Meaning and the Transformational Stew

Meaning and the Transformational StewAuthor(s): Steven DavisSource: Foundations of Language, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Feb., 1970), pp. 67-88Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25000428 .

Accessed: 28/06/2014 12:13

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Foundations of Language.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 91.213.220.163 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 12:13:40 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springer

http://www.jstor.org/stable/25000428?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


STEVEN DAVIS

MEANING AND THE TRANSFORMATIONAL STEW

Current research in grammar' justifies the claim that an adequate grammar of language will throw much light on the meaning of particular words. In so far as an adequate grammar can do this, it will illuminate philosophical problems which turn on questions of meaning. But bad grammar raises only false hopes. Mr. Stampe, in 'Toward a Grammar of Meaning'2, brings to bear transformational analysis to support two philosophical claims:

(A) In 'x means y' and 'x means that p,' 'y' and 'that p' are not

referring expressions.3 (B) 'x means y' means the same as or can be analyzed in terms of

'By x Agent means y'. Support for this is given by the hypothesis that an abstract form relating to the latter transformationally underlies sentences related to the former schema.4

All the arguments Mr. Stampe advances for (A) are bad arguments. I will,

briefly, recount each of these arguments in turn and then offer counterargu ments. His arguments for (B) are more persuasive, but he does not carry the transformational analysis far enough. I will attempt to deepen his analysis.

But, first I want to consider his arguments for (A). Argument: 'Mean' does not undergo the passive transformation. The reason

for this is that the passive transformation moves an object noun phrase into

subject position which characteristically can be used as a referring expression. Hence, the supposition that the object noun phrases of 'mean' are not

referring expressions explains why this verb cannot undergo the passive (pp. 143-4).

Counterargument: (1) 'Mean' is a member of a class of verbs not subject to the passive transformation which includes 'weigh', 'resemble', 'lack', 'cost', and 'have', called middle verbs. However, it is obvious that many of

1 Recent work in syntax by J. R. Ross, G. Lakoff, and J. D. McCawley present evidence that the relationship between syntax and meaning is closer than hitherto realized. It is their contention that the study of syntax and semantics is continuous and that the former cannot be pursued independently of the latter, as supposed by Chomsky. 2 'Toward a Grammar of Meaning', Philosophical Review 77 (1968), No. 2. All page references are to this article. 3 This view is held by W. F. Sellars, W. P. Alston, G. Ryle, and J. L. Austin. 4 H. P. Grice advances this position.

Foundations of Language 6 (1970) 67-88. All rights reserved.



68 STEVEN DAVIS

these verbs can take objects which can function as referring expressions. Hence, the failure of the passive transformation to apply to a verb cannot be explained by supposing that the objects of these verbs are not referring expressions.

(2) The supposition, adopted by Stampe, that subjects of sentences are

characteristically used as referring expressions, would lead us to believe that the complements of 'mean' in "Masticate' means chew', and 'That sign

means that people should keep out', cannot occur as subjects of sentences.

But, in Chew is what 'masticate' means

and That people should keep out is what that sign means

the complements in question do occur as surface subjects.

Argument: In "masticate' means chew', 'chew' is not a nominal expres sion. Since only nominals can be used to make reference, the complement here cannot be a referring expression (p. 144).

Counterargument: (1) If 'chew' is not a nominal expression, then what

part of speech is it? Is it a verb? This gives us the following structure for the sentence: S[NP +vp[V +V]]. In turn we must have the following phrase structure rule to generate this sentence: VP-+V +V. This rule only appears in the derivation of the type of sentence in the above argument which con tains 'mean'. The addition of such a rule to a grammar is theoretically ex

pensive since it would require additional rules to prevent the generation of deviant strings, and ad hoc since it applies only to 'mean'.

(2) If 'chew' is not a nominal expression in "Masticate' means chew', then it cannot occur as the subject of a sentence related transformationally to this sentence, since all subjects are nominal expressions. However, it occurs as the subject of

Chew is what 'masticate' means.

Hence, it must be a nominal expression. (3) Stampe contradicts himself. In giving the underlying structure of cleft

sentences where 'chew' can occur as the subject, he marks these subjects as

NP's (p. 165). Argument: If 'x' is a referring expression, then it is possible to substitute

for 'x' a more general or more specific expression 'categorizing' what is referred to by 'x'. Moreover, such substitutivity preserves grammaticality and truth. Since fire is a form of oxidation and 'a form of oxidation' cannot

be substituted for 'fire' in "Feu' means fire', 'fire' is not a referring expression

(p. 145).



MEANING AND THE TRANSFORMATIONAL STEW 69

Counterargument: The form of Stampe's argument is

'Feu' means fire. Fire is a form of oxidation.

.'. 'Feu' means a form of oxidation.

However, Stampe is committing the fallacy of ambiguity. He has assumed that the two instances of 'fire' in the two premises are not homonyms. But, 'fire' in the first premise is the meaning of 'feu' and the meaning of 'feu' is not a form of oxidation. Hence, 'a form of oxidation' cannot be substituted for 'fire'. This can be brought out more clearly when we consider that 'fire' in the second premise refers to instances of combustion, whereas 'fire' in the first premise, if it refers to anything, does not refer to instances of com bustion. Those who claim that it is a referring expression, such as Frege, Church, and Katz, hold that it refers to a sense or a concept. Instances of

combustion are neither of these.

Argument: 'Mean', unlike 'prove', 'imply', and 'believe' cannot take an

appositive noun before 'that' complements. Any string of the following form is deviant. is deviant

*NP means the (N) that p.5

The reason for this, according to Stampe, is that the sentential comple ment of 'mean' is not a referring expression and hence, cannot take an

appositive noun which 'categorizes' what is referred to by the complements which do co-occur with such nouns.

Stampe maintains that this is connected with the fact that sentences which

contain 'mean' cannot be passivized. Stampe claims more generally that any verb which takes a complement and which does not take an appositive noun

directly following it cannot be passivized so that the sentential complement of the verb becomes the surface subject of the passivized sentence. Included within this class are 'warn', 'inform', 'tell', and 'remind' (p. 146).

Counterargument: (1) There are verbs which do not take an appositive noun, but which take sentential complements which can appear as passivized subjects. 'Know' does not co-occur with an appositive noun, but undergoes passivization.

That the earth was round was known by the Greeks many centuries before Columbus.

(2) The reason 'warn','inform', 'tell', and 'remind' do not form passives with sentential subjects has nothing to do with appositive nouns.6 The reason

5 '*, indicates an ungrammatical string. '?' indicates a doubtful string.

6 Sentences containing verbs of this sort, transitive oblique noun phrase constructions, are discussed in P. S. Rosenbaum, The Grammar of English Predicate Constructions, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1967.



70 STEVEN DAVIS

the sentential complements of these verbs cannot occur as surface subjects of passive sentences is that they cannot occur as the first NP after the verb and thus, they do not meet the structural description for the passive trans formation.7 All these verbs must take an indirect object which cannot be

interchanged with the complement. Those verbs which do take indirect

objects, have complements, and allow these complements under passiviza tion to become surface subjects, also, allow the interchange of the indirect object and the complement. This brings the complement adjacent to the verb which in turn allows the passive transformation to apply. For example,

John reported to the boss that Fred was an organizer. John reported that Fred was an organizer to the boss. That Fred was an organizer was reported by John to the boss.

The verbs in question here do not allow such interchange and hence, the

complement cannot become a surface subject as a result of passivization.

John warned me that Fred was an organizer. *John warned that Fred was an organizer to me. *That Fred was an organizer was warned by John to me.

Hence, we see that whether a verb takes an appositive noun immediately following it does not necessarily have any bearing on the passivization of sentences containing that verb.

Argument: Let us assume that Stampe has shown that the objects of 'mean' cannot be referring expressions. There are, however, other ex

pressions, like

What 'stiat

means ( masticate' )

The meaning of 'masticate',

which seem to function as referring expressions and to refer to meanings. Against this Stampe argues that even though these two expressions can function as subjects, they are not referring expressions.

In order to support this claim Stampe argues that there are two kinds of wh-nominals: those derived from underlying interrogatives and those derived from underlying relative clauses. An example of each kind of wh

7 There are sentences where an NP follows the verb, but passivization is not allowed. John ate with a fork *A fork was eaten with by John.

Perhaps, the reason for this is that there is an underlying direct object, 'food', immediately following 'ate'. If this is the case, 'a fork' is not the first NP following the verb. Or the reason might be that NP's which are objects of only certain prepositions can undergo passivization.




nominal, respectively, is

What was in the tub was hard to determine.

What was in the tub was hard.

Stampe claims that the latter kind of wh-nominal can be used as a referring expression. The test Stampe proposes for interrogative nominals is that sentences containing them are transformationally related to sentences like

It was hard to determine what was in the tub.

Clearly, here, the wh-clause is an interrogative. For, 'It was hard to deter

mine', is an answer to the question 'What was in the tub?'

Stampe argues that both the wh-nominals above containing 'mean' are related to underlying interrogative forms. His evidence for this is that they both meet his test for interrogative nominals.

What 'masticat means is obscure. 'masticate'

It is obscure what 'masticate' means.

The meaning of the passage is clear. It is clear what the meaning of the passage is.

Hence, the two kinds of wh-nominals with 'mean' are not referring expres sions (pp. 151-2).

Counterargument: 'Odd', 'exciting', 'obscene', 'unbelievable', and 'strange' unlike 'evident', 'apparent', 'clear', 'obvious', and 'a mystery' take relative clause nominals. The evidence for this is that 'whether' clauses are always interrogative and never occur with the former set while they can occur with

the latter set.

*Whether John is coming is odd. Whether John is coming is evident.

The two kinds of wh-nominals, containing 'mean', can co-occur with the

predicate adjectives which do not take interrogative clauses as subjects.

What Joh, means is obscene.

The meaning of the passage is strange.

Moreover, these two sentences are not related to Stampe's test for inter

rogative nominals.

*It is obscene what John means.

*It is strange what the meaning of the passage is.



72 STEVEN DAVIS

Hence, these two kinds of nominals are not necessarily derived from under

lying interrogative forms, and thus, it is possible for them to be referring expressions.

I have examined all the arguments Stampe gives in support of (A) and shown them to be bad arguments. But there are still the following gram

matical facts about 'mean' for which an account must be given.

(1) 'Mean' does not take the passive except in cleft-sentence constructions

(p. 139). (2) 'Mean' cannot be modified by manner adverbs (p. 140). (3) 'Mean' does not have an indirect object (p. 141). (4) 'Mean' does not occur in imperatives (p. 142). (5) 'Mean' does not take an appositive noun immediately following it

(p. 146). (6) 'Mean' does not have a past participle form8 (p. 147). These facts, possibly except for the last, cannot be denied. Stampe seems

to think that these are characteristics of intransitive verbs. He uses 'transitive' in a somewhat archaic sense. He tells us that "a transitive verb 'may be followed by a substantive denoting that which receives the action or is

produced by it"' (fn. p. 139). It is true that 'mean' is not an active verb and

hence, its complement noun phrases do not denote anything which receives the action designated by the verb. But it does not follow from this that these noun phrases are not referring expressions. Moreover, Stampe concludes from this that 'mean' is an intransitive verb. This leads him to claim that 'mean' does not take a direct object (p. 147). What Stampe has conflated is the distinction drawn by contemporary linguists between transitive verbs and active verbs. These two features of verbs are really quite distinct. The former is defined in terms of the frame of grammatical categories in which a verb can occur while the latter is determined by co-occurrence relations between the verb and other types of morphemes. Transitivity falls into a class of features which Chomsky calls strict subcategorizational.9 A verb is transitive just in case it can occur in the following frame:

V+NP.

'Mean' clearly occurs in such frames and is, thereby, a transitive verb. More

over, the NP which follows 'mean', contrary to Stampe, is the object of 'mean'. Of course, that this NP is an object has no bearing on whether it is a

referring expression. An NP is an object just in case it is the first NP fol

lowing V. The terminological issue, of course, is not important. What Stampe has

8 A past participle form does occur in 'What is meant by 'Masticate' is chew'. 9 N. Chomsky, Aspects of a Theory of Syntax, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965, p. 95.




noticed is that 'mean' is a stative rather than an active verb. Included within the former class are 'believe', 'know', 'regret', 'expect', 'hope', 'have', 'resemble', 'cost', 'want', 'break', 'lack', and 'like'. Examples of the latter class are 'persuade', 'force', 'listen', 'watch', 'order', 'make', 'swim', and 'sit'. Notice that there are stative verbs which are transitive, 'expect', 'have', and 'like' while 'break', as in 'The chair broke', is intransitive. On the other hand there are active verbs which are transitive: 'force', 'watch', and 'make', while 'swim' and 'sit' are intransitive.

The distinction between active and stative verbs is a semantic distinction. The former verbs, when used, indicate that something was done10, while the latter do not. There are a variety of tests, most of which are unrelated at this point in linguistic research, for the distinction between these two kinds of verbs. Stampe has cited three of them, two of which are sufficient and one

of which is necessary for a verb being stative. The two sufficient conditions he gives are that a verb is stative, if it cannot occur in imperatives as the

main verb and if it cannot take manner adverbials. And the necessary con

dition is that if a verb is stative, it cannot take an indirect object. There are

many other tests only a few of which I will list. A verb is stative if it cannot occur in the following frames:

What he did was

He is careful in (at) I saw him

He _ instead of

I order him to __.

He kept on __

and if it cannot co-occur with instrumental 'with', 'locatives', 'do so', 'for someone's sake' and 'progressive'.ll Clearly, 'mean' falls within the class of stative verbs. Hence, when Stampe asks why 'mean' is intransitive, he is

actually asking why it is stative (p. 143). His confusion about the grammatical character of the complement of 'mean' leads him to seek the answer by examining the grammatical character of the complement of the verb (p. 143).

He is led to look in this direction since intransitive verbs do not have com

plements. Consequently, on Stampe's view of intransitive verbs, that 'mean' can be followed by NP's is in need of an explanation.

I have shown that all of Stampe's arguments for the position that the com

plements of 'mean' are not referring expressions are bad arguments. But

10 It might be thought that they must have human subjects. But clouds can indicate rain and 'indicate' is an active verb. 11 These tests are taken from lectures of George Lakoff at the Linguistic Society of America summer institute, 1968.



74 STEVEN DAVIS

there are further considerations which lead one to believe that the facts about 'mean' should not be explained by examining the complements of this verb. Notice that all the facts about 'mean', except 5, are also true of 're semble'. Let us assume that Stampe is correct in his claim that these facts about 'mean' can be explained in terms of the non-referential function of the

NP's following this verb. Stampe would, then, be forced to give an entirely different account for 'resemble', since 'resemble' does take complements which can be used as referring expressions.

What, then, does explain these facts about 'resemble' and 'mean?' It is

merely that 'mean' and 'resemble' are stative verbs. That is to say, meaning something and x's resembling y are not actions. There are difficulties, how ever. Some of the stative verbs, such as 'like', 'hope', 'known', and 'believe' can be passivized but 'mean' does not undergo passivization. Hence, that 'mean' is a stative verb cannot account for this fact. I think the difficulty can

be resolved. 'Stative' is too broad a classification. Notice that some of the stative verbs mentioned above do not pass all the tests I have given. For

example, 'believe', 'like', 'hope' and 'want' can occur in, 'He kept on _ ', and 'expect' can take the progressive. What is needed is a refinement of this classification. I think we will find that there is a class of verbs, exemplified by 'mean', which meet all the tests I have given above for stative and in

addition do not take the passive. There will be another class, which can be

passivized, and yet another, exemplified by 'expect', which can take passive and progressive. Perhaps the reason for this is that there is not a sharp division between active and stative verbs, but rather there is a continuum of cases. Is not expecting that p more action like than knowing that p and

knowing that p more action like than meaning that p? For we can say,

For two hours I have been expecting that Jones will arrive,

but we cannot say

*For two hours I have been knowing that Jones will arrive,

and we can say

At two o'clock I knew that Jones would arrive, but not

*At two o'clock I meant that Jones would arrive.

Some things we do, such as running a race, stretch over a period of time

while other things we do occur at particular times, such as scoring a goal.

Meaning something neither occupies a stretch of time nor occurs at a

particular time. Hence, it is not an action, nor does it share any features of

actions. This in turn explains the facts given by Stampe.




Some may question whether the semantical facts I have cited can 'explain' or 'account' for Stampe's syntactic facts. The supposition behind this ques tion is that these two sorts of facts are independent of one another. What I am explicitly denying is that they are independent. My claim is that some

syntactic facts will be explained in terms of semantic facts. I think an exami nation of the 'grammar' of 'mean' shows this to be the case and leaves open the question whether the complements of 'mean' are referring expressions.

Let us now turn to (B). Before discussing Stampe's transformational

analysis, I want to present criteria which this analysis must meet. First, any transformation must not produce ungrammatical strings. Second, a trans formation must not effect a tree in such a way that it provides an incorrect

grammatical description for a sentence. These two criteria hold for any grammatical analysis. They, in effect, set the minimal goals for such an

analysis. Lastly, Stampe's transformations must be meaning preserving. That is, the structures they produce must mean the same as the structures

they operate on. This is, in fact, an hypothesis held by some linguists.12 However, for linguistic research it might turn out to be false that all trans formations are meaning preserving. There is some evidence to suggest that it is false. But this in no way exempts Stampe's analysis from this require

ment. For Stampe is using transformational grammar to support the philo sophical claim that 'x means y' can be analyzed in terms of 'By x Agent

means y', which, I take it, comes down to the claim that they mean or almost mean the same. If the supposed set of transformations which relate these two forms do not preserve meaning, then Stampe's analysis, even if gram

matically correct, is philosophically uninteresting. I want to set out Stampe's grammatical analysis of the transformational

relationship between 'x means y' and 'By x Agent means y' before proceeding to his arguments that they are transformationally related. After giving his

arguments, I will augment them with several of my own. Then, I will deepen the analysis by relating

Agent means y by x to

Agent uses x to mean y.

Stampe's initial hypothesis is that structures of the form Prepi13 - NP2 - 14

12 I believe the hypothesis was first suggested by Postal. It is found in J. Katz and P. Postal, An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Description, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1964. 13 Prepi includes 'by', 'with', and 'in'. All the subsequent discussion will be concerned with 'by' and consequently, Prepi will be replaced by it. 14 Stampe, throughout his discussion, uses the variables 'x' and 'y'. But in linguistics such variables range over any string of grammatical categories. This produces unnecessary in accuracies in Stampe's account. NP is actually what is needed. To indicate different NP's when necessary I will use subscripted numbers. The same number indicates the same NP.



76 STEVEN DAVIS

Agent - Verbfa15 - NP1 are related by what he calls an instrument promotion transformation to NP2 - Verbfa - NP1 (p. 158). But there are obvious

counterexamples to the hypothesis as it stands.

With ease John proved it. *Ease proved it.

In order to rule out counterexamples of this sort Stampe claims that the

prepositional phrase in its underlying form contains a sentence (p. 173). Thus, the transformational relation is between

(1) Agent - Verbfa - NP1 - by - Agent - Verb - NP2

(2) NP2 - Verbfa - NP1.

There are counterexamples to this modification.

By John owns horses, John means that he is free of his mother's domination. *Horses mean that John is free of his mother's domination.

To prevent this, Stampe maintains that the sentences in the prepositional phrase and the main sentence must be able to enter into the following constructions:

(3) Agent - Verb - NP2 - and (or: by which) - Agent - Verbfa - NPI (4) When - Agent - Verb - NP2, Agent - Verbfa - NP1

(5) By - NP2 - Agent - Verbf, - NP,.

There is no way at present in transformational theory directly to incorporate these restrictions into Stampe's analysis. We can, however, view his pro posal as a series of transformations which operate initially on (1), have (5) as an intermediate step, and result in (2). Many of the transformations

necessary to do this are in the literature. In order to illustrate these points I will run through a derivation indicating

what transformations are being used and where Stampe must introduce transformations of his own.

(6) By Agent-prove-the-theorem-Agent-Present-show-that-p. (This is provided by the base component and an irrelevant trans

formation.)

15 'fa' stands for factive-agentive and marks out the class of verbs which take both 'the fact that...' and its transformational variants and agentive subjects. These two types of

subjects are not exhaustive of the subjects of such verbs. Included within the class of these verbs are 'mean', 'indicate', 'imply', 'prove', 'suggest', 'show', 'reveal', 'demonstrate' 'warn', 'tell', 'inform', and 'remind' (p. 138).




(7) By-Agent's-proving-the-theorem-Agent-Present-show-that-p. (Poss-ing transformation.16)

(8) By proving-the-theorem-Agent-Present-show-that-p. (Equi-noun phrase deletion.)

(9) By-the-theorem-Agent-Present-show-that-p. (Stampe.) (10) The theorem-Present-show-that-p. (Stampe.) (11) The theorem-shows-that-p. (Affix hopping.)

We see transformations, not in the literature, are needed to get us from (8) to (9) and (9) to (10). The first transformation deletes the gerund of the

prepositional phrase while the second deletes 'by' and 'Agent' in the main clause.

There are obvious counterexamples to the first transformation. For

example, By selling shoelaces Peter showed that he was no communist.

*By shoelaces Peter showed that he was no communist.

One way around these counterexamples is to limit the gerund to 'using'. But there are still counterexamples.

By using a pen one writes formal letters.

*By a pen one writes formal letters.

What we should have here is

With a pen one writes formal letters.

Perhaps the solution is to have the transformation operate on the fol

lowing SD.

Prep-using-NP-X 1 2 34 1 0 3 4

The preposition substituted for Prep will depend upon what noun is sub stituted for NP. Let us assume a solution has been found for this problem. It is not central to Stampe's claim.

The second transformation, Stampe's instrument promotion transforma tion (p. 157), operates in the following way.

By-NP-Agent-Verbfa-NP 1 2 3 4 5 0 2 0 4 5

16 This and the following transformations can be found in P. S. Rosenbaum, The Grammar

of English Complement Constructions, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1967.



78 STEVEN DAVIS

As it stands, this transformation is not meaning preserving.

By 'hot' John means cold. 'Hot' means cold.

In order to avoid this Stampe suggests that 'Agent' be replaced by 'one'

(p. 172). Thus, the transformational relation Stampe has described is

exemplified by the following pairs.

By 'procrastinate' one means put things off. 'Procrastinate' means put things off.

By this theorem one proves that p. This theorem proves that p.

By such a signal one indicates a turn to the left.

Such a signal indicates a turn to the left.

Stampe gives two arguments to support his transformational analysis. The first is that the set of expressions which occur in By ... Agent-Verbfa-NP1 is

equivalent to the set of expressions, except Agent, which occur in the environment ... Verbfa-NPl. Hence, Stampe claims, the instrument promo tion transformation captures a co-occurrence relationship common to these two forms (p. 158). However, there are apparent counterexamples.

That Jones came showed that we were wrong.

*By that Jones came one showed that we were wrong.

The fact that Jones came etc.

*By the fact that Jones came one showed etc.

His having come showed etc.

*By his having come one showed etc.

These examples which are all derived from 'the fact that' actually support Stampe's hypothesis. He claims that sentences of the form

NP2-Verbfa-NPl

have two sources. The one source which we have explored in some depth is

'One-Verbfa-NPl by NP2', the other source is 'The fact that ... NP2 ... -Verbfa

NP1...'. The double source is supposed to explain the ambiguity of

sentences like

White patches on the road mean that a division of troops have

passed this way.

The second argument Stampe uses to support his hypothesis is that it ac




counts for the passivization of meann' 17 in cleft-sentences.18 For example,

Fire is what is meant by 'feu'.

Moreover, it is supposed to account for the non-passivization of meannn. That is we do not have

*What is meant by clouds is that there is going to be rain.

According to Stampe the derivation of the former sentence proceeds in the

following fashion.

(12) One Vintransitive NP1 by NP2. (We apply Stampe's instrument promotion transformation we

get.) (13) NP2 Vintransitive NP1.

(We then apply Stampe's cleft-sentence transformation (n. 19, pp. 163-4.19))

(14) NP1 is wh-NP2 Vintransitive. (Finally we passivize the embedded sentence.)

(15) NP1 is wh-is Vintransitive by NP2.

According to Stampe, the passive applies to verbs in cleft-sentences if they are transitive, and if the passive applies to intransitives, it applies when con structions containing them are derived from sentences which have the form in (12). This allows 'meann.' in such constructions to be passivized, but not meann' or 'resemble' in cleft sentences. Hence, Stampe claims that his

hypothesis explains the passivization of 'meannn' in such constructions

(pp. 164-5). There are several things wrong with this argument. There is the quite

trivial, but misleading terminological blunder. As I have shown, 'mean' is a

transitive, not an intransitive verb. Stampe can remedy this merely by re

placing 'intransitive' with 'middle verb' in his discussion. There are other more serious defects. Stampe in (14) has the passive trans

formation apply to

NP+V

Such a transformation, if it exists, is quite distinct from the regular passive

17 'nn' stands for non-natural and 'n', natural; both are borrowed from Grice's 'Meaning', Philosophical Review 66 (1957), No. 3. 18 Stampe, throughout his paper, calls sentences like, 'What he hit was a car', cleft sentences. But, they are called pseudo-cleft-sentences. In order to conform to Stampe's usage I will use 'cleft-sentence'. 19 Stampe's cleft-sentence transformation is inadequate. It gives the wrong structural

description for the output string.



80 STEVEN DAVIS

transformation in the literature which has the following structural de

scription: (PreS)-NP-[X Passive]-V-NP-Y.20

Aux Aux

Stampe would have to create and motivate a separate 'passive' transforma tion which applies within cleft-sentences. Moreover, he would have to explain

why this separate and unrelated special passive transformation seems to have the same effect as the regular passive.

Perhaps Stampe's analysis can be rescued by amending his cleft-sentence transformation so that it forms strings like

NP1 is wh-NP2 V NP1.

We could have a simple deletion transformation obligatorily delete the second NP1 or have passive apply and then delete the unwanted NP.

However, this still will not work. Notice that in the SD (structural de

scription) for the passive transformation the Aux must contain Passive.

Moreover, Passive is introduced by a phrase structure rule. This means that

Passive, if it appears in a cleft-sentence, and cleft-sentences are the result of

transformations, it must appear in the string which underlies the cleft sentence which is generated by the base component alone. The consequence this has for Stampe's analysis is that Passive must appear in the expansion of Aux in

(16) One Aux means NP1 by NP2.

Hence, it is in (17) which results from (16), using Stampe's instrument pro motion transformation,

(17) NP2-Aux-Passive-means-NP1

if it is to appear in

(18) NPl-is-wh-NP2-Passive means-NP1,

so that the passive transformation can apply to this latter structure. But, (17) meets the SD for the passive transformation. Applying it to this structure, produces the unwanted

Fire is meant by 'feu'.

Stampe can reject either the account of passives which appears in the liter

ature or show how Passive can appear in cleft-sentences when it does not

appear in structures from which cleft-sentences are derived. I suppose this

20 This transformation is taken from a lecture of J. R. Ross at the Linguistic Society of America summer institute, 1968.




would amount to showing that Passive can be introduced by the transforma tion which forms cleft-sentences. Such an account, however, seems im

plausible. A perhaps more damaging criticism is that the condition Stampe places

on the application of the passive transformation to middle verbs in cleft sentences is ad hoc. It only applies to meannn. Stampe has told us no more than that 'meannn' undergoes passivization in cleft-sentences.

Lastly, the condition on the application of passive to 'mean' in cleft sentences actually excludes some cases. There are passive cleft-sentences

which are not derived from an underlying form which has an impersonal subject. For example,

What is meant by the meter reading in this kind of experiment is that there is boron in the tube.

Since Stampe's analysis of passives in cleft-sentences does not provide for the generation of an English sentence, it does not meet the minimal condi tion for linguistic adequacy.

There are, though, other arguments which show that sentences of the form

(19) One Verbfa NP1 by NP2

are transformationally related to sentences of the form

(20) NP2 Verbfa NP1.

However, all the arguments which show that sentences having these forms are related will show that sentences with the following forms are related to the above two forms.

(21) One uses NP2 to Verbfa NP1

(21') One uses NP2 by which one Verbfa NP1.21

Stampe does not deny that this is the case (p. 163). But he seems to think that

(19) is more basic than (21). His argument is that 'by' or 'with' are transforms of 'use' and any verb "... of such meager semantic content that it can be

absorbed into a preposition offers small purchase to philosophical analysis"

(p. 163). It is probably not the case that 'by' or 'with' are transforms of 'use'. More than likely these prepositions occur in deep structure somewhat in the manner they appear in (21'). In addition a similar argument can be used against Stampe's instrument promotion transformation. He takes his

analysis to support Grice's view that

One means NP1 by NP2

21 This alternate form of (21) was suggested to me by Miss Janet Dean.



82 STEVEN DAVIS

is more basic than

NP2 means NP1.

That is, that the latter can be analyzed in terms of the former. But, 'by' and

'one' are deleted by Stampe's transformation and, using Stampe's argument, any construction which can be so disfigured by transformational amputation without loss of semantic content does not offer much basis for philosophical analysis. More importantly, there is linguistic evidence that a structure related to (21) is more basic than (19). And, also, considerations which sug gest that (19) is more basic than (20). But, first I want to show that there is evidence that (19), (20) and (21) are transformationally related.

It is not always clear, however, what counts as evidence that two structures are related transformationally. A current view in transformational grammar is that selectional restrictions and co-occurrence relations, such as that certain verbs take animate subjects or animate objects or both, are stated on the output of the phrase structure component before transformations

apply. If two seemingly different but synonymous sentences have the same selectional restrictions stated for them, then these two sentences are taken to have the same deep structure.22 Transformations, operating on this deep structure, produce the two related sentences. Of course it is possible, even

given such data, to posit two different deep structures. But, if the same selection restrictions apply to both sentences, we would be missing a signifi cant linguistic generalization by stating them on two unrelated deep struc tures. Hence, arguments which show that the same selection restrictions

must be stated for two synonymous sentences are evidence that these two sentences have the same underlying structure. Clearly, this kind of argument does not tell us what the deep structures are in any detail, nor what the

transformations are which relate this deep structure to sentences. However, this is really irrelevant for the philosophical claims being considered here. It is enough to show for this purpose that there is a significant linguistic relation between (19), (20), and (21).

In (19), (20), and (21) NPI cannot be identical to NP2.

*One means 'flower' by 'flower'.

*'Flowers' mean 'flowers'.

*One uses 'flower' to mean 'flower'.

Here we have two constraints which seem to be the same. In (19) the object of the main verb and the object of the instrumental prepositional phrase

22 Cf. J. Katz and P. Postal, An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Descriptions, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1964; N. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965.




must not be identical. In (20) the subject and object of the main verb cannot be identical. And in (21) the object of 'use' and of the Verbfa cannot be identical. Since these are essentially the same co-occurrence relations, we

would be missing a significant linguistic generalization by not describing them in the same way. This can be done by having the same underlying form for the three structures in question.

(19), (20), and (21) have other features in common. All other factive-agentive verbs, except 'mean', when they take I, he, she, you, we, and people's names as subjects are active. But in the forms we are considering they are not. They do not take the progressive.

*One is proving that p by the theorem. *The theorem is proving that p. *One is using the theorem to prove that p.

Manner adverbials, a mark of an active verb, which do not co-occur with

one form do not co-occur with the other.

*One rapidly shows that p by the theorem. *The theorem rapidly shows that p. *One uses the theorem rapidly to show that p.

None of these forms can occur in 'I order ' or 'I saw ' but they can occur in '_ seems to _ '

*I order one to indicate that p by the theorem *I order the theorem to indicate that p *I order one to use the theorem to indicate that p *I saw one warn him that p by the smoke signal *I saw the smoke signal warn him that p *I saw one use the smoke signal to warn him that p

One seems to prove that p by this statement

This statement seems to prove that p One seems to use this statement to prove that p.

All these tests indicate that factive-agentive verbs with impersonal or in animate subjects are stative. This in fact gives us further reason for placing

'mean', a stative verb no matter what its subject is, into the general class of

factive-agentive verbs. There is additional evidence that these three forms are related. It has been

argued that to say what some word means is not to make a statistical claim.

This is supposed to account for the strangeness of

*99 times a day 'blomster' means flowers



84 STEVEN DAVIS

The same strangeness infects sentences with an impersonal subject.

*99 times a day one uses 'blomster' to mean flowers

*99 times a day one means flowers by 'blomster'.23

Notice that it is not strange to say

99 times a day people mean flowers by 'blomster'.

We can count what people mean, but not what one means. Consequently, we cannot directly analyze what some word means in terms of what (sta tistically) people mean. But of course, there must be some relationship between what people mean by a word and what one means by that word. All that can be said linguistically is that what a word means is related to what

one means by that word. Similar considerations also apply to other factive

agentive verbs. The above arguments show that (19), (20), and (21) are related syntactically.

There are additional arguments which apply to (19) and (21) which further

strengthen the hypothesis that they are related syntactically.24 First the

subject of neither of these structures can refer to the same thing as NP2.

*One proves that p by (means of) oneself *One uses oneself to prove that p.

However, the addition of an as-phrase can make sentences like these gram matical.

One proves that ESP is unfounded by (using) oneself as a subject. One uses oneself as a subject to prove that ESP is unfounded.

If we have two different deep structures, we would have to state two different unrelated constraints:

(i) The subject of the main verb cannot be identical to the object of instrumental prepositional phrase which modifies the main verb.

(ii) The subject and object of 'use' cannot be identical. As Lakoff points out, the constraint in (i) appears nowhere else in English

grammar, but constraints like (ii) must be stated for 'kidnap', 'murder', 'marry', and 'assassinate'.25 This last consideration shows that if the two

23 These examples should not be taken to imply that no time or place adverbials can co occur with impersonal locutions. We have

In the 18th century one meant flowers by 'blomster'. In Norway one means flowers by 'blomster'.

24 The following arguments are taken from G. Lakoff, 'Instrumental Adverbs and the

Concept of Deep Structure', Foundations of Language 4 (1968), No. 1. 25 Ibid., p. 16.




structures, (19) and (21), have the same deep structure, then the deep structure is similar to (21) rather than (19). For if we take (19) as the deep structure we would have to state a unique kind of co-occurrence constraint found nowhere else in the grammar. Simplicity demands that we choose as

deep structure for these two forms one similar to (21). The second argument which shows that (19) and (21) are related syn

tactically depends upon the fact that certain compound sentences require the same kind of adverb in both parts of that construction. For example,

She can cut bait on the boat and I can do so, as well, in the

fish house. *She can cut bait on the boat and I can do so as well, with a

knife.

The same kind of phenomenon appears with the sorts of constructions we have been considering.

One proves this theorem by q and one can, as well, do so by p. *One proves this theorem by q and one can, as well, do so in

the third grade.

This suggests that we can determine whether the two sides of such con

structions are similar linguistically. Applying this test to our problem we find,

One can prove this theorem by q and one can, as well, use p to

do so.

One can use q to prove this theorem and one can, as well, do

so by p.

Consequently, both sides of such constructions are linguistically similar. We can account for this by supposing that both sides of the constructions have the same sort of deep structure.

Lastly, both questions and negatives related to (19) and (21) are under stood in the same way.

Does one mean light by 'lys'? Does one use 'lys' to mean light?

Here we are asking whether 'lys' means light.

One doesn't mean light by 'lys'. One doesn't use 'lys' to mean light.

In these examples we are denying that 'lys' means light. If we supposed different deep structures, in order to account for these facts we would have



86 STEVEN DAVIS

to have different semantic rules operating on these different deep structures. It seems a more reasonable explanation that these structures are related

transformationally by virtue of having the same deep structure. The arguments I have given do not tell us what the deep structure is for

(19), (20), and (21). What they show is that these three forms have the same

deep structure. I next want to consider two arguments, the first of which

suggests that the deep structure of (20) is an abstract form related to (19) or

(21), but not (20). The second argument shows that a form related to (21), rather than (19) is the underlying form for these two structures. First, NP2 in

NP2 Verbfa NP1

is not the deep subject of the sentence where the verbs are interpreted non

naturally. All factive-agent verbs allow refiexivization of their subject when this subject is animate, even when it is impersonal.

By such a proof one shows oneself that the argument is valid.

By that remark John proved himself to be a fool.

Moreover, the prepositional objects of the above sentences when occurring with other verbs as subject can be reflexivized.

That remark contradicts itself. Such a proof defeats itself.

However, when these prepositional objects become superficial subjects of

factive-agentive verbs they cannot by reflexivized unless the verbs are inter

preted naturally.

*Such a proof shows itself that the argument is valid. *That remark proved itself to be inconsistent.

But we do have

Measles shows itself to be a dangerous disease.

We cannot conclude from this that in

NP2 Verbfa NP1,

where Verbfa is taken non-naturally, the underlying subject is 'one', but we can conclude that it is not NP2, but is some other NP. Since we are con

cerned with the non-natural sense of 'mean', sentences of the above form

which contain this verb do not have NP2 as their underlying subject. Second, if we take some structure related to (19) to be the deep structure

underlying both (19) and (21), we have for the VP something like the tree of Figure 1.




This makes the claim that the prepositional phrase is part of the VP and that V and the NP to the right of V by themselves do not form a constituent. Lakoff and Ross hold that if 'do so' and 'do it' occur in a sentence, they must stand in the place of whole VP's.26 However, we have

One proves this theorem by p and one can use p to do so too.

VP

prepositional phrase V

NP

Prep NP by

det N

Fig. 1.

'Do so' clearly stands in place of 'proves this theorem'. But if the above tree describes the VP of the first sentence of the conjunction, this phrase does not occur as a separable constituent. On the assumption that Lakoff and Ross are correct, we must conclude that this tree cannot be the correct

structural description for the VP. We run into no problem of this sort, if we take the underlying structure of the first conjunct to be related to (21). For the structure here marks 'prove the theorem' as a constituent. This is further evidence that the underlying form for (19) is related to (21).

I have shown, supporting Stampe, that there are grounds for taking

One means NP1 by NP2

to be transformationally related to

NP2 means NP1.

Also, I have argued that there are reasons for taking the former constructions to be related transformationally to

One uses NP2 to mean NP1

26 Ibid., p. 20.



88 STEVEN DAVIS

or

One uses NP2 by which one means NP1.27

Moreover, there is evidence that, contrary to Stampe, an abstract form related to the construction which contains 'use' is the underlying structure for the other two constructions.

What interest, if any, does the linguistic discussion of Stampe's two theses have to philosophers? The first thesis, that the complements of 'mean' are not referring expressions, is an attempt at an answer to a philosophical ques tion asked first by Plato. To what, if anything, do the meanings of words refer? Stampe's answer is that they do not refer to anything. I am sym pathetic to this position, but Stampe's arguments have not shown this.

The second thesis that Stampe considers, Grice's thesis, is of course of interest to both philosophers and linguists. In arguing for his thesis Grice claims that the meanings of words or expressions in a language can be ana

lyzed in terms of what speakers mean by uttering these words or expressions. This sort of claim, that x can be analyzed in terms of y, is often made by

philosophers. If it can be shown that 'x' is a paraphrase of 'y' or 'x' means the same as 'y', I would think that this would be sufficient, but perhaps not

necessary to show that x can be analyzed in terms of y. In current trans

formational linguistics it is held that if two sentences have the same under

lying structure, then they mean the same. Hence, grammatical analysis can offer support for those philosophical theses which are based upon claims that two expressions mean the same or that they are paraphrases of one

another. Stampe's and my arguments are an attempt to offer linguistic evidence of this sort. However, we must be cautious. Further linguistic in

vestigation might show that what we thought was a pairing of two sentences with the same deep structure is not in fact such a pairing. But until such

evidence is in, we can only go on what we have available.

University of Pittsburgh

27 A complete transformational analysis should consider the relationship among not only the forms I have considered, but also

NP2 is used to Verbra NP1 Using NP2, one Verbta NPI.



Documents

Meaning and the Transformational Stew