McLaren Independent Weightlifting Investigation · 2020. 8. 6. · The McLaren Independent Investigation Team has determined that $10.4 million USD is unaccounted for. 3. Weightlifting

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INDEPENDENTINVESTIGATORREPORTTO

THEOVERSIGHTANDINTEGRITYCOMMISSION

OF

INTERNATIONALWEIGHTLIFTINGFEDERATION

4JUNE20201

1Corrected as of 30 July 2020 at page 105, 106.

McLaren Independent Weightlifting Investigation

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TableofContentsChapter1:ExecutiveSummaryofthisReport............................................................................41.1Introduction..............................................................................................................................................61.2BackgroundontheIWF.........................................................................................................................71.3CreationandTermsofReferenceoftheIndependentInvestigationintotheIWFirregularities....................................................................................................................................................71.4SummaryoftheEvidenceGatheringProcess..............................................................................111.5Witnesses.................................................................................................................................................121.6TheMcLarenIndependentInvestigationTeam’sVisittotheIWF’sOffices......................141.7OverallOutcomesoftheIndependentInvestigation.................................................................151.8Recommendations.................................................................................................................................19A.IMMEDIATEACTION.............................................................................................................................................19B.OVERALLRECOMMENDATIONS......................................................................................................................20i.ConstitutionalReform............................................................................................................................................20ii.ElectoralReform......................................................................................................................................................21iii.FinancialReform....................................................................................................................................................21iv.GovernanceReform...............................................................................................................................................22v.Anti-dopingControlReform...............................................................................................................................23

Chapter2:TheDr.AjánPresidency.............................................................................................242.1ConstitutionalStructure&HierarchyofIWF...............................................................................242.2AHalf-CenturyofUnfetteredAutonomousControl...................................................................272.3PresidentialCoercion...........................................................................................................................30i.CashControl................................................................................................................................................................31ii.RedundantTreasurer............................................................................................................................................32iii.ExclusiveFinancialControl...............................................................................................................................33iv.EBApprovalWithoutQuestions......................................................................................................................35v.Cashforvotes:RiggingElectoralCongresses..............................................................................................35vi.ThePresidentiallyAnointedExecutiveBoard...........................................................................................36vii.TheIWF’sSecretariat..........................................................................................................................................38viii.CashfromDopingFines....................................................................................................................................39

2.4InfiltrationoftheAnti-DopingControlProgram........................................................................392.5Conclusion................................................................................................................................................41

Chapter3:TheHijackingofFinancialControl.........................................................................433.1Introduction............................................................................................................................................433.2BackgroundandConstitutionalFinancialFramework............................................................433.3IllusoryReform......................................................................................................................................463.4BankAccountsandMoneyFlow.......................................................................................................47.i.TheLegacyofFlawedAccounting-MissingCashPre-2009................................................................49

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ii.TheSwissAccounts................................................................................................................................................52iii.TheFlowofFundstotheknownHungarianAccounts..........................................................................52iv.HiddenHungarianAccounts(VilagKupaandMKB)..............................................................................53

3.5TyrannyofCash......................................................................................................................................553.5.1President’sUseofCash.....................................................................................................................57i.Collectionofcash:Todepositornottodeposit..........................................................................................57ii.CountryFines............................................................................................................................................................58iii.TravelExpenses......................................................................................................................................................62iv.UnexplainedCash...................................................................................................................................................63v.CashWithdrawals....................................................................................................................................................64

3.6FinancialReporting:MisrepresentedReality..............................................................................66i.ConstructingAccountingData............................................................................................................................68ii.MisleadingtheEB....................................................................................................................................................68

3.7CrossingInternationalBorderswithUndeclaredCash............................................................693.7.1SubjectMatterExpertMoneyLaundering.................................................................................703.8FinancialMethodology........................................................................................................................713.9PrincipleOutcomes...............................................................................................................................75

Chapter4:ElectoralCorruption-CashforVotes....................................................................774.1Introduction............................................................................................................................................774.2PreparationsfortheElectoralCongress........................................................................................784.2.1TheAnointedEB................................................................................................................................................784.2.2Settingupthevotingblocwithbribes.....................................................................................................80

4.3HowaPresidencyisBought...............................................................................................................834.4Conclusion................................................................................................................................................89

Chapter5:Anti-DopingOvertheDecades.................................................................................905.1Introduction............................................................................................................................................905.2The1980s&1990s................................................................................................................................925.3WeightliftingScandalsMorphedintotheTwenty-firstCentury...........................................945.4ADirtyDecadeintheTwenty-firstCentury.................................................................................955.5LegalStructureandOperationoftheAnti-DopingCommission...........................................965.6PresidentialMeddlinginAntidoping...........................................................................................1015.6.1TestDistributionPlans.................................................................................................................1025.6.2InterferenceinResultsManagement.......................................................................................104i.DelayofResultsManagement:ACaseStudyofAzeriLifters..............................................................105ii.MissingPositivesResults...................................................................................................................................108

5.7DopingFines.........................................................................................................................................1135.8RoleofHUNADO..................................................................................................................................113i.HUNADOatHoustonWorldChampionships2015..................................................................................118ii.SuspiciousOut-of-CompetitionTestResultspriortoHouston.........................................................119

5.7Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................121

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Chapter1:ExecutiveSummaryofthisReport

KeyFindings

1. Dr. Aján’s autocratic authoritarian leadership of the International Weightlifting

Federationresultedinadysfunctional,ineffectiveoversightoftheorganisationbythe

ExecutiveBoard,whichhadanill-informedunderstandingoftheorganisation.This

was achieved through various control mechanisms. As a consequence, Dr. Aján

disabledanyoneotherthanhimselffromunderstandingtheoverallaffairsoftheIWF.

2. ThefoundationalcontrolmechanismusedbyDr.Ajánwasthetyrannyofcash.Cash

collected, cashwithdrawn,andcashunaccounted for,whichDr.Ajánwas the sole

collector.Theprimarysourcesofthiscashweredopingfinespaidpersonallytothe

PresidentandcashwithdrawalsoflargeamountsfromtheIWF’saccounts,usually

withdrawnbeforemajorcompetitionsorIWFcongresses.Itisabsolutelyimpossible

todeterminehowmuchofthecashcollectedorwithdrawnwasusedforlegitimate

expenses.TheMcLarenIndependentInvestigationTeamhasdeterminedthat$10.4

millionUSDisunaccountedfor.

3. Weightliftinghasahistoryofuseofperformanceenhancingdrugs.Over600liftersin

thepast decadehave testedpositive.WhileDr.Ajánhas impermissibly interfered

withtheIWFAnti-DopingCommission,therealproblemisthecultureofdopingthat

exists in the sport. The investigation uncovered 40 positive Adverse Analytical

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FindingshiddenintheIWFrecords.Thisincludesgoldandsilvermedalistswhohave

nothadtheirsamplesdealtwith.ThisinformationhasbeenpassedontoWADAfor

furtherinvestigation.

4. HUNADO isnot thecauseofdopingsamplemanipulationorhiddenresults. Ithas

operated in compliance with WADA standards. The investigation found that the

procedures followedbyDopingControlOfficerBarbaraKallowere correct and in

accordancewiththeWADACode.Thesourceofantidopingissuesthathaveplagued

theIWFandsportofweightliftinglieelsewhere.HUNADOanditsDCOsarenotthe

causeof thepositive testing resultsor thealleged influenceonweightlifters tobe

tested.

5. Thefinancialrecordsareajumbleofincompleteandinaccuratefiguresdistortedby

a failuretoaccuratelyrecordcashexpendituresandrevenuesanddisclosehidden

bankaccountsbyDr.Aján.

6. The twomost recentElectoralCongresseswere rampantwithvotebuying for the

PresidentandseniorlevelpositionsoftheExecutiveBoard,despitemonitoring.Such

actionsareafundamentalviolationofthesport’sBy-LawsonDisciplinaryandEthics

Procedures.

ThisReportwillexplainthesekeyfindings.

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1.1Introduction

On5 January2020 theGerman televisionnetwork,ARDaired theprogram“DerHerrde

Heber”(TheLordoftheLifters),adocumentaryfilmbyHajoSeppelt,NickButlerandGritt

Hartmann (the “ARD Documentary”). The documentary claimed the leadership of the

InternationalWeightliftingFederation(“IWF”),includingPresidentTamásAján(“Dr.Aján”)

participatedinorhadknowledgeofnumerousirregularitiesoccurringwithintheIWF.The

allegations related to corruption, financial irregularities, property investment, doping

controltestingandsamplemanipulationcombinedwithdopingfinepaymentirregularities.

There were also suggestions of favouritism and the deliberate undermining of certain

MemberFederationsaccomplishedthroughcronyismandnepotism.

ThisChaptercontainsasummaryoftheprincipleoutcomesoftheinvestigationconducted

bytheMcLarenIndependentInvestigationTeam(“MIIT”)underthedirectionofandbythe

Independent Investigator (“II”) appointed by the IWF’s Executive Board (“EB”) and the

Acting President, through the Oversight and Integrity Commission (“O&I Commission”).

BackgroundanddetailedfindingsoftheinvestigationareprovidedinsubsequentChapters

ofthisReport.

This Executive Summary describes the formation of the II and sets out the Terms of

Referenceandabriefsummaryoftheinvestigativemethodologyused.Thebalanceofthe

summarysetsouttheMIIT’skeyinvestigativefindingsinrespectoftheallegationsandthe

recommendationsforreform.

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1.2BackgroundontheIWF

TheIWFistheinternationalgoverningbodyforthesportofweightliftingasrecognisedby

the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”). It has had a rich and important history in

internationalsports.Itisoneoftheoldestsportingfederations,havingbeenfoundedin1905

andgovernsoneofthefoundingsportsofthemodernOlympicGames,beginningin1896.

TheIWFiscomposedof192affiliatedNationalMemberFederationsworldwide,fromfive

Continents.

1.3CreationandTermsofReferenceoftheIndependentInvestigationintotheIWF

irregularities

On22January2020theEBannouncedtheformationofanO&ICommissiontooverseean

investigationintotheallegationsarisingfromtheARDDocumentary.TheO&ICommission’s

responsibilitiesarelaidoutintheTermsofReferenceofthesamedateandassubsequently

revised in mid-March 2020. The EB concurrently suspended the powers of the then

PresidentoftheIWF,Dr.Aján,foraperiodof90daysandappointedUrsulaGarzaPapandrea

tothepostofActingIWFPresident,withdirectoversightresponsibilityfortheinvestigation.

The Terms of Reference for the Acting President included, but were not limited to the

followingresponsibilities:

1.1.8ToIWFConstitution7.1,theIWFActingPresidentsupervisestheIWFSecretariat.[…]1.1.11 IWF By-law to 4.2 (8), the IWF Acting President will propose the dates andlocationofanyIWFCongresstotheIWFExecutiveBoard.

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1.1.12IWFBy-lawto4.2(9),theExecutiveBoardwillmonitorthefinancialoperationsoftheIWFandadvisetheActingPresidentonfinancialissues.1.1.13IWFBy-lawto4.2.1.1,points1,2,3,5,7,8,9,10,12aredelegatedinfulltotheIWFActingPresident.[…]1.1.20IWFBylawto7,point1,theIWFSecretariat(administrativeoffice)isundertheresponsibilityoftheIWFActingPresident.[…]1.1.23IWFBy-lawto11,point4,theIWFActingPresidentmanagesandsupervisestheactivitiesoftheIWFandoftheSecretariatthatadministersthefinancialactivitiesandkeepstheaccountsoftheIWF.1.1.24.IWFBy-lawto11,point5.3,theIWFActingPresidentmayauthorisedescribedexpenditureamounts.1.1.25. TheIWFActingPresidentshall, fortheavoidanceofdoubt,beconsideredtheChairoftheIWFExecutiveBoardthroughoutthemandateandwillhavethepowertocallameetingofsaidbody.1.1.26.TheIWFActingPresidentisobligedtoactinatransparentwaywiththeIWFExecutiveBoard,whohavetherighttorequestreportsoftheIWFActingPresidentatanytime.

On31January2020theEBannouncedtheappointmentofProfessorRichardH.McLaren,

O.C., lawprofessoratWesternUniversity,Canada;CEOofMcLarenGlobalSportSolutions

Inc.;counseltoMcKenzieLakeLawyers,LLPandlongstandingCourtofArbitrationofSport

(“CAS”) arbitrator, as the Independent Investigator (“II”) to conduct and chair the O&I

Commission’s investigation intotheallegationsagainst the IWFandDr.Ajánmade in the

ARDDocumentary.Tothatend,paragraph1.1.1oftheO&ICommission’sTermsofReference

statesthat:

[…]toensurethattheIWFfulfilsitsinvestigatoryobligationsunderArticle20.3.10oftheWorldAnti-DopingCode,anditscommitmenttocooperationwithWADA,toappointareputableandhighlyqualifiedinvestigatorconductafullandunfetteredinvestigationintoallanti-doping,compliance,ethicalandotherdisciplinarymattersarisingfromtheARD documentary and any other related misconduct found as the investigationcontinues,aswellas intoany further issuesof concern thatarise in relation to IWFgovernance or ethical matters within the IWF and/or otherwise in the sport ofWeightlifting that are identified in the course of the investigation (together, theMatters),inorder:

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(a)toestablishalloftherelevantfactsinrelationtotheMatters;(b)todeterminewhetheranypersonormemberorotherbodythatissubjecttothejurisdictionoftheIWFhasacasetoanswerforbreachoftheirobligationstotheIWFinrelationtoanyoftheMatters,whetherbycontract,undertheIWFrulesandregulations,orotherwise,includingbutnotlimitedto:(i)determiningwhethertheIWFanti-dopingrulesanddisciplinaryrules,aswell as all applicableWorldAnti-DopingCodeprovisions, have beenproperly applied, leading to appropriate adjudication and subsequentconsequences, or alternatively whether any anti-doping rule violationshavebeencovereduporotherwiseimproperlyhandled(bytheIWFand/orothers);(ii)determiningwhetheranybreachesoftheIWFcodeofethicsand/orotherrulesofconducthaveoccurred;and(iii)determiningwhethertheallegedfinancialimproprietiesareamatterofmalpractice.(iv) Determining whether there was at any time, by any person, anyarrangement,collusionorotherwisepressureonanyanti-dopingagency,with specificattentionpaid toHUNADO, tomanipulate the tests of anyathlete,ornation.(v) Determining and identifying the full extent of themodus operandifound in respect of doping manipulation and those involved in suchactivity.(vi) Toidentify ifthereisanyotherevidenceorinformationrelatingtoPresidentTamasAjánand/orthoseactingwithhim,inrespectofanyoftheallegationsraisedbytheARDtelevisionstation,oranyotherformofinappropriateactivity.(vii)ToadvisetheIWFwhetheranypersonormemberorotherbodyhasacasetoanswerforabreachoftheirobligationstotheIWF.”

Dr.Aján,underpressurefromtheEB,resignedoncertaintermsfromhispositionon15April

2020. The Acting President took certain steps to terminate the employment of various

membersoftheSecretariatoftheIWFandtomovetheofficesofthefederationfromtheir

currentlocationofBudapest,HungarytoLausanne,Switzerland.

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Working independently as the II, Professor RichardMcLarenwas supported by amulti-

disciplinaryteamwithprovenexperienceincomplexinvestigations,dopingviolations,the

interviewing of witnesses, forensic analysis, financial investigations, antidoping and

laboratoryregulationandprocesses. TheII’sTeamwasstaffedbytheChief Investigator,

Martin Dubbey and members of his staff from Harod Associates, including, Alex Miller,

HowardLeatherandGregKitsell; lawyer,DianaTesic;andforensic financial investigator,

StevenBerryman.

Professor McLaren has significant experience in the world of international sports law.

Notably, he was a member of WADA’s three-person Independent Commission, led by

foundingWADA President RichardW. Pound, QC, which exposed widespread doping in

RussianAthleticsandthecorruptionattheInternationalAssociationofAthleticsFederations

(“IAAF”),asitwasthenknown.Followingthatassignment,hewasappointedbyWADAas

the Independent Person (“IP”) to investigate the allegations of state sponsored doping

manipulation during the Sochi Games andmore generallywithin Russian sport. Martin

DubbeywastheChiefInvestigatorintheIPworkandservedinthesamecapacityintheIWF

work. Professor McLaren has extensive experience in many other international

investigationsrelatedtodopingandcorruptioninOlympicandprofessionalsport.

Throughoutthecourseofhismandate,theIIhaspersonallyreviewedallevidencegathered

bytheMIIT.

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ThisReportwaspreparedfromthecollectiveworkoftheMIIT.Theinvestigationprocessis

outlinedandthemanysignificantaspectsthatwerestudiedandanalysedultimatelyprovide

theevidenceandbackgroundforfindingsoffact.

1.4SummaryoftheEvidenceGatheringProcess

Professor McLaren was appointed to lead this investigation to ensure an unbiased and

independentexaminationoftheevidencefromwhichthisReportwaswritten.Theobjective

was to ensure that all stakeholders could have confidence in the reporting of a careful,

thoroughandbalancedindependentassessmentofestablishedfacts.

ProfessorMcLarenandhisteamofinvestigatorsweregivencompleteautonomyonhowto

conduct the investigation; what allegations could or should be tested; and the lines of

enquirytobefollowed.ThemandatewasnotlimitedtotheallegationsdescribedintheARD

documentary. ItalsograntedtheMIITtherighttoapproachandprovideauthoritieswith

relevantinformationuncoveredduringthecourseoftheinvestigation.

Thefirstphaseoftheinvestigationconsistedofmappingouttheelementsdescribedinthe

ARDallegations.TheMIITcreateditsoverallinvestigativeframeworkbasedonboththeARD

allegations and as a result of its own lines of enquiry. The framework included an

unannounced site visit to the IWF offices in Budapest, keywitness interviews, evidence

collectionandvariousprocessingprotocols.Theframeworkwasalivingdocumentandwas

updatedasandwhennewlinesofenquirywereaddedtotheinvestigation.

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TheMIIT collected, developed and reviewed thousands of documents, emails, laboratory

records, Doping Control Officer (“DCO”) official reports, witness statements, recordings,

photographs,conductedcyberandforensicanalysisofharddrives,andconductedfinancial

forensicanalysisofbankingandaccountingrecords.

TheIIproducedtwointerimReportstotheO&ICommissionandtheEB.Followingarequest

forextension,necessitatedbydelaysarisingfromtheCOVID-19pandemiccircumstances,

thetimeperiodfortheIItoproducethisReportwasextendedto135days.

ThisReportcontainsinformationandevidencethattheIIconsiderstobereliableandfirmly

established.What is stated in this Report is backed by an enormous volume ofmaterial

reviewedandexamined in the investigation, togetherwithover50witness interviewsof

thosewhovoluntarilycameforwardandspokewiththeMIITinvestigators.

1.5Witnesses

TheMIIT conducted interviewswith individualswhopossessed first-handknowledge or

evidence relevant to the investigation. A number of these individuals are confidential

witnesses.WhiletheCOVID-19worldwidepandemicshutdownmovementandcomplicated

theMIIT’sinterviewprocess,itquicklybecameapparentthatcertainmembersoftheEBand

PresidentsofMemberFederationswerefrustratingtheevidencegatheringmoresothanthe

ongoing global pandemic. They acted in contradiction of the Terms of Reference, which

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requiredfullcooperation.ThetermsofreferencewerealsoexplicitontheEB’sparticipation

in,andcooperationwith,theMIIT:

“2.2.2 Each of the Members of the IWF Executive Board will provide the samecooperationtotheinvestigator.2.2.3Anyfailuretoprovidethecooperationsetoutabovetotheinvestigator,and/orany attempt to hinder or delay the work of the investigator, including (withoutlimitation) any attempt to withhold potentially relevant information, interfere withwitnessesortamperwithordestroypotentiallyrelevantinformation,willbetreatedasaseriousbreachofobligationstotheIWF.[…]”

Despite the required cooperation, only two of five Vice-Presidents, excluding the Acting

President,cameforward.TwooutofeightcongressionallyelectedmembersoftheEBand

onlyoneofthefivePresidentsofContinentalFederationscameforward,onerefusedwhen

approached.

Even more surprising was that of 20 Member Federation Presidents and/or General

SecretarieswhowerecontactedbytheMIIT,onlyfourrespondedandultimatelyonlyoneof

thoseprovidedinformationofsignificantvaluetotheinvestigation.SomeMembersactively

attempted todeceiveand frustrate the investigationprocess.Forexample,oneseniorEB

member stated that hewas unable to speak to theMIIT because he did not have phone

service.WhenitwasputtohimthatthislackofcooperationwouldbenotedintheReport,

heproducedawrittenmaterialandprovidedittotheMIIToneweekpriortothereleaseof

thisReport.

TheappetiteforMembersandstakeholdersoftheIWFtocomeforwardwaspracticallynon-

existent. Only one current athlete spoke with the MIIT investigators. The confidential

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whistleblower hotline established at the outset of the investigation brought limited

responses.MeredaysbeforethereleaseofthisReport,intelligenceofcorruptionacrossall

levelsoftheIWFwassentthroughthehotline.Someofthismaterialhascontributedtothis

ReportandothermatterswillbereferredtoWADAandtheInternationalTestingAgency

(“ITA”).

The MIIT recognises that there are forces at work that inhibited some from providing

evidence.However,theturnoutdoesnotreflectthepassionanddesireforchangethatwe

heard fromsomewhodidcomeforward.Therewereasurprisingnumberof individuals,

includingEBmembers,whorefusedtospeakwithus.

1.6TheMcLarenIndependentInvestigationTeam’sVisittotheIWF’sOffices

The investigation team visited the offices of the IWF in Budapest, Hungary between 3-6

March2020.ThevisitwasunannouncedtoboththeIWFSecretariatandDr.Aján.TheMIIT

investigatorsontheirvisittotheIWFofficesencounteredanorganisationwiththelegacyof

onemanincontrolofeveryvitalfunctionoftheorganisationanditsSecretariatfromwho

totalloyaltywasexpected.TheindividualsmakinguptheSecretariatdidthebiddingofthe

Presidentandwereresponsivetohiseverywhimandcontrolledbyhimonfearofretaliation.

TheimpressionoftheMIITisthattheSecretariatworkedwelltogetherandsupportedeach

otherintheirvariousduties.TheActingPresidentoftheIWF,UrsulaGarzaPapandreawas

presentandaccompaniedtheMIITintotheIWF’soffices.

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WhatbecamequicklyevidentfollowingtheonsitearrivalwasthatDr.Ajánremainedvery

much in control of the office and the Secretariat, despite the EBmotion suspending his

responsibilitiesforthedurationoftheinvestigation.Nearly45daysafterthesuspensionof

Dr. Aján’s duties, he was still carrying on with business as usual, running the office,

organisinganEBmeetingandhavingmeetingswiththeIWF’sfinancialadvisorandexternal

auditors,KPMG.

Dr.AjáneffectivelyblockedtheActingPresidentfromfulfillingherposition,grantedtoher

by the Terms of Reference, which authorised her management and supervision of the

activitiesoftheIWFandoftheSecretariat.Shedidnotevenhaveakeytotheofficeofthe

Secretariatuntilthedaybeforethevisit.Despiteassurancestothecontrary,Dr.Ajándidnot

providehersignatoryauthoritytotheHungarianOTPaccountasnecessaryfortheeffective

runningoftheorganisation.Furthermore,hefailedtomakeafulldisclosureofbankaccounts

totheActingPresidentandtotheMIIT.PerhapsthebiggestsurprisetotheSecretariatand

Dr.AjánwastheinstructionoftheActingPresidenttoallowforthedownloadoftheIWF’s

servers.

The MIIT would like to thank the IWF’s former legal counsel, Eva Nyirfa, current legal

counsel,LillaSagianddopingadministrativeassistant,RekaFoldesifortheirassistanceand

displaysofintegritythroughouttheinvestigation.

1.7OverallOutcomesoftheIndependentInvestigation

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TheMIIThadanunfetteredmandatetofollowtheinformationwhereveritmayhaveled.

ThroughoutthecourseoftheinvestigationtheMIITheardofmanyrumoursandallegations

thatcouldnotbesubstantiated.Themajorityof rumoursrelated todopingpracticesand

cover-upsthatwereoccurringinweightliftingasfarbackasthe1980s.Theperceptionof

everyonewithwhomtheMIITspokewasthatthesportwashistoricallymiredinproblems

ofillicitdopingandfinancialmalpractice.

Consequently, itwasdecidedearlyon inthe investigationthatthefocuswouldbeonthe

periodbetween2009-2019.Thisdecisionwasmadeforthefollowingreasons.First,the

triggerevent,whichbroughtintheIWF’sfinancialreformsofthelastdecade,occurredin

2009.Second,whiletheinvestigationhasuncoveredevidenceofdopingpracticesandthe

subsequentcover-upsthereofinthe1990sandearly2000s,theIInotesthatalinemustbe

drawntodemarcatewheretheIWF’spastcannolongerhaveaholdoverthefuture.Ihope

that this report serves as that demarcation. Weightlifting must face its past and move

forward,leavingwhateverrumors,allegations,facts,andevidenceinthepast.

Finally,aneweraofaccountabilityanddopingcontrolmanagementhasalreadybegunto

takeholdwithin the IWFasa resultof theCleanSportCommissionrecommendations in

2018.In2019,theentireIWFAnti-DopingControlProgramwasoutsourcedtotheITA.Most

recently,theadjudicationoffirstinstancecasesasaresultofanallegedAnti-DopingRule

Violation(“ADRV”)havenowbeendelegatedtotheCourtofArbitrationofSportAnti-Doping

Division.Thesechangesdemonstrateasportwilling tomove forward, freeing itselfof its

conflictsofinterestandintroducingtransparentandtrustworthyprocesses.Thefollowing

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recommendations serve to bolster the momentum that has already begun to reform an

organisationwhosereputationhasbeenseverelyandadverselyaffectedbytheactionsofa

singleindividual.

As the investigation progressed, theMIIT became aware of activities that demonstrated

possible criminal conduct,withmillions in cash unaccounted for and not entered in the

booksoftheIWF.TheMIIThowever,hasreportedseparately,onastrictlyconfidentialbasis,

totheO&ICommissiononthesematters.Afurtherreportmayfollowinduecourse.Areport

of findings in respect of antidoping controls will be filed with WADA and ITA, where

appropriate.

The ARD documentary presented specific allegations regarding the testing of the 2019

WeightliftingWorldChampionshipsheldinThailand.Asof2019,theIWFhasoutsourcedits

Anti-Doping Control Program to the ITA in Lausanne, Switzerland. It was the ITA who

preparedtheTestDistributionPlanandactedastheTestingAuthorityfortheevent.Atthe

outsetoftheinvestigation,theMIITestablishedanagreementwithBenCohen,theDirector

oftheITAthatitwouldundertaketheinvestigationofthisevent,giventhattheIWFdidnot

haveadministrativecontrolovertheirAnti-DopingControlProgramduringtheevent.The

ITAalsoagreedtoinvestigatethemattersrelatingtotheallegationsofswappingofsamples

ofMoldovanathletesasreferredtointheARDDocumentary.Mr.Cohenprovidedanupdate

totheIIon2June2020andindicatedthattheirinvestigationisincompleteandstillongoing.

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TheMIIThasidentifiedcertainadditionalsuspiciouseventsandhasrecommendedfurther

follow-upandinvestigationbytheIWF.

Therewasacompletelackofoversightintothefinancesoftheorganisation,whichallowed

forthepossibleeffortlessflightofcapitalfromtheIWF’sbankaccountsforimpermissible

purposes. There are inadequate checks and balances, and those that do exist were not

enforced.

The IWF is an organisation in need of resuscitation and fundamental foundational

restoration.Ithasbeenheldtogetherfornearly45yearsbytheirongraspofDr.Aján,oneof

thelongestservingsportsfederationpresidents.Failurefortheorganisationtoactonthe

II’srecommendationshasthepotentialtocauseirreparableharmtoanorganisationfacing

constitutional,governanceandmembershipchallengesasaresultofhisreign.Considerable

progresshasalreadybeenmadeonrestoringtheIWF’spoorimageoframpantdoping.While

theimportantstepofseparatingtheantidopingadministrationfromtheorganisationhas

occurred,itwilllikelybetheleastoftheuncomfortablerealitiestheIWFmustface.

ThecontrolexertedbyDr.Ajánwasabsoluteandinfamous.Atamacrolevel,hemanipulated

theEB,MemberFederationsandstafftoacquiescewhateverauthoritytheymayhavebeen

abletoexertintheirrespectiveroles.TheeithertacitacceptanceorwillfulblindnesstoDr.

Aján’smethodsofcontrolhasexposedsystemicgovernancefailuresatthehighestlevelsof

theIWF.Thosewhochallengedhimwerepunishedorbullied.Anyconductatthehighest

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levels of a federation that permits the rule by fear, deception and corruption to satisfy

personaldesires,actstothedetrimentofthesport’skeystakeholders:theathletes.

1.8Recommendations

ArisingoutoftheworkoftheMIITaretheserecommendations,whicharetiedtothe

work we undertook. They are divided into two categories: Immediate Action on

releaseoftheReportandOverallrecommendations.

A.IMMEDIATEACTION

1. Conductafull-scaleindependentforensicauditofthelasttenfiscalyears,

includinginformationuncoveredinthisinvestigationandwithfullaccesstoall accounts. In this regard, an immediate examination of the books andrecordsheld in two “safe” cupboards in theBudapestofficediscovered2weeksago.

2. AlterthemethodofvotingattheupcomingElectoralCongressandensure

effectiveoversightoftheprocess.3. ChangeallemailpasswordsusedbyeveryoneinIWF.4. Donotpermitanycashpaymentofantidopingfinesorsumsover$500USD.5. Anypaymentofnecessitypaidorreceivedincashmustbeaccompaniedby

aserialsequentiallynumberedreceiptsignedbytherecipient.Thereceiptmustbesavedtocreateanaudittrail.Twopeoplemustwitnessthereceipt,movementandbankingofcashfunds.

6. All cash received to be immediately deposited in the designated bank

account with only a small float maintained in the office for incidentalexpenses.

7. TheclosureofallbankaccountsinBudapestbanks.

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8. Jointsignaturesmustbeputinplaceandcompliedwithonallbankaccountstobeopenedorremaininginuse.

9. Hire a full-time financial accountant reporting to a revitalized General

SecretaryTreasurerposition.10. ReviewandreformthefinancialpowersofthePresident.11. Implementprofessionalelectronicaccountingsoftware.12. Takeover and continue the operation of the independent whistleblower

hotlineestablishedbytheMIIT.

B.OVERALLRECOMMENDATIONS

i.ConstitutionalReform

1. Redraft IWFConstitutiontoreducethenumberofmembersof theExecutive

Board(“EB”)andmakeitthecentrallegislativebody,insteadoftheCongress,andpassBy-Lawsbasedontheserecommendations.

2. CongressreviewsallactionsoftheEBbutonlyhaslegislativepowersinrespectoffinancesandantidoping.AllotherlegislativepowerstoEB.

3. OnlyonehalftheEBiselectedateachElectoralCongress,therebynecessitating

anElectoralCongresseverytwoyears.Serveamaximumof2terms.4. EB members to be suspended from their EB position if their National

Federationissanctionedfordopingviolations.

5. Publicize a reformed IWF Constitution and By-Laws once the initialrecommendationshavebeen implemented to establish renewed trust in thenewmanagementandadministration.

6. ProportionalrepresentationontheEBapproximatingthegenderbreakdownofthesport.

7. Reform the constitution to reserveone seaton theEB for a currently activeAthlete.

21

8. Provide for an Integrity Officer with sufficient budget to oversee the IWF’soperations.

9. AccountsandbalancestobeupdatedquarterlytotheEB.

10. IncludeintheConstitutionapositionofDirectorGeneralanddefinetheroleandresponsibilities.

ii.ElectoralReform

1. Examineonevoteforeachcountryvoting,withaviewtotheuseofaweighted

votingsystem.

2. The Integrity Officer to have sufficient budget to have effective oversight ofelectionsatElectoralCongresses.Establishindependentoversightprotocolsinrespectofelectionmonitoringandcontrol.

3. ElectionstobemonitoredbyindependentscrutineersselectedbytheIntegrityOfficer.

4. Establish a committee responsible to process applications for election of allVice-Presidents and senior positions in the IWF. Nominees be required todeclare business and property interests and how they are funded. Eachcandidate’s suitability to be an electoral candidate to be examined by theIntegrityOfficer.ThecommitteetoobtainaconfidentialpersonalreportfromtheIntegrityOfficerbeforeacandidatecanbenominatedbythecommitteeforthestatedelectoralpositions.

5. AllfirsttimeelectedEBmemberstoundergoEBeducationtrainingprogramandIWForientationandattendadirector’seducationprogramorganisedanddevelopedfortheIWF.Theobjectoftheeducationtodemonstratethedivisionbetween a director as policy maker and the management of the operation,whichisafunctionofthefull-timepaidstaff.

6. Establish and implement yearly trainingmodules onmatters of corruption,bribery,andconflictofinterest.

iii.FinancialReform

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1. Reform Constitution to require General Secretary Treasurer financialoversight.GeneralSecretaryTreasurerresponsible for thedevelopmentanduseofBudgetformajorcompetitions.

2. Wherepossible,theGeneralSecretaryTreasurershouldbeco-locatedwiththeSecretariatwhoisresponsiblefortheadministrationofthefinances.

3. FinancialresponsibilitiesshouldberemovedfromthePresidentandvestedintheDirectorGeneraloftheorganisation.

4. EstablishanInvestmentManagementCommitteetooverseeinvestmentswithpowertohire,reviewandterminatethefinancialmanagers.ReportannuallytotheGeneralSecretaryTreasurerandtheEB.

5. Establish an internal audit committee reporting to the Director General toconductaninternalauditpriortotheexternalaudit.

6. Allnewsponsorshipandbroadcastingcontractstobeanalysedandagreedby

theEBinadvanceofimplementationorrenewal.

7. Payments to EBmembers and others receiving attendance fees bywire andtotalforeachindividualpublishedontheIWFwebsiteannually.

iv.GovernanceReform

8. Termlimitstotwoquadrennialperiodsforallpositions(refertoConstitutional

reformpoint3).ConsideragelimitsforallEBmembers.

9. IntegrityOfficertoconductduediligenceofallEBmemberstoensuretheymeetestablishedqualificationcriteria.InvestigateandreviewbackgroundofthoserunningforelectioninseniorEBpositions.

10. Review and revise the Code of Ethics; Disciplinary Code; and Conflicts ofInterestPolicytobemorecomprehensiveandoverseetheobservanceofthesamebytheDirectorGeneralandIntegrityOfficer.

11. Establish Integrity Officer with powers to investigate disciplinary codeviolationsandrecommendappropriatesanction.

12. EstablishanexternalindependentadjudicativebodytoheardisputesovertheCodeofEthics;DisciplinaryCodeandConflictsofInterestwithappealtoCAS.

23

13. AdopttheindependentlyoperatedandmonitoredconfidentialwhistleblowerhotlineestablishedbytheMIITtoinspireconfidenceinthesystem.Allegationsof malpractice,where appropriate, to be independently investigated by theIntegrityOfficer.

14. Redesign the IWF website to be a more effective communication vehicle topromoteanopenandtransparentorganisation.

15. Developanepotismpolicy.

v.Anti-DopingControlReform

The outsourcing of the administration and application of the Anti-Doping ControlProgramtotheInternationalTestingAgencyincludingresultsmanagementandfirstinstanceadjudicationbytheCourtofArbitrationforSportleaveslittlefortheIWFtodo.

16. Proscribe therelationshipof the IndependentMemberFederationSanctions

Panel to the outsourced Anti-Doping Control Program administered by theInternational Testing Agency. Decisions of the Independent MemberFederation Sanctions Panel to be determined by the internal first instanceadjudicativepaneloftheIWF.

17. TheroleoftheAnti-DopingCommissiontoberevisedanddescribeddifferentlyin the Constitution. The role is nowone ofmonitoring and reviewing on anannualbasistheoutsourcedactionsoftheITAtoensurefullcompliancewiththe WADA Code. Provide an annual report to the Executive Board on theoutsourcedinstitution’sperformance. MonitorandrespondexpeditiouslytoMember Federation complaints regarding the IWF Anti-Doping ControlProgram.

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Chapter2:TheDr.AjánPresidency

2.1ConstitutionalStructure&HierarchyofIWF

Thesupremelegislativebodyof the IWFis theCongress(seetheattachedorganisational

chart.)TheConstitutionprovidesthatMemberFederations,intheircapacityasmembersof

theCongress,overseetheIWF,electthePresidentandmembersoftheIWFExecutiveBoard

(“EB”),supervisetheday-to-dayoperationsoftheIWFandmayissuebindingdecisions.

The Congress holds annual meetings where it must approve the annual reports on the

activities of the President, the General Secretary Treasurer, the Committees, the

CommissionsandtheIWF’sAnnualFinancialReport.TheCongressalsoholdselectionsfor

certainpositionsintheIWF.BetweenannualCongressestheaffairsoftheIWFaremanaged

bytheEBthroughtheSecretariat.

ElectoralCongressestakeplacequadrennially, intheyearfollowingtheSummerOlympic

GamesandareprecededbytheregularAnnualCongress.OnlyFullMemberswhohavepaid

their membership fee for the year by the end of March may participate or vote at the

Congress.2AttheCongressallmembersvotebysecretballotfortheelectionoftheEB,3and

seven(outofatotaloften)membersofeachCommittee.4Thetermofallelectedandnon-

electedofficialsisfouryears,unlessitconcludesearlierduetoresignationorexpulsionas

decidedbytheCongressuponproposaloftheEB.

2IWF Constitution 4.1.4. A requirement not always fulfilled and applied in reality. 3 Except for the 5 Continental Federations Presidents who are ex officio members with full voting rights. 4 IWF Constitution 8.1.2.

25

BetweenannualmeetingsoftheCongress,thedailyaffairsoftheIWFarevestedintheEB,

theoperationaldecision-makingbodythatgovernstheIWF.TheEBmayadoptormodifythe

By-Laws,theAnti-DopingPolicyandtheTechnicalandCompetitionRules&Regulations.The

EBalsoparticipatesinfinancialdecisionsbymonitoringthefinancialoperationsoftheIWF,

considering financial reports, participating in decisions involving economic deliberations

andadvisingthePresidentonfinancialissues.TheEBalsofunctionsasadisciplinarybody

andisresponsiblefordeterminingpenaltiesandsanctionsforbreachesoftheIWF’spolicies

andregulations,whichincludesitsAnti-DopingProgram.

Three Committees work under the IWF EB. 5 Each Committee consists of ten elected

members,sevenofwhichareelectedbytheCongressandthreeofwhichareelectedbythe

EB. The Chairperson of each Committee is appointed by the EB upon nomination of the

President.TheseCommitteesresearchanddeveloppoliciesandadvisetheEBandCongress

withrespecttotheirareasofexpertise.

Similar to Committees, Commissions are responsible for discrete areas that are of

importance to the IWF and the sport of weightlifting. They research, develop policies,

overseeIWFcompetitionsandeventsandadvisethedecision-makingbodiesoftheIWFwith

respecttotheirareasofexpertise.However,unliketheCommittees,Commissionsarenot

5 The Technical Committee is responsible for studying, analysing, monitoring and developing all Technical and Competition Rules related issues of the sport of weightlifting. The Coaching and Research Committee is responsible for overseeing the content and implementation of the IWF Coach Licensing program. The Medical Committee is tasked with safeguarding the health of the athletes involved in the sport of weightlifting, including monitoring the implementation of the IWF Anti-Doping Policy.

26

elected.TheyareestablishedandstaffeduponproposalofthePresidentandapprovalbythe

EB.

ThePresidentdoesnotderivehispowerfromtheConstitutionbutratherthroughtheBy-

LawsenactedundertheConstitution.TheBy-LawsprovideforthePresidenttochairtheEB,

overseetheIWF’sactivitiesandtobetheIWF’srepresentativeatmajorweightliftingand

international sporting events. The President also holds certain powers over some of the

institutions,asanexofficiomemberofallIWFCommitteesorasaconsultativeoverseerof

theCongress.

MuchofthePresident’spowerisexercisedthroughtheofficeoftheSecretariat,whichfalls

under the sole responsibility andauthorityof thePresident.ThePresidentmay staff the

Secretariatathisdiscretion inorder to fulfill itsdutiesandhas thepowertoassigneach

CommissionwithaCoordinator from the IWFSecretariat. For example, theAnti-Doping

CommissionCoordinatoristheIWF’sLegalCounsel.

The Constitution and By-Laws provide that both the President and General Secretary

Treasurer have authority over the finances of the IWF, including the signing of financial

documents.Bothpositionsareauthorized toenter intoagreementswith thirdpartieson

behalfoftheIWF.ThePresidenthoweverhasexclusiveauthorityovertheSecretariat,who

administersthefederation’sfinancialactivitiesandaccounts.

27

Likemostorganisations,thelegalstructureestablishedbytheConstitutiondoesnotconform

totheorganisation’sactualoperationsandhierarchy.TheIWF’sConstitutionistoagreat

extentafaçadeofproperlegalstructureandoperatingrules.Therealityisthatthepowerin

theIWFwasusurpedbyDr.AjánandexecutedthroughtheSecretariat,withallstaffthereof

being personally appointed by the President. He was able to establish an operating

methodology that enabled absolute authoritarian rule through manipulation of the

Constitution by use of intimidation, fear and retaliation. As a result, the constitutional

structure was warped into one that enabled his sole control. How that process was

accomplishedisexplainedbelow.Ultimately,thePresidentwasabletoconsolidatehispower

throughtheuseoffear-basedandretaliatorymeasuresagainstbothMemberFederations

andhisownstaff,andtokeepthispowerthroughmanipulatedandpredeterminedelections.

2.2AHalf-CenturyofUnfetteredAutonomousControl

Dr.Ajánjoinedthe115-year-oldIWFahalfcenturyago.Afteranearlycareerasaphysical

educationteacherandlawyer,heservedastheGeneralSecretaryoftheorganizationfrom

1975 through 2000. At this time Dr. Aján was elected President, and he occupied that

positionuntilhisresignationinApril2020.

InthemorethantwodecadespriortohiselectionhewasdefactoPresidentwithoutthetitle.

HisinfluenceasGeneralSecretaryisdemonstratedbyhismovingtheIWF’sheadquarters

fromAustria toBudapest in1982,despite the fact that the thenPresidentwasAustrian.

Throughtheyears1989to2005healsoservedastheGeneralSecretaryoftheHungarian

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OlympicCommittee.HewasamemberoftheInternationalOlympicCommittee(“IOC”)until

2010 after which he became an Honourary Member of the IOC until he resigned his

membershipon5March2020,convenientlyprecludinghimfrombeinginvestigatedbythe

IOCEthicsCommission.Since1999,hehasbeenafoundingmemberofWADAandamember

oftheWADAFoundationBoarduntil2018.

AtthetimeDr.AjánjoinedtheIWF,weightliftinghadbeenprimarilyaEuropeansportthat

wasdominatedbytheUSSR.ItthereforehadastronginfluenceovertheIWF.Hungarywas

underSovietcontrolupuntilthefalloftheIronCurtainin1991.The30-yearperiodbefore

ascending to the presidency in 2000 is the crucible in which Dr. Aján developed his

management style and assertion of total control over all the affairs of the IWF. The

authoritarianmanagementtechniquesDr.AjánlearnedduringtheeraoftheUSSRcanbe

found to this day in his management style while operating the organization. The

relationships that evolvedbetweenDr.Aján and the sports administrators of the former

SovietRepublicsbecamehisforgedalliancesandenabledhimtoexertdominanceoverthe

IWFwhenhe stood for thePresidency in2000andchangedhisde factopresidency into

reality.

After the collapse of the Soviet era at the beginning of the 1990’s, the IOC blossomed,

enriched by television revenues and contracts, which enabled it to provide significant

financial support to its members. Upon Dr. Aján’s election as President of the IWF, the

financialresourcesoftheIWFweregrowing,attributableinmostparttothesupportbythe

IOC.Heusedhisauthoritarianwaystotakeadvantageofthesenewsourcesofrevenueand

29

gain greater control of the organization and structure of the IWF. This control of the

organisationcontinuedtothetimeoftheappointmentoftheIndependentInvestigator(the

“II”)bytheIWF’sOversight&InvestigationCommittee(“O&ICommittee”)inFebruary2020.

Dr.AjáncontrolledtheIWF’sMemberFederationsbypatronage,rewardandpunishment

using different types of manipulative controls, which guaranteed his 20-year tenure as

President.Hismanagementstyleinvolvedlimitingtheinformationprovidedtomembersof

theEB,whooperatedasapassivestampofapprovalofhismanagement,whileneverbeing

properly informed of what was going on within the IWF organization. Dr. Aján would

generouslyrewardMemberFederations thatsupportedhimandanydefianceagainstDr.

Aján’spositionwouldbemetwithanear instantaneousrebukethatcould inturnhaving

lastingconsequences.

Anti-dopingcontrolprocedureswereoneofseveralmechanismsusedtoconsolidateand

holdontohis tight controlover the IWF.Atamacro level it servedasoneof thecontrol

mechanisms.Anti-dopingfines,beingpartoftherulesofcleansportintheIWF,provideda

convenient pool of cash resources that greased the wheels of consolidating the power

structureandenabledthePresident’slargessduringtheperiodexaminedbytheMcLaren

Independent Investigation Team (“MIIT”). Finally, Dr. Aján used the IWF Electoral

Congresses to strengthen his support base and power by distributing the IWF’s cash

resourcestoMemberFederationsthatpromisedtovoteforhim.Thisensuredhiscontinuing

positionofpowerasthePresident,whilepoisoningtherelationsofmembersoftheEBand

causingtheBoard’sparalysisinoverseeingtheorganisation.

30

2.3PresidentialCoercion

Dr.AjánrantheIWFasifitwashisownpersonalfiefdomorprivatecompanyoverwhichhe

hadabsolutecontrol.Hemadeallthetop-leveldecisions,staffedtheIWFSecretariatwith

Hungariannationalsandpromotedhisson-in-law,AtillaAdamfi(“Mr.Adamfi”),toDirector

General in 2014. The family circle was a tight one. The very loyal and hardworking

Secretariat,onthedirectionofMr.Adamfi,wouldefficientlyandeffectivelyadministerallof

the day-to-day operations of the IWF and execute the decisions of the President when

required.

Throughouthispresidency,Dr.AjánconsolidatedandkepthisgripontheIWFthrougha

varietyofcarefullycraftedmechanisms.Theserangedfrom:

(i) boughtelectionstoremaininpower;

(ii) completefinancialcontroloftheorganisationanditsaccompanyingbankaccounts

andrecordsincludingcashdepositsandwithdrawals;

(iii) use of administrative powers allowing for the exclusive staffing of the IWF

Secretariat;and

(iv) infiltrationoftheconfidentialAnti-DopingCommission.

Thediscussionthatfollowsdescribesingreaterdetailthepowercontrolsandadministrative

tools thePresidentused toenable theoperationof the IWFas if itwerehisownprivate

corporation.

31

i.CashControl

TheMIITanalysedthecashreceiptsissuedbytheorganisationduringtheperiodof2009-

2019inrespectofdopingfines,competitionandmembershipfeesandmultipleotherforms

ofincome,suchaslargecashpaymentsthatwereoftenmadebysponsorsatIWFeventsto

honourtheircontracts.Theprocessofissuingreceiptsandcollectingcashisdependentupon

theaccuracyandhonestyofthePresident.

AllofthesesourcesofcashwereprimarilycollectedbyDr.Aján.Hewastheonlypersonwho

controlled the receipts and deposits of cash payments into and out of the IWF’s bank

accounts.Healsowithdrewsignificantcash6amountsfromtheOTPBankandMKBaccounts.

Basedupon interviewsand records reviewed from2009 through2019, the investigation

revealsthatthesecashactivitiestotaledapproximately$27.8MillionUSD.7Fromthistotal,

theMcLarenIndependentInvestigationTeam(“MIIT”)havemadeadjustmentstoaccount

forDr.Ajánpayingoutcashatevents,anddepositsofcashtovariousIWFbankaccountsfor

example, resulting in a deduction of $17.4Million USD from the indicated total amount

above.

Basedontheavailablerecords,theMIITestablishedthatapproximately$10.4MillionUSD

isunaccountedfor.TheindividualreportsoftheMIITinvestigatorshavebeenturnedover

6 In various currencies (USD, Euros, HUF, GBP). 7 While a vast majority of the cash transactions occurred in US Dollars, cash transactions were also performed in EUR, GBP, and HUF currencies. All calculations were converted to USD based upon historic per day currency exchange rates.

32

aspartofaconfidentialpackageofreportstotheO&ICommission.Theuseandabuseofcash

isdiscussedmorefullyinthenextChapter.

ii.RedundantTreasurer

TheConstitutionprovides thatalongwith thePresident, theGeneralSecretaryTreasurer

holds a position of power and influence over the affairs of the IWF and the dual role of

administrator and financial overseer of the organisation. The reality was that the two

personswhooccupiedtheGeneralSecretaryTreasurerpositionduringDr.Aján’spresidency

weredeliberatelychosenbyhimbecauseheknewthattheirlimitations,beitknowledgeof

theEnglishlanguageoradministrativeabilities,wouldcausethemtobeineffectiveintheir

role. Thereby continuing his iron grip with little to no interference from the General

SecretaryTreasurer.Asaresult,Dr.AjánwasabletofurthercurtailtheGeneralSecretary

Treasurer’s authority. For example, theGeneral SecretaryTreasurer’s financial oversight

and reporting role as Treasurer wasmade superfluous by the President being the only

signatory to the IWF’s operating account at the OTP Bank, according to all witnesses

interviewedbytheMIIT.

ThisexerciseofauthorityiscontrarytoEBmotionsregardingextraordinaryexpenditures

above$50,000USDrequiringtwosignatories.Thetwoindividualswhoheldtheofficeofthe

GeneralSecretaryTreasurerduring2009-2019didhoweversignasdualsignatoriesofthe

IWF’sSwissaccount,ostensiblysigningbankpaymentauthorisationswithoutcompletely

knowingorunderstandingtherealpurposebehindthem.TheMIITacceptsthattherewere

33

certainly proper reasons for the bank payments, for example to cover the expenses of

runningthefederationandcostsassociatedwithantidopingefforts.However,neitherofthe

former or current General Secretary Treasurers had any insight or knowledge of what

occurredfollowingreceiptofthewiresthattheysignedfor.Thus,thebankingaffairsofthe

IWF were effectively in the exclusive control of the Dr. Aján. There was no one in the

organisationotherthanDr.Ajánwhoreviewedthebankingrecordsandhadabsolutecontrol

overthebankaccountsandrecords.Thisformofautonomousfinancialcontrolexertedby

himfurtherstrengthenedhispowers.

iii.ExclusiveFinancialControl

Dr.Aján’sinfluencelikewiseextendedtohisstewardshipoftheIWF’sfinancialresources.

Givenhissole-signatorystatusoftheIWF’soperatingaccountattheOTPBank,hewas,with

veryrareexception,theonlypersonwhomadecashdepositsorwithdrawalstoandfrom

that account.Healsokept secret theexistenceof certainbankaccounts and theiruseor

purpose.Toillustrate,duringtheMIIT’sinterviewsoftheIWFSecretariat,theEB,andthe

IWF’sfinancialadvisorandauditors,noneoftheseindividualswereawareofanyfurther

IWFbankaccountsotherthaninitiallytheUBSandsubsequentlyUBPBanksinSwitzerland,

andtheoperatingaccountattheOTPBankinHungary.EventheIWF’sdedicatedpart-time

bookkeeperwhenaskedabouttheIWFaccountsatMKB,forwhateverreason,wasunwilling

todiscuss theMKBaccountswith theMIIT.Thepart-timebookkeeperadmitted that the

official IWF financial records kept by her did not include the financial transactions that

occurredwithintheMKBaccounts.

34

InadditiontotheMKBaccounts,theinvestigationalsouncoveredasecondUSDollaraccount

attheOTPBank,namedVilagKupa.8ThisaccountwasalsonotdisclosedtotheMIIT.Several

requests weremade of the IWF to provide the bank statements for this account, which

remainoutstanding.

Theannualreportingoffinancesisthusseverelyincompleteandfactuallymisrepresented.

Thebookkeeper’srecordsformthebasisoftheinternalfinancialstatementpreparedbythe

financialadvisor,andthoserecordsdonot includeanytransactionsfromeithertheVilag

KupaorMKBaccounts.Theseflawedfinancialstatementsaresubsequentlyreviewedbythe

externalauditorsandformthebasisoftheirannualopinionontheIWFfinancialaccounting,

complyingwithSwiss law.Therefore, theEB, the IWF’sGeneral SecretaryTreasurer, the

externalfinancialadvisor,anditsexternalauditorswereunawareofthebankingactivities

andtransactionsoccurringineithertheIWFaccountsatMKB;ortheIWFVilagKupaaccount

atOTP(seeChapter3forthediscussionontheIWF’sfinances).

8There also exists a Vilag Kupa Euro account.

35

iv.EBApprovalWithoutQuestions

Dr.AjánalsousedhisadministrativeorganisationalpowerstoexerthiscontrolovertheIWF.

He took the opportunity to appoint people to roles in the organisation as a method of

administrative oversight and organisational control. For example, nowhere in the

ConstitutionisthereapositionofDirectorGeneral.ThePresidentcreatedthepostin2014.

HehadtheEBvotetoestablishthepositionandnamedhisson-in-law,Mr.Adamfi,asthe

firstDirectorGeneral.Similarly,PatrickSchamaschwasappointedin2013astheChairof

theAnti-DopingCommission.ThePresidentwasverywellacquaintedwithDr.Schamasch

throughtheirrespectiverolesintheIOC.However,nomatterhowtrustedeachofthesetwo

menmayhavebeenintheirroles,theirdutiesandresponsibilitiesweredeliberatelysiloed,

inhibiting their ability to have a comprehensive oversight of the IWF. Indeed, the same

managementstylewasexertedovertheappointmentstotheSecretariat.Theconsequence

wasthatonlyDr.Ajánhadafulloverviewoftheoperationsoftheorganisation.

v.Cashforvotes:RiggingElectoralCongresses

Dr.Ajánisfrequentlydescribedasacleverpersonandaseasonedpoliticaloperative.Hewas

asuccessfulcandidateforIWFPresidencyeveryfouryearssince2000.Hissuccessfultenure

howeverhasnotbeen theresultofa fairordemocraticprocess.Tohaveandmaintaina

strongpowerbaseandcontroloftheadministrativehierarchy,Dr.Ajánhadtoensurehis

own re-election to the office of President, together with the election of his favoured

candidatestotheseniorpositionsofinfluencewithintheIWF.Hisre-electionwasassured

throughhissupporterscausingthemanipulationoftheresultsintheElectoralCongresses.

36

Theelection results for theofficeofPresidentand including thepositionsof theGeneral

SecretaryTreasurer,1stVicePresidentandfiveVicePresidentswerepredeterminedbefore

any ballotwas ever completed. Dr. Aján bent the voting rules in the IWF’s Constitution,

permitting bribery, exchanged favours, and lavished his supporters with material

experiencestoensurehisPresidency(seeChapter4forafulldescriptionofthistopic).What

followsisasummaryoverviewofthiselectioncontrolmechanismofDr.Ajándesignedto

ensuremaximumadministrativeandorganisationalcontrols.

Theeventthatsetthewheelsinmotionforthesuccessfulre-electionasthePresidentwas

theAnnualCongress,held inadvanceof theElectoralCongress.Dr.AjánusedtheAnnual

Congress to build his allegiances by accepting latemembershippayments in cash or not

demanding thesame, in contraventionof the IWFConstitution.9In some instances, those

whoorganisedtheElectoralCongresswouldbeassuredofreceivinganEBposition.TheMIIT

has uncovered this pattern took that place in at least the two most recent Electoral

Congresses,inMoscow2013andBangkok2017.10

vi.ThePresidentiallyAnointedExecutiveBoard

Dr.AjánstrategicallyandpersonallyselectedtheseniormemberstotheEBwhohelpedhim

maintain his power. Without enquiry, the EB approved his management decisions and

9See IWF Article 2. Only Full Members who have paid their membership fees in advance of the March 31st of an election year may vote. The annual Congresses occurred in all three, 2009, 2013 and 2017 electoral congresses following March 31. 10 Though Dr. Aján ran for president unopposed in 2009, there is evidence that Aján bought votes during the 2009 Electoral Congress in Madrid for the election of his favoured candidates to the Executive Board.

37

providedlittleresistancetohiscontrolovertheEBandtheorganisation.Theseindividuals

weretypically“corruptpersonsorstatusseekers”whowerehappytoprovidehimaquid

proquoorwerecompletelyunawareofwhatthePresidentwastryingtoaccomplish.11See

Chapter 4 for a detailed description howDr. Aján ensured that his preferred candidates

wouldreceivethevotesnecessarytobevotedintotheEB.

IfanyofhischosenEBmembersstartedtodriftoutofline,hewouldwarnthemwiththreats.

Inonehistoricalinstance,hestatedtoaconfidentialwitnessthathecouldturntheirathletes’

samples“dirty,”andinanotherinstancehedeclaredtoNicuVlad,PresidentoftheRomanian

WeightliftingFederation“donotforgot,nexttimewemustdecidethecountriesinsidethe

Olympicgamesoroutside,wewilldecidewhowillbeinTokyoandwhowillnot;”aveiled

threat that the Romanian Federation may not make it to the Olympics. These warning

messagesaimedatEBmemberswerecontrolmechanismstoensureacompliantEB(seethe

Chapter5onDoping).

11 The President of a Member Federation described how Dr Aján had a former General Secretary of the federation voted in as one of the Vice Presidents of the IWF. He took advantage of his lack of understanding of the English language by this individual and knowledge of the inner working of the IWF. As a consequence, on individual on several occasions voted as Dr Aján had instructed and, unknowingly, against the interests of his federation.

38

vii.TheIWF’sSecretariat

ThePresidenthasabsoluteconstitutionalauthoritytostafftheofficesoftheSecretariatas

heseesfittofulfillthedutiesoftheIWF.Since1982,whenDr.Ajánmovedtheofficefrom

AustriatoBudapestwhileactingasGeneralSecretary,hestaffedtheBudapestofficeofthe

SecretariatexclusivelywithHungariannationals.Dr.Ajánhadcompletecontrolandpower

overeveryonewhoworkedintheofficesoftheIWFinBudapest,andtheydidhisbidding.

Since2014,duringtheday-todayoperations,theSecretariatansweredtoMr.Adamfiwho

wasbroughtonbyDr.AjántorunthesportastheDirectorGeneral.Heisatypicalsports

bureaucratrunningtheday-to-dayoperationsoftheIWFwhichincludethecoordinationof

thedifferentdepartments,executingtheEBdecisions,managingthedailyoperationofthe

Federation, and liaisingwith the IOC’s organising committees, technical committees, and

sportcommission.PriortohisroleasDirectorGeneral,hewasthecompetitionandtechnical

director of the IWF. The Anointed EB allowed the appointment despite the position not

existingintheConstitutionandtheobviousissuesofnepotism.

AsDirectorGeneral, the Secretariat reporteddirectly toMr.Adamfi, causing theGeneral

Secretary Treasurer to have a diminished position of authority and control over the

Secretariat. Interviews with various members of the EB and Secretariat reveal that Mr.

Adamfiistheeffectiveday-to-day‘activepresident’.

SecondtoMr.AdamfiwasAnikoNemeth-Mora,theDirectorofInternationalRelations.She

wasDr.Aján’s firsthire andhas remained loyal tohimever since.Other than theduties

39

associatedwithhertitle,sheexecutesthedecisionsofthePresident,andfunctionsasthe

equivalentofcorporatesecretaryoftheorganisation.SheispresentatallEBmeetings,which

arerecordedandtransformedbyherintowrittenminutes.12

viii.CashfromDopingFines

In 2005, the IWF adopted new rules in its Anti-Doping Program that imposed fines on

Member Federations for multiple positive doping results in an effort to provide a

disincentivetopotentialdopers.From2005until therulechangein2017, fineswerethe

primarymethodofsanctioningaMemberFederationfordoping,andthePresidentcollected

largesumsofcashfromthesefines.After2017,MemberFederationsessentiallylosttheir

ability to “buy” theirwayoutof a sanctionandnowhad to serveamandatoryperiodof

suspension in addition to payment of a fine. Fines however could be negotiated, and

sanctions could be suspended or delayed for favoured countries (see the discussion on

dopingfinesinChapter5).

2.4InfiltrationoftheAnti-DopingControlProgram

ThePresidentappointedtheIWF’sfirstinternalLegalCounselin2005.Thispersonalsoheld

thepositionofAnti-DopingCoordinator.Inthatcapacity,shewouldassisttheAnti-Doping

Commission with the performance of the IWF’s Anti-Doping Program. This included

12Witnesses have described how minutes of meetings have been altered after the fact to suit Dr. Aján’s position, making it appear that the EB had in fact agreed to whatever he was proposing, when in fact the original minutes show no acceptance by the EB.

40

developing the Test Distribution Plan (“TDP”), the International Registered Testing Pool

(“IRTP”), the results-management of Anti-Doping Rule Violation (“ADRV”) cases and

functioningasfirstinstanceadjudicator.

InthetimeperiodinvestigatedbytheMIIT,Dr.Ajánhadopenaccesstowhatissupposedto

beaconfidentialAnti-DopingProgram.AsmorefullydetailedinChapter5,duringthe1980s

and90seachindividualinternationalsportfederation(“IF”)recognisedbytheIOCmanaged

theirownantidopingprogramwiththeirownrespectiverules.Thaterawastheincubator

thatenabledDr.AjántobringtheIWFAnti-DopingProgramwithininhissphereofinfluence

asapartofhisoverallcontroloftheorganisationalstructure.

WiththeintroductionoftheWADACode,theworld’sfirstharmonisedcodeonthecontrol

ofPerformanceEnhancingDrugs(“PEDs”),theeraofdopingcontrolsbeingadministeredby

individualsportfederationsended.TheWADACodecameintofulleffectattheoutsetofthe

2004 Olympic Games in Athens. A different era of doping control emerged with a new

independentinternationalinstitutiontochampionthecauseofcleansportworldwide.

LikeallIFs,theantidopingcontrolproceduresoftheIWFchangedtoaccommodate:(i)the

harmonisedworld-widecodewithitslistofPEDs;(ii)theharmonisedworldwidesanctions

forviolationofthecode;and(iii)thestructuretosupportthecodethroughWADAaccredited

laboratories.AstheinstitutionofWADAevolved,itrequiredtheIWFtochangeitsmethods

of antidoping.The strengtheningofWADA triggeredDr.Aján’s lesser involvement in the

microadministrationoftheIWF’sAnti-DopingProgramandresultedinamoremacrolevel

41

of infiltration.Whilehehad toacceptcertainexternaloversight,hemaintainedaccess to

IWF’sconfidentialantidopingdepartment.

As WADA developed as an international regulatory body, a new set of evolving

manipulationshadtoputinplacetosupportthepowerandcontrolofDr.Aján.Toachieve

this end the President would manipulate Member Federations through fear, bluffs and

bravado.WhileDr.Aján’sreachoverantidopinghadconsiderablydiminishedwiththeonset

oftheWADACode,thelegendofhiscontrolandmanipulationskepthisMemberFederations

infear.Dr.Ajánwouldoftenstoketheembersofhisownlegend,forexample,bysayinghe

couldturndirtysamplescleanandcleansamplesdirty,toensurehisMemberFederations

stayedloyalandinline.

2.5Conclusion

The extent to which the President used and abused his powers granted to his office or

securedbyhimisthesubjectofthefollowingChapters.

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43

Chapter3:TheHijackingofFinancialControl

3.1Introduction

TheMcLarenIndependentInvestigativeTeam(“MIIT”)hasreviewedthefinancialrecords

providedbytheIWForotherwiseobtainedbytheMIIT.Basedontheinformationavailable

atthistime,weconcludethat$10.4millionUSDappearstobeunaccountedforfromtheIWF

accounts.

3.2BackgroundandConstitutionalFinancialFramework

The IWF’s Constitution provides the framework for themanagement of the Federation’s

finances. At its core, it dictates that the goal of all financial operations must be for the

ultimatebenefitofthesportofweightliftingandtheIWF’sMemberFederations.Itimposes

theguidingprinciplesofaccuracy,transparency,andaccountabilityonallofficers,officials

orotherpartiesinvolvedinthefinancialmanagementandoperationsoftheIWF.13

Significant changes occurred to the IWF’s constitutional financial framework in 2009.

HistoricallyandundertheConstitutioncurrentlyinplace,theveryapexoffinancialcontrol

andmonitoringissupposedtobetheExecutiveBoard(“EB”).Itholdstheabsoluteauthority

todecideonallmattersconcerningthesportofweightlifting,includingfinancialmatters.14

The EB is required by the Constitution to approve the Budget15 , monitor the financial

13 By-Law to 11 (1.1). 14 By-Law to 4.2 (1). 15 By-Law to 11 (2.2).

44

operationsoftheIWF,considertheFinancialReports,andparticipateindecisionsinvolving

economicdeliberations;aswellasadvisethePresidentonfinancialissues.16

UndertheConstitutionthatexistedin2009andearlier,thePresidenthadsoleresponsibility

tomanage,supervise,anddecideonthefinancialandbusinessactivitiesoftheIWF.That

versionoftheConstitutionalsoprovidedforanInternalAuditorsCommittee(“IAC”)whose

three elected members required “relevant experience in bookkeeping, finance or

economics”. The IACwas responsible for performing an audit on the IWF accounts and

presentingayearlyreporttotheEBandCongress.17Noticeablyabsentfromthoseearlier

auditreportsandauditedfinancialstatementspre-2009wereanydegreeofprofessionalism

ortransparency.Accordingtoaconfidentialwitness,theyearly“audit”consistedoftheIAC

goingtoBudapest,collecting100dollarsorabottleofwhiskeyandDr.Ajánwouldsay“Here

youare,herearethebooks.Signthemandwegotodinner."

In2009,awatershedincidenttriggeredaconstitutionaloverhaulofthefinancialframework.

TheCongresselectedthreefinanciallycompetentmemberstotheIAC,whowereinterested

inconductingaproperaudit.ThisnewIACdidnotperformthetraditionallylaxauditprocess

with Dr. Aján. Instead, they requested documents, supplementary information and even

invitedaprofessionalaccountanttoassistthemincompletingtheaudit.Alloftheserequests

wereeitherdeniedorseverelyhamperedbyDr.Aján.Theireventualauditreportalleged

16 In accordance with Article 11 and By-Law to 4.2 (9). 17 IWF 2009 Constitution, Article 8.5.

45

thattherewerepooraccountingpractices,undisclosedbankaccountsandthattheIWFwas

missingmillionsofdollars.

Theuproarcausedbytheserevelationsbroughtaboutapparentconstitutionalreform.Dr.

AjánmovedtodissolvetheIACandinstallanexternalprofessionalauditorandafinancial

advisor. Constitutional reform provided for the EB to have oversight of all audits of the

Federation’s financial operations. 18 The difficulty was that despite the changes to the

ConstitutionandBy-Laws,Dr.Ajáncontinuedonashehadinthepast.HedidabolishtheIAC.

TheexternalprofessionalauditorandfinancialadvisorwerepersonsselectedbyDr.Aján,

whohaddemandedandreceivedthetacitapprovaloftheEBfortheirappointment.

AsthesechangeswerebeingintroducedbyDr.Aján,thenewlyelectedGeneralSecretary

Treasurer,WenguangMa,submittedtotheEBthatthe“EBpowerandfinancialmanagement

is under one person’s power, while this should be separated.” As a consequence, the

Constitution and By-Laws do not distinguish or delineate the financial responsibility

betweenthePresidentandtheGeneralSecretaryTreasurer.Assuch,theyarebothrequired

tomanageandsupervisethefinancialandbusinessactivitiesoftheIWFanddecideonits

financialmatters.19

Finally,theSecretariatisresponsibleforadministeringthefinancialactivitiesandkeeping

theaccountsoftheIWF,underandwiththesupervisionofthePresident.20Thismeansthat

18 By- Law to 11 (6.1). 19 By- Law to 11(2.3 b,d). 20 By- Law to 7 (11).

46

the IWFPresidenthas the sole authority to instruct thebookkeeper as amemberof the

Secretariat.However,therealityisthattheGeneralSecretaryTreasurerisexcludedfroma

constitutionalsupervisoryroleovertheSecretariat’sadministrationoffinancialactivities.

3.3IllusoryReform

ThereformsthattookplaceonlychangedthepaperworkoftheConstitution,whileinreality

thestatusquoremainedunchanged.AbsolutecontroloftheIWF’sfinancesremainedinthe

irongripofDr.Aján.Hecontinuedtocreateandcontrolanorchestratedfinancialreality.Not

a single individual involved in the financial administration of the organisation, from the

internalbookkeeper,theexternalauditor,thefinancialadvisor,andeventheEB,hadany

realorfactuallycompleteunderstandingoftheIWF’sfinances.Atbest,theEBonlyreceived

information in the form of progress reports or skeletal financial summaries. Dr. Aján

achievedthiscontrolandblockedtheEBthroughaseriesofmechanismsincluding,butnot

limitedto:

(i) exclusivecontroloverbankcashdeposits,withdrawalsandtransfersoffunds,

(ii) singularknowledgeofallbankaccountsoperatinginthenameoftheIWF,

(iii) dismissingchallengesforgreaterexaminationoffinancialactivities,byrelyingon

thefactthatitwasnowoverseenbyexternalauditorsKPMGandfinancialadvisor,

AlainSiegrist,andwithholdingpapers,filibusteringandrefusingtoengageindebate

onthesubject

(iv) directingandinstructingthebookkeeper’sentriesintotheIWF’sbooksandrecords,

and

47

(v) theexclusiveauthorityoverthecollectionofdifferentcashpayments,includingthe

selectivereceiptinganddocumentationofthesame.

Allof thesemanipulationsallowedDr.Aján tousurp the financialcontrol that,under the

Constitution,rightlybelongedtotheEB.Itiswhatultimatelyallowedfor$10.4millionUSD

inthepastdecadetobeunaccountedfor.

3.4BankAccountsandMoneyFlow

TheIWFgeneratesthemajorityofitsrevenuesfromitsshareoftheInternationalOlympic

Committee’s(“IOC”)distributionofbroadcastandmarketingrights.Theothermajorsources

of incomearefromsponsorshipandmarketingarrangements,dopingfinesleviedagainst

MemberFederationswhohavecontravenedthe IWF’sAnti-DopingProgram,competition

revenues,andtoalesserextentmembershipfees,accreditationfeesandmerchandisesales.

TherevenuesflowintotheIWFbankaccountsinoneoftwoways:eitherviawiretransfers

orcash.

Attheoutsetoftheinvestigation,theMIITrequestedthattheIWFSecretariatprovideafull

setofbankaccountstatementsfromalloftheIWF’sfinancialinstitutionsduringthe2009-

2019period.TheMIITwasinformedandassuredbybothseniorIWFpersonnelandDr.Aján

thathistorically,theIWFonlyhadinvestmentaccountsattheSwissbanksUniondeBanques

Suisses(UBS)andUnionBancairePrivée(UBP),andoperatingaccountsattheOTPBankin

Hungary. Based upon the subsequent financial investigation conducted by theMIIT, this

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representationof theentiretyof the IWFaccounts turnedout tobeblatantlyandwholly

untrue.

ConsiderabletimeandeffortweretakentoobtaintheUBS,UBPandOTPbankstatements,

causingdelaystotheMIIT’sinvestigation.TheSecretariatattemptedtocomplyinatimely

fashion,howevertheinitialstatementsthatweresenttotheMIITwereseriouslyincomplete.

This made it nearly impossible to conduct the forensic tracing techniques necessary to

determinetheflowoffundsinandoutoftheaccounts.Asthestatementstrickledin,theMIIT

wasabletoperforman initialanalysis thatrevealedtheexistenceofadditionalbankand

credit card accounts that were never disclosed to investigators by anyone at the IWF.

Withoutthemissingfinancialrecords,theform,sourceanddispositionofthesefundscould

notbeproperlyandcompletelyidentified.

The diagram below demonstrates the flow of funds around IWF and cash holdings. The

paragraphsthereafterdescribehowtheflowworked.

49

-MIITMoneyFlowChart

.i.TheLegacyofFlawedAccounting-MissingCashPre-2009

Thecatalystforthefinancialconstitutionalreformthattookplacebetween2009–2011was

thewidelyreportedcomplaintbyDr.AntonioUrso,PresidentoftheEuropeanContinental

Federation,toboththeIWFandIOCthatmanymillionsweremissingfromtheIWF’sSwiss

accounts.TheIAC,ofwhichDr.Ursowasamember,inthecourseoftheirauditconducteda

reviewoftheavailablebalancesheetsandtherevenuespaidintotheSwissbankaccounts

and had determined that funds were missing from these accounts. The IOC Ethics

Commission refused to take on thematter stating that itwas an issue for the individual

federation.21

AlthoughthisperiodwasnottheMIIT’spriorityfocus,anoverviewfortheperiodfrom1992

– 2009 was undertaken to develop a baseline understanding of the universe of funds

availableatthestartof2009.TheIOCindependentlyconfirmedtotheMIITthatoverthe

periodfrom1992–2008theywiretransferredatotalof$23,255,471USDintotheIWF’s

Swissaccount22andsomesmalleramountsintotheHungarianOTPoperatingaccount.Some

smallerIOChonorariumpaymentstoDr.AjánwereadditionallypaidtotheMKBaccount.

21 CAS 2011/A/2474 Urso and Casadei v IOC. The matter was taken to the CAS, and it determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter. 22The investment bankers for the IWF were originally the UBS of Zurich. The UBP Swiss account also existed prior to 2009. In 2016, UBS closed the IWF’s accounts, and all balances on investments were transferred to UBP.

50

TheIOCpaymentswerenotfullydeclaredinthebalancesheetsprovidedtotheEBatthat

time.Moreover,thereviewofEBmeetingminutesconfirmedthattheEBhadbeenawareof

the Swiss account at least since 2005 where they were discussed by Dr. Aján at an EB

meeting.NodeclarationwasmadebyhimoftheMKBaccount,operatingsinceatleast2007

andpossiblyasearlyas2000,accordingtoDr.Aján.

Separately,theIWFprovidedtheMIITwithanexpendituresheetfortheperiodof1992–

2009. These amountswere reconciledwith the balance sheets for each respective year.

TheseexpenditureamountsroughlybalancedwiththemoneywiretransferredbytheIOC.

Subsequent to the appointments of the external auditor and financial advisor, after the

ruckusof2009,theEBwasprovidedwithmoredetailedyearlyfinancialinformation.Those

recordsappearedtoshowthatthetotalinvestmentsintheSwissaccountwereconsiderably

less than the funds received from the IOC. However, the records also proved to be

incomplete, as they did not include, for whatever reason, the IOC payment for 2008.

Accounting for the error, it appears that the Swiss account reflected the correct

corresponding amounts that were wire transferred by the IOC. Therefore, Dr. Urso’s

complainttotheIOCwasfoundedonanincorrectfinancialpremise.

While the premise of the IAC’s allegations, that funds had disappeared from the Swiss

accountisincorrect,theMIIThasdeterminedthattheirsuspicionsofunaccountedformoney

islikelycorrect,butnotforthereasonstheystated.OtherthantheinitialreviewoftheIOC’s

transfersintotheIWF’sSwissaccount,theMIITdidnotconductanyanalysisonmovement

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offundspriorto2009.However,theMIIT’sanalysisdemonstratesthattherealflightoffunds

occursnotoutoftheSwissaccount,butinstead,afterthemoneyistransferredtotheIWF

accountsinHungary.

TheSwissaccountsonwhichDr.UrsoandtheIACplacedsomuchemphasismayhavebeen

a‘red-herring’.ThesefundsaresubsequentlyallowedtocascadedownintotheHungarian

OTPaccountandappeartobeforlegitimatepurposes,whiletherealproblemexistswithin

theHungarianOTPandMKBaccounts.Todetermineifasimilarprocesswasinplaceprior

to2009,afurtherinvestigationofthesepointswithaccesstobankstatementsisrequired.

TheMIITwasnevergiventheserecords.

52

ii.TheSwissAccounts

Historically,theIWFhasheldaccountsatUBSinZurich,Switzerland(closedin2016),and

at UBP in Geneva, Switzerland. These Swiss accounts were funded solely by the IOC’s

distributionofbroadcastingandmarketing rights, andwhereapplicable,positive income

attributable to investment profits. The account also functions as a repository of the

significantandvariedinvestmentsoftheIWF.

Even thoughnosignaturecardswereprovided,witnesseshaveconfirmed that theSwiss

accountsrequiredualsignatoriesofthePresidentandtheGeneralSecretaryTreasurer.The

General Secretary Treasurer’s sole involvement into oversight and administration of the

IWF’s financeswas,upon the requestofDr.Aján, to signwire transfersauthorising fund

movementfromtheSwissaccounttotheIWF’soperatingOTPaccount.Thesignaturewas

madewithoutknowledgeorunderstandingofthereasonorpurposebehindthetransfers.

TheMIITappliedforensictracingtechniquesontheaccountsthatweremadeavailable.Wire

paymentsweretracedfromtheIOCtotheIWF’sSwissbankaccounts,andsubsequentwire

transferstherefromtotheIWF’soperatingOTPaccountinHungary.Onthelimitedmaterial

examinedpertainingtotheSwissaccountsoftheIWF,theMIITcouldnotfindanyirregular

wiretransfers,missing,orunallocatedfundsfromtheperiodbetween2009-2020.

iii.TheFlowofFundstotheknownHungarianAccounts

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TheIWFholdstheiroperatingaccountatOTPBankinBudapestwhereithasUSDollar(USD),

HungarianForint(HUF),andvariousotherforeigncurrencyaccounts.Theonlypersonthat

hadanysignatoryrightsoroversightoftheHungarianOTPaccountwasDr.Aján.

Duringthe2009to2019period,Dr.Ajánpersonallywithdrewapproximately$12.5million

USDincashfromtheOTPoperatingaccountwithoutanycorrespondingexplanationforthe

withdrawalsintheinternalbookkeepingrecords.23Itisacceptedthatsomeofthismoney

wasusedforlegitimatepurposesincludingcostsrelatingtotherunningoftheorganisation

andcompetitions.However,thisamountofcashextendswellbeyondthenecessityofsmall

amountsofinsignificantexpenses.

iv.HiddenHungarianAccounts(VilagKupaandMKB)

Aspreviouslystated,theMIITrequestedcopiesofbankstatementsofallIWFaccounts,and

atfirstitwasbelievedtheyhadbeenproducedintheirentirety.However,duringfinancial

analysisoftheOTPBankrecords,theMIITsoondiscoveredthattheIWFhadatleasttwo

additionalaccountsatOTPBankunderthenameofIWFVilagKupa,andnumerousaccounts

atanotherHungarianfinancialinstitutioncalledMKB.Duringthecourseofinterviewsofthe

SecretariatandtheinitialinterviewDr.Aján,noneofthesenewlydiscoveredaccountswere

disclosed.

23Of this amount approximately $1.8 million USD consisted of entries that were identified as presidential honorarium payments that Dr. Aján withdrew in cash.

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NumerousrequestsweremadeoftheIWFoverthecourseoftheinvestigationbytheMIIT

and the Acting President to provide all of the IWF’s bank statements. Only certain

transactionsrelatedtothehiddenaccountswereidentifiedinthestatementsmadeavailable,

thus theseaccountsand theircontentsandpurposeremainedhidden from investigators.

Eventually,whentheMIITspecificallyaskedforthesecretMKBaccountstatements, they

werefinallyproduced, lessthanamonthbeforetheissuingofthisReport.TheOTPVilag

Kupaaccountstatementshaveneverbeenproduced.

TheMIITfinallyreceivedtheMKBmonthlystatementsfortheperiodof2010throughearly

2020 in the finalmonthof its investigation.Thesestatementsshowthat theaccountwas

fundedwithapproximately$4.7millionUSDincashdepositsinvarioustypesofcurrencies

(USD,Euro,GBP,andHUF,convertedonaperdayhistoricbasis)andapproximately$8.5

millionUSDinelectronicwiretransfers.Thevastmajorityofthewiretransfersoriginated

fromtheIWF’sOTPVilagKupaUSDaccount.

AfterinitiallydenyingtheexistenceofanyotherIWFaccounts,besidestheoperatingOTP

accountsandtheSwissaccounts,inafollowupinterviewwiththeMIIT,Dr.Ajánadmitted

totheexistenceoftheMKBaccounts.Itssolepurpose,hepresented,wastofacilitateamore

favorableforeigncurrencyexchangerateforUSdollars.TherecordsdemonstratethatDr.

AjánwouldtransferUSdollarfundsfromtheOTPoperatingaccountorfromtheundisclosed

OTPVilagKupaaccount,andmadecashdepositstoundisclosedMKBaccount(s).TheMKB

wouldthenconvertthetransferredfundsintoHungarianForint.Thenonlyaportionofthose

convertedHUFfundswouldbewiredbacktotheIWF’sOTPHUFoperatingaccount.Once

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theMKBHUFwireswereintheOTPHUFoperatingaccount,thefundswereusedtopaythe

localoperatingexpensesoftheIWF.

Dr.Aján’scurrencyexchangerateexplanationissupportable,buttherecordsprovethere

wasmoregoingon.Excludedfromthatexplanationwastheotherpurposeoftheoff-record

MKBaccounts,fromwhichDr.Ajánwouldmakeregularandrecurringcashwithdrawalsof

theconvertedHUFfundsthatremainedintheaccountsatMKB.During2010-2020,Dr.Aján

personally withdrew cash in local currency a total of 2,079,500,000 HUF (equivalent to

approximately$8.3millionUSD).TheundisclosedMKBaccountsandconstantwithdrawal

ofcashfromthem,furtherhighlightsthesignificantflawsinfinancialreporting,disclosure,

andtransparencyoftheIWFasawhole.

TheIWFbookkeeperadmittedtonothavingaccesstoanyrecordsof thesetransfersand

withdrawals, nor was she provided any information by Dr. Aján regarding the same.

Therefore,anyfinancialtransactionsthatwereconductedwithintheMKBorOTPVilagKupa

accountsareneitherenteredontotheIWFaccountingrecords,norsubsequentlyincluded

intheIWF’sannualfinancialstatements.ThemovementoffundsiswhyneitherKPMGnor

AlainSiegristwouldhavebeeninformedoftheexistenceorpurposeoftheMKBandVilag

Kupaaccounts.

3.5TyrannyofCash

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Theuseofcashinanyorganisationisproblematic.Dependingonwhatisdonewithcashit

isdifficult,ifsometimesimpossible,totrace.OtherthanDr.Aján,nooversightexistedover

theuseofcashwithintheIWF,whichcausedincompleterecordsbeingmaintainedbythe

IWFbookkeeper.The IWF’scashmanagementandstandardofaccounting issurprisingly

amateurforasportsfederation.Itisabysmalatbest.

TheIWFhasseveralcashrevenuestreams.Theyaregeneratedfromdopingfines,paidfor

byMemberFederationswhohavecontravenedantidopingregulationsandsubjecttoeither

oneorbothofathleteorcountryfines.TheIWFalsocollectsaccreditationandlicensefees

fromNationalandContinentalFederationswhoorganiseandplancompetitions.Thesefees

aregenerallycollected incash.Fromtimetotime,revenues fromsponsorshipdealswith

sportequipmentmanufacturers,oilcompaniesandfoodsupplementmanufacturersarealso

collected in cash. The audit trail for all these cash transactions is a receipt, which the

Presidentwhimsicallyissuesfromabookwithtriplicatecarboncopies.

Largeamountsof thesecashrevenueshavebeencollectedbyDr.Ajánwhile fulfillinghis

Presidentialdutiesatinternationalcompetitions.Thereisnowaytodeterminewhetherthe

receiptsheissuedareforthecorrectamountofcashorifareceiptwasissuedatall.

Ananalysisofavailablecashreceiptsthatwereissuedconcludesthatduringtheperiodfrom

2009-2019,approximately$6millionUSDwascollectedincashbyDr.Aján.Inadditionto

the amount of collected cash already stated, unknown amounts of cash may have been

57

collectedbyhimorhispersonnelwithnoapplicablerecordofareceiptbeingissued.24This

istheinherentriskofcashbasedtransactions.

ThereisnowayofactuallyknowingexactlyhowmuchcashwascollectedbyDr.Ajánduring

thisperiod.Itisunknownwhetherheissuedanyreceiptatall,recordedthecorrectamount

received,orreceiptedallcashtransactions.Thenthereistheproblemasthesolereporterof

informationtothepart-timebookkeeperLiviaBudavari,whetherheinformedhertomake

abookingkeepingentry in theofficial accounting ledger.The issuingof receiptsand the

collection of cash was entirely dependent upon the accuracy and honesty of Dr. Aján.

WitnessestothisenquiryindicatedthatDr.Ajánwasincompletecontrolofcashandwould

supplysomereceiptsandnotalltothebookkeeperforentryintotheIWFaccounts.

3.5.1President’sUseofCash

i.Collectionofcash:Todepositornottodeposit

Dr.Ajánissuedatleast574cashreceiptsbetween2009-2019.Thetotalofthesereceiptsis

approximately$6millionUSD.ThereceiptbooksarenumberedconsecutivelyandtheMIIT’s

analysisshowsthattherearepotentially133receiptsmissingfrombooks,generallyheld

solelybyDr.Aján.Thehardcopyreceiptbooksfortheentireperiodfrom2009-2018have

beendestroyedbytheIWF.TheactionsofDr.AjánisanoffenceundertheIWF’sCodeof

ConductBy-Law,2.2.2(e).

24 Atilla Adamfi advised that on occasion he had collected $ 13,000 USD. On his return from abroad he turned over the cash to the President. No receipt was given to him for the money.

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All declared receiptswere tracked to the IWF ledgers and a confirmed entrywasmade.

However, from2013onwards,noneof thedeclared receipted fundsweredeposited into

IWF’sdeclaredOTPoperatingaccount.Theonlypersonknowledgeableofwherethemoney

wentisDr.Aján.

Severalcashanalyseswereconductedtodeterminethe frequencyofwhichthereceipted

cashwasdeposited,includingdopingfines,travelexpenses,andattemptsofreconcilingthe

accountingledgeragainsttheactualbankdeposits.Theseanalysesrevealthattherewere

severedeficienciesinthemanagementanddepositofcash.

ii.CountryFines

TheMIITconductedanin-depthanalysisoftheMemberFederationswhopaidtheirdoping

finesincash.ThepurposeofwhichwastoreconciletheamountstheMemberFederations

apparentlypaidwiththereceiptstheywereissuesbyDr.Aján.Severalrequestsweremade

of 20 Member Federations who had paid their fines in cash. Out of these requests, the

ArmenianWeightliftingFederationrespondedthat theyhaddestroyedthoserecords, the

Turkish Federation provided uninformative information, the Iraqi Federation provided

limitedinformationandtheRussianFederationprovidedinformationwhereaccessible.16

otherMemberFederationsdidnotrespondatall.Theattempttoreconcilethecashdeposits

withtheoriginalreceiptscouldthereforenotbeconducted.Thus,manyMemberFederations

areindirectviolationof2.2.2and2.2.3ofthetermsofreferenceintheirfailuretocooperate.

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TheRomanianWeightliftingFederationwastheonlyMemberFederationthatprovidedthe

MIITitsoriginalreceiptsforcashpaymentstoDr.Aján.Theexaminationoftheirreceipts

revealed unexplained anomalies. The total receipted amount of three cash payments

providedbytheRomanianWeightliftingFederationequaled$100,000USD.However, the

correspondingreceiptsprovidedbytheIWFhadcompletelydifferentamountsthanthoseof

thereceiptsprovidedtoMIITbytheRomanianMemberFederation.Thedestructionofthe

receiptbooksprecludestheMIITfromreconcilingthediscrepancies.

TheanomaliescontinuedintheanalysisoftheRussianWeightliftingFederation’s(“RWF”)

dopingfines.Inthisinstance,itisacasewherenoreceipthasbeenissuedandnorecordcan

befoundofthetransactionintheIWF’sledgers.TheMIITrequestedthattheRWFexamine

howmuchitpaidindopingfines.Itprovidedexcerptsfromitsaccountsthatshoweditpaid

theIWF$120,000USDincashovertheperiodexamined.Notraceofthesefundscanbefound

in thereceiptsor ledgersof the IWF.MaximAgapitov, thecurrentPresidentof theRWF,

describedtotheMIITthatononeoccasiontheRWF’sformerPresidentSyrtsov,travelledto

Budapestwith$50,000USDtopayadopingfine.ThisamountwaspaiddirectlytoDr.Aján.

TheMIIThasnotbeenabletolocateareceiptforthesefundsandnoentrycorrespondingto

thispaymentwasmadeintheIWF’saccountingledger.Effectively,thereisnoproofofthe

paymentwithintherecordsoftheIWF.

TheAlbanianWeightliftingFederation’sdoping finepaymentprovidesanexampleofDr.

Aján’sinsistenceontheuseofcashtopaydopingfines.Aconfidentialwitnessdescribedan

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incident during the Rio Games where he was approached by Stavri Bello, the Albanian

NationalOlympicCommittee’sSecretaryGeneral.Mr.Belloproceededtotellthewitnessthat

hewas“veryupsetwithTamasAjánandtheIWF,thisisunacceptable,thisisanoutrage.He

[Dr.Aján]calledthePresidentofourweightliftingfederationandtoldhimthat ifyoudon’t

bringyoursuitcasewith$100,000cashtopayyourdopingfine,yourteamwillnotgotoRio

2016.”

Mr.Bellodescribedtotheconfidentialwitnessthatagroupoffourindividuals,ledbyAgron

Haxhihyseni,SecretaryGeneraloftheAlbanianWeightliftingFederation,divided$100,000

USDbetweenthemanddrovethepaymentfromTirana,viaBelgradetoBudapest.Mr.Bello

indicated to the witness that carrying such amounts of cash over the border and not

declaringitwasinviolationofthenationallawsofbothAlbaniaandSerbia.25

ExaminationoftherecordsoftheIWFindicatesthattheAlbanianWeightliftingFederation

wiretransferred$25,000USDtotheIWFonthe13November2015andthatasubsequent

cashpaymentof$73,910USDwasmadeonthe22July2016.26Thus,clearingtheirdoping

fineallowingtheirparticipationinRio.TheMIITrecoveredphotographicevidenceofthis

cashpaymenttoDr.Aján,whichtookplaceinarestaurantinBudapestinthepresenceofMr.

Haxhihyseni.AcopyoftheIWFreceiptisalsophotographedandaccompaniesthisreport.

25 https://www.iatatravelcentre.com/AL-Albania-customs-currency-airport-tax-regulations-details.htm; https://www.iatatravelcentre.com/RS-Serbia-customs-currency-airport-tax-regulations-details.htm26 Stavri Bello denied all knowledge of the payment of the fine, despite having told a confidential witness that the cash was delivered to Dr. Aján. The Albanian Weightlifting Federation initially agreed to assist the MIIT, but after several attempts to contact them refused to do so. Thus the discrepancy between the cash payment received and the $100,000 USD doping fine could not be reconciled.

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-PhotographofDrAjánissuingacashreceipttoAlbanianWeightliftingFederation

Dr.AjánexplainedthatitwasnecessarytoallowMemberFederationstheoptiontopaytheir

fines,andotherfees,incash.Hestatedthatsomecountriesdonothavetheabilitytowire

money electronically for various reasons, political or otherwise. The MIIT’s review of

Member Federation doping fine payments disproves this theory. Only two out of 194

MemberFederationshavenotpaidviawiretransfers.Infact,evenMemberFederationsof

countrieswithrestrictedbankingsystemsorunderpoliticalsanctionsprohibitingtheiruse

oftheUSdollar,suchasVenezuelaorIran,haveallsuccessfullymadewiretransfertothe

IWF’saccounts.Anumberoffederationsafterhavingpreviouslypaidbybanktransferhave

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laterpaidtheirdopingfinesincash.Evidencesuggeststhatthemethodsusedtomakethese

paymentsaremaybeamatterofchoicebutcouldbeamatterofrequestsbyDr.Aján.

Thepracticeoftransportingcashisariskybusinesstothepersonandtotheownerthereof.

It isn’t safe,may be illegal in certain circumstances, and puts personnel at risk of theft,

embezzlementorattack.TheMIIT’smoneylaunderingexpertindicatedthatthemovement

of cash also puts the Secretariat and federation personnel at risk of money laundering

offences.

iii.TravelExpenses

Thepracticeofdoublecountingtravelcostsisacommonwaytoembezzlefundsfroman

organisation.ItappearsthatthiswasalsopracticedbyDr.Aján.TheMIITrecoveredfrom

theIWFservertwophotographsofinvoicesissuedbytheIWFforreimbursementsofservice

and travel costs. These two invoices are for the amounts of $5,536 and $6,800 USD,

respectivelyandbotharesignedindicatingthatcashhadbeenreceivedforthoseamounts,

yetnocorrespondingentryexistsintheIWF’saccountingledger.Mr.Adamfistatedthathe

collectedandpassedthecashtoDr.Aján,butcannotproveit.NoreceiptwasissuedtoMr.

AdamfibyDr.Aján.

AconfidentialwitnessdescribedanothertravelrelatedincidentwhereDr.Ajánhadpaidthe

witnessanofficialvisit,duringwhich,Dr.Ajánpresentedthewitnesswithaninvoiceofhis

airfaretotaling$14,955USDanddemandedpaymentthereof.Thewitnesswasshockedbut

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paidtheamount.AlthoughthewitnessdidnotgetareceiptfromDr.Ajánforthispayment,

theMIIThasacopyoftheinvoiceissuedfortheairfare.Mr.AdamfifollowedshortlyafterDr.

Ajánandalsopresentedthewitnesswithaninvoiceforhisairfare,whichthewitnessalso

paid.ThecompletelyinadequaterecordsofthesportdidnotenabletheMIITtoconducta

completeanalysisandevaluationofthetravelexpensestodetermine,forexample,whether

these airfare expenses were also covered by the IWF. However, these examples are

illustrativeofhowthedoublepaymentoftravelexpensescouldbeanillegitimatedrainon

theIWF’sresources.

iv.UnexplainedCash

ThereareotherexamplesofcashbeingpaidtoDr.Aján,butnotfullyexplained.InJanuary

2020, at the EB meeting in Doha, the President of the Asian Continental Federation,

MohamedYusefAlManamadethebelowcomments.TheentireEBmeetingiscustomarily

recordedbytheSecretariatandhisstatementisretrievedfromthatrecording.

Haveyouseenow.Hedon'twanttostepdown.Hedon'twantyoutobeactingpresident.He wants to control the commission and because he told he's innocent. There is noevidenceas[unintelligible03:25:17]said.No,there'sevidenceifyouwant,Icangiveyoutheevidenceforallofyou.Ihaveevidenceifyouwant,butthisisveryshamefultoshowittohimortoshowittoanyone.Ifyouwantacopyfromit,Icangiveyouacopy.Youseeit,don'ttakeanypicturefromit.Wehaveitandweknowhimverywell.Wecoverhim,it'sokay,wesupporthim,it'sokay,butweknowhim.Iknowhimverywell.Iknowhimfrom1997,not1998,1997untilnowIknowhimverywell.Wehaveeverything.Letusagreetothispoint,wecan.Ihavetwoslipsby$200,000,hereceivedfromsomebodyandIhavetheoriginal,notthefake,original.Untilheknowsthis,wedon'twanttouseitagainsthimbecausewedon'twanthimtomakeanyscandal.

Mr.AlManawascontactedon threeoccasions toprovide the “twoslipsby$200,000” to

which he was referring in the recording and explain his other comments. Mr. Al Mana

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regrettablydeclinedtheopportunitiestobeinterviewedcontrarytothetermsofreference

previouslyquoted.

v.CashWithdrawals

The IWF’s part-time bookkeeper indicated to theMIIT that she never handled any cash

collectedbythePresidentnordidshewithdrawcashfromtheOTPBank.Inheropinion,the

reason Dr. Aján’s name repeatedly appears on the OTP Bank statements for cash

withdrawalsisbecausehewastheonlyonewhowithdrewmoneyfromthataccount.She

did not includeDr. Aján’s namenext to thewithdrawals on her ledger given that itwas

obvioustoherthathewithdrewthecash.Hewastheonlypersonauthorisedtowithdraw

fundsfromtheOTPoperatingaccount.

ItwasexplainedthatsinceDr.Ajándidnotgiveherreceiptsorrecordsevidencinghowthe

cashhewithdrewwasspent,shecouldnotsubsequentlyaccountforitsuse.Dr.Ajándidnot

depositthecashhereceivedfromMemberFederationsintotheIWF’soperatingaccountat

the OTP post-2013 because it charged banking fees on both USD cashwithdrawals and

deposits.

AccordingtotheIWF’sledger,andconfirmedbybankstatements,Dr.Ajánwithdrewatotal

of$12.5millionUSDfromtheOTPoperationalaccountbetween2009-2019.Noconclusive

audit trail exists evidencing the purpose or use of those funds. The MIIT has identified

severaloccasionswhenlargesumswerewithdrawninadvanceofContinentalelectionsand

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ElectoralCongresses,whereitisallegedthatDr.AjánusedtheIWF’sresourcestobuyvotes

(see Chapter 4 on Electoral Congresses). Given that the bookkeeper was not directly

informedoftheMKBaccount,shecouldnotincludeanydepositsorwithdrawalsmadefrom

thataccountintheIWFledger.

The cash withdrawals and related bookkeeping practices have resulted in a completely

inaccurateunderstandingof the IWF’srevenuesandexpenses.Sincethebookkeeperwas

onlyonoccasionprovidedwithreceiptsdemonstratinghowthewithdrawncashhasbeen

spent, it is impossible toknowwhatpercentagewasused for legitimate IWFoperations.

Furthermore, withdrawals from the MKB account did not factor into her reporting of

withdrawalsmadebyDr.Aján.

SeveralwitnessesidentifiedthatDr.Ajánkeptthecashinasafeinhisoffice.However,on8

May2020whenhissafewaseventuallyopenedinfrontoftheIWF’slegalcounsel,Dr.Lilla

Sagi,therewasnocashcontainedwithinthesafeatall.Infact,itwascompletelyempty.

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-PictureofDr.Aján’semptysafeattheIWFofficeinBudapest

3.6FinancialReporting:MisrepresentedReality

Thefoundationofanyaccuratefinancialrecordkeepingsystemisthetruthofthebooksof

accountusedtoprovidethedatasetfromwhichthefinancialaccountingrecordsarebuilt.

Thefinancialaccountsarethendrawntogetherintheformoffinancialstatements.Itisthose

documents upon which the oversight, management and analysis of an organisation’s

financial affairs are considered. At its core, the IWF’s bookkeeping process was

fundamentallyflawed.

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Duringtheten-yeartimeframeunderreview,theIWFemployedonepart-timebookkeeper

thatworkedunderthesoledirectionandsupervisionofDr.Aján.Sherelieduponrecords

providedtoherbyDr.AjántopopulatetheIWFspreadsheetfilewiththeIWF’srevenues

andexpenses.ThisspreadsheetservedasthebasisuponwhichtheIWF’sannualfinancial

records were prepared by the financial advisor and presented to external auditor and

ultimatelytheEB.

Afterinterviewingthebookkeeper,itwasdiscoveredthattheIWFintentionallyomittedand

obscuredthousandsoftransactionswithintheIWFspreadsheetfile,theoverallneteffectof

whichconcealedmorethan$10millionUSDinunaccountedforcash.Specifically,millionsof

dollars in cash withdrawals conducted by Dr. Aján were never recorded, while certain

electronicfundstransferspaidinHungarianForintweregroupedtogether,convertedtoUSD

and recorded as cash expenditures. The cumulative effect of these confounding entries

produced an approximate difference between cash revenues and cash expenses of $10.4

millionUSDovertheperiodunderreview.Adominoeffectofaccountingreportingfailures

resulted from this flawed process of recording entries in the IWF’s books and records.

Further details of the Cash Analysis have been provided to the O&I Commission on a

confidentialbasisasdescribedintheExecutiveSummaryinChapterOne.

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i.ConstructingAccountingData

Theyearly financial statementsweredrawn from thebookkeeper’s flawedspreadsheets.

Whenthisincompleteaccountingdatasetwaspresentedtothenewindependent‘checks’on

financialimproprietyasaresultoftheerstwhileconstitutionalreforms,itwasacceptedon

face value. Therefore, the resulting financial reports were not properly informative and

thereforemisleading.ThisisCodeofConductoffenceaspreviouslysetout.

ii.MisleadingtheEB

The allegations surrounding financial mismanagement and corruption that have arisen

withintheIWF,stematleastinpartfromthetotallackofoversightandgovernanceoverthe

IWF’sbankaccounts.Dr.AjánwasthesingularpersonwithcompleteknowledgeoftheIWF’s

assets. The EBwas regularly shown incomplete, inaccurate and rudimentary documents

therebydenyingittheabilitytofulfillitsconstitutionaloversightrole.Fromtimetotimean

EBmemberwouldquestionorrequestofDr.Ajanmoreindepthexplanationsoffinances,

andtheywouldbetold“DonotaskabouttheIWFfinances.”27Indeed,therewasnofinancial

controlattheEBlevel.ThereformsoftheIWFConstitutionandBy-Lawswerecontinually

ignored by Dr. Aján and provided him the easy access to potentially acquire the funds

belongingtotheIWF.

27A confidential witness described to the MIIT that after several requests for greater detail, the EB member was told by a member of the Secretariat to refrain from asking about finances again.

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3.7CrossingInternationalBorderswithUndeclaredCash

EUregulationsrequirethatdeclarationonthetransportingofthe10,000EURormoreacross

internationalboundaries.Dr.Ajáninitiallysaidthathedidnotcarryamounts largerthan

10,000EURandifheneededtomovecashinexcessofthelimit,hespreaditamongstaff

members travelingwithhim.TheMIITnotes thatDr.AjánholdsaHungarianDiplomatic

passport and a confidential witness has attested that Dr. Aján is prepared to use its

associatedstatustoavoidsearchesbycustomsofficials.

An analysis of cash receipts has been compared against events Dr. Aján attended. The

snapshotofthisworkshowsthaton29occasionsduringtheperiod2009-2019Dr.Aján

collectedinexcessof$40,000USDatthevariousevents,totaling$3.7millionUSD,related

mainlytodopingfines.Forexample,betweenthe6-15April2013hewasattheIWFYouth

Games inTashkent.There,he issuedreceipts forthecollectionof$234,300USD,someof

which,theMIITconcedesmayhavebeenspentlocally.Giventhenatureofthecashreporting,

itwasnotpossibletoverifythebooksforanylegitimateexpenditures.

Between5-6March2014Dr.Ajánissued18receiptstotaling$444,675USDwhileattending

the South East Asian Weightlifting Congress and the Asian Junior Championships. To

transportthisamountbacktoHungarywouldhaverequiredittobesplitamong45staff.All

oftheIWFstaffinterviewedbytheMIITdeniedcarryingcashinlargeamountsonbehalfof

Dr.Aján.

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AConfidentialwitnessexplainedthatDr.Aján’snephew,AkosUmaruJolathy,travelledwith

Dr. Aján to many international competitions and was accredited as an IWF ‘financial

assistant’.Oneoftherolesofthatpositionwastotransportcashforhisuncle,Dr.Aján.

3.7.1SubjectMatterExpertMoneyLaundering

TheMIIT consulteda subjectmatterexpert inmoney launderingandprovidedhimwith

spreadsheetsoftheIWF’scashcollectionsanddeposits.Inhisexpertopinionreporttothe

IIhedescribedtheevidence“ascompletelyunbelievable”,addingthat“His[Dr.Aján’s]modus

operandiisindicativeofcashcollectionsanddeliverytohishomecountryissomethingthatI

have seenonmanyprevious occasions and I associate thismethodologyas symptomatic of

corruptionorcriminalactivity.”Itcouldbeargued,heexplained,thattheactivitybreaches

theCriminalCodeofHungaryinrespectof1.1.1Embezzlementand1.1.2Misappropriation

ofFunds.

The conclusions above are based upon many factors, which are explained within his

statement,whichhadbeenprovidedonaconfidentialbasistotheO&ICommission.Butthe

mainpointsare:

“(I)Thelackofanydeclarationsofanycash.

a. Hehasknowledgeofthecashdeclarationproceduresandthethresholdamountsbut

noevidenceofanylegitimatedeclarations.

b. Thereisacompletelackofanaudittrail.

c. Therearemuchsafer,secureandauditablemethodstomovelargevolumesofcash

usingtraditionalbankingsystems.

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d. Dr.Ajánhasreadyaccesstofederationbankaccountsbutstillchoosestohandcarry

significantcashamountsdespitethehighriskoflossordetectionbyenforcement

authoritiessuchasCustomsataborderentrypoint.

e. …

f. The complete recklessness of hand carrying cash in these volumes without any

travel,personalorbusinessinsurancetocovertheamountsincaseoflossortheftis

intheexpert’sview,implausible.”

3.8FinancialMethodology

Thedevelopmentofabaselineunderstandingofthetypesofrevenuesandexpenseswithin

the organisation was the starting point of the investigation. This was accomplished by

downloadingtheFinancialReportsavailableontheIWFwebsite.Analysisof thesepublic

documentsprovidedawindowintothevariousassetsheldbytheIWFandideasastowhere

otheraccountsmightpossiblyexist.

The IWF provided the MIIT records of annual financial statements, which were then

compared against the public financial reports. In parallel, an analysis of the minutes of

various Congresses and EB meetings was conducted to anticipate and record financial

matters being discussed. Extracted from these analyseswere records related to interest

earned,balancesintheSwissaccounts,dopingfinerevenues,bankcharges,dopingcontrol

costsandotherexpensesoftheIWF.

AnanalysisoftheyearlyKPMGAuditReportsfollowedtodetermineiftheexternalauditors

hadidentifiedanyissuesorproblemsinthecompletionoftheirannualaudits.

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The compiled data from all of the above analyses instructed the investigators how to

structurefutureinterviewsandformedthethemesunderwhichquestionsweredeveloped.

Interviews were conducted with the external auditors and the IWF’s Financial Advisor

during a site visit to the headquarters of the IWF in earlyMarch. Both KPMG andAlain

Siegristlimitedthetimeavailabletobeinterviewed,resultinginsignificantlyabbreviated

and therefore, incomplete interviews.28Thepart-timebookkeeperwasnoticeably absent

from the headquarters, and access to herwas blocked. TheMIITwas granted access to

interviewheroveramonthlater, followingthesitevisit.Theinternalaccountingrecords

wereprovidedtotheMIITinadvanceofherinterview.

Asdescribedearlier,theIWFinternalaccountingspreadsheetspreparedbythebookkeeper

wererudimentaryinnatureandscope,resemblingasimplegeneralledger.Theinformation

from these spreadsheets was sorted and filtered using different variables. Financial

transactions of interest or out of the ordinary amountswere identified and extracted to

createtheMIIT’sownworkingdocuments.Ananalysisoftheindicatedaccountingcodeswas

alsoconducted.Avastmajorityofthelargecashwithdrawaltransactionsthatappearedon

theIWFspreadsheetdidnothaveanassociatedaccountingcode.Thesetransactionswere

laterdeterminedtobethecashwithdrawalslistingDr.Ajánasthetransactor.

28 When approached by the MIIT at a later date, KPMG would not provide information or interviews without the team signing a document that would have rendered any information gleaned unusable. Needless to say, the MIIT did not accept their terms, additional auditor documents were not provided, and a second interview was never carried out.

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ThisworkwasconductedastheMIITwaitedfortherequestedbankrecordstobeproduced.

Uptothispointnoactualbankrecordshadbeenexamined.ItwaslateMarch,nearlyamonth

aftertheMIITfirstrequestedthebankstatements,thatitwassuppliedwiththefirstactual

bankrecordsfromtheSwissUBSandUBPaccountsandtheOTPBankinHungary.TheUBS

recordswereeithermissingorvirtuallyuseless.Themajorityof therecordsconsistedof

year-end summaries of investments without individual transactions of deposit and

withdrawals. Only a single year of the UBS accounts was usable. The OTP statements

however,provedusefulindevelopinganunderstandingoftheflowoftheIOCfundsoutof

that particular account. Together with IWF spreadsheet, the MIIT was able to reverse-

engineertransactionsoriginatingfromtheUBSaccount.DespitetheMIIT’smultiplerequests

fortheUBSaccountmonthlystatements,thesewereneverprovided.Therefore,notracing

wasconductedonthisaccount.

AforensictracinganalysiswasconductedagainsttheSwissUBPrecords.Inadditiontothe

investment and trading activity, theUBP statements evidenced thewire transfers of IOC

revenuepayments intotheaccountandsubsequentsmalleramountwiretransferstothe

IWFOTPUSDaccountinHungary.

Four thousand pages of OTP bank and credit card statements from 2009 - 2019 were

reviewedandanalysed.Theserecordswerecross-referencedwiththeearlieranalysisofthe

IWF spreadsheets. The review and analysis focused on cash deposits and withdrawals,

intrabanktransferstootherOTPaccountsandcreditcards,identificationoflegitimateIWF

operating expenses, tracing of interbank wired funds to determine the existence of

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undisclosed IWFaccountsand theoverall sourceanduseof funds todeterminepossible

indiciaof corruptionandmoney laundering. In addition, several analyticalprojectswere

completedtosupporttherestoftheinvestigation.Theseincludedcashtransactions,doping

finepaymentsfromIran,cashpaidforvotesatElectoralCongresses,movementofIOCfunds

totheIWF,IWFsupportanddevelopmentfunds,IWFofficials’creditcardusage,antidoping

relatedpayments to the IndependentTestingAgency (“ITA”), fundspaid toanotherwise

unknownlegalcounsel,Dr.BanosCsaba(Karoly),researchingcashreceiptstobankrecords,

research related to an IWF bank account in Colorado, USA, and Dr. Aján presidential

honorariumpayments.

Theforegoingconductedanalysesrevealedtwoaccountsthatwereneverdisclosedtothe

MIITbyanyonewithintheIWF.OneisaUSDaccountatOTPBankunderthenameofIWF

VilagKupa.AnalysisofthisaccountwasnotpossiblesinceitwasneverprovidedtotheMIIT,

despiteitsmultiplerequests.

InearlyApril,theMIITadvisedtheIWFthattheyknewabouttheexistenceofaccountsat

theMKBBank.Itwasonlyon8May2020,lessthanamonthbeforethisReportwasdue,that

the IWF finallyproduced theMKBrecords.Those recordswereanalysedusing the same

procedures that had been applied against the OTP accounts. None of the MKB banking

transactions are explicitly recorded in the IWF’s books of account. Another flaw in the

processofkeepingbookrecordswasrevealed.Theundisclosed,andthereforeunaccounted

forMKBtransactionsleftaninexplicablerecordinthepreparedfinancialstatements.This

furtheraggravatestheflawedrecordingsystemdiscussedearlier.

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3.9PrincipleOutcomes

Theoveralloutcomeofalloftheforegoingworkisreflectedinthetableonthenextpage.It

showsthat,basedontherecordsavailabletotheMIITatthistime,thereisapproximately

$10.4millionUSDincashthatcannotbeaccountedfor.

Asof3June2020,theIWFhasfailedtoprovidecompletefinancialrecordsfor2009through

2019. Until all relevant records are provided for analysis by the IWF and Dr. Aján, the

‘Unaccounted For Cash’ amount indicated in the table below will have the potential to

increaseordecrease.

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IWFCASHREVENUES(2009through2019)

CASHFEES&FINESCOLLECTEDATCONGRESSES,TOURNAMENTS,etc.

(PerIWFbookkeepingrecords)

6,156,733

CASHWITHDRAWNFROMIWFOTPACCOUNTS

(ValuedinUSD)

12,571,609

CASHWITHDRAWNFROMIWFMKBACCOUNTS

(ValuedinUSD)

9,128,608

27,856,950

IWFCASHEXPENDITURES(2009through2019)

EXPENSESPAIDINCASH

(PerIWFbookkeepingrecords)

11,040,438

CASHDEPOSITEDTOIWFOTPACCOUNTS

(ValuedinUSD)

1,668,610

CASHDEPOSITEDTOIWFMKBACCOUNTS

(ValuedinUSD)

4,743,974

17,453,022

UNACCOUNTEDFORCASH

TOTALCASHREVENUES

27,856,950

TOTALCASHEXPENDITURES

(17,453,022)

TOTALUNACCOUNTEDFORCASH* 10,403,928

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Chapter4:ElectoralCorruption-CashforVotes

4.1Introduction

Dr.AjánhassustainedanirongripontheIWF’selectoralresultsforatleastthepastdecade

ofhis20-yeartenureasthePresident.OneofthefundamentalconclusionsfromtheMcLaren

Independent InvestigationTeam(“MIIT”) is that thepresidentialandotherelections that

tookplaceduringtheperiodfrom2009-2017wereastonishinglybriberyprone.Corruption

wasrifewithrampantcronyismandoutrightbribery.Thebuyingofvoteswasaccomplished

through individuals acting on behalf of the President as “vote brokers.” A confidential

witnessdescribedthebriberyapproachtohiminahotelroomafterthemidnighthourbya

thenseniormemberofoneoftheContinentalFederations.Herequested$5,000USDbased

on an alleged prior agreement to support the “African countries”. The request was

dismissed.

Dr.Ajánalwaysmaintainedacadreofindividualsclosetohimthroughtheappointmentof

friendsandassociateswithoutproper regard to theirqualifications.Witnessesdescribed

suchindividualsasthe“President’sTeam”.Theywere,ineffect,thePresident’scronies.They

wereoftenmembersoftheExecutiveBoard(“EB”)andIWFhierarchywhosoughtstatusfor

themselves or quid pro quo favours for their support and the status of being on the

President’sTeam.From time to time, generous supportpaymentswerebestowedonhis

cronies, some of whom would have received cash for votes. Typically, some of these

individualswouldactasthevotebrokers.Throughthem,thePresidentwasnotonlyableto

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distancehimselffromthedirtybusinessofexchangingmoneyforvotes,butalsocoordinate

aboughtandpredeterminedelectionresultbyleveragingtheseindividuals’alliesandtiesto

their own continental Member Federations. The President’s political prowess and clout

amongMemberFederationsresultedincorruptedandundemocraticelectionsthatMember

Federationsseeminglyacceptedasthenorm,despitetheirprotestationstothecontrary.This

ChapterdescribesthemethodsbywhichDr.Ajánwasabletosustainthisultimatecontrol

overtheIWFtoensurehisownre-electiontotheofficeofPresident.

4.2PreparationsfortheElectoralCongress

4.2.1TheAnointedEB

Dr.Aján’spowerbaseandcontroloftheSecretariatandtheEBoftheIWFweredependent

onhisownre-electionaswellastheelectionofhisfavouredcandidatestoseniorinfluential

positionswithintheinternationalorganisation:theGeneralSecretaryTreasurer,the1stVice

Presidentandtheother5Vice-Presidents(the“AnointedEB”).Hewouldthenexploithis

croniesintheoperationoftheIWF.TheConstitutionrulesareexplicit:membersoftheEB

are to be elected, except for the 5 Continental Federation Presidents who are ex officio

members, but with full EB voting rights. The election of the Anointed EB however was

neitherfairnordemocratic.InadvanceoftheElectoralCongress,Dr.Ajánwouldevaluate

andpersonallyselectthememberstotheEBthatwouldformhisteam,strategicallychoosing

individualsthatareeither“corruptandstatusseekers”orcompletelyunawareandoblivious

to what he was trying to accomplish.29 On at least one occasion an individual from the

29 See footnote in Chapter #2 footnote 10.

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Anointed EBwas untruthfulwith theMIIT as to his accepting and giving of bribes. This

processformaintainingpowerwasreplicatedateachofthe2009,2013and2017Electoral

Congresses. Evidence of this process has been corroborated through both witness and

documentaryevidence.The integrityprovisionsof theCodeofEthicsarehighlydeficient

becausethebuyingofvotesisnotanoffence.Howeverthebehaviourofvotebrokersisin

violationofsection1.4.1oftheIntegrityprovisions.

Dr.Aján’s influencewasnot limited to selecting the seniorpositions for the “elected”EB

members. His influence could also affect the elections of the Continental Federations’

Presidents. Members of Dr. Aján’s team would travel to the Continental Federations’

electionsandworkasvotebrokers,bribingmemberstovoteforaspecificindividual,who,

ifsuccessful,wouldtakeupaseatontheEBasaContinentalFederationPresident.Thus,the

buyingofvoteswasnotlimitedtothequadrennialElectoralCongresses(discussedbelow)

but existed as a pattern of systemic behaviour that was accepted throughout the

organisation.

WithDr.Aján’sTeamstackingtheseniorEBpositions,hecouldleveragethosealliancesfor

votesattheElectoralCongressandensurecomplianceoftheEB.Asaresult,membersonthe

EBwould intentionallynot fulfill their critical responsibilities of approving Presidential

actions, reviewing and assessingmanagement plans, including committee appointments,

financesandthedopingprogram.WithoutresistancefromhiscroniesontheEB,Dr.Aján

was able to assert and maintain his complete control over the organisation. More

importantly, his re-election,whichwaskey tohis control,was assured throughhis team

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causingthemanipulationoftheresultsintheElectoralCongressesoftheIWF.Thisisthe

patterntheMIIThasuncovered.Amoredetailedreportofthisprocessandtheeventsinthis

ChapterwasdraftedbytheMIITandhasbeengiventotheO&ICommissiononaconfidential

basis.

4.2.2Settingupthevotingblocwithbribes

ParalleltoDr.Aján’sstrategicselectionofhisAnointedEBwastheprocessofensuringthe

availabilityofcashforbribesandvotingmembersattheElectoralCongresses.TheAnnual

Congress,whichalwaysoccurspriortotheElectoralCongress,iswherethegroundworkis

ostensibly laid.During these election-year annual congresses, theMIIT’s analysis of cash

receipts, cash withdrawals, and IWF internal spreadsheets show a flurry of activity

surroundingcashpaymentsofbothcurrentmembershipfeesandthoseinarrears.Onits

face,theactivityseemsinnocuous.However,thetimingofthepaymentsturnsaseemingly

innocentmembershippaymentintosomethingmoreillicit.

OnlyFullMemberswhohavepaidtheirmembershipfeesbytheendofMarchintheyearof

the Electoral Congressmay participate and vote (see 2.1 of Constitution). However, the

AnnualCongresses tookplaceafter theendofMarch inallof the200930,2013and2017

electionyears.Therefore,astrictapplicationoftheConstitutionwouldhaveprohibitedlate

payingmembers fromparticipating and voting in theElectoral Congresses.Nevertheless

they did vote. The majority of such members who paid late were members of the

30 While Dr. Aján ran unopposed during the 2009 election, the process of strategically selecting and voting in his cronies to senior EB member positions through bribes occurred.

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Weightlifting Federation of Africa or Asian Weightlifting Federation. 31 To build his

allegiancesandensurehehadthenumbersinhisvotingbloc,Dr.Ajánactivelysubvertedthe

rulesofvotingsetoutintheConstitutionandacceptedlatemembershippaymentsincash

or,insomeinstances,didnotdemandthematall.32SuchconductisnotaviolationofBy-Law

12,clearlydemonstratingthenecessityofsignificantrevision.

AttheElectoralCongressesvotebrokershadfundsintheirpossessiontoencouragevoting

forthePresident.TheformerGeneralSecretary,Mr.MaWenguangstatedthatDr.Ajánwas

abletousethefullweightoftheIWFresourcestogetre-elected,whileopponentshadtouse

theirownlimitedpersonalresources.TheonlypersonwithexclusivecontroloftheIWFbank

accounts,collectionandhandlingofcashmembershipfeesandmemberdopingfines,and

the ability to withdraw cash from the IWF bank accounts was Dr. Aján. Documentary

evidencesupportedthroughwitnesstestimony,indicatesthataconsiderableamountofcash

wasspentatthe2013Moscowandlaterthe2017BangkokElectoralCongressesinorderto

guaranteevotesforDr.Ajánandhisteamthroughbribes.

Dr.Aján’spresidencywassecuredbypayingMemberFederationscashbribesrangingfrom

$5,000-$30,000USDtovoteforhimandhisteamofcronies.Thefinancialforensictracing

oftheIWFbankaccountsshowthatthatthePresidenthadthetotalof$405,000USD33and

31 At the 2017 Annual Congress in Bangkok, numerous African nations (including Congo, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, and Uganda) paid their IWF annual membership fees of $500 in cash. The annual membership fees paid by the African Member Federations were all for prior years. While many of these same federations voted in the Electoral Congress, their membership fees due for 2017 were not paid until 1 June 2017. 32 Minutes of the 2009 Electoral Congress confirm that 129 National Federations were given voting rights but according to the IWF’s accounting records only 90 federations had paid any membership fees in 2009, with many of these paying for historic years only, not including payment for the election year.33 On 22 April 2013, Dr. Aján withdrew $182,000 USD from the OTP account. On 15 May 2013, in the days leading up to the IWF Electoral Congress in Moscow, the President withdrew another $223,000 USD.

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$218,000USDavailabletohimatthetimeoftheMoscowandBangkokElectoralCongresses,

respectively.34TheMIIThasspokentoseveralconfidentialwitnessesregardingtheevents

leading up to the vote during these Congresses. The oral evidence provided by these

witnesses is corroborative with the MIIT’s forensic financial analysis of the IWF bank

accounts.SeeChapter3forthedetaileddescriptionsurroundingDr.Aján’scontroloverthe

financesoftheIWFincludingthebankaccountsandhandlingofcash.

With the cash available to the vote brokers for distribution at the election and the

circumventionoftheConstitutiontoensurethenumbersavailabletocreateabribedvoting

bloc,Dr.AjáneffectivelysafeguardedhisPresidencyduringtheperiodexaminedbytheMIIT.

Thefollowingsectiondescribeshowtheelectionwasboughtinpractice.Onceagain,thereis

greaterdetailintheMIITinvestigatorreportprovidedconfidentiallytotheO&ICommission.

34 Tamas Aján would personally withdraw amounts from the Hungarian OTP USD account. There is no corresponding reference or notation in the IWF’s accounting ledgers that records the purpose of the withdrawals preceding the Electoral Congresses. The MIIT notes that some, but not all, of this cash was used to pay attendance fees and other costs of the Congress.

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4.3HowaPresidencyisBought

Preparations to ensure an electoral victory for Dr. Aján and the Anointed EB members

commencebydraftingalistof‘preferred’candidatestofillthetoproleswithintheEB.This

listincludedthenames,allocatedpositions,countriesandtowhichContinentalFederations

these individualsbelong,withsomeof the lesserEBpositionsremainingblank.TheMIIT

identifiedtheprocessthroughtheforensicexaminationofAtillaAdamfi’sharddriveswhere

theevidencewasretrieved.TheevidenceconsistsofoneversionoftheAnointedEBlistand

asecondslightlyvaried35versionofthesame,photographed1monthand3daysinadvance

of the 2017 election, respectively. Thus, evidencing this process and revealing that the

resultsoftheelectionwerepredeterminedwellbeforeanyvotingtookplace.

OncethefuturemakeupoftheAnointedEBandDr.Aján’steamwasfinalised,theselistswere

convertedinto,whattheMIITlabeled,anaidememoire:adocumentcreatedtoensurethat

thosedelegateswhohadbeensubjectedtothebribery,didnotmakeanymistakesinthe

votingboothwhenenteringtheirchoicesontheballots.Theaidememoirewasforwardedto

thebribedvotingbloc.It indicatedthetopeightseniorEBmemberpositions(Dr.Ajánas

Presidentand theother sevenseniorEBroles).Thesepositionswere listedon2 slipsof

paper and next to each position was printed the names of Dr. Aján and his preferred

candidates.Tofurtherensurethattherecouldbenodoubtastohowthebribedvotingbloc

shouldvote, inthefinalcolumntitled ‘VOTE’,aprinted ‘X’wasplacedagainsteachofthe

candidates’names.Thenamesenteredontheaidememoireforthetopeightpositionswere

35 There was only a single name that differed between both versions.

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notonlysimilartodraftlistsextractedfromMr.Adamfi’sharddrives,butmoreimportantly,

alsomatchedexactlythefinalballotresultaspublishedsubsequentlybytheIWF.Seephoto

below.

-Photographofthe“aidememoire”retrievedfromtheIWFservers.

Throughinterviewswithconfidentialwitnesses,theMIIThaslearnedthattheAsian,African

andOceanicMemberFederationsweretheswingvotes,whichDr.Ajáncouldinfluenceand

bribe.Forexample,inthe2013electiontheAsianfederationsvotedagainstDr.Ajánwhile

theOceanicfederationsvotedinfavour.However,in2017Dr.AjánsecuredhisPresidency

through an agreement with certain African and Asian federations, who were originally

standingagainsthim.Thebribesrangedfrom$5,000-$30,000USDpervoteand,specificto

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the2017election,memberswerelavishedwithtripsonprivatecruiseshipsandstaysin5-

starhotelspriortotheelection.Asaresult,Dr.AjánwaselectedasthePresidentforanother

4-yeartermtoendin2021.HisresignationinApril2020broughtthattermtoanend.

TheMIIT’sdocumentaryevidenceindicatesthatthedelegationofbribedofficialshadpassed

throughDohaon27May2017travellingasagroupwithQatarAirlinestoThailand.Upon

theirarrival,thisbribedvotingblocwasdriventoadifferenthotelfromtheonewhereall

othermembers attending the Congresswere staying. For the 2017 Congress, the bribed

voting blocwas kept quarantined from the rest of the Electoral Congress until the very

morningoftheelectiontocurbanypossibilityofthemembersswitchingtheirvoteatthe

lastminute.ThemorningoftheelectiontheywerebussedtothehotelwheretheElectoral

Congresswastakingplace.Theirquarantinehoweverincludedaperdiem,dinnersandatrip

onacruiseboatinBangkok.

The bribed voting bloc, armed with their personal aide memoire, was instructed to

photograph their completed ballot thereby evidencing for whom they voted. Therefore,

establishingtheirentitlementtoabribe.AconfidentialwitnessprovidedtheMIITwiththe

photographhehadbeensentofadelegatephotographinghisballotpaperwithamobile

phone.Together,twoconfidentialwitnessescorroboratedthatcameraflashescouldbeseen

comingfrominsidethevotingbooths.Aphotoofthisprocedureisincludedbelow.

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-Photographofamemberatthe2017ElectoralCongressphotographingtheirballot.

Whilethebriberyremainedaconstantatthe2009,2013and2017ElectoralCongresses,the

processofcashdistributionbythevotebrokersandthemethodsofensuringthatthebribed

votingblocvotedasdirected,evolvedthroughouttheyears.Earlier,anhonoursystemwas

applied,butitwasdiscoveredthatsomemembers,havingbeenswayedintheirvote,were

usingerasableink,oraskingforasecondballottochangetheirvotesaftertakingapicture

asproofoftheirsubmittedballot.Thisresultedinachangeinthevotingprocedureinthe

2017election,requiringtheuseofaninkstampratherthanapentomarktheballot.

Oncetheballothadbeensubmittedandthephotohadbeenverifiedasacorrectballotby

thevotebroker, thedelegatewouldreceivetheircashpayment. Inprioryears,witnesses

describedthatthevotebrokerwoulddeliverthepaymenttothehotelroomofthemember

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who had been bribed. 36 In 2017 however, witnesses observed delegates queuing in a

corridor at the hotel following the vote to get their promised cash. The vote broker

distributingthe$5,000USDcashbribefromabaginhispossessionin2017wassaidtobe

MajorGeneralIntaratYodbangtoey,the1stVicePresidentoftheIWF.37Manywitnesseswho

spoke to the MIIT stated that it eventually became common knowledge among all the

CongressmemberswhichgrouphadbeenboughtbyDr.Ajánandthathewouldwinbefore

theballotswereevencounted.Indeed,Dr.AjánwaselectedastheIWFPresidentineachof

the2013and2017elections,aswerehispreferredcandidatesfortheseniorEBpositions.

AconsequenceofthesecorruptedelectionswasthatcandidatesstandingagainstDr.Aján

would have a false sense of security and purpose that perhaps they could dislodge his

dynasty.Onewitnessadvisedthatthenightbeforethe2013voteatapproximately1:00am,

a delegation came to his hotel room requesting that he withdraw his nomination. The

delegation,whichhadpreviouslyagreedtosupportthecandidate,indicatedthatsomething

hadchanged.Theymadeitcleartothewitnessthattheycouldnolongerworkwithhimand

hewouldnotgettheirvote.Inanotherinstance,awitnesswhowasstandingforaposition

ontheEBalsoindependentlydescribedthesameapproachhavingbeenmadethenightprior

to the 2017 election. According to thewitnesses, it appeared that theirminds had been

changedandtheyhadalldecidedtovoteforsomeoneelse.Itthenbecameobviousthatthey

36 In one instance, a vote broker knocked on the hotel room door of the President of Bahrain’s National Olympic Committee, mistakenly thinking he was part of the African delegation and handed him an envelope with $30,000 USD. The mistake was quickly realised and no payment was turned over to the person whose identity was mistaken. 37 Major General Intarat Yodbangtoey was overheard by confidential witnesses telling the Ugandan Weightlifting Federation’s President Salim Musoke Ssenkungu that the money had run out and that he would have to come back later. Mr. Ssenkungu responded by saying “I want my money now; I've voted for you."

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hadresolved toelectDr.Ajánandhis team.Despite theirwarningof failureandensuing

embarrassment,bothwitnessesrefusedtowithdrawfromthepresidentialraceandtheEB,

respectively.Afterthevoteswerecounted,Dr.AjánstillremainedtheIWFPresidentandhis

AnointedEBwaselected.

ThegeneralacceptanceoframpantbriberyatElectoralCongresseswasunderscoredbyan

email chain retrieved from the IWF’s servers by theMIIT. Following the 2017 Electoral

Congress,correspondenceexchangedbetweentheIWFDirectorGeneral,Mr.Adamfi,andan

assistantofaContinentalFederationPresidentfurthersupportedtheMIIT’sevidenceofcash

forvotesatthemostseniorlevelswithintheIWF.Intheexchange,Mr.Adamfiquestioned

the Continental President’s motives for continuing to support Dr. Aján’s opponent, Dr.

AntonioUrso,giventhathehadlosttoDr.Ajánin2013andagainin2017.Theassistantto

the Continental Federation’s President replied that in addition to issues surrounding

financialsupportfortheContinentalFederation,theContinentalFederationPresidenthad

beenofferedabribeinreturnforsupportingDr.Aján,andthatthiswasagainsthisprinciples.

Mr. Adamfi forwarded the correspondence to Peruvian’s Weightlifting President, Jose

Quinones, whose single-sentence response was “You offer him a bribe?” This response

elicitedwhatappearstobea‘tongueincheek’responsefromMr.Adamfistating,“Iwassure

itwasyou….forvotestoAntonio:)”.

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4.4Conclusion

The extent of vote brokering at Electoral and Continental Congresses demonstrates a

shocking and scandalous level of institutionalised corruption. The members of the

organisationseemtoacceptitaspartofthecultureoftheIWF,andlittle,ifanythinghasbeen

done to stop these corrupt practices. Unfortunately, those positioned, and oftentimes

required,tostampoutcorruptionarethebeneficiariesofthisinstitutionalisedcorruption

andshowlittleinclinationtodoso.Finally,theemailsshowthejocularwayinwhichsenior

membersoftheIWFthinkofandrefertothevotebrokeringandbriberypractices.Whilenot

partoftheinvestigationoftheMIIT,therearesuggestionsthatthepracticesdescribedinthis

ChapterhavecontinuedatthePanAmericanFederationelectionsinFebruaryofthisyear

after the investigationwas launched.The IWFneeds fundamental reformand rebuilding

fromthefoundationsupwardstoaffectashiftinculture.Theobjectiveshouldbeafairand

democraticelection,freeofbriberyandfavouritism.

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Chapter5:Anti-DopingOvertheDecades

5.1Introduction

Weightliftinghasbeenvulnerabletotheallureofperformanceenhancingdrugsthroughout

itshistory.Thesportrequiresperfecttechnique,whichisimportant,butphysicalstrengthis

paramount.Likeathletesinmostsports,weightliftershavetriedtocircumventthephysical

limitations of their bodies by succumbing, knowingly or not, to performance enhancing

drugs (“PEDs”) since the earliest Olympic Games. Their apparent drug of choice being

strengthbuildingsteroids.

TheARDdocumentarythattriggeredthisinvestigationisnotthefirsttimethatweightlifting

hasfounditselfatthecenterofdopingallegations.Dr.Aján,inhiscapacityaseitherGeneral

SecretaryorPresident,haspresidedoverthemanydecadesofdopingscandalsthathave

affected the sport. The McLaren Independent Investigation Team (“MIIT”) investigated

allegationspresentedbyboththeARD’sdocumentaryandotherwitnesses.Theseincluded

accusations that results of positive tests had been intentionally delayed, hidden or

manipulatedinordertoprotectcertain‘favoured’athletesorcountriesfromdetectionand

punishment.ThesesupposedlyfavouredcountrieswerethosewhosupportedthePresident

andwouldallegedlyalsobenefitfromeitherlessout-of-competitiontesting(“OOC”)and/or

knowingthedatesofOOCtestsinadvance.Itwasallegedthattheywereabletocircumvent

thenormaldopingcontrolproceduresthrougheitherpaymentofbribestoDopingControl

Officers (“DCO”), theSampleCollectionAuthority (“SCA”), and/or the IWF itself, perhaps

witharrangementsmadeorcondonedbyDr.Aján.

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Dr.AjánwasamemberofWADA’sFoundationBoardsinceitsinceptionin1999wherehe

helpedshapetheorganisationandtheWADACode.HisinsideknowledgeofWADAhasbeen

thesourceofmuchspeculation.ItwasallegedthatfromthispositionwithinWADAhecould

exerthispowerovertheAnti-DopingProgramoftheIWF.Beforetheexistenceofthe2004

WADACode,Dr.Ajánmighthavehadtheabilitytopersonallyaffectthedopingprogram.38

However,asWADAdevelopedastheinternationalregulatorybody,theabilityofthesport

togovernitsownantidopingprogramwassignificantlyreduced.Thenewrealityofaglobal

antidoping regulator severely restricted Dr. Aján’s potential capabilities to manipulate

antidopingintheIWF.

Throughthecourseofitsinvestigations,theMIITfoundthatmanyoftheaboveallegations

wereunsubstantiated.Instead,whatDr.Ajánappearstohavedoneisleveragetherumours

and storiesofhisdopingmanipulations to instill a senseof fearofwhatcould happen if

Member Federations challenged his authority. Dr. Aján’s image and reputation was his

weaponoftyrannyandthesourceofthefearofretaliation.Thus,thelegendofhispower

grewovertimeasthosewithintheorganisationfueledits flamesandrefusedtoaccepta

muchdifferentreality.

38 There is much spoken about the incident where Dr. Aján provided advanced notice to the Greek Weightlifting

Federation in 1997. While visiting Corfu, Greece the President wrote on a napkin the dates of three future out-of-competition doping tests and provided it to the Greek Federation’s President. See the discussion in section 5.2 related to doping in the 1990s.

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Theperiodunderinvestigation,between2009–2019,wastheworstdecadeofdopingthe

sportofweightliftinghaseverexperienced. Therewere58weightliftingpositivetestson

theretestingofsamplesfromtheBeijingandLondonOlympicGames.Atthetimeofthose

announcements in 2016 it was also learned that there were 24 positive results at the

Houston World Championships in 2015. Over the decade there have been at least 615

confirmed Anti-Doping Rule Violations (“ADRVs”). Throughout this time Dr. Aján, was a

proud member of the WADA Foundation Board, boasting about his clean sport while

presidingoveroneofthedirtiestdecadesinthesport’shistory.

This chapter describes a brief historical perspective to provide context for the present

difficultiesofdopingcontrolinweightlifting.WhatfollowsistheMIIT’sinvestigativeresults

intoallegationssurroundingDr.Aján’stransgressionsandmanipulationsoftheAnti-Doping

ControlProgram(“ADCP”)oftheIWF.

5.2The1980s&1990s

These two decades might be characterized as the wild west of doping in many sports,

includingweightlifting.Antidopingregulationswereeithernonexistentorintheirinfancy.

Becauseeachsportadministereditsownparticularantidopingregime,theregulationsthat

did exist were highly inconsistent between sports. Inconsistencies in the rules for drug

testingandanalysisofspecimenswerealsoprevalent.Themostnotableincluded:

(i) prohibitedsubstancesinonesportthatwerenotprohibitedinothers;

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(ii) inconsistentsanctionsappliedtoPEDsuseviolations(forexample,penaltyforuseof

the sameprohibited substancevaried frompublicwarnings to lifebans fora first

offence);and

(iii) unannounced,OOCtestingappliedinsomecountriesandinternationalfederations

andnotinothers.

Theonlysportingbodywithsomeconsistencyandrationaletoitsantidopingruleswasthe

MedicalCommissionoftheIOCwhohadjurisdictionoverantidopingattheOlympicGames.

Duringthe1980sandthe1990sweightlifterswereconsistentlybreakingWorldandOlympic

records, a fact that did not go unnoticed by the IOC.Dr.Ajánwas theGeneral Secretary

throughout this period and became an IOC member in 2000 (see Chapter 2 on his

Presidency). Following the 1988 Games in Seoul, where Hungary, Korea and Bulgaria

withdrew their weightlifting teams after a string of positive doping results, the IOC

threatened to ban the IWF from theOlympic programuntil it could prove itwas taking

doping control seriously. 39 The IOC’s early warning triggered a move by the IWF to

restructureitsweightclassesin1992,eliminatingquestionableWorldandOlympicrecords.

Thechangetookeffectatthebeginningof1993.Afurtherandsimilarrestructuringoccurred

in 1997. Dopingwas so pervasive in the 1990s that had the IWF not acted, the records

establishedduringthatperiodwouldlikelyremainunbrokenuptothepresent.

39https://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/23/sports/sydney-2000-weight-lifting-drug-scandal-goes-bulgarian-team-ousted-games.html

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5.3WeightliftingScandalsMorphedintotheTwenty-firstCentury

Themeasures of previous decades to reset the playing field did little to stop thedoping

activity leading up to the Olympic Games in 2000, 2004 and 2008. The Bulgarian and

Romanianweightliftingteamswereexpelledfromthe2000OlympicGamesinSydneyfor

dopingandtheBulgarianswereforcedtoreturntheirmedals.Atthe2004SummerOlympics

in Athens, a Greekweightlifterwas stripped of hismedal for taking banned substances.

Bulgaria,arepeatoffender,wasforcedtowithdrawitsentireweightliftingteamfromthe

2008BeijingGamesafter11athletestestedpositiveforsteroids.Meanwhile,Greeceonly

sentfourweightlifterstotheBeijingGamesafter11weresuspendedfordopingpriortothe

Games.40ThecallsbecameevenmoreshrillanddemandingfortheIOCtodropweightlifting

fromtheOlympicprogram.

Prior to 2005, there was a single person coordinating the organisation’s Anti-Doping

Program.AsthenewWADACodestartedgeneratingmoresophisticatedrequirements,an

in-house lawyer was hired for the first time in 2005. This person took over as the

CoordinatoroftheAnti-DopingCommission(“ADC”).In2008,NicuVlad,thePresidentofthe

Romanian Weightlifting Federation, was the Chairman of the IWF’s ADC, preceding the

appointmentofPatrickSchamaschin2013.In2006,HungarycreateditsownNationalAnti-

DopingAgency(“NADO”),theHungarianAnti-DopingGroupNon-ProfitLtd(“HUNADO”).41

40 Hungarian Anti-Doping Group Non-profit Ltd (“HUNADO”) DCO Barbara Kallo conducted the doping control mission where these positive samples were collected.41HUNADO’s constating documents state that it was created in 2006. It became operational in 2007. Up until that point there was a department within the Ministry of Sport that performed that anti-doping control. That department was eventually re-modeled to become the independent NADO.

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5.4ADirtyDecadeintheTwenty-firstCentury

Littleprogresswasmadefollowingtheembarrassmentsoftheearly2000s.Theperiodfrom

2009-2019isoneofthedirtiestperiodsinthesport’shistory.Itcontinuedthepatternof

negativeresults fromthedecadebeforeandbroughton itsownuniquecontributions. In

November 2015, the IWFheld itsmarquee event, theWorld Championships inHouston,

Texas. It has the regrettable and unfortunate distinction of being the dirtiest World

ChampionshipsintheIWF’shistory,withanunprecedented24positiveADRVs.Justasthese

results were beingmade known in early 2016, the IOCwas ramping up its retesting of

samplesfromthe2008and2012Olympics.Dr.AjánhadpreviouslypromisedcleanOlympics

in2008and2012.TheIOC’sretestingmadethosestatementsringasournotewithnearly

60weightliftersbeingfoundtohavecompeteddirtyateitherorboththeBeijingandLondon

Games. The sport is second only to Athletics 42 for having the greatest number of dirty

athletesattheOlympicGames.

Onceagain,theIOCreactedtotheseabysmalstatistics,threateningtheremovalofthesport

fromtheOlympicprogram.TheCleanSportCommission(“CSC”)establishedin2017atthe

behestof the IWFPresidentwasaneffort torespondto the IOC’spressuresarising from

thesedespicableresults.ThemovetoestablishtheCSCstavedoff,atleasttemporarily,the

threattothesport.TheCSCReportconcludedthatthedopingproblemsinthesportwere

42 See the WADA Independent Commission Report in 2015 examining the Anti-Doping antics in Athletics.

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concentratedinahandfulofhigh-riskcountries,wheredopingissystemicacrossallsports.

PartoftheCSC’srecommendationswastooutsourcetheADC’sresponsibilities.In2019,the

International Testing Agency (“ITA”) took over the test distribution planning, sample

collectionandresultsmanagementofcases,andearlierthisyeartheCourtofArbitrationfor

Sports Anti-Doping Division (“CAS ADD”) was appointed to perform first instance

adjudicationofresultsmanagement.ThesefindingsandchangeswerewelcomedbytheIOC

andhaveensuredweightlifting’sparticipationuptoatleasttheOlympicGamesscheduled

forParisin2024.

5.5LegalStructureandOperationoftheAnti-DopingCommission

The IWF ADC is a standing body within the organisational structure of the IWF. It is

responsiblefortheadministrationoftheIWFADCPandisrequiredtomeetbiannually.Its

responsibilities includecreatingandpopulatingtheInternationalRegisteredTestingPool

(“IRTP”)43anddevelopingtheyearlyandmonthlyTestDistributionPlans(“TDP”).

UndertheConstitution,eachCommissionisassignedaCoordinatorfromtheIWFSecretariat

whoisexclusivelyappointedbythePresident.TheCoordinatorfortheADChas,sinceatleast

2005, been the legal personwithin the Secretariat (the “AD Coordinator”). The role and

powersofanyCommissionCoordinatorarenotsetoutintheConstitutionortheBy-Laws.

43Where words are capitalised in this chapter it is either because they are defined terms in the WADC and its accompanying International Standards or they are required to be capitalised in ordinary English language usage.

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The ADC is composed of the Chair and two other appointedmembers. The Constitution

provides that the President recommends and the EB approves the appointment of the

membersandtheChairperson.Dr.AjánhasappointedandanointedtheChairpersonandthe

EBhasconfirmedtheappointments,withoutactiveenquiry.In2012,theEBapprovedthe

President’sappointmentofDr.Schamasch,44theformerIOCMedicalDirector(1993-2012),

as theChairpersonof theADC.45Heheld that positionuntil 15April 2020whenhewas

dismissed following Dr. Aján’s resignation. In accordance with the Constitution, the

ChairpersonissolelyentitledtosignallagreementsconnectedwiththeADCP.

ThefunctionoftheADC,withtheassistanceoftheSecretariat,isto“advise,assistandsupport

theIWFADCoordinatorintheimplementationoftheIWFADProgram.”TheADCPrequires

that the Secretariat “together with the AD Commission manages and monitors the IWF

ADP”. 46 The AD Coordinator holds particularly important role in the oversight and

implementationoftheADCP.Onthefrontend,theADCwill“directtheIWFADCoordinator

regardingtheIn-CompetitionandOut-of-CompetitionTestingProgram”,whileontheresults

managementside,theADCoordinator“…shallinformtheChairpersonoftheADCoftheclosed

ResultManagementprocesses”.47Theunderlinedphrasemeansthatupuntilthepointthat

thecaseisclosed;itremainsconfidentialtoeveryoneexceptfortheCoordinator.Therefore,

44 Dr. Schamasch held appointments with Russian Athletics Federation; Russian Biathlon, International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF). 45 According to the IWF’s website, the 1st official meeting of the Independent IWF Anti-Doping Commission was held on 29 January 2014 in Budapest in presence of Dr. Patrick Schamasch, Dr. Michael Petrou, Dr. Monika Ungar and Dr. Magdolna Trombitas. 46 By-Law 7.11 to the IWF Constitution. 47 By-Law 6.1.2 to the IWF Constitution.

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theADCoordinatoristheonlypersonthatoughttohaveacompleteunderstandingofthe

applicationandresultsoftheADCP.

TheADCineffectshouldfunctionasanindependentbodyexecutingtheIWF’sADCP.Under

the current and previousWADA Code (“WADC”), the IWF must be able to perform the

following:

(i) planandimplementaTDP48fromgatheredintelligence;

(ii) engageintargettesting;and

(iii) conduct investigations into anypossibleADRVs.49TheWADC requires that all

Anti-Doping Organisations (which include International Federations) “have

policiesandproceduresinplacetoensurethatantidopingintelligencecapturedor

received is handled securely and confidentially, that sources of intelligence are

protected”… and that the intelligence is “used and disclosed only for legitimate

anti-dopingpurposes.”50

On the instruction of the Chairperson of the ADC, representing the IWF as the Testing

Authority,HUNADOplayedakeyoperationalroleintheimplementationoftheADCPasthe

SampleCollectionAuthoritychosenbytheIWFtoconductthevastmajorityof itstesting

48 The contents of the TDP is the responsibility and duty of the Testing Authority (IWF) in accordance with the ISTI. A Doping Control Officer plays no role in the selection of who is to be tested. 49 WADC (2015 version) Article 5.50 ISTI, 2018 para 11.2.2 Anti-Doping Organisations shall have policies and procedures in place to ensure that antidoping intelligence captured or received is handled securely and confidentially, that sources of intelligence are protected, that the risk of leaks or inadvertent disclosure is properly addressed, and that intelligence shared with them by law enforcement, other relevant authorities and/or other third parties, is processed, used and disclosed only for legitimate antidoping purposes.

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missions.TheADCoutsourcedthefunctionsofsamplecollectionandsubsequentsendingof

samplestoaWADAlaboratoryforanalysistoHUNADOonitsformationin2007.Theroleof

HUNADOwas the subject of commentary by the ARD’s documentary.51The operation of

HUNADOisdescribedingreaterdetailbelow.

Following the receipt of a WADA accredited laboratory notification that a weightlifting

athlete has produced an adverse analytical finding (“AAF”), atypical finding, or adverse

biologicalpassportfindings,theADConbehalfoftheIWFisrequiredbytheWADACodeto

investigate the results52anddetermine if anADRVunder theCodehasoccurred. If so, it

proceedstoproposetheapplicablesanctionontheathlete,whothenhasrightsofappeal.53

ItwaswellunderstoodbymembersoftheIWFinterviewedbytheMIIT,includingtheformer

ADCChairperson,thepastandpresentADCoordinators,andDr.Aján,thattheADCshould

functionasanindependentandautonomousbodyoftheIWF.Ultimately,theintegrityofthe

ADCPandconfidentialitythereofiscriticaltoitssuccessfulimplementation.

5.6TheIWFasTestingAuthority

51 The response of HUNADO to the allegations may be found in the Internal Audit Report dated 20 April 2020 and available at https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1-uqW6MEJQ33efDZlCPJnteOa2MMvjobB?usp=sharing. Accessed 30 April 2020. 52 WADC Article 7.4 & 7.5. 53The AD Coordinator is the legal person in the Secretariat. As the legal counsel they would look at the information they had, including a response by the athlete and any aggravating circumstances and then decide on the sanction period. They are both the prosecutor and the judge in the process when those functions are required. The assignment of all functions to the ITA has terminated this dual role of the legal counsel who were also regarded by some members of the IWF EB as harsh in their sanction determinations. For example, one Member Federations was upset about a 2.5 year ban of one of their athletes.

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TheMIIT reviewed and analysed the IWF’s instructions as the Testing Authority on the

mission’s instructions it issued to HUNADO. The purpose was to establish whether any

evidenceexistedtosupportallegationsthatthefederationitselfwascomplicit inanyofa

range of potentially corrupt activities that would enable ‘favoured’ athletes and/or

federationstoavoidADRVsanctions.

Theanalysisinvolvedexamining:

(i) whetherincertaincasessamplemanipulationtookplaceeitheratthepointoftesting

orlaterinthesamplingprocess;

(ii) whethertherewasadvancednotificationofout-of-competitiontesting;

(iii) whattheinstructionsweretotheSCAonthemissionorders;

(iv) whattheinstructionsweretotheWADAaccreditedlaboratories;andfinally,

(v) shouldalltheotheroptionshavefailed,whetherthereweredelays,manipulationor

disappearanceoftheresultsmanagementofpositivesamples.

TheMIITobtainedevidencefromvarioussourcestotesttheselinesofenquiry.Itrequested

documents from the IWF andHUNADO, aswell as theWADA accredited laboratories at

Cologne,MontréalandRome.InterviewswereconductedwiththedirectorofHUNADO,Dr.

AgnesTiszekerandHUNADODopingControlOfficer(“DCO”)BarbaraKalloaswellaswith

Hans Geyer, the deputy head of the Cologne laboratory. WADA’s ADAMS database was

reviewed, which revealed that the instructions to both the HUNADO and the WADA

accreditedlaboratoriesfollowedallproperprotocols.TheproceduresfollowedbyMs.Kallo

asDCOwerealsoconfirmedtobecorrectandinaccordancewiththeWADACode.TheMIIT

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did not interview any other DCOs, but was satisfied that Dr. Tiszeker and Ms. Kallo

performedtheirdutiestothestandardsrequiredbytheWADACode.

Theareasofconcern,however,weretheabilityofDr.Aján,inhisroleasthePresident,to

gainaccesstotheADC’sconfidentialinformation,whichcouldbeusedinsomecapacityto

giveadvancenoticeofOOCtestingandmanipulatetheresultsmanagementofcases.These

areasaredescribedingreaterdetailinthefollowingsection.

5.6PresidentialMeddlinginAntidoping

While themajorityof theallegations theMIITexaminedproved tobeunsubstantiated, it

realisedthat,inthecourseoftestingthoseallegations,thereweretransgressionshappening

quiteapartfromtherumoursbeingrepeatedbymembersoftheorganisation.Thebehaviour

ofDr.Aján iswhat theMIIT refers togenerally as “meddling”.ThePresidentwouldgain

accesstotheconfidentialandindependentfunctioningoftheADC,inordertofrustrateits

operations. This action is a breachof the confidentiality provisions of the confidentiality

provisionsofBy-Law12ofthedisciplinaryandethicsproceduresat1.5.1and1.5.2.

The sourceof any abuseor improper conduct in the applicationof theADCPof the IWF

beginswiththepowerofDr.AjántoinfluencetheADCPasitappliestoMemberFederations.

AsdescribedinChapter2,Dr.Ajánusedhisthreatsofantidopingmanipulationtoexerthis

poweroverMemberFederations.HeleveragedthispowerbyusingtheADCPasavehicleof

controlandtyrannywithintheoverallIWForganisation.DespitetheoperationoftheADCP,

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theIWFisatthemercyofitsMemberFederationswhomaycarryouttheirowndomestic

controlsofweightliftingwithintheircountriesandatnationalcompetitions.54

Dr. Aján’s controlwas, in part, backstopped by the IWF’s Constitution,which creates an

appointment structure that is oneof grace and favour at thebehest of thePresident.He

staffedtheSecretariatathisdiscretion,whichincludedthelegalpersonwithinit.Dr.Aján

appointedthelegalpersonintheSecretariattotheroleofADCoordinator.Thatpersonwas

thenseconded to theADCandgivenapivotal role incarryingout the instructionsof the

presidentiallyappointedChairperson,Dr.Schamasch.TheEBintheory,functionsasacheck

onalltheseappointmentsbyitsapprovalrole.However,therealityisthattheEBexercised

noeffectiveapprovalcontroloverappointmentsofeither theChairperson, theother two

members of the ADC, or its Coordinator. It simply accepted the appointments Dr. Aján

presented.

5.6.1TestDistributionPlans

Asdiscussedabove,WADAmandatedthatallinformationandintelligenceheldbytheADC

should remain confidential and only disclosed for legitimate antidoping purposes. In

particular,theOOCTDPisaconfidentialdocumentrestrictedincirculationandwhichisonly

supposedtobeknowntotheADC,whocreatesitonayearlybasisandupdatesitmonthlyto

54The Egyptian Weightlifting Federation was suspended in 2019 following an internal investigation which revealed

that coaches were supplying their junior and senior female lifters with steroids on a regular basis. See https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1088667/egyptian-coaches-jailed-over-doping.

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administertheIWF’sADCP.Theconfidentialityofthisdocumentisparamountinorderto

executealegitimateantidopingprogram.

Dr.Aján’smeddlingintheaffairsoftheADCfrustratedtheconfidentialfunctionbelonging

totheIWFADCinviolationofthepreviouslydiscussedconfidentialityprovisionsinBy-Law

12.TheIWF’sfirstinternallegalcounsel,MonikaUngarsharedwiththeMIITthatDr.Aján

hadknowledgeof,andaccessto,theannualTDP.HewouldregularlydemandtoseetheTDP

and its updates. With the evolution of the WADA Code and with each successive legal

counsels’ knowledge and appreciation of how important the TDP was to the successful

functioning of a legitimate ADCP, Dr. Aján’s ability to have access to the TDP became

restricted.55Thisenragedhimandhemadecontinuousattemptstoregainhisaccess.

EvidenceprovidedbyEvaNyirfa,theADCoordinatorfromtheyears2015-2017,detailed

howDr.AjánwantedtoknowwhereandwhentheADCwasgoingtotestandwhatNADOit

would deploy. These requests happened continuously, creating a constant pressure to

provide the OOC TDP. While the IWF President liked to emphasize publicly that the

antidopingprogramwasindependent,hedidnotmincehiswordswhenhetoldDr.Nyirfa

that he, as the President, had the real authority and could not care less about how the

antidopingprogramwassupposedtofunction.

MostofthetimethelegalcounselswouldrefusetoprovideDr.AjánwiththeTDP,bysaying

“No,wearenotprovidingit[TDP].”However,onatleasttwooccasionsthepressurebecame

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sointensethatinordertodiffusethetensionandresistthepressure,Dr.Ajánwasprovided

withaversionwherethetestingdatesoftheTDPweremodified.Thelegalcounselchanged

thedatesindicatedontheTDPbutleftthecountrylocationandtheSCAintact.Whilethe

OOCTDPdidnotcontain thenamesofathletes, sufficient informationremained toknow

whatcountriesweretargets.

5.6.2InterferenceinResultsManagement

Several witnesses described instances where the President interfered or attempted to

interfereintheresultsmanagementofcases.Forexample,Dr.Ajánregularlydemandedthat

thelegalcounsel’sadjudicationofthepositivecasesresultingfromtheBeijingandLondon

samplereanalysisbediscussedwithhim.Thisperiodwasincrediblyembarrassingforthe

IWF as the reanalysis of samples eventually concluded that 58 weightlifting athletes

competingateitherthe2008and/orthe2012GameshadpositiveAAFs.Hewouldthreaten

herrightfulnoncompliancewithdismissalinanattempttoinfluenceherdecisions.These

detailspromptedtheMIITtoexaminefurtherthepossibilityofDr.Aján’sinterferenceinto

theresultsmanagementprocess.

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i.DelayofResultsManagement:ACaseStudyofAzeriLifters

IntheforensicexaminationoftheIWF’sservers,theMIITdiscoveredapreviouslydeleted

letteraddressedtoDr.AjánfromtheAzerbaijanMinisterofSport,whoisalsotheAzerbaijan

NationalOlympicCommittee’sVicePresident,dated2016.56TheletterthankedDr.Ajánfor

delayingthesuspensionsofcertainAzeriweightliftersthathadtestedpositiveforPEDsso

thatitwouldnotinterferewiththeIslamicGamesthatwereheldinBaku.Thisdiscovery

prompted the MIIT to examine in greater detail the circumstances surrounding these

delayedsuspensions.ApatternquicklyemergedshowingthattheIWFdidnotnotify18Azeri

athletesoftheirrespectiveADRVsformonthsfollowinglaboratorynotificationofthesame

totheIWF, thusallowingtheseathletestocompeteand insomeinstanceswinmedalsat

variouscompetitions,includingtheWorldChampionshipsandtheBakuGrandPrix.

The timeline of Valentin SnejevHristov, aBulgarian bornAzeriweightlifter, illustrates a

particularly egregious case of delay. The athlete had tested positive following an in-

competitionsampleheprovidedon9April2013attheEuropeanChampionships.Helater

providedanOOCsampleon19June2013,whichalsoproducedanAAF.Despitehavingbeen

informedbytheCologneLaboratoryoftheAAFon4July2013,theIWFdidnotimmediately

notifytheathleteoftheresult.HethencompetedintheWorldChampionshipsinPolandon

20 October 2013, and at the Azeri organized Baku IWF Grand Prix and 2nd Baku

InternationalCup,heldonthe6December2013,wherehewonagoldmedal.TheIWFfinally

notifiedtheathleteoftheAAFandcorrespondingprovisionalsuspensionon11April2014,

56This information was updated 30 July 2020 to reflect that the letter was sent from the desk of the Azerbaijan Minister of Sport, who was also at the time the Vice President of the Azerbaijan National Olympic Committee.

106

withthesuspensionbeginning9April2013.Thiswasnearlyafullyearafterheprovidedhis

firstpositivesample.

TherewerediscrepanciesidentifiedduringtheforensicexaminationoftheIWF’sservers,

relatingtothenotificationlettersenttotheathlete,whichwasdated18November2013.57

Had the athlete been legitimately notified of the AAF on that date, he should have been

subject to a provisional suspension, precluding him from competing at the Baku

competitions. The metadata of the document properties however evidences that the

document was actually created on 20 January 2014, two months after the purported

notificationdate.InadditiontoHristov,fourotherathletes’hadthesamediscrepanciesin

thenotificationletterprocess,whereitwascreatedafteritwasdated.Thisdiscrepancycould

notbeexplainedbyDr.Ungar, theADCoordinatorat the timeand sheequallyhad little

recollectionofthesepositivecases.

According to the letter sent toDr. Aján from theAzeriMinister of Sport andNOC’sVice

President,itappearsthatnotificationofthese18athletes’AAFsweredeliberatelydelayed

andplannedtobereleasedatsomepointfollowingtheBakuGames.Thisintentionaldelay

allowedthese18athletestocompeteinvariouschampionships,distortingthecompetition

resultsanddenyingotherathletestheopportunitiestolegitimatelycompeteandwinmedals.

See graphic timeline entitled ‘Azerbaijan 18’ showing the gap between the test date and

initial notification is set out below. The MIIT confirmed that the IWF was the Testing

Authorityforallthesecases.

57These same discrepancies were identified in the notification letters for an additional 5 Azeri weightlifters.

107

108

TheMIITinterviewedDr.MonikaUngarwhowastheADCoordinatoratthetimeof

this incident.Shecouldnotexplainhowthesedelaysinresultsmanagementcould

haveoccurred.Whenshewasaskedif theAzerishavebeenshownfavoritism,she

replied“theyarenotmyfavourites.”WhenaskedwhetherAzerbaijanwasafavourite

ofDr.Aján’s,shehadnoresponse.

ii.MissingPositivesResults

TheMIITrecoveredfromtheIWF’sservers,aspreadsheetthathadbeensenttothe

IWFfromWADAidentifiedanumberofantidopingcasesthatpotentiallyremained

unresolved. The document entitled “IWF pending 2009-2013” listed 109 samples

whichhadproducedanAAFandappearednottohavebeenfinalizedandtheresults

subsequentlyuploadedtoADAMS.

ParalleltothisdiscoverytheMIITwasprovidedwithanemailfromSeptember2016,

sentfromWADAResultsManagementtoMs.Nyirfa,theIWF’sADCoordinatorand

legal counsel. The email related to45outstanding casesbetween2009and2014,

whereitagainappearedthatnodecisionhadbeenrenderedandrelatedresultsnot

uploadedinADAMS.AnumberofthesamplesfromboththeWADAspreadsheetand

theemailsrelatedtoTurkishweightlifters.TheMIITconductedananalysisofallthe

outstanding cases to establish whether the recorded AAFs had been properly

finalisedandwhererequired,asanctionapplied.Whileitwasabletoreconcilemany,

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theTurkish, and someother cases remainedoutstanding and triggered amore in

depthreview.

TheMIITrequestedtheassistanceoftheIWFSecretariat,HUNADOandtheWADA

accredited laboratory in Cologne, to provide documents surrounding five testing

missionsbetween2010and2012wherethese26outstandingTurkishsampleswere

collected.58TheIWFsearcheditsownrecordsandthoseofADAMSforthesesamples.

TheresultsestablishedthattheAAFshadbeenrecordedagainsttheathletes’names

andnofurtherentrieshadbeenmadeineithertheIWFrecordsorADAMSdatabase

toindicatehoworwhethertheresultsmanagementhadbeencompleted.

The IWF Secretariat member who performed the search alerted the MIIT to the

possibility that these initial AAFs may have been the result of national missions

conductedbytheTurkishWeightliftingFederationratherthantheIWF.Therefore,

althoughtheIWFshouldhavebeennotified,itwasnotitsresponsibilitytoupdatethe

detailsonADAMSdatabase.Dr.Ungar59,theIWF’sADCoordinatorandlegalcounsel

atthetimeofthesesamplereportingissues,echoedthissentiment.Herrecollection

wasthattheseweremissionsthattheIWFagreedtoconductonbehalfoftheTurkish

Weightlifting Federation. She believed a notation on the mission instructions to

HUNADO would so indicate. Therefore, these missions would be considered a

5821 athletes provided these 26 samples. 59 She also denied any knowledge of, or involvement in any corrupt practices that, should they prove to be IWF missions, prevented the AAF results from being properly logged in the records and the relevant sanctions being implemented against the athletes and if appropriate, the national federation.

110

nationalmission,theresultsofwhichwouldnotnecessarilyberecordedbytheIWF,

unless the results of the mission were notified to it by the national member

federation.

The MIIT subsequently received the laboratory documentation from the Cologne

Laboratorywhere the Turkish samples had been tested. It confirmed that all the

samples had produced an AAF and that the resultswere notified to the IWF and

addressedtoDr.Aján.HUNADOprovidedthemissionorderrequestforthemission

where the vast majority of positive samples were collected. The mission order

request confirmed that the IWF had indeed been the Testing Authority for that

particular mission. Indicated on the bottom of the request however, was a

handwrittennote“forTUR”.60

Thespecific recollectionofDr.Ungar, theADCoordinatorwho issued themission

ordertoHUNADO,appearstobeconfirmedbythemissionrequest.TheIWFisinfact

the Testing Authority regardless of what is written on the mission order or the

agreementmadebetweenitselfandtheTurkishFederation.ThereforetheIWFbares

anequalresponsibilitywiththeTurkishFederationtofollowtheresultsmanagement

ofthesepositivesamplesor,attheveryleastrequirethenationalfederationtodothe

same. This inaction by the IWF caused some devastating consequences to

international competitive results since most of these athletes would have likely

servedsuspensionsasaresultoftheirAAFs.

60 The mission however was paid for by the IWF.

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Toillustrate, twohighprofileTurkishlifterswereamongthe21athleteswhoalso

providedasampleresultinginanAAFduringanOOCteston3September2010.Both

athleteswentontocompeteattheWorldChampionshipsinAntalya,Turkeyon17

September2010andsubsequentlyattheEuropeanChampionshipsinKazan,Russia

inApril2011.Oneofthem61wongoldonbothoccasionsandtheotherwonsilverat

the World Championships. 62 The athletes retained their medals from these

competitions. A timeline is attached below, showing how both in and out-of-

competitiontestingwasinterspersedwithattendanceatcompetitions.

61The athlete later provided a positive OOC sample on 26 October 2011, for which she received a 2-year ban. 62 Both athletes were also found guilty of doping in 2016, when their Beijing 2008 samples were found positive during the IOC reanalysis.

112

InadditiontotheTurkishexamples,theMIIThasidentified41hiddencasesand10

possibleothercaseswheretheAAFshavenotbeenfollowedthrough.Thesecases

havebeenforwardedtoWADAforinvestigation.

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5.7DopingFines

TheIWFhashadvariousdifferingrulesovertheyearsthatpermitfinestobeimposed

onathletesandcountries.63Thosefinescanbepaidbywireorincash.Thisaspectof

theADCPextendsfurtherpowertoDr.Ajánwhenthefinesarepaidbycash.Heisthe

onlypersonwhoreceivescashfines,withsomerareexceptionswhenothermembers

ofstaffactedonhisbehalf.IthasbeenestablishedduringthisinvestigationthatDr.

Aján is the sole person making all cash deposits into the IWF’s Bank accounts.

Between 2009 - 2019 the amount of doping fines collected by wire transfer is

approximately$4.9millionUSD,and incash isapproximately$3millionUSD(see

Chapter3forfurtherdiscussion.)

5.8RoleofHUNADO

TheHungarianAnti-DopingGroupNon-profitLtdwasestablishedin2006asalegal

entity and began operations in 2007. Since that time it has been recognized as

compliantandregulatedbyWADA.HUNADOisaserviceproviderthatiscontracted

byaTestingAuthoritytocollecturinesamplesontheirbehalf.HUNADOhasbeenone

of the SCAs for the ADC of the IWF, in their capacity as the Testing Authority. It

performedinaccordancewiththeWADConbehalfoftheIWF,whoissuedthemission

instructions. HUNADO was guided exclusively by the Testing Authority’s mission

ordersandcouldnotactbeyondthoseboundaries.HUNADOcouldalsoact,addidact,

from time to time, as the Testing Authority of NationalMember Federations and

63The MIIT confirms that the Azerbaijan Weightlifting Federations paid $500,000 USD in 2014.

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majoreventorganisersoftheIWF.TheMIITconcludesthatHUNADO,initsposition

asSampleCollectionAuthority,hasnoinfluencetodeterminewhichweightliftersare

tobetested.

The allegations relating to HUNADO’s complicity in sample manipulation either

throughexternalpressureorfinancialincentiveshasbeeninvestigatedbytheMIIT.

InterviewswereconductedwithAgnesTiszeker,HUNADO’sDirectorandMs.Kallo,a

senior DCO within the organisation. Following the ARD’s documentary, HUNADO

commissioned a comprehensive internal audit of its operations to establish the

veracityoftheallegationsmadeagainstthem.64Thisreporthasbeenreviewedbythe

MIITandanalysedagainstwitness testimonyanddocumentaryevidenceobtained

fromvariousothersources.Itisathoroughdocument.

Therearecurrently45DCOswhocouldbeassignedbytheHUNADODirectortoa

specificmission.TheARD’sdocumentaryfocusedononeperson,Ms.Kallo,whothe

MIIThas since interviewed. It is satisfied thatother thanmeetingasnecessary to

performherroleasaDCO,shehasnoconnectionswithDr.Ajánandnoattemptshave

beenmadebyhimtoinfluenceherinthecourseofcarryingoutherworkasaDCO

forHUNADO.Ms.KallohasapermanentjobinthehealthcarefieldinBudapestand

actsasaDCOonacontractbasisasneeded.Thereasonsheisstaffedonmanyofthe

HUNADOmissions for the IWF fordoping controlpurposes isbecause she speaks

64See Internal Audit Group Report: “Conducted on the Basis of the Claims Concerning HUNADO in the Documentary Film ‘Lord of the Lifters’/’Herr der Heber’”. 20 April 2020.

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Russian, English, German, Polish, and some Italian and Spanish as well as

understandingalloftheSlaviclanguages,duetohermothertonguebeingPolish.

TheMIIThasnoevidencethatanyoftheother45DCOswhocouldbeassignedby

HUNADOtocarryoutanIWFmission,engagedinconductnotcompliantwiththeir

obligationsundertheWADACode.Inreachingthisconclusion,theMIITnotesthat

HUNADODCOshaveattendedthesummerOlympicGamesinbothLondonandRiode

Janeiro. They have partnered twice with United States Anti-Doping Authority

(“USADA”) since the partial assignment with them at Houston 2015, and most

recentlyatLosAngelesin2019.Furthermore,theyhavebeentheDCOsinattendance

ateventshostedbyHungary(includingtheFINAWorldChampionshipsin2017,the

EOCEYOF2017andtheGAISFWorldUrbanGames in2019).Noneof theseevent

organisershavereportedanymisconducttotheMIIT;norcouldwefindanyevidence

ofsuchmisconductfromopensourceenquiries.MIIThaveconcludedthatthereisno

evidence available to suggest that HUNADO’s DCOs misconducted themselves in

contraventionoftheWADACodewhileactingastheSCAonbehalfoftheIWF.65

Taking all the abovepoints into account, it is the opinion of theMIIT, thatwhilst

rumourscontinuetopersist,thereisnoavailableevidencetosupportanyallegations

of HUNADO’s complicity in sample manipulation. Indeed, it is clear that some

65A very late arriving piece of intelligence regarding direct observation of sample swapping at the World

Cup in Georgia in 2019. The information will be passed to WADA. It was too late in the investigation for the MIIT to examine the evidence.

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information thatwas used as the foundation of the allegations against them,was

twistedtosupportanarrativeuponwhichthereislittleornobasisinfact.66

Overall,theMIITfoundHUNADOtobecooperative,fullycompliantandhelpfulwith

theseinquiries.AsignificantamountofassistancewasrequestedofthembytheMIIT

to complete its investigation to which they fully cooperated. The information

providedbyandthequestionsansweredfrombothDr.TiszekerandMs.Kallowas

found to be beyond reproach. Over the years, HUNADO has been responsible for

collectinghundredsofsamplesthatprovedtobepositive.Theirsystems,structures

andrecordkeepingwerefoundtobefullyinorderasprescribedbyWADAstandards.

IthasbeensuggestedthatthereissomethingextraordinaryinthefactthatHUNADO

iscommissionedby theADChairperson tocarryout inexcessof75%of the total

missions requested by the IWF. While the MIIT did not attempt to examine the

validityofthepercentageitdoesnotethattherearemanyvalidreasonsforthistobe

thecase67withoutraisingsuspicions.

The MIIT is satisfied that the IWF’s extensive use of HUNADO was based on a

combination of language skills, knowledge of the sport and value for money. No

evidence was found to contradict this. Questions surrounding the rumours and

storiesregardingallegationsofHUNADO’simproperbehaviourwereansweredtothe

MIIT’ssatisfaction.Furthermore,itisacceptedthatHUNADOwasnotinfluencedin

66 See the Internal Audit Report, supra, at 4.1.9 and 4.1.10. 67 See the explanations in the Internal Audit Report, supra, at parts 4.1.3 through 4.1.5.

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anyway byDr. Aján and that no personal relationships existed between him, Dr.

TizekerorMs.Kallo.

TheMIITconcludes that there is absolutelynoevidence to indicate thatHUNADO

determined who was to be tested. It acted strictly on the mission instructions

receivedfromtheTestingAuthority.Ifthereistobeanyselectivityastowhoistested

itonlyappliesinanarrowsetofcircumstanceswhiletheyaretestingin-competition

samples.68

It has been further suggested that samples collected in the field are sent to the

laboratoryviatheHUNADOofficeinBudapest,theinferencebeingthatmanipulation

of thecollectedsamplescouldoccuronsite. DCOswhohaveobtainedsamples in

certainEasternEuropeancountries,arerestrictedinshippingthecollectedsamples

by courier directly toWADA accredited laboratories. Some of their national laws

prohibit the movement of biological specimens outside its borders. In those

circumstances,andatsomepersonalrisktothemselves,theDCOswouldbringthe

samplesbacktoBudapestwiththem.Thesampleswouldbebrieflystoredinasealed

refrigerationareaattheheadofficeofHUNADO,beforebeingforwardedtoaWADA

accreditedlaboratorywhich,inthecaseofIWFmissions,wasfrequentlytheCologne

Laboratory.While therewouldbeanopportunity tomanipulateasample in these

68The in-competition TDP requires the DCOs to test 1st, 2nd, and 3rd place finishers. In addition, 4th place is typically tested. This accounts for approximately half of the tests. The remaining half are a combination of the Testing Authority specifically requesting certain athletes be tested and the HUNADO’s discretion to ensure that each country attending is represented equally in the tests.

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circumstances,thesecurityandotherintegritymeasuresimplementedbyHUNADO

makeithighlyunlikelyinthemindoftheMIITthatanythingillicitoccurred.Thereis

certainlynoevidenceorsuggestionthatthiswouldbethecase.`

i.HUNADOatHoustonWorldChampionships2015

Thiseventappearstobeawatershedinthesagaofweightliftingpositiveresults.A

totalof24athletestestedpositiveattheevent.Dr.Ajánhadbeenreluctanttohold

theWorldChampionshipsintheUnitedStates.DragomirCioroslanwasinstrumental

in finding new sponsors for the Local Organising Committee to host these

championships, after a fake bidding process described by a confidential witness

pushed the cost of the event to over $1.2 million USD. That sum was triple the

$400,000USDotherhostcountrieshadpaidinthepast.IntherushfortheIWFshare

ofthemoney(competitionfeesaresplitbetweentheIWFandtheeventorganising

committee),Dr.AjántriedtoensurethatHUNADOandUSADAwouldshareequally

the role of SCA. This was not satisfactory to USADA. Ultimately, after lengthy

discussions and positioning andwithWADA’s intervention, the Sample Collection

Authority was designated to by USADA with HUNADO DCOs involvement being

limited to technical advice, athletenotificationand translationwhereneeded.The

TDP for Houston was entirely created by the IWF as the Testing Authority. The

contractcalledforthetransportofurinesamplestotheMontrealWADAaccredited

laboratoryandbloodsamplestotheSaltLakeCityWADAaccreditedlaboratory.

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TheMIITinterviewedUSADAofficialsconcerningHouston2015.Thatorganisation

washighlyco-operativeandprovidedemailsandnegotiationdocumentsinthelead-

up to the event and all documents relating to the antidoping control process at

Houston.TheMIITreviewedthoroughlythecircumstanceleadinguptoandatthe

competitioninHouston.WefindthattherewasajointeffortbetweenHUNADOand

USADAandthepositivetestingresultswereaproductofthatjoint-effortandnotthe

solesuccessofUSADAorillustrativeofadeficiencyintheoperationofHUNADOas

hasbeenalleged.Indeed,USADAwassufficientlysatisfiedwiththejointventurethat

they have partnered with HUNADO for subsequent events, including The World

ChampionshipsinAnaheimin2017.TheMIITnotesthatthepositivetestsatAnaheim

in2017resultedinonlyfourpositivetests,althoughmanycountrieshadbeenbanned

from participating because of prior positive results. The joint venturing between

USADAandHUNDAOcontinuestothisday.

ii.SuspiciousOut-of-CompetitionTestResultspriortoHouston

The underlying problem which has been flagged regarding the 24 positives at

Houstonisthefactthatmanyofthe24athletesthattestedpositivein-competition

hadundergoneOOC testinga relativelyshort timebefore theevent.69Manyof the

OOCsamplecollectionswereconductedbyIDTM.Allofthoseathleteswhosetests

werepositiveatHouston,werecleanintheirOOCtestscarriedoutbytheCologne

69The vast majority of the athletes tested positive for the anabolic steroid, Turinabol, and mainly represented Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Moldova, and Belarus.

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Laboratory,whichcarriedoutafull-menuanalysisagainsttheirsamples.70Thevast

majorityofthe24athletestestedpositivefortheanabolicsteroid,Turinabol.

ItisapparentthatthoseOOCtestscollectedpriortoHoustonaredubious.Whenput

toDr.Geyer,theDeputyHeadoftheCologneLaboratory,heconfirmedthat itwas

highlyirregularthattheywouldhavetestedcleanpriortotheeventandpositiveat

theeventinsuchashorttimeframe.Indeed,headmittedthatthestatisticsworried

himsince itwasColognewhoconductedthesampleanalysisontheOOCsamples.

TestsonsamplestakenbothatHoustonandOOCweresubsequentlyre-analysedby

the Cologne Laboratory. Their analysis confirmed that their testing capability to

detectthelong-termmetabolitesofTurinabolwas,atthattime,moresensitivethan

theMontréalLaboratory, and certainlymore than sufficient tohave identified the

AAFs in the OOC samples. The heads of Montréal and Cologne Laboratories are

thereforeunabletoexplainwhatmayhavehappened.

TheMIIThasnotbeenabletoestablishhowthesesignificantdiscrepanciesinthein-

competition and OOC test results could have occurred. The working hypothesis

providedtotheMIITbyDr.Geyer is that themanipulationofsamplesoccurredat

somestageduringthein-the-fieldOOCtestingprocess.Themostlikelyexplanationis

thaturinehadbeenswapped.Indeed,asaresultofhisre-analysisofHoustonsamples

70 Azeri Athletes Silviya Angelova, Valentin Snejev Hristov, Elkhan Aligulizadi, Intigam Zairov, Firidun Guliyev were all positive at Houston, and were a part of the delayed 18 Azeri samples in 2013. All five athletes produced AAF’s when analysed by the Montreal Laboratory. They were subsequently banned from competition for periods ranging from four to eight years.

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and out-of-competition samples, the Cologne Laboratory found that samples

providedbytwoMoldovanathletesindicatedthattheDNAintheOOCsamplewas

nottheirs.TheMIITmakesnofindingshereandleavesittothetwolaboratoriesand

WADAtoexaminethisissuemorethoroughly

5.7Conclusion

AlloftheinadequaciesoftheIWFoperationsoftheADCPhavebecomehistorical.In

arecentpressreleasebytheActingPresidentUrsulaPapandrearecentlysaid:

“[i]nadesiretodecreasetheperceptionorpotentialinterferencebytheIWFinanyand

allantidopingprocesses,theBoardhasvotedunanimouslytohandovertheappointing

of all members of both the Anti-Doping Commission and the Member Federations

SanctioningPanel.Discussionsandanagreementarestillpending.Theseactionsbythe

Board exemplify the intent and desire to achieve external and independent bodies’

involvementinourantidopingefforts.Toconclude,yesterdaywesignedtheagreement

withCASADDtohearanddecideantidopingcasesasafirstinstanceauthorityupon

writtendelegationofpowersfromtheIOC,ITA,andotherWADAsignatories.”

Documents

McLaren Independent Weightlifting Investigation · 2020. 8. 6. · The McLaren Independent Investigation Team has determined that $10.4 million USD is unaccounted for. 3. Weightlifting