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THEPARADOXOFNATURE:MERLEAUPONTYSSEMINATURALISTICCRITIQUEOFHUSSERLIANPHENOMENOLOGY
by
ShazadAkhtar,B.A.,M.A.
ADissertationsubmittedtotheFacultyoftheGraduate
School,MarquetteUniversity,inPartialFulfillmentoftheRequirementsfortheDegreeofDoctorofPhilosophy
Milwaukee,Wisconsin
December2010
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ABSTRACT
THEPARADOXOFNATURE:MERLEAUPONTYSSEMINATURALISTICCRITIQUEOFHUSSERLIANPHENOMENOLOGY
ShazadAkhtar,B.A.,M.A.
MarquetteUniversity,2010ThisdissertationdealswithMerleauPontyscriticaltransformationofHusserlsphenomenologythrougharethinkingoftheconceptofnature,whichHusserl,MerleauPontyargues,failstointegrateorexplainsuccessfullyinhisphilosophicalsystem.ThefirstchapterreconstructsHusserlstranscendentalphenomenologicalprojectinIdeasI,whilethesecondwidenstheinvestigationtocovertheontologicallycenteredIdeasIIandIII.Inmythirdchapter,IchartwhatIcallMerleauPontysorganicappropriationofHusserlandtheuniquehermeneuticalchallengesitposes.HeretheambiguityofIdeasII,whichbothgroundssubjectivity
inthelivedbodyandseparatesnaturefromspirit(Geist),playsacrucialrole.ThefourthchapterconcentratesontheMerleauPontyslatermeditationsontheontologyofnatureandsubjectivity,particularlyinhisrecentlytranslatedNaturelecturesof195961.Finally,thefifthchaptercomparesandcontrastsHusserlandMerleauPonty,intermsofbothsubstanceandmethod,throughadetailedexaminationoftheirdifferentnotionsof(andwaystoaddress)paradox.IshowhowMerleauPontysparadoxicalthinkingstemsnotfromchanceormeretemperamentbutafundamental,systematiccommitmenttotheselfcontradictory(ordialectical,butinamodifiedsense)natureofbeingandtruththemselves.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ShazadAkhtar,B.A.,M.A. Iowetheconceptionandfruitionofthisprojectabovealltomydirector,Pol
Vandevelde.ItisinhisclassesthatIfirstawakenedtotheimportanceof
phenomenologyandthepowerofitsmethod.Hehastaughtmethetextsandstyles
ofHusserl,Heidegger,MerleauPonty,andmanyotherfigureswhohaveinfluenced
myphilosophicalthinkingandresearchdecisively.Ihavelearnedtremendously
fromlengthydiscussionsoverbothhisownandotherauthorsoriginalworks.Ifthis
dissertationissuccessfulinanysmallmeasure,thisisowingsubstantiallytothe
guidanceandinfluenceofDr.Vandevelde.
Ihavealsomysecondreader,Dr.SebastianLuft,tothankprofuselyforhis
energeticandgenerousaidtomeovertheyearsandinthecompletionofthe
presentproject.IhavebenefittedgreatlyfrommyyearslongconversationswithDr.
LuftonmanytopicsrangingfromphenomenologytoHegelianidealismandmuch
more.Hisfriendship,availability,andcuttingedgescholarshiphavebeenvery
valuabletomeinmyacademicdevelopment.
Inaddition,IwouldalsoliketotaketheopportunitytosincerelythankDr.
AndyTallonandDr.StephenWatsonofNotreDamefortheirencouragementand
suggestionsduringmywritingprocess.
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ImustaddthatIwasgreatlyaidedincompletingthisdissertationinatimely
mannerbytheMarquetteGraduateSchoolanditsgenerousfinancialsupport,
throughtheRaynorFellowship,throughthe20092010academicyear.Iamalso
deeplygratefultotheMarquettePhilosophydepartmentforhavingnominatedme
fortheawardand,moregenerally,forhavinggivenmeafirstclassphilosophical
educationthatIwilltakewithmeandbuildupon,Iamsure,fortherestofmylife.
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TABLEOFCONTENTSACKNOWLEDGMENTS..................................................................................................................iINTRODUCTION..1I.PresentStatusoftheProblem
A.MerleauPontysInterpretationofHusserlandHusserlsConceptionofNature..4
B.MerleauPontysLaterOntologyandConceptofNature..6C.IdeasIandII7
II.SummaryoftheDissertation
A.ChaptersOneandTwo...8
B.ChaptersThreeandFour...11C.ChapterFive...15
III.Conclusion.17CHAPTERONE:HUSSERLSTRANSCENDENTALPHENOMENOLOGYINIDEASI:THEBASICPOSITION...19
I.Introduction:IdeasIandtheProjectofTranscendentalPhenomenology...19II.EpochandPhenomenologicalReduction
A.Introduction..24B.TheNaturalandtheTranscendentalAttitudes26
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C.PhenomenologicalEpoch.32D.PhenomenologicalTranscendentalReduction(s)34
E.AnInterlude:OntheMotivationoftheReduction.38III.EssencesandtheEideticReduction..40
A.Intentionality,NoesisandNoema,andTranscendence.43B.TheEideticDistinctionbetweenMentalandPhysical49C.TheChargeofDualism52D.AbsoluteandRelativeExistenceandtheWorldAnnihilation
Experiment..55E.HusserlsFinalPosition:TranscendentalIdealism60
IV.ConcludingReflections..65CHAPTERTWO:THECONSTITUTIONOFNATURE,BODY,ANDSPIRITINHUSSERLSIDEASII73
I.Introduction79II.TheOntologicalMatrixofIdeasII/III
A.Introduction..79B.TheConstitutionofWorldlyReality
1.MaterialNature822.AnimalNature,ortheBodyandSoul85
3.Ego...914.Spirit...93
III.Analysis:PhilosophicalDifficultiesofIdeasII/III
A.Introduction:PhenomenologicalMonism,OntologicalDualism..99
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B.HusserlsNaturalism.102C.ThePriorityThesis.108
D.SpiritandConsciousness110E.TheQuestionoftheBody114
IV.Conclusion..118CHAPTERTHREE:MERLEAUPONTYSORGANICAPPROPRIATIONOFHUSSERLIANPHENOMENOLOGY
I.Introduction.122II.MerleauPontysRelationshiptoHusserl:AnDoxographicalOverviewandCritique
A.Introduction127B.TheStrongView:Zahavi,Smith,andBarbaras.129C.WeakandMixedViews:Lefort,Richir,Madison,etal.130
D.FourWeakReadings:Embree,Behnke,Seebohm,Bergo...133E.ConcludingThoughts.140
III.MerleauPontysHusserlianPhenomenology:ByText
A.Introduction141B.HusserlinPP..143C.HusserlinMerleauPontysLaterWork146
IV.MerleauPontysHusserlianPhenomenology:ByTheme
A.ThePhenomenologicalReduction152B.EssencesandtheEideticReduction.158
V.ConcludingReflections.161
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CHAPTERFOUR:MERLEAUPONTYSMATUREONTOLOGYOFNATUREI.Introduction.166
II.NatureandtheOntologyoftheNatureLecturesA.Introduction:TheNatureLectures,TheVisibleandtheInvisible,andtheProjectofOntology..168B.DefiningNature174C.NatureandtheSciencesofLife...181
III.TheNatureLecturesandTheVisibleandtheInvisible:TowardsaNewDialecticalOntoPhenomenology
A.Introduction190B.Reversibility191C.Flesh.196D.IdentityandDifference,theOneandtheMany:DimensionsofMerleauPontysDialectic.200
IV.Conclusion..205
CHAPTERFIVE:MERLEAUPONTYANDHUSSERLONTHEQUESTIONOFTHEPARADOXOFSUBJECTIVITYANDNATUREI.Introduction.....207II.MerleauPontysPhilosophyofParadox
A.OverviewofMereauPontysReferencestoParadox....211
B.ParadoxandthePerceptualFaith.217C.ParadoxandPhilosophy..220
III.HusserlandParadox221IV.TheParadoxofReflection
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A.TheReflectiveAttitude225B.HyperReflection.229
V.MerleauPontysParadoxicalThinkingInRelationtoOtherStylesofThinking:Dialectic,Skepticism/Quietism,andMysticismA.MerleauPontyandHegelianDialectic...234B.MerleauPontyandSkepticism/Quietism237C.MerleauPontyandMysticism.240
VI.Conclusion.244
CONCLUSION
I.MerleauPontyvisvisHusserl.....247
II.MerleauPontyandSomeOtherPhilosophers..251
III.ThePersonalisticAttitudeandtheLimitsofReflection253
IV.PhenomenologyasParadox254
V.Naturalism...255
BIBLIOGRAPHYI.PrimaryLiterature(HusserlandMerleauPonty)
A.Husserl...257
B.MerleauPonty...258II.SecondaryLiteratureandOtherWorks
A.BooksandMonographs...259
B.Articles,BookChapters,andVolumeIntroductions..262
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C.Miscellaneous.268
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1
Introduction
Thecentraldynamicofthisdissertationisthecreativeencounterbetween
MauriceMerleauPonty(19081961)andEdmundHusserl(18591938),twoofthe
mostimportantphilosophersofthetwentiethcentury.Iexplorethisencounteran
encounterbetweentwophilosophiesasopposedtotwophilosophers,asthetwo
thinkershadneverformallymetandareseparatedbymorethanageneration
withrespectprincipallytotheontologicalissuessurroundingtheclassicaldivision
ofnatureandspirit.Butinthecaseofphenomenology,ontologicaland
epistemologicalissuescannotbecleanlyseparated.Thusmajorquestionsof
epistemologicalsignificance,suchasthoseofidealismandthenatureofreflection,
arealsoaddressedandrelatedtothequestionofwhatitmeanstodo
phenomenologyandevenphilosophyitself.Phenomenology,ontology,
epistemologyallofthesetermsarenegotiatedandrenegotiatedinthecourseof
MerleauPontyssustainedhermeneuticsofHusserlswork,ahermeneuticsthat
opensupontoahiddenworldofpossibilitieslatentinthe(ostensibly)simple
phenomenaofsensing,seeing,speaking,andreflecting.
MerleauPontysinterpretationofHusserlhasbeencommentedonbefore.
However,oneoftheuniquecontributionsofthepresentresearch,Ibelieve,isitsuse
oftheconceptofnature,afundamentalconcernofboththinkersbutinvery
differentways,togototheheartofthequestionsofphenomenologicalmethodand
therelationshipofhumansubjectivitytotheworld.Thischoiceallowsusto
appreciatethemotivationsofMerleauPontysrethinkingofphenomenology,
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puttingasideitschallengetoclassicalmetaphysicalbinariessuchashuman
animalandnaturespirit,inthecontextofawiderphilosophicalontological
tradition(thoughstillverymuchamodernone,forthemostpart).Merleau
PontyscritiqueofsomeelementsofHusserlianphilosophyclearlybelongstohis
generalcritiqueofmodernismand,inturn,blendharmoniouslywithhispositive
appropriationofHusserlianphenomenologyasakindofunifiedfieldtheoryof
Being,oncecleansedofitsCartesianpresuppositions.1
InHusserl,natureappearsprimarilyinthreeguises:asthenatural
attitude;astheregionaldomainofthenaturalsciences;andastheonticnoematic
correlateofspiritintherealmofworldly(nontranscendental)reality.For
MerleauPonty,ontheotherhand,naturecomestoemergeasacomplexand
nuancedothernessattheheartofsubjectivity,manifestingitselfmostdirectlyin
therealmoflife,especiallyanimality,andyetalsohauntingconsciousness,or
spirit,withitspresencebyabsence,itsimpenetrableoriginality.Itis,as
Schellingsays,awildBeinguntamedbythought,yetalsountamable,forthere
couldbenothoughtwithoutahorizon,andthathorizonalityisthedepththat
cannotbeknownwithoutmyvanishingfromtheworldaltogetherandsomehow
seeingitfromaboveanimpossibilityevenforaGod,however,since,asboth
HusserlandMerleauPontyremindus,visionisacorporealact.
Inmyinterpretation,NatureandthenBeing,andstillagain,the
fleshcome,inMerleauPontystreatment,toquietlydisplacethetranscendental
egoofHusserl,itselfaholdoveroftheCartesianepistemologicalprioritizationof
1Itisinthislight,too,thatwecanappreciateMerleauPontysendorsementoftheworkofLeibniz,Hegel,andBergson,ontheonehand,andhisrejectionof(muchof)KantandSartreontheother.
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theinnerovertheouter.Natureisambiguouslybothinnerandouteran
interiorityquaexteriority,likethelivingorganism,whoseoutwardbehaviorcan
onlybeunderstoodaslivingoutwithintheinternalhorizonofanUmwelt.The
organism,mostevidentlyinthesimpler(butnottheverysimplest)forms,likecrabs
orworms,isradicallyselfcentered(initsownworld)atthesametimethatit
lacksacenter,anegothatcandifferentiateitselfabsolutelyfromaworldapart
fromitsinteriority.Theanimalisitsworld.Thelivingbeinginitsunitywithits
worldservesasareminderoftheprereflectivelifeofconsciousnessthat
underliesandchallengesfromwithinthedualismsofreflectivethought,
includingthatofthenaturalandspiritual,thecentraldivisionofHusserlsIdeas
II.2
Whileremainingaphenomenologisttotheend,MerleauPontyrejectedboth
Husserlstranscendentalidealism3aswellasthelattersimplicit(andironical)
collusionwithnaturalscienceoveritsdefinitionoftheessenceofnature.Itisnot
onlyinresponsetoHusserlorIdeasII,ofcourse,thatMerleauPontydevelopedhis
ideasofnature;afterall,hehadbeenatworkontheontologicalimplicationsof
animalityevenbeforehebecameacquaintedwithHusserlsworksinaseriousway,
startingwithhisfirstmajorworkTheStructureofBehavior(1942).4Nonetheless,in
IdeasIIheseesHusserlstrugglingwiththeconsequencesofdividingtheworldfrom
consciousnessandnatureandanimalityfromspirit,andhisarticulationofan2Husserl,Edmund.IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,SecondBook:StudiesinthePhenomenologyofConstitution .Trs.R.RojcewiczandA.Schuwer.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,19893Itcanbedebatedtowhatdegree,ofcourse;seeToadvine,Ted.LeavingHusserlsCave?ThePhilosophersShadowRevisited.InMerleau-PontysReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(pp.7194).4MerleauPonty,TheStructureofBehavior.Trans.A.L.Fisher.Boston:BeaconPress,1963.
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alternativecannotbefullyappreciatedwithoutthisworkasahermeneutical
backdrop.
Theremainderofthisintroductionoffersanoverviewofthepresentstatusin
therelevantsecondaryliteratureofthetheme(s)ofthiswork,aswellasapreview
ofthecontentsofthedissertationchapterbychapter,culminatinginasummaryof
theconclusionsIdrawfromalloftheforegoingstudies.
I.PresentStatusoftheProblem
A.Merleau-PontysInterpretationofHusserlandHusserlsConceptionofNature
WhilethereareanumberofgoodarticlesonMerleauPontysreadingof
Husserl,severalofwhicharecollectedinthe2002essaycollectionentitledMerleau-
PontysReadingofHusserl,5thereisverylittlematerialwrittenspecificallyon
MerleauPontyscritiqueofHusserlsconceptionofnature,6letaloneasustained
assessmentoftheirrespectivephilosophiesthroughthelensofthisidea.Thedearth
ofmaterialonthequestionofnatureisprobablyduetothefactthatMerleau5Merleau-PontysReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002.OthergoodarticlesincludethosebyTaylorCarmanandAnthony
Steinbockforinstance,whichbothcompareHusserlianandMerleauPontianphenomenologiesofthebody,amajorthemeofIdeasII;CarmanevenexplicitlydiscussesMerleauPontysreadingofIdeasII,thoughonlyinpassing.Thismaterialis,however,onlypartiallyrelevantforourpresentpurposes.See:Carman,Taylor.TheBodyinHusserlandMerleauPonty.PhilosophicalTopics,Vol.27,No.2,Fall1999(pp.205225);Steinbock,Anthony.SaturatedIntentionality.In TheBody.Ed.DonnWelton,Oxford:BlackwellPublishing,1999(pp.178199).6AnexceptionisStephenCrowellsessayTheMythicalandtheMeaningless:HusserlandtheTwoFacesofNature.PrintedinIssuesinHusserlsIdeasII.Eds.ThomasNenonandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1996.(pp.81106)Thisessayalsocontainsmuchextraneousmaterial,forourpurposes,onthephilosophyofmythology.
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Pontysmostpointedcriticismsonthisissuearedirectlytobefoundinhislecture
coursesonnature,whichwerehoweverpublishedonlyrelativelyrecently.7The
presentdissertationclosessomeofthisgapinthescholarship.
MuchofthediscussionofMerleauPontysreadingofandphilosophical
relationtoHusserlispolemicalandinsomewaysparalleltothemorestandard
HusserlversusHeideggerdebate.TaylorCarmanexpressesacharacteristicpro
MerleauPontianview:
UnlikeHusserl,butlikeHeidegger,MerleauPontylooksbeyondthesubjectobjectdividetotrytogaininsightintotheconcretestructuresofworldlyexperienceIndeed,takingtheproblemofembodimentseriously,asMerleauPontydoes,entailsaradicalreassessmentoftheveryconceptualdistinctionsonwhichHusserlsenterpriserests.8
CarmanfurtherclaimsthatgoingbeyondHusserlwouldmeanrelinquishingthe
conceptualdualismonwhich[his]projectrests.9ManyHusserlianswoulddispute
thischaracterizationofHusserl,thoughIpersonallybelieveitislargelyaccurate,10
thoughthereareactuallyseveralconceptualdualisms,notjustone,thatmustbe
contendedwithandsortedthroughontheirownterms,notallofwhichequatetoa
substancedualismofasortonefindsinDescartes(andisatleastoutwardly
refutedinHusserl).IaddressthisissueinChapter2.
7MerleauPonty,Maurice.Nature:CourseNotesfromtheCollgedeFrance .Compiledandwithnotes
fromDominiqueSglard.Trans.RobertVallier.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,2003.8Carman,Taylor.TheBodyinHusserlandMerleauPonty.PhilosophicalTopics,Vol.27,No.2,Fall1999,p206.9Ibid.,p.208
10FranoiseDastur,acarefulandrelativelynonpolemicalreaderofbothHusserlandMerleauPonty,
agreeswiththelatterthatHusserlisbasicallydualistic.SeeDastur,Franoise.HusserlandtheProblemofDualism.SoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI),ed.AnnaTeresaTymieniecka.Dordrecht:Springer,1983(pp.6577).MerleauPontyisroutinelyreadasazealousantidualist,aclaimIwillpartiallychallengeinchapters4and5.
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Husserlhasplentyofdefenders,ofcourse,someofwhom,likePanos
Theodorou,takeissuewiththewidespreadreadingofIdeasIIthatunderstandsitas
validating,essentially,thenaturalscientificviewofnature.11J.ClaudeEvansagrees
thatthisreadingismisleading,andgoesevenfurther,arguingforthesuperiorityof
HusserlsaccountofnatureandscienceinIdeasIIoverhislaterreflectionsonthe
lifeworld,definitelyaminoritypositionforthoseconcernedwiththisproblem.12
WithinHusserlianscholarship,atleastasevidencedbyMerleau-Pontys
ReadingofHusserl,achiefquestionliesinjusthowfarMerleauPontydivergesfrom
Husserl.Fordiametricalpositionsonthisquestion,seeforexampleSeebohmsand
Zahavisarticlesinsaidvolume.13
B.Merleau-PontysLaterOntologyandConceptofNature
InrecentyearstherehasbeenaspateofliteratureonMerleauPontyslater
philosophyandhisgeneralontology.Theseincludeseveralbooklength
treatments,forexamplebyDillon(1998)andBarbaras(2004)14twoofthebest
availableaswellasmanyarticles,interestinglylargelyinEnglish.(MerleauPonty
hasproventobepopularinAmericaespecially,thoughoneshouldnotfailto
11Theodorou,Panos.PerceptualandScientificThing:OnHusserlsAnalysisofNatureThingin
IdeasII.InTheNewYearbookforPhenomenologyandPhenomenologicalPhilosophyVolume5,2005.Eds.BurtHopkinsandStevenCrowell,165187.Seattle:NoesisPress,2005.12
Evans,J.Claude.WhereistheLifeWorld?PrintedinIssuesinHusserlsIdeasII.Eds.ThomasNenonandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1996.13Seebohm,ThomasM.ThePhenomenologicalMovement:ATraditionwithoutMethod?Merleau
PontyandHusserl.InMerleau-PontysReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(pp.5170);Zahavi,Dan.MerleauPontyonHusserl:AReappraisal.InMerleau-PontysReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(pp.329).14Barbaras,Renaud.TheBeingofthePhenomenon.Trans.TedToadvineandLeonardLawlor.
Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,2004;Dillon,M.C. Merleau-PontysOntology.Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1988
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mentionthatthereisalsoaJapaneseMerleauPontyCircle).Oneofthesearticles,by
Geraets,dealswiththethemeofnatureexplicitly,15whileothersdealmorewiththe
fleshandotherrelatedtopicsfromthelaterphilosophy.16Acomprehensive
treatmentofMerleauPontysphilosophyofnature,onelongoverdue,hasbeen
recentlyauthoredbyTedToadvine.17
C.IdeasIandII
RegardingHusserl,thereareinnumerableworksdealingwiththecentral
conceptsoftranscendentalidealismandwithIdeasI18,asatext,inparticular
indeed,virtuallyeveryintroductorytextorstatementonHusserlhastotakethis
seminalworkintoaccount.Myrelianceonsecondaryliteratureforthesectionon
IdeasIisminimal,however,fortworeasons.First,Iexpoundonlytheworksmost
basicthemesepochandreduction,noesisandnoema,thetranscendentalego,etc.
Second,althoughthesenotionsthemselvesareallcontroversialandcontested
throughouttheHusserlliterature,myaimisnottogiveadefinitiveinterpretationof
them,onlytofacilitatethroughmytreatmentofthemacomprehensiblediscussion
ofMerleauPontysgeneralappropriationsandcriticismsofHusserlian
phenomenology.
15Geraets,ThodoreF.MerleauPontysConceptionofNature.InSoulandBodyinHusserlian
Phenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI) ,ed.AnnaTeresaTymieniecka.Dordrecht:Springer,1983(pp.301312).16SeeforexampleDastur,Franoise.World,Flesh,Vision.InChiasms:Merleau-PontysNotionof
Flesh.Eds.FredEvansandLeonardLawlor.StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.Albany:2000(pp.2350).17Toadvine,Ted.Merleau-PontysPhilosophyofNature.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,
200918Husserl,Edmund.IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,
FirstBook:GeneralIntroductiontoaPurePhenomenology. Trans.F.Kersten.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1983
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WorkonIdeasIIisfarlessextensivethanthatonIdeasI,buttherehasbeen
somenoteworthysecondaryscholarshipinthelastdecadeonIdeasII,someofit
includedinthevolumeIssuesinIdeasII19,whichdrawstogetheranumberofessays
onvariousaspectsofthework.Otherpenetratingreadingsincludethoseof
Rockstad20andthealreadymentionedEvansandTheodorou.IdeasIIhasofcourse
beenwrittenaboutbymajorphenomenologists,includingRicoeur21,Landgrebe22,
and(obviously)MerleauPontyhimself.Ihavefoundthatthese,alongobviously
withtheprimarytext,arestillthemostvaluableelementsinIdeasIIscholarshipat
thepresenttime.
II.SummaryoftheDissertation
A.ChaptersOneandTwo
InChaptersOneandTwo,IsketchapictureofHusserlofIdeasIandII,the
idealistHusserlwho,inthelatterofthesetwoworks,neverthelesslaysthe
foundationsofmostofwhatMerleauPontywillforgeintoanewvisionof19IssuesinHusserlsIdeasII,eds.ThomasNenonandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademic
Publishers,1996.20
Rokstad,Konrad.TheHistoricityofBodyandSoul.InPhenomenologyofLife--FromtheAnimalSoultotheHumanMind:BookI:InSearchofExperience ,ed.AnnaTeresaTymieniecka.(pp.127159).Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,2007;also,Rokstad,Konrad.Nature,SubjectivityandtheLifeWorld.InAnalectaHusserliana:TheYearbookofPhenomenologicalResearchVolLXXVII,ed.AnnaTeresaTymieniecka.(pp.4159).Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishing,2002.21Ricoeur,Paul.Husserl:AnAnalysisofHisPhenomenology.Trans.EdwardG.BallardandLester
Embree.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1967(Thirdchapter:HusserlsIdeasII:AnalysesandProblems,pp.3581).22Landgrebe,Ludwig.ThePhenomenologyofEdmundHusserl.Ed.DonnWelton.Ithaca,NewYork:
CornellUniversityPress,1981.
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phenomenologyandthenaturespiritrelation.Asjustalludedto,thefirstchapteris
adetailedoverviewofHusserlstranscendentalphenomenologytheeideticand
transcendentalphenomenologicalreductions,thenaturalandtranscendental
attitudes,noesisandnoema,intentionality,thetranscendentalego,constitution,and
thelike.23Thepurposeofthischapterismostlyexpository(someinterpretationis
involved,ofcourseasanygenuineexpositioninfactrequiresanyway);the
demandsofexplainingHusserlsphilosophicalsystem,however,alsohappento
makeitthelongestchapterinthiswork.
ThesecondchapterisadetailedexpositionandreadingofIdeasII24,witha
focusonitsontophenomenologicalmeditationsontherealmsofmaterialnature,
bodyandsoul,andspirit,alongwiththequestionoftheenigmaticrelationof
theseconstitutedrealitiesandthetranscendentalsubjectivity(orsimply
consciousness)ofthetranscendentalreductionformallyexpoundedinIdeasI.
23ANoteontheChoiceofText:Husserlwasconstantlyintheprocessofreinventinghimself; IdeasIis
onlyoneofmanypossibleintroductorytextstousetopresentHusserlstranscendentalversionofphenomenology(CartesianMeditationsandtheCrisisoftheEuropeanSciencescomemostquicklytomind,buttherehasevenbeenabooklengthintroductiontoHusserl,byKockelmanns,basedonhisEncyclopediaBritannicaarticleonphenomenologysee:Kockelmanns,JosephJ.EdmundHusserlsPhenomenology.Indianapolis:PurdueUniversityPress,1994).WhychooseIdeasI?AsidefromthereasonthatIdeasIandIIbelongtogetherbytheirtitles( IdeasIIhadbeeninitiallyplannedasasequelandfurtherexplicationofthethesismaintainedinIdeasI),itisalsotruethat IdeasIissufficienttointroducemostofthefundamentalplanksofHusserlianphenomenology.WhetherornotHusserleventually,inthe1930s,shiftedhisbasicpositiontoamoreexistentialand
detranscendentalizedformofphenomenology,orwhetherthelatergeneticphenomenologyisnotmerelyanextensionofthephenomenologyoftheIdeasbutratherafarreachingradicalrethinkingofit,arequestionsIwillnotandneednotdealwithhere.ForitwouldsuitmypurposesiftheHusserl/sofIdeasIandIIareregardedasjustone(ortwo)ofmanyactualorpossibleHusserls,onlybecausethepointsIwillbetryingtomakearebasicallysystematicones,whichthetextsathandbringoutsufficientlyontheirown. 24Husserl,Edmund.IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,
SecondBook:StudiesinthePhenomenologyofConstitution .Trans.R.RojcewiczandA.Schuwer.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1989.TheyearofpublicationoftheoriginalGermanlanguageeditionwas1952.
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InIdeasII,Husserlpresentsapictureofnatureasathelifeless,meaningless
(Sinnlos)substrateofreality,abarephysicalthinghoodthatdistinguishesitself
fromlife(soul,Seele),ontheonehand,andmind(spirit,Geist),ontheother.The
livedbody,aspresentedbyHusserl,istheunityofmindandmatter,but,
importantly,itisdistinguishablefromthepureformsofeither.Whatshields
HusserlfrombaldfacedCartesiandualismishisclaim,announcedalreadyinIdeas
I,thatpureortranscendentalsubjectivityandherehefollows(roughly)Kant,
whoseCopernicanturnhebroadlyendorsescannotbereducedtothinghood
orobjectivityofanykind.Puresubjectivityismorefundamentalthananyobject,
sinceitistheveryconditionforthepossibilityofobjectivityinthefirstplace.
Husserlsprioritizationoftranscendentalsubjectivityoverempiricalsubjectivity
radicalizesthisdifferencebyplacingempiricalsubjectivitysocompletelyinthegrip
oftheobjectiveandevenlifelessworldofphysicalnature,thatweareforcedto
seethatsubjectivitystrictly(orpurely)speakingcannotbeoftheworld,literally.
Thisisnottosaythatitcanexistwithoutit,butitcertainlycanbeconceivedtodo
soasdemonstratedinafamous,and,tosome,infamous,passageinIdeasIthatis
echoedinlaterwritingsaswell.ThatHusserlwasinterestedinmakingsuchan
underlyingpointisclearfromIdeasIIanditsother,complementaryarguments
againstmindbodyreductionisminthattext.25
25Foragoodtreatmentofthis,seeMarcelle,Daniel.TheOntologicalPriorityofSpiritOverNature:
HusserlsRefutationofPsychophysicalParallelisminIdeasII.InPhilosophyToday,vol.50(suppl.),2006(pp.7582).Whetherconsciouslyornot,Husserlpresentsakindofontologicalgambitdirectedagainstthenaturalisticorphysicalisticphilosopher.Inthislanguage,MerleauPontysconcernmightbethatHusserlsgambitfails,intheprocessconcedingfartoomuchtonaturalscience.Accordingtothisview,then,thetranscendentalego,thatis,istoothinareedtoputtheburdenon,sothatinthewakeofthefailureoftranscendentalphenomenology,therewouldbeonly
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IdeasIIwasunpublishedinHusserlslifetimebutreadandstudiedclosely
byMerleauPonty,whosepositiveappropriationofthatworkliesmostlyinthearea
ofthephenomenologyofthebody(thelivedbody,orLeib).26MerleauPontys
reservationsregardingtheworkasawhole,however,andinparticularonwhathe
regardedasitsunderlyingconceptualconfusions,wereconsiderable.Andthe
questionofnaturewhatitis,andhowhumanbeingsaretobeunderstoodin
relationtoitoccupied(aswehaveseen)greatdealofMerleauPontysmature
thought,whosegeneralthrustgoesagainstthegrainofHusserlsfindingsinIdeasII.
HusserldoesnotseemeithertorecognizethetensionsinIdeasIIasfundamental
onesorrealizethatnatureposesaradicalproblemforthetranscendental
phenomenologicalmethoditself.Wemightputitthisway:whereasforHusserl
naturehastobeexplainedintermsofitsconstitutionintranscendental
consciousness,forMerleauPonty,itisthisveryconsciousnesswhichwouldneed
explaining,inlightofitsobviousoriginationintheprimordialexperiencesofthe
livedbody,whichisitselfanemblemofnature.
B.ChaptersThreeandFour
ChapterThreeaddressesMerleauPontysspecificformofphenomenologyin
relationtoHusserlsown.Itessentiallyrepresentsmytakeonthedecadesold
questionofhowbesttounderstandMerleauPontysoftencontroversialreadingof
Husserl.Theissueiscomplex,butafterthoroughlydocumentingMerleauPontys
thenaturalisticphysicalisticoptionleft,adisastrousoption.Hencethereistheneedtorethinkphenomenologyinawhollynewlight(thoughstillrootedinperception,asHusserlhadit).26SeeforexampleMerleauPonty,Maurice.ThePhilosopherandHisShadow.InSigns.Trans.
RichardM.McCleary.Evanston,Illinois:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964
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reenvisioningofclassicphenomenologicalmotifssuchasthephenomenological
andeideticreductionsfromthePhenomenologyofPerceptionthroughTheVisible
andtheInvisible,IarguefinallythattheFrenchphilosophersmannerof
appropriationofHusserlispersuasivebutalso,moreinterestingly,highlyorganic.
IusethistermnotonlyinthesensethatitdrawsonHusserlinanaturalmanner,so
tospeak,butmoreparticularlyinthesensethatitembodiesorinstantiates
MerleauPontysstyleofphilosophyandevenhisownontology.Forexample,
MerleauPontysownnotionsofambiguity,reflection,andparadox,amongothers,
actuallyprovetobethekeytounlockingthesecretofhisHusserlreading.Butthis
alsomeansthattheextenttowhichoneagreeswithMerleauPontysreading
correlatessomewhattothedegreetowhichoneacceptshisoverallphilosophical
vision,somethingthatmayaccountforatleastsomeofthedoggedoppositionto
himfromcertainmembersofthestrongHusserliancamp,atleast.(Merleau
PontysreadingofhisownreadingofHusserlhisviewofthedegreeofhisown
faithfulnessorunfaithfulnesstothesource,forexampleisalsoherelargely
confirmedthroughtheprismofhisowndialecticalviewsandhermeneutics.)
ThefourthchapterplumbsMerleauPontyswritings,mostparticularlythe
Naturelectures,toconnecthisreadingofHusserlandexistentializationof
phenomenologytohisnewlydevelopingconceptionsofnatureand,accordingly,the
natureofhumanityaswell.TheNaturelectureseriesisanexcitinglydetailedand
densetractoforiginalresearchandtextualandscientificinterpretationthat
MerleauPontygaveastheheadoftheCollgedeFranceoveraperiodofseveral
years,between1958and1961,shortlybeforehisuntimelydeath.Hedelivered
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thematthesametimehewascomposinghisunfinishedmasterpieceTheVisibleand
theInvisible,alsoatextIwillalsoheavilyrelyoninbothChapters4and5(itis
effectivelyMerleauPontysmostsignificantworksincethePhenomenologyof
Perception).
MerleauPontysexpressaiminthelecturesistoinitiateaprojectof
ontologystartingfromtheideaofnatureasitappearsinthehistoryofWestern
philosophyandscience,particularlyinthemodernperioddowntohisownpresent
day.Thisisasurprisingchoiceforaselfidentifiedphenomenologist,butitis
consistentwithMerleauPontysownfamousassertionthatthephenomenological
method,includingthephenomenologicalandeideticreductions,areradically
incompleteandthus,oneissafetoconclude,unabletosealconsciousnessofffrom
theempiricalrealminthewayHusserl,theprogenitorofthemethod,hadintended.
(Thisisnottosaythatnaturalmeansempirical,onlythatthereisafamily
resemblancebetweendoingexistentialphenomenologyandanarchaeologyof
nature,therootofourlivingexistence.)
WhereasinTheStructureofBehaviorandPhenomenologyofPerceptionthe
focushadbeenonanimalityandthelivedbodythesignificanceofwhichremains
inthelaterphilosophy(whichIdonot,asdosomeothers,readintermsofabreak
withtheold,ratheronlyadeepeningthatoccasionallypromptsacorrection),
MerleauPontynowbroadenshisinquirytoBeingasawhole,therebyfinding
himselfinquiringintonatureasafieldoflifepriortothedivisionofsubjectand
object.NatureturnsouttobenothinglikeeithertheobjectiveNatureof
scientistsorthenoematicpoleofHusserliantranscendentalconsciousness,since
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itis,inaprofoundsense,foreverbeyondanypowersofconstitution.Remarkably
andimportantly,MerleauPontydoesnotabandonthephenomenologicalattitudeor
standpointofreflectivethoughtinfavorofaholisticimmersioninprereflective
life.Hisvisionisoneofthehumanbeingsinevitablebelongingnessandalienation
fromnaturethatis,fromhimself/herself.Humanexistenceisthereforeself
interrupting,thoughnottothepointofrealizingaSartreandisconnectionfromthe
wholespectacleofBeing,inwhoseinternalfoldhumanconsciousnesstakesits
rightfulplace.Itis,however,aconditionedconsciousness,justasfreedomfor
MerleauPontyisaconditionedfreedom.Ineithercase,onecanputtheemphasison
eitherthefirstorthesecondtermandfind,ineachcase,animportantnuancethat
illuminesauniquesideofexistence.
MuchofthemostinterestingmaterialintheNaturelecturespresentsthese
ideasindirectlythroughMerleauPontysoriginalinterpretationsofsuch
philosophicalfiguresasDescartes,Spinoza,Kant,Schelling,andBergson,aswellthe
findingsofcontemporaneousscientists.MerleauPontyslaterconceptionofnature,
andanewontologicalvocabularytogowithit,hadbeengestatingforalongtime,
sincehisfirstworksinfact.Nature,aswehavealreadyseen,comestotakeonthe
meaningofwhatSchellingcalledthebarbarousprincipleofthereal,oragainwild
Being,whichcannotbebroughtinatransparentwaywithintheorbitofreflection.
MerleauPontyscritiqueoftranscendentalphenomenologyisapparenthere(much
asSchellingcriticizedthereflexivityofHegelandidealismgenerally).Itseemsas
thoughMerleauPontysnatureisonewhichsomehow,fromwithinitself,gives
risetosubjectivityandreflectionandtherebytranscendsitselfwhileremaining
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opaquetoitselfatthesametime.(Thisopacityisreflectedinthemottoweare
giventoourselves.)TheparalleltoSchellingsownNaturphilosophieis
unmistakable,asaretheromanticresonancesofhisunderstandingofnature
generally.27Butwhatisgoneisintellectualintuitionortheclaimtoaninsightinto
ahigherorderofbeing.
C.ChapterFive
Thefinalchapterisasystematicexplorationofonefundamentaldifference
betweenHusserl(andperhapsthevastmajorityoftraditionalphilosophy)and
MerleauPonty,anditpertainstotheirapproachtophilosophyandthought
itself.Isphilosophybestappreciatedasaproblemsolvingenterprise,asHusserl
believes,orratherasameditationonparadoxes,themselvesbeyondanysimple
solution?MerleauPontyfindstheultimatetruthofthehumanconditiontoconsist
inacertaindialecticalcontradictionwhich,however,unlikeHegelsversion,does
notfindaresolutioninsomethinghigher,suchasanabsolutestandpoint.
MerleauPontyisultimatelyaphilosopherofparadox,whichiswhatexplainsthe
titleofthepresentdissertation,TheParadoxofNature...Itisregardingthe
problemofnatureatoncethehomeofhumanspirit,aswellasitspermanent
otherthatMerleauPontyfindsoneofhismostfruitfulapplicationsofwhathe
callsinTheVisibleandtheInvisiblethemethodofinterrogation.
27WatsonmentionsNovalisinthisconnection.(Watson,StephenH.MerleauPontys
PhenomenologicalItineraryFromBodySchematoSituatedKnowledge:OnHowWeAreandHowWeAreNottoSingtheWorld.JanusHead,Winter/SpringIssue,9.2,2007.Amherst,NY:TriviumPublications,p.534549.)RobertVallierhaswrittenhisdissertation,notpublishedunfortunately,onthetopicofSchellingandMerleauPonty.(Institution:OfNature,Life,andMeaninginMerleauPontyandSchelling.DePaulUniversity,2001)
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Ofcourse,Husserlhimselfmakesparadoxacentralpartofthediscourseof
phenomenologyinthenarrowsensethatheneverceasesfirstofalltoemphasize
theuttercounterintuitivenessoftherevolutionaryperspectiveoftranscendental
phenomenology,oftheenormouseffortittakestooverturn(para)thecommon
view(doxa)thatplacessubjectivityatthemercyofthespatiotemporalcausal
world,ratherthanviceversa.YethealsospeakseloquentlyintheCrisisaboutwhat
hecallstheparadoxofsubjectivityparadoxheremoreinthemoreMerleau
Pontiansenseofantinomynamelytheparadoxthatsubjectivityisatonceapart
oftheworld(initsembodiedform,inindividualconsciousnesses),evenasitisthe
transcendentalconditionfortheverypossibilityoftheworld(whatHusserl
controversiallycallsabsoluteexistenceasopposedtotherelativeexistenceof
theworld).Inanimportantway,this,too,isaparadoxofnature:fortheworld
natureisboththeconditionofthepossibilityofconsciousness,evenas
consciousnessistheconditionforthepossibilityoftheworld.ButHusserloffersa
solutiontotheparadoxbymakingadistinctionbetweentwotypesofsubjectivity,
andofferingonepriorityovertheother.Aswehavealreadyseen,suchasolution
willnotdoforMerleauPonty.Andintheend,Husserlisnolesssympatheticto
antinomiesthanmostofthecanonicalthinkersoftheWesternphilosophical
tradition,fromAristotle(Metaphysics,BookIII)onward.
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III.Conclusion
InHusserl,thethematicofnatureinitiallyassertsitselfinthatphilosophers
famous(thoughclearlyambiguous)rejectionofthenaturalattitudeandhisstrong
distinctionbetweenworldandconsciousness,anditextendsinMerleauPontys
worktothelattersfinegrainedattempts,throughhislifelongstudiesofbiology
andpsychology,tonegotiatebetweenthissortofdualismandtheequaldanger,in
hiseyes,ofapurelyscientificnaturalism.MerleauPontyeventuallysettlesonan
interpretationofthephenomenologicalreductionasadeepeningofthenatural
attituderatherthanaflighttopureconsciousnessor,asMerleauPonty
paradoxicallystatesit(inHegelianterms),itisonlyadeparturebywayofreturning
toourselves.Inthisway,MerleauPontyslecturecourseonnatureafocaltextof
thisdissertation,alongwithIdeasIandIIandTheVisibleandtheInvisiblecanbe
seentobetheculminationofanongoingcritiqueofHusserliantranscendental
phenomenologyinfavorofamoreexistentialnaturalisticatonce
phenomenologicallythickandscientificallyinformedvariety,whichplaceshuman
subjectivityattheheartofnature,orBeing,ratherthanoutsideoraboveit.The
consequenceisthatforMerleauPonty,phenomenologyisnotanewscienceora
magickeytounlockphilosophicalpuzzlesonceandforall;rather,itisthe
witnessingofthemiraculouscoherenceofcontradictorytruthsinthespectacleof
existence.
Fromthebeginning,MerleauPontyrefusestoadoptamethodthatwould
allowfortheworldsthoroughgoingconstitutioninthemind.Atthesametime,he
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explicitlyprioritizedwhatwemightcallthefirstpersonalityofthe
phenomenologicalmethodoverthenaverealistmethodofmostsocalled
naturalists.ThenaturalisticmethodMerleauPontyandHusserl(nottomention
Heidegger)opposeisthatoftakingtheworldassomethingfirstselfconstituted,so
tospeak,andthenlaterexperiencedornotexperienced,dependingoncausal
conditionsthatobtainbetweensubjectsandtheworldasobject.InMerleau
Pontyswayofthinking,humansubjectivity,orspiritbroadlyspeaking,bearsan
intrinsicrelationwiththeworlditlivesthrough,perceives,andunderstands,butat
thesametime,itisalienatedfromthisworldatalevelwhichsuggestsatwistingor
breakingapart(dehiscence)attherootlevelofbeingitself.MerleauPontysanalysis
ofnatureandphenomenologymarksaturntowardswhatIcallMerleauPontys
seminaturalisticversionofthephenomenologicalproject;naturalisticbecause
itsituateshumansubjectivityorspiritintermsthatinscribeitinalargermatrixof
being,butonlyseminaturalisticbecauseitisnotthefullblownorreductive
naturalismofakindthat,onceagain,bothHusserlandMerleauPontyvigorously
opposed.
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ChapterOne:HusserlsTranscendentalPhenomenologyinIdeasI28:TheBasicPosition
I.Introduction:IdeasIandtheProjectofTranscendentalPhenomenology
IdeasIdemandsourattentionbothfortheboldnessandoriginalityofits
ideasandforbeinganundeniablemilestoneinHusserlscareeraswellasa
watershedmomentinthehistoryofthephenomenologicalmovement.Itisthefirst
textinwhichHusserl,theeffectivefounderofthemovementasweknowittoday,29
formallyintroducessomeofhismostfamousanddistinctivetheories,includingthe
phenomenologicaltranscendentalepochandthephenomenologicaltranscendental
reduction.30Italsocontainspreliminaryattemptsatarigorousdefinitionof
28Thefulltitleoftheworkis IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy(FirstBook).Iwillrefertoitthroughoutthistextas IdeasIforshort,asiscommonpractice.29Brentano,Husserlsteacher,revivedthemedievalnotionofintentionalityandpracticedarudimentary(andarguablypsychological)formofwhathetermedphenomenology,butHusserlsLogicalInvestigationsandIdeasIaregenerallycreditedforinitiatingtheschoolknowntodayasphenomenology,thoughHeideggers1927workBeingandTimealsocontributedstronglytothewaytheideaofphenomenologyeventuallycametobereceivedandinterpreted.30Husserlsometimesmakesastrongdistinctionbetweenthephenomenologicalandthetranscendentalreductions,whichissomethingIwillbringupagainbelow(IID)withrespectto
HusserlsfamousEncyclopaediaBritannicaarticleonphenomenology.ButinIdeasI,hetreatsthemashavingthesameextension,onlyreferringtodifferentaspectsofasingleprocess.Thushedistinguishesthemasfollows:...weshall,onmostoccasions,speakofphenomenologicalreductions(butalso,withreferencetotheircollectiveunity,weshallspeakof thephenomenologicalreduction)and,accordingly,fromanepistemologicalpointofview[myitalicshere],weshallrefertotranscendentalreductions.(IdeasI,66)Inotherwords,thedistinctionasgivenhereismerelyoneofperspective,andaccordinglyIwilloftenusethetwotermsphenomenologicalreductionandtranscendentalreductioninterchangeably,exceptwhentheexpositiondemandsthattheytemporarilybeunderstoodasdistinct.(Whatgoesforthereductioninthiscasegoesfortheepochaswell,fortheyarecompanionconcepts.)
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phenomenologyasdistinctfromothersciences(naturalandhuman)andthe
introductionoftheterminology(noesisandnoema,naturalandtranscendental
attitudes,constitution)socharacteristicofHusserlssubsequenttechnical
phenomenologicaldiscussions.Itis,then,easilyonparinimportancewithHusserls
earlierandsimilarlypathbreakingLogicalInvestigations.31
YetevenincomparisontootherpublishedtextsbyHusserl,IdeasIisnota
particularlyeasytexttounderstandorunpack.Itishighlyabstractandrarely
pausestoexplainthesignificanceorphilosophicalcontextofitsanalyses,takingthis
backgroundmoreorlessforgranted.AsPaulRicoeurpointsout,themotivationsof
thework,rootedinaconfrontationwithskepticism,arebestdiscernedthrough
unpublishedtextsandlecturesfromtheperiodbetween1905and1913,aswellas
withthehelpofthewritingsofHusserlsremarkableassistantEugenFink.32Indeed,
theactualtextofIdeasIreadsattimeslikeastarterstrainingmanual,inthiscase
forthepracticeofanewphenomenologicalmethodofthinkingandanalysis.Yetthe
manualisalsoarecordofselfdiscoveryandhasthefeelofaworkinprogress,as
Husserlwashimselfworkingthroughmanyofitsideasandtheirimplications,not
allofwhich,asisclearfromhislaterintroductorytexts,arefullyworkedoutinits
pages.
31Husserl,Edmund.LogicalInvestigations.Trans.J.N.Findlay.London:Routledge,1900/01(2nd,revisededition1913)(HereafterLI)32InRicoeurswords:Finally,itmustbesaidthat IdeasIisabookwhosemeaningremainsconcealedandthatoneisinevitablyinclinedtolookforitsmeaningelsewhere.See:Ricoeur,Paul.AKeytoEdmundHusserlsIdeasI.Trans.BondHarrisandJacquelineBouchardSpurlock.(Trans.revisedbyPolVandevelde,ed.)Milwaukee:MarquetteUniversityPress,1996(pp.367)HereafterKey.RicoeurreliesheavilyontheHusserlapprovedessaybyFink,DiephnomenologischePhilosophieEdmundHusserlsindergegenwrtigenKritik(1933),tofillinsomeofthegapsleftbyHusserlhimself.MerleauPontywastodothesamelateron.
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ItwouldbeimpossibletocondenseallofIdeasIinthespaceofonechapter,
letalonetoshowhowitbuildsonHusserlsconsiderableoutputbeforeits
publication,orforthatmatterhowhisstilllaterthinkingrelatestoIdeasI.Indeed,
IdeasIiswrittenwithreadershipoftheLIlargelybeingpresumed.Certainofthe
lattersideasarerevisitedanewintentionality,forexamplewhileothersare
enfoldedimplicitlyintothesubstanceofnewerreflections.33Itisnecessaryforthe
purposesofthepresentworkforustosketchoutIdeasIsmainargument(ifthisis
therightword)anditsbasicorientationtowardssomeofthefundamentalquestions
itposestoitself,concerningespecially:thenatureofconsciousnessandthe
relationshipofconsciousnesstotheworld;thedefinitionofphenomenologyasa
transcendental(aswellaseidetic)sciencethateschewsthenaturalattitude
whileseekingtoexplainitscontents;theideasoftranscendenceand
immanence;andthequestionofthescopeandmeaningofthephenomenological
epochandreduction,thelatterquestionbearingofcourseonthecentralissueof
thephenomenologicalmethod.Theseareallinterrelatedquestions;indeed,one
mightevengosofarastosay(inHeideggerianstyleperhaps)thattheyarethe
samequestion.Forroughly,theyallconcerntheunderlyingrelationshipof
consciousnesstoworldor,putinanotherway,subjectivityandnature.Wecannot
33Forexample,inIdeasIHusserltakesforgrantedthenotionthatphenomenologydealswithactsofconsciousness,whosemeaningintentionsareeitheremptyorfulfilled.ThisprincipleisofcoursefoundationaltoHusserlsideasonperception.Forexample,whileIcanseeorintendonesideofadie,Igenerallyalsointenditshiddensidesaswell.Theformerintentionisfulfilledbyintuitiveevidencethegivennessofthedieinitscolor,shape,etc.,asitshowsitselftomevisually.Thelattersignitiveintentionsarenotfulfilledandarethusemptyunlessoruntilothersidesofthedieareseenbyme.ThedistinctionisimportantforitallowsHusserltoexplainhowitisthatweperceivethedieandnotmerelythissideofthedie.Weperceiveobjects,inotherwords,notmerelyprofiles.ThisisoneofHusserlsstrategies,sotosay,forovercomingtheappearancerealitydividethathashamperedprevioustheoriesofperception.
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hopetodofulljusticetothemanyanglesonemightusetoapproachandaddress
Husserlsmultifacetedanswertothesequestions.Totakeoneexample,wewillhave
toglossoverthesignificantcontroversiessurroundingHusserlsconceptofthe
noema34orofitsrelationtofulfilment.35Nonetheless,manyofthesortsof
fundamentalproblemsthatariseinsuchdebateswillbetouchedoninother
sectionsoftheoverviewprovidedbelow.Thisoverview,alongwithsome
independentcommentaryandbriefreferencestosomeofthesecondaryliterature
onIdeasI,willconstitutethebulkofthischapter.
YetgiventherelativelyintermediarystatusofIdeasIinthecourseof
Husserlsownlifelongtask(fromIdeasIonward)ofexplainingtranscendental
phenomenology,itmightstillbewonderedwhyweareconcentratinginthischapter
onthisparticulartext.MerleauPonty,forexample,regardedIdeasIasabelonging
toamiddleortransitionperiodbetweenHusserlslogicism,presumably
culminatingintheLogicalInvestigations,andthelatersupposedexistentialismof
34Thisquestionhasbeenwrittenaboutendlessly,especiallyincontextofthedebatebetweenthosewhointerpretthenoemaaspercept(Gurwitsch,Cairns,etal.)andthose,leadchieflybyFllesdal,whointerpretitasavariantofFregesSinn.Foranicerecapofthedebate,see:Solomon,RobertC.HusserlsConceptoftheNoema.InHusserl:ExpositionsandAppraisals,FrederickA.EllistonandPeterMcCormack,eds.NotreDame:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1977(pp.5469).Solomonbeginshisessaybynoting:Itisgenerallyagreedthattheconceptofthe noemaisoneofthethemes,ifnotthecentraltheme,ofHusserlsphenomenologicalphilosophy.J.N.Mohantyisseeminglyin
perfectagreementwhenhemakesapassingreferencetotheallimportantideaofnoemaandnoeticnoematicstructure,regardedbymanyasconstitutingthemostimportantandoriginalpartof[IdeasI].(Mohanty,J.N.ThePhilosophyofEdmundHusserl:AHistoricalDevelopment.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2008,p.372)Anothertopicwewillhavetoleaveout,thoughinthiscasebecauseitisalmostwhollyabsentfromtheIdeasitself,isthetopicoftimeconstitution,whichlaterfiguresdeeplyinallofHusserlsmostadvancedanalyses.35Foranexcellentsummaryofthedebate,seePolVandeveldesintroductiontoKey(pp.1620).AlsoofnoteisRicoeursremark,inspiredalsobythedifficultiessurroundingthenoema,andquotedbyVandeveldeintheintroduction,thatthus,realityalwaysseemstoescapetranscendentalconstitution.
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thelifeworldphilosophy,bestknownthroughtheCrisis.36Givensuchviews,why
notreviewHusserlslaterreformulationsofmuchofthismaterial?Moreover,as
mentionedabove,Husserlhimselflateradmitstothedisadvantagesthoughnot
necessarilyinadequaciesoftheCartesianwaytothereductionpresentedherein.
Healsodevelopedanewformofphenomenology,geneticordynamic
phenomenology,whichsupplements(andsomesaysupplants)thestatic
phenomenologyofIdeasI.
Thefactremains,however,thatHusserlhimselfnevertotallyabandoned
eitherthestaticortheCartesianphenomenologicalmethod.Regardingthelatter,
forexample,nolessthantheauthoroftheheterodoxtextTheOtherHusserl,Donn
Weltonnotesthat[t]heexistenceoftheCartesianMeditations,andthefactthat
[Husserl]recommendeditsFrenchtranslationtoreadersaslateas1933evenashe
begandevelopingthetextoftheCrisisconvincesusthat[theCartesianwaytothe
reduction]wasneveroverthrown.37Furthermore,Husserlneverabandonedthe
basicframeworkoftranscendentalsubjectivityanditswhollynonnaturalistic
essence.IdeasIpresentsabroadlyfaithfulpictureofthebasicthrustof
transcendentalphenomenology,andthisfact,combinedwithitshistorical
importanceandthefactthatitistheprequeltoIdeasII,atextequallyifnotmore
vitalforourtask,are,Ibelieve,enoughtorecommenditfordetailedinvestigationat
thepresenttime.
36SeeMerleauPonty,Maurice.ThePhenomenologyofPerception.Tr.ColinSmith.NewYork:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1962(p.320n).CrisisreferstoHusserlstextTheCrisisofEuropeanSciencesandTranscendentalPhenomenology:AnIntroductiontoPhenomenologicalPhilosophy.Trans.DavidCarr.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1970.37Welton,Donn.TheOtherHusserl:TheHorizonsofTranscendentalPhenomenology.Indianapolis:IndianaUniversityPress,2000(p.118).HereafterWelton.
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II.EpochandPhenomenologicalReduction
A.Introduction
TheheartofIdeasI,andprobablythesignatureofphenomenologyitselfasit
ispopularlyknown,isthephenomenologicalreduction.Itisallbutimpossibleto
giveabriefdefinitionofit,butanyaccountmustbeginwiththeconceptofepoch
orthesuspensionorbracketingofallonesbeliefsregardingexternalexistence
oftheobjectsofperception(andofcourseofanyothermentalact).Throughthisall
importantsuspension,oneeffectsaradicallynewattitude,thephenomenological
attitude,accordingtowhichtheworldisseentobeasitisfortheconsciousness,or
subjectivity,thatbeholdsit.Inthisway,allobjectiverealityisreducedtoits
significanceforconsciousnessor,alternately,toitsmeaningfulnessasa
noematiccorrelatetothenoeticactsofaconsciousnessinwhichtheworldis
constituted.38
Thejargonladendefinitiongivenabovemust,however,becarefully
explained.Furthermore,manypossiblemisinterpretationsmustbeobviatedat
leastregardingHusserlsownintentionssuchastheinterpretationofthe
reductionasbeingameanstoexposetheillusorinessoftheexternalreality.Thisis
notatallHusserlsintentionorreflectiveofhisactualview.Atthesametime,it
38Thislanguagewillbeexplainedbelow(IVA).NotethatthetermreductiondoesnothavethemodernmeaningofreductivenessforHusserl;thereisnoquestionhereofconvertingobjectiverealityintoasubjectivesubstratum.Reducemeans,etymologically,tobringorleadback,andthisisHusserlsintendedmeaning.Thereductionleadsbackaconsciousnessthatlosesitselfinitsworldbacktoitsownachievementsasasensebestowingandworldconstitutingbeing.
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cannotbedeniedthatHusserldidinsomesenseprioritizesubjectivityoverobjective
reality.Husserldidnotdenytheexistenceofsuchareality,butaswewillsee,
underthereductionitacquiresawhollynewsensenamely,thatofbeingthesense
mindindependentreality(alongwithinnumerableothersenseswhichgivethe
worlditsintelligibility).Toputitanother(unHusserlian)way,whilewecansay
thatthereisaworldthattranscendsthemind,itonlydoessoforthemind,39
acquiringitsmeaningfulnessassuchatranscendentbeinginthiswayalone.Thus,it
caninacertainwaybecalledindependent(initsexistence,orthatness)fromthe
mindinonewayandyetwhollydependentonit(foritsmeaning,orwhatness)in
another.Consciousnessitselfinitspurifiedandtranscendentalformis,by
contrast,dependentonnothing.Anditissolelybecauseofthisasymmetry,andnot
becauseofsomesupposednonexistenceofexternalreality,thatHusserlcalls
consciousness(asopposedtothetranscendentworldassuch)absolute.Allof
thesenotionswillbefurtherexploredindividually,however,inPartIVbelow.
Inthesectionsthatfollow,Iwillproceedtodescribethereductionasitis
outlinedinIdeasI.Alongtheway,Iwillbeflaggingsomeofthemostsignificantand
controversialissuesofinterpretation,aswellaspossibleinconsistencies,mysteries,
orambiguitiesinHusserlsaccount,whichcanbe(andusuallyalreadyhavebeen)
raised.Indoingso,itisinevitablethatsomecommentarybemixedwithpure
description(contrarytothespiritofHusserlsownmethodology!)evenbeforethe
39Iwillattimesusethewordmindforconsciousness,despitethepotentialhazardsthatcometherewith.Mindcaneasilybereified,whereasbyconsciousness(Bewusststein)HusserlmeansanythingbutanobjectorsubstanceintheclassicalCartesiansense.Nonetheless,itiscumbersometousethewordconsciousnesssolelytotranslateBewusststein,andhencesynonymswilloccasionally,thoughcautiouslybeused.
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finalsection,whichisprimarilycommentary.Butmyunderlyinggoalistopresent
HusserlsconceptionofthereductionasaccuratelyasIcan,andfurthermorewith
minimalrecoursetojargon(thoughHusserlis,afterall,coiningmanynewterms
here),andinawaythatisatleastplausibleasaninterpretationofjustwhatHusserl
wasafter.Nonetheless,extendedquotationsareoccasionallycalledfor,asmuchis
tobegained(andclarified)throughadirectexaminationofHusserlsprecise
phraseologyofhisownmainideas.
B.TheNaturalandtheTranscendentalAttitudes
Thestoryofthereduction,sotospeak,beginswithadescriptionofthe
naturalattitude.40Sowhat,then,isthenaturalattitude?Itwouldhelptobeginby
contrastingitwithwhatHusserlalternativelycallsthephilosophical,
phenomenological,andtranscendentalattitudes(allofthesebeingequivalentin
thecurrentcontext).41Thenaturalattitudeisthedefault,normalattitudeinwhich
wetacitlyornontacitlyframeour(mostlyperceptual)experiences;thealternative
attitudeisoneinwhichwehavedisengagedfromthepresuppositionsofthenatural
attitude,particularlyregardingobjectiveexistenceandnonexistence,andhave
takenupanewappreciationoftheoriginsofmeaningfulexperienceinthedepthsof
40Ofcourse,whatispossiblymostcontroversialaboutthereductionishowitcanbebegunatall,butwewillcometothatlater(PartV).41ThispictureofattitudeswillbecomeimportantlyexpandedandenrichedinIdeasII,inwhichthenaturalattitudeisdividedintopersonalisticandnaturalisticforms.Thesewillbediscussedcloselyinthenextchapter.
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subjectivityinourselves:Imustlosetheworldbyepoch,inordertoregainitby
auniversalselfexamination.42
ButwhatdoesHusserlmeanbyattitude(Einstellung)?Amazingly,Husserl
nowheredefineshistechnicalusageoftheterminthetextoftheIdeas(or
anywhere,asfarasIcantell),perhapsowingtoitsstatusasbasictounderstanding
thereductionitself.Fornow,wewillseehowHusserlusestheterm;wewillreturn
tothequestionofhowitmightbestbedefinedattheendofthissection.
Todescribethenaturalattitude,Husserlpresentsaseriesofobservationsof
whatexperienceinthisattitudeconsistsin:
Iamconsciousofaworldendlesslyspreadoutinspace,endlesslybecomingandhavingendlesslybecomeintime.Iamconsciousofit:thatsignifies,aboveall,thatintuitivelyIfinditimmediately,thatIexperienceit.Bymyseeing,touching,hearing,andsoforth,andinthedifferentmodesofsensuousperception,corporealphysicalthingsaresimplythereforme,onhandintheliteralandfigurativesense43
Inthenaturalattitude,hecontinues,we[are]humanbeingswhoareliving
naturally,objectivating,judging,feeling,willing.44Butanimatebeingsandpeople
arethereformealso:Ilookup;IseethemIgrasptheirhands45
Thenaturalattitudeisnaturalfirstofallinthesenseofitseveryday
pervasivenessaswellasitsdefaultcharacter.Itcomestousnaturally.Roughly,
then,wecancharacterizethisasaconditioninwhichweasnormal,adulthuman
beingsfindourselvesroutinelyandasitwereautomatically,justinsofarasweare
42Husserl,Edmund.CartesianMeditations:AnIntroductiontoPhenomenology.Trans.DorionCairns.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1999(p.157).HereafterCM.43IdeasI,p.5144Ibid.,p.5145Ibid.,p.51
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aliveandawake(andmaybeasleepanddreamingaswell),inwhichweperceive
theretobeobjects,aswellaspeopleandvaluecharacteristicsofthings,toexist
outsideusandonhand.Husserlstressesthattheworldasweknowitinthe
naturalattitudeisnotsimplytheworldofscienceoramaterialworld;thuswe
naturallyperceiveaworldofobjectswithvalues,aworldofgoods,apractical
world46Intermsofmaterialobjects,weperceivenotsimply(orvirtuallyever,
unlesswearescientistsinascientificattitude)matter,butthingsliketables
andpianosobjectswithculturalmeaningaccretions.Thenaturalattitudeisalso
oneinwhichwethinkandcogitate,atleastintheeveryday(non
phenomenological!)way.47Butmostpertinentlywithregardtothe
phenomenologicalepoch,inthenaturalattitudeweaccepttheworldasafactually
existentactualityandalsoacceptitasitpresentsitselfto[us]asfactuallyexisting.48
Empiricalscienceanditsmodeofcognitionpertaintothisworld,preciselytakenas
existentinthesenseoutlined.Hencescience(asanactivityandaformofthought)
itselfbelongstothenaturalattitude,afactHusserlnevertiresofexploitingtothe
advantageofphilosophyasheconceivesit.
Husserlregardshisdescriptionofthenaturalattitudeaspretheoretical;that
is,itisnotaconstruct,butsimplywhatisdirectlyintuitedtobethecaseabout
natural,nontranscendentalexperience:
46Ibid.,p.53(Husserlsitalics)47Ibid.,p.5348Ibid,p.57(Husserlsitalics)
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Whatwepresentedasacharacterizationofthegivennessbelongingtothenaturalattitude,andthereforeasacharacterizationoftheattitudeitself,wasapieceofpuredescriptionpriortoanytheory.49
Hethennotesthatbytheorieshemeanspreconceivedopinionsofeverysort.
Husserlclaimstokeeptheseatadistancestrictly,astancehemaintains
throughouthiscareer,inkeepingwithhiscommitmenttogotothethings
themselvesandbypassthecorruptinginfluenceofpresuppositionsofanykind.
(Hencehisfamousandfamouslyimperileddreamofdevelopinga
presuppositionlessscience.)ButwhileHusserlsdescriptionofthenaturalattitude
maybepretheoretical,itismorethanapparentfromitthatwe,insofaraswedwell
inthenaturalattitude,areallatypeofnaverealist,tousethemodernparlance.
Thus,Husserlsunderstandingofthenaturalattitudemaybestbeunderstood
throughasimpleconsiderationofwhatsomebodyunbiasedby,say,fancy
metaphysicaltheoriesunderstandshimselftobeexperiencingeveryday,inthemost
thoroughlyordinarysenseimaginable,asalivinghumanbeing.Itisthisthoroughgoingaverageness,thebasicmediocrityofexistence,thatHusserl
continuallycontrastswiththedisconcertingandvertiginousheightsofthe
transcendentalattitude.ItisnotasthoughHusserldismissesnaturalexperience;to
thecontrary,thewholepurposeofphenomenologyistounderstandit.Itisjustthis
embraceoftheordinarythatdistinguishesphenomenologyfrommorespeculative
sortsofphilosophicalendeavors.Andyetthereisatranscendental,noetic
noematicdimensionofmeaningconstitution,arealminwhichordinaryexperience
becomesclarifiedintermsofitssourceandtruemeaning.Itisthrough
49Ibid.,p.56
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transcendentalinvestigationthatnaturalconsciousnesscomestoknowthe
foundationsoftheexperientialityittakesnavelyforgranted.(Iwillexplorethe
transcendentallevelinsubsequentsections.)SebastianLufthelpfullyframesthe
natural/transcendentaldistinctionintermsoftheclassicaldivisionbetweendoxa
andepisteme:
WhenHusserlconceivesofthenaturalinoppositiontothephilosophicalattitude,thisechoesthedistinctionbetweenpretranscendentalandtranscendentalstandpointsasamodernversionofthedoxa/epistemedistinction.ThetranscendentalturnanticipatedbyDescartes,andtakenbyKant,appliestherealizationofthesubjectrelativityoftheworld.Theturntothesubject,thereductiontotheego(cogito),becomesthefoundationofscience.Theworldisnotanabsolutebeing,butis
relativetotheexperiencingsubject.(Luft2034)
Hefurtherexplains:
Thedistinctionofdoxaandepistemetranslatedintothisconceptionmeans:Philosophythatbelievesitcanoperateonarealisticlevelisboundtothenaturalattitudeanditcannotbecriticalinthetranscendentalsense.ThisisnotonlyHusserlscritiqueofpretranscendentalphilosophybutespeciallyofhispupilswhoneglectedtopursuethetranscendentalpaththathehadtakenupwithIdeasI(1913).50
Luftsexplanationisuseful,butitmustbekeptinmind,afactIwillcomebackto
lateron,thatinadditiontobeingdoxicasopposedtoepistemic,thenatural
attitudeforHusserlisafalsedoxa,awrongview.Thisisimportantbecausethe
naturalattitudesnaverealismisnotonlynavebut,preciselyinshowinga
blind[ness]tothecorrelativityofworldandexperience,(Luft,208)itwrongly
pronouncesagainstjustthiscorrelativity,falsely(thoughtacitly)affirming,asLuft
pointsout,theworldsabsoluteexistence.
50Luft,Sebastian.HusserlsTheoryofthePhenomenologicalReduction:BetweenLifeWorldandCartesianism.InResearchinPhenomenology34,2004(p.204)Hereafter,Luft.
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Letusfirstreturntotheinitialquestionofwhatanattitudeissupposedto
beinthefirstplace.IfwetakeHusserlforhisword,anattitudecannotbe
explainedmerelyasapsychologicalstate,astheword(inEnglish)isroutinelytaken
todenote.Afterall,onlythenaturalattitudeproperlydeservestobecalled
psychological,asHusserlhimselfonoccasiondoescallit.51Anattitude,then,I
propose,mightbestbedefinedastheorientationinwhichtheparametersof
experiencearedelimitedanddefined.Inthenaturalattitude,theseparametersare
defined,sotospeak,bytheinternalandexternalhorizonsoftranscendentthings
(andthehalosthatformthebackgroundinwhichweperceivethem),bypeople
andlivingbeings,byvariousactsoffantasyandmemory,andtoanextentbyour
selfperception(andhenceourownegos).Butinthetranscendentalattitude,these
parametersshifttosomethingnew,afieldofconstitution,aswellastothe
transcendentalegoorpureconsciousnessinwhichallworldlybeings,including
theempiricalego,arethemselvesconstituted(inwhichtheycometobeing).52A
shiftinattitudeisthusashiftoftheentirematrixofintelligibilityofthingsa
prefiguring,perhaps,ofHeideggerslaterconceptofworld.53
51Ibid.,p.126:Inourcasewehave,accordingly,ontheonehand,the psychologicalattitudeinwhichournaturallyfocusedregardisdirectedtomentalprocessese.g.toamentalprocessofrejoicingasasequenceofmentalstatesofhumanorbeast.Ontheotherhand,wehavethephenomenologicalattitude(Husserlsitalics)Seealsop.172forfurtherclarificationofwhatthepsychological
attitudeinvolves.52ItistruethatHusserldoesnotrestrictthetermattitudetothecontrastofnaturalandtranscendentalattitudes:healsospeaksoftheeideticattitude,thenaturalscientificattitude,etc..Onemaystillapplyourdefinition,however:forexample,intheeideticattitudetheparametersofexperienceareessences,ratherthanfacts.(Itneedstobeunderstood,ofcourseasIwilldiscussbelowthatthetranscendentalattitudepresupposestheeidetic,whilethenaturalmayormaynotoverlapwitheideticattitude.)53IamindebtedtoDr.PolVandeveldeforthislanguageofparametersandintelligibility,aswellastohisunderstandingofHeideggersconceptionofaworld,thoughIwouldnotpresumetosayhewouldendorsemyapplicationoftheseconceptsunderthesecircumstances.
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C.PhenomenologicalEpoch
Husserlbeginshisshiftintothenewattitudebynoticingthat,contrarytoits
spiritoftotalselfconfidence,thenaturalattitudehassomeansweringtodo.For
therearepresuppositionstoitspsychologicalexperience54thatremainsofar
unexploredandunknown(tonaturalconsciousnessitself).Husserlwantsto
investigatethese.Herenowaradicalalterationiscalledfor:anewstyleof
attitudeisneededwhichisentirelyalteredincontrasttothenaturalattitudein
experiencingandthenaturalattitudeinthinking.55Inordertodemonstratethis
transformation,HusserlcallsfatefullyupontheexampleofDescartesandthelatters
MeditationsonFirstPhilosophy.Subsequently,thewaytothereductionoutlinedin
IdeasIistypicallycalledtheCartesianway.Husserlcertainlybelievedthat
Descarteshadopenedthewaytoawhollynewfieldofbeing,whichHusserlhimself
callstranscendentalsubjectivity,buthealsobelievedthatDescartesdidnot
properlyunderstandhisownachievementandhencefellawayfromthenewperch
almostassoonashereachedit,aswewillseebelow.
HusserlexploitstheCartesianmethodofdoubtinanewandoriginalway.
Throughhisownconfrontationwithskepticism,Descartesenactedthisfamous
methodinordertoreachthefoundationofknowledge,theselfcertainIthink,I
am(cogito).Husserlnowpracticesavariationofthismethodinordertoreacha
similarlyselfevidentsphere,somethingheisabouttocallasphereofpure
consciousnessorimmanence.ButHusserldoesnotwanttoactuallydoubtanything,
certainlynottheindubitableexistenceoftheworld(whichisalwayspresupposedin
54IdeasI,xix55Ibid.,xix
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consciousnessasitsultimatehorizon).Whatheisinterestedinistheattemptat
doubt.Forwhilewecannotdoubtcertainthings,wecanattempttodoubtanything
whatever,nomatterhowfirmlyconvincedofit,evenassuredofitinanadequate
evidence,wemaybe.56Thenatureofsuchanact,theattemptatdoubt,isto
hypotheticallyplacetheexistenceofthatwhichisdoubtedintometaphorical
bracketsorparentheses.Iteffectsacertainannulmentofpositingandprecisely
thisinterestsus.Thereisnoquestionofnegatingthatwhichexists,i.e.denyingits
existence.Butthereisasuddenneutralitywithregardtothisentirequestion
somethingwhollypeculiar.57Thequestionoftheexistenceofthingsissuddenly
putoutofaction,andinmywords,intoakindofpurgatorialmaybethat
neverthelessallowsonetofocusonsomethingelseinthiscase,onthemannersof
givennessofthings.Thisnewfocus58automaticallyimplicatesthemasexperienced
bysomeone,i.e.,showsthemintheirselfgivenness.
Aswehavesaid,theparenthesizingofpositingsofexistenceiswhatis
calledtheepoch.Morespecifically,thereareseveraltypesofepoch.Whatisat
issuenow,however,isnot,forexample,thekindofepochonespeaksofinregards
tothebracketingoffeaturesunrelatedtothestudyathand(forexample,a
scientistbracketsallvaluepredicatesofphysicalobjectsandfocusesontheir
spatiotemporaldeterminationssolely,aphenomenologicalpsychologistbracketsall
materialorbiochemicalaspectsofanlivingorganism,etc.),butratherthefulland
56Ibid.,p.5857Ibid.,p.5858ItmightbenotedthatthissortoflanguagechangingfocuswouldnotreallybesufficientforHusserltocapturetheradicalityofthenewattitude,sinceitisitselfborrowedfromexperiencewithinthenaturalattitude.
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totalbracketingofthequestionofexistence(ornonexistence)oftheentireworld
(includingevenoneselfinsofarasoneispartoftheworld,thoughthiscomes
later)thethesisoftheworld(Weltthesis).Butcanweeffectaglobalepochof
thissort?Canweputthewholeofrealityinbrackets?Thisisaquestionwewill
comebacktoattheendofthischapter.
D.Phenomenological-TranscendentalReduction(s)
ThebracketingoftranscendentthingsisnotforHusserlsufficient,however,
toreachthetranscendentalego.59Itonlygoesasfarassealingthepsycheofffrom
whatmightbecalled(fromanaturalattitudinalstandpoint,anyway)theexternal
world.ItisherethatHusserlmakesanotherinterestingdeparturefromDescartes.
Theego,too[is]arealObjectlikeothersinthenaturalworld.60Thisisnottrue
onlyinthesensethatIhaveaphysicalbody,butalsointhesensethatIeffect
cogitationes,actsofconsciousnessinboththebroaderandthenarrowersenseand
theseacts,asbelongingtothehumansubject,areoccurrenceswithinthesame
naturalactuality.61(Thisprincipleofthenaturalityofpsychicasopposedto
transcendentalconsciousnesswillonceagainbecomeacentralthemeinIdeasII.)
Inlaterwritings,Husserldistinguishesbetweenthephenomenologicalreduction
andthetranscendentalreduction,characterizingthelatterasafurtherstep
beyondtheformer,preciselyintermsofthefurtherbracketingoftheego.The
phenomenologicalreductiononthisunderstandingeffectsauniversalepochonthe
59Moreissaidaboutthisconceptinthissectionbelow.60IdeasI,p.6461Ibid.
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naturalworld,butnotupontheegoitself.Henceitisareductiontowhatmightbe
calledphenomenologicalpsychologyortheintentionallifeofconsciousness,but
withoutanexplicitrecognitiononlytobesuppliedthroughthefinal,
transcendentalreductionoftheultimatesourceofmeaning,thetranscendental
ego:
Ifthetranscendentalrelativityofeverypossibleworlddemandsanallembracingbracketing,italsopostulatesthebracketingofpurepsychesandthepurephenomenologicalpsychologyrelatedtothem.
Andso,
Accordingly,theconsistentreflectiononconsciousnessyieldshimtimeaftertimetranscendentallypuredata,andmoreparticularlyitisintuitiveinthemodeofnewkindofexperience,transcendentalinnerexperience.62
InIdeasI,Husserllatercomestounderstandthesetwodistinctstepstohavebeen
conflated.63Onceitiskeptinmind,however,itissufficientforourpurposestokeep
thembothascomprisingwhatHusserltreatsinIdeasIasasingle
phenomenologicalreductionareductiontophenomenologicalconsciousness
and,therewith,thetranscendentalego.
Husserlsbracketingofthe(empirical)egoisamajordevelopmentthat,in
Husserlsunderstanding,distinguisheshisownmethod,atthispoint,from
62ThesequotesarefromHusserlsEncyclopaediaBritannicaarticleof1928(trans.RichardE.Palmer),reproducedinfullin:Kockelmanns,JosephJ.EdmundHusserlsPhenomenology.Indianapolis:PurdueUniversityPress,1994(p.209)KockelmannssourceforthetranslationisHusserl:ShorterWorks.McCormackandElliston,eds.NotreDame,Ind.:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1981(pp.2135).63Seefn.3,above.
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Descartes.64Forthereductiondoesnotretreatintoaprivatecogitooritstheater
ofconsciousness;neitherdoesitmerelyseizeontheessenceofconsciousness,when
takeninthemundanesense(thisisstillthetaskofpsychology).
Evenmoreinaccessibletohim[Descartes],andnaturallyso,wastheconsiderationthattheegoasitisdisclosedwithintheepoch,existingforitself,isasyetnotatallanegowhichcanhaveotherormanyfellowegosoutsideitself.ItremainedhiddenfromDescartesthatallsuchdistinctionsasIandyou,insideandoutside,firstconstitutethemselvesintheabsoluteego.65
HusserlunderstandsDescartestohavecorrectlydiscoveredtheabsolute
egoastheindubitableultimatumoftranscendentalinquiry,onlytohavethen
misinterpretedhisowndiscoveryinanimportantway.Inparticular,hefailedto
properlygraspthenatureoftheIoftheselfcertainIthink,Iam.66TheIin
questionisnotme,Descartesorevensomepossibleindividualempiricalego,atleast
notquapsychophysicalbeing,butrathertranscendentalsubjectivitynota
thinkingsubjectbutthethinkerassuch,transcendentallyconsidered,forwhomand
inwhomanentireworldisconstitutedand,hence,availableinfullselfevidence
formyknowingregard.Furthermore,whileHusserlendorsesDescartesthesisthat
theIisinsomewaymorecertainthantheveryquestionoftheexistenceofthe
world,helamentsthelattersfailuretoseethattheworldisstillpreservedasa
phenomenoninthereduction.WhatDescartesfundamentallymisunderstoodisthat
theindubitableselfisnotthemereegopoleofconsciousnessorevenpsychic
empiricalconsciousnessitself.Itistranscendentalsubjectivity.67
64IdeasI,p.6865Ibid.,p.8266MyitalicsontheCartesianquote67Crisis,p.81.OnecanalsoseeherethelanguageofDescartesselfmisinterpretation.
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Yetwhatremainsafterthereductionisnonethelessastreamofmentallife.
Isthisthenotorioustranscendentalego?JustwhatHusserlmeansbythe
transcendentalegoisoneoftheverydifficultproblemstosolveinHusserl
scholarship.AccordingtoDavidBell,thetranscendentalegoisnothingbutthe
ordinary,commonorgardenmind,albeitviewedfromwithinaphilosophicalor
transcendentalperspective.Insupportofthisthesishecitesthefollowingpassage
fromtheCrisis:Astranscendentalego,afterall,Iamthesameegothatinthe
worldlysphereisahumanego.WhatwasconcealedfrommeinthehumansphereI
revealthroughtranscendentalenquiry.68Inthisspirit,wewouldperhapsnotdo
badlytounderstandthetranscendentalegoofIdeasIastheselfquatranscendental
sphereofnoetic-noematicconsciousness,withallofitsactsandintentionalobjects
included,andunderstoodtoconstituteitselfthroughthelawsoftemporality
(thoughHusserlelaboratesonthislastpartlater).Ofcourse,thisdefinitionmight
seemtoconflictwithHusserlsenigmaticpostIdeasIclaimthatthemeaningof
transcendentalsubjectivityistranscendentalintersubjectivity.69Butwewillhaveto
presentlyleavethatcomplexissueaside.
68Bell,David.Husserl.NewYork:Routlege,1990(p.207),hereafterBell;theHusserlquotecanbefoundinCrisis,p.26469ThesubtitleoftheFifthMeditationofthe CM(p.89)statesthepointdirectly:Uncoveringofthe
SphereofTranscendentalBeingasMonadologicalIntersubjectivity.TherecanbenoquestionbutthatHusserlviewsintersubjectivityhere(andfortherestofhiscareer)astheauthenticmeaningoftranscendentalsubjectivity.Thetranscendentalegoisnotayouorme,butneitherisitanempiricalcommunity(asthiscouldleadtorelativism,oneofHusserlsavowedenemies),butsomehowanIthatisaweinatranscendentalregister.WecannothererehearsethestepsofHusserlselaboratedescriptionofthemannerinwhichthebeingofotheregosisevincedandverifiedintherealmofthetranscendentalego.(p.90)ForadetailedexpositionandinterpretationofHusserlsviewsee:Zahavi,Dan.HusserlandTranscendentalIntersubjectivity:AResponsetotheLinguistic-PragmaticCritique.TranslatedbyElizabethA.Behnke.Athens:OhioUniversityPress,2001.(Seeespeciallypp.15966).
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E.AnInterlude:OntheMotivationoftheReduction
Beforefurtherexploringthephilosophicalandontologicalimplicationsofthe
reduction(seePartIVbelow),wemightatthisstageaskwhatactuallymotivatesit
inthefirstplace.Sofar,wehavepresentedthereductionlargelyasHusserl(inIdeas
I)himselfdoes,namelyasaprocedureforgettingatthetruthofexperienceandthe
world.ButwhatmakesHusserlthinkthisparticularmethodisnecessary,asopposed
toothers?HereitisimportanttounderstandthatHusserlfitsintoaveryold
traditioninphilosophy,namelythequestforwhatmightbecalledrealandsecure
knowledge.Alongtheselines,thephilosopherspeaksoftheelementalquestfor
freedominthiscasetheepistemicfreedomthatcanalsobedescribedasthe
freedomfromerrorandbias,illusionandemptyabstraction.Foritisthepursuitof
certainty,clarity,andfreedomfromprejudicethatconspiretoproducetheprecisely
HusserlianversionofphenomenologythatburstsforthoutofIdeasI.See,for
example,Husserlsreferencetogenuinefreedomfromprejudice70inthefirstpart,
orHusserlsowndeclarationthatthegoalofthephenomenologicalreductionsisto
reachthefreevistaoftranscendentallypurifiedphenomenaand,therewith,the
fieldofphenomenologyinourpeculiarsense.71
Whatwecangather,then,isthat(transcendental)phenomenologyis
motivatedbyathirstforacertainfreedom,inparticularafreedomfrom
presuppositions.Butiffreedomfrompresuppositionsmotivatesthereduction,what
isthissupposedtobeafreedomto?Inshort,Husserlwasinsearchofthe
foundationofknowledge.Wemustbefreefrombiasinordertogainaccesstoa
70IdeasI,p.36(myitalics)71Ibid.,xix
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securezoneofknowing,adirectaccesstoreality.Logic,science,andmathematics
makethemostvigorousclaimstoknowledgeinourandHusserlsera,butHusserl
becameconvincedthateventheyneededsecuringonamorefundamentalbasis.But
Husserlwasnotsimplyametascientist.Insteadofbeingmerelyfixatedongiving
thesesciencesafoundation,hecamealsotobefascinatedforitsownsakewiththe
realmofmeaningsinwhichconsciousnessrevealedallthingsintheiressence.He
cametoregardphilosophyunderstoodinanewandnondogmaticwayasthe
indispensablescienceandthefoundationofallknowledge.Italonebearsthe
customaryroleandtheresponsibilityofansweringtheskepticwhodeniesthe
possibilityofknowledge,andhedoesthisbyshowingthewaytoanindubitable,
undeniablesourceofapodicticevidence.Husserlsstrivingforknowledgeissodeep
andthoroughthatheiswillingtorevisehimselfruthlessly.Husserldidnotthink
philosophywasascienceamongsciencesi.e.,asjustanotherformalor
materialontologythatmakesclaimsandargumentsaboutacertainregionof
reality.Sounlikepreviousphilosophers,HusserlinlargeagreementwithKant,his
transcendentalistancestorplacedallhistrustnotinsomerealmofmetaphysical
truths,intuitedorlearnedthroughrevelation(suchasPlatonicForms,God,
AbsoluteSpirit),fromwhichtoderiveandsecureothers,butsimplyinexperience.
Philosophysroleistodrawitsevidencefromthewellofexperienceactsof
consciousnessandthethingsofwhichitisconscious(egocogitocogitatum)
throughamethodinwhicheverythingbutthispurifiedexperientialityissuspended
indefinitely,andputoutofactionforthetranscendentalgaze.
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InthiswayHusserlsphilosophicalorientation,broadlyconstrued,is
radicallyepistemological.ButthisdoesnotmeanHusserlwasconcernedwith
epistemologyinthenarrowsenseinusetodayHusserlwasnotoverlyconcerned
withdefiningknowledgeasjustifiedtruebelieforsomethingelse,forexample.
Andheisnot,onceagain,obsessedwiththesubjectivesideofknowing(noetic
phenomenology)inthewaytraditionalepistemologyis(exceptingthecausaland
externalistmodels,ofcourse),ashegivesampleattentiontothevariousobjects
thatareknown(noematicphenomenology).Itdoesmean,however,thatfor
Husserl,todiscoverhowknowledgetakesplaceisbothanecessaryandasufficient
taskforphilosophyassuch,regardedinitspurestessence.
III.EssencesandtheEideticReduction
Besidesthephenomenologicalreduction,thereisanother,nolessimportant
typeofreductionwhoseperformanceisalsonecessaryforphenomenologyas
Husserlconceivesit:theeideticreduction.HusserlbeginstheversionofIdeasI
eventuallypublishedwithatackedonbut(tohismind)crucialdiscussionofthe
eideticnatureofphenomenology,tryingtoclassifyphenomenologyamongandas
againstothersciences.Thismaterialisveryinteresting,butwecanonlytouchon
itbrieflyhere,insofarasitisrelevanttoourtask.
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Thereis,forHusserl,afundamentaldividebetweenmattersoffact(in
muchtheHumeansense)ontheonehandandessences(oreid)ontheother.72
Overlappingwiththisdistinctionisthatbetweenreality(thereal,whichistosay
factical)ortheempiricalontheonehand,andessentiality,ontheother.What
exactlyisaHusserlianessence,oreidos?Isit,forexample,auniversal?Sucha
questionmaynotbeterriblyhelpful,giventhecontestednessofthequestionof
universalsitself,butHusserlianessencesareuniversallikeinthattheyare
multiplyinstantiableandnonparticular.Thatis,theyarenotsingularintheway
existentparticularsare.However,itisnottechnicallytruetosaythattheyare
outsideofspaceandtime;theydonotsubsistlikePlatonicFormsinasupra
spatiotemporalorder,asHusserlforcefullyunderscores.73Essencesarealso
ontologicalinastrongsensethatis,theyarenotpurelylinguisticor
conventional.Wedonotdecideasacommunitywhatisorisnotanessence,at
leastaspertainstothenaturalandspiritualfurnitureoftheworld;wediscoversuch
essences.
Thecleargraspofessencesisachievedthroughamethodknownas
imaginativevariation.Intheeideticreductionwhichistobeperformedbefore
thephenomenologicalreductiononeistobracketoutallparticular,factical,and
contingentfeaturesofthingsperceived(orremembered,imagined,etc.)andtoseize
onlythosefeaturesthatbelongtotheobjectnecessarilyi.e.,thatmaketheobject
whatitis.Inotherwords,theeideticreductiondistillsthosecategorialformsthat
weintuitinthings.Yethowdoesoneclearlydistinguishbetweentheessentialand
72Ibid.,pp.7873Ibid.,pp.4042
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inessentialaspectsofthings?Thisiswhereimaginativevariationasamultiply
repeatableexercisebecomescrucial:wearetoimaginethethingsinmanydifferent
circumstancesandundergoingmanychanges.Ineachchangeofcircumstance,some
featureorpropertyofthethingisaltered.Doestheobjectsurviveasjusttheobject
thatitisevenafterthisalteration?Thenthepropertyalteredmusthavebeen
inessential.Aftervaryingtheobjectenough,itistobecomeapparentwhatthe
essentialfeaturesoftheobjectare.
Hence,inkeepingwithatraditioninauguratedbytheGreeksandsustained
bythescholastics,essencesrevealthewhatofthings(andpeople),theessential
natureofthings,and,tothisextent,theirbeing.Allthesame,therearetwodistinct
sensesofthewordbeingessenceandexistence.74Itwouldseemthattheessence
ofathingcannotexistwithoutthereexistingthingsthatinstantiatethatessence.75
Thereare,then,atleastthesetwooptionsforthetheoreticalregardofan
objectorreal(athingorstateofaffairs,forexample):toviewitasfactualand
spatiotemporallylocated,ortoviewitinitsessentiality,i.e.intermsoftheessences
itinstantiates.Thedistinctiondoesnot,however,correspondtothatbetweenthe
naturalandtranscendentalattitudes;fortranscendentalreflectionisnottheonly
sciencedoneintheeideticattitude.Essencesarenottheprovinceonlyof
phenomenology.Phenomenologyisaneideticscience,butnotalleideticsciences
e.g.,logicandmathematicsarepersephenomenological.Phenomenology,in
Husserlsconception,isthereforeoneofmanyeideticsciences.(Tobemoreprecise
74Ibid.,p.1275Attimes,itdoesseemasthoughHusserlgoesevenfurther:Positingofessencesimpliesnottheslightestpositingofanyindividualfactualexistences;pureeidetictruthscontainnottheslightest
assertionaboutmattersoffact.(IdeasI,p.11;Husserlsitalics)
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still,onemightsaythatthereisnothingphenomenologicalintheeidosofthe
eidetic,butverymuchsomethingeideticintheeidosofthe
phenomenological.)
Husserlmakesmuchdependnotonlyontheeideticreduction,butalsoon
thestrictandabsolutedifferencebetweenfactsandessences,theempiricalandthe
eidetic.EssentialismalsobecomesextremelyimportantforHusserlspurposesin
termsofhisdistinguishingbetweentheessencesofmentalprocessesontheone
handandphysicalthingsontheother.76ThusitwillbecentraltoHusserls
delineationsoftheessencesofconsciousnessandreality,aswewillseebelow.
IV.ConsciousnessandWorld
A.Intentionality,NoesisandNoema,andTranscendence
ForHusserl,asforhisteacherBrentano,themostfundamentalfactabout
consciousnessisthatitisintentionalitisintrinsicallyaboutorofsomething.77
Fromtheperspectiveofthetraditionalissuesinmodernphilosophyofmindand
epistemology,thephenomenologicalnotionofintentionality,alreadyanticipatedby
Kant78,couldbyitselfbeseentosolve,asitwere,theoldquestionofhowsomething
likeconsciousness,whichisinner,cantranscenditselfandreachouttoaworld
76Ibid.,p.9877Ibid.,pp.73578See,forexample:Russell,Matheson.Husserl:AGuideforthePerplexed.ContinuumBooks.NewYork:2006(p.47).HereafterRussell.Theconceptisalsopresentinmedievalwriters.
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thatisoutsideofitouter.Forintentionalityrevealsanintimate,indeed
unbreakablebondbetweenanactofconsciousness(noesis)ontheonehand,and
anintentionalobject(noema,vaguelyakintoKantsphenomenological
objectGegenstand)ontheother.Onemightatfirstbetemptedtosaythatsucha
relationshiptakesplacewithinconsciousnessitself,butconsciousnessshouldnow
beseenasanequivocalterm.Consciousnessasintentionalityhousesbotha
subjectivepoleaswellasanobjectiveone;consciousnessinthissenseisnot
meresubjectivity.Whilethisisnotsomuchaproofthatthereexistsanoutside
world,sincethisisbuiltintotheverydefinitionofexperience(atleastforHusserl),
itisafundamentalproblematizationoftheveryinner/outerdistinction
philosophyhadbeentakingforgrantedprephenomenologically(orprecritically
intheKantiansense).Thereissimplynosenseintheideaofaconsciousness
essentiallyunrelatedtoanintendedworld,horizon,orobject.
Mostcommentatorshavegenerallyfoundthereferentofthetermnoesisto
beunproblematictograsp,butnotsonoema.Asmentioned,thetermnoesis
referstointentionalactsofconsciousnessandnoematotheobjectssointended
(andquaintended).InHusserlswords:
CorrespondingineverycasetothemultiplicityofDatapertainingtothereallyinherentnoeticcontent,thereisamultiplicityofData,demonstrableinactualpureintuition,inacorrelativenoematiccontentor,inshort,inthenoematermswhichweshallcontinuetousefromnowon.79
Husserlgivesanexample,pertainingtotheexperienceofseeingatree:
thetreesimpliciter,thephysicalthingbelongingtoNature,isnothinglessthanthis perceivedtreeasperceivedwhich,asperceptualsense,inseparablybelongstotheperception.Thetreecanburnup,be
79Ibid.,p.214
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resolvedintoitschemicalelements,etc.Butthesensethesenseofthisperception,somethingbelongingnecessarilytoitsessencecannotburnup;ithasnochemicalelements,noforces,norealproperties.80
However,thenoemaisnotforHusserlareallyinherentpartofconsciousness.The
noematree,saysHusserl,isnomorecontainedinherentlythanisthetreewhich
belongstoactuality.81
Hencethenoemaofaperceptionissimplytheperceivedasperceived.This
wouldapplyacrosstheboardtoallthevarioustypesofact:thenoemaofa
recollectionistherecollectedasrecollected,thenoemaofafantasyisthefantasied
thingasfantasied,etc.Husserlalsocallsthenoemaornoematiccorrelatethe
senseofanact.Howthisdefinitionofitmatchesupwiththefirstisadeepsource
ofdebate,butitcannotbefurtheredaddressedhere.82
Ashintedatalready,thenoeticnoematicbifurcationallowsHusserltoclaim
thatphenomenologyisnotmerelyaboutconsciousnessinthenarrowsenseof
subjectiveconsciousnesssincethisisonlythenoeticpoleofexperiencebut
alsoabouttheobjectsexperienced(asexperienced)thenoematicpole.Every
consciousexperience,withoutfail,hasbothanoeticandanoematicside.Itmakes
nosensetoisolatetheconsciousnessoffromthatofwhichthereis
consciousnessapointMohantymakeseloquentlyinspeakingoftheirreducibility
ofthephraseconsciousnessofsomething:
80Ibid.,p.21681Ibid.,p.23782Onceagain,Bellswayofcharacterizingtheissueishelpfulforourpresentnarrowpurposes:somethingisnoematicinsofarasitisanimmanent,butnonrealcontributoryfactorinthepossessionbyanactofsignif