Medethics-2012-100700 Voluntary Moral Enhancement.full

8112019 Medethics-2012-100700 Voluntary Moral Enhancementfull

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullmedethics-2012-100700-voluntary-moral-enhancementfull 16

PAPER

Voluntary moral enhancementand the survival-at-any-cost bias

Vojin Rakić

Additional material ispublished online only To viewplease visit the journal online(httpdxdoiorg101136medethics-2012-100700)

Correspondence toProfessor Vojin RakićCenter for the Study of Bioethics Institute forPhilosophy and Social TheoryUniversity of BelgradeBeograd 11000 Serbiavojinrakichotmailcom

Received 27 March 2012Revised 17 December 2012Accepted 7 January 2013

To cite Rakić V J Med Ethics Published Online First[ please include Day Month

Year] doi101136medethics-2012-100700

ABSTRACTI discuss the argument of Persson and Savulescu thatmoral enhancement ought to accompany cognitiveenhancement as well as brie1047298y addressing critiques of this argument notably by John Harris I argue thatHarris who believes that cognitive enhancement islargely suf 1047297cient for making us behave more morallymight be disposing too easily of the great quandary of our moral existence the gap between what we do andwhat we believe is morally right to do In that regardPersson and Savulescursquos position has the potential tooffer more However I question Persson and

Savulescursquos proposal of compulsory moral enhancement

(a conception they used to promote) proposing thealternative of voluntary moral enhancement

MORAL ENHANCEMENT AS A COMPANION TOCOGNITIVE ENHANCEMENTProponents of cognitive bioenhancement whocombine their utilitarianism with a libertarianattitude believe that enhancement increases ourfreedom for two reasons First it augments theoptions open to people by adding the possiblechoice of undergoing enhancement Second the

enhancement itself increases freedom it enables usto become more successful and hence amplifyingthe opportunities we obtain throughout our lives

Nevertheless even if we accept that enhancementincreases freedom that it lsquoexpresses the humanspiritrsquo and that lsquoto be human is to be betterrsquo(p 531)1 the question that remains unanswered iswhether ordinary people has the moral ability toenhance themselves above all cognitively And if they do not have such ability should they seek asolution in moral bioenhancement

Douglas2 considers moral bioenhancement to bepermissible He focuses on motives de1047297ning moral

enhancement (ME) as follows A person morally enhances herself if she alters

herself in a way that may reasonably be expected

to result in her having morally better future

motives taken in sum than she would otherwise

have had (p 229)2

Douglas tentatively suggests that examples of ME might include in some individuals areduction of dislike of certain racial groups aswell as lessening of impulsive violent aggres-sion Thus ME would lead people whochoose to undergo it to have better motivesthan they would otherwise have had ( p 231)2

Douglas refers to a number of relevant1047297ndings oxytocin has been shown to promote

trusti serotonin (and selective serotonin reuptakeinhibitors (SSRIs)) to increase cooperation andreduce aggressionii while methylphenidate (Ritalin)reduces violent belligerence Furthermore theremay be a biological basis for some personality typesthat tend to immoral conduct antisocial personal-ity disorder may have biological underpinningsand criminality has been related to MAO mutationon the X chromosome when coupled with socialdeprivation (p 233)2 None of these 1047297ndings showthat we already have reliable means of achievingmoral bioenhancement but they do suggest the

possibility of further advancesiii

The biological underpinnings of morality are alsosuggested by the 1047297nding that identical twins whohave been brought up separately exhibit similarresponses in lsquoultimatum gamesrsquo These gamesfeature in economic experiments in which twoplayers have to decide how to divide a sum of money Player A proposes how to divide this sumbetween her and Player B The latter can say lsquoyesrsquoor turn down the proposal In the case that Player

iFor substantiations of oxytocin stimulating trusting

behaviour in games of cooperation see Kosfeld et al3 andZak et al4 For evidence of oxytocinrsquos effects on trustingand additional forms of prosocial behaviour towardsothers being sensitive to the group membership of theseothers see De Dreu5 6

iiFor an illustrative analysis of the role of theneurotransmitter serotonin it is always good to take alook at Crockettrsquos experiment7 Serotonin turns out todirectly alter moral judgement and behaviour throughincreasing our aversion to personally harming othersHence it has the capacity of enhancing us morally InCrockettrsquos trial the level of serotonin in healthyvolunteers was increased with an SSRI The effects of thisdrug on moral judgement were measured in a set of morallsquodilemmasrsquo contrasting utilitarian outcomes (eg saving1047297ve lives) to extremely aversive harmful actions (eg

killing an innocent human being) Individuals whoseserotonin levels were increased by the SSRI turned out tobe more likely to judge harmful actions as unacceptablebut only in cases in which harms were emotionally laden(p 17 433)7 Tse and Bond8 made subjects participate inthe lsquodictator gamersquo In this game an individual (thelsquodictatorrsquo) divides a sum of money between her andanother participant It turned out that those subjects towhom an SSRI was administered divided the sum morefairly than control subjects Crockettrsquos 1047297ndings and thedictator game results have sparked various reactions andfollow-up considerations It is outside the scope of myargument to go into them For the purposes of this paperit suf 1047297ces to suggest that heightened serotonin levels havean impact on the morality of our behaviouriii For this interpretation of Tom Douglas see Rakić9

(p 118) For a concise review of various forms of moral

bioenhancement (with useful references) see Savulecuand Persson10

Rakić V J Med Ethics 201301ndash5 doi101136medethics-2012-100700 1

Neuroethics

JME Online First published on February 14 2013 as 101136medethics-2012-100700

Copyright Article author (or their employer) 2013 Produced by BMJ Publishing Group Ltd under licence

groupbmjcomon February 14 2013 - Published by jmebmjcomDownloaded from



B opts to decline neither player receives anything If Player Baccepts the proposal the money is divided according to the pro-posal Reactions to lsquounfair offersrsquo (anything other than a 50ndash50split) vary but the similarity of the responses in the study onmonozygotic twins who have been brought up separatelyappears to support the hypothesis that genetic variation canaffect reactions to lsquounfair offersrsquoiv

Persson and Savulescu are also sensitive to the biological

underpinnings of morality and are favourably disposed to thepossibilities of moral bioenhancement They argue that MEought to be included with other types of enhancement in orderto reduce the risks of death and disaster

For if an increasing percentage of us acquires the power to

destroy a large number of us it is enough if very few of us are

malevolent or vicious enough to use this power for all of us to

run an unacceptable increase of the risk of death and disaster To

eliminate this risk cognitive enhancement would have to be

accompanied by a moral enhancement which extends to all of us

since such moral enhancement could reduce malevolence

(p 166)11

ME has to be related to our motivation to act morally

(p 167)11 The steady decrease of racism through our evolutionPersson and Savulescu forward as an example of ME that isshaped by our motivation the biological signi1047297cance of racialdissimilarity to indicate a lack of relationship by marking off strangers from our kin has been gradually becoming less rele-vant allowing us to understand the moral incongruity of racism(p 168)11 As moral traits are not socially constructed but havebiological underpinnings (p 168)11 Persson and Savulescu con-clude that cognitive enhancement (CE) is to be kept undercontrol by serious research into the biological basis of our mor-ality Going one step further than Douglas they argued thatdeveloping and implementing effective and safe forms of MEare our duty and they ought to be mandatory

At the very least the perils of cognitive enhancement require a

vigorous research program on understanding the biological

underpinnings of moral behaviorhelliphellipIf safe moral enhance-

ments are ever developed there are strong reasons to believe that

their use should be obligatory like education or 1047298uoride in the

water since those who should take them are least likely to be

inclined to use them That is safe effective moral enhancement

would be compulsory (p 174)11

In a more recent paper Persson and Savulescu continue todevelop their argument along the same linesv12

They diagnoseda mismatch between a limited human moral nature and a globa-lised highly sophisticated technology As the progress of scien-ti1047297c technology has been steadily increasing the human capacity

to cause harm has reached the stage at which life on Earthmight be annihilated or forever cease to be worthwhile Theauthors call this scenario lsquoultimate harmrsquo (UH) The source of the problem is that human moral psychology is lsquomyopicrsquo it hasbeen adapted to life in small cohesive societies with primitivetechnology while it is unprepared for the moral challenges of atechnologically advanced global society Moreover humanssuffer from various biases that incapacitate them to face contem-porary moral challengesmdashfor example they are biased towards

the near future (another symptom of lsquomoral myopiarsquo) theybelieve in the appropriateness of lsquoparochial altruismrsquo

(ie altruism extending only to kin and to people we are person-ally acquainted with) and the lsquoact-omission doctrinersquo (whichimplies that it is morally less objectionable to omit bene1047297t thanto harm) and they are incapable of feeling proportionate sym-pathy with larger numbers of sufferers Hence humans are inneed of ME For a detailed account of the causes and conse-

quences of our moral biases and the need for ME that followsfrom them see Persson and Savulescursquos Un 1047297t for the Future13

(But do note that in Un 1047297t for the Future Persson and Savulescudiverge from their earlier position in no longer insisting onmaking ME compulsoryvi)

Fenton14 and Harris15 criticise Persson and Savulescu11

Fenton claims that if ME is to occur at the level of our biologynon-traditional CE is a requisite Hence if scienti1047297c researchinto enhancement is aborted we will not be able to progressmorally to the extent that ensures the survival of humankind Inother words the argumentation of Persson and Savulescu appar-ently leads us to a paradoxical predicament lsquoscienti1047297c progressis both the means of our salvation as well as the means of ourdownfallrsquo (p 148)14 vii

Harris also asserts that ME must consist largely of CE andthe latter is not to be delayed in expectation of the former(p 106)15 Such a delay would postpone scienti1047297c developmentas well as impose limitations on our freedom including thelsquofreedom to fallrsquo Moreover much of the destruction humanityhas exposed itself to in its history (or will expose itself to in thefuture) is not to be attributed to wickedness and can thus be notsuccessfully addressed by ME It is rather the result of variouscognitive shortcomings (eg prejudices and lsquoidiocyrsquo) Harrisbelieves that we ought to deal with prejudices by combiningrationality and education while new types of CE will also behelpful in the future (p 105)15 He also makes a weighty obser-vation about the gap between how we act and how we believe is

right to act

The space between knowing the good and doing the good is a

region entirely inhabited by freedom hellip We know how lament-

ably bad we are at doing what we know we should (p 104) 15

Persson and Savulescu argue against Harris in several ways17

Where the issue of freedom is concerned they do it in the fol-lowing manner Suppose they say that our freedom is compat-ible with it being fully determined by us acting in accordancewith what we believe is right to do In that case a proper use of moral bioenhancement techniques will not reduce our freedomIt will simply make us always or almost always act as we believe

we ought to act Suppose on the other hand they continuethat we are free only because by nature we are not fully deter-mined to do what we believe is right to do In that case moralbioenhancement cannot be truly effective because our freedomin this non-deterministic sense limits its effectiveness In otherwords no matter whether we accept determinism or

ivIt is however open to debate whether an increased rate of rejection of unfair offers in ultimatum games is to be interpreted as an expression of a more developed sense of fairness or possibly of an increased aversion

to harming others (as Crockettrsquos 1047297ndings would suggest)vFor a related interpretation of their argument see Rakić9 (p 119)

viUntil recently Persson and Savulescu have been arguing in favour of compulsory moral enhancement (as will be shown below) but in theirnewly published book Un 1047297t for the Future they do not take a stance onwhether ME should be made mandatory The position promoted in thispaper however clearly insists upon leaving ME up to our free choiceviiFor a response to Fentonrsquos argumentation see Persson andSavulescu16

2 Rakić V J Med Ethics 201301ndash5 doi101136medethics-2012-100700

Neuroethics




indeterminism in the realm of human action moral bioenhance-ment will not limit our freedomviii

In fact Persson and Savulescu appear to argue thatmoral bioenhancement will not encroach upon our freedombecause we either lack a completely free will and moral bioenhance-

ment will thus not make us lose our freedom or have a completely free will that limits the effectiveness

of moral bioenhancementBut they do not take into account the possibility that we can

have an entirely free will that does not limit the effectiveness of moral bioenhancement As a matter of fact we can be morallyenhanced in an effective manner without losing our freedomThe reason why this is possible is that our free judgement willalways remain the adjudicator of the morality of our actionsmdasheven if it has been effectively subjected to moral bioenhance-ment We are free to decide whether we wish to be morallybioenhanced If we wish to be we do not give up our freedomWe only use our freedom to decide to be morally bioenhancedOur motives might change if we undergo effective moral bioen-hancement (as do our motives change for a variety of otherreasons) but our freedom will not be curtailed by it In otherwords voluntary moral enhancement (VME) even if broughtabout in an effective manner by medication can make us actmore morally while leaving our freedom intactix

Moreover for people with a heightened level of altruism orempathy some types of conduct towards others would be out of the question because they consider them morally inappropriatewhereas for people with a lower level of altruism such beha-viour might be perfectly acceptable But that does not lead tothe conclusion that people with a higher level of altruism areless free than people with a lower level of altruism As Savulescuand Persson rightly note that would mean that women whoappear to be by biological nature more altruistic and lessaggressive than men are less free than men (p 409)10 Hence

ME that increases empathy and consequently altruism in peopledoes not restrict their freedom people who are morally good(no matter whether they are morally bioenhanced or not) andalways try to do the right thing are not less free than the oneswho are inclined to fail to do so Still by making ME compul-

sory the state would indeed encroach upon the freedom of itscitizens

VOLUNTARY MORAL ENHANCEMENTBuilding upon the position of Persson and Savulescu VME con-cedes that CE ought to be accompanied by ME if we wish tokeep the likelihood of the obliteration of worthwhile life onEarth as low as possible In what follows I will 1047297rst accentuate

the relevance of the gap between how we act and how webelieve we ought to act and show why Harrisrsquos position mighthave a dif 1047297culty in successfully addressing this gap Next I shallprovide arguments in favour of VME as an alternative to theinitial position of Persson and Savulescu that ME ought to beobligatory I will also address the issue of whether we shouldexpect a signi1047297cant number of people to be suf 1047297ciently moti-vated to subject themselves to VME

As I have argued earlier9 the gap between what we do andwhat we believe is right to do might well be the greatest

predicament of our existence as moral beings The essentialissue is not how to make us understand morality better but howto morally enhance our actions It is motivation rather than cog-nition that is at the heart of the matter Hence the key problemof morality comes down to our motivation to act as we believewe should

On the other hand we have seen that Harrisrsquos thesis is thatprejudices can best be countered by a combination of rationality

and education If these two countermeasures are applied suc-cessfully our comprehension of morality will be enhanced Butthe question is to what extent will it morally enhance ouractions (in quantity and quality) Will it make us less lsquolament-ably bad at doing what we know we shouldrsquo Are rationality andeducation going to have a critical impact on the problem of howto bring our actions in line with our understanding of moralitySince it is dif 1047297cult to believe that the impact will be even closeto decisive additional means will have to be sought in order tomake us act more morally (p 120)9 In other words the con-ception that we will act morally if we rationally give up on ourprejudices is an idea that might well be prejudiced itself preju-dice about prejudice

One possible way to enhance the morality of our actionswould be the administration of medication for ME Hence itmight be some types of drugs rather than rationality and educa-tion which can have a favourable bearing on the enhancementof the morality of our conduct They improve the morality of our deeds and not solely our comprehension of morality If theyhave a direct impact on our motivations they will lead tomorally enhanced behaviour (p 121)9

Harris is certainly right in claiming that defects in cognitiondrive some of our immoral behaviour Garett Jones observesthat smarter groups are generally more patient and more percep-tive traits that are keys to cooperative behaviour (p 496)20 If these observations are correct the implication is that intelligenceis one of the drivers of moral behaviour When we are more

intelligent we cooperate more and are less prone to violent con-1047298ict or to secretive actions hence we might be less inclined tocertain types of immoral behaviour (p 121ndash22)9 Consequentlyit is possible that enhanced intelligence might help us act moremorally We can improve our intelligence through better nour-ishment healthier surroundings and better schooling in theworldrsquos most impoverished countries In other words trad-itional means of CE might indeed be important for ME Butthey do not appear to be suf 1047297cient for two reasons morality has certain biological underpinnings which

cannot be affected by traditional means of CE and traditional means of CE do not have a critical impact on

us bridging the gap between how we act and how wethink is right to act

Ergo traditional types of CE or any other type of CE forthat matter do not appear to be the solution to our immoralbehaviour ME is undeniably needed as a supplement to CE Butif ME is to become compulsory as argued earlier by Perssonand Savulescu our freedom would obviously be restrictedVME on the other hand maintains that only voluntaryenhancement will leave our autonomy intact If we wish todiminish the danger of UH by restricting our freedom weencroach upon a crucial element of our morality If freedom isessential for our morality (ie for us acting intentionally in amorally appropriate manner) and morality is a key element of us being lsquohumanrsquo (as Persson and Savulescu themselves arguewhen claiming that it is morality rather than biology that

ensures us human status21

) the implication is that making MEobligatory would deprive us to some extent of an important

viiiFor another reply to Harrisrsquos position that moral bioenhancement viathe direct modulation of emotions would invariably come at an

unacceptable cost to our freedom see Douglas18

ixFor Harrisrsquos reply to Persson and Savulescursquos rebuke see Harris19


Neuroethics




part of our human existence It is critical that we keep ourfreedom intact If we fail to do that we will dispossess ourselvesof something that is vital for our human status and will havealready embarked upon the path of in1047298icting serious (if notultimate) harm upon ourselves Hence I argue in favour of vol-untary instead of compulsory MEx

We can never fully eliminate the possibility of self-annihilationNuclear biotechnological and other weapons of mass destruction

may end up in the hands of one or more deranged individualswho can in1047298ict UH with them A small number of psychopathswould be suf 1047297cient to bring that about We have to learn to livewith the idea that this harm will remain a possibilityTechnological developments cannot and should not be reversedno matter how intensely we fear that life can be extinguished onour planet and no matter how much we would like to eliminatethat fear A growth of the likelihood of UH from 005 to 01might not noticeably in1047298uence the intensity of our worrywhereas its increase from 0 to 005 could horrify us The realityof this horror is why Persson and Savulescu believe that we haveto make sure that CE is accompanied by ME Nonetheless theprobability of the annihilation of humankind will never be zeroHence we can only attempt to keep its likelihood to a minimumBut this attempt should fall short of compulsory ME

Persson and Savulescu argue that the negative instrumentalvalue of UH is inde 1047297nitely high because there is no way of tellinghow much of a net balance of goodness UH prevents that ishow much of worthwhile life there would have been in thefuture had it not occurred Moreover we might well have over-looked some of the factors that contribute to the risk of UH Thismakes it warranted Persson and Savulescu argue to demand thatwe try to minimise UH risk whatever the expected gain of thealternatives might bemdashwithin realistic limits (p 442)16

Indeed it is impossible to know how much of a net balanceof goodness UH prevents but that does not imply that theinstrumental value of UH is inde1047297nitely high It might as well

imply that the negative instrumental value of a speci1047297c UH iszero because it could have been followed right away by anotherUH Hence humanity might not have lost anything after theoccurrence of a speci1047297c UH

Furthermore the very existence of humanity does not have toimply a net balance of goodness Its existence might at somepoint imply a net balance of badness The fact that we will con-tinue to wish to survive (if we will) has to a large extent to dowith our biology Organisms do their best to survive So dohumans But that does not mean that our survival entails a netbalance of goodness Our self-annihilation might at some pointamount to the annulment of a net balance of badness (eg whenlife on Earth has permanently ceased to be worth living) Thenit would be good for us not to survive At another pointwe might not even have a strong wish anymore to survive Orwe might even wish not to survive That can be a stage on ourevolutionary path at which we have suppressed the biologicalneed to survive or to survive at any cost

In a recent paper Persson and Savulescu deal with the issueof freedom in the following manner They introduce theconcept of a lsquoGod machinersquo an entity that preserves our

freedom of limited moral transgression but that prevents usfrom engaging in excessively nefarious and dangerous moralpractices10 Hence the lsquoGod machinersquo safeguards our freedomto some extent but makes sure that whenever it detects wickedand hazardous intentions in an individual it intervenes in sucha way that she does not wish to realise them anymore In factthe lsquoGod machinersquo resembles a sort of lsquoenhanced Godrsquo a Godthat leaves much of our autonomy intact but prevents us from

using it to in1047298ict grave harm upon others or ourselves Although the lsquoGod machinersquo might be developed at some

point it is imaginable if at all only in a distant futureSavulescu and Persson optimistically picture its existence in2050 (p 412)10 In the much nearer future however I believethat it is dif 1047297cult to envision a more realistic option than VMEThe possibility of VME we already have And more types of MEare to come Hence we should pursue the opportunity we havethat is to morally enhance ourselves on a voluntary basisaccepting the fact that we are not yet up to the task of creatingan all-powerful lsquomachinersquo that will prevent us from developingthe most heinous intentions

The last issue I would like to address here is whether weshould expect a signi1047297cant number of people to be suf 1047297cientlymotivated to subject themselves to VME Would many of us bereally motivated to embark on that path of enhancement Are weeager to use medication in order to enhance the morality of ourdeeds If we were why would we prefer to take drugs ratherthan decide to act more morally without them Furthermorewill more trust and less aggressiveness help us to be successful inthe societies we live in Might not more empathy subject us forbeing abused by others (p 123)9

As all of the above concerns seem well founded it appearsthat we might be in need of external stimuli to undergo VMEThe state ought not to be excluded here as an actor that canhave a role in providing them It should not compel ME but itcan use a variety of incentives in favour of morally enhanced

citizens tax reductions schooling allowances for their childrenretirement bene1047297ts and af 1047297rmative action policies that favourthem Such bene1047297ts would give morally enhanced individualsvarious social advantages advantage in opportunity rather thanequality of opportunity (p 123)9

The fact that ME would not be obligatory in combinationwith what has been proposed above ensures us in achieving twoessential objectives First VME would be encouraged whilemaking sure that morally enhanced individuals are not disadvan-taged in relation to the morally unenhanced ones Second bytreating ME as a matter of choice our freedom would not becurtailed ( p 124)9

When talking about the state as a potential agent that canprovide us with external stimuli to undergo ME it should benoted that voters who have not undergone ME might not votefor a government that is morally wise enough to provide uswith these stimuli It is apparent why this fact led Persson andSavulescu to promote compulsory ME But I argue that bymaking ME compulsory we might deprive humans of an essen-tial element of their human existence thus in a way gettingalready into the business of our self-annihilation Hencehumanity has no other choice than to give up on the imperativeto survive at any cost

CONCLUSIONCE is not decisive for making us act more morally Those whoassert that are plainly wrong CE is to be accompanied by ME if

we wish to improve the morality of our conduct Henceresearch into the possibilities of ME (including moral

x An exemption from VME might be convicts who repeat their offencesand whose release from prison poses a danger For example a repeatedchild rapist might not be given the option of voluntary ME The moralenhancement of such a person could be legally imposed on him That

would rightfully take away some of his freedom (as did hisimprisonment)


Neuroethics




bioenhancement) is certainly needed It is not suf 1047297cient toimprove our cognition of moral issues Our motivation needs tobe morally enhanced as well Only then will we lower the prob-ability of UH As effective means of moral bioenhancement arebeing developed their voluntary adoption is to be encouragedbut not more than that The implication is that humanity oughtto learn to live with the danger of UH and give up on whatmight well be called its lsquosurvival-at-any-cost biasrsquo We should do

everything in our power to diminish the probability of UHmdashbuteverything short of making moral bioenhancement compulsoryWe need to make a choice between preserving freedom as anessential marker of our distinctively human existence andobtaining additional assurances that humanity will survive bymaking ME obligatory If we opt for the former we will safe-guard an essential component of our human status If we optfor the latter we might possibly feel more con1047297dent thathumanity will survive but we do so only at the cost of givingup on a key element of our speci1047297cally human existence

Acknowledgements I am indebted to Ingmar Persson and Tom Douglas forthe discussions we had and for commenting on a previous version of this paperThe responsibility for the content remains with the author

Competing interests NoneProvenance and peer review Not commissioned externally peer reviewed

REFERENCES1 Savulescu J Justice fairness and enhancement Ann NYAS 20061093321ndash382 Douglas T Moral enhancement J Appl Philos 200825228ndash453 Kosfeld M Heinrichs M Zak P et al Oxytocin increases trust in humans Nature

2005435673ndash64 Zak P Kurzban R Matzner W et al The neurobiology of trust Ann NYAS

20041032224ndash7

5 De Dreu C Greer L Handgraaf M et al Neuropeptide oxytocin regulates parochialaltruism in intergroup con1047298icts among humans Science 20103281408ndash11

6 De Dreu C Greer L Van Kleef G et al Oxytocin promotes human ethnocentrismProc NASUSA 20111081262ndash6

7 Crockett M Clark L Tabibnia G Serotonin selectively in1047298uences moral judgmentand behavior through effects on harm aversion Proc NASUSA 201010717433ndash8

8 Tse WS Bond AJ Serotonergic intervention affects both social dominance andaf 1047297liative behaviour Psychopharmacology 2002161324ndash30

9 Rakić V From cognitive to moral enhancement a possible reconciliation of religiousoutlooks and the biotechnological creation of a better human J Stud Religions

Ideologies 201211113ndash2810 Savulescu J Persson I Moral enhancement freedom and the god machine Monist

201295399ndash42111 Persson I Savulescu J The perils of cognitive enhancement and the urgent

imperative to enhance the moral character of humanity J Appl Philos200825162ndash77

12 Persson I Savulescu J Un1047297t for the future Human nature scienti1047297c progress andthe need for moral enhancement In Savulescu J Ter Meulen R Kahane G edsEnhancing human capacities Oxford Wiley-Blackwell 2011486ndash500

13 Persson I Savulescu Un1047297 t for the future the need for moral enhancement OxfordOxford University Press 2012

14 Fenton E The perils of failing to enhance a response to Persson and Savulescu J Med Ethics 201036148ndash51

15 Harris J Moral enhancement and freedom Bioethics 201125102ndash1116 Persson I Savulescu J The turn for ultimate harm a reply to Fenton J Med Ethics

201137441ndash4

17 Persson I Savulescu J Getting moral enhancement right the desirability of moral enhancement Bioethics Published Online First 29 July 2011doi101111j1467-8519201101907x

18 Douglas T Moral enhancement via direct emotion modulation a reply toJohn Harris Bioethics Published Online First 17 November 2011doi101111j1467-8519201101919x

19 Harris J Moral progress and moral enhancement Bioethics Published Online First19 June 2012 doi101111j1467-8519201201965x

20 Jones G Are smarter groups more cooperative Evidence from prisonerrsquos dilemmaexperiments 1959ndash2003 J Econ Behav Organ 200868489ndash97

21 Persson I Savulescu J Moral transhumanism J Med Philos 201035656ndash69


Neuroethics




doi 101136medethics-2012-100700 published online February 14 2013J Med Ethics

Vojin Rakic survival-at-any-cost biasVoluntary moral enhancement and the

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B opts to decline neither player receives anything If Player Baccepts the proposal the money is divided according to the pro-posal Reactions to lsquounfair offersrsquo (anything other than a 50ndash50split) vary but the similarity of the responses in the study onmonozygotic twins who have been brought up separatelyappears to support the hypothesis that genetic variation canaffect reactions to lsquounfair offersrsquoiv

Persson and Savulescu are also sensitive to the biological

underpinnings of morality and are favourably disposed to thepossibilities of moral bioenhancement They argue that MEought to be included with other types of enhancement in orderto reduce the risks of death and disaster

For if an increasing percentage of us acquires the power to

destroy a large number of us it is enough if very few of us are

malevolent or vicious enough to use this power for all of us to

run an unacceptable increase of the risk of death and disaster To

eliminate this risk cognitive enhancement would have to be

accompanied by a moral enhancement which extends to all of us

since such moral enhancement could reduce malevolence

(p 166)11

ME has to be related to our motivation to act morally

(p 167)11 The steady decrease of racism through our evolutionPersson and Savulescu forward as an example of ME that isshaped by our motivation the biological signi1047297cance of racialdissimilarity to indicate a lack of relationship by marking off strangers from our kin has been gradually becoming less rele-vant allowing us to understand the moral incongruity of racism(p 168)11 As moral traits are not socially constructed but havebiological underpinnings (p 168)11 Persson and Savulescu con-clude that cognitive enhancement (CE) is to be kept undercontrol by serious research into the biological basis of our mor-ality Going one step further than Douglas they argued thatdeveloping and implementing effective and safe forms of MEare our duty and they ought to be mandatory

At the very least the perils of cognitive enhancement require a

vigorous research program on understanding the biological

underpinnings of moral behaviorhelliphellipIf safe moral enhance-

ments are ever developed there are strong reasons to believe that

their use should be obligatory like education or 1047298uoride in the

water since those who should take them are least likely to be

inclined to use them That is safe effective moral enhancement

would be compulsory (p 174)11

In a more recent paper Persson and Savulescu continue todevelop their argument along the same linesv12

They diagnoseda mismatch between a limited human moral nature and a globa-lised highly sophisticated technology As the progress of scien-ti1047297c technology has been steadily increasing the human capacity

to cause harm has reached the stage at which life on Earthmight be annihilated or forever cease to be worthwhile Theauthors call this scenario lsquoultimate harmrsquo (UH) The source of the problem is that human moral psychology is lsquomyopicrsquo it hasbeen adapted to life in small cohesive societies with primitivetechnology while it is unprepared for the moral challenges of atechnologically advanced global society Moreover humanssuffer from various biases that incapacitate them to face contem-porary moral challengesmdashfor example they are biased towards

the near future (another symptom of lsquomoral myopiarsquo) theybelieve in the appropriateness of lsquoparochial altruismrsquo

(ie altruism extending only to kin and to people we are person-ally acquainted with) and the lsquoact-omission doctrinersquo (whichimplies that it is morally less objectionable to omit bene1047297t thanto harm) and they are incapable of feeling proportionate sym-pathy with larger numbers of sufferers Hence humans are inneed of ME For a detailed account of the causes and conse-

quences of our moral biases and the need for ME that followsfrom them see Persson and Savulescursquos Un 1047297t for the Future13

(But do note that in Un 1047297t for the Future Persson and Savulescudiverge from their earlier position in no longer insisting onmaking ME compulsoryvi)

Fenton14 and Harris15 criticise Persson and Savulescu11

Fenton claims that if ME is to occur at the level of our biologynon-traditional CE is a requisite Hence if scienti1047297c researchinto enhancement is aborted we will not be able to progressmorally to the extent that ensures the survival of humankind Inother words the argumentation of Persson and Savulescu appar-ently leads us to a paradoxical predicament lsquoscienti1047297c progressis both the means of our salvation as well as the means of ourdownfallrsquo (p 148)14 vii

Harris also asserts that ME must consist largely of CE andthe latter is not to be delayed in expectation of the former(p 106)15 Such a delay would postpone scienti1047297c developmentas well as impose limitations on our freedom including thelsquofreedom to fallrsquo Moreover much of the destruction humanityhas exposed itself to in its history (or will expose itself to in thefuture) is not to be attributed to wickedness and can thus be notsuccessfully addressed by ME It is rather the result of variouscognitive shortcomings (eg prejudices and lsquoidiocyrsquo) Harrisbelieves that we ought to deal with prejudices by combiningrationality and education while new types of CE will also behelpful in the future (p 105)15 He also makes a weighty obser-vation about the gap between how we act and how we believe is

right to act

The space between knowing the good and doing the good is a

region entirely inhabited by freedom hellip We know how lament-

ably bad we are at doing what we know we should (p 104) 15

Persson and Savulescu argue against Harris in several ways17

Where the issue of freedom is concerned they do it in the fol-lowing manner Suppose they say that our freedom is compat-ible with it being fully determined by us acting in accordancewith what we believe is right to do In that case a proper use of moral bioenhancement techniques will not reduce our freedomIt will simply make us always or almost always act as we believe

we ought to act Suppose on the other hand they continuethat we are free only because by nature we are not fully deter-mined to do what we believe is right to do In that case moralbioenhancement cannot be truly effective because our freedomin this non-deterministic sense limits its effectiveness In otherwords no matter whether we accept determinism or

ivIt is however open to debate whether an increased rate of rejection of unfair offers in ultimatum games is to be interpreted as an expression of a more developed sense of fairness or possibly of an increased aversion

to harming others (as Crockettrsquos 1047297ndings would suggest)vFor a related interpretation of their argument see Rakić9 (p 119)

viUntil recently Persson and Savulescu have been arguing in favour of compulsory moral enhancement (as will be shown below) but in theirnewly published book Un 1047297t for the Future they do not take a stance onwhether ME should be made mandatory The position promoted in thispaper however clearly insists upon leaving ME up to our free choiceviiFor a response to Fentonrsquos argumentation see Persson andSavulescu16


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Documents

Medethics-2012-100700 Voluntary Moral Enhancement.full