Metaethics and ethical language

Metaethics and ethical language

Michael Lacewingenquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

Michael Lacewingenquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

Normative and metaethicsNormative and metaethics

Normative ethics: theories about what is right and what is good which we can use in practical cases

Metaethics: theories about the concepts of right and wrong, whether moral judgments can be objectively true

Our interest today is in how moral language works

Normative ethics: theories about what is right and what is good which we can use in practical cases

Metaethics: theories about the concepts of right and wrong, whether moral judgments can be objectively true

Our interest today is in how moral language works

Moore’s intuitionismMoore’s intuitionism

The open question argument: no other fact, e.g. greatest happiness, is the same as ‘good’ – goodness is irreducible to any other (natural) property We may meaningfully ask ‘Is doing what makes

people happy good?’ But ‘Is doing what makes people happy doing what

makes people happy?’ is not a genuine question.

The open question argument: no other fact, e.g. greatest happiness, is the same as ‘good’ – goodness is irreducible to any other (natural) property We may meaningfully ask ‘Is doing what makes

people happy good?’ But ‘Is doing what makes people happy doing what

makes people happy?’ is not a genuine question.

ObjectionObjection

They could be two different ways of thinking of the same thing. Water is H2O - ‘is water H2O?’ v. ‘is water water?’ Moore confuses concepts and properties - ‘good’ is a

distinct concept, but this doesn’t mean it is a distinct property

They could be two different ways of thinking of the same thing. Water is H2O - ‘is water H2O?’ v. ‘is water water?’ Moore confuses concepts and properties - ‘good’ is a

distinct concept, but this doesn’t mean it is a distinct property

Moral ‘intuition’Moral ‘intuition’

How do we know about ‘good’ and ‘right’? Intuition - this is not a type of sensory mode, but a use of reason

Self-evident judgment No other evidence or proof than its own plausibility Controversial, but difficult to do without, e.g when

giving reasons Alternative: coherence between judgments

How do we know about ‘good’ and ‘right’? Intuition - this is not a type of sensory mode, but a use of reason

Self-evident judgment No other evidence or proof than its own plausibility Controversial, but difficult to do without, e.g when

giving reasons Alternative: coherence between judgments

Facts and valuesFacts and values

Intuitionism claims there are ‘facts’ about values But when we disagree about facts, we know how

to resolve the disagreement; disagreements about values seem very different

There is a ‘gap’ between claims about what is and claims about what ought to be (Hume)

Claims about values motivate us, claims about facts do not

Intuitionism claims there are ‘facts’ about values But when we disagree about facts, we know how

to resolve the disagreement; disagreements about values seem very different

There is a ‘gap’ between claims about what is and claims about what ought to be (Hume)

Claims about values motivate us, claims about facts do not

Ayer’s Verification PrincipleAyer’s Verification Principle

Ayer: in order to be literally meaningful, a statement must either be analytic (true or false in virtue of the definition of the words); or empirically verifiable (shown be experience to be true).

Because statements about values are neither analytic nor empirically verifiable, they are not literally meaningful

‘If I say to someone, “You acted wrongly in stealing that money”…I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had said, “You stole that money,” in a peculiar tone of horror’

Ayer: in order to be literally meaningful, a statement must either be analytic (true or false in virtue of the definition of the words); or empirically verifiable (shown be experience to be true).

Because statements about values are neither analytic nor empirically verifiable, they are not literally meaningful

‘If I say to someone, “You acted wrongly in stealing that money”…I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had said, “You stole that money,” in a peculiar tone of horror’

Developing emotivismDeveloping emotivism

The big objection: by its own standard, VP is not meaningful.

Stevenson: the point about ethics stands - moral use of words expresses emotion or tries to arouse it in others, it doesn’t state a fact

Objection: there can be no rational moral argument on this view There can be argument about the facts There can be a ‘disagreement in attitude’, i.e. about

how to live

The big objection: by its own standard, VP is not meaningful.

Stevenson: the point about ethics stands - moral use of words expresses emotion or tries to arouse it in others, it doesn’t state a fact

Objection: there can be no rational moral argument on this view There can be argument about the facts There can be a ‘disagreement in attitude’, i.e. about

how to live

Hare’s prescriptivismHare’s prescriptivism

Moral words are not emotive, but prescriptive ‘Right’ commands, ‘good’ commends ‘Good’ is always relative to a set of standards -

good teacher, good chocolate The standard provides a descriptive meaning

(not any chocolate can count as good) You can agree the example meets the standard

without caring about the standard, i.e. you don’t have to prescribe it

Moral words are not emotive, but prescriptive ‘Right’ commands, ‘good’ commends ‘Good’ is always relative to a set of standards -

good teacher, good chocolate The standard provides a descriptive meaning

(not any chocolate can count as good) You can agree the example meets the standard

without caring about the standard, i.e. you don’t have to prescribe it

UniversalizationUniversalization

You can prescribe whatever you choose, but you are rationally constrained by consistency - if x is good but y is not, there must be some relevant difference between them If I think your stealing from me is wrong, but my

stealing from you is not, I must say what the difference is

Universalization allows greater rationality - we can argue about relevance and consistency

You can prescribe whatever you choose, but you are rationally constrained by consistency - if x is good but y is not, there must be some relevant difference between them If I think your stealing from me is wrong, but my

stealing from you is not, I must say what the difference is

Universalization allows greater rationality - we can argue about relevance and consistency

Two objectionsTwo objections

Emotivism and prescriptivism make values subjective - so couldn’t we value anything we chose to? But this makes no sense - morality is not about just anything There is no logical constraint on what we can

value, but because of the type of creatures we are, there is a factual constraint

Emotivism and prescriptivism make values subjective - so couldn’t we value anything we chose to? But this makes no sense - morality is not about just anything There is no logical constraint on what we can

value, but because of the type of creatures we are, there is a factual constraint

Two objectionsTwo objections

Is morality no more than ‘taste’? We think it has greater importance and authority Our moral feelings matter more than others

We shouldn’t say that there are no moral values - this is itself an expression of feeling/prescription, and one we disapprove of

Is morality no more than ‘taste’? We think it has greater importance and authority Our moral feelings matter more than others

We shouldn’t say that there are no moral values - this is itself an expression of feeling/prescription, and one we disapprove of