BRIEF REPORT

Metacognitive Beliefs and Rumination: A Longitudinal Study

Friederike Weber • Cornelia Exner

� Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Abstract High prevalence and costs of depression

underline the importance of understanding and treating

vulnerability factors of depression such as rumination.

Given the role of rumination in predicting the onset of new

depressive episodes, it is important to learn why previously

healthy people start to ruminate. One explanation is pro-

vided by the metacognitive model of depression, which

assumes that positive beliefs about rumination initiate

rumination. However previous research has been predom-

inantly cross-sectional in nature. We investigated the effect

of positive beliefs about rumination on engagement in

rumination in a longitudinal design and tested the indirect

effect of positive beliefs about rumination on depressive

symptoms in 60 healthy university students. A hierarchical

regression revealed a significant effect of Time 1 (T1)

positive beliefs about rumination on Time 2 rumination,

even after controlling for T1 rumination. Additionally, an

indirect effect of positive beliefs about rumination on

depressive symptoms via rumination was confirmed using a

multiple regression and a Sobel test.

Keywords Rumination � Metacognitive beliefs �Longitudinal study � Mediation

Introduction

High costs and prevalence of depression (Wittchen et al.

2011) highlight the importance of understanding and

treating vulnerability factors of depression such as rumi-

nation. Evidence linking rumination to negative mood

comes from experimental (Huffziger and Kuehner 2009;

Lyubomirsky et al. 2003) and longitudinal studies (Huff-

ziger et al. 2009; Nolen-Hoeksema 2000), clearly under-

lining a causal role of rumination in prolonging and

amplifying negative mood. In a longitudinal study by

Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) rumination predicted the new

onset of depression after a retest interval of 1 year; even

after controlling for Time 1 (T1) level of depressive

symptoms. However in the subgroup of depressed partici-

pants, rumination was not a significant predictor of diag-

nostic status at Time 2 (T2) after controlling for T1 level of

depressive symptoms. Huffziger et al. (2009) yielded

similar results. Thus rumination is consistently shown to be

a risk factor for developing depression, but seems to be a

less valuable predictor of the chronicity of depression.

Given these indications of a causal relationship between

rumination and the new onset of depression, it is important to

learn, why formerly healthy people start to engage in rumi-

nation. In their metacognitive model Wells and Matthews

(1996) propose that the process of thinking is controlled and

driven by metacognitive beliefs about the usefulness of

certain strategies or the dangers of others. This general model

was specified for depression (Wells 2000). Here Wells pro-

poses that positive beliefs about rumination (i.e., regarding

rumination a useful coping strategy) initiate actual rumina-

tion. In turn negative beliefs about rumination, relating to the

dangers and uncontrollability of rumination, mediate the

relationship between rumination and depression (Papa-

georgiou and Wells 2001). Notably, Wells and Nolen-

Hoeksema have a slightly different understanding of rumi-

nation. While Nolen-Hoeksema restricts this term to

depressive rumination only, Wells subsumes all kinds of

repetitive thinking under rumination.

F. Weber (&) � C. Exner

Department of Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy,

Institute of Psychology, University of Leipzig,

Neumarkt 9-19, 04109 Leipzig, Germany

e-mail: fweber@uni-leipzig.de; friederike.weber@uni-leipzig.de

123

Cogn Ther Res

DOI 10.1007/s10608-013-9555-y

The metacognitive model of depression is supported by

several predominantly cross-sectional studies. Results of

two cross-sectional studies, one in a healthy and one in a

depressed sample, fitted the model (Papageorgiou and

Wells 2003; Roelofs et al. 2010). In both studies positive

beliefs about rumination were related to rumination; the

relationship between rumination and depressive symptoms

was partially mediated by negative beliefs about rumina-

tion. In conclusion these studies show an effect of positive

beliefs about rumination on rumination and suggest a

mediating effect of rumination on depressive symptoms.

Yilmaz et al. (2011) found that metacognitive beliefs

measured at T1 predict depressive symptoms 6 month later

in a healthy sample, even after controlling for stressful life

events. Furthermore, results of a longitudinal study by

Papageorgiou and Wells (2009) support the predictive

value of negative metacognitive beliefs for depressive

symptoms, even after controlling for initial levels of

depression and rumination. However, Yilmaz et al. (2011)

neither measured metacognitive beliefs specific to depres-

sion nor rumination while Papageorgiou and Wells (2009)

included only negative beliefs about rumination in their

analysis. Therefore, the link between positive beliefs about

rumination and actual engagement in rumination is mainly

grounded on cross-sectional data yet.

On top of that, the indirect effect of positive beliefs on

depressive symptoms via rumination as suggested by the

metacognitive model has not been tested by prospective

studies so far.

The current study thus aimed to test (1) positive beliefs

about rumination as a prospective predictor of rumination

and (2) the indirect effect of positive beliefs about rumi-

nation on later depressive symptoms via rumination. Since

we were interested in the mechanisms involved in the

development of depression free of confounding effects due

to negative experiences and strategies obtained during

former depressive episodes, a non-clinical sample was

investigated.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Sixty graduate and undergraduate university students (15

males, 45 females) participated in this study. Mean age of

the sample was 22.2 years (SD = 3.6, range 18–34 years).

All participants were native German speakers or completed

at least 5 years of school education in Germany. Following

a complete description of the study, participants gave their

written informed consent. Afterwards individuals were

asked to complete a set of questionnaires on an online

platform at home. Two month after the first measurement

participants were sent an e-mail containing the link for the

second measurement. All participants completed both

surveys, there was no attrition. Individuals were compen-

sated for participation by class credit and the opportunity to

win a gift certificate for a book shop (three individuals of

the total sample) in a lottery. The study design was

approved by the local ethics committee.

Measures

The German version (Wimmer 2010) of the positive beliefs

about rumination scale (PBRS) (Watkins and Moulds

2005) was used to assess positive metacognitive beliefs

about rumination. This 6-item scale assesses the necessity

and usefulness of rumination. Watkins and Moulds modi-

fied the original PBRS by omitting the terms depression

and rumination from the original scale to prevent criterion

overlap. Respondents indicate on a scale from 1 (don’t

agree) to 4 (agree strongly) how much they endorse each

statement.

The German version of the rumination response scale

(RSQ) (Kuehner et al. 2007) is a 32-item questionnaire,

derived from the Response Style Questionnaire (Nolen-

Hoeksema and Morrow 1991) that measures coping styles

in response to depressive symptoms. The instrument dif-

ferentiates between rumination and distraction in response

to depressive symptoms. Respondents are asked to indicate

how frequently they use each described coping style, from

almost never (1) to almost always (4).

The self-rated severity of depressive symptoms was

assessed with the German version (Hautzinger et al. 2006) of

the Beck depression scale-II (BDI-II) (Beck et al. 1996).

Respondents indicate on a scale from 0 to 3 how pronounced

each of 21 symptoms was during the past 2 weeks.

Statistical Analysis

The statistical analysis was run using the statistical package

for social sciences (SPSS version 20). We conducted a

multiple hierarchical regression with T2 rumination as

dependent variable and T1 rumination and PBRS as inde-

pendent variables. T1 rumination was entered in the first

step to control for baseline levels. T1 PBRS was entered in

the second step. According to our hypothesis, we expected

PBRS to explain additional variance after controlling for

T1 rumination in the first step.

The mediation hypothesis was tested via three consec-

utive multiple regressions, a heuristic procedure suggested

by Baron and Kenny (1986). Specifically, we expected T2

rumination to mediate the relationship between T1 PBRS

and T2 depressive symptoms (see Fig. 1). Causal ordering

in this model was established a priori through time of

measurement.

Cogn Ther Res

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To provide a more direct test of the indirect effect

(defined as the product of the a and b path), a Sobel test

was conducted. However, because the Sobel tests

assumption of normal sampling distribution of ab is often

violated, the use of nonparametric bootstrapping method is

recommended (Preacher and Hayes 2004). Thus, the heu-

ristic procedure of Baron and Kenny (1986) was followed

by a Sobel test as described by Preacher and Hayes (2004).

Results

Our first a priori hypothesis was that T1 PBRS would

predict T2 rumination even after controlling for T1 rumi-

nation in step 1. The hypothesis was evaluated in a hier-

archical multiple regression with T2 rumination as the

dependent variable. After controlling for T1 rumination in

the first step (R2 = .59, F(1, 58) = 85.65, p \ .001), T1

PBRS explained additional variance in step 2

(Rchange2 = .06, Fchange(1, 57) = 10.01, p = .002). Table 1

displays results of this analysis after each step.

Our second a priori hypothesis was that T2 rumination

mediates the relationship between T1 PBRS and T2

depressive symptoms. This hypothesis was tested through a

three-variable path model. T2 rumination was entered into

the model as the hypothesized mediator. We first followed

the heuristic procedure described by Baron and Kenny. All

conditions of the mediation model were met: b coefficients

and significance levels are displayed in Fig. 1. In the direct

model T1 PBRS affected T2 depressive symptoms

(b = .31, p = .016) significantly. T1 PBRS also influenced

the hypothesized mediator T2 rumination significantly

(b = .61, p \ .001). In the indirect model (multiple

regression equation) T2 rumination still had a significant

effect on depressive symptoms (b = .38, p = .016), but

the influence of T1 PBRS was reduced in absolute size and

dropped below statistical significance (b = .08, p = .605).

Direct statistical testing of the indirect effect of X on Y

through M revealed a significant indirect effect (critical

value M. = .417, S.E. = .181, 95 % CI .109–.850). Thus,

the influence of T1 PBRS on T2 depressive symptoms is

mediated through the level of T2 rumination.

Discussion

The current study aimed to examine positive beliefs about

rumination as a prospective predictor of rumination and to

test the indirect effect of positive beliefs about rumination

on depressive symptoms.

Time 1 positive beliefs about rumination explained

significantly additional variance after controlling for T1

rumination in a hierarchical multiple regression with T2

rumination as the dependent variable. These results are

consistent with a causal role of positive beliefs about

rumination in the initiation of rumination and thus with the

metacognitive model of depression (Papageorgiou and

Wells 2001). In fact our findings extend previous research

which supported a positive relationship between positive

beliefs about rumination and engagement in rumination,

but were cross-sectional in nature (Papageorgiou and Wells

2003; Roelofs et al. 2010). Recently Yilmaz et al. (2011)

verified the predictive value of metacognitive beliefs for

depressive symptoms. However, our study provides more

detailed information by measuring metacognitive beliefs

specific to rumination and depression.

In addition, we tested the mediation hypothesis through

three consecutive regressions, according to the heuristic

procedure suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986). After-

wards the indirect effect of positive beliefs about rumina-

tion on depressive symptoms was tested directly through a

Sobel test using a nonparametric bootstrapping procedure

as described by Preacher and Hayes (2004). These analyses

confirmed a significant indirect effect of T1 positive beliefs

Fig. 1 Illustration of the indirect, mediated model. X (T1 PBRS)

affects Y (T2 BDI) through the mediator M (T2 RSQ). We report

standard b coefficients (ranging between 0 and 1). *p \ .05;

**p \ .001 (two-tailed)

Table 1 Statistics for the regression equations with T2 rumination

regressed on PBRS after controlling for T1 rumination

Correlation between variables

T2 rumination T1 rumination T1 PBRS

T2 rumination –

T1 rumination .77** –

T1 PBRS .61** .52** –

T2 rumination regressed on T1 rumination and T1 PBRS

Variables b t df Fchange R2

Step 1: control variable

T1 rumination .77 6.86** 1, 58 85.65 .59

Step 2: main effect

T1 PBRS .29 3.16* 1, 57 10.01 .64

PBRS positive beliefs about rumination scale

* p \ .05; ** p \ .001 (two-tailed)

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about rumination on T2 depressive symptoms via T2

rumination. Our findings are in line with previous research.

Both Papageorgiou and Wells (2003) and Roelofs et al.

(2010) showed a positive relationship between positive

beliefs about rumination and rumination, which was in turn

linked to depressive symptoms. Yet since neither tested the

mediation formally, our study provides here valuable

additional information.

In brief, according to our results positive beliefs about

rumination might be one factor causing people to select

rumination as a coping strategy—which in turn will

increase the risk of negative mood. Furthermore our results

provide support for an indirect effect of positive beliefs on

depressive symptoms via rumination. Both findings are in

line with the metacognitive model of depression. The

observed influence of positive beliefs about rumination on

engagement in rumination tentatively suggests that rumi-

nation is a volitional strategy for self-regulation. If this

holds true, then negative mood and rumination might be

reducible by correcting these dysfunctional positive beliefs

about the usefulness of rumination. However, in the present

study we tested only part of the metacognitive model,

omitting negative beliefs about rumination. A longitudinal

study by Papageorgiou and Wells (2009) indicates that

negative metacognitive beliefs are relevant in predicting

depressive symptoms, even after controlling for rumina-

tion. Moreover, other cross-sectional studies demonstrate a

mediation effect of negative metacognitive beliefs for the

relationship between rumination and depressive symptoms

(Papageorgiou and Wells 2003; Roelofs et al. 2010). Thus,

the present study tested a specific pathway and not the full

model. Further studies should investigate the relationship

between positive and negative metacognitive beliefs,

rumination and depression in a longitudinal design.

Further limitations of our study have to be considered,

for example the short retest interval. Nevertheless we

controlled for T1 rumination, thus yielding essentially

change scores. Positive beliefs about rumination were a

significant predictor of this change in rumination. Still

further evaluations with longer retest intervals are neces-

sary. Secondly one might criticize that we investigated a

non-clinical sample. However, we were interested in the

mechanisms involved in the development of depression

without the confounding effects of negative experiences

and strategies obtained during former depressive episodes.

In addition rumination seems to be a more valuable pre-

dictor of the new onset of depression than of the chronicity

of depression (Huffziger et al. 2009). Yet it is questionable

if a heightened level of depressive symptoms is comparable

to the diagnosis of depression.

Nevertheless, based on a cross-sectional study in a

depressed sample demonstrating a positive relationship

between positive beliefs about rumination and rumination,

which was in turn associated with depressive symptoms

(Roelofs et al. 2010), similar results would be expected in a

clinical sample.

Overall, given that metacognitive beliefs about rumi-

nation partially drive the choice of dysfunctional coping

strategies and considering the negative effect of rumination

on mood, our results support the rational for targeting

metacognitive beliefs in the psychotherapy of depression.

Acknowledgments We thank all participants and Sissy Peisselt and

Franziska Wilke for their help with the data collection.

Conflict of interest Friederike Weber and Cornelia Exner report no

conflict of interest.

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