Maxims

By

NapoleonBonaparte

MAXIMI

The frontiers of states are either large rivers, or chains ofmountains, ordeserts.Ofall theseobstacles to themarchof anarmy, themostdifficult toovercome is the desert; mountains come next, and broad rivers occupy thethirdplace.

NOTE.

Napoleon, in his military career, appears to have been called upon tosurmounteverydifficultywhichcanoccurinwarsofinvasion.

In Egypt he traversed deserts, and vanquished and destroyed theMamelukes,socelebratedfortheiraddressandcourage.Hisgeniusknewhowtoaccommodateitselftoallthedangersofthisdistantenterprise,inacountryilladaptedtosupplythewantsofhistroops.

In the conquest of Italy, he twice crossed theAlps by themost difficultpasses, and at a season, too, which rendered this undertaking still moreformidable. In threemonths he passed the Pyrenees, defeated and dispersedfourSpanisharmies. Inshort, fromtheRhine to theBorysthenes,nonaturalobstaclecouldbefoundtoarresttherapidmarchofhisvictoriousarmy.

MAXIMII

Informingtheplanofacampaign,itisrequisitetoforeseeeverythingtheenemymaydo,andtobepreparedwiththenecessarymeanstocounteractit.

Plans of campaign may be modified ad infinitum according tocircumstances—thegeniusofthegeneral,thecharacterofthetroops,andthetopographyofthetheatreofaction.

NOTE.

Sometimes we see a hazardous campaign succeed, the plan of which isdirectly at variance with the principles of the art of war. But this successdependsgenerallyonthecapriceoffortune,oruponfaultscommittedbytheenemy—two things uponwhich a generalmust never count. Sometimes theplanofacampaign,althoughbasedonsoundprinciplesofwar,runstheriskoffailing at the outset if opposed by an adversary who acts at first on thedefensive,andthen,suddenlyseizingtheinitiative,surprisesbytheskilfulnessof his manœuvres. Such was the fate of the plan laid down by the Aulic

council for thecampaignof1796,under thecommandofMarshalWurmser.Fromhisgreatnumericalsuperiority,themarshalhadcalculatedontheentiredestruction of the French army, by cutting off its retreat. He founded hisoperationson thedefensiveattitudeofhisadversary,whowaspostedon thelineoftheAdige,andhadtocoverthesiegeofMantua,aswellascentralandlowerItaly.

Wurmser, supposing the French army fixed in the neighborhood ofMantua, divided his forces into three corps, which marched separately,intendingtouniteatthatplace.Napoleon,havingpenetratedthedesignoftheAustriangeneral,perceivedtheadvantagetobederivedfromstrikingthefirstblow against an army divided into three corps, with no communicationbetweenthem.Hehastened,therefore,toraisethesiegeofMantua,assembledthewholeofhisforces,andbythismeansbecamesuperiortotheimperialists,whosedivisionsheattackedandbeatindetail.ThusWurmser,whofanciedhehad only tomarch to certain victory, saw himself compelled, after ten dayscampaign,toretirewiththeremainsofhisarmyintotheTyrol,afteralossoftwenty-five thousandmeninkilledandwounded,fifteen thousandprisoners,ninestandofcolors,andseventypiecesofcannon.

Hence,nothing is sodifficult as toprescribebeforehand to ageneral thelineofconductheshallpursueduringthecourseofacampaign.Successmustoften depend on circumstances that cannot be foreseen; and it should beremembered, likewise, that nothing cramps somuch the efforts of genius ascompellingtheheadofanarmytobegovernedbyanywillbuthisown.

MAXIMIII

An armywhich undertakes the conquest of a country, has its twowingsrestingeitheruponneutralterritories,orupongreatnaturalobstacles,suchasriversorchainsofmountains.Ithappensinsomecasesthatonlyonewingissosupported;andinothersthatbothareexposed.

In thefirst instancecited,viz.,wherebothwingsareprotected,ageneralhasonlytoprotecthisfrontfrombeingpenetrated.Inthesecond,whereonewingonlyissupported,heshouldrestuponthesupportedwing.Inthethird,where bothwings are exposed, he should depend upon a central formation,andneverallowthedifferentcorpsunderhiscommandtodepartfromthis:forif it be difficult to contend with the disadvantage of having two flanksexposed,theinconvenienceisdoubledbyhavingfour,treblediftherebesix—that is to say, if thearmy isdivided into twoor threedifferentcorps. In thefirst instance, then, as above quoted, the line of operation may rest

indifferently on the right or on the left. In the second, it should be directedtoward the wing in support. In the third, it should be perpendicular to thecentreof thearmy’slineofmarch.But inall thesecasesit isnecessary,atadistance of every five or six days march, to have a strong post or anentrenched position upon the line of operation, in order to collect militarystoresandprovisions,toorganizeconvoys,toformofitacentreofmovement,andestablishapointofdefencetoshortenthelineofoperationofthearmy.

NOTE.

Thesegeneralprinciples in theartofwarwereentirelyunknown,or lostsight of, in themiddle ages.The crusaders in their incursions intoPalestineappear to havehadnoobject but to fight and to conquer, so little pains didthey take toprofit by theirvictories.Hence, innumerable armiesperished inSyria, without any other advantage than that derived from the momentarysuccessobtainedbysuperiornumbers.

Itwasbytheneglectoftheseprinciples,also,thatCharlesXII,abandoninghislineofoperationandallcommunicationwithSweden,threwhimselfintotheUkraine, and lost thegreaterpart ofhis armyby the fatigueof awintercampaigninabarrencountrydestituteofresources.

Defeated at Pultawa, he was obliged to seek refuge in Turkey, aftercrossing theNieperwith the remains of his army, diminished to littlemorethanonethousandmen.

GustavusAdolphuswasthefirstwhobroughtbacktheartofwartoitstrueprinciples.HisoperationsinGermanywerebold,rapid,andwellexecuted.Hemadesuccessatalltimesconducivetofuturesecurity,andestablishedhislineof operation so as to prevent the possibility of any interruption in hiscommunicationswithSweden.Hiscampaignsformaneweraintheartofwar.

MAXIMIV

When the conquest of a country is undertaken by two or three armies,whichhave each their separate lineof operation, until they arrive at a pointfixeduponfortheirconcentration,itshouldbelaiddownasaprinciple, thatthe union of these different corps should never take place near the enemy;because theenemy, inunitinghisforces,maynotonlyprevent this junction,butmaybeatthearmiesindetail.

NOTE.

Inthecampaignof1757,Frederick,marchingtotheconquestofBohemia

with twoarmies,whichhadeach theirseparate lineofoperation,succeeded,notwithstanding, in uniting them in sight of the Duke of Lorraine, whocovered Prague with the imperial army; but his example should not befollowed.Thesuccessofthismarchdependedentirelyontheinactionoftheduke,who, at theheadof seventy thousandmen,didnothing toprevent thejunctionofthetwoPrussianarmies.

MAXIMV

Allwars should be governed by certain principles, for everywar shouldhaveadefiniteobject,andbeconductedaccordingtotherulesofart.(Awarshould only be undertaken with forces proportioned to the obstacles to beovercome.)

NOTE.

It was a saying of Marshal Villars, that when war is decided on, it isnecessary to have exact informationof thenumberof troops the enemycanbring into the field, since it is impossible to lay down any solid plan ofoffensiveordefensiveoperationwithoutanaccurateknowledgeofwhatyouhave to expect and fear. “When the first shot is fired,” observes MarshalVillars,“noonecancalculatewhatwillbetheissueofthewar.Itis,therefore,of vast importance to reflect maturely before we begin it.” When once,however, this is decided, the marshal observes that the boldest and mostextendedplansaregenerallythewisestandthemostsuccessful.“Whenwearedetermineduponwar,”headds,“weshouldcarryitonvigorouslyandwithouttrifling.”

MAXIMVI

At thecommencementofacampaign, toadvanceornot toadvance, isamatterforgraveconsideration;butwhenoncetheoffensivehasbeenassumed,itmustbesustainedtothelastextremity.Howeverskilfulthemanœuvresinaretreat, itwill alwaysweaken themorale of an army, because, in losing thechances of success, these last are transferred to the enemy.Besides, retreatsalwayscostmoremenandmateriel thanthemostbloodyengagements;withthisdifference,thatinabattletheenemy’slossisnearlyequaltoyourown—whereasinaretreatthelossisonyoursideonly.

NOTE.

MarshalSaxeremarks,thatnoretreatsaresofavorableasthosewhicharemade before a languid and unenterprising enemy, forwhen he pursueswithvigor,theretreatsoondegeneratesintoarout.“Uponthisprincipleitisagreaterror,” says themarshal, “to adhere to theproverbwhich recommendsus tobuildabridgeofgoldfora retreatingenemy.No; followhimupwithspirit,andheisdestroyed!”

MAXIMVII

Anarmyshouldbereadyeveryday,everynight,andatalltimesofthedayandnight, toopposeall theresistanceofwhichit iscapable.Withthisview,thesoldiershouldalwaysbefurnishedcompletelywitharmsandammunition;theinfantryshouldneverbewithoutitsartillery,itscavalry,anditsgenerals;and the different divisions of the army should be constantly in a state tosupport,tobesupported,andtoprotectitself.

The troops, whether halted, or encamped, or on the march, should bealwaysinfavorablepositions,possessingtheessentialsrequiredforafieldofbattle;forexample,theflanksshouldbewellcovered,andalltheartillerysoplacedastohavefreerange,andtoplaywiththegreatestadvantage.Whenanarmy is in column of march, it should have advanced guards and flankingparties,toexaminewellthecountryinfront,totheright,andtotheleft,andalwaysatsuchdistanceastoenablethemainbodytodeployintoposition.

NOTE.

Thefollowingmaxims,takenfromthememoirsofMontécuculli,appeartomewellsuited to thisplace,andcalculated to formausefulcommentaryonthegeneralprincipleslaiddownintheprecedingmaxim:

1.Whenwarhasbeenoncedecidedon,themomentispastfordoubtsandscruples.On thecontrary,wearebound tohope that all theevilwhichmayensue,willnot;thatProvidence,orourownwisdom,mayavertit;orthatthewantoftalentonthepartoftheenemymaypreventhimfrombenefitingbyit.The first security for success is to confer the command on one individual.Whentheauthorityisdivided,theopinionsofthecommandersoftenvary,andthe operations are deprived of that ensemble which is the first essential tovictory.Besides,whenanenterpriseiscommontomany,andnotconfinedtoasingleperson,itisconductedwithoutvigor,andlessinterestisattachedtotheresult.

After having strictly conformed to all the rules of war, and satisfiedourselves thatnothinghasbeenomitted toensureeventualsuccess,wemust

then leave the issue in the hands of Providence, and repose ourselvestranquillyinthedecisionofahigherpower.

Letwhatwillarrive,itisthepartofageneral-in-chieftoremainfirmandconstantinhispurposes;hemustnotallowhimselftobeelatedbyprosperity,nortobedepressedbyadversity:forinwargoodandbadandfortunesucceedeachotherbyturns,formtheebbandflowofmilitaryoperations.

2.When your own army is strong and inured to service, and that of theenemy is weak and consists of new levies, or of troops enervated by longinaction,thenyoushouldexerteverymeanstobringhimtobattle.

If, on the other hand, your adversary has the advantage in troops, adecisive combat is to be avoided, and you must be content to impede hisprogress, by encamping advantageously, and fortifying favorable passes.Whenarmiesarenearlyequalinforce,itisdesirablenottoavoidabattle,butonly to attempt to fight one to advantage. For this purpose, care should betakentoencampalwaysinfrontoftheenemy;tomovewhenhemoves,andoccupytheheightsandadvantageousgroundsthatlieuponhislineofmarch;to seize upon all the buildings and roads adjoining to his camp, and postyourself advantageously in the places by which he must pass. It is alwayssomething gained tomake him lose time, to thwart his designs, or to retardtheirprogressandexecution.If,however,anarmyisaltogetherinferiortothatof the enemy, and there is no possibility of manœuvring against him withsuccess,thenthecampaignmustbeabandoned,andthetroopsmustretireintothefortresses.

3. The principal object of a general-in-chief, in the moment of battle,shouldbetosecuretheflanksofhisarmy.Itistruethatnaturalpositionsmaybefoundtoeffectthisobject,butthesepositionsbeingfixedandimmovableinthemselves,theyareonlyadvantageoustoageneralwhowishestowaittheshockoftheenemy,andnottoonewhomarchestotheattack.

Ageneralcan,therefore,relyonlyontheproperarrangementofhistroops,toenablehimtorepelanyattempttheadversarymaymakeuponthefront,orflanks,orrearofhisarmy.

If one flank of an army rests upon a river, or an impassable ravine, thewholeof thecavalrymaybepostedwiththeotherwing, inordertoenveloptheenemymoreeasilybyitssuperiorityinnumbers.

If theenemyhashisflankssupportedbywoods, lightcavalryor infantryshouldbedespatched toattackhiminflankor in rearduring theheatof thebattle.Ifpracticable,also,anattackshouldbemadeuponthebaggage,toaddtohisconfusion.

Ifyoudesiretobeattheenemy’sleftwithyourrightwing,orhisrightwith

your leftwing, thewingwithwhichyou attack shouldbe reinforcedby theéliteofyourarmy.At thesamemoment, theotherwingshouldavoidbattle,and the attacking wing brought rapidly forward, so as to overwhelm theenemy.Ifthenatureofthegroundadmits,heshouldbeapproachedbystealth,andattackedbeforeheisonhisguard.Ifanysignsoffeararediscoverableintheenemy,andwhicharealwaystobedetectedbyconfusionordisorderinhismovements,heshouldbepursuedimmediately,withoutallowinghimtimetorecover himself. It is now the cavalry should be brought into action, andmanœuvresoastosurpriseandcutoffhisartilleryandbaggage.

4.Theorderofmarchshouldalwaysbesubservienttotheorderofbattle,which last should be arrangedbeforehand.Themarch of an army is alwayswellregulatedwhenitisgovernedbythedistancetobeaccomplished,andbythetimerequiredforitsperformance.Thefrontofthecolumnofmarchshouldbediminishedorincreasedaccordingtothenatureofthecountry,takingcarethattheartilleryalwaysproceedsbythemainroad.

Whenariveristobepassed,theartilleryshouldbeplacedinbatteryuponthebankoppositethepointofcrossing.

It isagreatadvantage,whenariverformsasweeporangle,andwhenafordistobefoundneartheplacewhereyouwishtoeffectapassage.Astheconstructionofthebridgeproceeds,infantryshouldbeadvancedtocovertheworkmen, by keeping up a fire on the opposite bank; but themoment it isfinished, a corps of infantry and cavalry, and some field-pieces, should bepushedacross.Theinfantryshouldentrenchitselfimmediatelyattheheadofthebridge,anditisprudent,moreover,tofortifyonthesamesideoftheriver,inorder toprotect thebridge incase theenemyshouldventureanoffensivemovement.

The advanced guard of an army should be always provided with trustyguides,andwithacorpsofpioneers:thefirsttopointoutthebestroads,thesecondtorendertheseroadsmorepracticable.

If thearmymarches indetachments, thecommanderof eachdetachmentshouldbefurnishedwiththenameoftheplaceinwriting,wherethewholearetobereassembled;theplaceshouldbesufficientlyremovedfromtheenemytopreventhimfromoccupyingitbeforethejunctionofallthedetachments.Tothisend,itisofimportancetokeepthenameasecret.

Fromthemomentanarmyapproaches theenemy, it shouldmarch in theorder in which it is intended to fight. If anything is to be apprehended,precautionsarenecessary inproportion to thedegreeof thedanger.Whenadefileistobepassed,thetroopsshouldbehaltedbeyondtheextremity,untilthewholearmyhasquittedthedefile.

Inordertoconcealthemovementsofanarmy,itisnecessarytomarchbynightthroughwoodsandvalleys,bythemostretiredroads,andoutofreachofallinhabitedplaces.Nofiresshouldbeallowed;and,tofavorthedesignstillmore,thetroopsshouldmovebyverbalorder.Whentheobjectofthemarchisto carry a post, or to relieve a place that is besieged, the advanced guardshould march within musket shot of the main body, because then you arepreparedforanimmediateattack,andreadytooverthrowallbeforeyou.

Whenamarchismadetoforceapassguardedbytheenemy,itisdesirabletomakeafeintupononepoint,while,byarapidmovement,youbringyourrealattacktobearuponanother.

Sometimessuccessisobtainedbypretendingtofallbackupontheoriginallineofmarch,and,byasuddencountermarch,seizingupon thepass,beforethe enemy is able to reoccupy it. Some generals have gained their point bymanœuvringsoastodeceivetheenemy,whileadetachmentunderthecoverofhighgroundshassurprisedthepassagebyastolenmarch.Theenemybeingengagedinwatchingthemovementsofthemainbody,thedetachmenthasanopportunityofentrenchingitselfinitsnewposition.

5.Anarmyregulatesitsmodeofencampmentaccordingtothegreaterorlessdegreeofprecaution,whencircumstances require. In a friendly countrythetroopsaredivided,toaffordbetteraccommodationandsupplies.Butwiththeenemyinfront,anarmyshouldalwaysencampinorderofbattle.Withthisview, it isof thehighest importance tocoveronepartof thecamp,asfaraspracticable,bynaturaldefences,suchasariver,achainofrocks,oraravine.Careshouldbetakenalsothatthecampisnotcommanded,andthatthereisnoobstacletoafreecommunicationbetweenthedifferentcorps,andwhichcanpreventthetroopsfrommutuallysuccoringeachother.

Whenanarmyoccupiesafixedcamp, it isnecessarytobewellsuppliedwithprovisionsandammunition,oratleastthattheseshouldbewithincertainreachandeasilyobtained.Toinsurethis, thelineofcommunicationmustbewellestablished,andcaretakennottoleaveanenemy’sfortressinyourrear.

Whenanarmyisestablished inwinterquarters, itssafety isbestsecuredeitherbyfortifyingacamp(forwhichpurposeaspotshouldbeselectednearalarge commercial town, or a river affording facility of transport), or bydistributingitinclosecantonments,sothatthetroopsshouldbeneartogether,andcapableofaffordingeachothermutualsupport.

The winter quarters of an army should be protected, likewise, byconstructing small covered works on all the lines of approach to thecantonments, and by posting advanced guards of cavalry to observe themotionsoftheenemy.

6.A battle is to be sought, when there is reason to hope for victory, orwhen an army runs the risk of being ruined without fighting; also when abesiegedplaceistoberelieved,orwhenyoudesiretopreventareinforcementfromreachingtheenemy.Battlesareuseful,likewise,whenwewishtoprofitbyafavorableopportunitywhichoffers,tosecureacertainadvantage,suchasseizinguponanundefendedpointorpass,attacking theenemywhenhehascommittedafault,orwhensomemisunderstandingamonghisgeneralsfavorstheundertaking.

Ifanenemydeclinesanengagement,hemaybecompelledtoit,eitherbybesiegingaplaceofimportance,orbyfallinguponhimunawares,andwhenhecannoteasilyeffecthisretreat.Or(afterpretendingtoretire),bymakingarapidcountermarch,attackinghimvigorouslyandforcinghimtoaction.

The different circumstances under which a battle should be avoided ordeclined,are,whenthereisgreaterdangertobeapprehendedfromdefeatthanadvantage to be derived from victory; when you are very inferior to youradversaryinnumbers,andareexpectingreinforcements;aboveall,whentheenemyisadvantageouslyposted,orwhenheiscontributingtohisownruinbysome inherent defect in his position, or by the errors and divisions of hisgenerals.

To gain a battle, each armmust be advantageously posted, and have themeans of engaging its front and in flank. The wings must be protected bynaturalobstacles,wherethesepresentthemselves,orbyhavingrecoursewhennecessarytotheaidofart.

The troopsmustbe able to assist eachotherwithout confusion, andcaremustbetakenthatthebrokencorpsdonotfallbackupon,andthrowtherestinto disorder. Above all, the intervals between the different corps must besufficientlysmalltopreventtheenemyfrompenetratingbetweenthem,forinthatcaseyouwouldbeobliged toemployyour reserves,and run the riskofbeing entirely overwhelmed. Sometimes victory is obtained by creating adiversioninthemiddleofabattle,orevenbydeprivingthesoldierofallhopeofretreat,andplacinghiminasituationwhereheisreducedtothenecessityeithertoconquerordie.

At the commencement of a battle, if the ground is level, you shouldadvancetomeettheenemy,inordertoinspirethesoldierwithcourage;butifyou arewell posted, andyour artillery advantageously placed, thenwait forhim with determination: remembering always to fight resolutely, to succoropportunelythosewhorequireit,andnevertobringyourreservesintoactionexcept in the lastextremity;andeven then topreservesomesupport,behindwhichthebrokencorpsmayrally.

When it is necessary to attack with your whole force, the battle should

commence toward evening; because then, whatever be the issue, night willarrive to separate the combatants before your troops are exhausted. By thismeans,anopportunityisaffordedofaffectinganorderlyretreatiftheresultofthebattlerequiresit.

Duringanaction,thegeneral-in-chiefshouldoccupysomespotwhencehecan, as far as possible, overlook his whole army. He should be informed,immediately,ofeverythingthatpassesinthedifferentdivisions.Heshouldbeready,inordertorendersuccessmorecomplete,tooperatewithfreshtroopsupon those pointswhere the enemy is givingway, and also to reinforce hisowncorpswherevertheyareinclinedtoyield.Whentheenemyisbeaten,hemustpursuehiminstantly,withoutgivinghimamomenttorally;ontheotherhand, if he ishimselfdefeated,ordespairsofvictory,hemust retreat in thebestpossibleorder.

7.Itshowsgreattalentinageneraltobringtroops,whoarepreparedforaction,intocollisionwiththosewhoarenot:forexample,freshtroopsagainstthose which are exhausted—brave and disciplined men against recruits. Hemustlikewisebereadyalwaystofallwithhisarmyuponaweakordetachedcorps,tofollowthetrackoftheenemy,andchargehimamongdefilesbeforehecanfaceaboutandgetintoposition.

8. A position is good when the different corps are so placed as to beengagedwithadvantage,andwithoutany remainingunemployed. Ifyouaresuperiorincavalry,positionsaretobetakeninplainsandopenground;ifininfantry, in an enclosed and covered country. If inferior in numbers, inconfinedandnarrowplaces;ifsuperior,inaspaciousandextensivefield.Withaveryinferiorarmy,adifficultpassmustbeselectedtooccupyandfortify.

9.Inordertoobtaineverypossibleadvantagefromadiversion,weshouldascertainfirst,thatthecountryinwhichitistobecreatediseasilypenetrated.A diversion should be made vigorously, and on those points where it iscalculatedtodothegreatestmischieftotheenemy.

10. Tomakewarwith success, the following principles should never bedepartedfrom:

Tobe superior to your enemy in numbers, aswell as inmorale; to fightbattles in order to spread terror in the country; to divide your army into asmany corps as may be effected without risk, in order to undertake severalobjects at the same time; to treatWELL thosewhoyield, to ILL treat thosewho resist; to secure your rear, and occupy and strengthen yourself at theoutsetinsomepostwhichshallserveasacentralpointforthesupportofyourfuturemovements;toguardagainstdesertion;tomakeyourselfmasterofthegreatriversandprincipalpasses,andtoestablishyourlineofcommunicationby getting possession of the fortresses, by laying siege to them, and of the

opencountry,bygivingbattle;foritisvaintoexpectthatconquestsaretobeachievedwithoutcombats;althoughwhenavictoryiswon,theywillbebestmaintainedbyunitingmildnesswithvalor.

MAXIMVIII

Ageneral-in-chiefshouldaskhimselffrequentlyintheday:“WhatshouldI do if the enemy’s army appeared now inmy front, or onmy right, ormyleft?” If he have any difficulty in answering these questions, his position isbad,andheshouldseektoremedyit.

NOTE.

Inthecampaignof1758,thepositionofthePrussianarmyatHohenKirk,beingcommandedbythebatteriesoftheenemy,whooccupiedalltheheights,was eminently defective; notwithstanding, Frederick, who saw his rearmenaced by the corps of Laudon, remained six days in his camp withoutseekingtocorrecthisposition.Itwouldseem,indeed,thathewasignorantofhis real danger: for Marshal Daun, having manœuvred during the night inordertoattackbydaybreak,surprisedthePrussiansintheirlinesbeforetheywere able to defend themselves, and by this means surrounded themcompletely.

Fredericksucceeded,however, ineffectinghis retreatwith regularity,butnotwithoutthelossoftenthousandmen,manygeneralofficers,andalmostallof his artillery. If Marshal Daun had followed up his victory with greaterboldness,thekingofPrussiawouldneverhavebeenabletorallyhisarmy.Onthisoccasion,Frederick’sgoodfortunebalancedhisimprudence.

MarshalSaxe remarks, that there ismore talent than is dreamtof inbaddispositions,ifwepossesstheartofconvertingthemintogoodoneswhenthefavorable moment arrives. Nothing astonishes the enemy so much as thismanœuvre; he has counted upon something; all his arrangements have beenfoundeduponitaccordingly—andatthemomentofattackitescapeshim!“Imust repeat,” says the marshal, “there is nothing that so completelydisconcerts an enemyas this, or leadshim to commit somany errors; for itfollows, that ifhedoesnotchangehisarrangements,he isbeaten;and ifhedoeschangethem,inpresenceofhisadversary,heisequallyundone.”

It seems tome,however, thatageneralwhoshould rest thesuccessofabattleuponsuchaprinciple,wouldbemorelikelytolosethantogainbyit;for ifhehad todealwithaskilfuladversaryandanalert tactician, the latterwouldfindtimetotakeadvantageofthepreviousbadarrangements,beforehe

wouldbeabletoremedythem.

MAXIMIX

The strength of an army, like the power in mechanics, is estimated bymultiplyingthemassbytherapidity;arapidmarchaugmentsthemoraleofanarmy,andincreasesitsmeansofvictory.Presson!

NOTE.

“Rapidity,” says Montécuculli, “is of importance in concealing themovementsofanarmy,becauseitleavesnotimetodivulgetheintentionofitschief.Itis,therefore,anadvantagetoattacktheenemyunexpectedly,totakehimoffhisguard,tosurprisehim,andlethimfeelthethunderbeforeheseesthe flash; but if too great celerity exhausts your troops,while, on the otherhand, delay deprives you of the favorable moment, you must weigh theadvantageagainstthedisadvantage,andchoosebetween.”

MarshalVillarsobserves,that“inwareverythingdependsuponbeingableto deceive the enemy; and having once gained this point, in never allowinghimtimetorecoverhimself.”Villarshasunitedpracticetoprecept.Hisboldandrapidmarcheswerealmostalwayscrownedwithsuccess.

It was the opinion of Frederick that all wars should be short and rapid;because a long war insensibly relaxes discipline, depopulates the state, andexhaustsitsresources.

MAXIMX

Whenanarmyisinferiorinnumber,inferiorincavalry,andinartillery,itisessential toavoidageneralaction.Thefirstdeficiencyshouldbesuppliedby rapidity of movement; the want of artillery, by the nature of themanœuvres;andtheinferiorityincavalry,bythechoiceofpositions.Insuchcircumstances,themoraleofthesoldierdoesmuch.

NOTE.

The campaign of 1814 in France was skilfully executed upon theseprinciples.Napoleon,withanarmy inferior innumber,anarmydiscouragedby the disastrous retreats ofMoscow and of Leipzig, and still more by thepresenceof theenemy in theFrench territory, contrived,notwithstanding, to

supply his vast inequality of force by the rapidity and combination of hismovements. By the success obtained at Champ-Aubert, Montmirail,Montereau, andRheims,hebegan to restore themoraleof theFrencharmy.Thenumerous recruitsofwhich itwas composed,hadalreadyacquired thatsteadiness ofwhich the old regiments afforded them an example, when thecapture of Paris, and the astonishing revolution it produced, compelledNapoleontolaydownhisarms.

Butthisconsequenceresultedratherfromtheforceofcircumstancesthanfromanyabsolutenecessity;forNapoleon,bycarryinghisarmytotheothersideoftheLoire,mighteasilyhaveformedajunctionwiththearmiesoftheAlpsandPyrenees,andhavereappearedonthefieldofbattleattheheadofahundredthousandmen.Suchaforcewouldhaveamplysufficedtore-establishthe chances ofwar in his favor;more especially as the armies of the alliedsovereignswereobliged tomanœuvreupon theFrench territorywith all thestrongplacesofItalyandFranceintheirrear.

MAXIMXI

Todirectoperationswith lines far removedfromeachother,andwithoutcommunications, is to commit a faultwhich alwaysgives birth to a second.Thedetachedcolumnhasonlyitsordersforthefirstday.Itsoperationsonthefollowingdaydependuponwhatmayhavehappenedtothemainbody.Thus,thiscolumneitherlosestimeuponemergency,inwaitingfororders,oritwillactwithoutthem,andathazard.Letitthereforebeheldasaprinciple,thatanarmyshouldalwayskeepitscolumnssounitedastopreventtheenemyfrompassing between themwith impunity.Whenever, for particular reasons, thisprincipleisdepartedfrom,thedetachedcorpsshouldbeindependentintheiroperations. They should move toward a point fixed upon for their futurejunction. They should advance without hesitating, and without waiting forfreshorders;andeveryprecautionshouldbetakentopreventanattackuponthemindetail.

NOTE.

The Austrian army, commanded by Field-marshal Alvinzi, was dividedinto two corps, destined to act independently, until they should accomplishtheirjunctionbeforeMantua.Thefirstofthesecorps,consistingofforty-fivethousandmen,wasundertheordersofAlvinzi.ItwastodebouchbyMonteBaldo, upon the positions occupied by the French army on the Adige. Thesecondcorps,commandedbyGeneralProvéra,wasdestined toactupon thelowerAdige,andtoraisetheblockadeofMantua.Napoleon,informedofthe

enemy’s movements, but not entirely comprehending his projects, confinedhimself to concentrating hismasses, and giving orders to the troops to holdthemselves in readiness to manœuvre. In the meantime, fresh informationsatisfied the general-in-chief of the French army that the corps which haddebouched by La Coronna, over Monte Baldo, was endeavoring to form ajunctionwithitscavalryandartillery—bothwhich,havingcrossedtheAdigeatDolce,weredirecting theirmarchupontheplateauofRivoli,by thegreatroadleadingbyIncanole.

Napoleon immediately foresaw that,byhavingpossessionof theplateau,heshouldbeabletopreventthisjunction,andobtainalltheadvantagesoftheinitiative.Heaccordinglyputhis troopsinmotion,andat twoo’clockin themorningoccupiedthatimportantposition.OncemasterofthepointfixeduponforthejunctionoftheAustriancolumns,successfollowedallhisdispositions.He repulsed every attack, made seven thousand prisoners, and took severalstandards and twelvepiecesof cannon.At twoo’clock in the afternoon, thebattle of Rivoli was already gained, when Napoleon, learning that GeneralProvérahadpassedtheAdigeatAnghiari,andwasdirectinghismarchuponMantua,lefttohisgeneralsthechargeoffollowinguptheretreatofAlvinzi,andplacedhimselfat theheadofadivisionfor thepurposeofdefeating thedesignsofProvéra.

Bya rapidmarch,heagainsucceeded in the initiatorymovement,and inpreventing the garrison ofMantua from uniting its force with the relievingarmy.Thecorpsintrustedwiththeblockade,eagertodistinguishitselfundertheeyesof theconquerorofRivoli,compelled thegarrison to retire into theplace,while thedivisionofVictor, forgetting thefatiguesofaforcedmarch,rushedwithimpetuosityontherelievingarmyinfront.AtthismomentasortiefromthelinesofSt.Georgetookhiminflank,whilethecorpsofAugereau,whichhad followed themarchof theAustriangeneral, attackedhim in rear.Provéra, surroundedonall sides, capitulated.The result of these twobattlescost the Austrians three thousand men in killed and wounded, twenty-twothousandprisoners,twenty-fourstandards,andforty-sixpiecesofcannon.

MAXIMXII

An army ought to have only one line of operation. This should bepreservedwithcare,andneverabandonedbutinthelastextremity.

NOTE.

“The line of communication of an army,” says Montécuculli, “must be

certainandwellestablished,foreveryarmythatactsfromadistantbase,andis not careful to keep this line perfectly open,marches upon a precipice. Itmovestocertainruin,asmaybeseenbyaninfinityofexamples.Infact,iftheroadbywhichprovisions,ammunitionand reinforcementsare tobebroughtup,isnotentirelysecured—ifthemagazines,thehospitals,thedepôtsofarms,andtheplacesofsupplyarenotfixedandcommodiouslysituated—notonlythearmycannotkeepthefield,butitwillbeexposedtothegreatestdangers.”

MAXIMXIII

Thedistancespermittedbetweencorpsofanarmyuponthemarchmustbegovernedbythelocalities,bycircumstances,andbytheobjectinview.

NOTE.

Whenanarmymovesatadistancefromtheenemy, thecolumnsmaybedisposedalongtheroadsoastofavortheartilleryandbaggage.Butwhenitismarchingintoaction,thedifferentcorpsmustbeformedinclosecolumnsinorder of battle. The generalsmust take care that the heads of the columns,whicharetoattacktogether,donotoutstepeachother,andthatinapproachingthefieldofactiontheypreservetherelativeintervalsrequiredfordeployment.

“The marches that are made preparatory to a battle require,” saysFrederick, “the greatest precaution.” With this view, he recommends hisgenerals to be particularly on their guard, and to reconnoitre the ground atsuccessive distances, in order to secure the initiative by occupying thosepositionsmostcalculatedtofavoranattack.Onaretreat, it is theopinionofmanygeneralsthatanarmyshouldconcentrateitsforces,andmarchinclosecolumnsifitisstillstrongenoughtoresumetheoffensive;forbythismeansitiseasytoformthelinewhenafavorableopportunitypresentsitself,eitherforholdingtheenemyincheckorforattackinghimifheisnotinasituationtoacceptbattle.

SuchwasMoreau’s retreat after the passage of theAdda by theAustro-Russian army. The French general, after having covered the evacuation ofMilan,tookupapositionbetweenthePoandtheTanaro.

HiscampresteduponAlexandriaandValentia,twocapitalfortresses,andhad the advantage of covering the roads to Turin and Savona, bywhich hecouldeffecthisretreatincasehewasunabletoaccomplishajunctionwiththecorpsd’armeeofMacdonald,whohadbeenordered to quit thekingdomofNaples,andhastenhismarchintoTuscany.

Forced to abandon his position in consequence of the insurrection in

Piedmont andTuscany,Moreau retired uponAsti,where he learned that hiscommunicationwiththeriverofGenoahadjustbeencutoffbythecaptureofCeva.After several ineffectual attempts to retake this place, he saw that hisonlysafetydependeduponthrowinghimselfintothemountains.

Toeffectthisobject,hedirectedthewholeofhisbatteringtrainandheavybaggageby theColdeFenestrelleuponFrance; thenopeninghimselfawayover the St. Bernard, he gainedLoanowith his light artillery and the smallproportionoffieldequipmenthehadbeenabletopreserve.

By this skilfulmovement, henot only retainedhis communicationswithFrance,butwasenabledtoobservethemotionsofthearmyfromNaples,andto facilitatehis junctionwith itbydirecting thewholeofhis forceupon thepointsnecessaryforthatpurpose.

Macdonald, in themeantime,whoseonlychanceofsuccessdependedonconcentratinghislittlearmy,neglectedthisprecaution,andwasbeateninthreesuccessiveactionsattheTrebia.

By this retardment of his march, he rendered all Moreau’s measures tounite the twoarmies in theplainsof thePouseless,andhis retreat,afterhisbrilliant but fruitless efforts at the Trebia, defeated the other arrangements,also, which the former hadmade to come to his support. The inactivity ofMarshalSuwarrow,however,finallyenabledtheFrenchgeneraltoaccomplishhis junction with the remains of the army from Naples. Moreau thenconcentrated his whole force upon the Appenines, and placed himself in asituationtodefendtheimportantpositionsofLiguria,untilthechancesofwarshouldaffordhimanopportunityofresumingtheoffensive.

When,afteradecisivebattle,anarmyhaslostitsartilleryandequipments,and is consequentlyno longer in a state to assume theoffensive, or even toarrest thepursuitof theenemy, itwouldseemmostdesirable todividewhatremains into several corps, andorder them tomarchby separate anddistantroutes upon the base of operation, and throw themselves into the fortresses.This is the onlymeans of safety: for the enemy, uncertain as to the precisedirectiontakenbythevanquishedarmy,isignorantinthefirstinstancewhichcorpstopursue,anditisinthismomentofindecisionthatamarchisgaineduponhim.Besides,themovementsofasmallbodybeingsomucheasierthanthose of a larger one, these separate lines of march are all in favor of aretreatingarmy.

MAXIMXIV

Amongmountains,agreatnumberofpositionsarealwaystobefoundverystronginthemselves,andwhichitisdangeroustoattack.Thecharacterofthismodeofwarfareconsists inoccupyingcampson the flanksor in the rearoftheenemy,leavinghimonlythealternativeofabandoninghispositionwithoutfighting,totakeupanotherintherear,ortodescendfromitinordertoattackyou.Inmountainwarfare, theassailanthasalwaysthedisadvantage;eveninoffensive warfare in the open field, the great secret consists in defensivecombats,andinobligingtheenemytoattack.

NOTE.

During the campaign of 1793, in the Maritime Alps, the French army,undertheordersofGeneralBrunet,didallinitspowertogetpossessionofthecampsatRausandatFourches,byanattackinfront.ButtheseuselesseffortsservedonlytoincreasethecourageofthePiedmontese,andtodestroytheéliteofthegrenadiersoftherepublicanarmy.ThemanœuvresbywhichNapoleon,without fighting, compelled the enemy to evacuate these positions in 1796,suffice to establish the truth of these principles, and to prove how muchsuccess in war depends upon the genius of the general as well as on thecourageofthesoldier.

MAXIMXV

Thefirstconsiderationwithageneralwhooffersbattle,shouldbethegloryand honor of his arms; the safety and preservation of his men is only thesecond;but it is intheenterpriseandcourageresultingfromtheformer, thatthe latterwillmostassuredlybefound. Inaretreat,besides thehonorof thearmy, the lossof life isoftengreater than in twobattles.For this reason,weshouldneverdespairwhilebravemenaretobefoundwiththeircolors.Itisbythismeansthatweobtainvictory,anddeservetoobtainit.

NOTE.

In1645,theFrencharmy,undertheordersofthePrinceofCondé,wasonthe march to lay siege to Nordlingen, when it was discovered that CountMerci,who commanded theBavarians, had foreseen this intention, and hadentrenched himself in a strong position which defended Nordlingen at thesametimethatitcoveredDonawerth.

Notwithstanding the favorable position of the enemy,Condé ordered theattack.Thecombatwasterrible.Alltheinfantryinthecentreandontheright,after being successively engaged, was routed and dispersed, in spite of theeffortsofthecavalryandthereserve,whichwerelikewisecarriedawaywith

the fugitives.Thebattlewas lost.Condé, indespair,havingno longereithercentreor right todependupon, collected the remnantsofhisbattalions, anddirected his march to the left, where Turenne was still engaged. Thisperseverancereanimatedtheardorofthetroops.Theybroketherightwingoftheenemy,andTurenne,byachangeoffront,returnedtotheattackuponhiscentre. Night, too, favored the boldness of Condé. An entire corps ofBavarians, fancying themselves cut off, laid down their arms; and theobstinacy of the French general in this struggle for victory was repaid bypossessionofthefieldofbattle,togetherwithagreatnumberofprisoners,andalmostalltheenemy’sartillery.TheBavarianarmybeataretreat,andthenextdayNordlingencapitulated.

MAXIMXVI

Itisanapprovedmaximinwar,nevertodowhattheenemywishesyoutodo,forthisreasonalone,thathedesiresit.Afieldofbattle,therefore,whichhe has previously studied and reconnoitred, should be avoided, and doublecare should be taken where he has had time to fortify and entrench. Oneconsequence deducible from this principle is, never to attack a position infrontwhichyoucangainbyturning.

NOTE.

It was without due regard to this principle, that Marshal Villeroi, onassuming the command of the army of Italy, during the campaign of 1701,attacked, with unwarrantable presumption, Prince Eugene, of Savoy, in hisentrenched position of Chiavi, on the Oglio. The French generals, Catinatamongtherest,consideredthepostunassailable,butVilleroiinsisted,andtheresult of this otherwise unimportant battle was the loss of the élite of theFrencharmy.Itwouldhavebeengreaterstill,butforCatinat’sexertions.

Itwasbyneglecting the sameprinciple, that thePrinceofCondé, in thecampaignof1644,failedinallhisattacksupontheentrenchedpositionoftheBavarianarmy.TheCountMerci,whocommanded the latter, haddrawnuphiscavalryskilfullyupontheplain,restinguponFreyberg,whilehisinfantryoccupied themountain. Aftermany fruitless attempts, the Prince of Condé,seeing the impossibility of dislodging the enemy, began to menace hiscommunications—butthemomentMerciperceivedthis,hebrokeuphiscampandretiredbeyondtheBlackmountains.

MAXIMXVII

In a war of march and manœuvre, if you would avoid a battle with asuperior army, it is necessary to entrench every night, and occupy a gooddefensiveposition.Thosenaturalpositionswhichareordinarilymetwith,arenotsufficienttoprotectanarmyagainstsuperiornumberswithoutrecoursetoart.

NOTE.

Thecampaignof theFrenchandSpanisharmy,commandedbytheDukeofBerwick,againstthePortuguese,intheyear1706,affordsagoodlessononthis subject.The twoarmiesmadealmost the tourofSpain.Theybegan thecampaignnearBadajoz,andaftermanœuvringacrossbothCastiles,finisheditinthekingdomsofValenciaandMurcia.TheDukeofBerwickencampedhisarmyeighty-five times,andalthough thecampaignpassedwithoutageneralaction,hetookabouttenthousandprisonersfromtheenemy.MarshalTurennealsomadea finecampaignofmanœuvreagainst theCountMontécuculli, in1675.

The imperial army having made its arrangements to pass the Rhine atStrasburg, Turenne used all diligence, and, throwing a bridge over the rivernearthevillageofOttenheim,threeleaguesbelowStrasburg,hecrossedwiththeFrench army, and encamped close to the little townofVilstet,whichheoccupied. This position covered the bridge of Strasburg, so that, by thismanœuvre,Turennedeprivedtheenemyofallapproachtothatcity.

Upon this, Montécuculli made a movement with his whole army,threatening the bridge at Ottenheim, by which the French received theirprovisionsfromupperAlsace.

As soon as Turenne discovered the design of the enemy, he left adetachmentatVilstet,andmadearapidmarchwithhiswholeforceuponthevillage of Altenheim. This intermediate position between the two bridges,whichhewishedtopreserve,gavehimtheadvantageofbeingabletosuccoreitherof thesepostsbefore theenemyhad time tocarry them.Montécuculliseeing that any successful attack upon the bridges was not to be expected,resolvedtopasstheRhinebelowStrasburg,andwiththisviewreturnedtohisfirstpositionatOffenburg.MarshalTurenne,whofollowedallthemovementsoftheAustrianarmy,broughtbackhisarmyalsotoVilstet.

In themeantime, thisattemptof theenemyhavingconvinced theFrenchgeneralofthedangertowhichhisbridgehadexposedhim,removeditnearertothatofStrasburg,inordertodiminishtheextentofgroundhehadtodefend.

Montécuculli, having commanded themagistrates of Strasburg to collect

materials for a bridge, moved to Scherzheim to receive them; but TurenneagaindefeatedhisprojectsbytakingapositionatFreistett,whereheoccupiedtheislandsoftheRhine,andimmediatelyconstructedastockade.

Thusitwasthat,duringthewholeofthiscampaign,Turennesucceededingainingtheinitiativeoftheenemy,andobliginghimtofollowhismovements.He succeeded, also, by a rapidmarch, in cutting offMontécuculli from theTownofOffenburg,whencehedrewhis supplies,andwouldnodoubthaveprevented theAustriangeneral fromeffectinghis junctionwith the corpsofCaprara,hadnotacannon-shotterminatedthisgreatman’slife.

MAXIMXVIII

Ageneralofordinarytalentoccupyingabadposition,andsurprisedbyasuperior force, seeks his safety in retreat; but a great captain supplies alldeficiencies by his courage, andmarches boldly tomeet the attack.By thismeanshedisconcertshisadversary;andifthelattershowsanyirresolutioninhismovements,askilfulleader,profitingbyhisindecision,mayevenhopeforvictory, or at least employ the day in manœuvring—at night he entrencheshimself, or falls back to a better position. By this determined conduct hemaintainsthehonorofhisarms,thefirstessentialtoallmilitarysuperiority.

NOTE.

In 1653, Marshal Turenne was surprised by the Prince of Condé, in aposition where his army was completely compromised. He had the power,indeed,byanimmediateretreat,ofcoveringhimselfbytheSomme,whichhepossessedthemeansofcrossingatPeronne,andwhencehewasdistantonlyhalf a league; but, fearing the influence of this retrogrademovement on themoraleof his army,Turennebalanced all disadvantagesbyhis courage, andmarchedboldlytomeettheenemywithveryinferiorforces.Aftermarchingaleague,hefoundanadvantageousposition,wherehemadeeverydispositionforabattle.Itwasthreeo’clockintheafternoon;buttheSpaniards,exhaustedwithfatigue,hesitatedtoattackhim,andTurennehavingcoveredhimselfwithentrenchmentsduring thenight, theenemyno longerdared to riskageneralaction,andbrokeuphiscamp.

MAXIMXIX

The transition from the defensive to the offensive is one of the most

delicateoperations.

NOTE.

By studying the first campaign ofNapoleon in Italy, we can learnwhatgeniusandboldnessmayeffectinpassingwithanarmyfromthedefensivetotheoffensive.Thearmyof theallies, commandedbyGeneralBeaulieu,wasprovidedwitheverymeansthatcouldrenderitformidable.Itsforceamountedtoeightythousandmen,andtwohundredpiecesofcannon.TheFrencharmy,on thecontrary,couldnumberscarcely thirty thousandmenunderarms,andthirtypiecesofcannon.Forsometimetherehadbeenno issueofmeat,andeven the bread was irregularly supplied. The infantry was ill clothed, thecavalrywretchedlymounted.All thedraught-horseshadperishedfromwant,sothat theserviceof theartillerywasperformedbymules.Toremedytheseevils, large disbursements were necessary; and such was the state of thefinances,thatthegovernmenthadonlybeenabletofurnishtwothousandlouisinspeciefortheopeningofthecampaign.TheFrencharmycouldnotpossiblyexistinthisstate.Toadvanceorretreatwasabsolutelynecessary.Awareoftheadvantageofsurprisingtheenemyattheveryoutsetofthecampaignbysomedecisiveblow,Napoleonpreparedforitbyrecastingthemoraleofhisarmy.

Inaproclamationfullofenergy,hereminded themthatan ignobledeathalone remained for them, if they continued on the defensive; that they hadnothing to expect from France, but everything to hope from victory.“Abundance courts you in the fertile plains of Italy,” said he; “are youdeficient, soldiers, in constancyor in courage?”Profiting by themoment ofenthusiasmwhichhehadinspired,Napoleonconcentratedhisforcesinordertofallwithhiswholeweightonthedifferentcorpsoftheenemy.Immediatelyafterward, the battles of Montenotte, Milesimo, and Mondovi, added freshconfidencetothehighopinionalreadyentertainedbythesoldierforhischief;and thatarmywhichonlya fewdaysagowasencampedamidbarrenrocks,and consumed by famine, already aspired to the conquest of Italy. In onemonth after the opening of the campaign,Napoleon had terminated thewarwith the King of Sardinia, and conquered the Milanese. Rich cantonmentssoon dispelled from the recollection of the French soldier the misery andfatigue attendant on this rapidmarch,while a vigilant administration of theresources of the country reorganized the materiel of the French army, andcreatedthemeansnecessaryfortheattainmentoffuturesuccess.

MAXIMXX

Itmaybelaiddownasaprinciple,thatthelineofoperationshouldnotbe

abandoned;butitisoneofthemostskilfulmanœuvresinwar,toknowhowtochange it, when circumstances authorize or render this necessary. An armywhichchangesskilfullyitslineofoperationdeceivestheenemy,whobecomesignorantwheretolookforitsrear,oruponwhatweakpointsitisassailable.

NOTE.

Frederick sometimes changed his line of operation in the middle of acampaign;buthewasenabledtodothis,becausehewasmanœuvringatthattimeinthecentreofGermany—anabundantcountry,capableofsupplyingallthe wants of his army in case his communications with Prussia wereintercepted.

Marshal Turenne, in the campaign of 1746, gave up his line ofcommunication to theallies in thesamemanner;but, likeFrederick,hewascarryingon thewarat this time in thecentreofGermany,andhaving fallenwithhiswholeforcesuponRain,hetooktheprecautionofsecuringtohimselfadepôtuponwhichtoestablishhisbaseofoperation.

By a series of manœuvres, marked alike by audacity and genius, hesubsequently compelled the imperial army to abandon its magazines, andretireintoAustriaforwinterquarters.

But these are examples which it appears tome should only be imitatedwhenwehavetakenfullmeasureofthecapacityofouradversary,andaboveall, when we see no reason to apprehend an insurrection in the country towhichwetransferthetheatreofwar.

MAXIMXXI

Whenanarmycarrieswithitabatteringtrain,orlargeconvoysofsickandwounded,itcannotmarchbytooshortalineuponitsdepôts.

NOTE.

It is above all in mountainous countries, and in those interspersed withwoods andmarshes, that it is of importance to observe thismaxim; for, theconvoys andmeans of transport being frequently embarrassed in defiles, anenemy by manœuvring may easily disperse the escorts, or make even asuccessfulattackuponthewholearmy,whenitisobliged,fromthenatureofthecountry,tomarchinanextendedcolumn.

MAXIMXXII

Theartofencampinginpositionisthesameastakingupthelineinorderofbattle in thisposition.To this end, the artillery shouldbe advantageouslyplaced, ground should be selected which is not commanded or liable to beturned, and, as far as possible, the guns should cover and command thesurroundingcountry.

NOTE.

Frederickhasremarkedthat,inordertobeassuredthatyourcampiswellplaced,you should see if, bymakinga smallmovement,youcanoblige theenemy to make a greater; or, if after having forced him to retrograde onemarchyoucancompelhimtofallbackanother.

Indefensivewar,allcampsshouldbeentrenchedinthefrontandwingsofthepositiontheyoccupy,andcareshouldbetakenthattherearisleftperfectlyopen. Ifyouare threatenedwithbeing turned,arrangementsshouldbemadebeforehandfortakingupamoredistantposition;andyoushouldprofitbyanydisorderintheenemy’slineofmarch,tomakeanattemptuponhisartilleryorbaggage.

MAXIMXXIII

When you are occupying a position which the enemy threatens tosurround, collect all your force immediately, and menace him with anoffensivemovement.Bythismanœuvre,youwillpreventhimfromdetachingandannoyingyourflanksincaseyoushouldjudgeitnecessarytoretire.

NOTE.

This was the manœuvre practised by General Desaix, in 1798, nearRadstadt.Hemadeupforinferiorityinnumbersbyaudacity,andmaintainedhimself the whole day in position in spite of the vigorous attacks of theArchdukeCharles.Atnightheeffectedhisretreatingoodorder,andtookupapositionintherear.

Itwasinaccordance,also,withthisprinciple,inthesamecampaign,thatGeneralMoreaugavebattleatBiberach,tosecurehisretreatbythepassesoftheBlackmountains.Afewdaysafter,hefoughtatSchliengenwiththesameobject.Placedinagooddefensiveposition,hemenacedtheArchdukeCharlesby a sudden return to the offensive, while his artillery and baggage werepassing the Rhine by the bridge of Huningen, and he was making all the

necessaryarrangementsforretiringbehindthatriverhimself.

Here, however, I would observe, that the execution of such offensivedemonstrationsshouldbedeferredalwaystilltowardtheevening,inorderthatyoumaynotbecompromisedbyengaging tooearly inacombatwhichyoucannotlongmaintainwithsuccess.

Night, and the uncertainty of the enemy after an affair of this kind,willalwaysfavoryourretreat, if it is judgednecessary;but,withaviewtomaskthe operationmore effectually, fires should be lighted all along the lines, todeceive the enemy and prevent him from discovering this retrogrademovement, for inaretreat it isagreatadvantage togainamarchuponyouradversary.

MAXIMXXIV

Neverlosesightofthismaxim:thatyoushouldestablishyourcantonmentsatthemostdistantandbest-protectedpointfromtheenemy,especiallywhereasurpriseispossible.Bythismeansyouwillhavetimetouniteallyourforcesbeforehecanattackyou.

NOTE.

Inthecampaignof1745,MarshalTurennelostthebattleofMarienthal,byneglecting this principle; for if, instead of reassembling his divisions atErbsthausen,hehadralliedhistroopsatMergentheim,behindtheTauber,hisarmywould have beenmuch sooner reunited; andCountMerci, in place offindingonlythreethousandmentofightatErbsthausen(ofwhichhewaswellinformed), would have had the whole French army to attack in a positioncoveredbyariver.

SomeonehavingindiscreetlyaskedViscountTurennehowhehadlostthebattleofMarienthal:“Bymyownfault,”repliedthemarshal;“but,”addedhe,“whenamanhascommittednofaultsinwar,hecanonlyhavebeenengagedinitbutashorttime.”

MAXIMXXV

Whentwoarmiesareinorderofbattle,andonehastoretireoverabridge,whiletheotherhasthecircumferenceofthecircleopen,alltheadvantagesarein favor of the latter. It is then a general should show boldness, strike a

decidedblow,andmanœuvreupontheflankofhisenemy.Thevictoryisinhishands.

NOTE.

ThiswasthepositionoftheFrencharmyatthefamousbattleofLeipzig,whichterminatedthecampaignof1813sofatallyforNapoleon;forthebattleofHanauwasofnoconsequence,comparatively,inthedesperatesituationofthatarmy.

Itstrikesmethat,inasituationlikethatoftheFrencharmyprevioustothebattle of Leipzig, a general should never calculate upon any of those luckychanceswhichmayariseoutof a return to theoffensive,but thathe shouldrather adopt every possible means to secure his retreat. With this view, heshouldimmediatelycoverhimselfwithgoodentrenchments,toenablehimtorepelwithinferiornumberstheattackoftheenemy,whilehisownequipmentsarecrossing the river.As fastas the troops reach theotherside, theyshouldoccupypositionstoprotectthepassageoftherearguard,andthislastshouldbecoveredbyatêtedepontassoonasthearmybreaksupitscamp.DuringthewarsoftheRevolution,toolittleregardwaspaidtoentrenchments;anditis for this reasonwehaveseen largearmiesdispersedaftera single reverse,andthefateofnationscompromisedbytheissueofonebattle.

MAXIMXXVI

It is contrary to all true principle, to make corps, which have nocommunicationwitheachother, act separatelyagainst a central forcewhosecommunicationsarecutoff.

NOTE.

TheAustrians lost thebattleofHohenlindenbyneglecting thisprinciple.The imperial army, under theorders of the archduke John,wasdivided intofour columns, which had to march through an immense forest, previous totheir junction in the plain of Anzing, where they intended to surprise theFrench. But these different corps, having no direct communication, foundthemselvescompelledtoengageseparatelywithanenemywhohadtakentheprecaution of concentrating his masses, and who could move them withfacilityinacountrywithwhichhehadbeenlongpreviouslyacquainted.

ThustheAustrianarmy,enclosedinthedefilesoftheforestwithitswholetrain of artillery and baggage, was attacked in its flanks and rear, and thearchdukeJohnwasonlyenabledtorallyhisdispersedandshattereddivisionsundercoverofthenight.

ThetrophiesobtainedbytheFrencharmyonthisdaywereimmense.Theyconsistedofeleventhousandprisoners,onehundredpiecesofcannon,severalstandofcolors,andallthebaggageoftheenemy.

ThebattleofHohenlindendecidedthefateof thecampaignof1800,andMoreau’sbrilliantandwell-meritedsuccessplacedhimintherankofthefirstgeneraloftheage.

MAXIMXXVII

Whenanarmyisdrivenfromafirstposition,theretreatingcolumnsshouldrally always sufficiently in the rear, to prevent any interruption from theenemy.Thegreatestdisasterthatcanhappen,iswhenthecolumnsareattackedindetail,andbeforetheirjunction.

NOTE.

Onegreatadvantagewhichresultsfromrallyingyourcolumnsonapointfarremovedfromthefieldofbattle,orfromthepositionpreviouslyoccupied,is,thattheenemyisuncertainastothedirectionyoumeantotake.

If he divides his force to pursue you, he exposes himself to see hisdetachmentsbeatenindetail,especiallyifyouhaveexertedallduediligence,andhaveeffectedthejunctionofyourtroopsinsufficienttimetogetbetweenhiscolumnsanddispersethemoneaftertheother.

ItwasbyamanœuvreofthiskindinthecampaignofItaly, in1799,thatGeneralMelasgainedthebattleofGenola.

GeneralChampionetcommandedtheFrencharmy,andendeavoredtocutoffthecommunicationoftheAustrianswithTurin,byemployingcorpswhichmanœuvred separately toget into their rear.Melas,whodivinedhisproject,madearetrogrademarch,bywhichhepersuadedhisadversaryhewasinfullretreat,althoughtherealobjectofhismovementwastoconcentratehisforcesat thepoint fixedfor the junctionof thedifferentdetachmentsof theFrencharmy, and which he beat and dispersed, one after another, by his greatsuperiority in numbers. The result of thismanœuvre, inwhich theAustriangeneraldisplayedvigor,decision,andforesight,securedtohimthepeaceablepossessionofPiedmont.

It was also by the neglect of this principle that General Beaulieu, whocommanded the Austro-Sardinian army in the campaign of 1796, lost thebattleofMilesimoafterthatofMontenotte.

Hisobject,inendeavoringtorallyhisdifferentcorpsuponMilesimo,was,

to cover the high roads of Turin and Milan; but Napoleon, aware of theadvantages arising from the ardor of troops emboldened by recent success,attackedhimbeforehecouldassemblehisdivisions,and,byaseriesofskilfulmanœuvres,succeededinseparatingthecombinedarmies.Theyretiredinthegreatestdisorder—theonebytheroadofMilan,theotherbythatofTurin.

MAXIMXXVIII

No force should be detached on the eve of a battle, because affairsmaychangeduringthenight,eitherbytheretreatoftheenemy,orbythearrivaloflarge reinforcements to enable him to resume the offensive, and counteractyourpreviousarrangements.

NOTE.

In 1796, the army of the Sambre and Meuse, commanded by GeneralJourdan,effectedaretreat,whichwasrenderedstillmoredifficultbythelossofhislineofcommunication.Seeing,however,thattheforcesofthearchdukeCharles were scattered, Jourdan, in order to accomplish his retreat uponFrankfort,resolvedtoopenhimselfawaybyWurtzburg,wheretherewereatthatmomentonlytwodivisionsoftheAustrianarmy.Thismovementwouldhave been attended with success, if the French general, believing he hadsimply these two divisions to contendwith, had not committed the error ofseparatinghimselffromthecorpsofLefevre—whichheleftatSchweinfurttocovertheonlydirectcommunicationofthearmywithitsbaseofoperation.

Thecommissionofthisfaultattheoutset,addedtosomeslownessinthemarch of the French general, secured the victory to the archduke, whohastenedtoconcentratehisforces.

Thearrivalofthetwodivisions,also,ofKrayandWartesleben,duringthebattle,enabledhim tooppose fifty thousandmen to theFrencharmy,whichscarcely numbered thirty thousand combatants. This last was consequentlybeaten,andobligedtocontinueitsretreatbythemountainsofFuldes,wherethe badness of the roads could be equalled only by the difficulty of thecountry.

ThedivisionofLefevre, amounting to fourteen thousandmen,would, inall probability, have turned the scale in favor of Jourdan, had the latter notunfortunatelyconceivedthattwodivisionsonlywereopposinghispassagetoWurtzburg.

MAXIMXXIX

When you have resolved to fight a battle, collect your whole force.Dispensewithnothing.Asinglebattalionsometimesdecidestheday.

NOTE.

Ithinkitheredesirabletoobserve,thatitisprudentbeforeabattletofixupon some point in rear of the reserve for the junction of the differentdetachments;forif,fromunforeseencircumstances,thesedetachmentsshouldbe prevented from joining before the action has commenced, theymight beexposed, in case a retrograde movement should be found necessary, to themasses of the enemy. It is desirable also to keep the enemy in ignoranceofthese reinforcements, in order to employ them with greater effect. “Aseasonable reinforcement,” says Frederick, “renders the success of a battlecertain,becausetheenemywillalwaysimagineitstrongerthanitreallyis,andlosecourageaccordingly.”

MAXIMXXX

Nothing is so rash or so contrary to principle, as tomake a flankmarchbeforeanarmyinposition,especiallywhenthisarmyoccupiesheightsatthefootofwhichyouareforcedtodefile.

NOTE.

ItwasbyaneglectofthisprinciplethatFrederickwasbeatenatKollininthefirstcampaignof1757.Notwithstandingprodigiesofvalor,thePrussianslostfifteenthousandmenandagreatportionoftheirartillery,whilethelossofthe Austrians did not exceed five thousand men. The consequence of thisbattlewasmoreunfortunatestill,sinceitobligedtheKingofPrussiatoraisethesiegeofPrague,andtoevacuateBohemia.

It was also bymaking a flankmarch before the Prussian army, that theFrenchlostthedisgracefulbattleofRosbach.

This imprudentmovementwas stillmore tobe reprehended,because thePrincedeSoubise,whocommandedtheFrencharmy,wassonegligentastomanœuvre,without either advancedguardsor flankingcorps, inpresenceoftheenemy.Theresultwas,thathisarmy,consistingoffiftythousandmen,wasbeatenbysixbattalionsandthirtysquadrons.TheFrenchlostseventhousandmen, twenty-seven standards, and a great number of cannon. The Prussianshadonlythreehundredmendisabled.

Thus,byhavingforgottenthisprinciple,thataflankmarchisnevertobemadebeforeanenemyinlineofbattle,FredericklosthisarmyatKollin;andSoubise,atRosbach,lostbothhisarmyandhishonor.

MAXIMXXXI

When you determine to risk a battle, reserve to yourself every possiblechanceofsuccess,moreparticularlyifyouhavetodealwithanadversaryofsuperiortalent;forifyouarebeaten,eveninthemidstofyourmagazinesandyourcommunications,wotothevanquished!

NOTE.

“Weshouldmakewar,”saysMarshalSaxe,“without leavinganything tohazard, and in this especially consists the talent of a general. Butwhenwehaveincurredtheriskofabattle,weshouldknowhowtoprofitbythevictory,andnotmerelycontentourselves,accordingtocustom,withpossessionofthefield.”

Itwasbyneglectingtofollowupthefirstsuccess,thattheAustrianarmy,aftergainingthefieldofMarengo,sawitselfcompelledonthefollowingdaytoevacuatethewholeofItaly.

GeneralMelas, observing the French in retreat, left the direction of themovementsofhisarmyto thechiefofhisstaff,andretired toAlexandria toreposefromthefatiguesoftheday.ColonelZach,equallyconvincedwithhisgeneral that the French armywas completely broken, and consisted only offugitives,formedthedivisionsincolumnofroute.

By this arrangement, the imperial army prepared to enter upon itsvictoriousmarchinaformationnotlessthanthreemilesindepth.

Itwas near four o’clockwhenGeneralDesaix rejoined theFrench armywithhisdivision.Hispresence restored in somedegreeanequalitybetweenthe contending forces; and yetNapoleon hesitated for amomentwhether toresume theoffensive,or tomakeuseof this corps to securehis retreat.Theardorof the troops to return to the charge,decidedhis irresolution.He roderapidlyalongthefrontofhisdivisions,andaddressingthesoldiers—“Wehaveretired far enough for to-day,” said he; “you know I always sleep upon thefieldofbattle!”

Thearmy,withunanimousshout,proclaimedtohimapromiseofvictory.Napoleonresumedtheoffensive.TheAustrianadvanceguard,panic-struckatthe sight of a formidable and unbroken body presenting itself suddenly at a

pointwhere,afewmomentsbefore,onlyfugitivesweretobeseen,wenttotheright about, and carried disorder into the mass of its columns. Attackedimmediatelyafterward,withimpetuosity, initsfrontandflanks,theAustrianarmywascompletelyrouted.

MarshalDaunexperiencednearly the same fateasGeneralMelas, at thebattleofTorgau,inthecampaignof1760.

The position of the Austrian army was excellent. It had its left uponTorgau,itsrightontheplateauofSiptitz,anditsfrontcoveredbyalargesheetofwater.

Frederick proposed to turn its right in order tomake an attack upon therear.For thispurposehedividedhisarmy into twocorps, theoneunder theordersofZiethen,withinstructionstoattackinfront,followingtheedgeofthewater;theotherunderhisownimmediatecommand,withwhichhesetouttoturntherightoftheAustrians.ButMarshalDaunhavinghadintimationofthemovementsoftheenemy,changedhisfrontbycountermarching,andwasthusenabledtorepeltheattacksofFrederick,whomheobligedtoretreat.ThetwocorpsofthePrussianarmyhadbeenactingwithoutcommunication.Ziethen,in themeantime, hearing the fire recede, concluded that the king had beenbeaten, and commenced amovement by his left in order to rejoin him; butfallinginwith twobattalionsof thereserve, thePrussiangeneralprofitedbythisreinforcementtoresumetheoffensive.Accordinglyherenewedtheattackwithvigor,gotpossessionoftheplateauofSiptitz,andsoonafterofthewholefieldofbattle.ThesunhadalreadysetwhentheKingofPrussiareceivedthenewsofthisunexpectedgoodfortune.Hereturnedinallhaste,tookadvantageof the night to restore order in his disorganized army, and the day after thebattleoccupiedTorgau.

Marshal Daun was receiving congratulations upon his victory, when heheard that the Prussians had resumed the offensive. He immediatelycommandedaretreat,andatdaybreaktheAustriansrepassedtheElbewiththelossoftwelvethousandmen,eightthousandprisoners,andforty-fivepiecesofcannon.

After thebattleofMarengo,GeneralMelas, although in themidstofhisfortresses andmagazines, saw himself compelled to abandon everything, inordertosavethewreckofhisarmy.

GeneralMackcapitulatedafterthebattleofUlm,althoughinthecentreofhisowncountry.

ThePrussians,inspiteoftheirdepôtsandreserves,wereobliged,afterthebattleofJena,andtheFrenchafterthatofWaterloo,tolaydowntheirarms.

Hence,wemayconcludethatthemisfortunethatresultsfromthelossofa

battle,doesnotconsistsomuchinthedestructionofmenandofmaterielasinthediscouragementwhichfollowsthisdisaster.Thecourageandconfidenceofthe victors augment in proportion as those of the vanquished diminish; andwhatevermaybetheresourcesofanarmy,itwillbefoundthataretreatwilldegenerate rapidly into a rout unless the general-in-chief shall succeed, bycombining boldnesswith skill, and perseverancewith firmness, in restoringthemoraleofhisarmy.

MAXIMXXXII

Thedutyofanadvancedguarddoesnotconsist inadvancingor retiring,butinmanœuvring.Anadvancedguardshouldbecomposedoflightcavalry,supported by a reserve of heavy cavalry, and by battalions of infantry,supported also by artillery. An advanced guard should consist of pickedtroops,andthegeneralofficers,officersandmen,shouldbeselectedfortheirrespectivecapabilitiesandknowledge.Acorpsdeficientininstructionisonlyanembarrassmenttoanadvancedguard.

NOTE.

It was the opinion of Frederick that an advanced guard should becomposed of detachments of troops of all arms. The commander shouldpossessskill in thechoiceofground,andheshouldtakecare tobe instantlyinformed,bymeansofnumerouspatrols,ofeverythingpassingintheenemy’scamp.

Inwar,itisnotthebusinessofanadvancedguardtofight,buttoobservetheenemy,inordertocoverthemovementsofthearmy.Wheninpursuit,theadvanced guard should charge with vigor, and cut off the baggage andinsulatedcorpsoftheretiringenemy.Forthispurpose,itshouldbereinforcedwithallthedisposablelightcavalryofthearmy.

MAXIMXXXIII

Itiscontrarytotheusagesofwartoallowparksorbatteriesofartillerytoenteradefile,unlessyouholdtheotherextremity.Incaseofretreat,thegunswillembarrassyourmovementsandbe lost.Theyshouldbe left inposition,underasufficientescort,untilyouaremasteroftheopening.

NOTE.

Nothing encumbers the march of an army so much as a quantity ofbaggage. In the campaign of 1796, Napoleon abandoned his battering trainunderthewallsofMantua,afterspikingthegunsanddestroyingthecarriages.Bythissacrifice,heacquiredafacilityofmanœuvringrapidlyhislittlearmy,andobtainedtheinitiativeaswellasageneralsuperiorityoverthenumerousbutdividedforcesofMarshalWurmser.

In 1799, during his retreat in Italy, GeneralMoreau being compelled tomanœuvre among themountains, preferred separating himself entirely fromhisreserveartillery,whichhedirecteduponFrancebytheColdeFenestrelle,ratherthanembarrasshismarchwiththispartofhisequipment.

Theseare theexamplesweshould follow; for if,bya rapidityofmarch,andafacilityofconcentrationupondecisivepoints,thevictoryisgained,thematerielofanarmy issoonre-established.But if,on theotherhand,wearebeatenandcompelledtoretreat,itwillbedifficulttosaveourequipments,andwemayhavereasontocongratulateourselvesthatweabandonedthemintimetopreventthemfromaugmentingthetrophiesoftheenemy.

MAXIMXXXIV

Itshouldbelaiddownasaprinciple,nevertoleaveintervalsbywhichtheenemycanpenetratebetweencorpsformedinorderofbattle,unless itbe todrawhimintoasnare.

NOTE.

Inthecampaignof1757,thePrinceofLorraine,whowascoveringPraguewith the Austrian army, perceived the Prussians threatening, by a flankmovement,toturnhisright.Heimmediatelyorderedapartialchangeoffrontbythrowingbacktheinfantryofthatwing,soastoformarightanglewiththerestoftheline.Butthismanœuvrebeingexecutedinpresenceoftheenemy,was not effected without some disorder. The heads of the columns havingmarched too quick, caused the rear to lengthen out, andwhen the linewasformed to the right, a large interval appearedat the salient angle.Frederick,observing this error,hastened to takeadvantageof it.Hedirectedhis centrecorps, commandedby theDukeofBevern, to throw itself into thisopening,andbythismanœuvredecidedthefateofthebattle.

ThePrince ofLorraine returned toPrague, beaten and pursued,with thelossofsixteenthousandmenandtwohundredpiecesofcannon.

It shouldbeobservedat the same time, that thisoperationof throwingacorps into the intervalsmade by an army in time of battle, should never be

attemptedunless you are at least equal in force, andhave anopportunityofoutflankingtheenemyontheonesideortheother;foritisthenonlyyoucanhope todividehisarmyin thecentre,and insulate thewingsentirely. Ifyouareinferiorinnumber,youruntheriskofbeingstoppedbythereverses,andoverpoweredbytheenemy’swings,whichmaydeployuponyourflanksandsurroundyou.

It was by thismanœuvre that theDuke of Berwick gained the battle ofAlmanza,intheyear1707,inSpain.

TheAnglo-Portuguesearmy,underthecommandofLordGalloway,cametoinvestVillena.MarshalBerwick,whocommandedtheFrenchandSpanisharmy,quittedhiscampatMontalegre,andmoveduponthistowntoraisethesiege.Athisapproach,theEnglishgeneral,eagertofightabattle,advancedtomeethimintheplainsofAlmanza.Theissuewaslongdoubtful.Thefirstline,commanded by the Duke of Popoli, having been broken, the Chevalierd’Asfeldt, who had charge of the second, drew up his masses with largeintervalsbetweenthem;andwhentheEnglish,whowereinpursuitofthefirstline,reachedthesereserves,hetookadvantageoftheirdisordertoattacktheminflankanddefeatedthementirely.

MarshalBerwick,perceivingthesuccessofthismanœuvre,threwopenhisfront,anddeployingupontheenemy’sflanks,whilethereservesustainedtheattackinfront,andthecavalrymanœuvredintheirrear,obtainedacompletevictory.

Lord Galloway, wounded and pursued, collected with difficulty theremainsofhisarmy,andtookshelterwiththeminTortosa.

MAXIMXXXV

Encampmentsofthesamearmyshouldalwaysbeformedsoastoprotecteachother.

NOTE.

AtthebattleofDresden,inthecampaignof1813,thecampoftheallies,althoughadvantageouslyplacedupontheheightsontheleftbankoftheElbe,wasneverthelessextremelydefective,frombeingtraversedlongitudinallybyadeepravine,whichseparatedtheleftwingcompletelyfromthecentreandtheright. This vicious arrangement did not escape the penetrating eye ofNapoleon. He instantly directed the whole of his cavalry and two corps ofinfantry against the insulated wing, attacked it with superior numbers,overthrewit,andtooktenthousandprisoners,beforeitwaspossibletocome

toitssupport.

MAXIMXXXVI

Whentheenemy’sarmyiscoveredbyariver,uponwhichheholdsseveraltêtesdepont,donotattackinfront.Thiswoulddivideyourforceandexposeyoutobeturned.Approachtheriverinechelonofcolumns,insuchamannerthat the leadingcolumnshallbe theonlyone theenemycanattack,withoutofferingyouhisflank.Inthemeantime,letyourlighttroopsoccupythebank,andwhen you have decided on the point of passage, rush upon it and flingacrossyourbridge.Observe that thepoint of passage shouldbe always at adistancefromtheleadingechelon,inordertodeceivetheenemy.

NOTE.

Ifyouoccupya townoravillageonthebankofariver,opposite to thatheld by the enemy, it is an advantage tomake this spot the crossing point,becauseitiseasiertocoveryourcarriagesandreserveartillery,aswellastomasktheconstructionofyourbridge,inatown,thanintheopencountry.Itisalsoagreatadvantagetopassariveroppositeavillage,whenthelatterisonlyweakly occupied by the enemy; because as soon as the advanced guardreachestheotherside,itcarriesthispost,makesalodgment,andbythrowingupafewdefensiveworks,convertsiteasilyintoatêtedepont.Bythismeans,therestofthearmyisenabledtoeffectthepassagewithfacility.

MAXIMXXXVII

From the moment you are master of a position which commands theopposite bank, facilities are acquired for effecting the passage of the river;aboveall,ifthispositionissufficientlyextensivetoplaceuponitartilleryinforce. This advantage is diminished, if the river ismore than three hundredtoises(orsixhundredyards)inbreadth,becausethedistancebeingoutoftherangeofgrape, it iseasyfor the troopswhichdefend thepassage to line thebankandgetundercover.Hence it follows that if thegrenadiers,ordered topasstheriverfortheprotectionofthebridge,shouldreachtheotherside,theywouldbedestroyedbythefireoftheenemy;becausehisbatteries,placedatthe distance of two hundred toises from the landing, are capable of amostdestructive effect, although removed above five hundred toises from thebatteries of the crossing force.Thus the advantage of the artillerywould be

exclusivelyhis.Forthesamereason,thepassageisimpracticable,unlessyousucceedinsurprisingtheenemy,andareprotectedbyanintermediateisland,or,unlessyouareabletotakeadvantageofanangleintheriver,toestablishacrossfireuponhisworks.Inthiscase,theislandorangleformsanaturaltêtedepont,andgivestheadvantageinartillerytotheattackingarmy.

Whenariverislessthansixtytoises(oronehundredandtwentyyards)inbreadth,andyouhaveapostupontheotherside,thetroopswhicharethrownacross derive such advantages from the protection of your artillery, that,howeversmalltheanglemaybe,itisimpossiblefortheenemytopreventtheestablishment of a bridge. In this case, themost skilful generals,when theyhavediscoveredtheprojectoftheiradversary,andbroughttheirownarmytothepointofcrossing,usuallycontentthemselveswithopposingthepassageofthebridge,byformingasemicirclerounditsextremity,asroundtheopeningofadefile,andremovingtothedistanceofthreeorfourhundredtoisesfromthefireoftheoppositeside.

NOTE.

Frederickobserves,that“thepassageofgreatriversinthepresenceoftheenemy is one of the most delicate operations in war.” Success on theseoccasions depends on secrecy, on the rapidity of the manœuvres, and thepunctualexecutionoftheordersgivenforthemovementsofeachdivision.Topasssuchanobstacleinpresenceofanenemy,andwithouthisknowledge,itisnecessarynotonlythatthepreviousdispositionsshouldbewellconceived,butthattheyshouldbeexecutedwithoutconfusion.

Inthecampaignof1705,PrinceEugene,ofSavoy,wishingtocometotheassistanceofthePrinceofPiedmont,soughtforafavorablepointatwhichtoforcethepassageoftheAdda,defendedatthattimebytheFrencharmy,underthecommandoftheDukedeVendome.

Afterhavingselectedanadvantageoussituation,PrinceEugeneerectedabatteryoftwentypiecesofcannononapositionwhichcommandedtheentireoftheoppositebank,andcoveredhisinfantrybyalineofentrenchedparallelsconstructedontheslopeofthedeclivity.

Theywereworkingvigorouslyatthebridge,whentheDukedeVendomeappearedwith hiswhole army.At first he seemed determined to oppose itsconstruction, but after having examined the position of Prince Eugene, hejudgedthistobeimpracticable.

Hethereforeplacedhisarmyoutofreachoftheprince’sbatteries,restingbothhiswingsupontheriver,soastoformabow,ofwhichtheAddawasthecord.He thencoveredhimselfwithentrenchmentsandabattis, andwas thusenabled to charge the enemy’s columnswhenever they debouched from the

bridge,andtobeatthemindetail.

Eugene, having reconnoitred the position of the French, considered thepassageimpossible.Hethereforewithdrewthebridge,andbrokeuphiscampduringthenight.

Itwasbythismanœuvre,also,that,inthecampaignof1809,theArchdukeCharles compelled the French to reoccupy the isle of Lobau, after havingdebouchedontheleftbankoftheDanube.ThemarchoftheArchdukeCharleswaswhollyconcentric.HemenacedGrosaspernwithhisright,Eslingwithhiscentre,andEnzersdorfwithhisleft.

His army, with both wings resting on the Danube, formed a semicirclearound Esling. Napoleon immediately attacked and broke the centre of theAustrians;butafterhavingforcedtheirfirstline,hefoundhimselfarrestedbythe reserves. In the meantime, the bridges upon the Danube had beendestroyed,andseveralofhiscorps,withtheirparksofartillery,werestillonthe right bank. This disappointment, joined to the favorable position of theAustrians, decided Napoleon to re-enter the isle of Lobau, where he hadpreviouslyconstructedalineoffield-works,soastogiveitalltheadvantagesofawellentrenchedcamp.

MAXIMXXXVIII

Itisdifficulttopreventanenemy,suppliedwithpontoons,fromcrossingariver.When theobject of an army,whichdefends thepassage, is to cover asiege, the moment the general has ascertained his inability to oppose thepassage, he should take measures to arrive before the enemy, at anintermediatepositionbetweentheriverhedefendsandtheplacehedesirestocover.

NOTE.

Here we may observe, that this intermediate position should bereconnoitred, or rather, well entrenched beforehand; for the enemy will beunable to make an offensive movement against the corps employed in thesiege,untilhehasbeatenthearmyofobservation;andthelatter,undercoverofitscamp,mayalwaysawaitafavorableopportunitytoattackhiminflankorinrear.

Besides, the army which is once entrenched in this manner, has theadvantage of being concentrated; while that of the enemy must act indetachments,ifhewishestocoverhisbridge,andwatchthemovementsofthearmyofobservation, soas toenablehim toattack thebesiegingcorps in its

lines,withoutbeingexposedtoanattemptonhisrear,orbeingmenacedwiththelossofhisbridge.

MAXIMXXXIX

In the campaign of 1645, Turenne was attacked with his army beforePhilipsburgbyaverysuperiorforce.TherewasnobridgehereovertheRhine,but he took advantage of the ground between the river and the place toestablish his camp. This should serve as a lesson to engineer officers, notmerely in theconstructionoffortresses,butof têtesdepont.Aspaceshouldalwaysbeleftbetweenthefortressandtheriver,whereanarmymayformandrally without being obliged to throw itself into the place, and therebycompromise its security.An army retiring uponMayence before a pursuingenemy, isnecessarilycompromised;for thisreason,because it requiresmorethanadaytopassthebridge,andbecausethelinesofCasselaretooconfinedto admit an army to remain there without being blocked up. Two hundredtoisesshouldhavebeen leftbetween thatplaceand theRhine. It isessentialthat all têtes de pont before great rivers should be constructed upon thisprinciple,otherwisetheywillproveaveryinefficientassistancetoprotectthepassageofaretreatingarmy.Têtesdepont,aslaiddowninourschools,areofuseonlyforsmallrivers,thepassageofwhichiscomparativelyshort.

NOTE.

MarshalSaxe,inthecampaignof1741,havingpassedtheMoldauinquestofadetachedcorpsoffourteenthousandmen,whichwasabouttothrowitselfintoPrague, left a thousand infantryupon that river,withorders toentrenchthemselvesuponaheightdirectlyoppositethetêtedepont.Bythisprecaution,themarshal secured his retreat, and also the facility of repassing the bridgewithoutdisorder,byrallyinghisdivisionsbetweentheentrenchedheightandthetêtedepont.

Weretheseexamplesunknowntothegeneralsofmoderntimes,oraretheydisposedtothinksuchprecautionssuperfluous?

MAXIMXL

Fortressesareequallyusefulinoffensiveanddefensivewarfare.Itistrue,theywillnotinthemselvesarrestanarmy,buttheyareanexcellentmeansofretarding,embarrassing,weakeningandannoyingavictoriousenemy.

NOTE.

The brilliant success of the allied armies in the campaign of 1814, hasgiventomanymilitarymenafalseideaoftherealvalueoffortresses.

TheformidablebodieswhichcrossedtheRhineandtheAlpsatthisperiod,were enabled to spare large detachments to blockade the strong places thatcovered the frontiers of France, without materially affecting the numericalsuperiorityof thearmywhichmarcheduponthecapital.Thisarmywas inacondition, therefore, to act,without the fear of beingmenaced in its line ofretreat.

ButatnoperiodofmilitaryhistorywerethearmiesofEuropesocombinedbefore,orgoverned so entirelybyone commonmind in the attainmentof asingleobject.Underthesecircumstances,thelineoffortresseswhichsurroundFrancewas renderedunavailable during the campaign; but itwould be veryimprudent, therefore, to conclude that a frontier guarded by numerousfortressesmay be passedwith impunity; or that battlesmay be foughtwiththese places in your rear,without previously besieging, or at least investingthemwithsufficientforces.

MAXIMXLI

There areonly twowaysof insuring the successof a siege.The first, tobeginbybeatingtheenemy’sarmyemployedtocovertheplace,forcingitoutofthefield,andthrowingitsremainsbeyondsomegreatnaturalobstacle,suchas a chainofmountains, or large river.Havingaccomplished thisobject, anarmy of observation should be placed behind the natural obstacle, until thetrenchesarefinishedandtheplacetaken.

But if it be desired to take the place in presence of a relieving army,withoutriskingabattle,thenthewholematerielandequipmentforasiegearenecessary to begin with, together with ammunition and provisions for thepresumed period of its duration, and also lines of contravallation andcircumvallation, aided by all the localities of heights, woods, marshes andinundations.

Havingnolongeroccasiontokeepupcommunicationswithyourdepôts,itisnowonlyrequisitetoholdinchecktherelievingarmy.Forthispurpose,anarmyofobservationshouldbeformed,whosebusinessitisnevertolosesightof that of the enemy, and which, while it effectually bars all access to theplace, has always time enough to arrive upon his flanks or rear in case heshouldattempttostealamarch.

It is to be remembered, too, that by profiting judiciously by the lines ofcontravallation, a portion of the besieging armywill always be available ingivingbattletotheapproachingenemy.

Upon the same general principle, when a place is to be besieged inpresence of an enemy’s army, it is necessary to cover the siege by lines ofcircumvallation.

Ifthebesiegingforceisofnumericalstrengthenough(afterleavingacorpsbefore the place four times the amount of the garrison) to cope with therelievingarmy,itmayremovemorethanoneday’smarchfromtheplace;butif it be inferior in numbers after providing for the siege, as above stated, itshould remain only a short day’smarch from the spot, in order to fall backuponitslines,ifnecessary,orreceivesuccorincaseofattack.

Iftheinvestingcorpsandarmyofobservationareonlyequalwhenunitedtotherelievingforce,thebesiegingarmyshouldremainentirewithin,ornearitslines,andpushtheworksandthesiegewiththegreatestactivity.

NOTE.

“Whenweundertakeasiege,”saysMontécuculli,“weshouldnotseektoplaceourselvesoppositetheweakestpartofthefortress,butatthepointmostfavorableforestablishingacampandexecutingthedesignswehaveinview.”

ThismaximwaswellunderstoodbytheDukeofBerwick.Senttoformthesiege of Nice in 1706, he determined to attack on the side of Montalban,contrarytotheadviceofVauban,andeventotheordersoftheking.Havingaverysmallarmyathisdisposal,hebeganbysecuringhiscamp.ThishedidbyconstructingredoubtsupontheheightsthatshutinthespacebetweentheVarand the Paillon, two rivers which supported his flanks. By this means, heprotectedhimselfagainstasurprise;fortheDukeofSavoy,havingthepowerofdebouchingsuddenlybytheColdeTende,itwasnecessarythatthemarshalshould be enabled to assemble his forces, so as to move rapidly upon hisadversary,andfighthimbeforehegotintoposition;otherwisehisinferiorityinnumberswouldhaveobligedhimtoraisethesiege.

When Marshal Saxe was besieging Brussels, with only twenty-eightthousand men, opposed to a garrison of twelve thousand, he receivedintelligencethatthePrinceofWaldeckwasassemblinghisforcestoraisethesiege.Notbeingstrongenough to formanarmyofobservation, themarshalreconnoitred a field of battle on the little river Voluve, and made all thenecessarydispositionsformovingrapidlytothespot,incaseoftheapproachoftheenemy.Bythismeanshewaspreparedtoreceivehisadversarywithoutdiscontinuingtheoperationsofthesiege.

MAXIMXLII

Feuquière says that “we should neverwait for the enemy in the lines ofcircumvallation,butweshouldgooutandattackhim.”Heisinerror.Thereisnoauthorityinwarwithoutexception;anditwouldbedangeroustoproscribetheprincipleofawaitingtheenemywithinthelinesofcircumvallation.

NOTE.

During the siege ofMons, in 1691, the Prince ofOrange assembled hisarmy,andadvancedasfarasNotreDamedeHalle,makingademonstrationtosuccor the place. LouisXIV,who commanded the siege in person, called acouncil of war to deliberate on what was to be done in case the Prince ofOrange approached. The opinion of Marshal Luxembourg was to remainwithinthelinesofcircumvallation,andthatopinionprevailed.

Themarshal laid itdownasaprinciple that,when thebesiegingarmy isnotstrongenoughtodefendthewholeextentofcircumvallation,itshouldquitthe lines and advance to meet the enemy; but when it is strong enough toencamp in two lines around a place, that it is better to profit by a goodentrenchment—moreespeciallyasbythismeansthesiegeisnotinterrupted.

In1658,MarshalTurennewasbesiegingDunkirk.Hehadalreadyopenedthetrenches,whentheSpanisharmy,undertheordersofthePrinceDonJuan,Condé, and D’Hocquincourt, appeared in sight, and took post upon theDowns,atadistanceofaleaguefromhislines.Turennehadthesuperiorityinnumbers, and he determined to quit his entrenchments. He had otheradvantages also. The enemy was without artillery, and their superiority incavalrywasrendereduselessbytheunfavorablenatureoftheground.Itwas,therefore,ofgreat importancetobeat theSpanisharmybeforeithadtimetoentrenchitselfandbringupitsartillery.ThevictorygainedbytheFrenchonthisoccasionjustifiedallthecombinationsofMarshalTurenne.

WhenMarshalBerwickwas laying siege toPhilipsburg, in1733,hehadreason to apprehend that the Prince of Savoywould attack himwith all theforces of the empire before its termination. The marshal, therefore, afterhavingmadehisdispositionofthetroopsintendedforthesiege,formed,withthe rest of his army, a corps of observation to make head against PrinceEugene,incasethelattershouldchoosetoattackhiminhislines,orattemptadiversion on theMoselle orUpperRhine. PrinceEugene, having arrived infrontofthebesiegingarmy,somegeneralofficerswereofopinionthatitwasbetternottoawaittheenemyinthelines,buttomoveforwardandattackhim.But Marshal Berwick, who agreed with the Duke of Luxembourg, that anarmywhich can occupy, completely, good entrenchments is not liable to be

forced, persisted in remainingwithin his works. The result proved that thiswas also the opinion of Prince Eugene, for he did not dare to attack theentrenchments,whichhewouldnothavefailedtodoifhehadanyhopesofsuccess.

MAXIMXLIII

Thosewhoproscribelinesofcircumvallation,andalltheassistancewhichthescienceof theengineercanafford,deprive themselvesgratuitouslyofanauxiliary which is never injurious, almost always useful, and oftenindispensable. It must be admitted, at the same time, that the principles offield-fortification require improvement. This important branch of the art ofwarhasmadenoprogresssincethetimeoftheancients.Itiseveninferioratthisday towhat itwas two thousandyearsago.Engineerofficers shouldbeencouragedinbringingthisbranchoftheirarttoperfection,andinplacingituponalevelwiththerest.

NOTE.

“Ifweareinferiorinnumbers,”saysMarshalSaxe,“entrenchmentsareofnouse,fortheenemywillbringallhisforcestobearuponparticularpoints.Ifweareofequalstrengththeyareunnecessaryalso.Ifwearesuperior,wedonot want them. Then why give ourselves the trouble to entrench?”Notwithstandingthisopinionof theinutilityofentrenchments,MarshalSaxeoftenhadrecoursetothem.

In1797,GeneralsProvéraandHohenzollernhavingpresentedthemselvesbefore Mantua (where Marshal Wurmser was shut up), for the purpose ofraising the siege, they were stopped by the lines of contravallation of St.George.This slightobstacle sufficed toaffordNapoleon time toarrive fromRivoli and defeat their enterprise. It was in consequence of neglecting toentrenchthemselvesthattheFrenchhadbeenobligedtoraisethesiegeintheprecedingcampaign.

MAXIMXLIV

If circumstances prevent a sufficient garrison being left to defend afortifiedtown,whichcontainsanhospitalandmagazines,atleasteverymeansshouldbeemployedtosecurethecitadelagainstacoupdemain.

NOTE.

Afewbattalionsdispersedabouta town, inspireno terror;butshutup inthemore narrowoutline of a citadel, they assume an imposing attitude. Forthis reason it appears tome that such a precaution is always necessary, notonly in fortresses, but wherever there are hospitals or depôts of any kind.Wherethereisnocitadel,somequarterofthetownshouldbefixeduponmostfavorable for defence, and entrenched in such a manner as to oppose thegreatestresistancepossible.

MAXIMXLV

Afortifiedplacecanonlyprotectthegarrisonanddetaintheenemyforacertain time.When this time has elapsed, and the defences of the place aredestroyed, the garrison should lay down its arms. All civilized nations areagreed on this point, and there never has been an argument except withreferencetothegreaterorlessdegreeofdefencewhichagovernorisboundtomake before he capitulates. At the same time, there are generals—Villarsamong the number—who are of opinion that a governor should neversurrender,but that in the last extremityhe shouldblowup the fortifications,and take advantage of the night to cut hisway through the besieging army.Wherehe isunable toblowup the fortifications,hemayalways retire, theysay,withhisgarrison,andsavethemen.

Officers who have adopted this line of conduct, have often brought offthree-fourthsoftheirgarrison.

NOTE.

In1705,theFrench,whowerebesiegedinHaguenaubyCountThungen,found themselves incapableofsustaininganassault.Péri, thegovernor,whohadalreadydistinguishedhimselfbyavigorousdefence,despairingofbeingallowedtocapitulateonanytermsshortofbecomingprisonerofwar,resolvedtoabandontheplaceandcuthiswaythroughthebesiegers.

Inorder to concealhis intentionmoreeffectually, andwhilehedeceivedthe enemy, to sound at the same time the disposition of his officers, heassembleda council ofwar anddeclaredhis resolution todie in thebreach.Then,underpretextoftheextremitytowhichhewasreduced,hecommandedthewhole garrison under arms; and leaving only a few sharpshooters in thebreach, gave the order tomarch, and set out in silence, under cover of thenight, fromHaguenau.This audaciousenterprisewascrownedwith success,andPérireachedSavernewithouthavingsufferedthesmallestloss.

TwofineinstancesofdefenceinlatertimesarethoseofMassenaatGenoa,andofPalafoxatSaragossa.

Thefirstmarchedoutwitharmsandbaggage,andall thehonorsofwar,after rejecting every summons, and defending himself until hunger alonecompelledhimtocapitulate.Thesecondonlyyieldedafterhavingburiedhisgarrisonamid the ruinsof thecity,whichhedefended fromhouse tohouse,until famine and death left him no alternative but to surrender. This siege,whichwasequallyhonorabletotheFrenchastotheSpaniards,isoneofthemostmemorable in thehistoryofwar. In thecourseof it,Palafoxdisplayedevery possible resource which courage and obstinacy can supply in thedefenceofafortress.

All real strength is founded in the mind; and on this account I am ofopinion that we should be directed in the choice of a governor, less by hisgenius than his personal character. His most essential qualities should becourage, perseverance, and soldierlike devotedness. Above all, he shouldpossess the talent not only of infusing courage into the garrison, but ofkindling a spirit of resistance in the whole population. Where the latter iswanting,howeverartmaymultiplythedefencesofaplace, thegarrisonwillbe compelled to capitulate after having sustained the first, or at most, thesecondassault.

MAXIMXLVI

Thekeysofafortressarewellworththeretirementofthegarrison,whenitis resolved to yield only on those conditions. On this principle it is alwayswiser to grant an honorable capitulation to a garrison which has made avigorousresistance,thantoriskanassault.

NOTE.

MarshalVillarshasjustlyobserved,that“nogovernorofaplaceshouldbepermitted to excuse himself for surrendering, on the ground of wishing topreserve the king’s troops. Every garrison that displays couragewill escapebeingprisonersofwar.Forthereisnogeneralwho,howeverwellassuredofcarryingaplacebyassault,willnotprefergrantingtermsofcapitulationratherthan risk the loss of a thousand men in forcing determined troops tosurrender.”

MAXIMXLVII

Infantry, cavalry, and artillery, are nothingwithout each other; therefore,they should alwaysbe sodisposed in cantonments as to assist eachother incaseofsurprise.

NOTE.

“A general,” says Frederick, “should direct his whole attention to thetranquilityofhiscantonments,inorderthatthesoldiermayberelievedfromall anxiety, and repose in security from his fatigues. With this view, careshouldbetakenthatthetroopsareabletoformrapidlyupongroundwhichhasbeen previously reconnoitered; that the generals remain always with theirdivisions or brigades, and that the service is carried on throughout withexactness.”

MarshalSaxeisofopinionthatanarmyshouldnotbeinahurrytoquititscantonments,butthatitshouldwaittilltheenemyhasexhaustedhimselfwithmarching, and be ready to fall upon him with fresh troops when he isovercomewithfatigue.

I believe, however, that it would be dangerous to trust implicitly to thishighauthority,fortherearemanyoccasionswherealltheadvantageliesintheinitiative,moreespeciallywhentheenemyhasbeencompelledtoextendhiscantonments,fromscarcityofsubsistence,andcanbeattackedbeforehehastimetoconcentratehisforces.

MAXIMXLVIII

Theformationof infantry in lineshouldbealways in tworanks,becausethelengthofthemusketonlyadmitsofaneffectivefireinthisformation.Thedischargeof the thirdrankisnotonlyuncertain,butfrequentlydangeroustotheranks in its front. Indrawingup infantry in tworanks, thereshouldbeasupernumerarybehindeveryfourthorfifthfile.Areserveshouldlikewisebeplacedtwenty-fivepacesinrearofeachflank.

NOTE.

I amofopinion, if circumstances require a lineof infantry to resort to asquare, that two-deep is too light a formation to resist the shock of cavalry.Howeveruselessthethirdrankmayappearforthepurposeoffile-firing,itis,notwithstandingnecessary,inordertoreplacethemenwhofallintheranksinfront;otherwiseyouwouldbeobligedtocloseinthefiles,andbythismeansleave intervals between the companies, which the cavalrywould not fail to

penetrate.Itappearstome,also,thatwheninfantryisformedintworanks,thecolumns will be found to open out in marching to a flank. If it should beconsidered advantageous behind entrenchments to keep the infantry in tworanks, the third rank should be placed in reserve, and brought forward torelievethefrontrankwhenfatigued,orwhenthefireisobservedtoslacken.Iaminducedtomaketheseremarks,becauseIhaveseenanexcellentpamphletwhich proposes the two-deep formation for infantry as the best. The authorsupportshisopinionbyavarietyofplausiblereasons,butnotsufficient,asitappearstome,toansweralltheobjectionsthatmaybeofferedtothispractice.

MAXIMXLIX

Thepracticeofmixingsmallbodiesof infantryandcavalry together isabadone,andattendedwithmanyinconveniences.Thecavalrylosesitspowerof action. It becomes fettered in all itsmovements. Its energy is destroyed;even the infantry itself is compromised, for on the first movement of thecavalry it is leftwithout support. The bestmode of protecting cavalry is tocoveritsflank.

NOTE.

This alsowas theopinionofMarshalSaxe. “Theweaknessof the aboveformation,” says he, “is sufficient in itself to intimidate the platoons ofinfantry,becausetheymustbelostifthecavalryisbeaten.”

Thecavalry,also,whichdependsontheinfantryforsuccor,isdisconcertedthe moment a brisk forward movement carries them out of sight of theirsupports.MarshalTurenne,andthegeneralsofhistime,sometimesemployedthis order of formation; but that does not, in my opinion, justify a modernauthorforrecommendingit inanessay,entitled“Considerationssurl’ArtdelaGuerre.” In fact, this formation has long been abandoned; and, since theintroductionoflightartillery,itappearstomealmostridiculoustoproposeit.

MAXIML

Chargesofcavalryareequallyusefulatthebeginning,themiddle,andtheendofabattle.Theyshouldbemadealways,ifpossible,ontheflanksoftheinfantry,especiallywhenthelatterisengagedinfront.

NOTE.

TheArchdukeCharles,inspeakingofcavalry,recommendsthatitshouldbebroughtinmassuponadecisivepoint,whenthemomentforemployingitarrives; that is to say,when it canattackwitha certaintyof success.As therapidity of itsmovement enables cavalry to act along thewhole line in thesameday, thegeneralwhocommands it shouldkeep it together asmuch aspossible,andavoiddividingitintomanydetachments.Whenthenatureoftheground admits of cavalry being employed on all points of the line, it isdesirabletoformitincolumnbehindtheinfantry,andinapositionwhenceitmaybeeasilydirectedwhereveritisrequired.Ifcavalryisintendedtocoveraposition,itshouldbeplacedsufficientlyinthereartomeetatfullspeedanyadvanceoftroopscomingtoattackthatposition.Ifitisdestinedtocovertheflankoftheinfantry,itshould,forthesamereason,beplaceddirectlybehindit.Astheobjectofcavalryispurelyoffensive,itshouldbearuletoformitatsuchadistanceonly fromthepointofcollisionas toenable it toacquire itsutmostimpulse,andarriveatthetopofitsspeedintoaction.Withrespecttothecavalryreserve,thisshouldonlybeemployedattheendofabattle,eithertorenderthesuccessmoredecisive,ortocovertheretreat.Napoleonremarksthat, at thebattleofWaterloo, thecavalryof theguardwhichcomposed thereserve, was engaged against his orders. He complains of having beendeprived from five o’clock of the use of this reserve, which, when wellemployed,hadsoofteninsuredhimthevictory.

MAXIMLI

It is the business of cavalry to follow up the victory, and to prevent thebeatenenemyfromrallying.

NOTE.

Victor or vanquished, it is of the greatest importance to have a body ofcavalry in reserve, either to takeadvantageofvictory,or to securea retreat.Themostdecisivebattleslosehalftheirvaluetotheconqueror,whenthewantof cavalry prevents him from following up his success, and depriving theenemyofthepowerofrallying.

Whenaretiringarmyispursued,itismoreespeciallyupontheflanksthattheweightofcavalryshouldfall, ifyouarestrongenoughinthatarmtocutoffhisretreat.

MAXIMLII

Artilleryismoreessentialtocavalrythantoinfantry,becausecavalryhasno fire for its defence, but depends upon the sabre. It is to remedy thisdeficiency that recourse has been had to horse-artillery. Cavalry, therefore,should never be without cannon, whether when attacking, rallying, or inposition.

NOTE.

Horse-artillery is an invention of Frederick. Austria lost no time inintroducingitintoherarmies,althoughinanimperfectdegree.Itwasonlyin1792thatthisarmwasadoptedinFrance,whereitwasbroughtrapidlytoitspresentperfection.

TheservicesofthisarmduringthewarsoftheRevolutionwereimmense.It may be said to have changed to a certain extent the character of tactics,becauseitsfacilityofmovementenablesittobearwithrapidityoneverypointwhereartillerycanbeemployedwithsuccess.Napoleonhasremarkedinhismemoirsthataflankingbatterywhichstrikesandrakestheenemyobliquely,iscapableofdecidingavictoryinitself.Tothiswemayaddthat,independentof the advantages which cavalry derives from horse-artillery in securing itsflanks,andinopeningthewayforasuccessfulchargebythedestructivenessof its fire, it is desirable that these twoarms shouldneverbe separated, butreadyatall times toseizeuponpointswhere itmaybenecessary toemploycannon. On these occasions, the cavalry masks the march of the artillery,protects its establishment in position, and covers it from the attack of theenemy,untilitisreadytoopenitsfire.

MAXIMLIII

Inmarch,orinposition,thegreaterpartoftheartilleryshouldbewiththedivisions of infantry and cavalry. The rest should be in reserve. Each gunshouldhavewithitthreehundredrounds,withoutincludingthelimber.Thisisaboutthecomplementfortwobattles.

NOTE.

The better infantry is, themore important it is to support it by artillery,withaviewtoitspreservation.

Itisessential,also,thatthebatteriesattachedtodivisionsshouldmarchinthefront,becausethishasastronginfluenceonthemoraleofthesoldier.Heattacks alwayswith confidencewhen he sees the flanks of the columnwell

coveredwithcannon.

The artillery reserve should be kept for a decisive moment, and thenemployedinfullforce,foritwillbedifficultfortheenemyatsuchatimetopresumetoattackit.

Thereisscarcelyaninstanceofabatteryofsixtypiecesofcannonhavingbeencarriedbyachargeof infantryor cavalry,unlesswhere itwasentirelywithoutsupport,orinapositiontobeeasilyturned.

MAXIMLIV

Artilleryshouldalwaysbeplacedinthemostadvantageouspositions,andas far in front of the line of cavalry and infantry as possible, withoutcompromisingthesafetyoftheguns.

Fieldbatteriesshouldcommandthewholecountryroundfromtheleveloftheplatform.Theyshouldonnoaccountbemaskedontherightandleft,buthavefreerangeineverydirection.

NOTE.

Thebatteryofeighteenpiecesofcannon,whichcoveredthecentreoftheRussian army at the battle of La Moskwa (Borodino), may be cited as anexample.

Its position, upon a circular heightwhich commanded the field in everydirection, added sopowerfully to its effect, that its fire alone sufficed, for aconsiderable time, to paralyze the vigorous attackmade by the Frenchwiththeirright.Althoughtwicebroken,theleftoftheRussianarmyclosedtothisbattery,as toapivot,andtwicerecovereditsformerposition.Afterrepeatedattacks,conductedwitharareintrepidity,thebatterywasatlengthcarriedbythe French, but not till they had lost the élite of their army, andwith it theGenerals Caulincourt and Montbrun. Its capture decided the retreat of theRussianleft.

Imightadvertlikewisetoanotherinstance,inthecampaignof1809,andtotheterribleeffectproducedbythehundredpiecesofcannonof theGuardwhichGeneralLauristondirected,atthebattleofWagram,againsttherightoftheAustrianarmy.

MAXIMLV

AGeneral shouldneverputhis army into cantonments,whenhehas themeansofcollectingsuppliesof forageandprovisions,andof thusprovidingforthewantsofthesoldierinthefield.

NOTE.

Onegreatadvantagewhichresultsfromhavinganarmyincampis,thatitis easier to direct its spirit andmaintain its discipline there. The soldier incantonments abandons himself to repose; he ends by finding a pleasure inidleness, and in fearing to return to the field. The reverse takes place in acamp.There,a feelingofennui,anda severerdiscipline,makehimanxiousfortheopeningofthecampaign,tointerruptthemonotonyoftheserviceandrelieve itwith the chances and variety ofwar.Besides, an army in camp ismuchmoresecurefromasurprisethanincantonments—thedefectofwhichusually consists in their occupying too great an extent of ground.When anarmyisobligedtogointoquarters,theMarquisdeFeuquièrerecommendsacamp to be selected in front of the line,where the troops can be frequentlyassembled—sometimes suddenly, in order to exercise their vigilance, or forthesolepurposeofbringingthedifferentcorpstogether.

MAXIMLVI

A good general, a well-organized system, good instructions, and severediscipline, aidedby effective establishments,will alwaysmakegood troops,independentlyofthecauseforwhichtheyfight.

At the same time, a love of country, a spirit of enthusiasm, a sense ofnational honor, and fanaticism, will operate upon young soldiers withadvantage.

NOTE.

Thisremarkappears tomelessapplicable toofficers thantosoldiers,foras war is not a state of things natural to man, it follows that those whomaintain its cause must be governed by some strong excitement. Muchenthusiasm and devotedness are required on the part of the troops for thegeneralwhocommands,toinduceanarmytoperformgreatactionsinawarinwhich it takes no interest. This is sufficiently proved by the apathy ofauxiliaries,unlesswheninspiredbytheconductoftheirchief.

MAXIMLVII

Whenanation iswithoutestablishmentsandamilitarysystem, it isverydifficulttoorganizeanarmy.

NOTE.

Thisisanunanswerabletruth,moreparticularlywithreferencetoanarmyintendedtoactuponthesystemofmodernwar,andinwhichorder,precision,andrapidityofmovement,aretheprincipalessentialstosuccess.

MAXIMLVIII

Thefirstqualificationofasoldierisfortitudeunderfatigueandprivation.Courageisonlythesecond;hardship,povertyandwant,arethebestschoolforasoldier.

NOTE.

Valor belongs to the young soldier as well as to the veteran; but in theformeritismoreevanescent.Itisonlybyhabitsofservice,andafterseveralcampaigns, that the soldier acquires that moral courage which makes himsupport the fatiguesandprivationsofwarwithoutamurmur.Experiencebythistimehasinstructedhimtosupplyhisownwants.Heissatisfiedwithwhathe can procure, because he knows that success is only to be obtained byfortitude and perseverance.Well might Napoleon say that misery and wantwerethebestschoolforasoldier;forasnothingcouldbecomparedwiththetotaldestitutionof thearmyof theAlps,whenheassumedthecommand,sonothingcouldequalthebrilliantsuccesswhichheobtainedwiththisarmyinthefirstcampaigninItaly.TheconquerorsofMontenotte,Lodi,Castiglione,Bassano, Arcole and Rivoli had beheld, only a few months before, wholebattalionscoveredwithrags,anddesertingforthewantofsubsistence.

MAXIMLIX

Therearefivethingsthesoldiershouldneverbewithout—hismusket,hisammunition, his knapsack, his provisions (for at least four days), and hisentrenching-tool.Theknapsackmaybereducedtothesmallestsizepossible,ifitbethoughtproper,butthesoldiershouldalwayshaveitwithhim.

NOTE.

It is fortunate that Napoleon has recognized the advantage of giving toevery soldier an entrenching-tool. His authority is the best answer to theridiculewhichhasbeen thrownupon thosewhoproposed it.Anaxewillbefoundto inconvenience thefoot-soldieras littleas theswordhewearsathisside, and it will be infinitely more useful. When axes are given out tocompanies, or are carried by fatigue-men during a campaign, they are soonlost;anditoftenhappens,whenacampistobeformed,thatadifficultyarisesincuttingwoodandbuildinghutsforthesoldier;whereas,bymakingtheaxeapartofeveryman’sappointments,heisobligedtohaveitalwayswithhim;andwhethertheobjectbetoentrenchhimselfinavillage,ortoerecthutsinacamp, the commander of a corps will speedily see the advantage of thisinnovation.

Whenoncetheaxehasbeengenerallyadopted,weshall,perhaps,seethedesirabilityofissuingpickaxesandshovelstoparticularcompanies,andalsothe benefit of more frequent entrenchments. It is more particularly duringretreats that it is important to entrench when the army has reached a goodposition; for an entrenched camp not only furnishes the means of rallyingtroopswhicharepursued,but if itbefortifiedinsuchamanneras torendertheissueofanattackdoubtfultotheenemy,itwillnotonlysustainthemoraleof the soldier in the retreat, but afford the general-in-chief opportunities forresumingtheoffensive,andprofitingbythefirstfalsemovementonthepartofhisadversary.ItwillberecollectedhowFrederick,inthecampaignof1761,whensurroundedbytwoRussianandAustrianarmies,whoseunitedforcewasquadruple his own, saved his army by entrenching himself in the camp ofBuntzalvitz.

MAXIMLX

Everymeansshouldbetakentoattachthesoldiertohiscolors.Thisisbestaccomplishedbyshowingconsiderationandrespecttotheoldsoldier.Hispaylikewiseshouldincreasewithhislengthofservice.Itistheheightofinjusticenottopayaveteranmorethanarecruit.

NOTE.

Somemodernwritershave recommended,on theotherhand, to limit theperiodofservice,inordertobringthewholeyouthofacountrysuccessivelyunderarms.Bythismeanstheypurposetohavethelevies,enmasse,allreadytrainedandcapableof resistingsuccessfullyawarof invasion.Buthowever

advantageousatfirstsightsuchamilitarysystemmayappear,Ibelieveitwillbefoundtohavemanyobjections.

In the firstplace, the soldier fatiguedwith theminutiæofdiscipline inagarrison, will not feel much inclined to re-enlist after he has received hisdischarge,more especially since, having served the prescribed time, hewillconsider himself to have fulfilled all the duties of a citizen to his country.Returning to his friends, he will probably marry, or establish himself in atrade.Fromthatmomenthismilitaryspiritdeclines,andhesoonbecomesilladaptedtothebusinessofwar.Onthecontrary, thesoldierwhoserveslong,becomesattachedtohisregimentastoanewfamily.Hesubmitstotheyokeof discipline, accustoms himself to the privations his situation imposes, andendsbyfindinghisconditionagreeable.Therearefewofficersthathaveseenservice who have not discovered the difference between old and youngsoldiers, with reference to their power of supporting the fatigues of a longcampaign, to the determined courage that characterizes the attack, or to theeasewithwhichtheyrallyafterbeingbroken.

Montécuculliobserves, that “it takes time todisciplineanarmy;more toinure it to war; and still more to constitute veterans.” For this reason, herecommends that great consideration should be shown to old soldiers; thattheyshouldbecarefullyprovidedfor,andalargebodyofthemkeptalwaysonfoot. It seems to me, also, that it is not enough to increase the pay of thesoldier according to his period of service, but that it is highly essential toconfer on him somemark of distinction that shall secure to him privilegescalculatedtoencouragehimtogrowgrayunderarms,and,aboveall,todosowithhonor.

MAXIMLXI

Itisnotsetspeechesatthemomentofbattlethatrendersoldiersbrave.Theveteran scarcely listens to them, and the recruit forgets them at the firstdischarge.Ifdiscoursesandharanguesareuseful,itisduringthecampaign:todo away unfavorable impressions, to correct false reports, to keep alive aproper spirit in the camp, and to furnish materials and amusement for thebivouac.Allprintedordersofthedayshouldkeepinviewtheseobjects.

NOTE.

The opinion of the general-in-chief, energetically expressed, is,notwithstanding,productiveofgreateffectonthemoraleofthesoldier.

In 1703, at the attack of Hornbec, Marshal Villars, seeing the troops

advancingwithoutspirit, threwhimselfat theirhead:“What!”saidhe,“is itexpected that I, amarshal ofFrance, shouldbe the first to escalade,when IorderYOUtoattack?”

These fewwords rekindled theirardor;officersandsoldiers rushedupontheworks,andthetownwastakenalmostwithoutloss.

“Wehaveretiredfarenoughforto-day;youknowIalwayssleepuponthefieldofbattle!”saidNapoleon,asheflewthroughtheranksatthemomentofresuming the offensive atMarengo. These fewwords sufficed to revive thecourageofthesoldiers,andtomakethemforgetthefatiguesoftheday,duringwhichalmosteverymanhadbeenengaged.

MAXIMLXII

Tents are unfavorable to health. The soldier is best when he bivouacs,becausehesleepswithhisfeettothefire,whichspeedilydriesthegroundonwhichhelies.Afewplanks,oralittlestraw,shelterhimfromthewind.

Ontheotherhand,tentsarenecessaryforthesuperiorofficers,whohavetowriteandtoconsulttheirmaps.Tentsshould,therefore,beissuedtothese,withdirectionstothemnevertosleepinahouse.Tentsarealwaysobjectsofobservation to the enemy’s staff. They afford information in regard to yournumbers and the ground you occupy;while an army bivouacking in two orthreelines,isonlydistinguishablefromafarbythesmokewhichmingleswiththeclouds.Itisimpossibletocountthenumberofthefires.

NOTE.

Theacknowledgedadvantageofbivouackingisanotherreasonforaddinganentrenching-tooltotheequipmentofthesoldier;for,withtheassistanceofthe axe and shovel, he can hut himself without difficulty. I have seen hutserectedwith the branches of trees, coveredwith turf,where the soldierwasperfectlyshelteredfromthecoldandwet,evenintheworstseason.

MAXIMLXIII

All informationobtainedfromprisonersshouldbereceivedwithcaution,and estimated at its real value. A soldier seldom sees anything beyond hiscompany;andanofficercanaffordintelligenceoflittlemorethanthepositionand movements of the division to which his regiment belongs. On this

account, the general of an army should never depend upon the informationderived from prisoners, unless it agrees with the reports received from theadvancedguards,inreferencetotheposition,etc.,oftheenemy.

NOTE.

Montécuculli wisely observes that “prisoners should be interrogatedseparately, in order to ascertain, by the agreement in their answers, how fartheymaybeendeavoringtomisleadyou.”Generallyspeaking,theinformationrequiredfromofficerswhoareprisoners,shouldhavereferencetothestrengthand resources of the enemy, and sometimes to his localities and position.Frederickrecommendsthatprisonersshouldbemenacedwithinstantdeathiftheyarefoundattemptingtodeceivebyfalsereports.

MAXIMLXIV

Nothingissoimportantinwarasanundividedcommand;forthisreason,whenwariscarriedonagainstasinglepower,thereshouldbeonlyonearmy,actingupononebase,andconductedbyonechief.

NOTE.

“Success,” says the Archduke Charles, “is only to be obtained bysimultaneous efforts, directed upon a given point, sustainedwith constancy,andexecutedwithdecision.” It rarelyhappens thatanynumberofmenwhodesirethesameobjectareperfectlyagreedastothemeansofattainingit;andif thewill of one individual is not allowed to predominate, there can be noensembleintheexecutionoftheiroperations;neitherwilltheyattaintheendproposed.Itisuselesstoconfirmthismaximbyexamples.Historyaboundsinthem.

PrinceEugeneandMarlboroughwouldneverhavebeen so successful inthe campaigns which they directed in concert, if a spirit of intrigue anddifferenceof opinionhadnot constantly disorganized the armies opposed tothem.

MAXIMLXV

The same consequenceswhichhaveuniformly attended longdiscussionsand councils of war, will follow at all times. They will terminate in theadoptionoftheworstcourse,whichinwarisalwaysthemosttimid,or,ifyou

will, the most prudent. The only true wisdom in a general is determinedcourage.

NOTE.

PrinceEugeneusedtosaythatcouncilsofwar“areonlyusefulwhenyouwantanexcuseforattemptingnothing.”ThiswasalsotheopinionofVillars.Ageneral-in-chiefshouldavoid,therefore,assemblingacouncilonoccasionsof difficulty, and should confine himself to consulting separately his mostexperiencedgeneralsinordertobenefitbytheiradvice,whileheisgovernedat the same time in his decision by his own judgment. By this means, hebecomes responsible, it is true, for themeasures he pursues; but he has theadvantagealsoofactinguponhisownconviction,andofbeingcertainthatthesecretofhisoperationswillnotbedivulged,asisusuallythecasewhereitisdiscussedbyacouncilofwar.

MAXIMLXVI

Inwar,thegeneralalonecanjudgeofcertainarrangements.Itdependsonhimalonetoconquerdifficultiesbyhisownsuperiortalentsandresolution.

NOTE.

The officer who obeys, whatever may be the nature or extent of hiscommand,willalwaysstandexcusedforexecutingimplicitlytheorderswhichhave been given to him. This is not the case with the general-in-chief, onwhom the safety of the army and the success of the campaign depend.Occupied, without intermission, in the whole process of observation andreflection, it iseasy toconceive thathewillacquirebydegreesasolidityofjudgmentwhichwillenablehimtoseethingsinaclearerandmoreenlargedpointofviewthanhisinferiorgenerals.

MarshalVillars,inhiscampaigns,actedalmostalwaysinoppositiontotheadviceofhisgenerals,andhewasalmostalwaysfortunate.Sotrueitis,thatageneral, who feels confident in his talent for command, must follow thedictatesofhisowngeniusifhewishestoachievesuccess.

MAXIMLXVII

Toauthorizegeneralsorotherofficerstolaydowntheirarmsinvirtueofaparticular capitulation, under any other circumstances than when they are

composing the garrison of a fortress, affords a dangerous latitude. It isdestructive of all military character in a nation to open such a door to thecowardly,theweak,oreventothemisdirectedbrave.Greatextremitiesrequireextraordinary resolution. The more obstinate the resistance of an army, thegreaterthechancesofassistanceorofsuccess.

Howmanyseemingimpossibilitieshavebeenaccomplishedbymenwhoseonlyresourcewasdeath!

NOTE.

In the campaignof1759,FrederickdirectedGeneralFink,with eighteenthousandmen,uponMaxen,forthepurposeofcuttingofftheAustrianarmyfrom the defiles of Bohemia. Surrounded by twice his numbers, Finkcapitulated after a sharp action, and fourteen thousandmen laid down theirarms. This conductwas themore disgraceful, becauseGeneralWinch,whocommandedthecavalry,cuthiswaythroughtheenemy.Thewholeblameofthesurrender fell, therefore,uponFink,whowas triedafterwardbyacourt-martial,andsentencedtobecashieredandimprisonedfortwoyears.

InthecampaignofItalyin1796,theAustrianGeneralProvéracapitulatedwithtwothousandmeninthecastleofCossaria.Subsequently,atthebattleofLaFavorite,thesamegeneralcapitulatedwithacorpsofsixthousandmen.Iscarcely dare to revert to the shameful defection of General Mack in thecapitulationofUlmin1805,wherethirtythousandAustrianslaiddowntheirarms—when we have seen, during the wars of the Revolution, so manygenerals open themselves a way by a vigorous effort through the enemy,supportedonlybyafewbattalions.

MAXIMLXVIII

Thereisnosecurityforanysovereign,foranynation,orforanygeneral,ifofficers are permitted to capitulate in the open field, and to lay down theirarmsinvirtueofconditionsfavorabletothecontractingparty,butcontrarytothe interests of the army at large. Towithdraw fromdanger, and thereby toinvolve their comrades in greater peril, is the height of cowardice. Suchconduct shouldbeproscribed,declared infamous,andmadepunishablewithdeath.Allgenerals,officersandsoldiers,whocapitulateinbattletosavetheirownlives,shouldbedecimated.

Hewhogivestheorder,andthosewhoobey,arealiketraitors,anddeservecapitalpunishment.

NOTE.

Soldiers, who are almost always ignorant of the designs of their chief,cannot be responsible for his conduct. If he orders them to lay down theirarms, theymustdoso;otherwise they fail in that lawofdisciplinewhich ismoreessentialtoanarmythanthousandsofmen.Itappearstome,therefore,underthesecircumstances,thatthechiefsaloneareresponsible,andliabletothepunishmentduetotheircowardice.Wehavenoexampleofsoldiersbeingwanting in their duty in the most desperate situations, where they arecommandedbyofficersofapprovedresolution.

MAXIMLXIX

Thereisbutonehonorablemodeofbecomingprisonerofwar.Thatis,bybeingtakenseparately;bywhichismeant,bybeingcutoffentirely,andwhenwe can no longer make use of our arms. In this case, there can be noconditions,forhonorcanimposenone.Weyieldtoanirresistiblenecessity.

NOTE.

Thereisalwaystimeenoughtosurrenderprisonerofwar.Thisshouldbedeferred,therefore,tillthelastextremity.AndhereImaybepermittedtocitean example of rare obstinacy in defence, which has been related to me byocular witnesses. The captain of grenadiers, Dubrenil, of the thirty-seventhregimentoftheline,havingbeensentondetachmentwithhiscompany,wasstoppedon themarchbya largepartyofCossacks,whosurroundedhimoneveryside.Dubrenilformedhislittleforceintosquare,andendeavoredtogaintheskirtsofawood(withinafewmuskets’shotofthespotwherehehadbeenattacked), and reached itwith very little loss.But as soon as the grenadierssawthisrefugesecuredtothem,theybrokeandfled,leavingtheircaptainandafewbravemen,whowereresolvednottoabandonhim,atthemercyoftheenemy. In the meantime, the fugitives, who had rallied in the depth of thewood, ashamed of having forsaken their leader, came to the resolution ofrescuinghimfromtheenemy, ifaprisoner,orofcarryingoffhisbodyifhehad fallen.With this view, they formed once more upon the outskirts, andopeningapassagewiththeirbayonetsthroughthecavalry,penetratedtotheircaptain,who,notwithstandingseventeenwounds,wasdefendinghimselfstill.They immediately surrounded him, and regained the wood with little loss.SuchexamplesarenotrareinthewarsoftheRevolution,anditweredesirableto see them collected by some contemporary, that soldiersmight learn howmuchistobeachievedinwarbydeterminedenergyandsustainedresolution.

MAXIMLXX

Theconductofageneral inaconqueredcountry is fullofdifficulties. Ifsevere, he irritates and increases the number of his enemies. If lenient, hegives birth to expectations which only render the abuses and vexations,inseparable fromwar, themore intolerable.Avictorious generalmust knowhow to employ severity, justice and mildness by turns, if he would allayseditionorpreventit.

NOTE.

Among the Romans, generals were only permitted to arrive at thecommand of armies after having exercised the different functions of themagistracy. Thus by a previous knowledge of administration, they wereprepared to govern the conqueredprovinceswith all that discretionwhich anewly-acquiredpower,supportedbyarbitraryforce,demands.

Inthemilitaryinstitutionsofmoderntimes,thegenerals,instructedonlyinwhatconcernstheoperationofstrategyandtactics,areobligedtointrust thecivildepartmentsofthewartoinferioragents,who,withoutbelongingtothearmy, renderall thoseabusesandvexations, inseparable from itsoperations,stillmoreintolerable.

This observation, which I do little more than repeat, seems to me,notwithstanding,deservingofparticularattention;foriftheleisureofgeneralofficerswasdirectedintimeofpeacetothestudyofdiplomacy—iftheywereemployedinthedifferentembassieswhichsovereignssendtoforeigncourts—theywouldacquireaknowledgeof the lawsandof thegovernmentof thesecountries, in which theymay be called hereafter to carry on thewar. Theywould learn also to distinguish those points of interest onwhich all treatiesmustbebased,whichhavefortheirobjecttheadvantageousterminationofacampaign. By the aid of this information they would obtain certain andpositiveresults,sinceallthespringsofaction,aswellasthemachineryofwar,would be in their hands.Wehave seenPrinceEugene, andMarshalVillars,eachfulfillingwithequalabilitythedutiesofageneralandanegotiator.

When an army which occupies a conquered province observes strictdiscipline, there are few examples of insurrection among the people, unlessindeedresistanceisprovoked(asbuttoooftenhappens),bytheexactionsofinferioragentsemployedintheciviladministration.

It is to this point, therefore, that the general-in-chief should principallydirecthisattention,inorderthatthecontributionsimposedbythewantsofthearmymaybeleviedwithimpartiality;andaboveall,thattheymaybeappliedtotheirtrueobject,insteadofservingtoenrichthecollectors,asisordinarily

thecase.

MAXIMLXXI

Nothing can excuse a general who takes advantage of the knowledgeacquiredintheserviceofhiscountry,todeliverupherfrontierandhertownsto foreigners. This is a crime reprobated by every principle of religion,moralityandhonor.

NOTE.

Ambitiousmenwho, listening only to their passions, arm natives of thesamelandagainsteachother(underthedeceitfulpretextofthepublicgood),are stillmore criminal. For however arbitrary a government, the institutionswhichhavebeenconsolidatedbytime,arealwayspreferabletocivilwar,andtothatanarchywhichthelatterisobligedtocreateforthejustificationofitscrimes.

Tobefaithfultohissovereign,andtorespecttheestablishedgovernment,arethefirstprincipleswhichoughttodistinguishasoldierandamanofhonor.

MAXIMLXXII

Ageneral-in-chiefhasnorighttoshelterhismistakesinwarundercoverofhissovereign,orofaminister,whenthesearebothdistantfromthesceneofoperation,andmustconsequentlybeeitherillinformedorwhollyignorantoftheactualstateofthings.

Hence, it follows, that every general is culpable who undertakes theexecutionof aplanwhichhe considers faulty. It is his duty to represent hisreasons, to insist upona changeofplan, in short, togive inhis resignation,ratherthanallowhimselftobemadetheinstrumentofhisarmy’sruin.Everygeneral-in-chiefwhofightsabattleinconsequenceofsuperiororders,withthecertaintyoflosingit,isequallyblamable.

Inthislast-mentionedcase,thegeneraloughttorefuseobedience;becausea blind obedience is due only to a military command given by a superiorpresenton the spotat themomentofaction.Being inpossessionof the realstate of things, the superior has it then in his power to afford the necessaryexplanationstothepersonwhoexecuteshisorders.

But supposing a general-in-chief to receive positive order from hissovereign,directinghimtofightabattle,withthefurtherinjunction,toyieldtohisadversary,andallowhimselftobedefeated—oughthetoobeyit?No.Ifthe general should be able to comprehend themeaning or utility of such anorder,heshouldexecuteit;otherwiseheshouldrefusetoobeyit.

NOTE.

In the campaign of 1697, Prince Eugene caused the courier to beintercepted,whowasbringinghimordersfromtheemperorforbiddinghimtohazardabattle,forwhicheverythinghadbeenprepared,andwhichheforesawwouldprovedecisive.Heconsidered,therefore,thathedidhisdutyinevadingtheordersofhissovereign;andthevictoryofZanta,inwhichtheTurkslostaboutthirtythousandmen,andfourthousandprisoners,rewardedhisaudacity.In the meantime, notwithstanding the immense advantages which accruedfromthisvictorytotheimperialarms,EugenewasdisgracedonhisarrivalatVienna.

In1793,GeneralHoche,havingreceivedorderstomoveuponTreveswithanarmyharassedbyconstantmarchesinamountainousanddifficultcountry,refusedtoobey.Heobserved,withreason,thatinordertoobtainpossessionofan unimportant fortress, theywere exposing his army to inevitable ruin.Hecaused, therefore,his troops to return intowinterquarters, andpreferred thepreservation of his army, upon which the success of the future campaigndepended,tohisownsafety.RecalledtoParis,hewasthrownintoadungeon,whichheonlyquittedonthedownfallofRobespierre.

Idarenotdecide ifsuchexamplesare tobe imitated;but it seems tomehighlydesirablethataquestionsonewandsoimportant,shouldbediscussedbymenwhoarecapableofdeterminingitsmerits.

MAXIMLXXIII

Thefirstqualificationinageneral-in-chiefisacoolhead—thatis,aheadwhichreceivesjustimpressions,andestimatesthingsandobjectsattheirrealvalue.Hemustnotallowhimselftobeelatedbygoodnews,ordepressedbybad.

The impressions he receives either successively or simultaneously in thecourseoftheday,shouldbesoclassedastotakeuponlytheexactplaceinhismindwhich they deserve to occupy; since it is upon a just comparison andconsideration of the weight due to different impressions, that the power ofreasoningandofrightjudgmentdepends.

Somemenaresophysicallyandmorallyconstitutedas toseeeverythingthrough a highly-colored medium. They raise up a picture in the mind oneveryslightoccasion,andgivetoeverytrivialoccurrenceadramaticinterest.Butwhatever knowledge, or talent, or courage, or other good qualities suchmenmaypossess,naturehasnotformedthemforthecommandofarmies,orthedirectionofgreatmilitaryoperations.

NOTE.

“The first quality in a general-in-chief,” says Montécuculli, “is a greatknowledgeoftheartofwar.Thisisnotintuitive,buttheresultofexperience.Amanisnotbornacommander.Hemustbecomeone.Nottobeanxious;tobe always cool; to avoid confusion in his commands; never to changecountenance;togivehisordersinthemidstofbattlewithasmuchcomposureasifhewereperfectlyatease.Thesearetheproofsofvalorinageneral.

“To encourage the timid; to increase the number of the truly brave; torevivethedroopingardorofthetroopsinbattle;torallythosewhoarebroken;to bring back to the charge those who are repulsed; to find resources indifficulty,andsuccessevenamiddisaster;tobereadyatamomenttodevotehimself,ifnecessary,forthewelfareofthestate.Thesearetheactionswhichacquireforageneraldistinctionandrenown.”

Tothisenumerationmaybeadded, the talentofdiscriminatingcharacter,andofemployingeverymanintheparticularpostwhichnaturehasqualifiedhim to fill. “My principal attention,” said Marshal Villars, “was alwaysdirected to the study of the younger generals. Such a one I found, by theboldness of his character, fit to lead a column of attack; another, from adisposition naturally cautious, but without being deficient in courage, moreperfectly to be relied on for the defence of a country.” It is only by a justapplication of these personal qualities to their respective objects, that it ispossibletocommandsuccessinwar.

MAXIMLXXIV

Theleadingqualificationswhichshoulddistinguishanofficerselectedforthe head of the staff, are, to know the country thoroughly; to be able toconductareconnoissancewithskill;tosuperintendthetransmissionoforderspromptly;tolaydownthemostcomplicatedmovementsintelligibly,butinafewwords,andwithsimplicity.

NOTE.

Formerly, the duties of the chiefs of the staff were confined to the

necessary preparations for carrying the plan of the campaign, and theoperations resolved on by the general-in-chief, into effect. In a battle, theywere only employed in directing movements and superintending theirexecution. But in the late wars, the officers of the staff were frequentlyintrustedwith the commandof a columnof attack, or of largedetachments,when the general-in-chief feared to disclose the secret of his plans by thetransmission of orders or instructions. Great advantages have resulted fromthis innovation, although itwas long resisted.By thismeans, the staff havebeen enabled to perfect their theory by practice, and they have acquired,moreover, theesteemof the soldiers and juniorofficersof the line,whoareeasilyledtothinklightlyoftheirsuperiors,whomtheydonotseefightinginthe ranks.The generalswho have held the arduous situation of chief of thestaffduringthewarsoftheRevolution,havealmostalwaysbeenemployedinthe different branches of the profession. Marshal Berthier, who filled soconspicuously this appointment to Napoleon, was distinguished by all theessentials of a general. He possessed calm, and at the same time brilliantcourage, excellent judgment, andapprovedexperience.Heborearmsduringhalf a century, made war in the four quarters of the globe, opened andterminatedthirty-twocampaigns.Inhisyouthheacquired,undertheeyeofhisfather,whowasanengineerofficer, the talentof tracingplansand finishingthem with exactness, as well as the preliminary qualifications necessary toformastaff-officer.AdmittedbythePrincedeLambesqintohisregimentofdragoons,hewastaughttheskilfulmanagementofhishorseandhissword—accomplishmentssoimportanttoasoldier.AttachedafterwardtothestaffofCountRochambeau, hemadehis first campaign inAmerica,where he soonbegantodistinguishhimselfbyhisvalor,activityandtalents.Havingatlengthattained superior rank in the staff-corps formed by Marshal de Segur, hevisitedthecampsoftheKingofPrussia,anddischargedthedutiesofchiefofthestaffundertheBarondeBezenval.

During nineteen years, consumed in sixteen campaigns, the history ofMarshalBerthier’slifewaslittleelsebutthatofthewarsofNapoleon,allthedetailsofwhichhedirected,bothinthecabinetandthefield.Astrangertotheintrigues of politics, he labored with indefatigable activity; seized withpromptitudeandsagacityupongeneralviews,andgave thenecessaryordersfor attaining them with prudence, perspicuity, and conciseness. Discreet,impenetrable,modest;hewasjust,exact,andevensevere, ineverythingthatregardedtheservice;buthealwayssetanexampleofvigilanceandzealinhisownperson,andknewhowtomaintaindiscipline,andtocausehisauthoritytoberespectedbyeveryrankunderhisorders.

MAXIMLXXV

Acommandantofartilleryshouldunderstandwellthegeneralprinciplesofeach branch of the service, since he is called upon to supply arms andammunition to the different corps of which it is composed. Hiscorrespondence with the commanding officers of artillery at the advancedposts,shouldputhiminpossessionofallthemovementsofthearmy,andthedispositionandmanagementofthegreatparkofartilleryshoulddependuponthisinformation.

NOTE.

Afterhavingrecognizedtheadvantageofintrustingthesupplyofarmsandammunitionforanarmytoamilitarybody,itappearstomeextraordinarythatthesameregulationdoesnotextendtothatofprovisionsandforage,insteadofleaving it in the hands of a separate administration, as is the practice atpresent.

The civil establishments attached to armies are formed almost always atthecommencementofawar,andcomposedofpersonsstrangerstothoselawsofdisciplinewhichtheyarebuttoomuchinclinedtodisregard.Thesemenarelittleesteemedbythemilitary,becausetheyserveonlytoenrichthemselves,without respect to themeans. They consider only their private interest in aservicewhoseglory theycannot share, although someportionof its successdepends upon their zeal. The disorders and defalcations incident to theseestablishmentswouldassuredlycease,iftheywereconfidedtomenwhohadbeenemployedinthearmy,andwho,inreturnfortheirlabors,werepermittedtopartakewiththeirfellow-soldiersthetriumphoftheirsuccess.

MAXIMLXXVI

Thequalitieswhichdistinguishagoodgeneralofadvancedposts,are, toreconnoitreaccuratelydefilesandfordsofeverydescription;toprovideguidesthatmaybedependedon;tointerrogatethecuréandpostmaster;toestablishrapidly a good understanding with the inhabitants; to send out spies; tointerceptpublicandprivateletters;totranslateandanalyzetheircontents;inaword, to be able to answer every question of the general-in-chief, when hearriveswiththewholearmy.

NOTE.

Foragingparties,composedofsmalldetachments,andwhichwereusually

intrustedtoyoungofficers,servedformerlytomakegoodofficersofadvancedposts;butnowthearmyissuppliedwithprovisionsbyregularcontributions:itis only in a course of partisanwarfare that the necessary experience can beacquiredtofillthesesituationswithsuccess.

A chief of partisans is, to a certain extent, independent of the army.Hereceives neither pay nor provisions from it, and rarely succor, and isabandonedduringthewholecampaigntohisownresources.

Anofficersocircumstancedmustuniteaddresswithcourage,andboldnesswithdiscretion,ifhewishestocollectplunderwithoutmeasuringthestrengthofhislittlecorpswithsuperiorforces.Alwaysharassed,alwayssurroundedbydangers,whichitishisbusinesstoforeseeandsurmount,aleaderofpartisansacquires in a short time an experience in the details of war rarely to beobtainedbyanofficeroftheline;becausethelatterisalmostalwaysundertheguidance of superior authority, which directs the whole of his movements,while the talentandgeniusof thepartisanaredevelopedandsustainedbyadependenceonhisownresources.

MAXIMLXXVII

Generals-in-chiefmustbeguidedbytheirownexperience,ortheirgenius.Tactics, evolutions, the duties and knowledge of an engineer or artilleryofficer,maybe learned in treatises, but the scienceof strategy is only tobeacquired by experience, and by studying the campaigns of all the greatcaptains.

Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, and Frederick, as well as Alexander,Hannibal, and Cæsar, have all acted upon the same principles. These havebeen: tokeep their forcesunited; to leavenoweakpart unguarded; to seizewithrapidityonimportantpoints.

Such are the principles which lead to victory, and which, by inspiringterroratthereputationofyourarms,willatoncemaintainfidelityandsecuresubjection.

NOTE.

“Agreatcaptaincanonlybeformed,”saystheArchdukeCharles,“bylongexperience and intense study: neither is his own experience enough—forwhose life is there sufficiently fruitful of events to render his knowledgeuniversal?” It is, therefore,byaugmentinghis information from thestockofothers, by appreciating justly the discoveries of his predecessors, and bytaking for his standard of comparison those great military exploits, in

connectionwith their political results, inwhich the history ofwar abounds,thathecanalonebecomeagreatcommander.

MAXIMLXXVIII

Peruse again and again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar,Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick. Model yourself uponthem.Thisistheonlymeansofbecomingagreatcaptain,andofacquiringthesecretoftheartofwar.Yourowngeniuswillbeenlightenedandimprovedbythisstudy,andyouwilllearntorejectallmaximsforeigntotheprinciplesofthesegreatcommanders.

NOTE.

It is in order to facilitate this object that I have formed the presentcollection. It isafter readingandmeditatingupon thehistoryofmodernwarthatIhaveendeavoredtoillustrate,byexamples,howthemaximsofagreatcaptainmaybemostsuccessfullyappliedtothisstudy.MaytheendIhavehadinviewbeaccomplished!