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8/14/2019 Mergers and Divestitures
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CHAPTER 21
Mergers and Divestitures
Types of mergers Merger analysis
Role of investment bankers Corporate alliances LBOs, divestitures, and
holding companies
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Why do mergers occur? Synergy: Value of the whole exceeds
sum of the parts. Could arise from:
Operating economies Financial economies
Differential management efficiency
Increased market power
Taxes (use accumulated losses)
Break-up value: Assets would be morevaluable if sold to some other company.
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questionable reasons for
mergers? Diversification
Purchase of assets at belowreplacement cost
Get bigger using debt-financedmergers to help fight off
takeovers
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What is the difference betweena friendly and a hostile
takeover? Friendly merger:
The merger is supported by the managements ofboth firms.
Hostile merger: Target firms management resists the merger.
Acquirer must go directly to the target firmsstockholders try to get 51% to tender their shares.
Often, mergers that start out hostile end up as
friendly when offer price is raised.
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Reasons why alliances can make
more sense than acquisitions Access to new markets and
technologies
Multiple parties share risks andexpenses
Rivals can often work together
harmoniously Antitrust laws can shelter
cooperative R&D activities
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Merger analysis:Post-merger cash flow
statements2003 2004 2005 2006
Net sales $60.0 $90.0 $112.5 $127.5
- Cost of goods sold 36.0 54.0 67.5 76.5
- Selling/admin. exp. 4.5 6.0 7.5 9.0- Interest expense 3.0 4.5 4.5 6.0
EBT 16.5 25.5 33.0 36.0
- Taxes 6.6 10.2 13.2 14.4
Net Income 9.9 15.3 19.8 21.6
Retentions 0.0 7.5 6.0 4.5
Cash flow 9.9 7.8 13.8 17.1
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What is the appropriate discountrate to apply to the targets cash
flows? Estimated cash flows are residuals which
belong to acquirers shareholders.
They are riskier than the typical capital
budgeting cash flows. Because fixed interestcharges are deducted, this increases thevolatility of the residual cash flows.
Because the cash flows are risky equity flows,they should be discounted using the cost ofequity rather than the WACC.
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Discounting the targets cash
flowsThe cash flows reflect the
targets business risk, not the
acquiring companys. However, the merger will affect
the targets leverage and taxrate, hence its financial risk.
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Calculating terminal value Find the appropriate discount rate
kS(Target) = kRF + (kM kRF )Target
= 9% + (4%)(1.3) = 14.2% Determine terminal value
TV2006 = CF2006 (1 + g) / (kS g)
= $17.1 (1.06) / (0.142 0.06)
=$221.0 million
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Net cash flow stream2003 2004 2005 2006
Annual cash flow $9.9 $7.8 $13.8 $ 17.1
Terminal value 221.0Net cash flow $9.9 $7.8 $13.8 $238.1
Value of target firm
Enter CFs in calculator CFLO register, and enter I/YR =14.2%. Solve for NPV = $163.9 million
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ou ano er acqu r ngcompany obtain the same
value? No. The input estimates would be
different, and different synergies
would lead to different cash flowforecasts.
Also, a different financing mix or taxrate would change the discount rate.
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outstanding at a price of $9.00 pershare. What should the offering
price be?The acquirer estimates the maximum pricethey would be willing to pay by dividing thetargets value by its number of shares:
Max price = Targets value / # of shares
= $163.9 million / 10 million
= $16.39
Offering range is between $9 and $16.39 pershare.
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Making the offerThe offer could range from $9 to
$16.39 per share.
At $9 all the merger benefits wouldgo to the acquirers shareholders. At $16.39, all value added would go
to the targets shareholders. Acquiring and target firms must
decide how much wealth they arewilling to forego.
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Shareholder wealth in a
mergerShareholders
Wealth
Acquirer Target
BargainingRange
Price Paidfor Target
$9.00 $16.39
0 5 10 15 20
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Shareholder wealth Nothing magic about crossover price from
the graph.
Actual price would be determined bybargaining. Higher if target is in betterbargaining position, lower if acquirer is.
If target is good fit for many acquirers,
other firms will come in, price will be bidup. If not, could be close to $9.
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Shareholder wealth Acquirer might want to make high
preemptive bid to ward off other
bidders, or low bid and then plan togo up. It all depends upon theirstrategy.
Do targets managers have 51% of
stock and want to remain in control? What kind of personal deal will
targets managers get?
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Do mergers really createvalue?
The evidence strongly suggests: Acquisitions do create value as a
result of economies of scale, othersynergies, and/or bettermanagement.
Shareholders of target firms reapmost of the benefits, because ofcompetitive bids.
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Functions of InvestmentBankers in Mergers
Arranging mergers Assisting in defensive tactics Establishing a fair value Financing mergers Risk arbitrage