience may be accepted without the explanations themselves being understood as true. He holds that our best theories likely do not correctly describe the natures of unobservable entities, but do successfully describe certain relations between them. Ontological questions “external” to the frameworks for knowledge represented by theories could then be meaningless. Framework choices could be made solely on pragmatic grounds, as long as things work within the existing paradigm, the metaphysical dimension of realism could be rejected.13

Conclusion

It seems that, with all aspects of knowledge being lensed via our cognition and perception, we could never be able to determine or find out what true reality is. An afterthought: If all of reality that is known to us comes through our mind and perception (such as words and thoughts), what about the origins of our mind?

12 Horwich, P. (ed.), 1993, World Changes: Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

13 Carnap, R., 1950, ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’, Revue Intérnationale de Philosophie, 4: 20–40. Reprinted in Carnap, R. 1956: Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantic and Modal Logic, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

In his argument, Lowe states14 that:

“How could it be that there is a fact of the matter as to our identities, and the identities of our words and thoughts, but not as to the identities of the mind-independent entities that we try to capture in language and thought? On the other hand, how could there not be any fact of the matter as to our identities and the identities of our words and thoughts?”

Lowe argues that ‘Identity’ means individual essence, which John Locke has characterized as ‘the very being of any thing, whereby it is, what it is’.

For our mind to come into existence, could there be some form of origin or essence or identity. Even though reality and concepts can be mind-dependent, the very being of the mind could come from some origin beyond the mind, some mind-independent existence (essence).

14 Lowe, E. Jonathan (2011). "Essentialism, Metaphysical Realism, and the Errors of Conceptualism."Philosophia Scientiae The Metaphysical Issue: 9-33.