Michael A. DoverDoctoral Student, Social Work and Sociology

Submitted to Prof. Mark S. MizruchiOctober 3, 1996

Status and Power Preliminary Examination Question #4 (September 1996)(Essay to satisfy the conditional pass)

AWhat is the relationship between class analysis and institutional or organizational analysis of status and power? Are they competing perspectives? Complimentary? Do they ask similar questions, or are they investigating different dimensions of inequality?@

Table of Contents

Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................3

Do they address different dimensions of inequality?.......................................................................................3

Aspects of the relationship of the three forms of analysis................................................................................4

Classical roots of class, organizational and institutional analysis: Marx, Weber, Durkheim.............4

Modern roots of analytic synthesis: Dahrendorf, Mills, Polanyi.........................................................5

Relationship Continued: Prototypes/Working Definitions: Wright, Stinchcombe, DiMaggio/Powell............6

Discuss/define Wright/class analysis in relationship to organizational and institutional analysis......6

Discuss/define Stinchcombe/organizational analysis in relation to class and institutional analysis . .7

Discuss/define DiMaggio & Powell/institutional analysis in relation to class/organizational ..........7

Are they competing perspectives?....................................................................................................................8

Are they complementary perspectives?..........................................................................................................10

Conclusions.....................................................................................................................................................12

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2

Introduction

The 1970's saw the advent of open systems perspectives on organizations (Mizruchi and

Galaskiewicz 1994). During that decade, organizational analysis recognized the centrality of

organizational environment in constraining and penetrating organizations, and institutional analysis

conceptualized organizations as functioning in the context of the cultural rules and beliefs of the wider

institutional environment (Scott 1995). Class analysis sought both to study links between firms= internal

states and segmented labor markets (Burawoy 1979; Edwards 1979) and to develop an early form of the

social class model of intercorporate relations (Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz 1994). Fueled by the

implications of the open systems perspective, the next 15 years saw the development of syntheses

represented by the new institutionalism in organizational analysis (Scott 1995; DiMaggio and Powell 1991)

and the work of Mizruchi (1992) and others. Three prototypical examples of class, organizational and

institutional analysis may be identified from that period: Wright (1986); Stinchcombe (1990), and

DiMaggio and Powell (1983), respectively. The relationship between these forms of analysis will be

explored by asking whether they address different dimensions of inequality; exploring their roots in

classical (Marx, Weber and Durkheim) and early modern (Mills, Dahrendorf and Polanyi) theory;

presenting prototypes and definitions of each form of analysis; identifying the questions each asks; and

asking whether they are competitive, complementary or both.

Do they address different dimensions of inequality?

Baron and Bielby (1980: 738) argued that social inequality may be studied at several levels of

social organization (societal, institutional, organizational, role, individual) and corresponding units of

analysis (economy, industry, firm, job and worker). Dimensions of inequality will be considered in terms

of these levels/units. DiMaggio and Powell (1991: 9, 16) noted that institutionalism in organizational

analysis has primarily been applied at industry-wide, national and international levels. Scott (1995: 60)

noted that sociologists apply institutional forms of analysis primarily to the world systems, society and

organizational field levels.i A review of the preliminary examination list confirmed that institutionalist

contributions (North 1981; Skocpol 1992; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Polanyi 1944; Piore and Sabel

1984; Walder 1995; Fligstein 1996) focused on these levels. Non-institutionalist organizational analysis

focused on intra/interorganizational levels (Blau 1968; Pfeffer 1981; Pfeffer 1987; Stinchcombe 1990;

McPherson and Rotolo 1996; Perrow 1979). The levels/units of class analysis included the societal

(Wright 1986), industrial (Hodson 1986; Burawoy 1993), firm (Stark 1986; Burawoy 1979, 1992), and job

3

levels (Moore 1995; Braverman 1974, Part IV). Thus, class analysis and institutional analysis examine

overlapping dimensions. Class and organizational analysis also overlap. Organizational and institutional

analysis overlap only at the interorganizational level. This observation, and the need to address both the

societal and organizational levels, justify including and distinguishing organizational and institutional

analysis.

Aspects of the relationship of the three forms of analysis

Classical roots of class, organizational and institutional analysis: Marx, Weber, Durkheim

One aspect of the relationship of class, organizational and institutional analysis can be found in

their distinct (but overlapping) roots in Marx, Weber and Durkheim, respectively. For Marx, the study of

power led him to focus primarily on class inequality and on how economic relations shaped consciousness.

Marxist class analysis saw the human exercise of power as in the Alast instance@ stemming from a status

as bearer of a position rooted in relations of production. But Marx distinguished between aspects of

workplace authority produced by capitalism and others which were generic to the social nature of

production.ii For Marx, the manufacturing organization produced a complex hierarchy of wages and skills

reflecting both natural and acquired capacities. iii Marx was also concerned with the analysis of historically

specific institutional forms, such as Bonapartism and the Factory Acts. Thus, class analysis was primary,

but was also applied to the study of organizations and institutions.

For Weber, power was rooted in one=s position as a wielder of varying degrees of economic goods

and skills. Status reflected an additional form of stratification based upon prestige or life style. Another

aspect of power for Weber was the development of constellations of individual interests. iv He recognized

that class-conscious organization can succeed when Alarge numbers of persons are in the same class

situation@.v In addition, power stemmed from the combined legitimatizing effects of three elements of

domination: charismatic, legal/bureaucratic and traditional. These elements of power were exercised in

social relationships and in organizational and institutional contexts. Relations of authority were related to

both rationally-pursued material interests and to shared value orientations towards institutional authority

structures themselves. Societal and class conflict were seen as self-limiting, not immanent as in Marx=s

account. Bureaucratic rationality served to reduce undue sources of conflict. For Weber, organizational

analysis was primary, but class and institutional factors were also important.

Durkheim=s approach to the integrative problem of modern society (Parsons 1937) was concerned

with the institutional conveyance of social facts that normatively and coercively constrain human behavior.

4

Parsons also pointed out that Durkheim observed that interests tend to centrifugally escape normative

control. But Durkheim noted that rules stemming from different institutional contexts can conflict. The

"institution of classes" caused conflicts which threatened organic solidarity (Division: 310). Each class had

its own morality (Ethics: 100). Inequality was explained by unequal societal contributions and personal

endowments, but the "lower classes" objected (Division: 310). Such factors undermined the

interdependence that Durkheim saw as the basis of order (Mizruchi 1992). In response, Durkheim stressed

the importance of moral discipline (Suicide: 251).vi Despite Durkheim's incomplete attention to

organizations (Berkowitz 1988), Durkheim stressed they transmit institutional values (Rules: 4-10). vii

Institutions were Durkheim=s foundation, but classes and organizations were also studied.

Modern roots of analytic synthesis: Dahrendorf, Mills, Polanyi

Although Dahrendorf, Mills and Polanyi may be seen as loosely representing, respectively, the

Weberian emphasis on the centrality of organization, the Marxian emphasis on the centrality of classes, and

the Durkheimian stress on social institutions, their work also reflects a more complex and increasingly

synthetic relationship between the three forms of analysis. For instance, Dahrendorf (1959) advised social

science not to either entirely reject or fully accept Marxist class analysis. For Dahrendorf, there was an

institutional isolation between the political state and industrial production, which he saw as independent

centers of power. Class conflict concerned the distribution of authority in social organizations which had

skill-based hierarchies (1959: 148). Class was derived from one=s social role in an organization, rather

than from one=s relationship to the capital-labor divide. Arguably, this form of class analysis becomes,

essentially, a form of organizational analysis. By and large, this is a competing, rather than a

complementary perspective to Marxist class analysis. But Dahrendorf retained a re-defined concept of

class in his analysis, as had Weber before him. Although he viewed the capitalist class as having become a

diverse, un-unified group rather than a class, he didn=t entirely substitute analysis of organizational

structure and social roles for Marx=s analysis of class relations and interests. Rather, he specified which

aspects of Marx he rejected, sustained and supplemented. In this way he followed his own advice and

pointed the way towards future syntheses.

Dahrendorf distinguished his institutional isolation theory from Mills= institutionally-linked power

elite (Dahrendorf 1959: 270). Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz (1994) said Mills influenced the social class

model of analysis. Domhoff (1978) argued Mills wrote from an institutional elite perspective. Mills can be

seen as combining elements of institutional, organizational and class analysis. For Mills (1956: 285), there

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was a structural coincidence of interest among three institutional domains of power - the economic,

political, and military. The historical evolution of the power elite was seen as a resulting from shifts in the

relative influence of these institutional domains. He viewed organizations as characterized by centralized

power and knowledge, which accrued to individuals occupying positions within key organizations (1956:

3). Power was positional and rooted in organizational auspices. But while the power elite were role-

determined, they were also role-determining (1956: 25). The power elite didn=t merely occupy positions

of power, they also designed and created organizational positions of pivotal power. Mills (1956: 122-3)

suggested that interlocking directorates represented evidence of a unified outlook among the Apropertied

class@, and that associations such as N.A.M. Atranslate narrow economic powers into industry-wide and

class-wide powers@, thus presaging Useem=s idea of classwide rationality (Useem 1984). Mills set a

research agenda on elites that took class, organizational and institutional factors into account.

Polanyi (1944) studied social institutions which influenced the subsequent course of history: both

purposive, public human inventions (social welfare systems) and various undisclosed powerful social

instrumentalities (from little-known regulatory systems to more diffuse processes similar to Durkheim=s

social facts). Polanyi argued that while at any one point in time a class analysis of a particular society

might conceivably be informative, over the long-run, class interests have only limited explanatory power.

His own conception of class referred to standing, rank, status and security, that is, primarily social rather

than economic factors. Citizenship was an important form of status for Polanyi. The ultimate source of

power was the ability to shape citizen opinion in a way which could produce behavioral conformity.

Nevertheless, Polanyi rejected Durkheim=s stress on the need for an all-encompassing ideology which

could forge social solidarity. Polanyi identified a fundamental contradiction between the existence of an

unregulated market economy (commodification) and the institutional measures of the state

(decommodification). The former can lead inexorably to human degradation, but the latter hinders

capitalist development. Polanyi had faith in Weberian bureaucracy as an ameliorative instrument of

planning, but did not prioritize the study of smaller-scale organizations. Polanyi was the forerunner of

efforts to apply institutional analysis to macro-level analysis of societies and institutions.

Prototypes/Working Definitions: Wright, Stinchcombe, DiMaggio/Powell

Discuss/define Wright/class analysis in relationship to organizational and institutional analysis

For Wright, Marx=s analysis of the dynamics of exploitation was the key element of class

analysis. But Wright also sought to go beyond the analysis of a simple polarization of class relations within

6

the capitalist mode of production. He developed an analysis of class that could be applied across different

modes of production. He contended that control of organizational assets was part and parcel of the

mechanism of exploitation, not just ownership of the means of production. Exploitation was based not only

on ownership position but on an organizational position coordinating production within a complex division

of labor. Organizational analysis of the extent to which managers and supervisors utilize such assets was a

key aspect of Wright=s analysis of class structure (Chapter 5). But Wright also argued that class analysis

needed to use conjunctural analysis to examine Aconcrete institutional details,@ since both Aclass and

non-class relations and practices usually occur@ (1986: 11-13). For the purposes of this answer, class

analysis is seen as using concepts such as domination and exploitation by a dominant class to help explain

the various dimensions of inequality. Class analysts see organizations as tools of class domination, sites of

class struggle or organizational bearers of class relations. Key questions include: How do common class

interests stemming from relations of production at the economic Abase@ shape the behavior of class actors

and influence superstructural institutions and organizations? How do class forces produced by economic

relations influence the nature of institutions and organizations? How do classes impose their will?

Discuss/define Stinchcombe/organizational analysis in relationship to class and institutional analysis

Stinchcombe (1990) relied upon a postulate of organizational rationality rather than an institutional

analysis of the societal and cultural contexts of organizational behavior. Specific mechanisms of

information processing found in organizational units were stressed, not the rules and belief systems which

Scott (1995) saw as incorporating institutional influences. Stinchcombe argued that different concrete

rationalities compete with each other to form a hierarchy determined by success in reducing the total

environmental uncertainty to which organizational information systems (OISs) respond. OISs engage in

organizational acts which can ultimately be traced to the organized structures of intentions of collectivities

of individuals. Functional processes ensure that the most rationalized OISs prevail. Stinchcombe stressed

the role of rationality, as opposed to institutional analysis=s stress on routines. Stinchcombe also applied

organizational analysis to issues of concern to class analysts, such as the internal labor market and external

labor market segmentation. Organizational analysis is defined for the purposes of this question in a way

which excludes new institutionalist forms of organizational analysis which incorporate both organizational

analysis and institutional analysis. Organizational analysis examines status and power from the distinctive

standpoint of organizationally-centered structures and processes. While these structures and processes may

intermediate between individuals and larger social structures such as social institutions (Scott 1995: 142),

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the focus of organizational analysis is primarily on organizations and their immediate environments, units

and internal actors. Key questions are: How do structures of organizations and networks of organizations

shape the nature of individual and institutional behavior? What is the intra-organizational structure of

power (Pfeffer 1981)? How do organizations ensure the predictable and dependent

flow of resources from other organizations (Pfeffer 1987)? Are organizations= tools in the hands of

managers (Perrow 1979)?

Discuss/define DiMaggio & Powell/institutional analysis= relationship to class/organizational

analysis

For DiMaggio and Powell (1983), individuals continue to rationally respond to uncertainty, but

within institutional arenas, the maturation of organizational fields from diversity to relative uniformity is

accompanied by a process of institutional definition which brings normative factors into play along with the

degree of rationality associated with competition.viii This process of structuration in organizational fields

involves increased interaction; emerging coalitions and patterns of domination; burgeoning field-specific

information loads; and heightened awareness of the existence of a uniquely demarcated field itself. Within

such fields, both connectedness and structural equivalence can be found, with the latter applying even to

unconnected dyads of organizations that are linked to a similar set of other organizations. Within such

fields, competitive and institutional isomorphic processes tend to produce organizational homogeneity.

Institutional isomorphic processes can include coercive, mimetic/emulative and normative forms of

isomorphism (or their combination). For DiMaggio and Powell, this is not a mechanistic, determinate

process. Numerous variables at the organizational level and field level influence the extent to which

isomorphic processes affect organizations. These variables account for factors which are both endogenous

and exogenous to organizations and fields. This enables DiMaggio and Powell to argue their approach

improves on previous forms of elite-control analysis and natural selection analysis, which are seen here as

related to class and organizational analysis. The concept institutional isomorphism improved institutional

analysis= ability to study links between the organizational, interorganizational, institutional and societal

levels of social organization. Institutional analysis is narrowly defined here as a form of analysis which

accounts for the influence of social institutions on classes, organizations, and individuals. Institutional

analysis identifies a variety of regulative (including coercive), normative and cognitive processes that

convey the resource requirements, standards, values, and schema embedded in institutional logics,

mechanisms and bases of legitimacy and compliance. Institutional analysis asks: How do institutions shape

8

economic relations and organizational and individual behavior? How do innovative actors and interventive

organizational collectivities shape institutions (Scott 1995)?

Are they competing perspectives?

Answering the question, AAre they competing perspectives?@, will help to further explore the

relationship between the forms of analysis. Burawoy (1990) criticized the tendency to assimilate non-

Marxist science into Marxism. Polanyi (1958, cited by Burawoy 1990) viewed Marxism as the anti-thesis

of science.ix Pfeffer (1987) distinguished clearly between the tenets of the intra-class and resource

dependence perspectives, although he also noted there were many similarities.x Thus, key advocates of the

three forms of analysis have contended that they are competing perspectives. Yet we have seen from the

above prototypes and definitions that each form of analysis tends to ask different questions. We have seen

from the first section that there are both different and similar (overlapping) dimensions of inequality. And

we have seen that each form of analysis can trace itself back to somewhat different theoretical roots.

Overall, this may make them different, even incompatible accounts, but it doesn=t make them competing

accounts. In fact, they may be complementary in the sense that they each contribute knowledge about

different aspects of social organization. But when different forms of analysis (influenced by neo-Marxist,

institutional segmentation and organizational theories) were applied to similar levels (organizational

stratification), they were considered Acompeting accounts@ by Baron and Bielby (1980: 750). In this

answer, accounts are not considered competing unless they apply different forms of analysis to similar

levels and ask similar questions. To be potentially complementary, they must be amenable to synthesis

(next section). Let=s compare two sets of studies where different forms of analysis are applied to similar

questions and levels.

AHow is domestic social policy determined at the state level?@, asked Quadagno (1988); Skocpol

(1992), and Laumann and Knoke (1987). Are these competing accounts? Offe (1984, cited by Quadagno

1988) identified three tiers of state power (arena of political decision-making; a matrix of social power

where macro processes influence social policy agenda priorities; and shifts in the relative power resources

of classes). Alford and Friedland (1985) identified three levels of state power: systemic, structural, and

situational. Although Quadagno (1988) sought to address all three of these levels, her class-oriented

analysis mainly concerned systemic/matrix shifts. Four key factors were examined: (1) the structure of the

labor movement (the industrial/craft division), (2) changing state capacity for action, (3) the structure of the

economy, and (4) the structure of the state/polity (particularly the Congressional committee system=s

9

affect on Southern strength). Thus, both class-related (1 & 3) and institutional (2 & 4) processes figured

into her analysis. Skocpol (1992) rejected determinist views that socioeconomic transformations directly

influence the agenda of state policy and rejected structuralist models that the state accommodates itself to

capitalism. Instead, she argued that prior institutional characteristics of state formation and previously

implemented social policies shape the nature of a structured polity of courts, parties and voluntary

associations. In turn, the polity constrains and empowers politicians to implement new characteristics and

policies in a rather path-dependent manner. Skocpol did account, however, for the effect of economic

relations and cultural patterns on the capacities and political behavior of citizen groups which influence

state policy. Skocpol=s focus was largely on the structural and systemic levels. Skocpol stressed

institutional factors rather than Quadagno=s class factors as predominant in state policy formation.

Laumann and Knoke (1987:30) recognized that institutionalist theories help explain the way in which

normative rules place constraints upon organizations operating within different institutional arenas. But by

and large, they focused upon organizational interests rather than upon the normative and ideological

expectations which stem from sources of legitimation and funding of organizations. Laumann and Knoke

(1987) explicitly rejected both pluralistic-individualist and Marxist class approaches. They identified a

mid-level structure - organizations - as the key to understanding a state whose public/private boundaries

were blurred. Tightly knit, nonideological business and labor-led interest group coalitions deployed

resources to influence policy events. Their managerial elite approach focused on networks of

organizational elites (state managers and interest group managers) rather class or mass-based elites.

So far it would appear that their levels of analysis are not so similar after all. What if we

reconsider our previous typologies of level of analysis, by applying Laumann and Knoke=s distinction

between levels of analysis of events and levels of analysis of actors? For events, Skocpol was concerned

with path-dependent historical events within institutions; Quadagno with the timing of events associated

with shifts in the matrix of class forces; Laumann and Knoke with the policy event processes themselves.

Thus, their event levels of analysis were different. For actors, Skocpol examined situationally influential

individual and associational actors; Quadagno world-historically located class actors and their

representatives; and Laumann/Knoke networks of organizational actors. Thus, their actor levels of

analysis diverged as well. Are these competing forms of analysis? The approaches are clearly not

compatible. But upon closer examination, they studied different levels of analysis. Thus, using the

modified Baron and Bielby definition, they don=t turn out to be directly competing perspectives.

10

Hodson (1986) and Pfeffer (1987) each asked how interorganizational-level processes influence

intra-organizational inequality. Pfeffer (1987) argued that in order to understand inequality, it is necessary

to focus on the way in which individuals are sorted in and by organizations, but also upon the way in which

organizations are sorted within networks of organizations. Thus, both intraorganizational actors and

organizations themselves have ranks within their respective environments. Holding the nature of an

individual=s organizational position constant, one=s rank within society as a whole is enhanced if one is

associated with a larger rather than a smaller organization. Hodson (1986) extended Weber's concept of

marketable resources of individuals to define structural resources of firms that are attached to employment

positions rather than individuals. Seeking to use organizational sociological and institutional economic

outlooks to supplement dual economy theory and status attainment approaches, Hodson argued that the

resources brought to class struggles are influenced by the size, concentration, capital intensity, foreign

involvement, and corporate autonomy of the organization, which are in turn influenced by the structure of

the industry. Thus, the organizational structure of the productive enterprise itself and the industry in which

it is embedded, and not merely class contradictions, help to explain wages and working conditions. Pfeffer

(1987) used organizational analysis and Hodson (1986) sought to extend class analysis. Clearly, the

approaches met our modified Baron/Bielby criteria of competing accounts.

Are they complementary perspectives?

If class analysis and organizational or institutional analysis are complementary, they ought to be

amenable to synthesis. Learning whether the three forms of analysis are compatible enough to be

synthesized successfully will tell us something more about the relationship between them. To what extent

has this been accomplished? Baron and Bielby (1980) recognized the potentially complementary nature of

organizational, class, and institutional analysis. They proposed one early form of synthesis.xi Mizruchi's

synthesis (Mizruchi 1992), a structural model of corporate political behavior, was called the inter -

organizational model of class cohesion. Using a relational approach to structural sociology, Mizruchi

synthesized the resource dependence and social class models of intercorporate relations. The resource

dependence model stressed the role of organizations rather than individuals. It stressed the ways

organizations cope with uncertainty by connecting with stable resource acquisition networks and by using

interlocks to neutralize or constrain potential resource competitors. The social class model had a wing

which stressed individual/family roots of the dominant class (Zeitlin 1974; Domhoff 1967), and an

institutional wing stressing the role of key corporate and financial institution positions (Mintz and

11

Schwartz 1985; Useem 1984). Mizruchi criticized the Domhoff/Zeitlin wing=s definitions of class,

stressing instead network links between the controlling positions of corporations, as represented by their

boards and management.

A class analyst might argue Mizruchi engaged in a false synthesis of competitive perspectives.

First, a class analyst could charge that Mizruchi=s definition of class substituted Weberian positional

power for Marxian class power. However, by defining market constraint as the ability of members of one

industry to impose limits on the profits of members of another industry, Mizruchi linked organizational-

analytic concepts of resources and class-analytic concepts of profit.xii Second, one hypothesis asserted

firms with common interests in government regulation (by virtue of being in heavily regulated industries)

were more likely to behave similarly. Marx pointed out that large firms were less opposed to the Factory

Acts than small firms, as the Acts favored capital-intensive over labor-intensive firms. But Mizruchi

controlled for capital intensity. Third, class analysts could argue that the organizational model of class

cohesion is a one-class model, and that structural definitions of the capitalist class evade the reality of class

struggle. But Mizruchi traced the structural model of cohesion to both Simmel and Marx. Simmel (1955:

176) argued that reduced substantive ties between employers and employees created a chain of events from

increased labor solidarity, to class conflict, to employer associations (in that order). Given Mizruchi=s

data, he could not be expected to confirm or rule out Simmel=s assertion, but it isn=t inconsistent with his

definition. Fourth, in looking for sources of capitalist control of corporations independent of ownership,

and in stressing a positional/network conception of class, has Mizruchi denied the reality of an actually

existing capitalist class, conceived of in Domhoff=s or Zeitlin=s terms? True, Mizruchi does not reserve

an explicit place at the ruling class table for Marx=s so-called Amoney capitalist@, who is not an

Aactually functioning capitalist@ holding one of Mizruchi=s controlling positions in a major corporation

(Marx 1967, V3: 436). But Mizruchi accounts for such investor positions indirectly through a financial

institutions variable.xiii

What about the organizational side of the equation? Did Mizruchi artificially inject the class

model into a false synthesis? Does he really need the class in the interorganizational model of class

cohesion? Mizruchi=s direct interlock variables had their theoretical origins in both the class and

organizational models. Given the joint measurement of such variables, it is hard to assess such a charge.

But if organizational theory is robust on its own, then variables rooted primarily in the class model should

show weak results, and vice versa for variables rooted in organizational theory. The financial institution-

12

related variable of indirect interlocks stemmed from the institutional version of the class model. And

indirect interlocks proved to be stronger predictors than direct interlocks. Both the institutional and the

interpersonal/business community versions of the class model were supported, along with institutional

theories of structural equivalence. Mizruchi described his central concept, market constraint, in class-

analytic (profit), organizational-analytic (resource) and institutional-analytic (structural equivalence) terms.

Class, organizational, and institutional theories all found support in Mizruchi=s synthesis. Mizruchi=s

conclusions about theoretical convergence survive these charges by organizational and class analysts. At

an interfirm unit of analysis, synthesis is possible, and the three forms of analysis appear complementary.

Conclusions

To review the nature of the relationship between these forms of analysis, it was first found that the

forms of analysis were being applied to both different and overlapping dimensions of equality, which were

conceptualized at Baron and Bielby=s levels of social organization or units of analysis. According to the

modified Baron/Bielby example of the nature of a competing account, the different forms of analysis were

considered competitive only when they were applied separately to similar questions about similar

dimensions of inequality. The potential for competition was seen in their classical theoretical roots. For

while Marx, Weber and Durkheim concentrated primarily on different aspects of social organization, and

therefore made complementary contributions to social science, they also developed competing accounts of

such structures as class, workplace organizations, and public institutions. The early modern social theorists

began the process of synthesis by linking different aspects of social organization. The modern prototypical

examples remained distinctive representatives of each form of analysis. The definitions of each form of

analysis and the questions posed by each were clearly different. But each form of analysis also expanded

its analytic scope to examine additional levels of social organization, where a potential for competitive

accounts arose. In one case (Pfeffer/Hodson), the forms of analysis were shown to be competitive, when

carefully matched with the modified Baron/Bielby criteria. But in another case (Mizruchi 1992) they were

shown to be complementary forms of analysis, amenable to synthesis.

In conclusion, the relationship between the three forms of analysis is one in which these

approaches to social science root themselves in and transcend classical and early modern theoretical roots;

typify and defy the distinctions drawn between the prototypical examples; conform to and outstrip the

definitions crafted for the purposes of this analysis; ask the questions identified and ask myriad more as

well; stress a central level of social organization and explore the relations between levels; have both unique

13

and common units of analysis; compete with each other and combine with each other. The relationship, in

other words, is both complex and upon occasion elegant and simple. As social science advances, the

answers to the questions asked here would require frequent re-appraisal. But the continued existence of

competitive, complementary and synthetic uses of class, organizational, and institutional analysis seems

assured given the long histories traced in this answer.

14

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i. However, as Scott (1995) has noted, various forms of institutional theory have been applied at nearly all levels of social organization, and integrative forms of organizational and institutional analysis were seen by Scott (1995) as having the potential to examine both top-down and bottom-up aspects of the relationships of institutions, organizations, and actors.

ii. For Marx, Athe work of directing, superintending and adjusting@ takes on Aspecial characteristics@ once it became a function of capital (Marx, Capital, Volume One, cited by Foucault 1979: 175). Foucault sought to extend an analysis of these special characteristics of power and authority to non-workplace institutions, thus providing a neo-Marxist form of institutional analysis. For Marx, this was not merely a passing comment. In Volume Three of Capital, Marx (p. 385) argued: AThe work of management and supervision - so far as it is not a special function determined by the nature of all combined social labour, but rather by the antithesis between the owner of means of production and the owner of mere labour-power...has all too often been quoted to justify this relationship". He then goes on to argue that this work of management and supervision, while it may be (p. 386) "common to all modes of production based on class contradictions like the capitalist mode" does not justify exploitation. Here, Marx opens the door which later generations of scholars enter. Here, Marx essentially admits that some, at least, of the work of management and supervision is necessary to production under most modes of production. How much becomes an empirical question.

iii. Marx stated (Capital, Volume One, p 348): "The collective labourer, formed by the combination of a number of detail labourers, is the machinery specially characteristic of the manufacturing period." But the collective labourer has both simple and complex functions. He went on (p. 349): "Manufacture, therefore, develops a hierarchy of labour-powers, to which there corresponds a scale of wages....The various operations of the hierarchy are parcelled out among the labourers according to both their natural and their acquired capacities." Thus, Marx recognized that, empirically, social hierarchies involve an interplay of class structure, various occupational niches, and individual status attainment.

iv. From Max Weber=s Law, cited by Reinhard Bendix in Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962, p. 287.

v. Weber, Max. Economy and Society: An outline of interpretive sociology. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, p. 305.

vi. Durkheim noted the need for a "moral discipline...to make those less favored by nature accept the lesser advantages which they owe to the chance of birth" (Suicide p. 251). Such a "moral order" (Suicide p. 309) or "collective order" (Suicide p. 252) could "neither be foreseen nor calculated" (Ethics, p. 75) by human design. Instead, conflicting tensions within society were most often resolved by a basic "regulative force" (Suicide p. 248) which promotes an organic "balance"(Ethics, p. 75) within society. Evolving social institutions (as well as workplace and occupational organizations) would need to ensure enlightened universal rather than particularistic value systems prevailed.

vii. In Rules, Durkheim saw two forms of transmission of social facts. First, there were what he called general social currents which directly conveyed morals, beliefs, customs and fashions (Rules, p. 4). Second, social facts stemming from institutional sources such as legal systems; religious faiths and financial systems were conveyed to social actors indirectly (p.10) through intermediate groups ("partial groups") (p. 3), such as local churches, occupational associations and the "economic organization" (p.10).

viii. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that the rationalistic assumptions underlying previously recognized forms of competitive isomorphism don=t account sufficiently for the nature of bureaucracy or the extent of the tendency towards homogeneity within organizational fields. In their 1991 article, however, DiMaggio and Powell appear to have moved further from their earlier joint emphasis on rationality and normative factors, arguing (p. 3): AStudies of organizational and political change routinely point to findings that are hard to

square with either rational-actor or functionalist accounts.@ They later imply (p. 7) that rational actor approaches are something less than sociological in nature, and stress the role of normative factors. They explicitly argue that the (p. 8) Anew institutionalism in organization theory and sociology comprises a rejection of rational-actor models.@ However, the assumptions of the joint influence of cognitive, normative and what might be considered pragmatic processes in their incipient theory of practical action may be seen as another form of the assumption of the organized individual (Coleman 1990). Coleman pointed out that rational choice assumptions were one simplifying sub-set of that broader assumption.

ix. Polanyi apparently directed his fire at the Soviet interpretation. For his own part, Burawoy (1990) stressed the necessity of retaining the integrity of Marxism=s core postulates, while simultaneously building auxiliary theories within new branches of Marxism which both clarify the nature of new developments and strengthen the character of Marxism. Thus, he praised Gramsci=s turn towards the superstructural, which might here be conceived of as a turn towards institutional analysis. Burawoy (1990) was critical of efforts by analytical Marxists to assimilate non-Marxist theories into Marxism. Yet Burawoy=s own early work (Burawoy 1979: 5) was an explicit effort to incorporate organizational theory into Marxism while insisting the study was Marxist. The line between Marx=s stress on using the best of non-Marxist science and deviating from Marxism=s core postulates may be difficult to assess. In any case, appending a subordinate non-Marxist approach to a Marxist study is one thing. Integrating class analysis with other forms of analysis is another.

x. Pfeffer (1987: 33) noted a series of contrasts between the resource dependence and intra-class perspectives on intercorporate relations: (1) Networks of organizations subordinate individual, family and class interests to organizational imperatives, as opposed to extra-organizational actors/classes subordinating organizations to their interests, (2) Resource dependence perspectives permit application to all organizations rather than mainly to business firms, (3) Transaction/resources flows are key rather than family/class solidarity, (4) Patterns of resource exchange shape control and internal power differentiation, as opposed to internal power differentiation being determined by the relationship of ownership to control, (5) Organizational policy is shaped by managers interacting with the environment in the interests of the organization, rather than being determined by the nature of the interaction between owners, managers and workers, (6) Organizational action is determined by forces over and above individual intent, rather than organizations being an instrument of individual intent, (7) The need to reduce environmental uncertainty and relate to interdependencies is more important than a drive for profit and efficiency, (8) The goal is to maximize organizational power and interests, rather than serve the interests of owning families or a capitalist class, (9) Individuals at the helm of organizations are beholden to their position and tend to serve organizational interests rather than managerial actions tending to serve the owners or themselves. Thus, for Pfeffer (1987), organizations are pluralistic coalitions of interests but also reflect institutionalized patterns of activity which don=t perfectly reflect any interests. In other words, organizations are markets for influence and control, but institutionalized intraorganizational and interorganizational power relations produce continuity. Thus, organizations seeks to reduce uncertainty implicit in interdependency, but some organizations become more dependent than others, creating a distribution of interorganizational power. This forces compliance with the demands of more powerful organizational actors. Those intraorganizational actors seen as best able to cope with external power relations tend to accrue intra-organizational power.

xi. On the one hand, Baron and Bielby (1980: 750) argued that a focus on the nature of power within firms is a common point of focus of several Acompeting theories of work organization and stratification@. They criticized neo-Marxist class analysts such as Braverman (1974) for a control imperative perspective, one which views firm-level organization as a mere reflection of societal-level class relations. They argued that dual economy theorists= institution-level analysis of different forms of labor control -- as represented in this preliminary examination by Edwards (1979) and Clegg (1981) -- failed to adequately draw upon the organizational sociological literature in studying internal labor markets in core industry firms. On the other hand, Baron and Bielby (1980) noted that organizational analyses and structuralist and segmentation approaches to the study of social inequality have often focused on overlapping issues. They pointed out that Burawoy (1979b) realized that a good deal of the variance in forms of labor process is probably explained within various industrial sectors rather than between them, and that Burawoy understood the need to study the

structure of those dimensions of inequality rooted in the distribution of organizational positions or Aempty places@ within the economy. They called for the incorporation of organizational analytic perspectives into structuralist and segmentation studies.

xii. Mizruchi=s operational definition relied upon a measure of the dependence of industry B on industry A for purchases and sales, and on the level of concentration in industry B. Although the available measures weren=t directly related to profit, Mizruchi (1992: 75) cited work indicating that industries that are more highly concentrated enjoy higher profit margins.

xiii. Furthermore, although Marx=s account of the transition from private capital to social capital and its Adirectly associated individuals@ (p. 436) may seem more consistent with the Domhoff/Zeitlin definition, Marx ( p. 439) stressed that for the capitalist it is a position of Acontrol over social capital, not the individual capital of his own, ...[which]...gives him control of social labour.@ It is not being rich that makes you a capitalist, but the position which investing the money gives you in relation to labor. Thus, even individual/family wealth dispersed via institutional investment through myriad corporations can be conceived of in Mizruchi=s structural and network terms. The chairs at the ruling class table in which the Amoney capitalists@ sit, or in which proxies sit in their place, are not their personal chairs, but rather their assigned places at the table.