McNair Capstone - Integration of Women into the Infantry 12 May 2014

Running head: THE INTEGRATION OF WOMEN SOLDIERS 1

The Integration of Women Soldiers into the Army Infantry

Joseph E. McNair

Webster University

THE INTEGRATION OF WOMEN SOLDIERS 2

Abstract

The full integration of women soldiers into the US Army infantry occupational specialty

begins in 2015. The purpose of this research project is to determine how effective the US Army

Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Leader Development and Assessment Course (LDAC)

serves as a microcosm of the broader issue concerning integration of women soldiers into male

Army infantry units and its effect on unit cohesion and morale. LDAC serves as the best

contemporary example of women in the infantry because it is the only useful model of gender

integrated, simulated infantry combat training occurring in the Army today.

An extensive literature review was conducted, and unit cohesion and morale were

determined to be the most problematic to the successful integration of women soldiers into the

infantry. A questionnaire was distributed to a sample of 51 male and female cadets of the

University of Central Oklahoma’s (UCO) Department of Military Science, 11 that had

experienced LDAC gender integrated infantry training and 40 that had not. Additionally,

available faculty of the UCO Department of Military Science, three regular Army or full time

officers and noncommissioned officers, and one retired infantry DA civilian, were polled in

order to provide a more holistic representation of the views of the UCO Department of Military

Science.


Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect

the official policy or position of the United States Department of Defense (DOD) or the

Department of the Army (DA).


Table of Contents

Chapter I - Introduction ........................................................................................ 6

Introduction .......................................................................................................... 6

Statement of the problem and sub problems ....................................................... 6

The hypothesis ...................................................................................................... 7

Delimitations ........................................................................................................ 8

Definition of Terms .............................................................................................. 9

Abbreviations ..................................................................................................... 11

Assumptions ....................................................................................................... 13

Importance of the study ...................................................................................... 13

Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 14

Chapter II – Review of Literature ...................................................................... 15

Introduction ........................................................................................................ 15

Sub problem 1: Army culture ............................................................................ 17

1975 and 1976 Army ROTC Advanced Leadership Camp .............................. 21

The role of DGCDAR and Army reorganization in shifting the culture

of the Army .................................................................................................... 25

DGCDAR: Co-location of gender integrated non-combat units with

non-gender integrated combat units in OEF/OIF ……………………… 27

DGCDAR: Attaching women soldiers below the brigade level in OEF/OIF .. 29

Combat performance of women soldiers in OEF/OIF ...................................... 30

Sub problem 2: Soldier 2020 and retaining Army infantry standards .............. 33


Soldier 2020 Physical Standards Assessment ................................................... 36

Soldier 2020 TRAC Gender Integration Study ................................................. 38

Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 38

Chapter III – Research Methodology ................................................................ 40

Introduction ........................................................................................................ 40

Research Design ................................................................................................. 41

Selection of the Sample ...................................................................................... 44

Data Collection ................................................................................................... 45

Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 46

Chapter IV – Analysis Results ........................................................................... 47

Introduction ........................................................................................................ 47

Summary of Results ........................................................................................... 48

Summary of Conclusions ................................................................................... 52

Chapter V – Conclusion and Recommendations .............................................. 54

Introduction ........................................................................................................ 54

Recommendations .............................................................................................. 54

Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 55

References .......................................................................................................... 56

Appendix A Questionnaire ................................................................................ 59


Chapter 1

Introduction

On January 24, 2013, the Secretary of Defense rescinded the 1994 Direct Ground Combat

Definition and Assignment Rule (DGCDAR), which prohibited women soldiers from being

assigned to combat units below the brigade level, and prohibited collocation of gender integrated

non-combat units with non-gender integrated combat units, in addition to other restrictions. In

2015, the full integration of women soldiers into the Army’s infantry occupational specialty will

begin, and there are apparent and unintelligible challenges associated with this endeavor,

specifically the effect integration of women in the infantry will have on male infantry units’

cohesion and morale (Burrelli, 2013).

Statement of the Problem

The purpose of this research project is to determine how effective the US Army Reserve

Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Leader Development and Assessment Course (LDAC) serves as

a microcosm of the broader issue concerning integration of women soldiers into male Army

infantry units and its effect on unit cohesion and morale. “With the exception of

Noncommissioned Officer training during the Warrior Leader Course, LDAC serves as the best


integrated, simulated infantry combat training occurring in the Army today” (K. Vaughn,

personal communication, April 21, 2014).

Sub Problems


The first sub problem facing the full integration of women soldiers in the infantry is the

Army culture. The Sergeant Major of the Army (SMA), the senior most advisor to the Chief of

Staff of the Army (CSA) on all enlisted-related matters, particularly in areas affecting Soldier

training and quality of life (Wikipedia, 2014), described culture as “the first and largest obstacle

the Army must overcome” (SMA: Review of Standards first step in Soldier 2020) to integrate

women soldiers into combat arms, which consists of the infantry, field artillery, armor, and

special operations occupational specialties. There is still a large proportion of soldiers that

disagree with the integration of women soldiers into combat arms based upon gender differences

and, perhaps, poor past experiences from ineffective, ad hoc gender integration in combat zones.

The second sub problem facing the full integration of women soldiers in the infantry is

retaining tough infantry standards. Based upon an extensive literary review, retaining the highest

infantry standards was identified as the most common refrain for male and female soldiers alike,

and an additional obstacle to the successful integration of women soldiers in the infantry. In

order to mitigate these concerns, Soldier 2020, the Army’s strategic campaign to integrate

women soldiers into combat arms and retain the trust of the American people, has emphasized

that the Army “will not sacrifice warfighting capability, the trust of the Congress, or that of the

American people as we seek to enhance force readiness and capability” (Bromberg, 2013). As a

result, the Army is conducting a review and validation of physical requirements for each military

occupational specialty and, in the future, will require its soldiers, regardless of gender, to pass

these physical requirements in order to be awarded a specialty (Bromberg, 2013).

Hypothesis


The hypothesis for this research paper is that US Army ROTC LDAC serves as a

microcosm of the broader issue concerning integration of women soldiers into male Army

infantry units and its effect on unit cohesion and morale. Additionally, it is presumed that the

questionnaire of UCO cadets will suggest that unit cohesion and morale will not decline

significantly once women are admitted into the infantry in 2015.

Delimitations

The 2013 repeal of the 1994 DGCDAR is a Department of Defense initiative and

therefore not a topic of study because its predominant focus on gender issues. This study is not

focused on gender issues and is limited to the Department of the Army and its efforts to integrate

women into the infantry branch under the auspices of the Army’s Soldier 2020 campaign.

This study is further limited to the University of Central Oklahoma Army ROTC’s

Military Science and Leadership (MSL) I-IV cadets (freshmen through senior cadets); 11 senior

cadets (MSL IV) that had experienced LDAC gender integrated infantry training and the

remaining 40 that had not. The junior and senior cadets (MSL III and MSL IV, respectively),

had more Army and life experience than freshmen and sophomore cadets (MSL I and II,

respectively), and, most importantly, the MSL III and MSL IV cadets were contracted to serve in

the Army, and the majority of MSL I and MSL II cadets were not; the implication being the

MSL I and II underclassmen would provide a more balanced, open minded opinion than the

upperclassmen, which had already formulated personal opinions about the integration of women

soldiers into the infantry. The available regular Army and DA civilians comprising the faculty of

the UCO Department of Military Science were also polled to confirm their opinions generally

reflect those of the Army, and also provide a more holistic representation of the opinions of those


assigned to the UCO Department of Military Science. During research it was discovered that

only a few writers had focused their research on the opinions of ROTC cadets during the

integration of women into ROTC training in 1972, and this lack of ROTC opinion about the

integration of women soldiers into the infantry became the focus of this research paper. Other

university ROTC students were not surveyed based upon a lack of Army Cadet Command

authority to do so.

Because of the researcher’s increased physical proximity to cadets, a largely quantitative,

slightly qualitative questionnaire was used to poll the opinions of MSL I – IV (freshmen through

senior) cadets at UCO, as well as the available regular Army and DA civilians comprising the

faculty of the UCO Department of Military Science. The sample of UCO cadet and ROTC

faculty was small enough to justify a more thorough questionnaire with 12 quantitative, and two

qualitative questions.

The DOD specific literature review was limited because of the sheer breadth of the topic;

the only time DOD literature was reviewed was to gain context and understanding of the DA

problem from a larger perspective. Finally, the integration of women soldiers into the Army

engineers and field artillery was not studied because these efforts are currently ongoing. The

integration of women into the Army infantry is still in the developing phases and this research

has the ability to be integrated into the Army’s literary review efforts headed by the Army

Training and Doctrine Command’s Analysis Center (TRAC).

Definition of terms

US Army infantry mission statement: “The mission of the infantry is to close with the enemy by

means of fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him, or to repel his assault with fire,


close combat, and counterattack. The infantry will engage the enemy with combined arms in all

operational environments to bring about his defeat” (US Army Field Manual 3-21.8, 2007).

Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) mission: “TRADOC recruits and trains

soldiers, supports unit training, develops adaptive leaders - both Soldier and civilian; TRADOC

guides the Army through doctrine, and shapes the Army by building and integrating formations,

capabilities, and materiel” (TRADOC, 2014).

Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (DGCDAR): A January 1994

Department of Defense ruling that defined direct ground combat as,

Engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while

being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact

with the hostile force’s personnel. Direct ground combat takes place well forward

on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy by fire, maneuver,

and shock effect.

DGCDAR prohibited the assignment of women to units below the brigade level whose primary

mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground. Additionally, it further restricted the

assignment of women,

-where the Service Secretary attests that the costs of appropriate berthing and

privacy arrangements are prohibitive;

-where units are and positions are doctrinally required to physically collocate and

remain with direct ground combat units that are closed to women;


-where units are engaged in long range reconnaissance operations and Special

Operations Forces missions; and

-where job related physical requirements would necessarily exclude the vast

majority of women Service members.

Soldier 2020: Soldier 2020 is founded on three principles which are closely aligned with this

research topic.

1. To maintain the dominance of our nation’s war fighting forces by preserving unit

readiness, cohesion and morale. 2. Validate both physical and mental occupational

performance standards for all MOSs, initially focusing on those currently closed to

women. 3. Set the conditions so all soldiers, male and female, have an opportunity

to succeed as their talents dictate (Cone, 2013). Soldier 2020 is comprised of two

efforts headed by TRADOC. First, in collaboration with USARIEM, is a study of

the physical demands required for each MOS throughout the Army, beginning with

the MOSs currently closed to women. The second effort, led by TRAC, is an

extensive study of the institutional and cultural factors associated with integrating

women into previously closed MOSs (Haviland, 2013).

Abbreviations

AOC: Army Occupational Code

BCT: Brigade Combat Team

CSA: Chief of Staff of the Army

DA: Department of the Army


DACOWITS: Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Armed Services

DGCDAR: Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule

DOD: Department of Defense

FOB: Forward Operating Base

JFTX: Joint Field Training Exercise

LDAC: Leader Development and Assessment Course

MOS: Military Occupational Specialty

MSL: Military Science and Leadership

NCO: Noncommissioned Officer

OEF: Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF: Operation Iraqi Freedom

ROTC: Reserve Officer Training Corps

SMA: Sergeant Major of the Army

TRAC: Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center

TRADOC: Training and Doctrine Command

UCO: University of Central Oklahoma

USACC: US Army Cadet Command


USARIEM: United States Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine

Assumptions

1. The first assumption is that UCO Army ROTC MSL IV (senior) cadets have a similar

opinion of infantry gender integration as do the remainder of MSL IV cadets in US

Army Cadet Command (USACC), based upon their shared training experience at

LDAC.

2. The second assumption is that UCO Army ROTC MSL IV cadets experienced the

same gender integrated, simulated infantry combat training at LDAC as the remainder

of the MSL IV cadets in USACC, and therefore, the infantry training experience will

lend a common opinion.

3. The third assumption is that UCO Army ROTC will commission about the same

number of female officers (one) into the Army combat arms as other ROTC units in

USACC (one or two). This assumption implies that the questionnaire will have a

small, but present female combat arms representation in addition to the majority of

non-combat arms female officers.

4. The fourth assumption is that UCO’s next generation of Army officers (MSL I-IV),

based upon their LDAC experience, Joint Field Training Exercise, and witnessing

ROTC leadership training on the UCO campus, will have different views of

integrating women into combat roles than do those officers and senior NCOs

currently serving in the Army.

Importance of the study


This study is important to the Army because it offers TRAC opinions from future officers

tasked to implement Soldier 2020, and specifically, their opinions regarding the integration of

women soldiers into the Army infantry. This research paper has the ability to be integrated into

the Army’s ongoing literary review efforts headed by TRAC.

Conclusion

Gender integration in the military has been debated for many years, and there is ample

research on this topic. However, there has been no research published on the integration of

women soldiers into the Army infantry based upon the views of cadets that have experienced

gender integrated simulated combat infantry training at LDAC, or of ROTC cadets in general.

There is no published, contemporary data of cadets’ views of how infantry gender integration

will affect male infantry units’ cohesion and morale, and this research could serve as another

perspective for TRAC in its ongoing gender integration study that ends in 2016.


Chapter II

Review of Literature

Introduction

The review of literature is comprised of two main sections. The first section explains the

Army’s struggle to overcome cultural bias that suggests women soldiers do not belong in the

infantry. The second section focuses on standards and explains the Army’s effort to equitably

integrate women soldiers into the infantry through a review of the physical requirements for all

military occupational specialties, with a goal of creating a single, gender neutral standard for all

infantry soldiers.

The first section references historical events to understand the culture the Army must

overcome if women soldiers are to be successfully integrated into the infantry. Through the lens

of the 1975 and 1976 ROTC summer camps, the precursor to LDAC, the reader will gain a

historic perspective of how the 1970s Army culture made it difficult to integrate women into

ROTC training, which will lend further perspective on how much farther the culture will need to

change to fully integrate women soldiers into the infantry. The first section continues by shifting

focus to the repeal of DGCDAR, by discussing the Army’s reasons for attaching women soldiers

to combat units in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OEF and OIF),

and housing non-combat gender integrated units with nonintegrated combat units, which

ultimately became a catalyst for the 2013 repeal of DGCDAR, an important step in the culture

shift of the Army and its views of women in the infantry. The first section will close with a

review the combat role women soldiers played in OIF and OEF, and highlight how they

performed in combat.


The second portion of the review of literature focuses on standards and the Army’s role

in figuring out the best way ahead to integrate women soldiers into the infantry. The second

portion will highlight, in detail, the ongoing TRAC Gender Integration Study, and the Physical

Standards Assessment of all Army MOS and AOC.

In order to fully understand the opinions of both faculty and cadets of the UCO

Department of Military Science, it is necessary to first understand what Army ROTC is and its

purpose. According to Neiberg,

ROTC is a scholarship program founded in the 1950s that provides college tuition

to students in exchange for four years of service as a commissioned officer after

graduation. Currently, more than 1,000 colleges and universities across the United

States offer these programs. ROTC is the largest source of officers for the armed

services, providing…75 percent of Army officers. Though embedded in a college

environment, ROTC students take military classes, participate in physical training

sessions, and spend their summers at training camps, all in preparation for

military service after graduation. When they graduate from college, they

commission as officers and serve a minimum of four years in the military.

UCO Army ROTC is representative of US Army Cadet Command and commissions 15

Army lieutenants per year into the regular Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve,

which is a yearly, stipulated commissioning quota for all ROTC departments. These lieutenants

are commissioned into both combat occupations (infantry, armor, field artillery, etc.) and also

combat support occupations (Army nurse, intelligence, communications, logistics, etc.).

Historically, UCO has only commissioned males into combat arms, but 2014 is the first year

UCO commissioned a female combat arms officer. UCO’s first female combat arms officer was


commissioned a field artillery officer because, as of March 4th, 2014, the Secretary of the Army

issued a directive that opened virtually all field artillery officer jobs to women (Tice, 2014).

UCO’s first female combat arms officer experienced the DA’s first big push to quickly integrate

women officers into combat units.

Sub problem 1: Army culture

Culture is one of the hardest aspects of organizational change, and integrating women

soldiers into male dominated combat units is proving to be a difficult task because the constraints

of Army culture. What is culture, exactly, and why is it so difficult to overcome? Karen O.

Dunivin (1994) defines cultures as, “a way of life that is learned and shared by human beings and

is taught by one generation to the next. Culture is learned from previous generations and broadly

shared by members.” This definition is appropriate for the Army because the status quo culture is

often passed from one generation to the next, and the culture is rarely challenged. Change is

always difficult, and because women soldiers have never before been in combat units, opponents

of infantry gender integration have concerns about integrating women soldiers into the infantry.

These concerns range from practical to political to emotional.

Practical concerns address issues of physiological differences between men and women

soldiers, primarily strength and endurance while conducting infantry tasks. King (2013) reports

that previous physiological testing suggests “approximately one percent of women can equal the

performance of the average man, and about 0.1 percent of the female applicants and one percent

of trained female soldiers would reach the required standards to meet the demands of these combat

roles.” Other practical concerns include the heightened risk for injury for women soldiers during


infantry training. According to Donnelly (2013), “extensive tests in the UK and US have indicated

that efforts to prepare significant numbers of women for potential infantry assignments would

steeply increase debilitating injures in training as well as during deployments…because the gender

free policy leads to higher losses from overuse injuries.” Donnelly (2013) continues her argument

by describing a Marine officer’s testimony to the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the

Armed Services (DACOWITS). “On average, women have 47% lower lifting strength, 40% lower

muscle strength, 20% lower aerobic capacity, and 26% slower road march speed…both female

attrition/injury rates during entry level training and discharge were twice those of men, and non

deployability rates were three times higher.”

Additionally, opponents of the integration of women soldiers into the infantry raise the

issue of cohesion when integrating women soldiers with male soldiers. Alderman (1992) describes

cohesion as the “intangible force that holds an army together in combat.” Alderman (1992) quotes

Stephen Westbrook, a professor of military science at the United States Military Academy, that

cohesion “serves as both a source of power and security, sustaining the soldier physically and

psychologically…helping to ward off feelings of impotence and vulnerability.” Alderman (1992)

argues that “if units have sufficient cohesion then they will…remain combat effective.”

Opponents of the integration of women soldiers in the infantry claim the cohesion of infantry units

are at risk when women are introduced to the infantry. Simons (2001) argues for simplicity in the

infantry, describing that in typical male dominated, heterosexual infantry units, “teammates always

know where they stand with one another, which is on the nonsexual side of intimacy.” She points

out that the “basic, undeniable, unresolvable problem is that heterosexual men like women in ways

that they don’t like other men.” Simons (2001) makes the final point that cohesion is at risk when

the “complementarity and unquestionable mutual trust between infantry soldiers is broken when


rewards are not shared.” Simons (2001) refers to these shared rewards as anything pleasant, like

food, responsibilities, dangers or even sex. Simons (2001) states “what there is to be shared must

be literally shared. If there is sex to be had, then anyone who wants it should be able to get it. If

not, tension mounts.”

Political obstacles to female integration in the infantry are numerous and include issues

like the 1981 Selective Service case Rostker v. Goldberg. This case set the precedent for excluding

women from registering for the Selective Service, but with the January 2013 repeal of DGCDAR,

Rostker was quickly challenged several months later (Donnelly, 2013); as a result, some politicians

are hesitant to be associated with any potential reversal of Rostker for fear of alienating

conservative voters. Feminism and the push for equality at all costs is also a political obstacle for

the integration of women soldiers in the infantry. Conservative politicians are uneasy with the

possibility that the integration of women soldiers into the infantry will diminish infantry training

standards in order to achieve a politically correct, acceptable quota of qualified female infantry

soldiers. According to gender integration opponents like Donnelly (2013), attempts to achieve

gender neutral infantry standards would be impossible because of pressure from feminists or the

DOD. For example, after the January 24, 2013 signing of the repeal of DGCDAR, General Martin

Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated, “If a particular standard is so high that

a woman couldn’t make it, the burden is now on the service to come back and explain…why is it

that high? Does it really have to be that high?” (Donnelly, 2013).

The potential increase, whether small or large, of sexual harassment and/or sexual assault

cases after the integration of women soldiers in male dominated infantry units makes integrating

women soldiers in the infantry a political landmine, especially in light of the microscope the media

placed on sexual assault in the DOD after Tail hook in 1991. According to Harrell and Miller


(1997), in light of the stigma associated with sexual harassment in the military, the proverbial

pendulum swung out of whack to the point that gender integrated units found it difficult to get

anything done because “many men had been told not to talk to the women, sit next to them, or even

go near them…these instructions, intended to keep men from sexually harassing women, made life

very difficult in work groups that included both men and women who were expected to

communicate and coordinate their efforts.” Not only can gender integration create an awkward

work environment but, according to Harrell and Miller (1997), inappropriate male and female

relationships can “breed resentment among colleagues based upon jealousy or sexual frustration”

especially in units that are far forward of the rear areas, like the infantry.

Emotional reasons serving as obstacles to female integration in the infantry primarily

revolve around the perceived role of the dominance of masculinity in the military, especially direct

ground combat jobs like the infantry. Titunik (2000), argues, “War has consistently been seen as

an entirely masculine activity and the military experience as an ignition into manhood.” Dunivin

(1994) agrees, stating, “As an institution comprised primarily of men, its culture is shaped by men.

Soldiering is viewed as a masculine role…and as men’s work; thus, a deeply entrenched cult of

masculinity pervades military culture.” MacKenzie (2012) observed this notion of masculinity

when she summarized the 1992 report of the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of

Women in the Armed Forces. It was identified that, “Interference with male bonding, cultural

values and the desire of men to protect women, and inappropriate male/female relationships could

negatively impact troop dynamics.” Additionally, General Merrill McPeak, former Air Force

Chief of Staff, admitted that he had a “culturally based hang up. I can’t get over this image of old

men ordering young women into combat…I have a gut-based hang up there. And it doesn’t make

a lot of sense in every way. I apologize for it.” (MacKenzie, 2012).


The culture of the Army can be easily summarized with one quote from one soldier, which

typifies the extent a cultural shift will be required when the Army integrates women soldiers into

the infantry in 2015. “If we have all those problems with women, it is a good thing women are

not in the important units” (Harrell and Miller, 1997). Likewise, civilian opponents of infantry

gender integration will also require an intellectual shift. “There are many reasons why the services

are hesitating and delaying implementation of plans to gender-integrate direct ground combat

units…to state the obvious, this is an unnecessary, bad idea that cannot be justified in terms of

military necessity; there is no empirical evidence, based on actual experience and not theory, to

support assertions that this is the right thing to do.” (Donnelly, 2013)

1975 and 1976 Army ROTC Advanced Leadership Camp

While the regular Army has been recently inundated with requests for opinion regarding

the integration of women soldiers into the infantry in 2015, the review of literature substantiates a

lack of research to obtain the opinions of the nation’s next generation of Army officers tasked to

lead troops in gender integrated infantry units after 2015. This portion of the review of literature

focuses on the experiences of cadets experiencing gender integrated ROTC Advanced

Leadership Camp (precursor to LDAC) training in 1975 and 1976. It serves as a historical

paradigm to understand how ROTC serves as a microcosm of the broader issue concerning

general integration of women soldiers into the Army in the 1970s, and specifically the

integration of women soldiers in the infantry in 2015. This portion of the review of literature

will also provide a glimpse of the Army culture of the 1970s and how ROTC students’ unique


college/ROTC experiences positively or negatively affect their view of unit cohesion and morale

when women soldiers are integrated.

For historical perspective, it is important to know that women were allowed to join

ROTC in 1973. In 1975, female cadets were authorized to attend the ROTC Advanced

Leadership Camp but with separate training events from males, and 1976 was the first year that

ROTC featured the same gender integrated training for both male and female cadets (Mohr,

Rowan, & Reidy, 1978 and Larwood, Glasser & McDonald, 1980).

Dunivin (1994) describes the 1970s and even today’s Army culture as “traditional,

characterized by conservatism; it is a homogenous male force, with masculine values and norms,

and exclusionary laws and policies.” This was the Army culture of the 1970s and the culture that

is requiring a shift in order to accommodate women soldiers in the infantry in 2015. Indicative

of this Army culture, the training experienced by cadets at the Advanced Leadership Camp in

1975 was slow to accommodate women’s inclusion in the Army. Mohr et al. (1978) describe the

1975 training as generally the same, but females were not allowed to “participate in offensive

combat operations or offensive tactical training; train with bayonets, pugil stick, hand grenades,

or hand to hand combat, and not authorized to march farther than six miles or carry more than 25

pounds.” Additionally, women “participated in activities on a reduced level commensurate with

their physical abilities, and received female physical training” (Mohr et al., 1978). Female

cadets were also segregated from their male peers and were “garrisoned with their own female

company. Women’s barracks were separate from and off limits to male cadets” (Mohr et al.,

1978).


At the 1975 ROTC Advanced Leadership Camp, peer ratings were first introduced to

male and female cadets; prior to 1975, peer ratings were male only events (Mohr et al., 1978).

According to Mohr et al. (1978),

Peer ratings have a long tradition of use in the military in evaluating leadership

potential and ability. The basic paradigm involves each group member estimating

the leadership potential or ability of all other group members. This technique has

been shown to be valid, reliable, unaffected by friendship factors, stable across

changing groups, and valid in predicting future performance even when the

groups are established for short periods of time.

In 1975, women cadets’ peer ratings were significantly lower than male cadets for several

reasons. According to Mohr et al. (1978), female cadets were not allowed to be leaders during

training that required offensive tactics, received less rigorous, inferior and incomplete training

that caused the male cadets to feel resentment toward female cadets, and their platoon officer

evaluators, young captains, were biased in their assessments based upon their personal opinions

about women in combat and non-combat Army roles.

As a result of the training female cadets experienced at the 1975 ROTC Advanced

Leadership Camp, the Army self-identified major issues and required necessary changes to the

succeeding years of training. “Problems associated with separate training programs for all cadets

who are competing for the same jobs are obvious. A group receiving inferior or incomplete

training will suffer. The women were disadvantaged when competing with males whose superior

and more complete training made them no longer ‘peers’” (Mohr et al., 1978).


Changes were made to provide female cadets with the same opportunities as men during

the 1976 ROTC Advanced Leadership Camp. Because of these equitable changes, the Army felt

it would have a more holistic cadet opinion about the integration of women into the Army. The

cadets at the 1976 ROTC Advanced Leadership Camp had the opportunity to gauge the

performance of female cadets in simulated combat situations, as well as a more general

observation of women in physical training (Larwood et al., 1980). Larwood et al. (1980)

hypothesized that since the male and female cadets would experience the same training, and

become well acquainted, the male cadets would express more favorable attitudes toward women

in nontraditional roles; however, the empirical data from the 1976 ROTC Advanced Leadership

Camp suggested the inverse was true. Interestingly enough, not only did the cadets’ opinions

reflect the negative opinions of regular Army personnel, but the longer men were in the camp,

the more negative they became toward women in the Army (Larwood et al., 1980). For some

reason, Larwood et al. concluded the summer training process convinced many men that women

do not belong in nontraditional Army roles.

The proffered conclusion was that male cadet attitudes may “partly reflect the unusually

threatening situation of having women superiors for the first time. The previously less negative

attitudes of men in mixed-sex college units may have resulted from the apparent lack of such a

threat on campus” (Larwood et al., 1980). The Army also concluded the study offered a glimpse

into a larger cultural issue, and action was required to ensure these male cadet attitudes did not

perpetuate into the Army force when these cadets graduated from college and commissioned into

the Army in 1976 and 1977. The Army was concerned male cadet reactions to gender

integration would “curtail the effectiveness of mixed-sex units and slow the movement of

women toward many positions for which they are equally suited” (Larwood et al., 1980). The


Army pinned its hope on the idea that the “individuals (1976 male cadets) studied may well be

suited to influence the outcome and are clearly reactive to the (political and social) change

process” (Larwood et al., 1980). Interestingly enough, the individuals studied in 1976 are in fact

well suited to influence the outcome of the current issue of integrating women in the infantry.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, and the Army Chief of

Staff, General Raymond Odierno, commissioned in the Army in 1974, and 1976, respectively

(Wikipedia, 2014).

The role of DGCDAR and Army reorganization in shifting the culture of the Army

The training experienced by women in the 1975 and 1976 ROTC Advanced Leadership

Camps suggested that the societal and political change of the 1970s did not help its future leaders

move beyond the Army culture previously described by Dunivin (1994). However, the

implementation of DGCDAR in 1994 and its eventual repeal in 2013 serve as significant points

that helped shift the culture of the Army to begin to accept women soldiers in combat roles.

Although the 1994 implementation of DGCDAR allowed women soldiers to serve in

direct ground combat units at the brigade or higher level, it still excluded women from serving in

the combat arms (infantry, field artillery, armor, special operations), and prohibited gender

integrated non-combat units (logistics, communications, etc.) from collocating with non-gender

integrated, direct combat units.

The 2013 repeal of DGCDAR was predicated on a requirement to align the ongoing

realities of nonlinear OEF and OIF combat with American law. MacKenzie (2012) pointed out

that the “last few decades had made the (DGCDAR) ban largely irrelevant; increasing counter


insurgency warfare virtually erased the concept of combat front lines and female soldiers’

contributions to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were undeniable.” MacKenzie (2012) credits

the progressive views of the former Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, and Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, as essential to remove gender based barriers to service.

Additionally, MacKenzie (2012) credits the media and scientific research as integral to dispelling

perceived myths about women’s physical abilities and the effect the integration of women soldiers

has on unit cohesion (MacKenzie, 2012).

The 2013 repeal of DGCDAR was not the only driving force behind the Army’s cultural

shift. MacKenzie (2012) reports that in 2003, the Army began reorganizing units and increasing

the number of brigades within each division. “Under this system, forward support companies,

which provide logistical support, transportation, and maintenance to battalions, are now grouped

together on the same bases as combat units. Since women are permitted to serve in support units,

a major barrier designed to keep them away from combat has vanished.”

The Army’s reorganization from division focus to brigade focus was in order to create a

lighter, more responsive force, in keeping with the changing threat after the fall of the Soviet

Union. The Army no longer saw itself fighting large scale maneuver warfare against standing

armies, but rather smaller scale engagements that could not afford large, time consuming buildups

like the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The Army needed to reorganize and increase its flexibility, and

the inclusive brigade combat team (BCT) was the answer. Instead of having to deploy a division

headquarters and maneuver brigades totaling about 16,000 troops, the Army built its basic fighting

formation around mechanized (armored), infantry (light, airborne and air assault) and Stryker

(light wheeled vehicle) brigade combat teams of about 4,000 troops. BCTs were task organized

with three maneuver battalions, a field artillery battalion, a support battalion, and additional


support elements like communications, intelligence, engineer, military police, Air Force tactical

air control parties, etc. This smaller formation provided more combat power to a lighter, more

flexible brigade, and enabled the Army to deploy smaller formations with enhanced capabilities,

in order to more quickly get troops in a conflict area without requiring a long buildup of troops

and materiel.

This shift from a division to BCT focus placed women soldiers in the support battalions and

forward support companies of direct combat brigade combat teams. When OEF and OIF began in

2001, and 2003, respectively, these new Army formations were front and center in nonlinear

combat zones devoid of front lines. The OEF and OIF counterinsurgency doctrine called for

American troops living among the civilian population, and BCTs occupied forward operating bases

where support units and fighting units were collocated due to the necessity of security and logistics.

In effect, the DGCDAR prohibition against collocation of gender integrated non-combat units, and

non-gender integrated combat units was violated because of operational necessity. Additionally,

the DGCDAR prohibition against assigning women to direct combat units below the brigade level

was challenged as well.

DGCDAR: Co-location of gender integrated non-combat units with non-gender integrated combat

units in OIF/OEF

As a result of combat and operational necessity, gender integrated non-combat units and

non-gender integrated combat units were collocated on forward operating bases in OEF and OIF.


The February 2012 Report to Congress on the Review of Laws, Policies and Regulations

Restricting the Service of Female Members of the US Armed Forces stated what had become the

reality of basing ground forces in the Afghan operating environment:

The DOD…, determined that the dynamics of the modern-day battlefield are non-

linear, meaning there are no clearly defined front line and safer rear area where

combat support operations are performed within a low-risk environment.

Therefore, there is no compelling reason for continuing the portion of the policy

that precludes female Service members from being assigned to units or positions

that are doctrinally required to physically co-locate and remain with direct ground

combat units. Women are now serving at the same operating locations in

Afghanistan as some direct ground combat units, without being assigned to

positions restricted by co-location. Removal of the co-location operating

restriction responds to the current operational environment.

The DOD recommended removal of the co-location restriction based upon the fact the

policy “has become irrelevant given the modern battle space with its nonlinear boundaries” (Report

to Congress, 2012).

Additionally, Burrelli (2013) noted the RAND Corporation reviewed the Army’s OEF/OIF

collocation policies and, in a 2007 report, declared,

While the Army was complying with the DOD assignment policy, it may not have

been complying with the separate Army assignment policy. Further, the report stated

“[w]e find considerable evidence that support units are collocated with direct combat

units if the definition of collocation is based purely on proximity. However, if the

definition of collocation is based on interdependency and proximity, the evidence is


inconclusive.” The report noted that hundreds of female Army members had received

a Combat Action Badge suggesting that regardless of what the report concludes, the

Army recognizes that females have been in combat (Burrelli, 2013).

While the 2007 RAND Corporation study proved the Army’s collocation policies were not

technically in violation of DGCDAR, the fact that women soldiers were receiving Combat Action

Badges led the DOD to attempt to align American law with the realities of combat in Afghanistan

and Iraq. Another necessity of nonlinear combat, characteristic of Afghanistan and Iraq, was the

prohibition against assigning women to direct combat units below the brigade level. This policy

too was challenged by the Army in OEF/OIF.

DGCDAR: Attaching women soldiers below the brigade level in OEF/OIF

When the Army reorganized from division to BCT as the primary fighting formation, the

Army established gender integrated brigade support battalions and forward support companies in the

same BCT as male only combat battalions. These hybrid BCTs consisted of non-combat and combat

units that trained together, deployed together, and fought together, often on the same forward

operating bases in Afghanistan and Iraq. The proximity of female non-combat soldiers on the same

forward operating bases as the combat battalions provided a combat multiplier for the maneuver

commanders conducting counterinsurgency operations, and, according to Burrelli (2013), “The

Army…utilized women to search Iraqi females for weapons, and to patrol with foot soldiers, usually

in door-to-door-type operations. Also, women have…served in female engagement teams which

helped units deal with female locals while operating in Afghan villages.”


King (2013) provides insight on how the Army skirted the DGCDAR prohibition regarding

the assignment of women soldiers to combat units below the brigade level. Instead of “assigning”

women to combat units to provide additional combat power, the Army “attached” women soldiers

to combat units below the brigade level in order to provide the maneuver commander a required

capability that he otherwise could not have. According to DOD Joint Publication 1-02, assigned

implies “to place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively

permanent;” attached implies “to place units or personnel in an organization where such placement

is relatively temporary and the detailing of individuals to specific functions where such functions are

secondary or relatively temporary.”

According to King (2013), “In Iraq and Afghanistan, the official rule (rescinded in 2011)

on women’s exclusion from combat units was regularly breached by the semantic method of

describing female soldiers working on the frontline as attached, rather than assigned, to combat units.

In the close confines of a patrol base or FOB, the distinction was academic.”

As a result of the counterinsurgency realities of combat in Afghanistan and Iraq, in 2012 the

DOD formally requested an exception to policy. “The exception requested would allow women to

be assigned to select units below brigade level, but not below the battalion level, within specific

military occupational specialties currently open to women. The request is based on 10 years of recent

combat experiences” (Report to Congress, 2012).

Combat performance of women soldiers in OEF/OIF

Since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq began in 2001, and 2003, respectively, women

soldiers deployed to combat zones in noncombat roles, either as part of maneuver BCTs or support


brigades in both the regular Army, Army Reserve and National Guard units. Because of the nature

of OEF/OIF nonlinear, counterinsurgency warfare, many women found themselves involved in

combat while performing their noncombat jobs.

According to MacKenzie (2012),

Around 280,000 women have worn American uniforms in Afghanistan and Iraq,

where 144 have died and over 600 have been injured. Hundreds of female soldiers

have received a Combat Action Badge, awarded for actively engaging with a hostile

enemy. Two women, Sergeant Leigh Ann Hester and Specialist Monica Lin Brown,

have been awarded Silver Stars - one of the highest military decorations awarded for

valor in combat - for their service in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Sergeant Hester and Specialist Brown are examples of how several events coalesced to

provide the right catalyst to witness women soldiers’ performance in combat. OEF/OIF’s nonlinear,

counterinsurgency warfare, coupled with the Army’s modular reorganization from divisions to BCTs

as the primary fighting force, combined with the necessity to collocate noncombat gender integrated

units with nonintegrated combat units on deployed forward operating bases, provided an entry point

for women soldiers to be inadvertently placed in combat situations, despite DGCDAR’s prohibition

against women serving in combat. Sergeant Hester’s and Specialist Brown’s heroism in combat

reinvigorated the gender integration debate in favor of providing women the opportunity to serve

their country in combat roles. Wikipedia (2014) provides some insight on their actions on the

battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan:

Sergeant Hester, while assigned to the 617th Military Police Company, a Kentucky

Army National Guard unit out of Richmond, Kentucky, received the Silver Star for

her actions on March 20, 2005 during an enemy ambush on a supply convoy near the

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_Police_Corps_(United_States)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Company_(military_unit)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kentucky_Army_National_Guard

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kentucky_Army_National_Guard

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richmond,_Kentucky

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Silver_Star


town of Salman Pak, Iraq. Hester…is the first female U.S. Army soldier to receive

the award for exceptional valor since World War II and the first ever to be cited for

valor in close quarters combat.

SPC Monica Brown, a United States Army medic, became the first woman in

Afghanistan and only the second woman since World War II to receive the Silver

Star, the United States' third-highest medal for valor. After a roadside bomb

detonated near a convoy of Humvees in the eastern Paktia Province of Afghanistan,

Brown saved the lives of fellow soldiers in April 2007 by running through insurgent

gunfire using her body to shield wounded soldiers while mortar rounds fell nearby.

Because women are not formally allowed to participate directly in combat, Brown

was pulled back to the base…shortly after the incident.

While MacKenzie (2012) is quick to illustrate Sergeant Hester’s and Specialist Brown’s

valorous actions on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, the capture and subsequent rescue of

former Private First Class Jessica Lynch in Iraq in 2003 is an example of how the integration of

women soldiers in combat and the infantry has been vehemently opposed, despite the bravery and

heroism of Sergeant Hester and Specialist Brown.

According to Wikipedia (2014),

Former Private First Class Jessica Lynch served in the 2003 invasion of Iraq…and

on March 23, 2003…,was serving as a unit supply specialist with the 507th

Maintenance Company when her convoy was ambushed by Iraqi forces during the

Battle of Nasiriyah. Lynch was seriously injured and captured. Her subsequent

recovery by U.S. Special Operations Forces on April 1, 2003 received considerable

media coverage and was the first successful rescue of an American prisoner of war

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salman_Pak

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Army

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghanistan

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medal

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Courage

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMMWV

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paktia_Province

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghanistan

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taliban_insurgency

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mortar_(weapon)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_invasion_of_Iraq

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quartermaster_Corps_(United_States_Army)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/507th_Maintenance_Company

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/507th_Maintenance_Company

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Nasiriyah

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Special_Operations_Forces

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner_of_war


since Vietnam and the first ever of a woman. Initial official reports on Lynch's

capture and rescue in Iraq were incorrect. On April 24, 2007, she testified in front of

Congress that she had never fired her weapon, her M16 rifle jammed, and that she

had been knocked unconscious when her vehicle crashed.

The combat stories of Sergeant Hester, Specialist Brown, and former Private First Class

Lynch has lent much to the ongoing debate regarding the role of women soldiers serving in combat

units like the infantry. Like all soldiers, regardless of gender or conflict, these are but three examples

of both valorous and questionable conduct on the modern, nonlinear, counterinsurgency battlefield.

Percy (2013) reiterated the impact these three stories have made to the ongoing, larger debate

concerning women soldiers serving in combat roles. “The idea that a woman could be a combat

soldier would be unthinkable without advances in gender equality; however, the reality that women

were already acting as combat troops in all but name brought the change to fruition” (Percy, 2013).

General Robert Cone, the current commander of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command,

summarized a common sentiment from many currently serving OEF/OIF veteran soldiers when he

stated, “…Most men who had worked and fought beside women expected them to do well in combat

roles…and most soldiers agree that women, based upon their wartime performance, have earned the

opportunity to stand in any one of our formations for which they qualify…; our recent wartime

experience indicates there are few practical limits to the vital contributions women make” (Cone,

2013).

Sub problem 2: Soldier 2020 and retaining Army infantry standards

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M16_rifle


General Cone’s sentiment reflects the opinion of a majority of currently serving soldiers, and

most agree that women soldiers have earned the opportunity to stand in any formation they qualify.

However, there are dissenting views how the Army can broaden opportunities for women soldiers

while simultaneously “not sacrificing warfighting capability, the trust of the Congress, or that of the

American people as we seek to enhance force readiness and capability” (Bromberg, 2013).

According to Lieutenant General Bromberg, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, “The

Army’s Soldier 2020 campaign will aid leadership in selecting the best-qualified soldiers, regardless

of gender, for each job within the Army profession and ensuring future force capability and

readiness. Per General Cone (2013), Soldier 2020 is founded on three principles. “1. To maintain

the dominance of our nation’s warfighting forces by preserving unit readiness, cohesion and morale.

2. Validate both physical and mental occupational performance standards for all MOSs, initially

focusing on those currently closed to women. 3. Set the conditions so all soldiers, male and female,

have an opportunity to succeed as their talents dictate.” Haviland (2013), further clarifies the scope

of Soldier 2020. “Soldier 2020 is comprised of two efforts headed by TRADOC. First, in

collaboration with USARIEM, is a study of the physical demands required for each MOS throughout

the Army, beginning with the MOSs currently closed to women. The second effort, led by TRAC,

is an extensive study of the institutional and cultural factors associated with integrating women into

previously closed MOSs.”

A significant challenge to Soldier 2020’s stated goal of “integrating women leaders and

soldiers into recently opened positions and units as expeditiously as possible” (Bromberg, 2013), is

the idea of critical mass, and its perceived effect on infantry standards. The online dictionary,

Merriam Webster (2014) defines critical mass as, “The size, number, or amount of something that is

needed to cause a particular result.” In regard to Soldier 2020, the term critical mass implies a pre-


determined amount of female soldiers integrated into infantry units in order to facilitate the reception

of female infantry soldiers, which is the particular result critical mass provides the Army. In order

to integrate women leaders and soldiers in infantry units as expeditiously as possible, some argue

that infantry standards will be lowered in order to accommodate a critical mass of women leaders to

serve as a cadre for younger, junior enlisted female infantry soldiers arriving in 2015, the Army’s

proposed date for opening infantry training to female soldiers.

Donnelly (2013) is a critic of the critical mass requirement that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, previously stated was a requirement prior to the arrival of junior

enlisted female soldiers in all male infantry units. Donnelly (2013) states her concern with critical

mass; “On January 24th, 2013, General Martin Dempsey called for a critical mass or significant

cadre of women in previously all male units – a phrase usually interpreted to mean 10-15 percent.

To assign even half that number into direct ground combat units, commanders will have to

incrementally modify male oriented programs of instruction to accommodate women.” Further,

Donnelly (2013) criticized ongoing efforts to achieve a critical mass of female soldiers in all male

infantry units by stating, “Efforts to achieve the goal of critical mass of women in formerly all-

male DGC [direct ground combat] battalions would have the inevitable effect of modifying and

lowering standards over time, making ground combat training programs less effective in preparing

both men and women for the contingencies of war” (Donnelly, 2013).

Because there are critics of the Army’s plan to integrate female infantry leaders prior to

female junior enlisted infantry soldiers, there is a perception that infantry standards will be dropped

to achieve a critical mass or diversity metrics and the Army has taken great lengths to ensure that

infantry standards are maintained to “ensure we maintain the world’s premiere land power, ready

and capable to defend this great nation at home and abroad” (Bromberg, 2013).


Soldier 2020: Physical Standards Assessment

As the first of two efforts of Soldier 2020, the Army has ordered TRADOC and USARIEM

to conduct an ongoing, three year physical standards study which concludes in 2015 (Robinson,

2013). The Army will review the most critical, physically demanding MOS specific tasks using

scientific methods in laboratories, and as Haviland (2013) reports, “These measurements will

determine the physiological capabilities (strength, endurance, and energy) that a soldier must have

to complete specific tasks to acceptable standards. These measurements will also help the Army to

establish clear, updated standards across the force.” Echoing the purpose of the physical standards

assessment, Robinson (2013) identifies that “not only are these gender-neutral standards, but they’re

also age-neutral and body-type neutral standards…in other words, it’s purely physical. (Robinson,

2013).

Representative of the Army’s larger problem of distinguishing between general fitness and

combat fitness, Harrell and Miller (1997) described the Army physical fitness test’s primary

problem; the current physical fitness test is merely a gauge of general physical fitness and not an

indicator of how a soldier will perform in a given MOS. As a result, Harrell and Miller (1997) report,

“Many personnel favor an occupation specific qualification test to screen both women and men for

the strength requirements for specific jobs…The current physical fitness test does not test for the

ability to perform specific jobs and is thus not a test of qualification.” Additionally, Harrell and

Miller (1997) illustrate that, because the Army physical fitness test has separate grading scales for

men and women, males are susceptible to premature judgment of the ability of female soldiers to

perform combat duties alongside their male counterparts. “Many troops believe that that the physical


fitness standards relate to the ability to perform in combat environment; thus the different physical

standard for all military women means to them that women will perform less well in a combat

environment” (Harrell and Miller, 1997). Further, Harrell and Miller (1997) describe the need for a

physical standards assessment that would properly gauge a soldier’s suitability for a specific MOS,

which in turn would level the playing field and make entrance into combat fields a gender neutral

assessment. “Men were generally unable to accept the degree of difference between the men’s and

women’s physical fitness requirements. We were told repeatedly that, if relevant and realistic

physical tests existed so that only qualified women (and men) were assigned to these positions,

gender integration would not be an issue” (Harrell and Miller, 1997 p. 80).

The Army’s Soldier 2020 physical standards assessment helps mitigate cultural concerns

associated with opening the infantry to women soldiers in 2015. By specifically identifying the

physical requirements for the infantry, the Army will strengthen its infantry branch by accepting

only the most physically and mentally capable soldiers, regardless of gender. Additionally, the

physical standards assessment will serve as a better quality control to mitigate the injuries associated

with combat MOSs, like the infantry. According to Robinson (2013), “having a more defined

requirement, not just mental, but physical, will lead to less attrition, lower injury rates and better

performance of our soldiers, which allows them to be more successful when they get to a unit,

thereby making the unit more successful.”

Robinson (2013) concludes, “Through a standards based approach, success will not be defined

by numbers, such as having 5 or 10 percent of women in infantry, but rather it will be defined as the

opportunity for women to be able to serve.” General Cone and majority of currently serving soldiers

agree, “Soldiers are OK with this, as long as we maintain standards” (Robinson, 2013).


Soldier 2020 TRAC Gender Integration Study

The second effort of Soldier 2020 is the ongoing TRAC gender integration study, which

began in January 2013 and ends in March 2015. (Robinson, 2013). This part of Soldier 2020 will

address how the implementation of women in combat jobs, like the infantry, will affect the Army

culturally, and will “analyze cultural factors, expectations, customs, and social behaviors of the

Army associated with integration, as well as institutional factors, which include Army processes and

policies that may be affected or changed because of integration” (Robinson, 2013). Colonel Lynette

Arnhart, TRAC’s Fort Leavenworth, Kansas deputy director and senior military analyst, states the

integration of women soldiers into combat MOSs must be done so “with the understanding that the

leadership and culture of a unit, the history, lineage and social dynamics, are crucial to successfully

dealing with changes that will occur” (Haviland, 2013). Robinson (2013) reports, “The end goal is

to proactively identify the problems and solutions before integration begins.”

Conclusion

Characteristic of any transformational change is instability and the requirement to lead

through adversity; leaders are required to have a solid change plan but must also remain flexible

enough to adapt to the realities of unforeseen consequences. Often, critics will allow the leader to

see his or her blind spots, and diagnose potential issues in the change plan. Unfortunately,

sometimes critics purposely try to derail the plan before it is implemented. Such is the case

involving the Army’s efforts to implement transformational change as a result of the 2013 repeal of


DGCDAR. Army leaders at all levels are tasked to lead their troops through this cultural shift,

because there is no choice but to work together to solve the gender integration problem.

The first section in the review of literature was to understand the Army culture through

the lens of the 1975 and 1976 ROTC summer camps. The reader gained a historic perspective of

how culture made it difficult to integrate women into ROTC training, which lent further

perspective on how much farther the culture will need to change to fully integrate women

soldiers into the infantry. The first section continued by shifting focus to the repeal of

DGCDAR, by discussing the Army’s reasons for attaching women soldiers to combat units in

OEF and OIF, and housing non-combat gender integrated units with nonintegrated combat units,

which ultimately became a catalyst for the 2013 repeal of DGCDAR, an important step in the

culture shift of the Army and its views of women in the infantry. The first section closed with a

review of the combat role women soldiers played in OEF and OIF, and highlighted their combat

performance therein.

The second portion of the review of literature focused on infantry standards and the

Army’s role in figuring out the best way ahead to integrate women soldiers into the infantry.

The second portion highlighted the ongoing TRAC Gender Integration Study, and the physical

standards assessment of all Army MOS and AOC.


Chapter III – Research Methodology

Introduction

The purpose of this research project is to determine how effective the US Army Reserve

Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Leader Development and Assessment Course (LDAC) serves as

a microcosm of the broader issue concerning the integration of women soldiers into male Army

infantry units and its effect on unit cohesion and morale. “With the exception of

Noncommissioned Officer training during the Warrior Leader Course, LDAC serves as the best


integrated, simulated infantry combat training occurring in the Army today” (K. Vaughn,

personal communication, April 21, 2014).

The hypothesis for this research paper is that US Army ROTC LDAC serves as a

microcosm of the broader issue concerning integration of women soldiers into male Army

infantry units and its effect on unit cohesion and morale. Additionally, it is presumed the

questionnaire of UCO cadets will suggest that unit cohesion and morale will not decline

significantly once women are admitted into the infantry in 2015.

The UCO Department of Military Science is comprised of regular Army officers,

noncommissioned officers, DA civilians and cadets. The gender breakdown of faculty and

cadets follows:


Figure 3-1. Faculty, UCO Department of Military Science

As of 7 May 2014 Officer Enlisted DA Civilian

Male 4 2 3

Female 0 0 0

The cadets are further divided into freshmen through senior cadets (MSL I-IV, respectively).

Figure 3-2. Cadets, UCO Department of Military Science

As of

7 May 2014

MSL I

(Freshmen)

MSL II

(Sophomore)

MSL III

(Junior)

MSL IV

(Senior)

Total

Male 14 7 7 8 36

Female 6 4 4 4 18

Total 20 11 11 12 54

Research Design

In order to accurately assess the opinions of the cadets and faculty of the UCO

Department of Military Science, one questionnaire consisting of 12 quantitative, multiple choice

questions and two qualitative, short answer questions was developed using a combination of

questions derived from several sources identified during the review of literature; all address how

effective ROTC LDAC serves as a microcosm of the broader issue concerning integration of

women soldiers into male Army infantry units and its effect on unit cohesion and morale.


Additionally, in some fashion, sub problems previously identified as Army culture and retaining

infantry standards are addressed in the questionnaire. Finally, the questionnaire attempts to

discern if UCO cadets believe unit cohesion and morale will decline significantly once women

are admitted into the infantry in 2015.

Of the 54 total cadets assigned to UCO Army ROTC, 18 MSL I (freshmen), 10 MSL II

(sophomore), 12 MSL III (junior), and 11 MSL IV (senior) cadets participated in the

questionnaire, for a total of 51 cadet respondents. The missing cadets were unavailable for

various reasons when the questionnaire was administered. Additionally, three regular Army,

and one DA civilian employee of the UCO Department of Military Science were respondents;

total cadet and faculty respondents was 55.

Several questions from the research from Larwood, et al. (1980) were used in the

questionnaire to identify any similarity or difference in cadet opinions of gender integration

between the 1976 ROTC Advanced Camp and ROTC LDAC 2013. One question was derived

from a quote from MacKenzie’s (2012) work concerning male bonding; one question was

derived from Wojack’s (2002) concern about separate shower/living accommodations in the field

and on deployment; a task and social cohesion question was posed, one question asked about the

impact gender integration would have on sexual harassment and sexual assault in infantry units;

one question asked the effect gender integration has on mixed gender bonding; several questions

specifically asked about the effect women soldiers would have on infantry units in combat;

several questions asked about female versus male cadet tactical performance at LDAC, and one

question asked about the general leadership abilities of female versus male cadets at LDAC;

Finally, The two short answer questions were designed to provide the respondent a final

opportunity to provide a general response of any kind to the broader issue concerning integration


of women soldiers into male Army infantry units. The preceding multiple choice questions were

designed to initiate creative thought about the problem and encourage the respondent to either

affirm the thoroughness of the multiple choice questions through no response, or identify

additional issues not previously mentioned in the multiple choice questions.

On April 24, 2014, all UCO MS I-IV cadets were assembled at a lecture hall on the

UCO campus and instructed on the purpose of the questionnaire, briefed the instructions of the

questionnaire, and advised their responses were in support of academic research, completely

voluntary, and could be potentially influential in TRAC’s ongoing review of literature as part of

the gender integration study. The 12 multiple choice questions and two short answer questions

included in the questionnaire were tailored to fit the experience level of all MSL I-IV cadets at

UCO. The majority of the 12 multiple choice responses were based upon Likert items, but some

deviated from Likert item responses because of the type of question asked. The freshmen and

sophomore (MSL I, and MSL II, respectively) cadets were instructed their questionnaire

responses were to be from their experience observing MSL III (junior) cadet leaders conducting

weekly physical training on the UCO campus, and their experience participating as squad

members during leadership laboratory, a weekly opportunity for the MSL III (junior) cadets to

train on map reading, land navigation and squad and platoon level tactics in preparation for

LDAC. The MSL III (junior) cadets were instructed their questionnaire responses were to be

from their experience participating in a Joint Field Training Exercise (JFTX) conducted several

weeks prior at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, which involved MSL III cadets from local Oklahoma

universities. The JFTX is designed to replicate the training at LDAC, and provides the MSL III

cadets with an opportunity to lead MSL III cadets from other universities in squad and platoon

level tactics. The MSL IV (senior) cadets were instructed that their responses were to be from


their experience the previous summer at LDAC 2013. LDAC 2013 was a 28 day training event

designed to develop and assess cadets’ leadership abilities through non-tactical garrison

leadership positions, and tactical, platoon based field exercises.

Available faculty of the UCO Department of Military Science were instructed to answer

the questionnaire based upon their years of Army experience. The available Military Science

faculty represent 85 combined years of Army experience in combat and non-combat occupations;

the four faculty respondents were two regular Army senior infantry NCOs, one retired infantry

senior NCO, and a field grade logistics officer.

Selection of the Sample

This study is limited in scope to UCO ROTC’s Military Science and Leadership (MSL)

I-IV cadets (freshmen through senior cadets); 11 senior cadets (MSL IV) that had experienced

LDAC gender integrated infantry training and the remaining 40 that had not. The junior and

senior cadets (MSL III and MSL IV, respectively), had more Army and life experience than

freshmen and sophomore cadets (MSL I and II, respectively), and, most importantly, the MSL III

and MSL IV cadets were contracted to serve in the Army, and the majority of MSL I and MSL II

cadets were not; the implication being the MSL I and II underclassmen would provide a more

balanced, open minded opinion than the upperclassmen, which had already formulated personal

opinions about the integration of women soldiers into the infantry. All available regular Army

and DA civilians comprising the faculty of the UCO Department of Military Science were also

polled to confirm their opinions generally reflect those of the Army, and also provide a more

holistic representation of the opinions of those assigned to the UCO Department of Military


Science. Other university ROTC students were not surveyed based upon a lack of Army Cadet

Command authority to do so.

Data Collection

The questionnaire was collected from all UCO cadets on April 24th, 2014. In order to

maintain respondent anonymity and encourage honest feedback, respondents turned in

questionnaires at the front of the lecture hall in folders corresponding to their MSL class, and

departed the lecture hall; there was purposely no attempt to collect data by gender because the

purpose of the questionnaire was to only gain an understanding of cadet opinion by MSL class.

Early in the research it was determined necessary to maintain MSL class integrity in order to

more easily understand the how each MSL class perceives the integration of women soldiers into

the infantry in 2015. It is important for UCO and USACC faculty to understand how each MSL

commissioning year feels about female officers serving in combat arms AOCs like infantry.

With useful data derived from the questionnaire, UCO and USACC faculty have discussion entry

points to better engage with each MSL class.

Because the hypothesis presumes the questionnaire will suggest that unit cohesion and

morale will not decline significantly once women are admitted into the infantry in 2015, it is

assumed there will be a deviation in opinion across freshman through senior cadets based upon

their level of Army experience; it is critical to compare results from the senior cadets that have

experienced gender integrated LDAC infantry training, the junior cadets that have not yet

attended LDAC, and the freshmen and sophomore cadets that only have limited, campus based

opinions.


Conclusion

Gender integration in the military has been debated for many years, and there is ample

research on this topic. However, there has been no research published on the integration of

women soldiers into the Army infantry based upon the views of cadets that have experienced

gender integrated simulated combat infantry training at LDAC, or those of cadets in ROTC in

general. There is no published, contemporary data of cadets’ views of how infantry gender

integration will affect male infantry units’ cohesion and morale, and this research could serve as

another perspective for TRAC in its ongoing gender integration study that ends in 2016.


Chapter IV Analysis Results

Introduction

On April 24th, 2014 questionnaires from 55 cadets and faculty of the UCO Department of

Military Science were gathered to determine how effective ROTC LDAC serves as a microcosm of

the broader issue concerning integration of women soldiers into male Army infantry units and its

effect on unit cohesion and morale. The purpose of the questionnaire was to gauge how LDAC’s

infantry training is viewed by future Army officers, and if there is reason to suspect that unit

cohesion and morale would decline once women soldiers are admitted into the infantry in 2015.

In order to fully understand the results of the analysis, it is important to recall the assumptions

of the research:

1. The first assumption is that UCO Army ROTC MSL IV (senior) cadets have a similar

opinion of infantry gender integration as do the remainder of MSL IV cadets in US Army

Cadet Command (USACC), based upon their shared training experience at LDAC.

2. The second assumption is that UCO Army ROTC MSL IV cadets experienced the

same gender integrated, simulated infantry combat training at LDAC as the remainder of

the MSL IV cadets in USACC, and therefore, the infantry training experience will lend a

common opinion.

3. The third assumption is that UCO Army ROTC will commission about the same

number of female officers (one) into the Army combat arms as other ROTC units in

USACC (one or two). This assumption implies that the questionnaire will have a small,


but present female combat arms representation in addition to the majority of non-combat

arms female officers.

4. The fourth assumption is that UCO’s next generation of Army officers (MSL I-IV),

based upon their LDAC experience, Joint Field Training Exercise, and witnessing ROTC

leadership training on the UCO campus, will have different views of integrating women

into combat roles than do those officers and senior NCOs currently serving in the Army.

Summary of Results

Figure 4-1. Questionnaire results of 55 cadet and faculty respondents from the UCO

Department of Military Science

MSL I

(18 resp.)

MSL II

(10 resp.)

MSL III

(12 resp.)

MSL IV

(11 resp.)

Faculty

(4 resp.)

Upon the integration

of female soldiers in

the infantry… (by majority)

What will be the most problematic issue?

Sexual

assault/

harassment

Sexual

assault/

harassment

Sexual

assault/

harassment

Sexual

assault/

harassment

Sexual

assault/

harassment

Would social or task cohesion

be most jeopardized? (social, task,

both, neither)

Both Neither Neither Both Neither

Will there be an increase in

sexual assault and/or harassment?

(increase, decrease, remain the same)

Increase Increase Increase Increase Increase

Will separate shower/living

areas be required? (yes, no) Yes Yes Yes Yes No

Kingsley Browne quote: “Women do not

evoke in men the same feelings of

comradeship & followership that men do”

(agree, disagree)

Agree Disagree Even split Disagree Disagree

Which type of bonds would be most

prevalent: sexual or brother-sister bonds?

Sexual

bonds

Brother-

sister

bonds

Brother-

sister

bonds

Brother-

sister

bonds

Brother-

sister

bonds

In combat, would you rely on a female

battle buddy like you would a male?

(definitely, probably, no unsure)

No Probably Even split

(D,P,N) No

Even split

(D & N)

If properly trained, would

female infantrymen be just as

good as male infantrymen?

(yes, no)

Even split Yes Yes Yes No


ROTC specific (by majority)

Are female cadets better than males

at tactical patrol orders? (yes, no, same) No Same Same No

Even split

(No &

same)


at land navigation? (yes, no, same) Same Same No No Same


at leadership? (yes, no, same) Same Same Same No Same

Short answer (by majority)

Can the integration of women

soldiers in the infantry work? (yes, no) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

What are your concerns regarding the

integration of women soldiers in the infantry?

(by majority of response)

Even split

(cohesion

& women

physically

incapable)

Reduction

of infantry

standards

Even split

(reduction

of infantry

standards

& increase

in sexual

assault)

Reduction

of infantry

standards

Even split

(reduction

of infantry

standards

& increase

in sexual

assault)

The responses to the short answer questions yielded results comparable to those found during

the review of literature. During the first short answer, open ended question, 69% of respondents

agreed that the integration of women soldiers in the infantry would work, which is an opinion most

readily encountered during the review of literature. Additionally, while conducting the review of

literature, it was identified that the most commonly cited barrier to the integration of women soldiers

into the infantry is a fear of the reduction of infantry standards to accommodate female soldiers.

During the second short answer, open ended question, when asked to identify a single primary

concern regarding the integration of female soldiers into the infantry, 31% of the respondents

answered their primary concern was also the reduction of infantry standards; this response was the

most prevalent to the second short answer question.

The second most prevalent response to the cadets’ primary concern to the integration of

female soldiers into the infantry was an increase in sexual assault and/or harassment in infantry units.

22% of all respondents answered an increase in sexual assault and/or harassment as a concern to this

second open ended question. A possible explanation for this response is because of the heavy


emphasis the Army places on training its force to intervene and/or act in response to allegations or

actual sexual misconduct; currently, UCO ROTC cadets and Army soldiers experience sexual assault

and sexual harassment training annually, and participate in sexual assault awareness month activities

to promote cadet and soldier awareness.

Interestingly, there were some majority responses that did not support my hypothesis that

UCO cadets will suggest that unit cohesion and morale will not decline significantly once

women are admitted into the infantry in 2015. When asked if there would be an issue if women

soldiers were not provided separate shower and living facilities, with the exception of the faculty,

which was predicted, 76% of the respondents agreed there would be issues. This in contrast to

my hypothesis, because when the MSL III (junior) cadets go to the field during JFTX and

LDAC, there are limited separate shower and living facilities for female cadets. At JFTX there

are no separate living or shower facilities, and at LDAC, all cadets are advised of a separate

shower facility for female cadets while in garrison, but the majority of female cadets do not use

them because they are a separate facility from the barracks and not as convenient. LDAC cadets

quickly realize it is easier to divide the latrine and shower time into male and female times;

additionally the female cadets understand the negative perception of male cadets regarding the

use of separate female shower facilities. At LDAC during the field portion of training, there are

no separate female shower facilities, and, while there are male cadet complaints about the

amount of shower time and hot water allotted to the minority female cadets, versus the amount of

time and hot water allotted to the majority male cadets, there were no concerns about the

requirement for separate shower and living facilities for female cadets. Based upon the

researcher’s personal experience at LDAC 2013, male and female cadets were housed together

by platoon and squad in both garrison barracks and field tents with no effect on small unit


cohesion and morale; in fact, billeting male and female cadets together had a positive effect on

small unit cohesion and morale.

The fact that each MSL class agreed there would be issues not having separate shower and

living facilities for female soldiers is questionable given the experiences of the MSL IIIs and

MSL IVs (junior and senior cadets). It is assumed that the question was insufficiently posed, or

misleading, and the cadets inferred the question was reflecting opposite genders showering

together, at the same time, in the same facility. There was the expectation the MSL I and II

(freshmen and sophomore) cadets would agree there would be issues based upon their lack of

knowledge of how cadets solve living and shower arrangements at JFTX and LDAC training, but

there was an expectation that the MSL III and MSL IV cadets, having experienced JFTX and

LDAC, would agree there would be no issues, and this would not affect cohesion or morale at

the small unit level.

Of similar interest is the response received when asked about the types of bonds that

would develop between male and female soldiers when integrated together in the infantry. With

the exception of the MSL I freshmen cadets, 61% of the faculty and each MSL class agreed

brother-sister bonds would be most prevalent over sexual bonds. This is in contrast to the open

ended question asking for a primary concern with integrating female soldiers in the infantry;

22% of respondents felt there would be an increase in sexual assault and/or harassment.

Additionally, as previously discussed, 76% of total respondents elected there would be an issue

with not having separate shower and living facilities for female soldiers, which is in contrast to

the 61% of respondents declaring there would be predominantly brother-sister bonds over sexual

bonds when integrating male and female soldiers into the infantry.


Summary of Conclusions

Based on the cadets’ 31% response stating they are concerned about the reduction of infantry

standards, and the cadets’ 22% response that a potential increase in sexual assault and/or harassment

would occur in infantry units after female soldiers are integrated into the infantry, as well as the 76%

majority of respondents that agreed there would be issues if women soldiers were not provided

separate shower and living facilities, it is apparent that ROTC LDAC’s infantry training, and

ROTC experiences in general, serve as a microcosm of the broader issue concerning integration

of women soldiers into male Army infantry units and its effect on infantry units’ cohesion and

morale. As evident in the review of literature, the perceived reduction of infantry standards and

increase in sexual assault and/or harassment are both directly linked to cohesion and morale in

currently all male infantry units. It seems ROTC cadets represent the views of currently serving

Army soldiers, that the integration of women soldiers into the infantry will work, but there is also a

concern the integration of female infantry soldiers will disrupt infantry unit cohesion and morale

when assimilated into the infantry in 2015.

The responses of the available faculty of the UCO Department of Military Science (two

regular Army senior infantry NCOs, one retired infantry DA civilian, and one field grade logistics

officer) do not generally reflect those of currently serving Army soldiers; because UCO ROTC

faculty responses were largely infantry and not representative of the diverse total Army force, it is

assumed the predominantly career infantry soldier responses skewed the faculty results in ways a


larger, more diverse faculty sample would not. However, the faculty responses were representative

of accomplished, career infantrymen that understand the implications of integrating women soldiers

into the infantry, and should be valued as representative of the infantry community.


Chapter V – Conclusion and Recommendations

Introduction

This study is important to the Army because it offers TRAC opinions from future officers

tasked to implement Soldier 2020, and specifically, their opinions regarding the integration of

women soldiers into the Army infantry. This research paper has the ability to be integrated into

the Army’s literary review efforts headed by TRAC; however, further research is required to

understand how the Army culture must be changed to mitigate cohesion and morale issues in

infantry units prior to the integration of women soldiers in 2015.

Recommendations

Further research is required to more fully understand how ROTC cadets perceive

the introduction of female soldiers into the infantry. While the regular Army has been inundated

with requests for opinion regarding the integration of women soldiers into the infantry in 2015, the

review of literature substantiates a lack of research to obtain the opinions of the nation’s next

generation of Army officers tasked to lead troops in gender integrated infantry units after 2015. In

similar fashion to the research of Mohr et al. (1978) and Larwood et al. (1980) to understand the

implications of cadets experiencing gender integrated ROTC Advanced Leadership Camp

(precursor to LDAC) training in 1975 and 1976, further research needs to be done to understand

ROTC cadets’ opinions about the integration of women soldiers in the infantry in 2015. In the

same way that Mohr et al. (1978) and Larwood et al. (1980) provided a glimpse of the Army

culture of the 1970s and how ROTC students’ unique college/ROTC experiences negatively


affected their view of unit cohesion and morale when women soldiers were integrated in ROTC

training in the 1970s, similar research needs to be done to gain an understanding of how the

present Army culture needs to change to reduce the impact women infantry soldiers will have on

the cohesion and morale of currently all male infantry units.

Conclusion

Based upon evidence from the review of literature, and the results of the questionnaire

from the UCO Department of Military Science, it is more than likely that cohesion and morale of

currently all male infantry units will suffer when female infantry soldiers are integrated in the

infantry in 2015, but the integration of women soldiers in the infantry will work. How much

cohesion and morale will suffer, and how long, requires further research. If the Army heeds the

opinions of both currently serving soldiers, as well as current ROTC cadets tasked with leading

troops in gender integrated infantry units after 2015, and ensures that current, tough infantry

standards are retained, the cohesion and morale of infantry units, as well as the total Army force,

will likely be mitigated. However, manipulation of infantry standards to accommodate a

preliminary critical mass of female infantry cadre, or a diversity quota to fill the infantry ranks with

female infantry soldiers will likely further impede infantry units from fully accepting their new

female infantry team mates once integrated in 2015.


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Appendix 1: Questionnaire Regarding the Integration of Women Soldiers into the Infantry

Questionnaire background

On 24 January 2013, the Secretary of Defense lifted all remaining restrictions on females serving

in the Armed Forces and tasked each service with developing a plan for integrating women into

closed occupations and units. Although this decision has opened Army Occupation Code (AOC)

11A and Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) 11B, 11C, and 11Z to female volunteers, the

Army has not established an implementation date. NLT 1 JAN 2016, the Army must provide the

Department of Defense with an implementation plan or a recommendation to continue to restrict

service in the Infantry to males only.

Purpose

This questionnaire is an attempt to gain your insight into the integration of women Soldiers

into the infantry. While the Department of the Army has solicited opinions from senior

leaders from the active, reserve and Guard components, there has never been a survey

directed toward ROTC cadets.

Your input matters. LDAC is the best contemporary example of women in the infantry

because it is the only model of gender integrated, simulated infantry combat training

occurring in the Army today.

Your input matters. This study has the potential to be considered by the Training &

Doctrine Command Analysis Center (TRAC) during their literary review as part of the

Gender Integration Study to be completed NLT 2015. Although your questionnaires will be

destroyed, the summary findings may be referenced by TRAC.

Your input is voluntary and will remain anonymous. This questionnaire is for academic

purposes only, and will be destroyed upon the conclusion of this study.

Please limit your responses to experiences categorized by MSL class: Military Science

and Leadership (MSL) IV: Leader Development & Assessment Course (LDAC); MSL

III: Joint Field Training Exercise (JFTX); MSL I-II: Leadership Laboratory &

Physical Training

Question 1

Circle the letter of your response. Based on your MSL experience, (MSL IV: LDAC;

MSL III: JFTX; MSL I-II: Leadership Laboratory & PT) which issue do you think is

most problematic concerning integration of women Soldiers into the infantry?

A Reduction of unit cohesion and morale

B Modification of current infantry standards to accommodate women infantry Soldiers

C Women cannot meet the physical requirements necessary to fight


Question 1

D Increase in sexual harassment/assault

Question 2

Circle the letter of your response. Fact: There are two types of cohesion, social and task

cohesion. Based on your MSL experience, (MSL IV: LDAC; MSL III: JFTX; MSL I-

II: Leadership Laboratory & PT) which type of cohesion do you think would be most

jeopardized by integrating women Soldiers into the infantry?

A Social cohesion (can male and female infantrymen bond socially?)

B Task cohesion (can male and female infantry Soldiers bond IOT accomplish an infantry

mission?)

C Both

D Neither

Question 3


MSL III: JFTX; MSL I-II: Leadership Laboratory & PT) do you think sexual

harassment and assault increase or decrease as a result of the integration of women Soldiers

into the infantry?

A Increase

B Decrease

C Remain the same

Question 4


MSL III: JFTX; MSL I-II: Leadership Laboratory & PT) do you think there would be

an issue if women Soldiers were not provided separate shower/living facilities?

A Yes

B No

Question 5


MSL III: JFTX; MSL I-II: Leadership Laboratory & PT) do you think women cadets

are generally superior to male cadets in regard to planning and issuing patrol orders?

A Yes

B No

C Mostly even


Question 6


MSL III: JFTX; MSL I-II: Leadership Laboratory & PT) do you think women cadets

are generally superior to male cadets with regard to map reading and land navigation?

A Yes

B No

C Mostly even

Question 7


MSL III: JFTX; MSL I-II: Leadership Laboratory, & PT) do you think women cadets

are generally superior to male cadets while in leadership?

A Yes

B No

C Mostly even

Question 8

Circle the letter of your response to this statement by Kingsley Browne. “Men fight for

many reasons, but probably the most powerful one is the male bonding with their

comrades….perhaps for very fundamental reasons, women do not evoke in men the

same feelings of ‘comradeship’ and ‘followership’ that men do.”

A I agree

B I disagree

Question 9


MSL III: JFTX; MSL I-II: Leadership Laboratory, & PT) do you think members of

gender-integrated infantry units will more readily develop brother-sister bonds or sexual

bonds?

A Brother-sister bonds

B Sexual bonds

Question 10

Circle the letter of your response. If you were in combat, would you rely on a woman as

your battle buddy to the same extent as a man?


Question 10

A Definitely

B Probably

C No

D Unsure

Question 11

Circle the letter of your response. Women Soldiers would make just as good infantry

Soldiers as men if they were given the same training.

A Agree

B Disagree

Question 12

Circle the letter of your response. If women Soldiers were assigned to infantry units, in your

opinion, would the Army:

A Be more effective on the battlefield

B Be less effective on the battlefield

C Remain the same

Essay

1. Please provide a short answer. Can the integration of women into the infantry work? Why

or why not?

2. Please provide a short answer. As an ROTC cadet and future Army officer, what are your

individual concerns regarding the integration of women Soldiers into the infantry?