McDermott Iranian Rescue Mission

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Prospect Theory in International Relations: The Iranian Hostage Rescue MissionAuthor(s): Rose McDermottReviewed work(s):Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 2, Special Issue: Prospect Theory and Political

Psychology (Jun., 1992), pp. 237-263Published by: International Society of Political PsychologyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791680.

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PoliticalPsychology, ol. 13,No. 2, 1992

Prospect heorynInternationalelations:TheIranianHostageRescueMissionRose McDermott1

This rticle sesprospectheory, descriptiveheoryfdecision-makingnderrisk, o examine he ailedrescuemission ftheAmerican ostagesn ran inApril 980.The rguments that residentarterwas n domainf ossesbothinternationallynd domesticallyt the time fthecrisis. n this ontext,ossaversion redisposed imto takemilitaryisks o securethereleaseof thehostages hathe wouldnotordinarilyavebeenwillingopursue.This rticlealso discusses herelationshipetweenolitical ndmilitaryisk nthe ptionsthatwereconsideredt the ime.KEY WORDS: risk;ossaversion;omain fgains/losses;ecision-making;rospectheory;resi-dentCarter;ranian ostage risis.

INTRODUCTIONThe renewedontroversyurroundinghe nvolvementftheReagan am-paignnthe ranian ostagerisis uels ew nterestnthe ctivitiesftheCarteradministrationo secure hehostages' elease.Afterxhaustingll diplomaticchannels or chievinghis oalfor ver ixmonths,residentarter ndertooka dramaticmilitaryescue ttemptnApril f1980. Carter'sctionwasnot nlycompletelyontraryohis humanitarianmphasisnworldpolitics utwas ahighly isky rospect rom militarytandpoints well.How canCarter's ctions e explainednlight fhispredilectionor he

peaceful esolutionfconflict? owis itpossible ounderstandhenature ftherisksCarterwaswilling orun, othmilitarilyndpolitically,norder oforcethe elease fthehostages romranian ontrol? his rticlergues hat rospect'New School for ocial Research, 13 West thSt., NewYork,NewYork10014.

2370162-895X/92/0600-0237$06.50/11992 nternationalociety f Political sychology

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238 McDermotttheory rovides he bestway to understandheseseeminglynomalous ndincomprehensiblevents n theCarterdministration.Prospectheoryncompasseswo elements. he firsts a framinghase,during hichnformationsreceived ndprocessedna waythat lacesempha-sisonparticularspects fa problem,uch s whetherr not ttakesplace n asituationfgainsor losses.Gainsor osses are udgedrelative othereferencepoint.nmost ases,this s the tatusuo. However,nmanymportantircum-stances, leaderwillrefuse oaccept new tatusuoas the eferenceointndthuswillcling otheold status uo as the"appropriate"eferenceoint.Thesecond valuativeegmentrgues,nshort,hat eople end oberisk-seekingnthedomain f ossesand risk-aversen thedomain fgains Tversky Kahne-man,1984).Theapplicationfprospect heoryoany ase inthe nternationalnviron-ment husnecessitatestwo-stagenalysis. hebeginningtage orrespondsothefirst,diting, haseof the heory.n this art, heparticularramingftherelevantssues andquestionsreinvestigatedt a substantiveevel norder odiscern ifferencesn thepoliticalmphasesndgoalsofvarious layers. hesecondphaseconsists fthe valuationhase,wherebyhe pecific omain fgainsor losses,and relative iskpropensity,ithercceptantraverse, s dis-cussed andanalyzed.Thisprocess llowsfor comparisonetween hepredictionsfthe heoryand theoutcomes factualevents.The critical ariable ere s thesubjectiveassessmentsf domain nd risk.Whiletheseare clearly iedto, and oftenderivativef,objective ssessments,heyrenot lways, rnecessarily,otallyanalogous.TheframingndevaluationfPresidentimmyarter's ecision ounder-take a rescuemission f the American ostagesn Iran n Aprilof 1980 isinvestigatedere.The hope s touse theflashlightfprospectheoryohelpilluminate case thatmighttherwiserove nexplicablesingmoredominantparadigmsnpolitical cience.Thefailed escuemission fthehostagess inexplicableromheperspec-tive of a structuralistaradigm. tructuralismouldsuggest hat t is highlyunlikely ora superpowerike theUnited tatesto getcaught n a hostagerelationshipith smallpower ike ran.Butonceengaged,tructuralismouldpredicthat hepowerdiscrepancynthe nternationalystem ouldplay o theadvantageftheUnited tates.TheUnited tates hould avebeen ble tofindwaytouse tspower o coerce he raniansnto eturninghehostages. owever,theUnited tates idnotgo into ranwith large howofforce;ndeed, arterwaswidely riticizednthepress tthe ime or enderingmericampotentnthefaceofthe slamic tudents.Whydidn't heCarterdministrationespondoIranwithmoredirect orce romhe utset? tructuralismrovides oadequateresponse.



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Prospectheoryn nternationalelations 239The rescue ttemptookplaceat theverynadir f the risis, ollowinghecollapseofnegotiationsith ranianmoderatesikeBani-Sadr hroughrench

legal ntermediariesSick, 1986).As a result,toffers superbasefor nvesti-gation romheperspectivefprospectheoryecause ttakes laceexclusivelyinthedomain f osses.Prospect heoryanoffer oth xplanationndanalysisfor naction hats seeminglyncomprehensiblerom more tructuralerspec-tive. ndeed,no other heory ouldpredicthisbehavior s accuratelys pros-pecttheory.DOMAIN

One of themostdramaticvents hat ccurred uring arter's enure spresidentas the ranian ostagerisis.OnNovember, 1979, n the ontextfa broaderslamicrevolution,s many s 3,000 raniantudentseizedtheU.S.embassynTehran,aking 6 Americans ostagen theprocess.The studentsthemselves ndertookhis ttack s a symbolic esture,ndexpectedhe ake-over o astonly matterfdays;theywere uite urprisedhen hey eceivedthevociferouslessingsndbenedictionsfthe mam ndproceededosettle nfor longer pisodethan riginallynticipatedSick, 1986).Thirteenf thehostages,ll either lackorfemale,were ubsequentlyeleased nNovember 8and 19 (Sick, 1986). The remaining32 werekeptfor444 daysuntil heirnegotiatedelease on January0, 1980, about twominutes ntotheReaganpresidency.3The Carter dministrationonsistentlyought onegotiate iplomaticallyfor hereleaseof thehostages, lthoughhey imultaneouslyeveloped on-tingencylansformilitaryctionBrzezinski, 985).Theactual escuemissionitself ookplaceonApril 4, 1980. Thismission esultednthedeaths feightAmericanoldiers,with our dditional mericannjuries,ndfailed obringabout hereleaseofanyofthehostages.2Oneof thehostages, ichard ueen,wasreleased nJuly 1, 1980,formedical easons hatwerelater iagnosed s multipleclerosis.3Gary ick hasrecentlylaimed hat heReagan ampaignwas independentlyegotiatingith heIranianRevolutionaryounciloverthetimingf thehostages' elease.He argues hat heCarteradministrationas unaware fthese llicit egotiationsnvolvinghe xchange fhostages or rmsthroughsraeli ntermediaries.ee GarySick, "The Election tory f theDecade," New YorkTimes,April 5, 1991. ABC NewsNightline,ncollaboration ith he inancialTimes fLondon,has conducted seriesof investigationsn these llegations. lthoughmuch ftheevidencensupportf Sick'sclaims s circumstantial,hereremanyndicationshat hebasisofhisargumentmaybe correct.n a classiccase of underestimatinghebase rate,much f thediscussion asfocused n thewhereaboutsf William asey,Reagan's ampaignhief, nd ater eadof heCIA.The problemwith hisfocus s that tfails to investigateowfrequentlyasey's locationwasunknown;heres nobaserate nformationn hisabsencefromhepublic ye.To the xtenthathaving n unknownocationwas a rare vent orCasey, tbecomesmorediagnosticnformation.



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240 McDermottIn applying rospect heoryo anycase in the nternationalrena, t iscrucial o first stablish heoperative omain s one of either ainsorlosses.While it maybe impossible o actually et inside thehead of the relevantdecision-makero assess his subjective erspective,t is possible ouse otherindicatorso determinehe most ikelydomainof action. To takea simpleexample,faninvestigatoranted o knowwhetherdecision-makerelt ot rcold andwasn't bleto askdirectly,e could ook at a thermometero makebestguess. f the emperatureas 100degrees,hances re thedecision-makerfelt ot. fthe hermometeread32degrees,hances re he erson eltold. nasimilarway,t spossible ouseexternalndicatorsodetermine,ngeneral, owa presidentssessedhis domain f action.Carter asclearly peratingn a domain f osses t the ime fthe ecisiontogo aheadwith herescuemission, onfrontingsituation here hings erebadandclearly ontinuingogetworsewith he assage ftime.This sobviousfromveryndicator: arter aced revolutionaryslamic ower hat efusedonegotiate irectly ithhim,an increasinglyrustratedndhostileAmericanpublic, growingenseofdesperationmongnumerous embersfCongressandother overnmentalfficialsbout he afetyndrelease fthehostages,nddecliningnternationalrestigendcredibility.arterouldonlyhave eenhim-selfoperatingna domain flosses,bothdomesticallynd nternationally.On thedomesticront,arter's opularityasdecliningapidly. nepollfrom une 979,evenbefore hehostagerisis egan, eportedhat nly 0% ofthepopulationpproved fCarter's oreignolicyNewYork imes,June 5,1979).Moreto thepoint, ccordingo a Time ollconducteduringhe ast woweeksofMarch, 0% of theAmerican ublicfelt hatCarterwas toosoft nIran.Moreover, arter's eelectionampaignwas goingbadly.During he astweekofMarch,ustprior o therescuemission, arter adsustainedwo argelosses n theNewYork ndConnecticutrimariesoSenator dwardKennedy.Althoughe won heWisconsinrimarynApril ,there ere ress eportshatheused thehostage risis omanipulatehat ictoryyprematurelynnouncinggoodnews bout heirmpendingelease.AccordingobothHamilton ordan'sandJody owell'sreports,hepresident'statementnApril hadbeenprompt-edbywhatwas viewed s a genuine reakthroughnthenegotiationsndwas notrelatedo theprimariesn Wisconsin ndKansasthat ay. ndeed, he ollspriortoApril showed hepresident ith solid 15-pointead inWisconsinven

before he nnouncementas madeconcerninghehostages.Inaddition,twas the irstime hat arter adslipped elowReaganntheelection olls;Carter adheld 2 to1 ead overReagannDecember. yMarch,however,lmost alf fthepeoplewho upportedarter id so "withoutnthu-siasm."Moreover, 1% ofthepopulationaid they elt hatAmericawas in



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ProspectTheory n International elations 241serious rouble,nd about 0% saidthey houghttwas time or changenthepresidencyTime,April14, 1980).Carter's elationshipithCongresswasdeterioratings well.Presidentialvictoriesn votes nCongress eclined rom1.4 to73.3 percentntheSenatealonebetween 979and 1980.Moreover, epublican upportn theSenateforCarter's ositions ellbelow 50% (Ornstein, 984).Pierre alinger,who covered hehostage risis orABC Newsfrom aris,provides goodsummaryf the ituation:

Other actors ereweighingnthePresident. etterhan nyone, arter newhow thehostage risishadparalyzed is administration'sffortsnother ields,fonlybecause tdiverted isownattentionndenergies o greatly.olitically,herefore,e was twicewounded-first ythe risis, ndagainby ts mpact nhisprograms. iscampaignorreelectionegisteredhefrustrationsftheAmericanublic.Whilehispolitical ortuneshadrisen fterhe akingfthehostages, ewasbeginningoslip nthe olls ndhad osta keyprimarynNew York oSenator dwardKennedy. immyarterwasnow n themidst fa fightorhis ife, nd t ooked s ifhewaslosing.A militaryptionhat reedthehostageswoulddramaticallylter heodds. Salinger, 981)It is significanthat alinger oteshere hat militaryptionhat reedhehostages ould somehow ectifyll the osses andperhapsvenrestore r im-provetheprevious tatus uo. In otherwords, t appeared hat hingswouldcontinueogetworse nless omethingasactivelyone orectifyhe ituation.The viewfromnsidetheadministrationas equallybleak,as NationalSecurity dvisorGarySickcommented:The mage fU.S. weakness eneratedymonthsfhumiliatingetbacks ndfrustrationswas nothealthyor elations ith llies or adversaries.ndomestic olitics, ontinuedpassivity otonly ondemned hePresidento self-immolationnthepollsbut triskedgeneratingpopular acklashnfavor fforces hoopposed verythingance ndCarterrepresented.Sick, 1986)As Sick mentions,he nternationalmpact f thehostage risiswas asproblematicorCarters were hedomestic ressures.ecretaryfStateCyrusVance had hadgreat ifficultyntryingogettheallies tocooperatewith heUnitedStates n joiningand enforcingconomic anctionsgainst ran.Forexample, U.N. Securityouncil esolutiongainstranhadbeenvetoed ytheSovietsearlierntheyear.GrievancesroughtgainstranbytheU.S. intheWorld ourtwere lowtoreach ruition.venafterhe ranians ere onvictedin thisCourt, herewas no real mechanismo enforcehepenaltiesmposed.Moreover, arterhad beenwarned y President nwarSadatof Egypt hat

America's "internationaltanding"was beingdamagedby "excessivepas-sivity"Brzezinski, 985).Thus,Carterwas man whohad sustainedremendousossestopersonalpopularity,ational onor, nd internationalnterests hen hehostagesweretaken.By thetime f therescuemission, arterwas a leader eady otakea



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242 McDermottgamble o returnhings o the status uo, with hehostages afely t home,national ride nd nternationalonor estored,nd hispolitical ortunesurnedupward.He was notwilling o define he new status uo as an acceptablereferenceointbecausethat oncessionmightosthimhisreelection,mongother alamities.n terms fprospectheory,e was a manoperatingn thedomain f losses.

THE FRAMING OF OPTIONSInseekingoapply rospectheoryo the ranian ostage risis,t s neces-

sary oanalyze he ptionshatwere onsideredythe elevantlayers,norderto determineheperceived elative iskinessfeach.Assessmentsf risk aninvolve ither alculations ftheprobabilityfsuccessfor particularhoiceand/or heutilityf eachoption.Theway hese ptionswere ramedor residentarteryhis dvisorssanimportantlement.AccordingoGarySick,therewas a consensuswithinheadministrationn thehierarchyf riskpresented ythevarious ptions.Riskhere meantboththe likelihood f success as well as thecosts and benefitsinvolved.The maindisagreementmongadvisors nd decision-makersur-roundedwhich evelofriskwas anacceptable nefor heUnited tates o take.In the nd,the hoice hatwasmadewasthehighestevelofrisk hat residentCarter imself aswilling oaccept Sick,personalommunication).From heoutset, ivebasicoptionswere onsidered or ringingbout herelease f thehostagesndendinghediplomatictalemate. rom he owest othehighestevel ofrisk, hese ptionswereto do nothing;ngage nminimalpoliticalnddiplomaticanctions;ndertakerescuemission;mine heharbors;andengage nan all-outmilitarytrike.The relative enefitsnd risks nvolvedneachoptionwillbediscussed nturn.As National ecurity dvisor bigniew rzezinski1990) comments,t scrucial to keep in mindthe distinctionetweenmilitarynd political isksthroughouthis nalysis.nmany ases,these isks re nverselyelated.More-over,there s often trade-offetween omestic nd internationalostsandbenefitss well.The firstptionwastodonothingnd wait or he nternalituationn ranto stabilize nd resolvethe crisisby itself.Thiswas theoption hatVancesupported.hestrategyerewastocontinue ith oliticalndmilitaryressurebutnotto offernynew nitiativesntil fterhe ranians adformulatedheirnewpolitical ystemnto coherenttructure.hebenefitfthis trategyasthat tdid notrisk ntagonizinghe ranians nyfurther.nVance'sview, hisapproachwas most ikely oprotecthehostages rom urtherarm.



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Prospect heoryn nternationalelations 243Thepolitical isks f thispolicyfrom domestic erspectivereobvious.Carterwould be chargedwith neffectivenessnd be accusedofbeingpushedaround ytheAyatollah.More mportantly,hepersonalenseofanger ttheIraniansn the administrationas runningeryhighat the time. Fromtheperspectivefcentralecision-makers,twasvirtuallympossibleoconceive faccepting eliberatenternationalumiliationn the face of suchabominableIranian ctionwithoutoing omethingnresponse.nshort,here asa univer-sal sensethat he ituation as intolerable.eep anger ndfrustrationdded othebelief hat herewas no strategicrpolitical easonwhy heUnited tatesshould llow tself o bepushed round ya third-rateanaticaleligioustate ntheMiddleEast.Thus,while hemilitaryisks fdoingnothing ere elatively

low,thedomestic olitical iskswerehigh.The secondoptionwas toupthe nte lightlyutonly hroughiplomaticmeans.Thismeant reakingoliticalnd economic elations ith he ranians,placing n embargo n shipmentsfmilitaryales,expellingranian itizensfrom heUnited tates nd so on. Everyonessumed hat hese hings ouldbedone, s theyll were ventually,nd heywerenot egardedsparticularlyiskyfrom ither political ra militarytandpoint.nfact, hese ctionsmountedomore how than ubstance. he realgoal inundertakinghese ctionswas tobring ressurentheEuropeanso oin inthe anctionsgainstran.Thispolicy mountedo a balancingctbetween mericannterestsn ranand U.S. relationshipsith eluctanturopeanllies.Thediplomaticmeasureswere omewhatuccessfulngaininguropean ooperation.owever,uropeanaccommodationotheAmericanosition asmore result fthe mplicithreatof the use of U.S. militaryorce hanofgenuinenterestn sanctioningheIranians.After herescuemission ookplace,theEuropeans elt etrayed,l-though hesediplomaticnitiatives id serve as a good coverfortherescuemission reparations.Thethirdptionhatwasseriouslyonsidered as the escuemissiontself.This wasreally n intermediateptionntermsfpolitical iskiness,ut twastheriskiestption hat ouldbe takenmilitarilyithoutngagingn anoutrightactofwar.Themissionwas intendedo workbystealth,ndthegoalwas tominimize asualties ndbring bout hereleaseofthehostages. veryonen-volvedntheplanningonsideredt obe a clever ndcarefullyhoughtutplan.Eventhosewhonowhave hebenefitfhindsight,uch s Sick andBrzezinski,considerthe plan to have been subtle,sophisticated,nd likelyto havesucceeded.AccordingoSick,all thedecision-makersnderstoodhe eriousmilitaryrisks nvolvednundertakinghemission, ut t still fferedheonlyrealpos-sibility f rescuingmostof thehostages live. The planners newthat hepossibilityf success was not 100%, buttheybelievedthat heriskswere



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244 McDermottmanageable.n otherwords, herisksherewere eenas beingmore bout heprobabilityf militaryuccess than bout thepolitical osts and benefits fundertakinghemission,which eemedmore cceptable.The keyfactor ere s that herescue missionwas the best balanceofpoliticalndmilitaryisk. f tworked,hehostageswould efree, arter ouldbe a hero,and America's nternationalredibility ould be salvaged.The-oretically,successwouldhave mountedo a returnothe ld statusuoas thereferenceoint.However, veryonegreed hat hemilitaryiskswere dmit-tedlyhigh, nd theprobabilityfcompleteuccessrelativelyow.However,militarylanning asdesigned ominimize hesemilitaryisksas much s possible.The strategyas to enter ranon a holidayweekend;herescuerswereto hithard ndquickly nder overof darkness. heAmericanembassytselfs surroundedy arge rounds,ndno oneexpectednough oisewould ravel utside he ompoundoarouse uspicion,speciallywith heuseof silencersn all weapons.The rescuers newwhere hehostageswerebeingheldwithin hebuilding,ndthey xpectedhestudentso be unpreparedndunskilledn combat.Althoughoonediscussedranianossesopenly,herewasevery xpectationhatargenumbersf ranian tudents ouldbe killed nthecourseof themission.However, he risks o Americanoldiers ndhostagesweremore pecific,ndevery ffortasmadetominimizehese osses.Thus,therescuemission eemed obe a particularlyttractiveptionwhen he lter-nativeswereperceivedoamount oeitherettinghe ituationontinueofesteror togo to all-outwar.The fourthptionwas tomine heharbors r tootherwisenterruptom-merce. hiswas seen obepoliticallyuite iskyecause twasthe quivalentfan act ofwar.TheUnited tateshad no ntentionfdeclaring arbutwanted opreventhipsfrom oing nto ran without aving o physicallytopthem.Miningwouldconstitutepassivesea blockade, nd ifwellpublicized,mostshipswouldn't ry o run herisk fenteringhemined rea.Thegoalwas tohave a significantegativempact nIran's xportsnd mports.Mining heharbors asviewed s a sharp scalation. he fearwasthatheIranianswould nvite he oviets nto he egionohelpwithmine-sweepingndthat his ffer ouldprovideheSovietswith nopeningntheregion hat heUnited tateswanted oprevent.hus,mining asseen s a significant,utnotan overwhelming,nternationalisk.Thisoptionwascertainlyiewed s man-ageablefrom militaryerspective. singmineswith utomaticelf-destructmechanisms ould llow someflexibilityndthis ptionwas seriouslyonsid-ered.However,herewasa militaryisk frepeatedlyosing lanes ndships nsuch an action, nd theother olitical isks nvolved yinflamingheregionwere seen to be quitehighas well. Most importantly,hisoptionwoulddonothing irectlyofurtherheprimaryoalofreleasinghehostages.The astoptionvailablewas an all-outmilitaryttack. hiswasextremely



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Prospectheoryn nternationalelations 245risky rom oth political nd a militarytandpointndwas never eriouslyconsidered. s with heprevious ption, hemain eason his ptionwas aban-donedwas because t didnothingoget hehostages ack. t would nflameheentire egion nd escalatethecrisiswithoutoing anythingirectlyo bringabout he elease fthehostages. asically,his ptionwasrejectedverytep fthewaybecause he dverse onsequences ere oogreat,ndthe iskswere oohighbothpoliticallyndmilitarily,omesticallynd nternationally.The most mportantoint egardingheoptionshatwerepoliticallymoreriskyhan herescuemissions that eitherneofferedhe hance o returnhesituationo theformertatus uo bybriningbout herelease f thehostages.Thus,while hemilitaryisks f the escuemissionmight avebeengreaterhanminingheharbor,ndthedomesticolitical isks f punitivetrikemightavebeen essrisky, eitherption fferedn immediateolution othe entralssueof contention.As mentioned,heprincipal ecision-makersgreedon theoptions hatwere vailable ndtheir elativeevels fmilitaryndpolitical isk.However,tis also true hat achadvisor ossessed differenthreshold,r toleranceevel,forwhatwas acceptable.As a result, ach framed isargumentsoCarternquitedifferentays.Theseperspectivesre addressed elow.

FramingItwas the ollapseof the dministration'segotiationsith rimeMinisterBani-Sadr nApril1 thated toCarter'subsequentecision oundertakeherescuemissionJordan,982;Powell,1984).Thepossibilityfundertakingmilitaryptionnresponseo thehostagerisiswasraised couple fdays fterthe embassywas takenin November f 1979. Under the instigationfBrzezinski,hroughecretaryfDefenseHaroldBrown,heJointhiefs fStaff(JCS)put ogetherJoint askForce ndbeganplanningor rescue ttempttthat ime. t was notseriously onsidered s an option,however, ntil hefollowing pril, fter hecollapseofdirect egotiationsith he ranians.Becauseofthenumber f memoirsnd official ocumentshat reavail-able, t spossible o examine numberfdifferentrgumentshatwere resent-ed to Presidentarter rioro hisdecision ogo aheadwith he escuemission.The mainperspectiveshatwillbe examinedrethose spoused ySecretaryf

StateCyrusVance,National ecurity dvisor bigniew rzezinski,ndpresi-dential ssistant amilton ordan.n theend,SecretaryfStateCyrusVanceresignedver his pisode,becausehebelieved hat hemissionouldnotworkandshouldbe pursued ecause twas toodangerous.Prospectheoryrgues hat hoice can often e substantivelyffectedyrelativelyrivialmanipulationsn theframingndconstructionfavailable p-



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246 McDermotttions. orexample, oding elpsdefine he eferenceoint,nd hepresentationofoptions efines heuniversefcontingencieshat reconsidered.One notable spect fthe ranian escuemission ase is that achadvisordrew n differentistoricalnalogies o makehispoint ndpresshisposition.These analogiesoffered frame ordefininghereferenceoint, s well asinstructingndividual dvisors boutappropriateourses f action n a givensituation. uch historicalnalogies anbe quite nfluential,s Jervisuggests:

What ne learns rom ey ventsninternationalistorys an importantactorndeter-mininghe mages hat hapethe nterpretationf ncomingnformation....Previous nternationalvents rovide statesman ith range fimaginableituationsand allowhim odetect atternsndcausal inks hat anhelphimunderstandisworld.(Jervis, 976)In this ase,eachadvisor,workingrom differentcript,oresaw differ-entprobable utcome ased on his chosenhistoricalnalogy.n somesense,these nalogies fferedredictionsbout hemost ikely utcome fevents oreach advocate.Conclusions eached nd thepoliciespromotedaried ccordingto the imilaritieshat achadvisor awbetween resentndpast vents. here-fore, t s importanto examine hese nalogies ndtheir roponent'sdvicetoCarter.One advisorwhoseanalogies ffectedis advicetoPresidentarterwasSecretaryf StateCyrusVance.Vancewas adamantlypposedto therescuemission,eeingt s tooriskyrom oth militarynd politicaltandpoint.hefinal ecision oattempthe escuemissionwasmadebyCarter ndhisprincipaladvisors n April11 in a meetinghat ookplacewithout ance Brzezinski,1985;Vance,1982;Carter,983).Uponhis returnromwhat veryonenvolveddescribeds a "well-earned" acation, ance xpressedhock ndconcernhatsuch momentousecision adbeenmadewithoutis nput. sa result,nothermeetingf theprincipals ascalledonApril15,at which ime ecretaryance

outlined isobjections.Atthatmeeting, ance:pointedutthatwehad made ubstantialrogressngainingllied upportor ffectivesanctions.. [I] pointedutfurtherhat he ormationftheMajlis,towhichKhomeinihadgiven urisdictionver hehostagerisis, ouldbe a major tep oward functioninggovernmentithwhomwecouldnegotiaten ran . . Even f he aidwere echnicallysuccessful,he missionwas almost ertain o lead to a number f deaths mong hehostages,notto mentionhe ranians. he only ustificationnmymindfor rescueattempt asthat hedangero thehostageswas so great hattoutweighedherisks familitaryption. did notbelieve hat o be the ase.I remindedhegroup hat ven ftherescuemission idfree omeofthe mbassytaff,the raniansould implyakemore ostages rommongheAmericanournaliststill nTehran.Wewould hen eworse ff han efore,ndthewhole egionwouldbeseverelyinflamedyour ction.Ournationalnterestsnthewholeregionwouldbe inflamedyour ction. inally, saidthere as a realchance hatwewould orcehe raniansnto hearms f theSoviets. Vance,1983)Inspite fVance's bjections,hedecision ogoaheadwithhemissionwasreaffirmed.tthis ime, ecretary ancetendered isresignationoPresident



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Prospect heoryn nternationalelations 247Carter, ho waited o announce ance'sdecision ntil fter herescuemissionhadtaken lace. Vanceexplains is decision oresign s a matterfprinciple:

I haddisagreedwith olicy ecisionnthepast,but cceptinghatmen f forcefuliewswould nevitablyisagree rom ime otime, ad cquiesced ut f oyaltyo hePresidentknowing couldnotwin very attle. hedecision o extracthehostages yforce romthecenter fa city foverfivemillion,more han ix thousandmilesfromheUnitedStates,which ouldbe reached nlyby flyingverdifficulterrain as different:wasconvincedhat hedecisionwaswrongndthattcarried reat isks or hehostagesndfor urnationalnterests..[I] knewthat couldnothonorablyemain s Secretaryf State when so stronglydisagreedwith Presidentialecision hatwent gainstmy udgments towhatwasbestfor he ountrynd for hehostages. ven fthemissionworked erfectly,nd didnotbelieve twould, wouldhave osayafterwardhat hadopposed t,givemy eason oropposingt,andpubliclyriticize hePresident.hatwouldbe intolerableor hePresi-dent nd me. Thatday, toldCarter wouldhave oresignfthemissionwent orward.(Vance, 1983)Of all hisadvisors, ecretaryancewas closest oPresidentarter, othpersonallynd ideologicallySick, 1986;Carter, 982). Indeed,bothVance'sandCarter's ccountsfthe nteractionurroundingance's esignationrequitemovingnd almost eminiscentfthekind ftragedyssociatedwith failedlove affair.t is thusparticularlyignificanthatPresidentarter ecidedto

override ance'sargumentsndpursue hemilitaryptionwhenhe knew hatVanceobjected tronglynough oresign ver t.Secretary ance rgued hroughouthehostagerisis hat heUnited tatesshouldusepatiencendnegotiationnorder ogaintherelease fthehostagessafely. isoverridingoncernwas the ives ndsafetyfthehostagesnd, ntheeventof the rescuemission, he ives of theAmerican oldiers s well. Heframedptionsn terms fmortality,ndeverythingasevaluatednterms fthe ikelihood hat particularctionwould ead tothedeath f a human eing.He alsoappearedo be more oncernedbout ainingndkeepinghe upportftheEuropean llies than ther dvisors.In terms f theoptions resentedarlier,Vance'sthresholdorriskwasreally t thefirsttage.Morespecifically,e wanted o donothingndwaitforthe nternalituationn ran o settle own.Hebelieved hat ncethishappened,the ranianswouldno longerhave use for he American ostages ndwouldrelease hem oluntarilyithoutdditionalressureromheU.S. FromVance'sperspective,nythinghatAmericamightotobringbout hehostages' eleasein themeantimeouldonly erve o furtherntagonizehe raniansndthus isktheultimateafetyfthehostages.He also thoughthatmilitaryctionwouldalienate heEuropean llies he had workedo hard oreassure. e thus awarescue missionas unacceptably iskyfromboth a politicaland militarystandpoint.It is significanto note that heAgnusWard ncident as thehistoricalanalogy romwhichVanceoperated.As Vancerecalls:



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248 McDermottI alsobelievedhathehostages ould e releasedafelynce hey ad ervedheirpoliticalurposen ran. foundupportor his onclusionnwhat ad appenedn wosimilaraseswhere mericansere eld ostage.heywere heAgnusWardncident,involvinghe eizuref ur onsulartaffnMukdent he nd fWorld arI,and hecaseof heUSS Pueblo. heWardasehadmanyimilaritieso he eizuren ran,s sclear romhememorandumf he ointhiefsf taffoPresidentrumanecommend-ing gainstheuse ofmilitaryorce. had ent copy f thismemorandumo thePresidenthortlyfter hehostages ere aken. was convinceds time assed hechancesfphysicalarmothe ostagesiminished.Vance, 983)Thus,Vanceused theWard nd Puebloanalogies osupport isviewthatthehostageswouldremainafe nd be released nharmeds long s theUnitedStateswaspatient,estrainednaction, ndwillingonegotiate.notherwords,Vancethoughthat he new status uo, while notoptimal,was nonethelessacceptable s longas no onewas killed.He feared hatAmericanctionwouldleadto the oss of ife nd thuswas not n advisable ourse faction. o, forVance, ny ction hat heUnited tates ookwould etomake gain ndnot oprevent loss.Vancebelieved nyrescuemissionwas doomed omilitary,ndthus oliti-cal, failurerom heoutset ecauseof thehigh isk fdeaths, etherefused ogloatwhenhispredictionsametrue.Rather, e was thefirsto offerarter hemostheartfeltondolences ollowingheannouncementfthefailedmission

(Jordan, 982).Vancehad heldsway n most ftheearly oreignolicydecisions ftheCarter dministration.owever,he was nottheonlyseniormember f thedecision-makingeam;Brzezinskiwas equally mportantolitically.here slittle oubt hat rzezinski'spinionwas taken uite eriously yCarter.ndeed,GarySick characterizesis importanceo thepresidentn quitecompellingfashion:Brzezinskiasthe eryntithesisfCyrus ance....Thisrestlessnergyndpersistentursuitf freshpproachesade rzezinskinaturalltergo oJimmyarter'sctivism.lthoughhewomenwere sychologicallyveryifferentndnevereallyecameersonallylose, heyomplementedach thernverypecial ays. arter asdissatisfiedithhingssthey ere ndwas eterminedousehis residencyogeneratehange.rzezinskiparkedewdeas t dazzlingate ndrefusedobe constrainedythestatus uo indevising isstrategies. lthougharterprobablyejected orefBrzezinski'sdeas hat eaccepted,eobviouslyaluedheirreverentnventivenesshat rzezinski roughtoany ubject.Sick, 1986)AccordingoGarySick,the real shift nCarter's olicy llegiance romVance oBrzezinskiame fterhe oviet nvasion fAfghanistann ate1979. tis clear from arter'smuch-publicizedtatementshathewas deeply hockedandpersonallyffendedytheSovietaction. ndeed, t was afterheSovietinvasion fAfghanistanhatVance nnounced hat e wouldnot tay nofficebeyondhe lection. t wasfollowinghis venthat arter's olicy hanged romanemphasisnpatiencendnegotiationoonebasedmore nconfrontationndcompetition.ndeed, changenframe tthis ime rom ains o ossesregard-



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Prospectheoryn nternationalelations 249ingU.S.-Sovietrelationsesultedn a noticeablehangenpolicy romppease-ment o deterrence.t waswithin his ontexthat hedecision bout herescuemissionwasmade Sick, 1986).Brzezinski as a powerfulorcenthe ecision oproceedwithhemission.However, rzezinski adquite differentgenda hanVance.His framencom-passednational ower ndprestiges well as thehostages'welfare. s HaroldSaunders,Assistant ecretaryf StateforNearEast and SouthAsia, notes,"ZbigBrzezinski as more oncerned ith ationalnterestndhonor, hileCyVanceemphasized umane alues" Saunders, 985). In short, ancewas theidealist o Brzezinski'smore lassicalrealist osition.Brzezinski avoredome kindofmilitaryescuemission romheoutset,even hough,ikeVance,he knew hatmilitaryiskswere nvolvednthe escuemission:

Myviewwasthat asualtiesnthe escuemissionwouldbeunavoidable;utwealso hadto face thepossibilityhat he ttempt ight ail ltogether.Brzezinski, 982)The differenceas thatBrzezinski asmorewilling oaccept hese isksthanVance nd saw thems more navoidableBrzezinski,985).Histhresholdof riskon the ist of optionswas thehighest fthe central ecision-makers.Indeed,he went o far s tosupport punitivemilitaryaid gainstran, nthe

faceofuniversalpposition. rzezinski as also the ne whobegan oplanforsecondrescuemission, wodaysafter he first ailureBrzezinski, 985).Asnoted, rzezinski'snterestasbroader han he ives nd afetyfthehostages:Ineffect,felt hat he uestion f the ivesof thehostageshould otbe our nly ocusbut hatwe should xamine s well what eeded o bedone oprotecturvital nterests.waspainfullyware hat t somepoint erhaps choicebetweenhe womightvenhavetobe made. Brzezinski, 985)

Indeed, twas Brzezinski hophoned rown nNovember togettheJCS towork na rescuemission. rzezinski asthe ne who uestioned hetherrnotthemission houldgo ahead with ivehelicoptersfter hehydrauliceakwasdiscoveredn the crucial ixth uringhe courseoftherescuemissiontself.Indeed,hiscommentarynthis vent rovides ingularnsightnto he onscioususe offramingo influence decision-maker:

I stood n fronto hisdeskwithmymind acing: hould press hepresidentogoaheadwith nly ivehelicopters?ere was,alonewith he resident.erhaps could onvincehim o abandonmilitaryrudence,ogo in a daring ingle troke or he igprize, otakethehistorichance.And atthe ametime, contraryhoughtlashedhrough ymind:would notbe abusingmyoffice y pressinghisman nto uch a quickdecision ftermonthsf meticulouslanning?Would notbe givingnto romanticdea?I haddecided ourge oing headwith ive nly fColonelBeckwith aspreparedo doit,butnot opress or twithouthefield ommander'soncurrence.Brzezinski, 985)

In this equence,Brzezinskiemonstratesconsciouswareness fanadvisor'sabilityopersuadendmanipulatedecision-maker,ven ne sopowerfuls thepresident,hroughheframingfoptions.



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250 McDermottTheevidenceuggestshat rzezinski ad a greatmpactnCarter's hink-ingwith egard o thehostage escuemission.n thememohe wrote o thepresidenthedaybefore arterpprovedhemission,fteremonstratinguchreluctancearlier, rzezinskirgued:In short, nless omethings done to change henature f thegame,we must esignourselveso the ontinuedmprisonmentf thehostages hroughouthe ummer r evenlater.However,wehave othinkeyondhefate f thefiftymericansndconsider hedeleteriousffectsf a protractedtalemate,rowing ublic rustration,nd nternationalhumiliationf theU.S. (Brzezinski, 985)Thus, t sevidenthat rzezinskitartedrom differentet f ssumptionsthanVance. Brzezinski elieved hat hingswouldgetworsewithoutrastic

Americanction,whileVancebelieved xactlyhe pposite.At themeetinghefollowing ay,Brzezinskirgued hatWeought oattempthe escue s early s possible ecause henightsregettinghorter;thatwe should onsiderakingrisonersackwith s,so thatwewouldhavebargainingleveragen the vent hat he ranians eized otherAmericanss hostages; ndthatweshould considera simultaneous etaliatorytrike n the event the rescue failed.(Brzezinski, 985)It is interestingo note hat rzezinski as influencedya quitedifferenthistoricalnalogyhanVance.Brzezinski'smodel or he escuemissionwastheIsraeliraid on Entebbe.One ofthereasonshe supported smallerAmericanhelicopterorce rew ut of this xperience:Some haveargued ubsequentlyhat he mission houldhavebeencomposed f,say,twice smany elicopters;ut f he ranians addiscoveredhemission s a resultfthesize of the air armadapenetratingheir irspace,we all wouldhave doubtless eenchargedwith ypicallyxcessiveAmericanedundancy,ith nwillingnessogo inhardand ean-the way,for xample, he sraelis id atEntebbe.Brzezinski, 985)Indeed, uringhe perationalspects fthe lanning,rzezinski asquite

aware f a second owerfulnalogywithheBayofPigs.Hewas carefulosteerCarterlearof themistakeshatKennedy ad made t that ime.As Brzezinskidescribest:He and had earlier iscussed ohn ennedy'snterferenceith hemilitarylanningortheBay ofPigsoperation,ndCarterwas clearly eterminedo makecertain hathispersonal oncerns id not nterfereith hemission's hances fsuccess. Brzezinski,1985)TheBayofPigsanalogyndeed ecame uite salientnalogy orCarter.AccordingoSick,John . Kennedy aswidely riticized,speciallywithinmilitaryircles, ornsistingncivilian ontrol vermilitaryperationsntheCuban MissileCrisisdownto themostminute etail. Later ick notes: presumablyt was dueto his disastrousxperiencettheBay ofPigsthat ed President ennedyo insist n civilian ontrol fevery etailduringheCubanMissile risis."]Lyndon ohnson as similarlyriticizedor ssertingPresidentialontrol ownto theunit evelduringperationsnVietnam. immyarterconsciouslyttemptedoavoid hese xtremes.Sick, 1985)



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Prospectheoryn nternationalelations 251Brzezinski's istoricalnalogiesmayhave ontributedoCarter'sonsciousdecision ogivecontrol fthe perationallans or he escuemissionver o the

military.his strategy ayhavehurt hancesforthe success of themissionbecauseproblemswith hechainofcommand hatmight aveemergedarlierwith tricterivilian ontrol idn'tbecomesalient ntil heexecution f themission tself.Thisanalogys particularlyronic iven hat arter equestedcopyofKennedy's peech ollowingheBayofPigsdebaclefrom odyPowellafter he failure f therescuemission,n order o helphimprepare isownspeechfor hepublic.See Jordan,982.)A thirdmportantdvisor oCarter uringhehostage escuemission, tleastpartly ecause ofhisemphasis n domestic olitical onsiderations,asHamilton ordan,hepresidentialdvisor.His memoirseem to be themostpsychologicallyandid ftheplethorafbookswrittenyCarterdministrationofficials. orexample,Jordan rote f Brzezinski'somments,ollowingheApril15 meeting uringwhichVance raisedhis objections,hat"Cy is theultimatexampleof a good man who has beentraumatizedyhis Vietnamexperience"Jordan, 982).Thiscomment asobviouslymade nreferenceoVance'sservice oth s secretaryfthearmy nddeputyecretaryfdefenseduringheVietnamwar.

Infact,Jordansquite pen bouthisanger t Vance ornotbelievingarlythat he rescuewouldsucceed, ndalso for bandoningarter nhistime fgreatesteed fterthadfailed.His book eems ess affectedyhindsight,n hisway, han heothers.Jordan ended o frame hingsn terms f its impact n thereelectioncampaign.He made rgumentsasedon howparticularctionswould ffecthepresident'somestic ppealandpopularity.ordan'serspectives interestingespeciallyn ight f Brzezinski'slaims hat omesticonsiderationsere rrel-evant oCarter uringhis ime:Perhaps urprisingly,herewas never ny xplicit iscussion f therelationshipetweenwhatwe might o in Iranand domestic olitics: eitherhePresident orhispoliticaladvisor ver discussedwithme thequestion fwhetherne oranother f our ranianoptionswouldhavea betterr worsedomestic olitical ffect.Brzezinski, 985)This recollectionacks self-awarenessnthewaybestexemplifiedythestoryf themanwhodidn't ikeparties ecausehe had never een oonewherehe wasn't n attendance.notherwords, t s difficultor omeone odiscount

sufficientlyor he mpact f his ownpresencena situation. o onemayhavetalked boutdomestic olitics round rzezinskierhaps ecause hey newhewasn't concerned bout the subject.Nonetheless,t is clear fromJordan'smemoirs hat he reelectionampaignwas far from n insignificantoncernduringhis eriod, articularlyiven arter's ledgenot ocampaignnthe oadbecauseofthecrisis.



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252 McDermottJordanresents is ownhopesconcerningherescuemission s follows:As I listened o GeneralPustay'spresentationon March24, 1980), I beganto beconvinced hatmaybetwouldwork.Aftermonthsfwaitingndhoping, egotiatingndfailing, erewas a waytogo in and snatch urpeople upand havethewholedamnedthing ver Not to mention hat t woulddo for hePresidentnd thenation. twouldprove o the olumnistsndourpoliticalpponentshat arter as not n ndecisivehiefExecutivewhohadfailed o act. t would olster world ommunityhatwas ncreasinglyskepticalboutAmericanower.A daringmissionwouldrighthegreatwrong onetoourcountrynd ts citizens.Jordan, 982)Jordan'sentimentsreparticularlyotable or heirmphasisnrightingwrong,r somehowryingogetback onormal,rrestorehe ormertatusuoas the ppropriateeferenceoint.Onceagain, hegoalofrecoupingll ofthe

personal, ational,nd nternationalosses nonegreat aring amble mergesas highlyppealing, rom oth politicals wellas a psychologicaltandpoint.This is exactlywhat rospect heory ouldpredictn sucha situation.THE DECISION

The most mportantecision-maker,fcourse,wasPresident arter im-self. Carter'smemoirs,lthough ontainingiary ntries,re notnotable ortheirevelofcognitiveremotionalntrospection.t spainfullyvidenthrough-out,however,hat arter as a manwhodeeply xperiencedhe ersonalurdenof hisglobalresponsibilities.e emergess a sincerelymoral, enuinelyindand caringman whoseleadershipbilitieswereseriouslyhallenged y theenormityf thecriseshe faced.Giventhe omplexityftheproblem,ndthediversityfopinionshat arter eceived,t s challengingounderstandowhereached hedecision hathe madeconcerningherescuemission.A framingnalysis llows n examinationntohow all the nformationndoptionswere ssimilatedyPresident arter. arter aced situationhat learlymilitatedgainst he mpact fa deleteriousroupthink-typeffect;4hepresi-dent'smindset an be examinedn ight fthedifferentrameshat is advisorspresented. is mindsets assumed o includehis ownperceptionf broaderdomesticndgeopoliticalonsiderations.Prospect heorywouldpredicthat,nthedomain f osses,Carterwouldoptfor risky amble hatmight eturnhe ituationotheformertatus uo.4For moreon theGroupthinkffect,ee IrvingJanis1982), whodescribes hephenomenonfgroupthinks a "quick ndeasyway orefer o a mode fthinkinghat eople ngagenwhen heyaredeeplynvolvedna cohesivengroup, hen hemembers'trivingsor nanimityverrideheirmotivationorealisticallyppraiselternativeourse f ction"p. 9). This learly idn't appenntheCarterdministration,s evidencedythe rastic ifferencesnopinionsspoused yVance ndBrzezinski,mong thers. hereasons or his renodoubtmany ut recertainlyue npart odeeplyheldpersonalnimositiesetweenhese articipants,s wellas thepersonaltyles fsomeparticipants,uchas Brzezinski, hodidnot hy wayfromonfrontation.



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Prospectheoryn nternationalelations 253Such a risky amble s characterizedy a situation here heprobabilityfsuccess s lower han hat fferedyotherptions, ut heutilityfthe utcomeishigher.fthe escuemission adbeen success,Carter ouldhavegained herelease f thehostages,he espectfhis alliesandadversaries,ndthevotes fhisconstituency.notherwords, ecouldhaverecoupedll his osses, ndmadesomegainsas well.No other ption vailable fferedhispossibility.What s surprising,owever, iventhe debate monghis advisors,wasCarter'sonfidencenthe ikelihood fthe lan's uccess.Even fterhemissionfailed,he insistedn itsviabilityntheApril 4-25diary ntry:

The cancellation four missionwas causedby a strangeeriesof mishaps-almostcompletely npredictable.he operationtselfwas wellplanned.The men were welltrained.We hadevery ossibilityfsuccess,becauseno Iranian larmwas raiseduntiltwo or three ours fter urpeople eftran. Carter, 982)

Carter's etrospectiveonfidences surprisingecause of thecomplexityndenormityf the ask s wellas the ow estimates fsuccessofferedytheJCSand others rior othemission.Atthis oint, owever, arter'sonfidences acentralssue because tclearly elped opromote isdecision ogo aheadwiththemission.There reseveral ossible easons, oth ognitivendmotivational,or hisconfidence.rom he ognitive oint fview,tcouldhavebeen classic aseofthe onjunctiveallacy,which emonstrateshat eoplethink heprobabilityftotal uccessfor n event hat equireshe ombinationf a number fsmallerevents s greaterhanthe ikelihood hat nyone of those vents lone willsucceed.Thisnotionspsychologicallyppealing ecausepeople hink hepos-sibilityfanyoneof a numberf differenthings appenings greaterhan hechance fonly ne ofthose hingsccurring;hey ail orealize hatllthe ventsin the umulativeequencemust ccur or he argervent osucceed. neventsrequiringuch a combination,omplete uccess s onlyas likely s the eastlikely vent.That s because f one linkfails, he ntire hainfails s well.Theconjunctiveallacy rovides compellingxplanationor he vercon-fidencehat edto thefailurefthe paceshuttlehallengernJanuaryf1986,for xample.n the ranianituation,artermayhave houghthat henumberfcontingencylansandback-up upplies nsured higher robabilityfsuccessthanwasrealistic,specially iven he heer umberfcontingencieshat adtosucceed n order or he ntire lanto work.This typeof confidences also reminiscentfJervis'srgumenthat nirrationalursuitfconsistencyfteneads tothe voidancefvaluetrade-offs.As Jervis otes,

[P]eoplewhofavor policy sually elieve hatt ssupportedymanyogicallyndepen-dent easons.When person elieves policy ontributeso onevalue,he is likely obelieve hat t lso contributeso several ther alues, ven houghheresnoreasonwhytheworld houldbe constructednsucha neat ndhelpfulmanner. his wouldnotbeirrationalf in order o agreewith proposition personhad to affirm number f



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254 McDermottnecessaryonditions.ut ften he erson olds numberfbeliefs,achofwhichwouldbe sufficiento ustify ispolicypreference.Jervis, 976)

This avoidanceof value trade-offsharacterizedhepositions f bothBrzezinski nd Vance s wellas Cartern the aseof the escuemission n ran.Vance believed hemissionwas likely ofail,would lienate uropean llies,inflame he slamicworld, esultnmoreAmerican ostages eing aken, ndthrowhe raniansnto he oviet amp, lthoughhese iewswerenot ogicallyrelated. rzezinskindCarter elieved hemissionwould ucceed, ngenderhegratitude,oweverubdued,fallied ndArab eaders,wouldnot ead toSovietinfiltrationf the rea,and notharm therAmericansntheregion.Other ossible xplanationsorCarter'sonfidenceremoremotivationalin nature. nemight e simplewishfulhinking.artermayhavebelieved hatthemissionwould ucceedbecausehewanted t tosucceed.However,here sevidence orefutehisview.Carterwas awareofthemilitaryisksnvolvednattemptingo rescuethehostages ecauseVance hadobjected o themissionpreciselyn thegroundsfthehighprobabilityffailure nd ost ives.GivenCarter'swareness fthe isksnvolved,t sdifficulto sustainnargumenthathe believed twould ucceed olelybecausehewantedt towork.Anotherxplanationor onfidencentheplan fter hedecisionwasmademayhave hadto do withustification.his is similar o thephenomenonhatoccursndissonancexperiments,hen he spreadingpart" fthe lternativesmakes he hosen ptionmuchmore ttractivehan herejectedne,nomatterhow close invaluetheywere valuated rior oactual hoice Festinger,957;Festigner Carlsmith,959;Wicklund Brehm, 976). In thisway,disso-nance reduction orks o ustifyhesuperiorityf thechosen ption fterhedecision.Thishelps oreduce egret,ven ong fter hedecision asproved obe suboptimal.Carter's elief erseverancenthe ikelihoodfthemission'success, venaftertsfailure,s alsohighlyeminiscentfthefindingsfFestinger,iecken,andSchacterFestignertal., 1956).They ell he toryfa religiousult edbya womanwhopreachedndpreparedll herfollowers or he mminentnd oftheworld.Proselytizingor hegroup ookplaceonly fterhe riginal redic-tionshad failed ocometrue.Festinger,t al. suggestedhat uchpost-failurebelief sgeneratedo ustifyll the osts ncurrednespousinghe riginaleliefsystem.Moreover, roselytizingrovides onsensual ealityesting or uch

beliefs. t splausible oargue hat arter asaffectivelyotivatedobelieve nthe ikelihoodf themission's uccess, ven ftertsfailure,norder o ustifythe ives ost n itspursuit.Carter's onfidencenthe robabilityf uccess simportantecause tfliesinthefaceofthe stimatedisk, othnterms f ives ndmaterialost, s wellas estimatesfthe ikelihood hat hehostageswouldbereleased. his s impor-



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Prospectheoryn nternationalelations 255tant ecause t s preciselyhis onfidence, hichwasgreaterhanmore bjec-tiveestimatesf the ikelihoodfsuccess, hat llowedCarterodecidetogoaheadwith missionhe knewto be risky.He understoodherisk,but hadconfidencehat t was worthaking ecauseof thepossibilityfrestoringheformertatus uo as referenceoint.In makinghisdecision,Carter ttemptedo assimilate ndintegrateheopinions hathad beenofferedohimbyhis advisors.He maynothave beenaware,however,ftheway nwhich his dvicewas skewed y heway nwhichtheir ssessmentsf theoperative omain ifferedrom isown.In termsfprospectheory,ancedidnot ee himselfsbeing oobviouslyin thedomain f losses.As is clear from isstatements,e did not hinkhatthings ouldgetdrasticallyorse nlessAmerica ookpositive teps opreventthathappening. s his earlier uotes ndicate, e believed hat s longas theUnited tateswaspatientnddid notuseforce,hings ould esolve hemselvesin America'sbest nterestver time.Moreover, ance did not see theentirepoliticalituations deterioratingnquite he ameway s Brzezinski id.Thus,whileVanceknew hings ereworse hanhey adbeenbefore hehostages eretaken,he seemedto have accepted nd indeed"renormalized"hehostagesituations a new tatusuo "referenceoint" na way hat rzezinski,ordan,andCarter id not.Thismayhavebeenbecausehethoughtfthingsnterms flives ost, ndsinceno iveshadbeen ostpriorothe escuemission, esawthesituations still eing elativelyeutral. hushe was notpreparedotake isks,becausehe did not ee himself s actingn thedomain f osses.Brzezinski erceived imself s confrontingnentirelyifferentituation.He clearly iewedhimselfnd the ountryo be in therealm fseriousosses.Again,thismaybe because he framedhingsn terms f threatso nationalprestigendhonor, ather han n terms f lives lost.The United tateswascertainlyn a worse ituationccordingothese alues han thadbeenbefore hehostageswere aken.Thus, na classiccase of ossaversion, e did not ssimi-late his lossesquickly reasily.Rather, rzezinski aspreparedotakegreatrisks oreturno theformertatus uo andto increaseAmerica's tanding ybringingboutthereleaseofthehostages.He believed hat hesituation asbound oget significantlyorseunlessAmerica ookdrastic ction opreventfurthereteriorationightway.As a result, rzezinskirgued gainstVance'spredictions. oreover, rzezinski elieved he missionwouldsucceed, lbeitwith asualties:

A very omprehensiveeview ftherescueplan byBrown,Jones,ndmyselfnmid-March edme to the onclusionshat heplanhad a reasonably oodchance fsuccess,thoughherewouldprobablye casualties.[W]ecouldundertakehe dmittedlyisky ut ncreasinglyeasible escuemission..With hepassageoftime,we were llbecomingmore onfidenthat ossible inkswerebeingworked ut of the rescueplanand that heprobabilityf success was increas-ing . . . (Brzezinski, 982)



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256 McDermottByand arge,Cartergreedwith rzezinskind took ssuewith lmost llof Vance'sconcerns.ndeed, n response o Vance'sobjections n April15,Carter eplied:I understandnd am notunconcernedbout heirwelfare. utmy bligations to thosehostages,whorepresent e,you,and ourcountry . .I disagreewithyour ssessmentf thereaction o therescuemission. t ifworks, urfriendsll over heworldwillbreathe sigh frelief hatt'sover nd hathey on'thaveto mpose urtheranctions.heMoslem ountries aymake few ublic tatementsorthe akeof slamic nity,utyouknow swell s I dothathey espise ndfear homeiniand will be snickeringt himbehind is back. Jordan, 982)Carterwas also in therealm f osses,althoughotto the ame extentsBrzezinski. arter's rimaryoncernwasreallyhe afetyfthehostages,morethan he nternationalrestigefAmerica.ndeed, arter escribedhis oal nadiary ntryf November 0:Wewantt o bequick, ncisive,urgical, o oss ofAmericanives,notnvolveny thercountry, inimalufferingf the ranian eople hemselves,o ncrease heireliance nimports,ure f success ndunpredictable.Carter, 982)

Carter ept hese s hisbasicgoals throughouthe risis, nd, nfact, he escuemission amecloser omeetinghese pecific oalsthanny fthe therptions.It s clearfrom iscommentshat arter'sxplicitoalwastobringhehostageshome,not opunishhe ranians. his s at east art fthe easonwhy he escuemission,venthoughmore iskyn termsfprobabilityfsuccess,waschosenover he thermilitaryptions,uch sminingheharbor r aunchingpunitivestrike.nfact,Carter'shresholdf risk n the arlier istofoptionswas atthelevelof therescuemission tself.He was a manwhofound he use offorcerepugnant.e felt ressureo do somethingofree hehostages.However, ecould notbring imself oengage nanactofwar such s miningheharbors,especiallyf twoulddo little odirectlyringbout he elease fthehostages.Thus,Cartermade a decision nApril11,followinghefinal ollapseofnegotiationsn April1, to proceedwith rescuemission e believedwouldsucceed nreleasinghehostageswithoutlienatingllies, nflaminghe slamicworld, ushingran nto he oviet amp, rresultingnthe akingfadditionalAmerican ostages. n otherwords,he tooka gamblehe understoodo bemilitarilyiskynorder ograb chance trecouping reviousossesand re-establishinghe arlier tatus uo.

RiskinessfChosenOptionThe relative iskiness fundertakingherescuemission s bestevaluatedrelative o the therptionsonsideredtthe ime.These ncludehediplomaticandmilitaryptions iscussed bove.By April, lmost ll political, conomicanddiplomaticanctionsossiblehadbeenunilaterallymposed nthe ranian



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Prospectheoryn nternationalelations 257governmentytheU.S. These ncludedxpellingranian iplomatsnd tudentsfromheU.S.; breaking iplomaticelations;mposingn embargon all ex-portedmaterial,ncluding eaponspaidforbythe shahbut never elivered;freezingranian ssets n theU.S.; andmaking inancialransactionsn Iranillegal norder oprevent .S. citizens,ncludinghe ress, romravelinghere.From he tart, arter elieved hatmilitaryptionshould nlybepursuediftherewas an immediate hreato thehostages' ives,if,for xample, heIranians ut hem n trial ndcondemnedhem,s threatened,r f llnegotiat-ingchannels ailed.Thisfailurefnegotiationss infactwhat ccurrednAprilof 1980.At that ime, he rescuemissionwas theoption hat fferedhegreatestprospect f recoupingll previousosses andreturningo thestatus uo thatexisted eforehehostages ad beentaken n November.t wasunderstoodhatthepolitical isksof undertakingrescuemissionwerehigh, speciallyfitfailed.However,smentioned,rzezinskindCarter elt hat oingnothing asevenmore isky olitically,specially iven hewidespreadriticismsfpresi-dentialncompetencehatwerefloatingroundhepress t the ime.Everyonebelieved hat successfulmission ouldredeemll osses.However,he oliticalriskof a failedmissionwas difficulto assess in advance.Unfortunately,heoutcome fevents roved usthowpolitically isky failedmission ouldbe:Carterost he lection;hehostageswere ispersedll over ran ndnot eleasedfor nother inemonths;nd America's nternationaltature iminishedvenfurther.From militaryerspective,t s clearfromhe rincipals'memoirshat herescuemissionwas understoodobe the iskiestptionhatwasseriouslyonsid-ered,both n terms f likelihood fsuccess,as well as interms f lives andmaterial hat ould be lost.Themilitarytself new f thehigh isks twasundertakingnplanningherescuemission.ndeed, heJCSreportn themissiontatesxplicitlyhat therescuemissionwasa high isk peration.eopleandequipment ere alled onto performt theupper imits fhuman apacity nd equipmentapability"(U.S. DefenseDept.,1980). ndeed,Admiral ollowayudged he ikelihoodfsuccessto have been about60% to 70% (Ryan,1985).Hamilton ordanells storybout query romheJCS'sGeneral ones-toCharlesBeckwith,he manwhoeventuallyed themission, t theoutset fplanning. eckwith as asked heprobabilityfsuccess ndthe isksnvolved;heresponded,"Sir,' said, theprobabilityfsuccess s zero ndthe isks rehigh.' (Jordan, 982).However, s mentionedarlier, heconfidencef theprincipalsn thesuccessof therescuemissionncreased fter hedecisionwasmade.Evenafterthemission ailed, ecretaryrown ates heprobabilityfsuccess s high s70%, arguinghat hemissionwaswell-plannedJordan,982).



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258 McDermottIt is interestingonote,however,hat he ntelligencestimatesfsuccessmayhavebeenlowerthanunderstoodythemilitarylanners. alinger e-scribes n allegedCIA report ivento Stansfield urnern March16 thatevaluated heprospectsor escuemission uccessas follows:6. The estimatedercentf ossamong heAmembassyostagesuringachof he ivemajorphaseswas:(a) Entry/Staging :0%Assumesno lossofcover(b) Initial ssault :20%Assumes . . immediateoss of thoseunder tateFSR and FSS cover ndothers(c) Location/Identification :25%

Loss of Statepersonnel efore ull uppressionf resistance roblemccentuatedsinceAmembassyostage ot ollocated(d) Evacuation o RH-53D's :15%Assumes oss fromnipers,nside ndoutsideAmembassyompound,ndfrom TandApersmines.(e) Transfer-RH-53soC-130s : 0%Assumemaintenancef site ecurity7. The estimate f loss rateof60% for heAmembassy ostages epresentshebestestimate f CA and M & P staff.8. It is presumedo be equally ikely hat heAmembassyescue ttempt ouldbe acompleteuccess 100% oftheAmembassyostages escued),s itwouldbe a completefailure0% of theAmembassy ostages escued)9. Of specialnote s thefact hatno analogous arge-scaleescue ttemptsavebeenmountednheavily opulatedrban reaswithinostileerritoryuringhe ast15years.The onlyroughlyimilar ttemptsSon Toy-Nov. 1970;Mayaguez-May 1975;En-tebbe-July1976) were all made in lightly opulated ural reas of hostile erritory(Salinger,1981).The storyfthis upposedlyecret eport asoriginallyeaked oGeorgeWilson t theWashingtonost nAugust 980butwasdenied yFrank arluc-ci, thendeputy irectorftheCIA. AccordingoJody owell,Carlucci's e-sponseto Wilsonwas as follows: I have beenunable ofind nythingntheallegedCIA documenthat s either ccurate r which pproximatesnymemo-randumweprepared."Wilsonrefusedoprinthe tory,ut similarnewaspublished yJackAndersoneveralmonthsaterPowell,1984).However, Timereportheweekafter herescuemissiontated hatPentagonfficials aveadamantlyenied eportsnWashingtonf a CIA estimatehat60% ofthe53 hostageswouldprobably avebeenkilled nthe escue ttempt.utTimehas earned hat nitialasualtystimatesnceran s high s 200fatalities,ncludingothhostagesnd rescuers. he final landid, ndeed, nvisionhepossibilityf osing rom15 to 20 hostages.Time,May 12, 1980)Whetherrnot heCIA document asa forgery,he uestionfhistoricalanalogys againhighlighted,lbeit na slightlyifferentontext.hefact fthematters that escue aidshavea highhistoricalbaserate)failureate; he ran



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Prospectheoryn nternationalelations 259rescuemissionmayoffern almost lassical xample f therepresentativenessheuristicnforeign olicy,where ase rateswereunderestimatedn light f asalient uccessful ase. In this nstance hat otable ase wasEntebbe, rescueraidwhichwas successful,lthought tookplace in quitea differenterrain.In the aseofAmerican escue ttempts,hehistoricalrackecordsdismalat best.The SonToyraid n a Vietnameserisoner-of-waramp,whichncludedsoldierswho ater articipatedn the ranmission, ailed ecausetheprisonershadbeenmoved o anotherocation rior othe rrivalftherescue eam.Theraidon thePalestinians ho tooknine sraeli thletes ostages uringhe1972MunichOlympics esultedn thedeaths fallthehostagesnd five f the ight-wing errorists.he 39hostagesntheMayaguezncident ere ndeed reed, utitappears hat heir eleasewasunderwayrior othe escuemission.5venso,thatmission ostthe ives of 41 Americanoldiers,ndwounded nother0.Anotherelativelyimilarase,that ftheHammelburgaid orelease risonersof war in Germany uringWorldWar I was only partlyuccessful s wellbecausefightingithGerman orcesubsequentotheraidwasheavy.Infact, ntebbendMogadishutandsrelativenomaliesnthehistoryfthesekinds fmissions, oth or heiruccess nd theirackofcasualties:hreehostagesnd one sraeli fficer erekilled tEntebbe;ndthreeerroristserekilledbytheWestGermansnSomalia.Thekey o both hese uccessfulaidswas total urpriseombinedwith relativelysolated rea ofattack.n spite fthe ritical eographicalifferences,ntebbewas the perativenalogy ormostof theprincipalsnvolvednthe ranian escuemissionChristophertal., 1953;Time,May5, 1980;Ryan,1985).

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSIONThe actual utcomefthedecision orescue hehostagesn ranhighlightsthe ealityfthehugemilitaryisk hatwas nvolvedntheundertaking.ndeed,theoverwhelmingomplexityftheplan s a critical art fany ssessmentftherisk nvolvedn thedecision oundertakeherescuemission.The rescue ttempt,odenamed peration agleClaw(theplanninghasewas calledRice Bowl),was a highlyomplex ndertakingRyan,1985;U.S.Defense ept.,1980).Theplanwas for ight H-53Dhelicoptersobelaunchedoffhe ircraftarrier imitz rom heArabianeaandfly 00miles o a landingfield esignateds DesertOne,near town alledTabas.Thesehelicoptersadtofly nder otal adio ilence t a lowaltitude o avoid ranian adar etection,usingonlyvisualnavigation,ndvery imitednertialuidance.Atthedesig-nated ite, hehelicoptersere omeetwith ixC-130transportlanes hatwere

5J mgratefulo Robert ervis or larificationn the pecificsfthismission.



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260 McDermotttofly n fromMasirahsland,off he oastofOman. ThreeC-130scarried heassaultforce f about 120men; heother hree arried uelfor hehelicopters.Aftermeeting,heC-130swere orefuelhehelicopters,ransferhe pecialoperations en othem,ndreturnobase. Thehelicoptersere hen ofly ntoanotherocationn thehills bout 100 miles outheast fTehran,alledDesertTwo,where he men weregoingto hideoutduringhedayuntil hesurpriseattackn the mbassy, hichwasplanned or hefollowing ight. ocal sympa-thizers ad arranged round ransportationo theembassy.After hegroundattackn the mbassy,hehelicopterseregoing opickupthe oldiers ndthehostagesta stadiumcross he treet romhe mbassyompound, ly hemoanearbybandoned irfield,tManzariyeh,ndfly hem ut of the ountrynC-141sthatwere o meet hem here. achphasewas timed ocoincide.Every tage ftheplanwasacknowledgedo berisky,oth nterms ftheprobabilityfsuccess, s well as the ikelihood f ivesandmaterialost.Theinitialphaseof insertinghe aircraftntothecountry ithout etectionwasconsideredymembersf therescue eam obe themost ifficultspect f theplan (Jordan, 982). The advanced tagesoftheplannever ame to fruitionbecausethe missionwas aborted t DesertOne becausethereweretoo fewhelicoptersocarryutthe est f themission. lannersudged hat hemissionrequired minimumf six helicoptersn order o complete hetask;eighthelicoptersere onsideredyall to be sufficientlyedundantor he uccess fthemission.However,hisnumberroved o be inadequatendthemissionwasaborted ecauseonlyfiveoperational elicopterseached esertOne.Followinghedecision oaborthemission,he ccident hat esultedntheAmericanasualties ccurred. helicopter as refuelingor hereturnlight,kickedup a blindingmount fsand,andaccidentallylew nto henose ofaC-130 and nstantlyxploded. ightmenwerekilled, ourwerebadlyburned,andthe estwere uicklyvacuated,eavingixhelicopters,hreewith ensitiveclassifiedmaterial,n the roundor he ranians ofind. he ranianolice aterbombed hesehelicoptersndtookpicturesfthem orpropagandaurposes.Evidence uggests, owever,hat he ranianswerenot wareofthe ttemptedmission, r of itsfailure, ntil nformedfitbytheCarterdministrationt Ia.m. Washingtonime nApril 6 (Carter, 982).

CONCLUSIONSThe failure f therescuemission n Iran nAprilof 1980was a tragedywhosefailureweighed eavily n theprinciple ecision-makersnvolvedn itsplanning nd execution.While Cartermaynothavebelieved hat hecostsassociatedwith hemissionwerehigh,hewaswrongbjectively.hefailure ftherescuemission idmake hingsworse orhim.From politicaltandpoint,



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Prospect heoryn nternationalelations 261the ailureostCarter aluable olitical apital.Hewas criticizednthepress orinadequatelanning,s well s for otmaking stronger ilitary ove romhestart.Moreover,hefailure f themissionmadeany subsequentttempt oredifficult.n short, arter's lanfailed orelease hehostagesndreaffirmedisgrowing omesticmageofimpotence.rom morepersonal erspective,hedeathof theeightAmerican oldierswas particularlyifficultorPresidentCarter.n a statementssued nApril 6,Presidentarterccepted ull esponsi-bility or heepisode:

Ourrescue eamknew, nd knew, hat heoperation ascertain o be dangerous.Wewereall convinced hat f and when herescuephaseof theoperation ad been com-menced,t hadan excellenthanceof success.Theywere ll volunteers;heywere llhighlyrained. . . (CarterndTrimble, 989)The decision o undertakehe escuemissionn ranwasmadeduringtimeof extremeifficultyor heCarter dministration.ndeed, heres noquestionthatttook laceduringdomain f ossfor he dministrationngeneralndforCarternparticular.his was true n both domestic nd on an internationallevel.Thetakingfthehostageswas a severe low oAmericanower, restige,andcredibilityn the nternationalcene.The ackof llied ndU.N. supportorsanctions as consideredn insult.Moreover,arterwasfacingnincreasingly

arduous eelectionampaignthome. n a classicexample foperatingnthedomain f losses, it seemed hathe had little o lose in launchingherescuemission nd everythingo gain should t succeed.In fact,had themissionsucceeded, istory ightookquite ifferentecause t seasily onceivable hatCarterouldhavewon reelectionnthe rest fpopularityhatwould ertainlyhavefollowed ucha courageous escue, uccessfullyompleted.The choice of the rescuemissionwas indeed heriskiestmilitaryptionseriouslyonsidered.his strue othnterms f ikelihoodf uccess s well sin terms f personnelnd material osts. Othermilitaryptionswere unie-quivocallyejected yCarterecause heyfferedittle robabilityf uccess orreleasinghehostages nd nvolved vert ctsof war.Nevertheless,arter eltthat ehad to do somethingo returnhehostages ome.Ex postfacto, n analystan see that hebestoption adbeenofferedySecretary ance. The hostageswerereleased ssentiallynharmedythe ra-nianswhen hey o longer erved nyfunction.nce therevolutionaryovern-mentwas secure, hehostageswere llowed oleave,althoughheremayhavebeen someother actorsnvolved n releasinghem nlya fewminutesfterCarterwas no longer fficiallyhepresident. owever, arterwas clearly n-aware fthese ther actors.nsome ense,Carter eceived he right"dvice-todo nothing-from ance;he chose toignoret,however,nd take hemoreriskymilitaryption. ven fhe didn't hink ftherescuemission s risky, eknew hat bjectivelyt was more iskyhan therptionshatwere vailable ohim.He knew hemissionarried reaterotentialosts hanhe therptions;t



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262 McDermottalsopromisedreaterenefits.nthis ense,he took hegamblen anattemptowintheprize.Throughouthe risis,twas difficultor ny f he articipantsoassessthebalanceof political ndmilitaryisks.This was especially he case becausenationalnd nternationalolitical iskswereoften s inverselyelated s werepolitical nd militaryisks.Nonetheless,t is clear thatCartermade a risk-seeking hoice.He had other hoicesthatwerebothmilitarilyess risky,ikemining heharbors, r politicallyess risky,ike seeking dditionalndirectdiplomaticegotiatinghannels. owever, e took he negamble hat fferedchanceof recoupingll the osseshe had previouslyustained o regain heformer tatus uo. Had he succeeded, hepayoff ouldcertainlyave beengreat.However, heprobabilityf success was low,and themission ailed.Whileother ptions,uch s negotiating, aynothaveofferedhe amepoten-tialpayoff,hey rovedmore ikely,nd moreprofitable,nthe nd.This findings perfectlyonsistent ith, ndevenpredictable,ased onprospectheory. oreover,rospect heoryrovidesnsight hichmakes ittlesensefrom structuralerspective.ndeed,no otherheory ouldpredictuchrisky ehaviorn a bad situation.ontraryo his nclinationsgainstheuse offorce, arter rdered military issiono rescue hehostages.He sawhimselfconfrontingbad situationndtook seeminglyrrationalamble norder orecoup is osses ndregainhe revioustatusuo. Thus he ailed escue fthehostagesn ranprovides superbllustrationfthe perationfprospectheoryin the nternationalealm.

REFERENCESBrzezinski,bigniew1982).Thefailed escuemission. ewYork imesMagazine,April 8,p.28-42.Brzezinski, bigniew1985) Power ndprinciple.NewYork:Farrar, trauss, nd Giroux.Brzezinski, bigniew1990). Personal ommunication.Carter, immy1982). Keeping aith.New York:Bantam.Carter, arry . & Trimble . (1989). Internationalawcasebook, orthcoming.Christopher, arren t al. (1985). American ostagesn ran. NewHaven,CT: Yale UniversityPress.Festinger,., Riecken,H. W., & Schachter,. (1956). When rophecyails. Minneapolis,MN:UniversityfMinnesota ress.Festinger,eon 1957).A theoryfcognitiveissonance. tanford,A: Stanfordniversityress.Festinger,eon& Carlsmith, . (1959). Cognitiveonsequencesnforcedompliance. ournalfAbnormal ndSocial Psychology,8, 203-211.Janis,rving1982). Groupthink.oston:Houghton ifflinompany.Jervis, obert1976).Perceptionndmisperceptionn nternationalolitics. rinceton,J:Prince-tonUniversityress.Jordan, amilton1982). Crisis. New York:Putnam.Kahneman, aniel& Tversky,. (1984). Values, hoices ndframes.mericansychologist,pril.NewYorkTimes,June 5, 1979,p. 1.



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Prospect heoryn nternationalelations 263Ornstein, orman t. al. (1984-5), Vital tatistics n Congress, 94-5. Washington,mericanEnterprisenstituteorPublicPolicyResearch 4.Powell,Jody1984). The other ideofthe tory.NewYork:WilliamMorrow ndCompany,nc.Ryan,Paul (1985). The ranianrescuemission.Annapolis,MD: Naval nstituteress.Salinger, ierre1981).American eldhostage.Garden ity,NewYork:DoubledayndCompany.Saunders,Harold 1985). Beginningf the nd. n Warrenhristophertal.,AmericanostagesnIran. NewHaven,Ct:YaleUniversityress.Sick,Gary1985).Militaryptionsnd onstraints.nWarrenhristophertal.,Americanostagesin ran.NewHaven,Ct: Yale Universityress.Sick,Gary 1986). Allfalldown. New York:Penguin ooks.Sick,Gary, ersonal ommunicationy phone,July 990.Sick,Gary 1991). The election toryf thedecade.New York imes,April15.Time,April14, 1980.Time,May5, 1980.Time,May 12, 1980.U.S. DefenseDepartment.1980). The rescuemission eport, ugust. ypescript.Vance,Cyrus1983). Hard choices. New York: imon ndSchuster.Wicklund Brehm, .Perspectivencognitiveissonance.Hillsdale,NJ:Erlbaum.

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McDermott Iranian Rescue Mission