Medieval Theories of Free Will

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Medieval Theories of Free Will

Why do human beings perform the actions they perform? What moves them to act?

Why do we blame a human being for knocking over the vase and not the family dog?

What gives us the idea that we are free to choose as we wish, that we have free will?These and other questions about human action have fascinated philosophers for

centuries. Throughout the thousand year period of the Middle Ages, scholars provided a

wide variety of different answers to these questions. These thinkers developed theories

both remarkable and original in their own right that continue to be of interest to scholars

working in this area today. While they shared an understanding of human psychology

and enjoyed a common intellectual heritage, they nevertheless maintained a lively and

diverse conversation on this topic throughout the whole of the Middle Ages, providing

us with a sophisticated intellectual inheritance.

This article considers a wide range of theories written throughout the Middle Ages,

from the foundational work ofAugustine in the early part of the period through that ofJohn Duns Scotus at the end. It notes the ways in which later work on the topic builds

upon that developed earlier, shows the lively disagreements that often arose on the

topic, and, although medieval thinkers worked within a different framework than

philosophers do today, reveals how their discussions share certain affinities.

Table of Contents

1. Medieval and Current Understandings of Free Will

2. Individual Theories the Early Middle Ages

1. Augustine

2. Anselm of Canterbury

3. Bernard of Clairvaux

3. Individual Theories Sentences Commentaries

1. Peter Lombard

2. Albert the Great

4. Individual Theories the High Middle Ages

1. Thomas Aquinas

2. John Duns Scotus

5. Conclusion

6. References and Further Reading

1. Primary Sources

2. Secondary Sources
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1. Medieval and Current Understandings of Free Will

Although at first glance it might not seem so, medieval philosophers were concerned

with many of the same issues that interest philosophers today. The current discussion of

action focuses on the topic of free will: whether free will is compatible with causal

determinism, and the relationship between free will and moral responsibility. Medieval

thinkers also discussed many of these issues; for example, they accept the common

intuition that unless one acts freely, one cannot be held morally responsible for what

one does. But the structure of their discussion often makes it difficult to recognize the

extent to which their concerns both resemble and deviate from the current debate.

Thinkers in the early part of the Middle Ages discussed human action and freedom in

the context of broader theological concerns such as the problem of evil or the effects of

the Fall, that is, the sin of the first human beings. As the Middle Ages progressed,

scholars became more interested in discussing the nature of freedom for its own sake,

apart from the particular theological problems in which free will forms an important

part of their solution. Thus, discussions of free will become embedded in larger treatisesof human psychology. This is not to say that later theorists lost interest in those

theological problems; rather, discussions of the two issues diverged from each other and

became discrete subjects of investigation.

Medieval philosophers did not ask the question whether free will was compatible with

causal determinism, not because they did not understand the ramifications of cause and

effect or because they lacked a scientific notion of the world. They recognized the

regularities of the world and understood the implications of a mechanistic world-view.

They did not ask this question because they accepted the position that the freedom of

human action is incompatible with causal determinism and because they believed that

human beings in fact do act freely, at least on some occasions. Thus, in current terms,they were libertarians about human freedom. They argued that human beings are

importantly different from other animals and the rest of creation. Human beings act

freely because they possess rational capacities, which are lacking in other animals.

Rational capacities enable human beings to act freely because those capacities are

immaterial. How does the immateriality of those capacities enable human beings to act

freely? The argument, roughly, is as follows: Everything else in the world is made of

matter and thus is material or physical. Material things are governed by particular laws

and so are determined to particular activities. If human beings were wholly material,

then their actions would also be determined and they would not act freely. But because

the capacities that bring about action are immaterial in nature, and hence, not governed

by physical laws, actions that come about as a result of those capacities will beuncoerced, at least under ordinary circumstances. According to medieval accounts of

freedom, then, freedom is incompatible with causal determinism (although medieval

philosophers would not express the point in these terms). Since they all agree on this

issue, medieval accounts of freedom then attempt to answer the question how is it that

human beings are able to act freely? The answer to this question was hotly contested.

All medieval theorists agreed that human beings have a soul that enables them to

perform the actions that they perform. As the era progressed, theories of human

psychology grew more and more elaborate, but even in the earliest theories, two

capacities in particular stood out: the intellect and the will. The intellect is the human

capacity to cognize. The will is the human motivational capacity; it is the capacity that

moves us to do what we do. The will depends upon the intellect to identify what
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alternatives for action are possible and desirable. It is on the basis of these intellectually

cognized alternatives that the will chooses. Medieval theorists recognized that it is the

human being who thinks and who acts, but it is in virtue of having an intellect and

having a will that human beings are able to do what they do. Talk about what the

intellect thinks or what the will does is a kind of shorthand for what the individual does

in virtue of those capacities In light of a common theory of human psychology, themedieval debate centered upon whether human beings act freely primarily in virtue of

their wills or in virtue of their intellects. Those who argue that freedom is primarily a

function of the intellect are known as intellectualists while those who argue that

freedom is primarily a function of the will are known as voluntarists, from the Latin

word for will, voluntas.

2. Individual Theories the Early Middle Ages

a. Augustine

Augustine was interested in the topic of human action and freedom because he needed

to explain how it is that God is not responsible for the presence of evil in the world

while at the same time holding that God sustains and governs the world. On his view,

human beings do evil things when they give in to their desires for the temporal things

instead of pursuing eternal things such as knowledge, virtue, and God. His theory of

human nature is rather rudimentary, but it helps to establish the foundation for later

more elaborate accounts. Human beings possess the rational capacities of intellect and

will as well as sensory capabilities and desire. Human beings perceive the world around

them, including what things are available to be pursued, through their senses. Such data

can also stimulate basic desires. This information is fed to the intellect, which makes

judgments about the contents of perception and desire. Choices as to what to do aremade in virtue of the will. Augustine argues that desire can never overwhelm an agent;

because they have intellects and wills, agents are not determined by basic bodily

desires. Rather, an agent gives in to desire in virtue of the will, which operates freely

and never under compulsion. In fact, if a will were ever coerced, Augustine says it

would not be a will. Thus, human beings commit sins freely by giving into the desire for

temporal things, which the intellect and will could disregard in favor of the eternal

things that human beings ought to pursue. Since human beings act freely, Augustine

argues that they, and not God, are responsible for evil in the world.

Early in his career, Augustine was very optimistic about the human ability to resist

temptation and sin. He argued that all one had to do in order to avoid sin was simply towill against it. This got him into a bit of trouble with a particular heresy of the time

Pelagianism. Pelagius was a contemporary of Augustines who held that human beings

are able to bring about their own salvation and do not require grace from God. This

position contradicts the traditional Christian view of the Fall of Adam and Eve and the

need for the Incarnation of Jesus and grace from God. Not surprisingly, Pelagius took

Augustines early writings to be favorable to his own position. Augustine argued that

Pelagius misinterpreted his early views, and in his later writings, he was much more

careful to insist upon the pernicious effects of sin upon human behavior and the need for

Gods grace in order to avoid sin and achieve salvation. This sets up a tension with his

insistence upon free will that exercised the minds of later theorists and one that

Augustine himself did not entirely resolve.
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b. Anselm of Canterbury

Anselms account of action and freedom reflects a broadly Augustinian framework.

Like Augustine, Anselm describes human action in terms of the workings of intellect

and will. Anselm also accepts the view that unless human beings act freely, they cannot

be held responsible for their actions and God will be blamed for sin. Worries over theeffect of sin and grace also help to structure his account.

Anselm rejects the notion that one must be able to act in ways other than they do in

order to be free. If freedom had to be defined in these terms, then God, the good angels,

the blessed in heaven, the bad angels, and the damned in hell could not be free since

they lack this ability to do otherwise. God, the good angels, and the blessed cannot

bring about evil while the bad angels and the damned cannot bring about the good. In

the medieval theological tradition, God is perfectly good so it is not possible for God to

will or perform evil. Medieval theologians also argued that rational beings (human

beings, angels) admitted into heaven are confirmed in the good in such a way that they

are unable to choose what is bad, while rational beings who are sent to hell areconfirmed in evil in such a way that they are unable to chose what is good. But Anselm

believes that all of these individuals act freely even though they cannot act in ways

other than they do. This is especially the case for God, who is the freest of them all.

Therefore, Anselm argues freedom cannot consist in the ability to do otherwise; another

account of freedom must be developed. The question, then, is how does Anselm

understand the notion of freedom?

Anselm presents two different accounts of freedom, which nevertheless are related. In

De libertate arbitrii (commonly translated as On Freedom of Choice), he defines

freedom as the ability to preserve uprightness of will for its own sake. He argues thatrational beings have this ability insofar as they possess intellects by which they come to

understand how to preserve uprightness of will and insofar as they possess the will itself

in virtue of which they will to preserve that uprightness. This might seem like a strange

definition of freedom, but given the connection to moral responsibility, Anselm

understands freedom not in terms of being able to act differently than one does. Rather,

he understands freedom in terms of whether one has the ability to do the right thing for

the right reason. It is obvious that God, the good angels, and the blessed in heaven all

possess this ability, but what about sinners in this life, who from the Christian

perspective are now slaves to sin in virtue of their sin? One can raise an analogous

worry about the demons and the damned in hell, both of whom are confirmed in evil.

Anselm needs to explain how they retain the ability to do the right thing given that theyare unable to do the right thing.

Anselm explains this seemingly contradictory situation by drawing upon a distinction

between possessing an ability and exercising that ability. Because sinners, demons, and

the damned all possess intellect and will, they retain the ability to preserve uprightness

of will. They are, however, unable to exercise that ability because of the hindrance of

sin. Anselm explains this by analogy with sight. One retains the ability to see a

mountain even though on a cloudy day, one cannot in fact see it due to the hindrance of

the clouds. Similarly, one who is a slave to sin or who is confirmed in evil retains the

ability to maintain uprightness of will even though one cannot actually maintain that

uprightness because being a slave to sin or confirmation in evil hinders one from doingso. Thus, Anselm agrees with Augustine that it takes an act of God to restore the sinner
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to a state of grace, although human beings are capable of losing that grace by their own

evil (and free) choices.

Anselms second account of freedom can be called the two-wills account. In his

treatise, On the Fall of the Devil, he develops a thought-experiment in which he

imagines that God is creating an angel from scratch. At the point where God has giventhe angel under construction only a will for happiness, the angel cannot act freely. For at

this point, the angel is necessitated to will happiness and those things required for its

happiness and is not able to refrain from willing happiness. Thus, the angels act of

willing happiness is not free, for the angel could will nothing but happiness. Anselm

then asks whether the situation would be any different should God give the angel only a

will for justice, In this case, Anselm insists that the angel does not will justice freely

since the angel is necessitated to will justice and is not able not to will justice. Only

when God gives the angel both a will for happiness and a will for justice does the angel

will freely. For now the angel is not necessitated to will happiness, for he could will

justice; nor is the angel necessitated to will justice, for he could will happiness.

There are several questions that come to mind about this second account of freedom.

First, there is the worry that Anselm is now relying on a principle that he rejected in the

first account of freedom, that is, the idea that freedom requires the ability to do

otherwise. Secondly, one can ask about the relationship between the two accounts. This

second issue is easier to address than the first. One can see in Anselms two-wills

account of freedom a further development of how the will of the first account is able to

maintain uprightness of will for its own sake. If the will had only the will for justice, it

would will justice, not because it is the right thing to do, but because it must do so. If

the will had only the will for happiness, then it could not will justice at all. Thus, it is

only when the will has both the will for justice and the will for happiness that the will

has the ability to maintain uprightness for the sake of uprightness. That is to say that the

will has the ability to will the right thing (that is, justice) for the right reason.

The first issue is harder to resolve. Anselm implies that having the will for happiness

means that one need not will justice and vice versa. Thus, one who has both wills is able

to will justly or not, as it pleases the agent. This implies that the one who follows the

will for justice could have abandoned justice to follow the will for happiness and vice

versa. But this implies the ability to act otherwise and also implies that God and the

blessed could abandon justice for happiness while the demons and the damned could

abandon happiness for justice, both of which Anselm denies. The answer to this

conundrum lies in Anselms reply to a third issue raised by his discussion.

This third issue addresses the apparent implication that the pursuit of justice could

require an agent to sacrifice her own happiness. For in following the will for justice, the

agent turns away from the will for happiness and vice versa. This implies that an agent

could be in a situation where doing what is right will make her unhappy. Anselm

responds by arguing that genuine happiness never conflicts with justice. When agents

are struggling between the demands of morality and happiness, the happiness in

question is only apparent. For example, consider the college student who is tempted to

spend the scholarship money, not on her tuition, but rather on a new car. Obviously she

ought to pay the tuition bill, but she really, really wants the car and thinks shell be

much happier with it. Anselm would argue that in the long run, the education will makeher happier; for one thing, the hope is that it will lead to a better paying job that will


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enable her to get the car. Thus, doing the right thing in the long run will coincide with

her happiness, regardless of whether she recognizes this in the short run. Anselm

characterizes the will for happiness as a will for our own benefit, what we think will be

advantageous to ourselves, what appears desirable to us, regardless of whether it in fact

will make us happy. What actually makes us happy is pursuing happiness in the right

way, that is, by doing what is in fact the right thing to do. Thus, for Anselm, there is noactual conflict between happiness and justice.

This answer helps him to resolve the first issue. The agent who acts justly simply

because it is the right thing to do de facto satisfies the will for happiness. Those who act

justly for its own sake recognize the connection between justice and happiness and so

would not forsake justice for the sake of happiness; it would be inconceivable to them to

do so. But they act freely insofar as they are not necessitated to justice in virtue of

having both wills. Thus, they act freely even though they cannot act otherwise. Those

who are confirmed in evil fail or failed to take seriously the connection between justice

and genuine happiness. They have chosen to follow the will for happiness and, by

pursuing the will for happiness in an unjust manner, forsake justice. Because they arefixed upon their own happiness, it would be inconceivable to them to pursue the will for

justice even though they realize that they would be better off to do so. But they act

freely insofar as they are not necessitated to happiness in virtue of having both wills.

Thus, they act freely even though they cannot act otherwise.

c. Bernard of Clairvaux

Bernard (1090-1153) is not often thought of in connection with philosophy; he was an

abbot and an important religious reformer as well as a prominent promoter of the First

Crusade. But he wrote a short treatise titled On Grace and Free Will that was ratherinfluential during the twelfth and first half of the thirteenth centuries. Although Bernard

is mainly concerned with theological worries such as the influence of grace upon human

freedom, he contributes to the voluntarist climate of the Middle Ages. He moves the

discussion even further than either Augustine or Anselm, for he is one of the first

medieval theorists to define the will as a rational appetite, that is, an appetite that is

responsive to reasons. Such an idea is merely nascent in Anselm.

Like Augustine and Anselm before him, Bernard acknowledges that moral

responsibility requires that human beings perform their actions freely. He argues that

human beings act freely primarily in virtue of the will. The intellect is not entirely

irrelevant; Bernard claims that only those who have an intellect and are capable ofengaging in thought are capable of acting freely. Thus, children, non-rational animals,

and the mentally handicapped do not act freely. As they mature, however, children

become more able to do so, as do those who recover from mental illness. Nevertheless,

the intellect is merely an instrument by which the will is able to exercise its primary

activity, which is to choose. The will depends upon the intellect to identify what choices

are available from which the will can choose. We cannot choose what we are not aware

of. But once the intellect has made apparent potential alternatives for action, its job is

finished. The will makes the final choice of what is to be done. Thus, it is ultimately in

virtue of the will that human beings perform free actions. Furthermore, on Bernards

account, the will is so free that nothing can determine its choices, not even the intellect.

He argues that the will is free to will against a judgment of the intellect. For example,the intellect could judge that some action is against Gods decrees, and therefore not to


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be done, yet the will could still choose this action. Such cases, of course, happen all the

time, and Bernard argues that if the will were not free to will against a particular

judgment of the intellect, that would in essence destroy it. This idea that the will is able

to will against a judgment of intellect will be an important claim in the late thirteenth

century debates.

3. Individual Theories Sentences Commentaries

a. Peter Lombard

Peter Lombard was a twelfth-century bishop of Paris and a theologian at what was to

become the University of Paris. The final edition of his most famous work, Sententiae

in IV libris distinctae, was released for circulation somewhere around 1155-57. This

book became the standard theological textbook at universities throughout Europe from

the thirteenth into the sixteenth centuries. It is divided into four books, the first of which

has to do with God; the second, with creatures, both human and angelic, and their fallfrom grace; the third, with the incarnation and redemption of Jesus; and the fourth with

the instruments of redemption, that is, the virtues and the sacraments. Writing a

commentary on the Sentences became a standard student practice at universities during

the Middle Ages.

Although use of the Latin phrase, liberum arbitrium, goes all the back to Augustine,

Lombard provides a definition for it that dominates the discussion of freedom in the

first half of the thirteenth century: liberum arbitrium is a faculty of intellect and will.

This term, for which there is no satisfactory English translation, refers to that power or

capacity that enables human beings to perform their actions freely. Lombards definition

appears to be fairly straightforward, but theorists in the first half of the thirteenthcentury very much disagreed over how it was to be interpreted. Part of the problem is

that Lombard himself did not discuss the meaning of the definition in any great detail.

Instead, he went on to discuss the place of liberum arbitrium in a larger theological

scheme, addressing such questions as whether God has liberum arbitrium, the status of

liberum arbitrium both before and after the Fall, and the effects of grace upon liberum

arbitrium.

Although later theologians make note of Lombards discussion of these topics, they are

far more interested in what he didnt discuss, that is, the basic definition of liberum

arbitrium. In the first half of the thirteenth century, there occurs a lively discussion on

how to interpret this definition. As far as the participants in this discussion areconcerned, there are four possibilities, and there are texts from this period defending

each of these possibilities. To say that liberum arbitrium is a faculty of intellect and will

could mean 1) that freedom is a function primarily of the intellect and only secondarily

of the will 2) that freedom is a function primarily of the will and only secondarily of the

intellect 3) that freedom is equally a function of both intellect and will and 4) that

freedom is a function of a third capacity independently of intellect and will but with

both cognitive and appetitive abilities. Because the fourth interpretation is the most

implausible (and the rarest and possibly for those reasons the most interesting) and

because it was held by one of the foremost scholars in the medieval period (Albert the

Great), it warrants a further look.
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b. Albert the Great

Outside of scholarly circles, Albert the Great is largely a forgotten figure or, at best, is

known merely as the teacher of Thomas Aquinas. In the thirteenth century, however, he

was in fact one of the most famous and respected scholars of the period. He published a

wide variety of writings in philosophy, theology, and especially in what we would callnatural science. He wrote a number of commentaries on the works of Aristotle and

argued for his importance at a time when many of Aristotles texts were banned from

study at Europes universities. Alberts theory of action is one of the most distinctive

parts of his philosophy and one of the most innovative theories of the Middle Ages.

Albert takes as his starting point Lombards definition of liberum arbitrium and argues

that it should not be interpreted too narrowly. He describes four distinct stages in the

production of free human action. First, the intellect identifies viable alternatives for

action from which to choose and makes a judgment about what to do. Secondly, the will

develops a preference for one of the alternatives identified by the intellect and inclines

toward it. Third, a choice is made between the alternative judged by the intellect and thealternative preferred by the will. The capacity for choice is exercised by a power

separate from both intellect and will, which Albert calls liberum arbitrium. Finally, the

choice is carried out by the will, which inclines the agent to perform the action chosen

by liberum arbitrium.

One might worry that the aforementioned description of action implies that human

beings are at the mercy of their capacities and so are not in charge of their own

actions. This is a mistaken judgment. Albert is aware that it is human beings who think,

judge, prefer, choose and finally act. What Albert is attempting to explain is how human

beings are capable of engaging in all of these activities. He is providing what we mightcall a microscopic explanation for what happens at the macroscopic level. This is

analogous to, say, the neuroscientist providing an explanation for why someone raises

her arm in terms of what is happening on the level of the nerves firing and the muscles

contracting. We of course assume that such an explanation does not negate our

judgment that the agent has control over whether she moves her arm; it is the same in

the case of Alberts explanation.

Albert argues that this account is compatible with Lombards definition of liberum

arbitrium. He argues that on his account, liberum arbitrium is a faculty of intellect and

will, not because it consists of intellect and will, but because it works with intellect and

will. Unless the intellect makes a judgment about what to do, and unless the willinclines toward a particular alternative (whether it be the same or different from the

intellects judgment), there is no choice made by liberum arbitrium. Intellect and will

make possible the activity of liberum arbitrium. Thus, liberum arbitrium is a power of

intellect and will, not because it is composed of intellect and will, as one might think,

but because it operates on the basis what goes on beforehand in intellect and will.

Recall that the whole purpose of liberum arbitrium was to frame the discussion of

human freedom. Liberum arbitrium is a placeholder for whatever it is that enables

human beings to act freely. Albert argues that liberum arbitrium must be a power

distinct from intellect and will because of certain deficiencies or constraints in both

intellect and will. The intellect cannot be the source of human freedom, for it is thepower by which human beings cognize the world and come to understand truth. Thus,


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its judgments are constrained by the way the world is; we are not free to decide what we

will and will not believe if we want to have truth as our goal. A reality that is not of our

own making intrudes. By and large, that is how we want our intellects to operate. Our

success in the world depends upon our being able to make accurate judgments about

how the world is and what options are open to us. We will return to this view because it

has certain implications for Thomas Aquinass account of freedom, which implicationsJohn Duns Scotus explicitly draws on in his criticism of Aquinass account. But for

now, we want to see what use Albert makes of this observation. According to Albert,

the constraints found in the intellect make it the case that the intellect cannot be the

source of human freedom.

But then neither can the will. Albert notes that what distinguishes the actions of human

beings from that of other animals is the human ability to contravene felt desires. To take

a medieval example, if a sheep is hungry and spies a lush field of grass, the sheep eats in

response to a brute felt desire for food. If the sheep is not hungry, the sheep does not eat

even if it is standing in the pasture. What determine the sheeps activities are the sheeps

desires and appetites over which the sheep has no control. It is different in the humancase. A human being can feel hungry but not act on that hunger because she can judge

that she has compelling reasons not to eat, say because she is waiting for her blood to be

drawn for a fasting glucose level. Thus, she has a choice; she can choose either to eat or

not to eat depending upon her reasons for doing one thing over the other. This ability to

act on the basis of reasons, which confers freedom of action on human beings, is a

cognitive ability. Since the will is an appetitive power, it cannot have this ability. The

intellect is a cognitive power but is constrained by the way the world is and so cannot be

the source of this ability. Albert concludes therefore that human beings must have a

third power that enables them to have this ability, which power he identifies with

liberum arbitrium.

4. Individual Theories the High Middle Ages

a. Thomas Aquinas

Thomas Aquinas developed one of the most elaborate and detailed accounts of action in

the Middle Ages. It is a testimony to his account that not only scholars of medieval

philosophy but also non-historically oriented philosophers remain interested in the

details of his view.

Aquinass account is roughly Aristotelian in character. Like Aristotle, Aquinas arguesthat human beings act for the sake of a particular end that they see as a good.

Furthermore, he thinks that all human actions aim (directly or indirectly) at an ultimate

end. This ultimate end is the final goal or object that human beings are trying to achieve.

Aquinas follows Aristotle in arguing that the ultimate end of human life, that which

human beings want most of all, is happiness. But Aquinas parts company with Aristotle

in arguing that what in fact makes human beings happy is to know and love God.

Aquinas recognizes that such a definition of happiness is highly controversial. He

concedes that not everyone agrees that the ultimate goal of human life is union with

God. But he takes it as uncontroversial that all human beings desire happinessregardless of whether they agree with him with respect to what in fact constitutes

happiness. Given Aquinass theological commitments, it is not surprising that he would
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think that what in fact will make human beings happy (whether they know it or not) is

to be in a relationship with the creator and sustainer of the world.

Aquinas presents a detailed account of what goes on when human beings perform a

particular course of action. This account reveals a close interaction between intellect

and will in bringing about the action. In considering this account, one must keep inmind that although the description that follows is put in terms of a series of steps, these

steps have only logical priority and not necessarily temporal priority. For example,

Aquinas cites deliberation and choice as distinct steps, but he is willing to grant that one

might not spend time deliberating over what to do. One might simply recognize what

the situation calls for and choose to do it. In that case, the judgment or recognition of

what to do and the choice come about simultaneously. However, Aquinas would insist

that the judgment has logical priority insofar as one cannot choose what one is not at

least on some level (and perhaps very quickly) cognizant of.

In bringing about a human action, first, human beings have some goal or end in mind

when they think about what to do. Without that goal or end, they would in fact neveract. Human beings dont act for the sake of acting; there is always something they are

trying to achieve by their actions. In other words, human behavior is always motivated.

So human beings think about what they want to accomplish and settle upon a goal. This

they do in virtue of their intellects in light of their fundamental desire for the good,

which is built into the will. Next they feel an attraction or desire for that goal or end;

their will inclines them toward it. Then they begin to think about how to achieve this

goal or end; that is to say, they engage in the activity of deliberation. They then make a

final judgment about what to do and choose what to do on the basis of that judgment.

Aquinas argues that choice is a function of the will in light of a judgment by the

intellect. In other words, the will moves the agent towards a particular action, an action

that has been determined by the intellect. The will then moves the appropriate limbs of

the bodies at the command of the intellect, thus executing the action. Finally, human

beings feel enjoyment at their accomplishment or achievement of the end in virtue of

the will.

Another aspect of human nature influences human action, and that is what Aquinas calls

the passions. Passions are somewhat akin to our conception of emotions. That is, they

are felt motivational states such as anger or joy that can have either a positive or a

negative effect upon what we do. For example, fear and love for a child can move an

otherwise timid individual to push the child out of the way of a speeding car. On the

other hand, anger can move an otherwise peaceful person to road rage. Nevertheless, onAquinass account, even though passions are very powerful influences upon actions and

can make things appear to us as good that ordinarily would not seem good, the passions

cannot simply overwhelm a (properly functioning) intellect and will and thereby

determine what we do. Aquinas argues that it is always possible for us to step back and

consider whether we should act on our passion as long as we possess a functional

intellect and will. It might be difficult to do, since passions can be very strong, but it is

always open to us to do so.

This of course is a very brief and succinct description of an account to which Aquinas

devotes a significant portion of his texts. What it illustrates though is the complexity of

what goes on in the course of producing an action and the ways in which the intellectand will interact with each other in producing a human action. We of course are not


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necessarily conscious of all of this activity, but Aquinass account does not depend

upon our being so. He relies on the principle that if a human being is able to do

something, there must be some power or capacity that enables her to do so. He then

considers what goes on in the course of human action and postulates the kinds of

powers or capacities that he thinks human beings must have in order to account for what

goes on. So while from a strictly empirical or even scientific viewpoint, Aquinassaccount might seem rather quaint, still from a heuristic perspective, Aquinass account

remains quite powerful.

One of the ways in which its power is revealed is in Aquinass account of good and bad

action. He uses his basic framework for action to set up the account. Recall that action is

ultimately a function of intellect and will with the potential influence of the passions.

Bad action for Aquinas comes about in light of a breakdown of one of these capacities.

Because the intellect has to do with knowledge and judgment, sins of the intellect have

to do with mistakes in judgment due to ignorance (that is, a lack of knowledge).

Aquinas also recognizes that wrongdoing can come about under the influence of

passion. Although on his view, the passions are not able to overwhelm a properlyfunctioning intellect and will, still the intellect can give in to passion under

inappropriate circumstances (road rage is an obvious example). And finally, because the

will is a type of (rational) desire, sins due to the will arise when ones desire for the

good is disordered, leading one to prefer a lesser good, forsaking a greater good that

ought to be preferred.

For an action to count as a good action, it must satisfy several conditions. First, it must

be a morally acceptable type of action. For Aquinas, such acts as murder, lying,

stealing, or adultery are never right, regardless of, say, the circumstances or the end.

They are in themselves disordered acts insofar as they, by their very nature, do not

promote human flourishing. Secondly, the action must be performed for an appropriate

end. Ordinarily, alms-giving is a good act, but it would be a bad action if one were to

give alms for the sake of vainglory. And finally the act must be performed in the

appropriate circumstances. Ordinarily one would be praised for taking a walk in order to

maintain ones health, but not if there is a blizzard raging outside. Under ordinary

conditions (for example, no ones life is at risk), it would be more appropriate under

those circumstances to skip the walk.

For Aquinas, although some acts might be morally neutral in nature (that is, neither

promoting nor detracting from human flourishing by their nature), because there are no

neutral ends or circumstances, in the final analysis, no actually performed actions aretruly morally neutral. Ends are either good or bad for Aquinas. Circumstances are either

appropriate or not. Thus, for Aquinas, the range of actions that are candidates for moral

appraisal is much broader than one often supposes. Even actions ordinarily considered

rather innocuous, such as eating a candy bar or raking leaves, have moral significance

for Aquinas.

Finally, although Aquinas is not a utilitarian, he does think that consequences can have

an effect on the moral appraisal of an action. What matters is whether the consequences

that result from performing the action are the typical consequences associated with an

action of that type and whether the agent was in a position to know this. If the agent

could have foreseen those consequences, then bad consequences increase the agentsblameworthiness and good consequences increase the agents praiseworthiness. If the


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agent could not have foreseen such consequences, then they have no effect on the moral

appraisal of the action.

Aquinas is interested not only in how human action comes about, but also in what

enables human beings to act freely. Given his emphasis on the intellect in his account of

action, it is not surprising to find Aquinas arguing that the intellect plays the larger rolein the explanation of freedom. This is in contrast with the tradition he inherits, which, as

we have seen so far, places the emphasis on the will in the majority of theories. For

Aquinas, the fact that the intellect is able to deliberate, consider, and reconsider reasons

for choosing various courses of action open to the agent enables the agent to act freely.

The will is free but only insofar as the intellect is free to make or revise its judgments.

Had the agent decided differently than she did, she would have chosen differently. Thus,

freedom in the will is dependent upon and derivative upon freedom in the intellect. As

we shall see, this position raises certain potential worries for Aquinas.

b. John Duns Scotus

John Duns Scotus was born in the town of Duns near the English-Scottish boarder

sometime in the 1260s. Educated both in England and at the University of Paris, he died

in Cologne, Germany in 1308. Known for the complexity of his thought, he was

referred to in the Middle Ages as the Subtle Doctor.

Scotus argues that if Aquinas is correct, human beings do not act freely. This is because

in Scotuss view, the intellect is determined by the external environment, a position we

saw earlier in Albert the Great. Scotus argues that the content of our beliefs and

judgments is a function of the world around us and not within our control. If I see a

table in front of me and I am functioning normally, I cannot help but believe that thereis a table in front of me. I have some control over my beliefs; I can choose to acquire

beliefs about quantum mechanics that I did not have before simply by choosing to read

a book on the subject. I can take the table out of the room so that I no longer believe that

there is a table in front of me. But even here my beliefs are fixed once I finish my

manipulations of the world; ultimately then, I have no control over their content. Once I

read the book, I have beliefs based upon what I have read and I am not in a position to

alter their content unless I read something further. Once I move the table, the world as it

exists at that point structures my belief about the table. As we mentioned before, this is

how we want the world and our beliefs to function. If we could not arrive at beliefs that

accurately reflected the state of the world around us, we would not survive. Scotus

argues that this feature of our beliefs and their relationship to the world means that theintellect is not free. Thus, if Aquinas is correct that the movement of the will is

determined by activity in the intellect, then if it is true that the intellect is not free, the

will is not free either, and human beings would not act freely.

Scotus denies Aquinass tight connection between the intellect and the will, arguing that

the will is not determined by a judgment of the intellect, a position we first noted in

Bernard of Clairvaux. Scotus draws upon our ordinary experience to defend this claim.

We have all been in situations where we know what we ought to do and yet we are not

moved to do it. The student knows she ought to study for her exams, but she is so

comfortable lying on the couch that she does not get up to study. She will get up to

study only insofar as she really wants to do so, and no judgment will move her to do soin opposition to her desire. Scotus describes this kind of case as one in which the will,


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the source of her desire to remain on the couch, wills (or in this case fails to will) in

opposition to the judgment of the intellect. Thus, the will is free of determination by the

intellect.

Scotus agrees with Aquinas that the will depends upon the intellect to identify possible

courses of action from which the will chooses, but he rejects Aquinass view that theintellects judgment determines the wills choice. For Scotus, the intellect makes a

judgment about what to do, but it is up to the will to determine which alternativeout of

all those the intellect has identified as possibilitiesthe agent acts upon. Scotus also

agrees with Aquinas that human beings cannot will misery for its own sake, but he

denies that this implies that human beings are necessitated to choose happiness. On

Scotuss account, human beings choose happiness if they choose anything at all and

they cannot will against happiness, but they nevertheless can fail to will happiness.

5. Conclusion

Thinkers throughout the Middle Ages found the topics of action and free will

compelling for many of the same reasons why they remain of perennial interest today.

Philosophers find them interesting in their own right as well as recognizing their

implications for moral responsibility, the concept of personhood, and such important

religious issues as the problem of evil and the tension with divine omniscience. The

general character of many medieval theories of free will is voluntarist in nature, with the

views of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas the most significant departures from this

trend.

The accounts of Thomas Aquinas and of John Duns Scotus are useful paradigms to

illustrate some of the advantages and disadvantages of voluntarist and intellectualistapproaches to action and its freedom. We have seen that the determinant nature of our

beliefs raises a problem for Aquinass location of freedom in the intellect. Aquinas also

has a harder time explaining cases of weakness of will (that is, cases where an agent

recognizes the better choice but chooses the lesser one). These cases are tough for

Aquinas to explain because they seem to involve a judgment that a particular action is

the better thing to do, yet the agent chooses not to perform that action. Instead, the agent

chooses some other action that the agent is willing to grant is worse. Scotus has a much

easier time accommodating these cases, since for him, the will is never necessitated by a

judgment of intellect. Yet his theory faces an important objection: the arbitrariness

objection. Because there is no tight connection between intellect and will on Scotuss

account, the will is never determined by the judgment of intellect. Therefore, it isalways possible for the will either to will in accordance with the intellects judgment or

against it. This situation raises the question: why does the agent choose as she does? It

cant be because the intellect made a particular judgment, for the will is not determined

by that judgment. Scotus argues that there is no further explanation for the wills choice;

the will simply chooses. But then the wills choice and the agents subsequent action

become very mysterious. Thus, Scotus loses a rational grounding for understanding why

an agent acts as she does. He can no longer appeal to an agents reasons for acting one

way rather than another, for those reasons do not determine the agents choice. Because

Aquinas maintains a tight connection between the intellects judgment and the wills

choice, he does not face this particular objection and can maintain what is known as a

reasons-explanation for action. In the end, what is an advantage for the one theory

becomes a difficulty for the other, and vice versa.


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See also the article Foreknowledge and Free Will in this encyclopedia.

6. References and Further Reading

a. Primary Sources

Albert the Great. Opera Omnia. Augustus Borgnet, ed., Paris: Vives, 1890-9.

o Unfortunately, the works of Albert the Great are not yet widely available

in translation.

Albert the Great. Opera Omnia. Bernhard Geyer et al, eds. Bonn: Institum Alerti

Magni, 1951-.

o A newer and currently incomplete edition of Alberts works.

Anselm of Canterbury. Three Philosophical Dialogues. Thomas Williams, trans.

Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2002.

o This book includes Anselms treatises, On Freedom of Choice and On

the Fall of the Devil.

Anselm of Canterbury. Truth, Freedom, and Evil. Jasper Hopkins and Herbert

Richardson, trans. New York: Harper and Row, 1965.

o This book includes Anselms treatises, On Freedom of Choice and On

the Fall of the Devil.

Aquinas, Thomas. Summa theologiae. Fathers of the English Dominican

Province, trans. Allen, TX: Christian Classics, 1981 (reprint).

Aquinas, Thomas. Treatise on Happiness. John A. Oesterle, trans. Notre Dame:

University of Notre Dame Press, 1964.

o This book consists of the twenty-one questions from Summa theologiae

that have to do with the human ultimate end, and human action and its

freedom.

Augustine. On Free Choice of the Will. Thomas Williams, trans. Indianapolis:

Hackett Publishing Co., 1993.

Bernard of Clairvaux. On Grace and Free Choice. Daniel ODonovan, trans.

Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, Inc., 1988.

Lombard, Peter. Sententiae in IV libris distinctae. Ignatius Brady, ed.

Grottoferrata: Editiones Colegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971-81.

o The question on liberum arbitrium is found in book two, distinction 24.

Unfortunately, this text is not yet translated into English.

Scotus, John Duns. Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality. Allan B. Wolter,

O.F.M., trans. William A Frank, ed. Washington, DC: Catholic University of

America Press, 1997.
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o This is a reprint of an earlier (1986) edition in which the Latin text found

in the 1986 edition has been removed. In addition to primary texts, it

contains commentary by Wolter.

b. Secondary Sources

Alexander, Archibald. Theories of the Will in the History of Philosophy. New

York: Scribner, 1898.

Bourke, Vernon J. Will in Western Thought. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1964.

Chappell, T.D.J. Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom: Two Theories of

Freedom Voluntary Action, and Akrasia. New York: St. Martins Press, 1995.

Colish, Marcia. Peter Lombard. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994.

Davies, Brian, ed. Aquinass Summa Theologiae: Critical Essays. Lanham:

Rowman and Littlefield, 2006.

o Contains some essays on action and freedom.

Matthews, Gareth B., ed. The Augustinian Tradition. Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1999.

o A collection of essays on Augustine, some of which deal with his theory

of will and freedom.

Matthews, Gareth B. Augustine. Blackwell Publishing, 2005.

McCluskey, Colleen. Intellective Appetite and the Freedom of Human Action.The Thomist 66 (2002): 421-56.

o A defense of Aquinass theory of freedom against criticisms raised by

Thomas Williams in the article listed below from The Thomist.

McCluskey, Colleen. Worthy Constraints in Albertus Magnuss Theory of

Action. Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (2001):491-533.

MacDonald, Scott, and Stump, Eleonore, eds. Aquinass Moral Theory: Essays

in Honor of Norman Kretzmann. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999.

o This book includes essays on Aquinass theory of the passions as well ashis account of practical reasoning.

Pope, Stephen J., ed. The Ethics of Aquinas. Washington, DC: Georgetown

University Press, 2002.

o This book contains essays on Aquinass theory of action and freedom as

well as his ethics. It is organized around the specific questions in Summa

theologiae that deal with these issues.

Rogers, Katherin. Anselm on Grace and Free Will. The Saint Anselm Journal

2 (2005): 66-72.

Stump, Eleonore. Aquinas. London: Routledge, 2003.


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o A broad discussion of Aquinass views, including his theory of action

and freedom.

Westberg, Daniel. Right Practical Reason: Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in

Aquinas. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.

Williams, Thomas and Visser, Sandra. Anselms Account of Freedom.

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (2001): 221-244.

Williams, Thomas. The Libertarian Foundations of Scotuss Moral

Philosophy. The Thomist (1998): 193-215.

o This article also contains a criticism of Aquinass theory of freedom.

Williams, Thomas. How Scotus Separates Morality from Happiness.

American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1995): 425-445.

Author Information

Colleen McClusky

Email: [email protected]

Saint Louis University
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]

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Medieval Theories of Free Will