Sari sari vs. Piglas-kamaoFACTS: In December 1990, Mariko Novel Wares, Inc. (petitioner) began its retail outlet operations under the name Sari-Sari in the basement of Robinsons Galleria inQuezonCity. Among its employees were: Head Checker RonnieTamayo, Checker Jose del Carmen, Section HeadsJocylenePadua,VickyBermeo, and ElizabethMatutina(respondents), all of whom were assigned at the Robinsons Galleria branch. Respondents organized a union known asPiglasKamao(Sari-Sari Chapter).At the time of the formation, the officers of the union were respondents RonnieTamayo, President; Jose del Carmen, Vice-President; andJocelynePadua, Secretary.Respondents claim that petitioner, through its President, RicoOcampo, interfered with the formation of the union.

RATIO: Effect of Non-Verification by All PartiesSection 1 of Rule 65[29]in relation to Section 3 of Rule 46[30]of the Rules of Court requires that a petition for review filed with the CA should be verified and should contain a certificate of non-forum shopping.The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or are true and correct, not merely speculative.[31]On the other hand, the rule against forum shopping is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in differentfora, as this practice is detrimental to orderly judicial procedure.[32]A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirements for Verification and noncompliance with those for Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.As to Verification, non-compliance therewith does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective; hence, the court may order a correction if Verification is lacking; or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.[33]A pleading which is required by the Rules of Court to be verified may be given due course even without a verification of the circumstances warranting the suspension of the rules in the interest of justice.[34]When circumstances warrant, the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.[35]Moreover, many authorities consider the absence of Verification a mere formal, not jurisdictional defect, the absence of which does not of itself justify a court in refusing to allow and act on the case.[36]

In the case at bar, respondent Jose del Carmen shares a common interest with the other respondents as to the resolution of the labor dispute between them and the petitioner.They collectively sued the petitioner for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practices and have collectively appealed the NLRC decision.Similarly, there is sufficient basis for Jose del Carmen to speak on behalf of his co-respondents in stating that they have not filed any action or claim involving the same issues in another court or tribunal, nor is there any other pending action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues.Thus, even if only respondent Jose del Carmen signed the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping, the rule on substantial compliance applies.The CA therefore did not commit any error in entertaining the appeal of the respondents.

MEDIAN CONTAINER CORPORATION VS. METROPOLITAN BANk

Facts: Respondent filed a complaint for sum of money against petitioner for failure to settle the amount of more than P5,000,000 representing the outstanding balance of loans contracted by MCC. Petitioner questions the certificate of non-forum shopping filed by respodent which was signed by a certain Atty. Alexander P. Mendoza on May 28, 2003. Petitioner claims that Atty. Mendoza was only given authority to execute the certificate only on June 3, 2003. The trial and appellate court denied petitioners motion to dismiss.

Issue/s: W/N respondent failed to comply with the proper procedure on the verification and certification of non-forum shopping.

Held/Ratio: NO. Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement. It is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. That explains why a court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking, or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order to serve the ends of justice.

As for the required certification against forum shopping, failure to comply therewith is generally not curable by its submission subsequent to the filing of the petition nor by amendment, and is cause for its dismissal. A certification against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which is unaccompanied by proof that the signatory is authorized to file the petition is generally likewise cause for dismissal. In several cases, however, this Court relaxed the application of these requirements upon appreciation of attendant special circumstances or compelling reasons.

In the case at bar, simultaneous with the filing of the complaint, Metrobank submitted both a certification of non-forum shopping and proof that Atty. Mendoza who signed it on its behalf was authorized to do so. The proof of authorization of Atty. Mendoza was dated later than the date of his signing of the certification of non-forum shopping, however, thus giving the impression that he, at the time he affixed his signature, was not authorized to do so. The passing on June 3, 2004 of a Board Resolution of authorization before the actual filing on June 23, 2004 of the complaint, however, is deemed a ratification of Atty. Mendoza's prior execution on May 28, 2004 of the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping, thus curing any defects thereof.

Remitere vs. YuloFACTS: Gregorio Remitere was declared the registered owner of two questioned Lots by then CFI of Negros Occidental. When he died, CFI appointed his wife as administratrix of his estate, among which are the two lots in question. During this period, the provincial sheriff of Negros Occidental, conducted a public auction sale over the said parcels of land, and on the same day, he issued a deed of sale in favor of Mariano Yulo. This lead to a series of cancellations of the Certificate of Titles and finally to the registration of the TCT by virtue of deeds of sales in the name of Remedios Montinola Vda. de Yulo. Hence, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendants and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. The complaint prayed that the defendants be ordered to reconvey the two lots in question to the plaintiffs and that the defendant Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel the certificates of titles in the name of the defendant and to issue new ones in the names of the plaintiffs. The defendants-appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint does not state a cause of action (and, that even assuming that a cause of action exists, the same has already prescribed.) The lower court dismissed the complaint precisely on the grounds relied upon by the defendants-appellees. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: WON the complaint states a cause of action.

RULING: NO SC held that no ultimate facts which may constitute the basis of plaintiffs rights which had been violated are alleged. Neither are there allegations of ultimate facts showing acts or omissions on the part of the defendants which constitute a violation of the rights of plaintiffs. Hence, the lower court had correctly ruled that the complaint in the present case does not narrate facts that constitute a cause of action.

The lack of a cause of action as a ground for dismissal must appear on the face of the complaint, and to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action, only the facts alleged therein, and no other, should be considered. It is not stated anywhere in the complaint why the sale at public auction was absolutely void, nor were there stated any particular facts or circumstances upon which the alleged nullity of the sale or transaction is predicated. The averment that "the public sale . . . was and still is absolutely a void sale, and certainly did not pass titles and ownerships of said lots, starting from its primitive owner, now being represented by the plaintiffs herein, as surviving heirs thereto, until it reaches the possession by the defendants is a conclusion of law or an inference from (or conclusion of) facts not stated in the pleading.

A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or defense asserted, as distinguished from a mere conclusion of fact, or conclusion of law. An allegation that a contract is valid or void, as in the instant case, is a mere conclusion of law.

Not being statements of ultimate facts which constitute basis of a right of the plaintiffs, nor are they statements if ultimate facts which constitute the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendants that violated the right of the plaintiffs the allegations of the complaint in the present case have not fulfilled the requirements of the rules of court that the complaint should contain a concise statement of the ultimate facts consulting the plaintiffs cause or causes of action.

Philippine Stock Exchange vs. Manila banking corporationFACTS:

Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Trazo

Namarco vs. Federation of United Namarco Distributors

Bungcayao Sr. vs. Fort Ilocandia

Calibre Traders Inc. vs. Bayer Philippines Facts: This is petition for review on certiorari assails the July 31, 2002 Decision and the December 19, 2003 Resolution of the CA that denied petitioners action for damages against respondent Bayer Philippines Inc. and instead granted the latters counterclaim for P1,272,103.07, representing unpaid purchases of Bayerphil s products. Calibre Traders, Inc. was one of Bayerphils distributors/dealers of its agricultural chemicals within the provinces of Pangasinan and Tarlac. Their last distributorship agreement was effective from June 1989 to June 1991. However, Bayerphil stopped delivering stocks to Calibre on July 31, 1989 after the latter failed to settle its unpaid accounts in the total amount of P1,751,064.56. The parties had a disagreement as to the entitlement and computations of the discounts of Calibre. It withheld the payment to Bayerphil and compelled the former to reconcile its accounts. In a letter dated August 16, 1989, Calibre requested Bayerphil for a reconciliation of accounts. It enumerated the following claims that amounted to P968,265.82. Calibre sent follow-up letters dated September 17, October 13, and November 16, 1989.

On September 29, 1989, Bayerphils credit and collection officer, Leon Abesamis, conferred with Calibres General Manager Mario Sebastian. The attempt to settle failed. Again, on October 27, 1989, Bayerphils Sales Manager of the Agro Division, Vidal Lingan, met with Sebastian. The results of their discussion were put in writing. Bayerphils explained that there are some claims in the form of rebates should not be granted to the petitioners, save those which have valid justifications. Respondents assert that they are fair to the petitioners in dealing with their claims, as they granted their requests. Bayerphils offered to grant Calibres claims so that they may finally settle its unpaid accounts totaling to P934,086.92 by a reply dated November 24, 1989. Bayerphils gave a deadline on or before December 8, 1989. Respondent conditioned on the premise that failure to remit the said amount through a bank shall be a cause for the cancellation of the respondents offer. In his December 8, 1989 letter, Sebastian expressed discontent in Bayerphils refusal to credit his claims in full and underscored the alleged inaction of Bayerphil in reconciling Calibre s accounts. This was followed by a demand letter requiring Bayerphil to pay the sum of P10,000,000.00 for the damages it had allegedly caused to Calibre. Bayerphil replied, reminding that Calibre owed it P1,272,103.07 as of December 31, 1989.

Accusing Bayerphil of maliciously breaching the distributorship agreement by manipulating Calibres accounts, withholding discounts and rebates due it, charging unwarranted penalties, refusing to supply goods, and favoring the new distributors/dealers to drive it out of business, Calibre, on March 14, 1990, filed a suit for damages, before the RTC of Pasig. Calibre prayed for P8,000,000.00 actual damages, representing alleged actual losses and profits; P2,000,000.00 award as alleged damage to its goodwill and business reputation; P3,500,000.00 as exemplary damages; and, attorneys fees of P1,500,000.00. In its Answer with Counterclaim, Bayerphil denied its alleged wanton appointment of other distributors and maintained that Calibre filed the damage suit to avoid paying its overdue accounts. Considering that those purchased on credit remained unpaid, Bayerphil had to refuse to further supply Calibre with its products. Bayerphil thus prayed for the collection of P1,272,103.07, with interest of 14% per annum accruing daily and compounded monthly from the date of default (as provided in the dealership agreement); P1,000,000.00 exemplary damages; and, P 200,000.00 attorneys fees and costs of suit. Bayerphil also moved that Mario Sebastian and his wife Minda (Sebastians) be impleaded as co-defendants.

Calibre opposed Bayerphils motion to implead the Sebastians and moved to strike out the counterclaim, reasoning that the spouses are not parties in its suit against Bayerphil and thus are not the proper parties to the counterclaim. Bayerphil contended that both causes of action arose from the same contract of distributorship, and that the Sebastians inclusion is necessary for a full adjudication of Bayerphils counterclaim to avoid duplication of suits. In its October 24, 1990 Resolution, the trial court rejected Calibres arguments and granted the motion to implead the Sebastians as co-defendants in the counterclaim

The spouses then filed their answer to Bayerphils counterclaim and raised the issue that the counterclaim against them is permissive, and since Bayerphil failed to pay the required docket fees, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the counterclaim. On December 6, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment favoring Calibre and dismissing the Counter-Complaint of the defendant against Spouses Mario and Minda Sebastian. CA reversed the RTCs decision and favored Bayerphil s counterclaim. Later, the appellate court denied the MR of the petitioner.

ISSUE: WON the relief granted to Bayerphils counterclaim is proper

HELD: Yes, the grant of the respondents counterclaim is proper

RATIO: A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or other relief, which a defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiffs complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the court, does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred x x x if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Any other claim is permissive. [The] Court has already laid down the following tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, to wit: (1) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same? (2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim as well as the defendant's counterclaim? and (4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court? The fourth test is the compelling test of compulsoriness.

Bayerphils suit may independently proceed in a separate action. Although the rights and obligations of the parties are anchored on the same contract, the causes of action they filed against each other are distinct and do not involve the same factual issues. We find no logical relationship between the two actions in a way that the recovery or dismissal of plaintiffs suit will establish a foundation for the others claim. The counterclaim for collection of money is not intertwined with or contingent on Calibres own claim for damages, which was based on the principle of abuse of rights. Both actions involve the presentation of different pieces of evidence. Calibres suit had to present evidence of malicious intent, while Bayerphils objective was to prove nonpayment of purchases. The allegations highlighting bad faith are different from the transactions constituting the subject matter of the collection suit. Respondents counterclaim was only permissive. Hence, the CA erred in ruling that Bayerphils claim against the petitioners partakes of a compulsory counterclaim. The rules and jurisprudence do not require that the parties to the counterclaim be the original parties only. In fact, the presence of third parties is allowed, the only provision being their capacity to be subjected under the courts jurisdiction. As regards the nature of the claims of the parties, neither is it required that they be of the same nature, only that they arise from the same transaction or occurrence. All along, Bayerphil has never evaded payment of the docket fees on the honest belief that its counterclaim was compulsory. It cannot be gainsaid that the emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Rules on the payment of filing fees have already been relaxed. It is a settled doctrine that although the payment of the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment x x x should not result in the automatic dismissal of the case provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable prescriptive period. The prescriptive period therein mentioned refers to the period within which a specific action must be filed. It means that in every case, the docket fee must be paid before the lapse of the prescriptive period. In accordance with the aforementioned rules on payment of docket fees, the trial court upon a determination that Bayerphils counterclaim was permissive, should have instead ordered Bayerphil to pay the required docket fees for the permissive counterclaim, giving it reasonable time but in no case beyond the reglementary period. Considering the foregoing discussion, we find no need to remand the case to the trial court for the resolution of Bayerphils counterclaim

Considering that the counterclaim is permissive, respondent Bayer Philippines, Inc. is ORDERED to pay the prescribed docket fees with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Decision

Planters Development Bank v LZK Holdings & Development Co

Young vs. SyFACTS: This case originated from 2 petitions. 1 regarding the supplemental complaint, 2 regarding the non-suit (not related to the topic). NOTE: The case didnt say how case number 1 initiated it just jumped to the supplemental complaint. So assuming procedurally petitioner filed a complaint then she filed a supplemental complaint.

Lili Dy Young the mother of Genalyn D. Young caused an extrajudicial partition which adjudicated an unregistered parcel of land solely in the latters favor is unenforceable. She contends that, since at the time of the execution she was only 15 years old and no court approval had been procured. This was due to the fact that the mother obtained a loan from spouses Sy and mortgaged the subject property. The property was foreclosed and sold to the Sys through auction. Hence the cases.

(Jumping to the supplemental complaint) The problem arose when the petitioner filed a motion to admit supplemental complaint. The supplemental complaint invoked her right, as co-owner, to exercise the legal redemption. In comparison to the original complaint which is to enforce unenforceability.

RTC and CA: Both the RTC and the CA dismissed her complaint. They ruled that the supplemental complaint constituted a substantial amendment of the original complaint because of the relief prayed for and the causes of action were different from the original complaint which is prohibited.

Issue: WON the dismissal of the supplemental complaint filed by the Petitioner was proper?Held: It was improper.

RATIO: In this case, the consolidation of title over the subject property in the name of respondent Manuel Sy and the issue as to whether it precluded petitioner as alleged co-owner from exercising the right of legal redemption, are new matters that occurred after the filing of the original complaint. The relief prayed for in the Supplemental Complaint, which is the exercise of the right of legal redemption accorded to co-owners of property, is germane to and intertwined with the cause of action in the Complaint for the nullification of the "Second Supplemental to the Extrajudicial Partition" on the ground that it lacked the approval of a guardianship court.

The petitioner's right to redeem the property is dependent on the nullification of the partition which is the subject of the original complaint. Unless the partition is nullified or declared without any force or effect, the petitioner will not be considered a co-owner of the property and, consequently, she will be unable to exercise any right of legal redemption under Article 1620of the Civil Code granted to co-owners of property.

The right of legal redemption as co-owner is conferred by law and is merely a natural consequence of co-ownership. Hence, the petitioner's cause of action for legal redemption as embodied in her Supplemental Complaint stems directly from and is an extension of her rights as co-owner of the property subject of the Complaint.

Furthermore, the evidence required to prove petitioner's right of legal redemption in the Supplemental Complaint will be exactly the same evidence required to prove the nullification of the partition in the Complaint.

If a separate action is filed for the subject covered by the Supplemental Complaint, there will be multiplicity of suits. Should a separate complaint be filed before the nullification of the partition, the same would be dismissed for being premature pending the resolution of the Complaint for nullification.

Section 6, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:SECTION 6.Supplemental Pleadings. - Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order admitting the supplemental pleading.

As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or add something to the primary pleading. A supplement exists side by side with the original. It does not replace that which it supplements. Moreover, a supplemental pleading assumes that the original pleading is to stand and that the issues joined with the original pleading remained an issue to be tried in the action. It is but a continuation of the complaint. Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject matter as the controversy referred to in the original complaint.

The purpose of the supplemental pleading is to bring into the records new facts which will enlarge or change the kind of relief to which the plaintiff is entitled; hence, any supplemental facts which further develop the original right of action, or extend to vary the relief, are available by way of supplemental complaint even though they themselves constitute a right of action. InLeobrera v. Court of Appeals,20the Court ruled that when the cause of action stated in the supplemental complaint is different from the causes of action mentioned in the original complaint, the court should not admit the supplemental complaint; the parties may file supplemental pleadings only to supply deficiencies in aid of an original pleading, but not to introduce new and independent causes of action. However, inPlanters Development Bank v. LZK Holdings and Development Co.,the Court held that a broad definition of causes of action should be applied: while a matter stated in a supplemental complaint should have some relation to the cause of action set forth in the original pleading, the fact that the supplemental pleading technically states a new cause of action should not be a bar to its allowance but only a factor to be considered by the court in the exercise of its discretion; and of course, a broad definition of "cause of action" should be applied here as elsewhere.