Meta-ethicsMeta-ethics

Meta-ethical Questions:Meta-ethical Questions:What does it mean to be good/bad?What does it mean to be good/bad?What constitutes the nature of being What constitutes the nature of being good or bad? good or bad?

Cognitivism: The view that ethical Cognitivism: The view that ethical statements have a truth value.statements have a truth value.

Non-cognitivism: the view that ethical Non-cognitivism: the view that ethical statements do not have a truth valuestatements do not have a truth value

A statement has a truth value if it is either A statement has a truth value if it is either true or false. true or false.

ExamplesExamples

Questions, exclamations, commandsQuestions, exclamations, commands

Each of these types of sentences does not Each of these types of sentences does not have a truth valuehave a truth value

Non-cognitivists hold that ethical statements Non-cognitivists hold that ethical statements are like these—they look like descriptions are like these—they look like descriptions but they are really not.but they are really not.

Example: “pleasure is good” = “pleasure! Example: “pleasure is good” = “pleasure! Goody!”Goody!”

Types of cognitivismTypes of cognitivism

Subjective descriptivism: moral statements Subjective descriptivism: moral statements describe the psychological state of the describe the psychological state of the person making the judgment.person making the judgment. moral relativism: moral statements moral relativism: moral statements describe the attitudes of the society or describe the attitudes of the society or culture the person making the statement is culture the person making the statement is in.in.Divine command theory: Moral statements Divine command theory: Moral statements describe the attitudes of a deitydescribe the attitudes of a deity

An argument subjective An argument subjective descriptivismdescriptivism

If SD is correct then sincere moral judgments If SD is correct then sincere moral judgments can never be wrong. No one can really disagree can never be wrong. No one can really disagree with anyone else about ethics.with anyone else about ethics.

If Sally and Beth are arguing about abortion, and If Sally and Beth are arguing about abortion, and both are sincere, then they are BOTH saying both are sincere, then they are BOTH saying true things when one says “abortion is morally true things when one says “abortion is morally permissible” and the other says “abortion is not permissible” and the other says “abortion is not morally permissible.”morally permissible.”

ResponseResponse

Perhaps moral disagreements are not Perhaps moral disagreements are not really about people having contradictory really about people having contradictory beliefs, but about people having conflicting beliefs, but about people having conflicting desires.desires.If Sally thinks abortion ought to legal, she If Sally thinks abortion ought to legal, she desires that abortion be legal. If Beth desires that abortion be legal. If Beth thinks abortion should not be legal, she thinks abortion should not be legal, she desires that abortion be outlawed. Both of desires that abortion be outlawed. Both of these desires cannot be fullfilled. these desires cannot be fullfilled.

Another argumentAnother argument

If SD is true, then when Hitler says “we If SD is true, then when Hitler says “we ought to exterminate the Jews” he is ought to exterminate the Jews” he is saying something true.saying something true.

But that is absurd. But that is absurd.

Therefore, SD is false.Therefore, SD is false.

An argument against Divine An argument against Divine Command theoryCommand theory

If divine command theory is true, then “x is If divine command theory is true, then “x is good” means “God approves of x” good” means “God approves of x”

There is nothing in the theory that limits There is nothing in the theory that limits what God can approve of.what God can approve of.

Therefore, if God approves of torturing Therefore, if God approves of torturing babies for the fun of it, it is good to torture babies for the fun of it, it is good to torture babies for the fun of it.babies for the fun of it.

But this is absurd. So DC. Is falseBut this is absurd. So DC. Is false

ObjectivismObjectivism

Objectivism is the view that moral Objectivism is the view that moral statements have a truth value and the statements have a truth value and the truth value does not depend on truth value does not depend on psychological states of individuals or psychological states of individuals or groups or even God.groups or even God.

If objectivism is true, “pleasure is good” If objectivism is true, “pleasure is good” would, if true, describe something about would, if true, describe something about the nature of pleasure itself. the nature of pleasure itself.

The argument from disagreementThe argument from disagreement

People often disagree about what is the People often disagree about what is the right thing to do. Different cultures also right thing to do. Different cultures also seem to have different standards about seem to have different standards about what is right or wrong.what is right or wrong.

Therefore, it is reasonable to think that Therefore, it is reasonable to think that there is no objective standard of what is there is no objective standard of what is right or wrongright or wrong

ResponsesResponses

It is illegitimate to infer from “people disagree It is illegitimate to infer from “people disagree about x” to “there is no fact about x”about x” to “there is no fact about x”

Compare: People disagree about whether God Compare: People disagree about whether God exists. Therefore there is no fact of the matter exists. Therefore there is no fact of the matter whether God exists or notwhether God exists or not

It may be that the differences are not as great as It may be that the differences are not as great as they seem when it comes to ultimate values: the they seem when it comes to ultimate values: the badness of suffering, the goodness of friendship, badness of suffering, the goodness of friendship, etc. etc.

The argument from queernessThe argument from queerness

Objective moral qualities would be Objective moral qualities would be “qualities or relations of a very strange “qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe” the universe”

These properties would require “some These properties would require “some special faculty of moral perception or special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else” ways of knowing everything else”

How are moral qualities strange?How are moral qualities strange?

Objective moral qualities would be action Objective moral qualities would be action directing. If you know x is good you would have directing. If you know x is good you would have a motive or reason to do x” But Mackie thinks a motive or reason to do x” But Mackie thinks there are no objective qualities that in there are no objective qualities that in themselves motivate behavior.themselves motivate behavior.

Objective moral qualities are also strange in that Objective moral qualities are also strange in that they are not perceived by the senses and are they are not perceived by the senses and are not part of the scientific description of the worldnot part of the scientific description of the world

Responses to MackieResponses to Mackie

What is wrong with supposing that some What is wrong with supposing that some qualities can move a person to act? Does qualities can move a person to act? Does not the apprehension of pain, for example, not the apprehension of pain, for example, in itself move a person to avoid the in itself move a person to avoid the painful?painful?

There are many objective facts that are There are many objective facts that are also “queer” in Mackie’s sense: also “queer” in Mackie’s sense: mathematics and logic, for example.mathematics and logic, for example.