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Collaboration between the World Food Programme and MNCs An exploratory analysis into the main barriers to effective collaboration Master’s Thesis by Frederik Rasmussen Supervisor: Patricia Plackett Assistant Professor, Department of Operations Management Copenhagen Business School
Master of Science in International Business & Politics Department of Business and Politics Copenhagen Business School June 30th, 2015
Pages: 68 Characters: 155.287
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Abstract The objective of this thesis is to conduct an exploratory study into the main
barriers to effective collaboration between the World Food Programme and
MNCs within the context of Project Laser Beam – a multi-‐stakeholder
partnership addressing malnutrition in Bangladesh and Indonesia. To analyse
these barriers the thesis has relied on semi-‐structured interviews with key
partnership stakeholders in order to gain an in-‐depth insight into the dynamics
behind the partnership.
Global development challenges such as hunger, poverty and climate change
cannot be solved by any actor singlehandedly, and this factor presents one of the
central drivers behind the increase in collaboration between UN aid agencies and
multinational companies. In addition, the respective nexus of interests of these
actors is increasingly aligning in terms of sustainability challenges within
developing countries. However, despite all the push-‐factors in terms of the
incentive to collaborate, there are still obstacles in the way of advancing the level
of collaboration among UN aid agencies and multinational companies. Scholars
such as Benedicte Bull (2010) point to a divide that still exists between the UN
and MNCs, while Venn and Berg (2014) highlight that cross-‐sector partnerships
are challenging in terms of the level of trust and integrative collaboration
required of partners.
The exploratory research into the barriers to effective collaboration between the
WFP and its corporate partners led to four central barriers being identified: 1)
headquarter-‐driven; 2) insufficient interaction among field-‐level partners; 3)
overly strong WFP gatekeeping and; 4) inherently conflicting goals. The
theoretical contextualisation of these barriers led to the conclusion that the four
main barriers are to a large extent interlinked, requiring a concerted effort to
address all four barriers collectively. These barriers need to be addressed
collectively in order for collaboration to reach a more effective and
transformational stage.
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Table of Contents
Abstract ................................................................................................................. 1
Tables and Figures ................................................................................................. 4
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................ 4
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 5 1.1 The reach and impact of malnutrition ........................................................................................... 5 1.2 Defining the problem area .................................................................................................................. 6 1.3 About Project Laser Beam ................................................................................................................... 9 1.4 Problem formulation and research question ........................................................................... 10 1.4.1 Pre-‐understanding ........................................................................................................................... 11 1.4.2 Plan of action going forward ....................................................................................................... 11
2 Methodology .................................................................................................. 13 2.1 Philosophy of Science ......................................................................................................................... 13 2.1.1 Ontology ................................................................................................................................................ 14 2.1.2 Epistemology ...................................................................................................................................... 15
2.2 Research Design ................................................................................................................................... 17 2.2.1 Nature of the Research Design ................................................................................................... 17
2.3 Research Strategy ................................................................................................................................ 18 2.3.1 Empirical Data ................................................................................................................................... 19 2.3.2 Interview Structure .......................................................................................................................... 20 2.3.3 Summarising of Interview Findings ......................................................................................... 21
2.4 Plan of Action – Analysis ................................................................................................................... 22 2.5 Research Approach ............................................................................................................................. 23 2.6 Research Validity and Reliability .................................................................................................. 24 2.7 Summary .................................................................................................................................................. 26
3 Theory ............................................................................................................ 27 3.1 Main considerations ........................................................................................................................... 27 3.2 Simple Rules for Making Alliances Work ................................................................................... 28 3.2.1 Principle 1: Focus less on defining the business plan and more on how you’ll work together ................................................................................................................................................................ 29 3.2.2 Principle 2: Develop metric pegged not only to alliance goals but also to alliance progress ................................................................................................................................................................ 30 3.2.3 Principle 3: Instead of trying to eliminate differences, leverage them to create value 30 3.2.4 Principle 4: Go beyond formal governance structures to encourage collaborative behaviour ............................................................................................................................................................. 31 3.2.5 Principle 5: Spend as much time on managing internal stakeholders as on managing the relationship with your partner .................................................................................... 31
3.3 Innovation from the Inside Out ..................................................................................................... 32 3.3.1 Theoretical Background ................................................................................................................ 32 3.3.2 Embedded Innovation Paradigm ............................................................................................... 33 3.3.3 The Gatekeeping Function of Trust in Cross-‐sector Social Partnerships ................. 34 3.3.4 Social Exchange Along the Partnership Continuum ......................................................... 35 3.3.5 The Impact of Goal Conflicts on Partnership Performance ............................................ 36 3.3.6 Trust in Cross-‐sector partnerships ............................................................................................ 37
4 Analysis .......................................................................................................... 39 4.1 Main considerations ........................................................................................................................... 39 4.2 Interview Findings .............................................................................................................................. 40 4.2.1 Barrier Nr. 1: Headquarter-‐driven approach excluded key stakeholder input ..... 41
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4.2.2 Barrier Nr. 2: Insufficient interaction leading to conflict ............................................... 44 4.2.3 Barrier Nr. 3: Overly strong WFP gatekeeping a barrier to extracting additional private-‐sector engagement .......................................................................................................................... 47 4.2.4 Barrier Nr. 4: Conflicting goals among the partners is an inherent obstacle, driving forward the need to address the first three barriers ........................................................ 54
5 Discussion ...................................................................................................... 59 5.1 Main considerations ........................................................................................................................... 59 5.2 Discussion of Findings ....................................................................................................................... 59 5.2.1 Barrier Nr. 1: Headquarter-‐driven ........................................................................................... 59 5.2.2 Barrier Nr. 2: Insufficient interaction ...................................................................................... 63 5.2.3 Barriers Nr. 3 and 4: WFP Gatekeeping and conflicting goals ..................................... 67
5.3 Conceptual Framework Discussion ............................................................................................. 72
6 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 78 6.1 Conclusion of Findings ...................................................................................................................... 78 6.1.1 Headquarter-‐driven ......................................................................................................................... 78 6.1.2 Insufficient interaction ................................................................................................................... 78 6.1.3 WFP gatekeeping .............................................................................................................................. 79 6.1.4 Inherently conflicting goals ......................................................................................................... 79
6.2 Main Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 80 6.3 Contribution ........................................................................................................................................... 81 6.4 Future Questions .................................................................................................................................. 82 6.5 Experience and insights .................................................................................................................... 83
7 Bibliography ................................................................................................... 84
8 Appendices .................................................................................................... 89 Appendix 1 .......................................................................................................................................................... 89 Appendix 2 .......................................................................................................................................................... 93 Appendix 3 .......................................................................................................................................................... 96 Appendix 4 .......................................................................................................................................................... 99 Appendix 5 ....................................................................................................................................................... 104 Appendix 6 ....................................................................................................................................................... 109 Appendix 7 ....................................................................................................................................................... 112 Appendix 8 ....................................................................................................................................................... 115
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Tables and Figures Table 1 -‐ Thesis Interviewees……………………………………………………………………………page 40
Figure 1 – Headquarter-‐driven approach of PLB……………………………............................page 41
Figure 2 -‐ Insufficient interaction……………………………………………………………………...page 44
Figure 3 -‐ WFP gatekeeping………………………………………………………………………………page 47
Figure 4 – Inherently conflicting goals………………………………………………………….……page 54
Figure 5 – Conceptual Framework of Barriers………………………………………………..… page 73
Figure 6 – Relationship between Barrier 1 and 2…………………………………………...…. page 74
Figure 7 – Relationship between Barrier 2 and 3…………………………………………...…. page 75
Figure 8 – Relationship between Barriers 3 and 4…………….………………………………. page 76
Abbreviations BOP – Bottom of the pyramid
FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GAIN – Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition
IFAD – International Fund for Agricultural Development
MDG – Millennium Development Goal
MNC – Multinational Company
PLB – Project Laser Beam
WFP – World Food Programme
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1 Introduction
Tackling malnutrition is among the greatest challenges of the 21st century and
one that requires effective action across a number of sectors and among a
number of actors. In other words, “tackling undernutrition will require action on
multiple fronts. We need direct interventions to help the neediest people, but also
market-‐based approaches to make sure nutritious foods are produced, and all
people have access to them. Aid or government action alone will not be enough”
(IDS Globalisation and Development Blog). Addressing global development
challenges has increasingly brought the UN and the private sector together
because of the growing interest on the part of multinationals in BOP markets and
sustainability challenges. Nonetheless, the heterogeneity of these actors has
meant that the partnerships process can be problematic at the best of times.
This chapter includes a general introduction to the topic of malnutrition in order
to portray the complexity of the issue, and why there is increasing collaboration
between UN aid agencies and the private sector to address malnutrition
challenges in developing countries. The definition of the problem area -‐ which
provides the foundation for the chosen area of research and the research
question – sets the foundation for the subsequent theoretical perspectives that
will attempt to address the main areas where effective collaboration between the
WFP and its MNC partners is being held back.
1.1 The reach and impact of malnutrition
The topic of malnutrition is incredibly complex and its consequences are far-‐
reaching. Malnutrition refers to both undernutrition (nutrition deficiencies) and
overnutrition (unbalanced diet intake, such as the over-‐consumption of calories)
(Concern et al, 2014; p. 7). In terms of the impact of malnutrition, FAO
estimations indicate that approximately 805 million people were chronically
undernourished in 2012-‐2014, which is a reduction of around 100 million
compared to the previous decade and 209 million since 1990-‐1992 (FAO et al,
2014; p. 8) In terms of identifiable targets, it does not appear as though there is
consensus as to the progress of tackling global food insecurity. Malnutrition
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factors heavily in the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, as MDG 1 (MDG 1c)
involves halving the proportion of undernourished people in developing
countries by 2015 (Ibid).
A lack of food, as well as the right food compromises peoples’ health, education,
ability to work, and ability to assert their rights (CIDA, 2014; p. 1). Malnutrition
at an early age has far-‐reaching consequences in terms of reduced physical and
mental development during childhood (WFP -‐ Malnutrition). This in turn has
consequences for the level of education and employment that malnourished
people can pursue later in life. In other words, proper nutrition is important for
the cognitive development of children, and therefore vital to educational success,
both of which are important determinants of labour productivity and therefore
economic growth (Horton and Hoddinott, 2014; p. 1). The burden as a result of
insufficient nutrition is placed on those affected as well as society as a whole, as
malnutrition impairs physical growth and learning, limits learnings, and
ultimately propagates poverty (GHI, 2014; p. 23). In developing countries where
a large share of the population suffers from food security and malnutrition
economic growth and development targets will be unattainable. This points to a
mutual interest on the part of governments, development organisations and
companies to tackle the issue.
1.2 Defining the problem area More and more the traditional sector roles and responsibilities are being
challenged by globalisation changes and rising global development challenges. In
other words, the boundaries between public and private sector actors are
becoming increasingly blurred. C. K. Prahalad pioneered the concept that
business could help address social and economic gaps by creating profitable
business serving the approximately 4 billion who represent the most poor and
underserved. As Prahalad and Hammond first argued, “improving the lives of the
billions of people at the bottom of the economic pyramid is a noble endeavour. It
can also be a lucrative one.” (Prahalad and Hammond, 2002; p. 48) In other
words, the BOP market represent profitable opportunity for companies to
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expand their portfolio, as the demands of the poorest are as diverse as that of the
traditional developed world consumer base. This relates to the scope for
innovation on the part of business in addressing the needs of the poor, including
areas such as poverty and malnutrition. Similarly, Patrick Cescau, the retired
CEO of Unilever, has acknowledged that “the social and environmental challenges
facing us in the twenty-‐first century are so complex and so multidimensional that
they cannot be solved by governments alone. Industry has to be part of the
solution.” (Prahalad, 2011; p. 19) The innovative role of business in developing
products and services for Bottom of the Pyramid (BOP) consumers is critical to
solving food security problems.
Similarly, collaborative initiatives such as the UN Global Compact and UN
Guiding Principles have moved the boundaries of corporate involvement in
social and environmental challenges, emphasizing the responsibility of
multinationals to respect the universal principles of human rights. Development
challenges such as malnutrition mark a junction whereby the agenda of
sustainable and ethical business practises is not merely a secondary part of
business strategy but a critical component of business growth. In addition,
development organisations are in consensus about the critical role that business
can play in addressing poverty and food security gaps. According to the UN, long-‐
term sustainable solutions are to be found in the markets, why it is all the more
critical that the private sector is an intimate part of the effort to meet, among
other, the vast nutritional challenges facing the developing world (UN Global
Compact, 2008; p. 25).
The WFP acknowledges that it is operating in an increasingly crowded field of
actors – both state and non-‐state – including longstanding partners and new
ones such as local NGOs, private sector foundations and businesses (WFP
Strategic Plan, 2013; p. 7). Additionally, the WFP validates its alliances with
multinationals because of the fact that companies contribute to making the WFP
more effective and impactful; whether it be through fundraising, sharing of
equipment or knowledge sharing (WFP – Private Sector). There is therefore a
clear recognition on multiple fronts that donor agencies and the private sector
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need to find strategic and innovative ways to partners together in order to solve
both short-‐term crises, but as importantly, work together on achieving progress
on long-‐term development goals that have help prevent future disasters and
crises or at least mitigate their effects.
According to Zyck and Kent, the growing role of business within aid – and the
subsequent leveraging of private sector resources for emergency needs – has a
great deal of potential and wide-‐ranging benefits. At the same time, this poses a
significant challenge to the humanitarian sector as it is traditionally conceived
(Zyck and Kent, 2014; p. 1). The private sector is being increasingly viewed as an
alternative to international aid agencies, and increasingly aid agencies are
expected to provide assistance through the local markets rather than serving the
traditional role of frontline aid providers. In addition, the authors stress that
“businesses’ greatest contribution is unlikely to be monetary […] These benefits
may, in some cases, emerge from corporate philanthropy, though they are far more
likely to result from firms’ ‘core business’ and pursuit of customers and long-‐term
growth opportunities in developing countries around the world” (Ibid; p. 5).
The increase in collaboration between UN aid agencies and the private sector is
therefor arguably a reflection of the need to speed up efforts to address global
development challenges – an effort that the UN cannot make singlehandedly.
However, increased collaboration between the UN and MNCs is not without its
complications. Whilst organisations such as the WFP are driven by the objective
of addressing emergency and longer-‐term development challenges, profit-‐
seeking and commercial interests primarily drive the private sector.
Fundamentally, the two sets of actors are driven by entirely different motives.
The inherent conflicting goals therefore lead to tensions and disagreements that
can hamper the impact of partnerships. Different goals and modes of operating
mean that mutual understanding is lacking between the two sets of actors, and
this prevents collaboration from intensifying. Nonetheless, in the same way that
Prahalad has argued for the fact that the private sector has become aware of the
growth opportunities in BOP markets by addressing socially impacting
challenges (Prahalad, 2011), Bull argues that the UN has become aware of the
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advantages to adopting private sector modes of operation in to order to more
effectively reach those most vulnerable. In other words, the search for PPPs is
part of a change in the UN system that also has included an adaption of the
structure and culture of the organisations to the private sector mode of operation”
(Bull, 2010; p. 491).
1.3 About Project Laser Beam
Project Laser Beam was established in 2009 as a collaborative effort between the
WFP, GAIN, Unilever, Royal DSM and Mondeléz International (formerly Kraft
Foods). It was a five-‐year, $50 million multi-‐sector partnership. Hailed as a
‘ground-‐breaking initiative’, the public-‐private partnership was created with the
explicit aim of harnessing the influence and capabilities of leading multinational
companies and ending hunger and malnutrition among children in the
developing world. Project Laser Beam, as an idea, was first conceived at the
World Economic Forum at Davos in 2009. The initiative was announced by
former US President Bill Clinton at the Clinton Global Initiative, was to combine
the unique development know-‐how of the WFP with the business expertise of
Unilever, Royal DSM and Mondeléz International. The WFP’s Executive Director
at the time, Josette Sheeran, championed the joint initiative by arguing that:
“With the numbers of hungry growing up, we need the private sector to join us in
the fight… It’s a battle that’s too big for any one player…” (WFP -‐ PLB Release
Statement, 2009) The aim of Project Laser Beam was to create a scalable,
replicable and sustainable model for addressing child malnutrition, representing
a significant contribution to achieving the Millennium Development Goal of
eradicating poverty and hunger (UN Millennium Development Goals -‐ MDG 1c).
Project Laser Beam is remarkable first and foremost because it is a partnership
that has brought together a wide variety of partners – both in terms of the
multinational companies behind the establishment of the partnership, but also
due to the vast number of local partners within each country. Therefore, the
partnership is arguably holistic in two respects: Holistic in its approach to
addressing both direct and underlying causes of malnutrition and holistic in
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terms of the number of partnership stakeholders. The holistic and multi-‐
dimensionality of malnutrition necessitates a response with the same
characteristics. Multi-‐stakeholder initiatives such as PLB that involve multiple
stakeholders, each with diverging interests, take time and effort to come into
proper effect. However, the first part of the analysis is first and foremost
concentrated on discussing on the findings of the interviews conducted.
On the face of things PLB has epitomized the integrative approach called for by
various UN aid agencies, both in terms of the wide range of partners and the
range of focus areas. In terms of the process of the initiative, the aim has been to
leverage the strengths of public and private sector actors in order to create new
methods and approaches to addressing malnutrition, as well as sustainable
markets that will continue to be viable beyond the project’s lifetime. The
following part of the analysis will critically examine the key challenges during
PLB and connecting these with the theoretical debates introduced in the theory
and literature review section of the thesis.
1.4 Problem formulation and research question
On the basis of the above-‐defined problem area, the aim of this thesis is to
critically address the main barriers to improved collaboration between the WFP
and Multinational companies. The point of departure will be Project Laser Beam
– a five-‐year multi-‐stakeholder partnership between the WFP, Unilever, Royal
DSM, Mondeléz International and the Global Alliance Against Malnutrition
(GAIN). On the basis of selected theoretical, literary and methodological
frameworks the thesis consequently asks the following research question:
What are the barriers and how do they affect the collaborative performance
of multi-‐stakeholder partnerships between the World Food Programme and
MNCs aimed at addressing malnutrition in developing countries?
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1.4.1 Pre-‐understanding
The thesis supports the interpretive paradigm position introduced by Fuglsang
and Olsen that the author cannot be considered entirely objective, and therefore
acknowledges that pre-‐conceived values and interests of the author affect the
domain of the investigation (Fuglsang and Olsen, 2009; p. 318). As such, the pre-‐
conceived understanding of the problem area becomes of significant importance
to how it is approached and analysed.
Our understanding of topics and issues are arguably affected by both context and
history. Therefore, the analysis and discussion undertaken by this thesis is
admittedly influenced by the author’s pre-‐conceived views, presuppositions,
experiences, values, as well as historical and cultural context shaping the author
throughout life (Fuglsang and Olsen, 2009; p. 321). Hans-‐Geoerg Gadamer’s
notion that understanding constitutes pre-‐understanding and prejudice, and
therefore the foregoing understanding of the topic together with the influence
from prejudices have an impact on the author’s ability to interpret and it affects
how the topic is understood (Fuglsang and Olsen, 2009; p. 322). As a result, it is
therefore concluded that it is important to inform the reader that the author of
this thesis is has been heavily involved in a UN student organisation – United
Nations Youth Association Global Health Working Group – and has recently been
involved in a United Nations Youth Associated-‐led case competition at the UN
City in Copenhagen. It is acknowledged that this could potentially bias the choice
of information and the interpretation of information. However, these
experiences also serve as a focal point for the interest in the overall topic of UN-‐
Business collaboration.
1.4.2 Plan of action going forward
This chapter demonstrated that the nexus occurring between the growing
challenge of malnutrition along with the increasing interest by the private sector
into BOP markets and developing countries, which has brought them into the
domain traditionally occupied by the UN. Whilst multinational companies have
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increasingly shown an interest in addressing sustainability challenges, the
chapter also attempted to highlight the inherently conflicting goals separating
UN aid agencies and private sector partners. The following chapter will address
the methodological approach of the thesis, critically reflecting on the
methodological choices made in the collection, analysis and subsequent
discussion of the empirical data. The methodology chapter will be succeeded by
a review of the theoretical and literary perspectives that are drawn upon in the
thesis. This subsequently leads to the respective analysis and discussion
chapters. The analysis will include a presentation of the data based on key
methodological choices, and the subsequent discussion will draw on the chosen
theoretical and literary perspectives in order to reflect on the analysis of the
empirical data. This will then lead to the chapter on the key conclusions from the
results and reflections in the analysis and discussion chapters. In addition, the
conclusion chapter will include reflections on the thesis and future questions.
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2 Methodology The following chapter aims at describing the research methods used to guide the
plan of action in addressing the research of question. The chapter will address
the philosophical considerations – including ontological and epistemological
reflections -‐ that have guided the research design and strategy of the thesis.
Additionally, the thesis will provide a reflection of the empirical setting, the
empirical data collected, as well as a description of how the thesis intends to
answer the research question. This chapter will include an overview and
description of how the interviews were conducted and what secondary data will
be used. Lastly, this chapter will address reflections about the validity and
reliability. These methodological reflections are considered important
foundations for the ability of the researcher to effectively address research
question, and therefore this chapter deserves adequate attention.
The methodological framework is necessary to explain the design of the research
strategy of the thesis. The methodological considerations are important in the
sense that they underpin the research strategy and the methods chosen as part
of that strategy (Saunders et al., 2012; p. 128). As inferred, an introduction to the
methodological considerations will subsequently lead to a discussion on the
research strategy and methods applied in answering the research question and
its objectives. Additionally, the choice of theory has consequences for the
outcome of the analysis as it provides the framework within which a social
phenomenon is to be understood and how the findings are interpreted (Bryman,
2012; p. 20).
2.1 Philosophy of Science
In order to study the phenomenon of the changing nature of the WFP’s strategic
collaboration with the private sector, the perception of the nature of social
reality and how it should be examined must be established (Bryman, 2012; p.
19). The research philosophy adopted in this paper is heavily influenced by
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practical considerations, as well as the research question itself. Nonetheless, the
main influence is the particular view on what constitutes acceptable knowledge
and how to arrive at this knowledge.
2.1.1 Ontology
Ontology refers to assumptions on how the world operates. Within this,
Saunders et al explain that there are two philosophical approaches: objectivism
and subjectivism. Objectivism represents the position that social entities exist in
reality external to and independent of social actors e.g. the organisational
structure and culture of a company (Saunders et al, 2012; p. 131) This paper
leans in favour of the more subjectivist position, as the analysis rests on the
subjective opinions of key stakeholders in order to critically analyse strategic
collaboration between the WFP and its MNC partners. According to the
subjectivist ontological position, social phenomena are created through the
perceptions and consequent actions of the social actors involved. Therefore,
because interaction among actors is a continual process, social phenomena are
constantly revised (Saunders et al, 2012; p. 132). This lends itself to the social
constructivist view, whereby people interpret situations different to others. In
terms of the research question and the objectives of this paper, it is therefore of
utmost importance that the thesis attempts to understand the subjective reality
of the partnership stakeholders in order to able to make meaning of and
understand their motives, actions and intentions in a manner that clarifies the
barriers being analysed.
Social constructivism departs from objectivism by deconstructing the taken-‐for-‐
granted social facts. According to Søren Wenneberg, social constructivism can be
divided into four domains; 1) the critical perspective; 2) social theory; 3)
epistemology; and 4) ontology (Wenneberg, 2000; pp. 17-‐19). The critical
perspective deconstructs the natural, obvious and typical to uncover the natural
phenomenon and consequently constructs a void. Through social theory this void
is addressed through a perception that society is a humanly constructed
expression. However, this position assumes that society is either constructed by
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materiality or that it is self-‐constructed. The epistemological position supposes
that all knowledge is socially constructed. The epistemological position is
divided by a focus on knowledge about the social world or the physical world. The
ontological position recognizes the world as socially constructed, and in this case
assumptions are divided between those about the social and physical world. In
other words, the relation between the observer and reality is based on the
assumption that the reality is produced while it is being observed (Andersen,
2009; p. 29).
In addressing the WFP collaboration with the private sector the thesis draws on
the ontological position that physical and social reality are both manifested by
social constructs, relying on the assertion that reality is shaped by our
recognition thereof (Andersen, 2009; pp. 29-‐30; Wenneberg, 2000; pp. 119-‐120).
Ontological constructivism adopts two opposing positions – a radical and less
radical position. The radical position assumes that no reality is recognised until
social constructions enable it to, while the less radical approach of social
constructivism assumes the existence of a proto-‐reality where reality takes
shape through the recognition of it through division and differentiation in order
to construct it (Andersen, 2009; pp. 29-‐30; Wenneberg, 2000; pp. 119-‐120). The
thesis will adopt the less radical view that reality is influenced and shaped
through people’s recognition of it. As pointed out by social constructivists,
societal phenomenon changes through historical and societal processes, and
because people create them they are also susceptible to change at the hands of
people (Fuglsang & Olsen, 2009; p. 349). Social constructivism recognises social
phenomenon as historically and socially phenomenon. Therefore they can and
will change over time through the actions of people. During investigations of a
social phenomenon there will always be a subject (people) recognising it, and an
object (the phenomenon) to be recognised (Fuglsang and Olsen, 2009; p. 349).
2.1.2 Epistemology
Epistemology refers to what constitutes as acceptable knowledge. The main
philosophical components associated with it are positivism, realism and
16
interpretivism. The positivist approach is more akin to the philosophical stance of
the natural scientist because of the preference for an observable reality and
causal relationships in order to create law-‐like generalisations (Saunders et al,
2012; p. 134). Another important component of positivism is its value-‐free
approach. However, this paper relies on the subjective opinions of partnership
stakeholders through person-‐to-‐person interviews that do not adopt a strict
format more akin to large-‐scale surveys. Due to the fact that the thesis is
conducting an in-‐depth case study analysis, excluding the personal values of the
author and interviewees is not realistic. Therefore, because of the nature of the
research question and its objectives, the two main components of positivism are
rejected: 1) only phenomena that is observable will lead to the production of
credible data, and; 2) research must be undertaken in a value-‐free way. Overall
the positivist approach lends itself to quantifiable observations leading to
statistical analysis (Saunders et al., 2012; pp. 134-‐135), which is not the focus of
this thesis.
The nature of the analysis of the research questions means that the research
philosophy also departs from that of the realist approach. Overall, realism is
similar to positivism in that it assumes a scientific approach to the collection of
data (Saunders et al, 2009; p. 114). There are two components of realism: direct
and critical realism. According to direct realism, what is observed is reality.
Direct realism, on the other hand, argues that there are two steps to observing
reality: The first step is observing the event; the second step is the mental
process that occurs subsequently after the sensation meets out senses (Saunders
et al; 2012; p. 136). Critical realists believe that our senses in some way deceive
us, that what we experience are sensations and not reality. Rather than being
strictly adopted, this thesis supports the interpretivist view that it is necessary to
understand the subtle and distinct differences between individuals in their role
as social actors (Saunders et al., 2012; p. 137). This is due to the fact that in order
to understand the dynamics of collaboration between the WFP and private
sector partners, the importance of ‘social actors’ is keenly recognized throughout
the thesis because of the reliance on key stakeholder insights rather than
objective structures.
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2.2 Research Design
The research design sets the plan for how the research question will be
answered. The nature of the research question, the research context and likely
research consequences are the main determinants of the most fitting choice of
method. Therefore, the exploratory nature of the research question as well as the
reliance on project stakeholder interviews in order to disseminate key learnings
about the initiative have invariably led the thesis in the direction of a qualitative
research design. However, whether one chooses a quantitative or qualitative
approach is not simply based on a distinction between numeric and non-‐numeric
data, or both. The adoption of the research design is based on the philosophical
assumptions, as well as research strategy considerations (Saunders et al, 2012;
p. 161).
The qualitative nature of the methodological approach of the thesis is therefore a
clear manifestation of the philosophical assumptions of the author. According to
Saunders et al, qualitative research is most closely associated with an
interpretive research philosophy because of the fact that “researchers need to
make sense of the subjective and socially constructed meanings expressed about
the phenomenon being studied” (Saunders et al, 2012; p. 163). This ties in well
with the approach in this thesis to rely on the experiences and opinions of
stakeholders involved in PLB, recognising the reality that the interviewees
themselves are ‘social actors’ and the reality that they express in the interviews
are a reflection of the social constructivist position that individuals “may perceive
different situations in varying ways as a consequence of their own view of the
world” (Ibid, 2012; p. 132).
2.2.1 Nature of the Research Design
An exploratory study is a useful approach to finding out “what is happening; to
seek new insights; to ask questions and to assess phenomena in a new light”
(Robson, 2002 in Saunders et al, 2009; p. 139). Saunders et al make the
argument that this approach is particularly advantageous in instances where the
18
researcher wishes to clarify his or her understanding of a problem because of
uncertainty about the precise nature of the problem (Ibid). PLB is a unique and
innovative multi-‐stakeholder partnership, but there exists little empirical
information on the partnership besides the official project report published in
2014 (Accenture, 2014). As such, in order to gain a more critical perspective on
the dynamics of the partnership process, it is the position of the author of the
thesis that the exploratory approach was the best method in extrapolating key
information about PLB. Saunders et al list three ways of conducting exploratory
research: 1) literature search; 2) interviewing ‘experts’ within the topical field
and; 3) conducting focus group interviews (Saunders et al, 2009; p. 140). The
method selected for this thesis is that of expert interviews with key stakeholders
involved in PLB, and one expert interview with a person not involved in the
partnership. This is in large part due to the relative non-‐existence of literature on
both PLB and they type of partnership that it represents.
There are several advantages to the use of an exploratory research approach.
The thesis supports the position that an exploratory study “is a valuable means to
ask open questions to discover what is happening and gain insights about the topic
of interest. It is particularly useful if you wish to clarify your understanding of a
problem” (Ibid; p. 171). Also, exploratory research is useful in the sense that it “is
flexible and adaptable to change. If you are conducting exploratory research you
must be willing to change your direction as a result of new data that appear and
new insights that occur to you” (Ibid; p. 171).
2.3 Research Strategy
The research strategy of the thesis broadly refers to the plan of action in
answering the research question, the ultimate goal of the thesis. The choice of
research strategy is primarily guided by the research question and the objectives
of analysing the barriers to effective collaboration between the WFP and MNCs.
The nature of the research question has led to the thesis pursuing the case study
approach in order to gain a detailed understanding of partnership dynamics
between the WFP and MNCs within the context of Project Laser Beam.
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Case studies are a valuable approach for numerous reasons. First of all they
provide more detailed information compared to research strategies such as
surveys. The definition provided by Robert Yin is that of a case study as “an
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-‐life
context, especially when the boundaries between object of study and context are
not clearly defined” (Yin, 2003; pp. 13-‐14). A definition which is far more
indicative of the research strategy of this thesis is the one provided by Dul and
Hak, where they define a case study as a study in which a single case in its real
life context is selected, and results gathered are analysed in a qualitative manner
(Dul & Hak, 2008; p. 4). Nonetheless, Yin differentiates between four case study
strategies: 1) single case study; 2) multiple case studies; 3) a holistic case study
and; 4) an embedded case study. This thesis will adopt the single case study
approach, which is because PLB “represents a critical case or, alternatively, an
extreme or unique case” (Saunders et al, 2012; p. 179). It is acknowledge by the
author of this thesis that relying on a single case study would be deemed as
insufficient in generating any definitive conclusions or generalities beyond PLB.
However, Flyvbjerg argues the following in defence of relying on single case
studies: “One can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case study
may be central to scientific development […] ‘the force of example’ is
underestimated” (Flyvbjerg, 2007; p. 245).
2.3.1 Empirical Data
The primary data collection method chosen was the use of in-‐depth, semi-‐
structured interviews. The advantage of using semi-‐structured interviews is that
they combine flexibility with structure, and often produce data of very good
quality (Gillham, 2005 in Skúladóttir, 2013; p. 34). Admittedly, the disadvantage
lies in that the interviews are less generalizable and comparable. The method
was chosen to gain a clear and holistic picture of the barriers to strategic
collaboration between the WFP and MNCs – both in terms of PLB and the wider
partnership arena, and to do this through gaining a deep understanding of the
personal experiences of the interviewees The empirical data is provided in the
20
form of primary data from interviews with people from the public and private
sector stakeholders involved in PLB. Interviews were conducted with the
following: a WFP Private Sector Partnership department representative, WFP
country office representatives from Indonesia and Bangladesh, and a
representative from Royal DSM’s Sustainability department. Only one
interviewee expressed a willingness to have said person’s name publicised in the
thesis. Therefore, for the sake of consistency, all of the interviewees are referred
to by their operative titles.
The author of the thesis also reached out to representatives from GAIN, Unilever
and Mondeléz International in an attempt to get their insights on the
partnerships. This would have provided the thesis with a holistic collection of
insights into the success and shortcomings of PLB and the overall barriers and
drivers of effective collaboration between the WFP and MNCs in multi-‐
stakeholder partnerships.
2.3.2 Interview Structure
As mentioned, the approach to the interviews was a semi-‐structured format with
the objective of revealing some of the main barriers to effective collaboration
between the WFP and its MNC partners. The exploratory approach of the thesis
meant that the researcher went into the thesis with a handful of questions in
mind, but with the mind-‐set of adapting the questioning according to the topics
of discussion raised by the interviewees. The main question that all the
interviewees were asked was:
In your opinion, what worked well during the partnership and what did not?
Besides the interviewee from WFP’s Private Sector Partnership department, who
was asked more generally about the reasoning behind partnering with the
private sector, all of the interviewees were also asked the following question:
21
What was the strategic reasoning behind Project Laser Beam – and pursuing
a broad multi-‐stakeholder approach?
From there on the interviews took on a more adaptive approach due to the fact
that the interviewees were given the freedom to address the issues that they felt
were important. The line of questioning largely remained the same throughout
the interviews, as the objective was to understand the barriers to effective
collaboration within the context of PLB, as well as within the larger partnership
arena. Therefore, the interviews also included questioning focused on the
dynamics between the WFP (and UN) and MNCs beyond PLB, in an attempt to
reveal additional barriers.
The first interview conducted was with the WFP Private Sector Partnership
department representative, and therefore a large part of the interview also
focused on the wider partnership between the WFP and MNCs after the
discussion had initially focused on PLB. The same approach was taken during all
the interviews, with an equal focus on PLB itself and the wider partnership
arena. Besides the two questions referenced to above, the line of questioning in
the subsequent interviews were in part inspired by the insights provided during
the first interview, which took on a focus beyond PLB.
2.3.3 Summarising of Interview Findings
According to Kvale and Brinkmann, the analysis of interviews consists of five
steps, all of which will be followed in the subsequent analysis (Kvale and
Brinkmann, 2009; p. 228):
1) First the researcher reads the entire interview transcript in order to gain
a holistic understanding the interview;
2) The researcher then decides on the relevant ‘units of analysis’ /
statements, as expressed by the interviewees;
3) For the third step the researcher summarises the statements in order to
categorise the statements according to chosen themes;
22
4) The fourth step entails critically analysing the themes in accordance with
the objectives of the research;
5) The final step consists of attaching the most important themes are linked
together in a descriptive statement.
This form of summarising data can be used to analyse extensive and often
complex interview transcripts by looking for the most significant / important
statements and interpret subsequent themes (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009; p.
228). The objective is to use these themes as the foundation for the analysis and
the critical discussion.
2.4 Plan of Action – Analysis
Saunders et al, 2009; p. 482)
(Saunders et al, 2009; p. 491 – Dimensions of qualitative analysis)
The table and figure above suggest that the analysing of qualitative data is more
loosely coupled and less structured than the analysis of quantitative date.
According to Kvale and Brinkmann, the open-‐ended format of the interview
investigation can be advantage as well as a challenge. In other words, there are
23
no standard procedures or rules for how to carry out an interview investigation
(Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009; p. 119). Nonetheless, the objective of this thesis is
to approach the analysis of the interview data appropriated in a structured
manner. There are several research tools available that can help organise the
interview data. The following section will present that methodological approach
to presenting and analysing the data from the interviews.
The objective of the interviews was to gather key insights about the multi-‐
stakeholder process. Therefore, the thesis took the approach of summarising the
interview data in order to extract key themes from the interviews. These key
themes were used to guide the subsequent analysis of the findings. The
condensation of data involves that the statements and opinions provided by the
interviewees are expressed in a shortened form. Long statements are
summarised into shortened statements, whereby the main significance of what
was said is rephrased into a few words (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; p. 227).
2.5 Research Approach
The thesis is using an inductive research approach in order to address the
research question. The exploratory nature of the research question has
led to the approach of collecting the data and then exploring it to find out
which issues and themes to follow up and concentrate on. According to
Saunders et al, this type of approach is also referred to as a grounded
approach, and it has the following characteristics (Saunders et al, 2009; p.
490):
• The study is not begun with a clearly defined theoretical framework;
• Relationships are identified between the data, and the researcher
develops questions and hypotheses or propositions to be tested;
• The theoretical framework emerges from the data collection and
subsequent analysis.
24
This thesis does not follow the step of developing hypotheses, as it was
concluded that the empirical foundation was not comprehensive enough for this
undertaking. The thesis supports the four reasons provided by Saunders et al
that validate using an inductive research approach. Firstly, an inductive research
can be used to generate a direction for further research to be undertaken.
Secondly, adopting restrictive theoretical propositions that do not reflect the
views of the interviewees or their experiences potentially restricts the scope of
the research. They argue that an inductive approach should provide a ‘good fit’
between the social reality of the research participants and the subsequent theory
that emerges, which will be ‘grounded’ in that reality. Third, the theory can
potentially be used to make suggestions for appropriate action as it is derived
from the events in which the research took place. Lastly, the theory’s
generalizability can be tested in other contexts (Saunders et al, 2009; pp. 502-‐
503). In conclusion, Saunders et al offer an important reasoning for the inductive
research approach: “The avoidance of a predetermined theoretical basis in this
type of approach is related to the desire to search for and recognise meanings in
the data and to understand the social context and perceptions of your research
participants” (Ibid; p. 503). It must also be clarified that despite this thesis
supporting the above mentioned support of an inductive research approach, the
objective was not to develop a grounded theory as is articulated by Saunders et
al. Instead, the objective was to use the theoretical reflections of the data to
establish a conceptual framework.
2.6 Research Validity and Reliability
During all stages of the research process the aspect of validity must be given a lot
of consideration. This is done so that the findings of the research conducted are
as precise and credible as possible. The aspiration is that the careful selection
and description of the research methods and design chosen can significantly help
achieving that objective. William Trochim addresses four different types of
validity that are important when doing scientific research: 1) Internal validity; 2)
external validity; 3) construct validity and; 4) conclusion validity. They are all
25
connected to different elements of the scientific research process (Trochim, 2006
in Skúladóttir, 2013; p. 39).
1) Internal validity refers to the causal relationship in scientific research. If
the objective of the research study is to establish a cause and effect
relationship between two variables then consideration must be given to
internal validity to limit the risk of bias. Internal validity is therefore
directly connected to the quality of design and structure of the research
study.
2) External validity refers to the generalizability of the research study and to
what extent the conclusions of the thesis can be transferred to other
contexts. External validity is therefore directly correlated with the
sampling process. Three factors can threaten the external validity of a
thesis; people, place and time.
3) Construct validity is also related to generalizability. One of its main
concerns is the correlation between the theoretical and observational
sphere, and the measurement behind these observations.
4) Conclusion validity refers to the analytical part of the thesis. It addresses
the conclusions that are made about the relationships and links in the
empirical data, and whether or not they are justified. Conclusion validity
is therefore important to the credibility of the thesis
Research reliability refers to the data collection techniques. It refers to if and
how these techniques will produce similar results if the research process was
repeated. Reliability also refers to the likelihood another research will reach the
same conclusions (Saunders et al, 2009; p. 156). Replication in qualitative
studies is notoriously difficult because of changing conditions. Therefore, it is
vital to produce a detailed description to ensure the reliability of the research
conducted. A significant threat to the reliability and credibility of the research is
that of observer bias. As Delbridge and Kirkpatrick argue, “because we are part of
the social world we are studying we cannot detach ourselves from it, or for that
matter avoid relying on our common sense knowledge and life experiences when
we try to interpret it” (Delbridge and Kirkpatrick, 1994; p. 43). This thesis
26
therefore supports the acknowledgement that it is impossible for the researcher
to avoid observer bias.
2.7 Summary This chapter presented a detailed description of the methods used for answering
the research question. Considerations regarding the research philosophy and the
research design were provided, as was an explanation of the empirical data used.
In addition, this chapter introduced the interviewees as well as a description of
how the interviews were conducted. Consideration was also given to the issue of
reliability and validity.
27
3 Theory
3.1 Main considerations The following chapter is dedicated to presenting the theoretical concepts and
literary insights found relevant for analysing the findings, and subsequently
addressing the research question. The theory and literature are instrumental in
forming the discussion of the themes selected through the interviews. The aim
was to introduce literature and theory that could contextualise the barriers
identified through the interviews, and provides a relevant critical perspective
beyond that of the author.
In order to further contextualise the barriers identified, the thesis relied on
theoretical perspectives from business strategy in the form of ‘Innovation from
the Inside Out’ by Erik Simanis and Stuart Hart, and ‘Simple Rules for Making
Alliances Work’ by Jonathan Hughes and Jeff Weiss. Whilst the theoretical
perspective by Simanis and Hart is mostly relevant in terms of the interaction
between an organisation and external stakeholders in the form of consumers in
the surrounding communities, it was also used to address key deficiencies in the
interaction among the partnership’s top-‐level and internal stakeholders on the
ground. Therefore, this theoretical perspective was used to address the
importance of including relevant stakeholders in multi-‐stakeholder initiatives.
The focus of Hughes and Weiss on the important steps to successful alliances
was chosen because their focus is on strategic mistakes that occur in
partnerships between heterogeneous actors, such as the case with the WFP and
its MNC partners. In addition, they address strategies to overcome these
strategic mistakes, which is relevant in terms of secondary objective of
addressing areas to drive collaboration forward.
Finally, Ronald Venn and Nicola Berg address a multitude of issues surrounding
the overall nexus of interests occurring between traditional development actors
and the private sector. The departure point of their discussion – the blurring
28
lines between development actors and the private sector – is similar to that of
this thesis. However, the importance of their theoretical perspectives lies in their
discussion surrounding the areas that create conflict between public and private
sector partners in development projects in terms of conflicting goals and trust. In
support of the use of Venn and Berg’s theoretical perspectives, the thesis will
rely on the literary insights by Benedicte Bull. Her chapter provides a useful
empirical context in which to complement the theoretical perspectives of Venn
and Berg. Overall, the approach of the thesis has been to use these the theory and
literature to guide the discussion of the findings in order to arrive at the
subsequent conceptual framework.
3.2 Simple Rules for Making Alliances Work Looking into the barriers associated with strategic collaboration between the
WFP and the private sector, the thesis chose to investigate literature examining
the critical aspect of collaboration. The academic insights of Jonathan Hughes
and Jeff Weiss (2007) address important issues that pertain to partnerships,
albeit their focus is on corporate alliances. Nonetheless, it is the position of this
thesis that their work provides important and topical insights into the barriers
and drivers associated with strategic collaboration, which is of course the main
focus of this thesis.
According to Hughes and Weiss, that despite the fact that corporate alliances are
showing an increase of approximately 25 per cent a year, the failure rate lies
between 60 and 70 per cent (Hughes and Weiss, 2007; p. 122). As with multi-‐
stakeholder partnerships, Hughes and Weiss argue that corporate alliances
require a high degree of interdependence among partners, including being able
to manage significant differences between the strengths and operating styles of
the respective partners. Hughes and Weiss thus advocate for 5 principles that
need to be followed in order to strengthen alliances between corporations. These
principles simultaneously highlight key barriers within the context of PLB.
29
3.2.1 Principle 1: Focus less on defining the business plan and more on how you’ll
work together
According to the authors, when entering partnerships companies draw up a
detailed business plan. However, focusing on the business plan and the end goals
obscured the critical need to clarify the working relationship. In order words,
partnering requires as much focus on how parties interact compared what the
objectives are. According to Hughes and Weiss, “people involved in the hundreds
of failed alliances we have seen over the years have consistently pointed to
breakdowns in trust and communication and the inability to resolve an inevitable
succession of disagreements as the most common causes of failure” (Hughes and
Weiss, 2007; p. 123).
In addition, the authors argue that collaboration must function as if both sets of
actors worked within the same company. Admittedly, this is a slightly utopic
scenario with regards to public and private sector partners as is the case with
the WFP and its MNC partners. However, the fundamental idea in terms of
fostering mutual understanding is nonetheless relevant. As such, in order “for
this kind of collaboration to occur, team members must know how their
counterparts operate: how they make decisions, how they allocate resources, how
they share information. That, in turn, requires a clear understanding of each
partner’s organizational structure, policies and procedures, and culture and norms.
The partners should use that understanding to establish guidelines for working
together” (Ibid). Hughes and Weiss advocate that partners move from abstract
terms of agreement to more specific guidelines. Also, they call for partners to
invest more time up front to jointly define the desired working relationship,
which they argue generates far greater value than when the focus is exclusively
on business goals and formal governance structures.
30
3.2.2 Principle 2: Develop metric pegged not only to alliance goals but also to
alliance progress
The second principle advocated by the authors is to a certain extent related to
the first principle in the respect that it examines the focus on ‘end goals’ rather
than the ‘means’ to reach those goals. The principle takes a look at the methods
of measurement used for evaluating the success of partnerships. It is argued that
instead of focusing entirely of outcome goals such as financial objectives, it is
important to focus on process benchmarks that will affect the outcome of the
overall objectives. The focus on metrics to measure the progress and not only
overall goals is important in the context of the discussion surrounding barriers
to collaboration because of the emphasis on factors that affect the ultimate
performance of an alliance. According to Hughes and Weiss, “instead of focusing
exclusively on ‘ends’ measurements of financial value, companies need to establish
‘means’ measurements of the factors that will affect the alliance’s ultimate
performance […]” (Ibid; p. 124). This demonstrates a strong attention to the
working relationship and valuable benefits that can arise from intense
collaboration, such as information sharing and generation of new ideas.
3.2.3 Principle 3: Instead of trying to eliminate differences, leverage them to
create value
The authors argue that managers quickly forget that the initial reason for
strategic collaboration is the ambition to leverage key difference between the
two sets of partners. Actually, the majority of alliances are characterised by a
considerable effort to “minimize conflict and reach agreement on what should be
done and how to do it. This practise reflects more than a commendable focus on
execution: It arises from a deep discomfort with differences and conflict and a
mistaken belief that the same management strategies that (sometimes) work
within a company will work equally well in collaboration with external partners”
(Ibid). However, the authors view this as harming the partnership process.
Therefore, “because these efforts send a message that differences are bad, they
tend to drive conflict underground. They erode the partners’ ability to make use of
31
the very differences that prompted formation of the alliance in the first place”
(Ibid). The message from Hughes and Weiss is therefore that differences
between partners need to be embraced to a much larger degree and in a sense
viewed as an opportunity rather than a barrier.
3.2.4 Principle 4: Go beyond formal governance structures to encourage
collaborative behaviour
The main message of this principle is that as much as partners need to assign
focus towards building a strong working relationship at the beginning, they need
to nurture that relationship throughout the partnership. In other words, this
means “leaders must actively foster collaborative behaviour among all the people
who work on the alliance. Although effective governance structures, such as joint
steering committees charged with providing oversight and direction to alliance
teams, can facilitate collaboration between individuals, they cannot guarantee it”
(Ibid; p. 128). The challenge focused on under this principle is the tendency to
assign blame to the other partner when something goes wrong.
According to Hughes and Weiss, this tendency needs to be replaced by “a
dispassionate analysis of how both parties contributed to a problematic situation
and what each can do to improve it […] Adopting this mind-‐set frees up time and
energy (otherwise devoted to figuring out who is at fault or to fending off blame)
for productively diagnosing problems […]” (Ibid). The authors point out that
despite the obvious need to establish collaborative behaviour, this is more often
than not neglected.
3.2.5 Principle 5: Spend as much time on managing internal stakeholders as on
managing the relationship with your partner
Hughes and Weiss argue that often top-‐level managers spend too much time
focusing on maintaining relationships with the opposing partner that they
neglect key stakeholders within the firm. Moreover, “companies are not
monolithic, yet alliance advice tends to gloss over this basic reality and treat
32
partners as if they were simple, homogenous entities. Although most counsel on
alliances highlights the fundamental importance of trust, it rarely delves into what
our research and experiences indicate are the biggest barriers to trust: mixed
messages, broken commitments, and unpredictable, inconsistent behaviour from
different segments of a partner organisation” (Ibid; p. 130). Although this is a long
reference, it highlights the negative consequences that arise as a result of
neglecting key internal stakeholders that are vital to ensuring the viability of
partnerships.
A major issue highlighted by Hughes and Weiss in reference to a partnership
between to companies was the fact that “the alliance had been driven, shaped, and
negotiated by executives from only two of the affected divisions; true buy-‐in from
other parts of the enterprise had never been secured. Things went smoothly until
the other division were asked to invest time and money in the alliance and to adjust
well-‐established processes and policies to facilitate collaboration with the partner”
(Ibid). Hughes and Weiss emphasise that ‘constituencies’ within a company can
feel shut out of the planning and decision-‐making process that invariably has an
impact on them. As a result, it is important for top-‐level executives to harvest
support and buy-‐in within an organisation, which streamlines the process and in
turn makes the respective organisation a more effective partner.
3.3 Innovation from the Inside Out
3.3.1 Theoretical Background
‘Innovation from the Inside Out’ is primarily concerned with the strategic
approach of businesses to creating value for themselves – and their surrounding
environment – in developing countries. As such, it is not immediately apparent
what relevance this approach has in terms of illuminating the research topic at
hand. However, the ‘business model intimacy’ component of this theory is used
to critically evaluate PLB in terms of the partnerships approach to engaging with
local stakeholders and beneficiaries to achieve buy-‐in from these parties, and
increase the prospects of achieving maximum impact.
33
The starting point for Erik Simanis and Stuart Hart is the success of Grameen
Bank, founded by Muhammad Yunus in Bangladesh to give financial assistance to
smallholder farmers. According to Simanis and Hart the success of Grammen
Bank is first and foremost due to a shared vision that was built by Muhammad
Yunus and the Bangladeshi farmers for which he established the initiative.
Simanis and Hart introduce a concept defined as business model intimacy, a
strategic approach, which still separates Grameen Bank from traditional
business models, and those business models, which have attempted to replicate
its approach (Simanis and Hart, 2009; p. 78) In basic terms, business model
intimacy is characterized by a relationship whereby the identity of the company
is fused with that of the community (Simanis and Hart, 2009; p. 79) Simanis and
Hart envision a shared identity among the company and the community in which
both parties share the same vision for an improved society anchored on the
success of the business itself. The sustainable and long-‐term focus of Simanis and
Hart’s theoretical approach means that it is an important insight into how such
multi-‐stakeholder partnerships can be create better value among the partners
collaboration and towards the beneficiaries for which the initiative is targeting.
Achieving business model intimacy requires CEOs and top-‐level managers to
fundamentally alter their understanding of value, and how they approach
innovation. For firms operating in underdeveloped markets the strategic
approach of co-‐creation appears to be a valuable strategy for penetrating a
complex market and reaching BOP consumers.
3.3.2 Embedded Innovation Paradigm
Simanis and Hart introduce the embedded innovation paradigm (EIP) whereby
companies establish more intimate ties with communities, where communities
entail diverse people working in unison to create and sustain interdependent
lives (Simanis and Hart, 2009; p. 83) The end-‐game of this approach is to achieve
a sustainable competitive advantage through business model intimacy on the
basis of three principles: Latent potential focus, relationship-‐based value and
transformational stakeholder engagement. Latent potential focus is based on the
34
belief that an untapped potential lies within economies to create a number of
new varieties of businesses and markets. In the context of the focus of this thesis,
this principle therefore carries little significance. Relationship-‐based value rests
on the assumption that value exists in the community of relationships between
people, which in turn creates new identities and aspirations. Transformational
stakeholder engagement in EIP is a process of personal engagement that fosters
responsibility and commitment in business partners, while also creating
dedicated customers in an ecosystem of people and institutions embracing the
value of the enterprise in question (Simanis and Hart, 2009; p. 83). While the
focus of Simanis and Hart is on the competitive advantage of the firm relative to
its competitors in BOP markets, the approach is nonetheless relevant because of
its emphasis on buy-‐in and ownership of those on the ground and in the
communities. It is this ‘ownership’ factor that is so important for businesses in
achieving a competitive advantage, and which is so important of multi-‐
stakeholder initiatives like PLB to succeed.
3.3.3 The Gatekeeping Function of Trust in Cross-‐sector Social Partnerships
The work done by Ronald Venn and Nicola Berg includes a ‘rigorous empirical
analysis of 207 inter-‐organizational relationships’ that looks into the dynamics
behind collaboration in cross-‐sector social partnerships (CSSPs). Their
investigation leads them to provide insights on the influence of trust and power
in CSSPs based on social exchange theory. However, the thesis is only concerned
with the issue surrounding trust between partners as this became an important
theme during interview discussions.
The empirical starting point for Venn and Berg lies within these partnerships
established to address issues such as poverty in developing countries. The
complexity associated with global development issues such as poverty mean that
no organization possesses the capabilities to address it single-‐handedly.
However, despite the obvious need for aid agencies, business and NGOs to pool
their collective resources together, Venn and Berg point out that this enthusiasm
is not always rewarded with positive results. According to the authors,
35
“heterogeneous participants, such as companies and nonprofit organizations,
struggle to work together because divergent expectations concerning outcomes
can cause strong conflict” (Venn and Berg, 2014; p. 386). Additionally, they argue
that literature has predominantly focused on the innovative potential of
partnerships, thus largely ignoring the issue of collaboration. As the authors
point out, the issue of collaboration has been largely left alone as ‘a black box’
(Ibid). Consistent with conventional wisdom, Venn and Berg note that sector
roles and responsibilities are currently undergoing massive changes, and as a
result the boundaries between public and private sector actors are becoming
increasingly blurred. This is especially the case in developing countries. In
addition, they reference to the growing BOP literature, which argues that
sustainable development and commercial interests can complement each other.
3.3.4 Social Exchange Along the Partnership Continuum
Where the theoretical insights of Venn and Berg significantly contribute is their
focus on social exchange. In reference to a quote by Muthusamy and White it is
highlighted that “through repeated interactions, relationships grow […] as a
consequence of an unfolding social exchange and coordination process”
(Muthusamy and White, 2005 in Venn and Berg, 2014; p. 389). Regarding the
different stages of collaboration the article aimed at introducing, the authors
introduce the theoretical insights of James Austin, who distinguishes between
philanthropic, transactional, and integrative CSSPs that together constitute a
collaboration continuum. This can be supplemented by an additional stage,
conflict resolution (Venn and Berg). The one that is determined to be relevant in
terms of the later discussion in this thesis is the third stage – the integrative
partnership stage. Collaboration among partners further intensifies at the
integrative stage of collaboration. According to the authors, “solving ‘wicked
problems’ such as poverty requires joint forces of multiple participants from
multiple sectors” (Ibid; p. 391). The so-‐called exchange patterns in this level of
collaboration are very complicated as partners “share, pool, and combine their
resources to coproduce entirely new ones” (Ibid). In addition, most poverty-‐
related partnerships necessitate an integrative approach where jointly created
36
solutions are the dominant force. Accordingly, the complexity of such issues
entails that partners develop a sound understanding of social exchange
principles and the overall objectives of the partnership (Ibid; p. 392). This is
similar to the typology of partnerships formulated by Bull in that it demonstrates
how the intensity of collaboration increases along the partnership continuum.
Examining the typology of partnerships presented by Benedicte Bull, operational
partnerships are the type that most closely resembles the integrative stage
discussed by Venn and Berg. These are established to correct so-‐called market
failures or governance failures preventing the provision of essential goods and
services. Often this is the most demanding type of partnership because of the
need for long-‐term and intimate collaboration amongst partners. According to
Bull, such partnerships constitute much more of a ‘risk’ for companies because
such partnerships are not one-‐off donations or limited engagement that can be
relegated to corporate social responsibility. Such partnerships necessitate
substantial investments, and possibly a change in the business practises of the
companies. In other words, “such partnerships may therefore be a ‘litmus test’ for
the power of PPPs to alter business’s actions in accordance with the goals of the
UN” (Bull, 2010; p. 487).
3.3.5 The Impact of Goal Conflicts on Partnership Performance
According to Venn and Berg, “solving mutual problems lies at the heart of the
partnership approach” (Venn and Berg, 2014; p. 392). In other words, the
mutually reinforcing ambition to address global challenges is what brings public
and private sector partners together. However, this does not invariably lead to
corresponding goals among the partners. Venn and Berg argue that despite that
fact that “macro goals (e.g., poverty alleviation) are shared by most participants,
significant differences can emerge at an organizational (meso) and individual
(micro) level and constitute a vital barrier for mutual value creation” (Ibid). This
arguably relates to the conflict that arises once partnerships begin as tensions
start to arise due to individual priorities that clash with agreed objectives.
37
The authors argue that private sector actors tend to enter partnerships with a
profit-‐seeking mind-‐set, and that commercial goals trump social ones. Similarly,
it is pointed out that these ethical concerns regarding private sector motives
have become increasingly widespread (Ibid). This correlates with the scepticism
that Benedicte Bull discusses on the part of the UN. A criticism levelled against
businesses in this context is that collaboration “is basically a convenient way of
getting an overview of future markets, development of new or improved vaccines
demands significant investments” (Bull, 2010; p. 490). Subsequently, the authors
note that the divergence of mind-‐sets and organizational goals can have a
considerable impact on the partnership. In evaluating the impact of goal conflicts
(input) on knowledge exchange (output), they emphasise for the careful
attention to the social exchange processes throughout (Venn and Berg, 2014; p.
393). The divide the exists in terms of conflicting goals highlighted by Venn and
Berg – and the consequences of this divide – is an important issue in the
discussion surrounding barriers to effective collaboration between UN aid
agencies and the private sector. Bull also highlights the fact that “collaborating
with the UN does not necessarily mean that business takes on responsibilities that
move beyond what it regularly takes on in doing business” (Bull, 2010; p. 489). Put
together, the two sets of authors portray a relationship affected by significant
mistrust and scepticism.
3.3.6 Trust in Cross-‐sector partnerships
Venn and Berg reference to the argument made by Kolk et al that “partnerships
for development unfold in an uncertain, complex and often distant setting, where
good governance is frequently lacking […] thus requiring an even greater degree of
trust” (Kolk et al, 2008 in Venn and Berg, 2014; p. 393). In the context of PLB this
bears significant relevance because of the fact that it is taking place in two
developing countries where the institutional settings are relatively unfamiliar. In
broad terms, this quote resonates closely with the overall challenge of
administering partnerships in developing countries. Venn and Berg place a
considerable amount importance on trust, especially in the context of
partnerships between actors from different sectors and organisations. Trust is
38
built up through repeated interaction among partners, and is therefore
important in the context of partners who are not familiar with the goals and
motives of partners, as is the case in PLB. Venn and Berger therefore present the
following hypothesis: “The higher the level of goal conflicts between participants
in CSSPs, the lower the level of trust” (Venn and Berg, 2014; p. 394). Arguably, it is
simplistic to place conflicting goals as the sole contributing factor to a lack of
trust, but it the argument and subsequent hypothesis does represent a valid
discussion in terms of the one in this thesis.
The authors argue that developing trust between companies and the poor in
CSSPs is a crucial enabler for realising the process of co-‐creation, and as such the
authors present another hypothesis: “The higher the level of trust between
participants in CSSPs, the higher the level of knowledge exchange” (Ibid). This can
in fact be argued in both directions in the context of PLB. The conceptual
framework included in the discussion will attempt to demonstrate this
interdependent link.
39
4 Analysis
4.1 Main considerations The interviews and disaggregation of the interview data into various themes
provided a more detailed understanding of the dynamics involved in multi-‐
stakeholder partnerships between the WFP and MNCs, including the key drivers
and barriers that impact the multi-‐stakeholder partnership process. The
interview investigation approach recommended by Kvale and Brinkmann helped
uncover key themes that came out of the various interviews. The analysis
attempted to structure the interview data according to key themes, in order to
set the stage for the discussion of the key barriers. The analysis has been
structured according to the central themes that were uncovered through the
interviews. The analysis thus provides the foundation for critically evaluating the
key barriers to strategic collaboration between the WFP and MNCs to address
malnutrition in developing countries.
The author’s understanding of the partnership process between the WFP and the
private sector has contributed to the interpretation of the views and statements
made by the interviews, and therefore what constitutes as some of the central
barriers in the multi-‐stakeholder partnership process within malnutrition. It
must be stressed that the semi-‐structured nature of the interviews resulted in
fluid answers. During the analytical process of uncovering the most important
themes emanating from the interviews several themes were found in the same
answers, and therefore several interview quotes are used multiple times.
It is important to address why the insights of the subjects interviewed are
meaningful for the answering of the overall research question and problem area.
The nature of the research question – focusing on the main barriers to effective
strategic collaboration between the WFP and MNCs within the context of the PLB
partnership – led to a search for the views from stakeholders intimately involved
in multi-‐stakeholder partnerships that could provide insights beyond the official
project report. For that reason the objective was to conduct interviews with
40
stakeholders from each of the founding partners of PLB. However, it was not
possible to interview representatives from either Unilever or Mondeléz
International. Additionally, whilst the interviews proved highly valuable in
revealing the barriers to effective collaboration, an important acknowledgement
must be made. Admittedly, the small sample of interviews means that it is
difficult to draw any significant generalisations based on the insights provided.
Admittedly, this has weakened the empirical foundation of the thesis, but
nonetheless the interviews that were conducted provided the thesis with
significantly important insights into the topic. The exploratory nature of the
research question meant that the thesis relied on a chosen methodological
approach advocated by Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) in order to decide on and
subsequently analyse the main themes relevant to answering the research
question.
4.2 Interview Findings
Table 1 -‐ Thesis Interviewees
Interviewee Interview Condensation Interview Transcripts
WFP Private Sector Partnership
department representative
Appendix 1 Appendix 5
DSM representative Appendix 2 Appendix 6
WFP country office
representative in Bangladesh
Appendix 3 Appendix 7
WFP country office
representative in Indonesia
Appendix 4 Appendix 8
41
4.2.1 Barrier Nr. 1: Headquarter-‐driven approach excluded key stakeholder input
Figure 1 – Headquarter-‐driven approach of PLB
The first barrier uncovered during the interviews was the headquarter-‐driven
approach of PLB, as the design and implementation of the partnerships was
mainly driven forward at ‘headquarter level’ by the WFP and private sector
founding partners. On the face of things PLB has epitomized the integrative
approach called for by various UN aid agencies, both in terms of the wide range
of partners and the range of focus areas. In terms of the process of the initiative,
the aim has been to leverage the strengths of public and private sector actors in
order to create new methods and approaches to addressing malnutrition, but
according to several of the interviewees the top-‐down design of the partnership
was a key weakness. This barrier was addressed in two of the interviews – with
the WFP Private Sector Partnership department representative and the WFP
country office representative in Bangladesh. It therefore became apparent that a
significant barrier to the successful implementation of initiatives was the fact
that the respective headquarters of the WFP and the MNC partners essentially
drove the partnership forward without properly involving stakeholders further
down the chain:
“I think the biggest flaw with Project Laser Beam was that it was really from a ‘top-‐
up’ approach […] The reality is that on the ground the situation was much different
– local NGOs, the communities themselves were never really consulted and ended
HQ
Country OfDice
BeneDiciaries
42
up with a programme that somebody else had designed […]” -‐ WFP Private Sector
Partnerships representative
A key issue emanating from the fact that the design and implementation of PLB
was primarily directed by senior officials from the project partners – WFP,
Unilever, DSM and Mondeléz – was the fact that the lack of inclusiveness
hampered the partnership process due to a lack of perceived ownership in the
process from the perspective of local stakeholders. As such, the point was made
that the headquarter-‐drive approach had a negative consequences in terms of
shared commitment:
“[…] they [NGOs, local communities] felt they did not have a buy-‐in and did not
participate in the process of creating it and therefore there was some resistance”. –
Ibid
Overall, the headquarter-‐driven approach resulted in the exclusion of
stakeholders within and outside of the partnership:
“WFP offices as well as local partners were not adequately consulted in the
program design. Consequences included lack of important operational insight
incorporated into the project design and reduced ownership and buy-‐in from local
actors including the WFP Country Offices”. -‐ WFP Private Sector Partnerships
department representative
A similar view was expressed from the country office representative of WFP in
Bangladesh:
“It was trickled down from the top – the country office was not involved from the
very beginning. So that was one of the lessons learned, that if these multi-‐
stakeholder initiatives happen, field level people should be involved from the very
beginning”. -‐ WFP country office representative in Bangladesh
43
It therefore appears that this has become viewed as a significant barrier to the
effective roll out of initiatives due to the amount of resistance that the initiatives
were met with. Not only were important stakeholders such as NGOs and the
benefitting communities not properly involved in the process when deciding on
specific development initiatives, but even within the WFP there was a severe lack
of inclusiveness in terms of the involvement of the organisations respective
country office teams in both Bangladesh and Indonesia.
PLB has been hailed as being a model for transformational partnerships
(Accenture, 2014; UN Global Compact, 2011). Among the four characteristics
emphasised in transformational partnerships is to involve key stakeholders
within the UN system, the private sector and public sector, and in relevant
geographical locations (UN Global Compact, 2011; p. 11). However, it became
apparent from the interview discussions that a key flaw with PLB was the fact
that key stakeholders were left out of the initial process – internally in terms of
WFP country office teams as well as key civil society actors and beneficiary
communities. Another of the four characteristics highlighted in transformational
partnerships is the fact that these partnerships have an in-‐built capacity to reach
both scale and impact (UN Global Compact, 2011; p. 11). In other words, PLB’s
pilot initiatives should have the potential for replication on a greater scale across
territorial areas. However, several of the interviewees expressed beliefs that the
top-‐down approach of PLB had negative consequences for how the partnership
process operated. The lack of involvement of WFP country office teams was
something that was especially highlighted as a negative consequence:
“[…] it really is critical to involve all stakeholders and particularly those that are
most affected or will be responsible for implementation”. – WFP Private Sector
Partnerships representative
It appears from discussions that the headquarter-‐driven approach of PLB was
viewed as a significant limiter to establishing an effective partnership process
during PLB. The theme concerning the headquarter-‐driven, top-‐down approach
of the partnership was expressed by half of the interviewees, but it is even more
44
significant that it was highlighted by 2 out of 3 of the WFP interviewees. The
headquarter-‐driven approach of PLB is therefore identified as one of the main
barriers affecting the collaborative process.
4.2.2 Barrier Nr. 2: Insufficient interaction leading to conflict
Figure 2 – Insufficient interaction
Another barrier highlighted during the interviews was the issue surrounding the
lack of sufficient interaction and communication between the WFP country
offices and the MNC partners. It was not directly stated during interviews that
the exclusion of WFP country offices from the decision-‐making process and the
lack of sufficient interaction with MNCs partners at the field-‐level were
interrelated issues. Therefore it was analysed as a separate theme, but the
implication appeared to be that the lack of involvement of the WFP country office
teams in the initial creation of PLB meant that they was unprepared for the
directions that the private sector partners wanted to head in once the initiatives
had to be rolled out. More concretely, it appears that not enough emphasis was
put on proper communication amongst partners on the ground in order to
properly mobilise the partnership. This barrier manifested itself in the following
way:
WFP country ofsicces MNC partners
45
“We didn’t have proper interaction at the very beginning so maybe the private
sector had the idea of being innovative from the very beginning, but since we didn’t
have any sort of interaction from the very beginning we didn’t know it […] if we
have more brainstorming at the beginning of the project, and if we really have a 5-‐
6 year long-‐term plan then it will be easier for us in long-‐term partnerships”.
-‐ WFP country office representative in Bangladesh
Addressing malnutrition is inherently complex, as are partnerships in general
within development due to various uncertainties, complexities and other
surrounding factors (Venn and Berg, 2014; p. 393). The language barrier that
exists appears to only strengthen the need for partners to communicate
effectively from the outset and to agree on objectives:
“If there are private sector, public sector, development sector partners – none of us
speak the same language so there will be some conflict of interest and you cannot
avoid that […] If we do more collaboration at the beginning it is easier for us to
understand what we want at the field level”. – WFP country office representative in
Bangladesh
There therefore appeared to be a strong emphasis on the fact that the complex
nature of operating multi-‐stakeholder partnerships such as PLB must be met
with a strong commitment to aligning objectives and expectations from the very
beginning of the partnership. Certainly, close interaction among the partners
seemed to be a key barrier in achieving mutually aligned expectations. It
therefore appeared that while there was agreement as to the overall objectives,
the means to achieving these objectives were less clear:
“With the partnerships – and especially that there were a lot of private partners in
this relationship with PLB – really understanding from the very beginning. The big
picture is very clear – it was addressed under nutrition but how were they [the
partners] to do that [reach those objectives] and what were the roles and
responsibilities of every partner – this was one of our challenges”. – WFP country
office representative in Indonesia
46
From the perspective of the Indonesian country office there therefore appears to
be a strong connection between the level of interaction and the subsequent
confusion and disagreement surrounding how to go about addressing specific
initiatives in line with the overall objective. The importance of enabling
interaction and mutual understanding was once again emphasised by the WFP’s
country office representative in Indonesia:
Part of all partnerships is really to at the very beginning to be clear on what it is
that everybody is expecting from this partnership, and PLB was just one example
where there was a little bit lack of clarity on a number of – not the objectives – but
a number of specific activities that were attributed to that particular goal. – Ibid
In short, the lack of sufficient interaction among the partners was complicated
further by the fact that so many partners were involved. Moreover, the
complexity in terms of the number of different project partners led to an
emphasis on concerted efforts to be clear on as many specific details before the
commencement of multi-‐stakeholder partnerships. It appears that it can often
times be a struggle progressing from general targets to the means to achieve
those ends. It can therefore be determined that the Insufficient interaction at the
beginning of the partnership represents a second major barrier attributed to
PLB.
47
4.2.3 Barrier Nr. 3: Overly strong WFP gatekeeping a barrier to extracting
additional private-‐sector engagement
Figure 3 – WFP gatekeeping
The third barrier revealed during the interviews was the ‘gatekeeping’ tendency
of the WFP. This appears to represent another significant barrier in improving
the strategic collaboration between the WFP and its private sector partners. This
barrier encompasses both the tendency on the part of the wider UN organisation
to demonstrate reluctance in facilitating the interests of the private sector
partners, as well as the restriction on private sector influence as a result of WFP
mandate obligations to aid-‐recipient governments. This dual-‐encompassing
barrier was addressed by the entirety of the interviewees. In addition, it must be
stressed that the reference was made both to the UN and the WFP by the
interviewees in terms of the gatekeeping barrier, which is the reason for the
reference to both.
The term ‘gatekeeping’ was used to encompass both of these tendencies, because
the end results of both is arguably the same – the WFP is reluctant to facilitate
interests or policy influence of private sector partners if they in any way conflict
with traditionally accepted approaches. The traditional definition of gatekeeping
refers to the process by which information is filtered through various
communication channels -‐ whether through television or the Internet. The main
Gatekeeping by WFP
Private Sector Innovation & Engagement
48
aspects of the model to be concerned with are that information passes through
various channels and that the various channels are governed by individual forces
or actors, which act as gatekeepers1. The term is hereby used as a metaphorical
reference due to the fact that this barrier encompasses the inability of the WFP
to facilitate the interests of the private sector due to its reluctance to trust their
motives and the struggle to balance its government mandate obligations with the
innovative interests of the private sector partners.
4.2.3.1 Gatekeeping Part 1: Trust factor It became apparent that the value offered by the WFP in return for private
sector’s engagement in development partnerships can be an important limiting
factor in achieving effective strategic collaboration due to the fact that the
private sector is not offered sufficient return on its investment in terms of being
allowed a bigger say in development partnerships. There appears to be a
challenge in extracting additional resources and commitment from the private
sector, and the view from the WFP indicates that this will be a struggle if the UN
continues with a negative mind-‐set in terms of the potential rewards and
opportunities associated with partnering with the UN to address key
development challenges:
“We sort of can’t say “give us your resources and your knowledge but you can’t
even come to the table and help us solve world problems, and by the way we’re
smarter than you and if you come you’ll just have a selfish view and you really have
nothing to contribute – it’s insulting if you’re the private sector”. – WFP Private
Partnership department representative
The lack of corporate priority coupled with a lack of inclusion therefore seems to
be a significant barrier to extracting additional resources and efforts from the
private sector. In addition, the prospect of these multi-‐stakeholder partnerships
expanding in scope seem to be remote unless organisations such as the WFP can 1 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gatekeeping_(communication)
49
extend itself in allowing the private sector to have a greater say in the decision-‐
making process, and trusting that despite its profit-‐seeking motives the private-‐
sector can help drive development initiatives forward. This appears to be a key
limiter in multi-‐stakeholder partnerships such as PLB:
“There is value in partnering. It can be association with the UN, it can be what you
learn, access to market, employee moral etc. But, if you try to put a value on some
of those different elements it is hard to get into the big money […] So until we can
figure out how we can increase strength in our value proposition I would say that
we are sort of operating near the limits of what we can be receiving in terms of
value to us […]” – WFP Private Partnership department representative
The degree of collaboration therefore seems to at a status quo. The reluctance on
the part of the WFP to allow its corporate partners a greater voice in
development initiatives is therefore viewed as a significant disabling factor in
extracting the maximum value out of partnerships. Prejudices about private
sector motives appear to prevent the WFP and the UN as a whole from fully
embracing market-‐driven solutions to development challenges:
“When it comes to partnering […] if both parties go into something and they’re
getting what they want and there is kind of full transparency about that then who
are we to judge. And on some level we have to say: Yeah, they’re trying to affect the
policy so that they can build their business, that’s what they’re supposed to do or
sell more products. But if that policy, we feel, advances a humanitarian or
development interest […] maybe that’s the cost. Our view is that if we feel there’s
any advantage for the company, we’re not even interested in talking with them or
letting them being a part of the process”. – WFP Private Sector Partnership
representative
There therefore appears to be a call to accept that the private sector partners
enter partnerships with interests that are not necessarily fully aligned with those
of the UN. The emphasis placed on the benefits of partnering with the private
sector in terms of moving the scales of achieving global development targets
50
does not seem to be properly matched with an equal willingness to allow for
private sector interests to dictate at various times. Moreover, there appears to be
an equal measure of frustration from the perspective of the WFP’s key corporate
partners as to the debilitating effect that the lack of trust has on the partnership
process, and for the prospects of expanding the level of strategic collaboration
going forward:
“While we are striving to better understand each other and look forward, some
preconceptions, prejudices and limitations still remain. The fact that the private
sector is indeed driven by profit is a fact. However, the negative stigma around that
or the misunderstanding around that sometimes can do more harm than good”. –
DSM representative
It can therefore be insinuated that this negative stigma attached to the motives of
the private sector is holding back the potential for more integrative
collaboration. Venn and Berg also note that companies frequently complain
about the lack of acceptance of their commercial interests (Venn and Berg, 2014;
p. 392). Additionally, it appears that whilst there is a concern as to the
debilitating effect that this lack of inclusion has on the potential success of
partnerships, there is also a large degree of irony in the reluctance of UN
agencies to trust the motives and ambitions of the private sector:
“So we sort of have to figure out if we want to be impermeable and say we are
above everybody’s interests – the irony being we’re run by governments and
everyday I see how governments influence and use us for their own national
ambitions. We are being played every which way and another. But we won’t let
companies do that, or we don’t think that we have the good judgement to say when
do we let a company in the door”. – WFP Private Sector Partnership representative
The irony surrounding the degree of influence levied on the UN by national
governments highlights the fact that no actor can operate in total isolation. There
thus appears to be acknowledgement that the ambition of private sectors
partners to influence the direction of partnerships is a natural part of the
51
process, and something that the UN has struggled to accept. Whilst this aspect
was admittedly not given enough consideration during other discussions, an
interesting perspective was provided from the private sector about the
significance attached to the fact that there are far to private and public sector
professionals with experience working in opposing fields:
“A lot of our misunderstandings come from that. There is simply such little cross-‐
over, and perhaps this is different for our generation, but I think it is true for
generations before us that we just don’t have the knowledge of each other”. – DSM
representative
From the private sector perspective there is therefore a need to create a better
enabling environment for mutual understanding, which can in part be provided
by cross-‐sector learning between UN and private sector partners. From the
private sector perspective it therefore appears that the lack of knowledge about
how the other partners operate is a key reason for the lack of trust and
misunderstanding. Thins brings back into perspective a point provided earlier,
whereby emphasis was put on the fact that mutual understanding represents an
important limiter in moving the partnership process forward:
“I don’t think it’s about working more closely, because I feel that we work very
closely [already]. But I thinks it’s about having an even deeper understanding of
each other’s drivers, and trust […] there is always more to be gained as you get to
know each other more as there is in any other relationship […]” – DSM
representative
4.2.3.2 Gatekeeping Part 2: WFP mandate Tied to the barrier associated with the WFP’s value proposition is the issue of the
WFP’s mandate obligations as it pertains to its close ties with national
governments. This was thus identified as the third main barrier – together with
the WFP’s mistrust of the private sector partners -‐ in improving the level of
strategic collaboration. As a development organisation the WFP has to maintain
52
close ties to the respective national governments in the countries where it
operates. Furthermore, the challenge of overcoming WFP mandate obligations
while also incorporating the interests of corporate partners during PLB is also
closely related to the issue of improving interaction among the PLB partners,
which was addressed under the top-‐down theme. The challenge associated with
the WFP’s mandate restrictions was addressed by all four of the interviewees,
highlighting its significance. Moreover, when highlighting the strategic benefits
of having the private sector as a strategic partner emphasis was placed on the
fact that the market-‐based aspirations of the private sector can be of great value
to the WFP in achieving its development objectives within malnutrition:
“And from the private sector, their main objective is to find the end-‐customers. If
you know the BOP theory – most of the people in Bangladesh live in the BOP sector
– so [the] private sector want to reach that group, and the development sector has
got better reach to those beneficiaries. So it was a win-‐win situation for the private
sector and the WFP to get into a partnership”. – WFP country office representative
in Bangladesh
The strategic importance of partnering with the private sector has been
highlighted as a key reason behind the multi-‐stakeholder structure of PLB due to
the market-‐based innovations by businesses that can be transferred to the
development sector and used to address humanitarian needs. However,
discussions highlighted the fact that the close ties the WFP has to the national
governments in Bangladesh and Indonesia served as a barrier in rolling out
innovative products by the private sector:
“[From the private sector’s perspective], it wanted to be more innovative. But that
was not possible for us because we work with governments – same goes for other
implementing partners. We cannot do whatever the private sector wants us to do
because all of us have certain mandates. Before being innovative we have to follow
those mandates and follow our guidelines. These are some the things that created
some sort of confusion”. – Ibid
53
This was a frustration that appears to be shared by the private sector. While not
specifically referencing to either PLB or the WFP’s mandate obligations, there
was suggestions that the operating structure of the UN can often times serve as a
limiter to more effective collaboration with the private sector:
“You also have the processes that are very much ingrained into an organisation,
which are quite bureaucratic and sometimes for good reasons. The UN is
sometimes very limited in how their agencies can work with business – simply for
legal reasons or financial reasons and try to protect the UN position, which of
course makes sense to an extent but sometimes can be limiting”. – DSM
representative
It can thus be reasoned that traditional development mandates are viewed by
both the WFP and private sector as occasionally being incompatible with the
ambitions of private sector partners in development partnerships. The rigidity
on the part of the WFP and the UN as a whole in terms of its neutrality also
relates to the discussion surrounding the limiting effect its mandate obligations
have during multi-‐stakeholder partnerships. The following statement perfectly
encapsulates the UN’s reluctance to be influenced by the private sector and
wanting to preserve its neutrality, and points out the damaging effect this has on
the prospects for strengthening the level of collaboration between the WFP and
its private sector partners:
“[…] if we as the UN, and we’re so into our UN world and our rules and neutrality
and all of that I know why it’s there and I respect it, so I am not criticising it, but we
have essentially determined that our business model, our purpose is above
influence and cannot be used in any way for the benefit for any one stakeholder or
party. So a business is going to look at that and say why is that even interesting
unless I can participate in some way with the UN and maybe in some way have
influence on economic progress in a country, policy”. – WFP Private Sector
The self-‐imposed neutrality therefore appears to represent a significant barrier
to more effective strategic collaboration because of the fact that the UN as a
54
whole leaves little room for facilitating the interests of its private sector
partners. The is represented in the form of the WFP’s scepticism surrounding the
private sector partners’ motives, coupled with the issue that the WFP and other
UN aid agencies are often caught between incorporating the interests of these
partners and mandate commitments towards national governments in the
project countries.
4.2.4 Barrier Nr. 4: Conflicting goals among the partners is an inherent obstacle,
driving forward the need to address the first three barriers
Figure 4 – Inherently conflicting goals
An argument can be made for the fact that conflicting goals represent the prime
starting point for discussing barriers to strategic collaboration between the WFP
and its private sector partners. It is perhaps inevitable that partners from
different sectors will experience difficulties surrounding opposing strategic
prioritites when partnering. The barrier of conflicting goals appears to be
further compounded by the fact that partnerships such as PLB do not constitute
enough of a priority for the private sector partners:
“The likelihood of failure or low impact increases proportionally based on the
number of participants […] given that these kind of initiatives tend not to be over-‐
WFP interests Private Sector Interests
55
arching corporate priorities, that there is competition for time and resources – it is
hard to have truly shared objectives”. – WFP Private Sector Partnership
department representative
The degree of strategic priority was also referenced from the perspective of the
DSM representative:
“They are strategically important projects, but in the context of DSM’s broader
business, this is a very small part of our business. Very, very small. So it is of
strategic importance but right now we are making these investments without an
immediate pay-‐off in sight”. – DSM representative
During the partnership itself, one of the disagreements that were expressed
during the interviews were regarding the location of activities:
“Particularly in Indonesia there was disagreement about the geographical location.
At the beginning of PLB there was not a 100% understanding of the mutual
objectives. So from the WFP side there was always a little bit of tension between
WFP and the partners on where we were at geographically”. – WFP country office
representative in Indonesia
The disagreement as to which areas to locate activities in highlighted a key
dilemma that exists in development partnerships especially when partnering
with the private sector – that surrounding return on investment:
“I think that the dilemma is really where to go [...] we incurred a little bit of
discussion – where do you make an investment, do you make it somewhere where
there is more return for your investment whereas at the same time where there is
food insecurity, where are there the highest level of is malnutrition and usually in
the poorest parts”. – Ibid
It is thus apparent that it is inhenrenlty difficult to manage conflicting ambitions
and expectations in multi-‐stakeholder partnerships within development, due to
56
the fact that these projects require such a high level of investment from all
parties involved. The dilemma between return on investment objectives and
malnutrition objectives that was highlighted during discussions raised the
question as to the level of ambition that the WFP and other UN agencies should
be pursuing when partnering with the private sector.
The predicament incurred is to what degree development activities should
facilitate private sector interests in order to maximise the capabilities and
resources of these partners. This dilemma was also raised in the official project
report. A key learning point emphasised in the official project report was the
importance of enabling all partnership stakeholders to contribute to as well as
benefit from initiatives when choosing target locations. Therein lies the difficulty
due to the fact that the ambition was to exploit the advantages of market-‐based
initiatives. However, “choosing places that were not viable for business (e.g., due
to extreme weather, lack of infrastructure etc.) made it impossible to test that
premise. As a result, Project Laser Beam’s private sector partners were constrained
in terms of rolling out their market-‐based solutions” (Accenture, 2014; p. 16).
The dilemma of where to focus target initiatives also underscored another
conundrum that the WFP is faced with, and one that is an important topic of
discussion in the context of the ambition of PLB to leverage the competencies of
a wide variety of private sector parnters simultaneously:
“Do you do a lot of little things that have lower potential for great impact but they
are lower in complexity because there are only one or two partners, or do you
continue to strive for these multi-‐stakeholder initiatives that if executed well and
you have the right partners, can be transformational? […] what is the right level of
complexity where we think that the thing [initiative] has a reasonable chance of
succeeding?” – WFP Private Sector Partnerships department representative
This relates to the point made by the same interviewee in referencing to the
degree of difficulty brought on by the number of senior stakeholders involved.
What the statement above underscores is that as much as the complexity of
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malnutrition represents a driver for bringing together a wide variety of partners
across different sectors, there exists a fundamental difficulty in addressing
complex development issues while simultaneously facilitating the broad
inclusion of relevant stakeholders. This dilemma manifested itself when it came
to deciding on which geographical locations to invest activities in. The WFP is
faced with balancing between the pursuit of partnerships with high potential for
successful impact involving a fewer number of partners, or higher-‐risk
development initiatives that also require a greater number of partners.
PLB was a pilot initiative, and therefore the lessons learned are key to further
improving multi-‐stakeholder partnerships in the future. The fact that the input of
so many partners had to be incorporated was seen as a challenge by one of the
WFP country office representatives:
“Not everything has happened so smoothly, because it was the first of its kind
initiative – the electing of 12 partners’ input in the local implementing partners
and the private partners who were funding us”. – WFP country office
representative in Bangladesh
The input of so many different actors emphasised a logical, but nonetheless
considerable reality. It is much more difficult to achieve results when dealing
with a larger number of partners, and to reach agreement in specific initiatives.
Different mandates and interests drive public and private sector organisations,
and therefore their respective approaches to development are inherently
different. Given that development is not a commercial priority for businesses
and given that the expected pay-‐offs come in the form of sustainable markets
that take several decades to build up, multi-‐stakeholder partnerships such as
PLB are faced with the difficulty of bringing together stakeholders competing for
time and resources as was pointed out during the interviews.
In conclusion, the analysis of the interviews and subsequent categorisation of
central themes meant that four main barriers were identified through the
analysis of the interviews, which was done by way of the methodological
58
approach advocated by Kvale and Brinkmann (2009). This approach involved
breaking the interviews into central statements, which where then summarised.
From that the main messages were revealed, allowing the author to disseminate
the main themes. The four themes that were identified through the interviews
were: 1) the overly headquarter-‐driven nature of PLB; 2) insufficient interaction
among partners; 3) WFP gatekeeping and; 4) inherently conflicting goals.
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5 Discussion
5.1 Main considerations The following chapter will discuss the empirical findings within the context of
the author’s reflections on the existing theory. The exploratory nature of the
research conducted in this thesis means that the theory will be used an
instrument to provide insights on the barriers uncovered in the previous
chapter. In addition the objective is to build a conceptual framework in order to
critically discuss the findings and answer the research question. As such, this
thesis supports the definition by Shields and Rangarjan whereby a conceptual
framework “is the way ideas are organized to achieve a research project’s
purpose” (Shields and Rangarjan, 2014; p. 24).
The plan of action during the analysis was to adopt the approach by Kvale and
Brinkmann (2009), which was to categorise the main interview statements
according to the most relevant themes, and subsequently to present the
interview findings in the context of those themes. The third and fourth steps
advocated by Kvale and Brinkmann was to critically analyse the themes in
accordance with the objectives of the research, and then to attach the most
important themes in a descriptive statement. Rather than follow the final step in
a rigorous way, the thesis will replace this with a critical discussion involving the
conceptual framework in order to best answer the research question.
5.2 Discussion of Findings 5.2.1 Barrier Nr. 1: Headquarter-‐driven
Based on the analysis of the interviews, it was concluded that the headquarter-‐
driven approach of PLB represents one of the main barriers to effective
collaboration because of the knock-‐on effects that follow from the exclusion of
key stakeholders within and outside the partners – in this case it was revealed
that key WFP stakeholders were excluded from the process of drawing up the
partnership, as were stakeholders constituting local NGOs and the communities
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themselves. Themes such as developing countries and BOP markets dominate
the overall discussion because it is exactly within these that such multi-‐
stakeholder initiates are based. It is inherently difficult for both aid agencies and
multinational companies to navigate in these markets and co-‐creation concepts
therefore offer relevant perspectives from which to dissect the headquarter-‐
driven approach of PLB. Innovation from the Inside Out – or business model
intimacy as it will be referred to from here on out – focuses on the benefits of co-‐
creation. This ties in with the emphasis on deep dialogue and local co-‐
development advocated for by Simanis and Hart (Simanis and Hart, 2009).
The underlying rationale behind is also closely aligned with the scenario
presented by Venn and Berg where “stakeholders infuse their knowledge into
bottom-‐up innovation processes” (Venn and Berg, 2013; p. 388). At its core,
business model intimacy instils a sense of responsibility in the community for the
growth and success of the new enterprise” (Simanis and Hart, 2009; p. 79). In the
context of this thesis, PLB represents the ‘enterprise’ whereby a shared
commitment is infused. Therefore, despite the fact that the focus of Simanis and
Hart is on the strategic approach of businesses in BOP markets, the theoretical
underpinnings of the model proposed by the authors lends itself to providing a
critical discussion of the drawbacks of not including key stakeholders in the
decision-‐making process. The situation invariably led to conflicts and tensions
later on in the partnership – among the project partners as well as between the
project partners and the beneficiaries themselves.
Simanis and Hart’s ‘Embedded innovation paradigm’ introduces three principles:
Latent potential focus, relationship-‐based value and transformational
engagement. In the context of PLB, the negative consequences headquarter-‐
driven approach can be partly explained through the perspective of the
embedded innovation paradigm. During interviews it was argued that the
exclusion of both from the design phase of the partnership resulted in a lack of
commitment and buy-‐in from these stakeholders, and therefore it can be argued
that the latent potential that exists within both sets of stakeholders was not
sufficiently extracted. In terms of the second principle, the most important
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message lies in the emphasis on the community of relationships that shape the
identity and sense of belonging of stakeholders. The third principle emphasises
the impact of engagement on the responsibility and commitment of stakeholders,
which in turn creates dedicated customers. Taken together in the context of PLB,
it can be argued that the headquarter-‐driven approach of the partnership has
had negative consequences for enabling important mechanisms such as shared
identity, joint commitment and mutual responsibility as emphasised by the
authors.
In criticising more top-‐down business models, the authors argue that a lack of
shared commitment increases the barriers to scaling up businesses in BOP
markers (Simanis and Hart, 2009). In terms of PLB, a negative consequence of
the absence of sufficient buy-‐in could potentially harm the efforts to scale-‐up
initiatives if issues such as shared commitments are not address in future
initiatives. If commitment is not shared by the most important stakeholders on
the ground then initiatives will arguably have significantly smaller chance of
succeeding, and added to this during PLB was the exclusion from the creation of
the partnership meant that there was confusion as to the shared objectives
between the WFP and the private sector partners when it came to rolling out
certain initiatives. This led to tension, and such fall-‐outs are not positive for
establishing or improving the level of strategic collaboration.
The fifth principle presented by Hughes and Weiss offers an additional
perspective to the headquarter-‐driven nature of the partnership. Hughes and
Weiss have noted that one of the partnerships they studies suffered from the fact
that the alliance was driven by senior executives, without securing buy-‐in from
those divisions also affected by the alliance. Emphasis is therefore placed on the
fact that within organisations exist important ‘constituencies’ that can feel
excluded from the decision-‐making process (Hughes and Weiss, 2007; p.130). It
became apparent from the interview discussions that there was discontent
surrounding the fact the WFP country offices were excluded from the PLB
partnership process until it was effectively ready to be rolled out. This
shortcoming ties in closely with the issue addressed during the interviews,
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whereby too much focus was on the input of headquarters within all the partners
as well as overall objectives. However, when it came to implementing activities, a
significant obstacle to success was the lack of buy-‐in at the field level. As such,
parallels can be drawn between PLB and the focus of the authors on the
importance of canvassing the support of stakeholders in order to secure their
buy-‐in and commitment, as well as expertise.
Hughes and Weiss – in reference to the alliance that suffered from this challenge
– point out that the alliance functioned well until key internal departments were
asked to commit time and resources, and adjust well-‐defined processes to
collaboration with the company’s partner (Ibid). There therefore exist several
similarities between the issues highlighted under this principle and the
difficulties experienced by WFP country office teams. Firstly, by excluding
country offices WFP headquarters failed to solicit the commitment and expertise
of important internal stakeholders in the form of country office teams in the
Bangladesh and Indonesia, both whom would have important insights that
would have been relevant for discussions to clarify mutual objectives and
expectations. In addition, it was expressed by representatives from the country
office teams that they struggled to adjust to and facilitate private sector
objectives that veered away from initial objectives agreed in the overall
partnership framework.
In conclusion, the headquarter-‐driven approach of PLB led to the omission
important insights of WFP country offices, which subsequently harmed
mobilisation of the partnership once initiatives were being launched. Both WFP
country offices and beneficiaries felt excluded from the process. The theories
cited above suggest that the lack of shared commitment on the performance of
businesses in BOP markets, and as such it is argued that the lack of shared
commitment within the WFP negatively impacted the collaboration between the
organisation and the MNCS partners. Similarly, Hughes and Weiss call for
managers to pay greater attention to internal stakeholders in order to ensure
their buy-‐in and commitment to partnerships. The fact that the principles touch
on three of the four barriers points to the interlinked relationship. In short, the
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lack of a focus on the working relationship ties in closely with the subsequent
exclusion of internal stakeholders, as these are arguably crucial to the
performance of the working relationship. Additionally, the lack of trust and
subsequent gatekeeping on the part of the WFP can potentially be addressed if
more attention is paid to fostering a better working relationship and better
interaction among partners.
PLB has been acclaimed as being a transformational partnership by the UN
Global Compact, and two of the main characteristics of such partnerships is that
it leverages the core competencies of all partners, while also involving the
appropriate set of stakeholders (UN Global Compact, 2011; p. 11). The first
characteristic is perhaps more relevent to the discussion surrounding the third
barrier (WFP gatekeeping), but in taking a rigerous approach it can be argued
that the exlusion of key internal and external stakeholders means that PLB falls
short in meeting this criteria. In addition, this leads to the criteria of involving
the appriate set of stakeholders, which also is not fully met. According to the UN
Global Compact, this criteria consists of “involving all stakeholders who play a
necessary role and pertain to the relevant geograhies […]” (Ibid). Once again, if
adopted strictly PLB has failed by being overly headquarter-‐driven and not
properly involving stakeholders with valuable project insight into the decision-‐
making process.
5.2.2 Barrier Nr. 2: Insufficient interaction
Hughes and Weiss predominantly focus on the working relationship among
partners, and therefore their perspectives are key to critically discussing the
second barrier. Examining the first principle and the focus on the working
relationship, the emphasis on the importance of understanding the working
procedures and culture of alliance partners can be related to that of
understanding motives and innovative interests as highlighted during
interviews. Arguably, such partnerships cannot fully function as if partners were
one entity – especially in such relative short-‐term partnerships and the fact that
partners have many other priorities outside the partnership – but it does appear
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that mutual understanding was hurt by the fact that there was not enough
interaction among WFP country offices and the private sector partners at the
beginning. Hughes and Weiss contend that focusing entirely on the ‘end goals’
obscures focus from the working relationship, which is arguably critical in
meeting these outcome targets.
“The big picture is very clear – it was addressed under nutrition but how were they
[the partners] to do that and what were the roles and responsibilities of every
partner – this was one of our challenges”. – WFP country office representative in
Indonesia
The fact that both WFP country office representatives called for more interaction
at the beginning suggests that the partnerships failed to invest the sufficient
amount of time during the initial stages of the design of the partnership that
required properly defining the working relationship as advocated for by Hughes
and Weiss. As part of the discussion surrounding the lack of proper interaction,
the following point was raised:
“Part of all partnerships is really to at the very beginning to be clear on what it is
that everybody is expecting from this partnership […]” – WFP country office
representative in Indonesia
“We didn’t have proper interaction at the very beginning so maybe the private
sector had the idea of being innovative from the very beginning, but since we didn’t
have any sort of interaction from the very beginning we didn’t know it […]” – WFP
country office representative in Bangladesh
The relevancy of second principle is admittedly less obvious in that it advocates
that partners develop metric pegged to the progress of a partnership rather than
outcomes. This in itself was not a focus of discussion during the interviews or the
research process. Nonetheless, the message of the principle carries an important
weight. Hughes and Weiss point out that “when partners sit down to create
alliance scorecards, they typically choose such as goals as increased revenue […]
65
then immediately begin to measure alliance performance against those goals […]”
(Hughes and Weiss, 2007; p. 124). Placing this in the context of PLB and the
second barrier, arguably too much attention was put on the achievement of
overall malnutrition goals and not enough on collaboration indicators, which in
turn will lead to better performing initiatives. The emphasis on highlighting
different expectations of how the partners will work together aligns with the
first principle. Similarly, it became apparent from the interviews that while there
was mutual understanding among PLB partners as to the overall objectives of
the partnership – referred to Hughes and Weiss as the ‘ends’ -‐, there was
confusion and disagreement as to how to go about reaching these objectives –
referred to Hughes and Weiss as the ‘means’ (Ibid; p. 124).
The third principle of leveraging differences, rather than trying to completely
eliminate them is admittedly an abstract recommendation. This is due to the fact
that it lacks specific recommendations on how to address this issue. Whilst the
focus of the principle is on leveraging differences in order to avoid wasted efforts
in avoiding conflicts and to foster a healthier working relationship, it does bear
strong relevance to the discussion surrounding the third barrier identified – the
gatekeeping tendencies of the WFP. Nonetheless, it will be discussed under this
barrier. During the analysis it was pointed out that the emphasis on the strategic
benefit of collaborating with the private sector was perhaps not appropriately
matched with a willingness to facilitate the interests of the these partners in
instances where business are trying to exact influence on the development
process. The lack of trust surrounding the motives of the private sector has
manifested itself in a reluctance to allow business partners to exact any
significant level of influence on development projects according to one of the
WFP representatives interviewed:
“When it comes to partnering […] if both parties go into something and they’re
getting what they want and there is kind of full transparency about that then who
are we to judge […] if that policy, we feel, advances a humanitarian or development
interest […] maybe that’s the cost. Our view is that if we feel there’s any advantage
for the company, we’re not even interested in talking with them or letting them
66
being a part of the process”. – WFP Private Sector Partnership representative
Among other things, Hughes and Weiss argue that the majority of corporate
alliances focus on minimising conflicts due to a fear of conflict. However,
according to the authors, the downside of this is that this gives the perception
that differences are inherently negative and as a result impedes the ability of
partners to leverage the differences and unique capabilities that initiated the
partnership in the first place (Ibid; p. 124). In the context of PLB and the quote
above, arguably the negative stigma attached to the motives of the private sector
can have a debilitating effect on partnerships.
The fourth principle advocates for the need to nurture the working relationship
among partners throughout the partnership, a culture of collaboration beyond
the reach of formal governance structures (Ibid; p. 128). Arguably, this ties in
closely with the first and second principles. In the context of PLB, it became
apparent during the interviews that this culture is lacking among the partners in
larger part due to the emphasis on increased interaction so as to be clear on
mutual objectives. Part of the principle involves moving towards a culture of how
both parties contribute to problematic situations, instead of spending time
assigning sole blame for issues. The interviewees did not in any way express any
opinions of blame, but the message of the principle is instrumental in critically
discussing the second barrier. Related to the first barrier surrounding the
headquarter-‐driven approach of PLB, it appears that there has not been enough
focus on the finder details of how partners will collaborate in order to achieve
objectives. To a large extent this principle relates to the wider discussion
surrounding the building of trust among partners, as it will arguably take much
time to reach a stage where this culture of shared blame is the norm. In the
context of PLB it can be argued that the lack of interaction among partners at the
ground level during the initial stages of the partnerships meant that the steps to
achieving this culture are much harder to reach.
In conclusion, the focus by Hughes and Weiss on corporate alliances address a
number of the barriers revealed during the analysis. The first two principles
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focus on the need to foster better interaction among partners, as it advocates
more focus on the working relationship beyond the overall objectives. Whilst the
overall focus is on the working relationship, the focus of the third principle on
leveraging differences rather than try to eliminate them closely resembles the
discussion surrounding the gatekeeping tendencies of the WFP as it struggles to
accept the commercial interests of its private sector partners. The fourth
principle to a large extent carries on this message by calling for a culture far less
characterised by finger pointing when conflicts arise. The fifth principle ties in
closely with the headquarter-‐driven discussion, and is therefore included in the
discussion and conclusion of the first barrier.
5.2.3 Barriers Nr. 3 and 4: WFP Gatekeeping and conflicting goals
The third barrier involves a much wider discussion because of the fact that it
involves a plethora of interlinked issues as demonstrated in the analysis. In
addition, it is arguably difficult to propose as straightforward a solution as with
the above-‐mentioned barriers due to the fact that the issues attributed stem
from fundamental differences in the organisational structures of the UN and
private sector. Nonetheless, it is useful to discuss this barrier on the basis of
theoretical and literary reflections in order to understand it within the context of
the other barriers. Additionally, much of the discussion surrounding this barrier
also involves a discussion of the fourth barrier – conflicting goals. As such, the
discussion of that barrier is attached to this section.
The discussion departs from the literary insights Venn and Berg (2014), as well
as Benedicte Bull (2010). During the analysis it was revealed that two central
barriers to effective strategic collaboration between the UN and its private sector
partners -‐ and to increase the leveraging of the resources and capabilities – were
the UN’s mandate obligations to governments in developing countries and its
reluctance to allow the private sector a greater voice in the decision-‐making
process and trusting that its motives could benefit development initiatives.
Coupled with this was inherently conflicting goals – an obstacle only made more
challenging by the large number of partners involved. A central statement
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identified through the interview with the WFP Private Sector Partnership
representative captured the stand off that still affects the level of collaboration
between the WFP and its MNC partners:
“We sort of can’t say “give us your resources and your knowledge but you can’t
even come to the table and help us solve world problems, and by the way we’re
smarter than you and if you come you’ll just have a selfish view and you really have
nothing to contribute – it’s insulting if you’re the private sector”. – WFP Private
Sector Partnership representative
This relates to the typology of partnerships introduced by Venn and Berg, the
authors arguing that poverty-‐related partnerships require integrative
collaboration among the partners. As was concluded during the analysis, the
statement above suggests that the partnerships between the WFP and its MNC
partners still suffer from a lack of inclusion with regards to the level of influence
afforded to the private sector partners. Placing this in the context of Venn and
Berg’s ‘integrative stage of collaboration’ – the impact of this negative mind-‐set
becomes more apparent. The authors point out that the complexity of
partnerships addressing poverty “requires participants to develop a basic
understanding of exchange principles and agreement on partnership goals.
Otherwise, collaboration will be chaotic and dominated by individual interests”
(Venn and Berg, 2014; p. 392). Placing Venn and Berg’s argument in the context
of PLB and the WFP, it appears that there is a disconnect between the level of
collaboration required for properly addressing malnutrition and the position of
the WFP in terms of allowing MNCs greater influence.
The tendency for gatekeeping by the WFP has been attributed to an overall lack
of trust. Venn and Berg present the hypothesis that the higher the level of goal
conflicts between participants in CSSPs, the lower the level of trust” (Ibid; p. 394).
Moreover, the authors point to several sources of ‘mistrust’ that can be identified
through PLB and the perspectives of the interviewees. Venn and Berg make the
point that the mind-‐sets of profit and non-‐profit actors diverge significantly in
the context of partnerships, and that these conflicting goals can therefore
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become a foundation for suspicion among partners. This brings the discussion
back to the point raised by the representative from DSM, who made the point
that:
“While we are striving to better understand each other and look forward, some
preconceptions, prejudices and limitations still remain. The fact that the private
sector is indeed driven by profit is a fact. However, the negative stigma around that
or the misunderstanding around that sometimes can do more harm than good”. –
DSM representative
Benedicte Bull addresses the scepticism on the part of the UN by pointing out
that in many cases it is difficult to “distinguish between cases where business
really contributes to the goals of the UN and where it simply seizes new business
opportunities […] collaborating with the UN does not necessarily mean that
business takes on responsibilities that move beyond what it regularly takes on in
doing business” (Bull, 2010; p. 489). As such, it appears that there is empirical
support behind the claim by Venn and Berg that conflicting goals represents a
source of conflict and suspicion. The authors place a high level of importance on
the issue of trust. While the connection between conflicting goals and trust is not
as apparent in the context of PLB, it is nonetheless possible to draw parallels
between the discussion by Venn and Berg, and the issues identified through the
interviews. Additionally, the authors point out that “trust is crucial for inter-‐
organizational knowledge exchange. It enhances efficiency of collaboration and
increases alliance performance” (Ibid). Subsequently, the connection between
trust and knowledge exchange forms the basis of Venn and Berg’s second
hypothesis: “The higher the level of trust between participants in CSSPs, the higher
the level of knowledge exchange” (Ibid; p. 394).
Placing this in the context of PLB, it becomes clear that a subsequent
consequence of the lack of trust among partners is that the level of interaction
and close collaboration in turn suffers. During the analysis it was concluded that
there was a strong link between the headquarter-‐driven approach of PLB and the
lack of interaction at the ground level. The insufficient interaction (Barrier 2)
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was attributed to the lack of inclusion of WFP country offices into the design
process of PLB (Headquarter-‐driven -‐ Barrier 1), and thus the country offices
new less of the interests of the MNC partners once initiatives began under PLB.
However, a case can be made for the fact that this lack of interaction can also be
attributed to a fundamental lack of trust that inhibits partners from entering into
more intimate and transparent collaboration required at the ground level.
Overall, the lack of trust in the motives of the private sector are exemplified in
the point made by the WFP Private Sector Partnership representative:
“When it comes to partnering […] if both parties go into something and they’re
getting what they want and there is kind of full transparency about that then who
are we to judge. And on some level we have to say: Yeah, they’re trying to affect the
policy so that they can build their business, that’s what they’re supposed to do or
sell more products. But if that policy, we feel, advances a humanitarian or
development interest […] maybe that’s the cost. Our view is that if we feel there’s
any advantage for the company, we’re not even interested in talking with them or
letting them being a part of the process”. – WFP Private Sector Partnership
representative
Examining this within the context of PLB and the views expressed about the
gatekeeping behaviour by the WFP, it becomes apparent the size of task in
meeting ambitious development goals with an equally ambitious level of
collaboration. The hypotheses presented by Venn and Berg are highly relevant in
terms of the critical discussion surrounding the third (WFP gatekeeping) and
fourth (inherently conflicting goals) identified in the analysis. In addition, the
discussion surrounding the relationship between trust and knowledge sharing
can be placed in the context of the second (insufficient interaction) and third
barriers due to strong link demonstrated by Venn and Berg.
According to Bull, private sector companies do not constitute a significant source
of funding for the UN. As Bull points out, “the private sector in total contributes
less than 1 per cent of the budget of UN aid agencies” (Ibid). In a document
breaking down its achievements in 2013, the WFP notes that out of its budget of
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$4.38 billion for that year, approximately $88.4 million came from private sector
corporate partners (WFP Annual Statement, 2013). To put this gap into
perspective, it helps to return to a point made by the WFP Private Sector
Partnership department representative:
“There was a lot of talk about bringing all these entities together, but at the end of
the day the amount of resources brought to bear against these challenges is pretty
small […]” – WFP Private Sector Partnership representative
Despite the fact that financial input is not the only measure of the contribution of
private sector partners, this statement does reveal that there is quite some way
to go in terms of increasing the priority of development challenges for the
private sector. One could therefore make the connection between the amount of
financial resources contributed by the businesses and the level of influence
afforded to it by the UN. However, it can also be legitimately argued that the UN
will struggle to extract a bigger commitment – financial or otherwise – from its
corporate partners unless the it alters its mind-‐set in terms of the benefits
associated with the private sector influencing the decision-‐making process. Bull
also argues that “the search for PPPs is part of a change in the UN system that also
has included an adaption of the structure and culture of the organisations to the
private sector mode of operation” (Bull, 2010; p. 491). On the basis of the
challenges raised during the interviews it appears that on an operational level
the UN and its organisations is struggling to fully embrace this new position. The
discussions surrounding the WFP’s mandate obligations highlighted the
precarious situation that UN aid agencies often find themselves in when having
to balance the interests of different partners and stakeholders, and therefore the
UN cannot realistically fully adapt itself to the private sector mode of operation
as Bull references to. In the case of the WFP in the context of PLB, it appears it is
a delicate balance between trying to adapt to private sector interests and modes
of operation while at the same time fulfilling traditional mandates and
development objectives. This same point is addressed in part by Venn and Berg.
Bull also points out that there is a realisation on the part of the UN that the
respective goals of the partners will not always align.
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5.3 Conceptual Framework Discussion
All of the theoretical and literary perspectives have served to put the findings of
the thesis into perspective. The discussion of the barriers within the theoretical
and literary perspectives have demonstrated the interdependent relationship
among the barriers, and therefore the final part of the discussion will attempt to
draw up a conceptual framework capable of demonstrating the relationship
among the various barriers and their impact on the overall collaborative
performance, in line with the overall objective of this thesis. Due to the
exploratory nature of this thesis, the conceptual framework serves as a
foundation for further research on the topic.
As mentioned above, the discussion of the four barriers within the context of the
theoretical and literary perspectives has served to highlight the importance that
each barrier carries. Nonetheless, the objective of the discussion was not to rank
the barriers in terms of importance or the sequence in which they need to be
addressed. The discussion on the back of theoretical reflections served to
highlight the interlinked relationship among these barriers. As such, the
discussion led to a reflection on this matrix of relationships that could
demonstrate the collective impact on the collaborative performance between the
WFP and its private sector partners. The figure on the following page illustrates
the discussion of the barriers within the context of effective collaboration:
73
Figure 5 – Conceptual Framework of Barriers
The exploratory approach of the thesis into the barriers preventing multi-‐
stakeholder partners from partnering effectively meant that collaborative
performance served as the independent variable by which all the identified
barriers arguably impact upon. In other words, the objective of the research
question dictated that the focus was on what barriers influenced collaboration
and their respective impact. The figure above is intentionally shown as not to
rank the barriers in terms of importance, but to demonstrate they collectively
affect the collaborative performance between the WFP and its private sector
partners. From the discussion of the headquarter-‐driven approach of PLB, it
became apparent through the theoretical reflections that this conceivably had a
strong influence on the second barrier related to the insufficient interaction
among the WFP country offices and private sector partners that occurred at the
ground level. This is most likely due to the fact that country offices were not
properly aware of the specific interests of the private sector partners having
been excluded from the initial stages of setting up the partnership and deciding
on initiatives.
When discussing PLB through the lens of Hughes and Weiss, it became apparent
that the neglected focus on the working relationship versus overall objective
goals demonstrates that there are parallels between the two barriers identified
during the interviews (Hughes and Weiss, 2007 – principles 1 and 2). Zyck and
HQ-‐driven Insufsicient interaction
Gatekeeping Conslicting Goals
Effective Collaboration
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Kent emphasise this same connection in discussing the neglect by headquarters
of country level offices, which hampers the mobilisation of partnerships at the
ground level. According to the authors, aid agency leaders in country offices are
often “unaware of global agreements established by theuir UN agency or NGO with
a particular company, or they had little sense of how to go about activating or
mobilising that partnership (Zyck and Kent, 2014; p. 16). Zyck and Kent are
arguing in the context of humanitarian emergency partnerships, but the logic
nonetheless applies to the context of PLB. This points to the link between the
lack of involvement of WFP country offices and the subsequent insufficient
interaction that would have clarified objectives. It can therefore be argued that
the headquarter-‐driven approach of PLB has led to insufficient interaction
among partners at the ground level, thus negatively affecting collaborative
performance:
Figure 6 – Relationship between Barrier 1 and 2
As argued, the WFP and its partners are fundamentally opposed in terms of
inherent strategic goals. As a result, it is difficult to make the claim that any
strategic approach by the respective partners will radically impact this situation
on way or the other. Instead, it can be argued the inherently conflicting goals of
partners – in this case emphasis was placed on conflicting strategic priorities of
the private sector partners – influence the gatekeeping tendencies of the WFP. In
addition, by placing a strong emphasis on the connection between trust and
knowledge sharing between partners, Venn and Berg provided an insight into
the potential relationship between the second (insufficient interaction) and third
(WFP gatekeeping) barriers. During the interviews it was claimed that better
interaction among partners would have made it easier to ascertain expectations.
From the basis of Venn and Berg’s perspective, it can therefore be argued that a
HQ-‐driven lack of 'local' stakeholder
input
Insufsicient enabling
environment for interaction
Lack of clarity surrounding mutual objectives
75
greater level of transparency as a result of improved interactions can perhaps
contribute to the WFP demonstrating a greater level of trust towards its private
sector partners. This is because each side engages in more intense collaboration
that in turn leads to improved mutual understanding. That is not to argue that
this will eradicate conflicting interests or WFP gatekeeping. But an improved
understanding and transparency will arguably lead to greater acceptance of
private sector interests and input. The negative process linking insufficient
interaction and WFP gatekeeping within the context of PLB is demonstrated in
the figure below:
Figure 7 – Relationship between Barrier 2 and 3
As has been discussed, the WFP and the private sector will always be divided in
terms of the respective motives and strategic priorities of each partner. Such
conflict and subsequent tension only increases with the addition of partners such
as in PLB. Venn and Berg argue that goal conflicts influence the level of trust
among partners (Venn and Berg, 2014; pp. 393-‐394). Venn and Berg legitimately
draw a connection between conflicting interests and trust between partners, but
as the discussion of the second and third barriers above has demonstrated, there
are approaches to minimising the negative consequences of conflicting goals.
Insufsicient interaction (Barrier 1)
Lack of transparency
Lack of mutual understanding
WFP gatekeeping (Barrier 3)
76
Nonetheless, the Bull, as well as Venn and Berg have demonstrated that the
inherent mistrust and suspicion that occurs between ‘for-‐profit and not-‐for-‐
profit’ partners stems in large part from inherently conflicting goals. This might
appear to be self-‐explanatory, but arguably the propensity to mistrust the
motives of the private sector only adds to the tension surrounding conflicting
goals. Therefore, the relationship between conflicting goals and WFP
gatekeeping arguably can be demonstrated in the following way:
Figure 8 – Relationship between Barriers 3 and 4
What the figure above attempts to demonstrate is that conflicting goals lead to
an inherent mistrust among partners – and in the case of this thesis it became
apparent that it is mostly on the part of UN aid agencies. Subsequently, this leads
to reluctance on the part of UN aid agencies to facilitate greater input by the
private sector that would arguably extract a greater level of commitment by the
private sector to development initiatives. The position of this thesis is that this
leads to a ‘vicious cycle’ of behaviour whereby the two barriers reinforce each
other. That is where the importance of the first two barriers comes into play
because of the impact that the headquarter-‐driven approach appeared to have
Conslicting goals
(Barier 4)
inherent mistrust
WFP gatekeeping (Barier 3)
insufsicient private sector commitment
77
on the enabling environment for interaction between WFP country offices and
MNCs partners at the ground level, which subsequently has an impact on mutual
understanding. This overall lack of transparency is arguably a contributing factor
to the level of mistrust between the UN and MNCs, and as a result it is difficult to
close the gap in terms of conflicting goals.
78
6 Conclusion
The following research question was presented for this thesis:
What are the barriers and how do they affect the collaborative performance
of multi-‐stakeholder partnerships between the WFP and MNCs aimed at
addressing malnutrition in developing countries?
6.1 Conclusion of Findings 6.1.1 Headquarter-‐driven
The headquarter-‐driven approach of PLB had a significant impact on how the
partnership functioned at the field level, because of the fact that the respective
WFP country offices were introduced late into the process. Besides the lack of
buy-‐in, the country offices were also less aware of the strategic priorities of the
private sector partners. Therefore, their exclusion from the creation of the
partnership led to them having difficulties mobilising initiatives because of the
fact that there was a lack of clarity surrounding how and where to carry out
initiatives. Including the country offices earlier in the process could have solved
the lack of mutual understanding, so that they would have been aware of private
sector interests.
6.1.2 Insufficient interaction
Closely related to this is the issue surrounding the insufficient interaction among
partners during the initial stages of the partnership. The insufficient interaction
meant that there was lack of mutual understanding between WFP country offices
and the MNC partners surrounding initiatives. The lack of interaction signifies a
fundamental neglect surrounding attention to the working relationship. As such,
improved interaction could arguably help improve mutual understanding
surrounding partnership objectives, as well as potentially address the issue of
gatekeeping because of improved mutual understanding and transparency.
79
6.1.3 WFP gatekeeping
It became apparent that overall partnerships are hampered by rigorous mandate
obligations and mistrust on the part of the WFP. Firstly, the influence of MNCs on
the direction of development initiatives is held back by WFP obligations to
traditional stakeholders such as donor recipient governments. Secondly, the
WFP is reluctant to trust the motives of MNCs and together these tendencies
combine to create a gatekeeping tendency on the part of the WFP. This harms the
overall value proposition that the WFP can offer its private sector partners, and
as a result it becomes difficult for the WFP to extract further engagement from
the private sector. Part of the theory highlighted that the relationships are
developed through repeated interactions (Venn and Berg, 2014), offering
optimism that as partnerships between UN aid agencies and the private sector
continue, the level of trust will increase, and as a consequence the extent of
gatekeeping will decrease.
6.1.4 Inherently conflicting goals
Conflicting goals are a recurring element during any partnership – whether it
involves partners from the same sector or opposing ones. In the context of PLB
the WFP and MNC partners disagreed as to where to target initiatives, with the
main source of disagreement being the interest of the MNC partners to invest in
territorial areas with more developed markets. As such, there is arguably no
ready solution to eliminating this barrier. In terms of conflicting goals between
the WFP and private sector partners, the WFP is predominantly focused on
addressing development challenges in under the umbrella of its official mandate
from Member State governments, whilst MCNs are predominantly driven by
commercial interests that conflict with these mandates. Such conflicting interests
are important to address before commencing any partnership.
80
6.2 Main Conclusion
The analysis and the findings above indicate the what part of the research
question, while the discussion attempted to address the how. To a larger extent
all of these barriers are interlinked and cannot be examined in isolation. The
conceptual framework discussion at the end of the previous chapter was an
attempt to draw on the theoretical and literary perspectives in order to
demonstrate the relationship between the various barriers. As the discussion
proved, it is difficult to isolate any of the barriers. To varying degree, each of the
factors is interlinked. It appears that the first two barriers are highly interlinked
due to the fact that the headquarter-‐driven approach detracted from sufficient
attention on important stakeholders both within the WFP and in the respective
communities on the ground.
The headquarter-‐driven approach of PLB subsequently appears to have
manifested itself in a lack of interaction among WFP country offices and the MNC
partners on the ground. Therefore, there appears to be a connection between the
headquarter-‐driven approach of PLB and an insufficient enabling environment
for collaboration resulting in the second barrier – insufficient interaction. The
connection between the third and fourth barriers is admittedly self-‐explanatory,
but as the discussion attempted to show, the two barriers arguably combine to
cause a vicious circle, whereby conflicting goals become the focal point of WFP
gatekeeping. In turn, this behaviour only serves to place partners further apart in
terms of aligning interests and collaborating effectively. In addition, the
discussion attempted to link the second and third barriers, as the theoretical
perspective of Venn and Berg was instrumental in pointing out the relationship
between interaction among partners and the subsequent development of trust.
Whilst it is undoubtedly difficult to overcome challenges associated with trust
and conflicting goals, the only viable way to address such barriers is a more
concerted effort at improving the enabling environment for UN and MNC
partners to work together more effectively.
81
The size of global development challenges means that increasingly these
challenges need to be met through collaborative efforts between multiple actors
such as aid agencies, national governments, private companies and foundations,
NGOs etc. Malnutrition is just one of many challenges facing the world –
including interlinked challenges such as poverty and climate change – and its far-‐
reaching consequences epitomise the need for collaborative approaches.
Alongside the need for collaborative efforts to tackle such challenges – most
prevalent in developing countries – is a growing interest on the part of the
companies in commercial opportunities in BOP markets. Similarly, companies
are also showing an increased interest in addressing sustainability challenges,
thus creating a nexus of interest between the private sector and the UN. Despite
the apparent aligning of interests, collaboration has proven to be difficult when it
has moved to more advanced stages. UN aid agencies and private sector
companies are inherently opposed in terms of the underlying objectives.
Nonetheless, there is scope for improved collaboration, and therefore the aim of
this thesis was to take an exploratory look into the main barriers to effective
collaboration between the WFP and MNCs, examining these barriers in the
context of PLB.
6.3 Contribution
The objective of this research was to investigate the potential barriers to
effective collaboration between the WFP and its MNC partners, in the context of a
multi-‐stakeholder partnership that has achieved a significant amount of acclaim
internally within the UN and among the project partners. Nonetheless, there
exists no critical inquiry into how the process of collaboration beyond the official
final report (Accenture, 2014) into the partnership as well as a brief inquiry into
the partnership through the UN Global Compact’s report on transformational
partnerships (UN Global Compact, 2011). Additionally, these reports examine
the end results without a sufficient investigation into the actual process. As such,
the thesis aimed to contribute with an exploratory and critical investigation into
the challenges associated with a partnership involving such a large number of
stakeholders. Multi-‐stakeholder partnerships addressing malnutrition is a
82
relatively new phenomenon, and there therefore does not exist a solid empirical
or theoretical foundation. Thus, the contribution of the thesis correspondingly
lies in its attempt to provide both an empirical and theoretical perspective on
this new topic area.
The thesis contributes in terms of highlighting significant barriers that can be
extrapolated to the wider partnership arena. The discussion of the barriers -‐ and
their interlinked relationship through the presentation of the conceptual
framework – thus provides an insight to the different factors that shape the
process of collaboration between UN aid agencies and MNCs. As argued in the
main conclusions, these barriers cannot be addressed in isolation. Therefore it
serves as an insightful guidebook to UN and MNC senior managers in addressing
areas that can improve the enabling environment for effective collaboration.
6.4 Future Questions Due to obvious time and resource constraints, this thesis admittedly leaves
considerably more unanswered questions than answered. A question that was
left unanswered by this thesis was the degree of measurable impact of the
identified barriers on the individual initiatives. PLB consisted of a large number
of individual initiatives, and an unanswered question was perhaps an identifiable
connection between the barriers revealed and specific initiatives. Moreover,
preferably the thesis would have addressed more concretely specific types of
enabling environments lacking at the ground level in order to bring partners
closer together. This would have provided better context surrounding the
potential shortcomings of partnerships, and more concrete guidance for
improvement. Overall, the exploratory nature of this thesis – focusing on a single
partnership – means that there are questions as to how prevalent these barriers
are in other partnerships, and whether they are limited to short-‐term
partnerships such as PLB. As such, a preferable scenario would be to conduct a
multiple case study research, comparing a number of multi-‐stakeholder
partnerships in order to gain a more detailed and holistic picture of key barriers
(and potential drivers) to effective collaboration between the WFP and its MNC
83
partners. Admittedly, the thesis did not sufficiently address the impact that the
headquarter-‐driven approach of PLB had on the buy-‐in by the local communities,
as the primary focus was on the WFP country offices. However, seeing as the
primary focus was on collaboration between the WFP and its MNC partners, it
was decided not to give this issue further attention.
6.5 Experience and insights The process in completing this thesis was as challenging as it was rewarding. A
particular rewarding experience was the amount of insight that the initial
research process provided – both into the area of malnutrition as well as the
collaboration between the UN and the private sector. The difficulty was
narrowing all of this into a narrow and workable research question. It was also
highly rewarding to gain the insight of the respective interviewees whose
insights were vital for addressing the research question. A particular challenge
experienced during the thesis was firstly that of contacting potential
interviewees and scheduling interviews due to conflicting schedules. The lesson
taken from this experience was that the research process into potential
interviewees requires a significantly concerted effort beyond initial expectations.
The iterative process of harmonising the theoretical perspectives with the
empirical findings was also a particular challenge due to the exploratory and
primarily inductive approach of the thesis. Due to the specificity of the barriers
revealed, and the uniqueness of Project Laser Beam, the process of aligning the
findings within matching theoretical frameworks proved to be a challenge. In
addition, despite the inductive approach, it proved difficult to analyse the
findings without being influenced by any pre-‐existing theoretical reflections.
Another challenge was the interviews themselves. The exploratory approach of
the thesis also meant that the researcher was reliant on the interviewees
pinpointing relevant themes, as much as onus was on the researcher to try and
identify key themes during the interviewees in order to direct the conversation
in the desired direction. This balance between proved to be a significant
challenge.
84
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8 Appendices
Appendix 1
Key Statement Central Theme
“I think the biggest flaw with Project Laser
Beam was that it was really from a ‘top-‐up’
approach […] The reality is that on the
ground the situation was much different –
local NGOs, the communities themselves
were never really consulted and ended up
with a programme that somebody else had
designed […] they felt they did not have a
buy-‐in and did not participate in the process
of creating it and therefore there was some
resistance […] it really is critical to involve
all stakeholders and particularly those that
are most affected or will be responsible for
implementation.
The design and implementation was led by
the headquarters of the project partners
without proper inclusion of local
stakeholders and beneficiaries.
Feeling of lack of buy-‐in for local
stakeholders and beneficiaries resulted in
resistance to PLB initiatives.
The second challenge was just one of time –
these things are inherently complex […] the
time-‐line of PLB was too short, and
probably had we had another couple of
years some of the problems would most
likely had worked themselves out – it took
time to discover them.
Complexity of malnutrition versus time-‐
line ambition of PLB led to many issues
being unresolved.
The likelihood of failure or low impact
increases proportionally based on the
number of participants […] given that these
kind of initiatives tend not to be over-‐
arching corporate priorities, that there is
competition for time and resources – it is
hard to have truly shared objectives.
Complexity of malnutrition coupled with
the lack of corporate priority creates
intense struggle for time and resources
prevents high impact.
Do you do a lot of little things that have The WFP and other UN aid agencies are
90
lower potential for great impact but they
are lower in complexity because there are
only one or two partners, or do you
continue to strive for these multi-‐
stakeholder initiatives that if executed well
and you have the right partners, can be
transformational? […] what is the right
level of complexity where we think that the
thing [initiative] has a reasonable chance of
succeeding?
faced with a conundrum: Do they pursue
low-‐impact / individual partnerships with
a higher chance of success, or pursue high-‐
impact / multiple partner initiatives with a
more uncertain chance of success?
There was a lot of talk about bringing all
these entities together, but at the end of the
day the amount of resources brought to
bear against these challenges is pretty small
[…] One of the challenges of PLB – it was
over-‐ambitious for its budget […] I think the
two countries was too ambitious for the
resources and commitment that were in
place.
That scale of the issue far out-‐weighs the
resources that are leveraged to tackle it
We just raise money – we’re a $5 billion +
organisation, and if you think about what
the private sector given that their model is
profitability, we’re unable to provide
commercial gain or benefit, so when there’s
partnership or fundraising it tends to be a
couple of hundred thousand, maybe it’s a
million, maybe it’s a couple of million – but
in the grand scheme of a $5 billion budget,
one million dollars doesn’t really matter
and we burn through it really fast. It’s nice,
it’s incremental funding, but in the grand
scheme of things it’s 2-‐3-‐4 per cent of our
total budget. So for the amount of time and
energy we put into engaging with the
private sector – it has, I would say, (an)
Financial contribution of the private sector
is inconsequential, but partnerships such
as that with TNT have taught WFP that the
private sector can contribute thought
product innovation.
91
insignificant element in terms of our total
revenue picture. But what he have learned
with TNT is that there are things that –
either we don’t have the money to buy or
our rules and how we procure prohibit us
from buying it, and that can be brought to
us from the private sector.
Now many organisations -‐ and we’ve done
some of this, but I think we’ve been more
disciplined than others – say: Oh great, I’ll
partner with the private sector and they can
help with data management or in our case
food quality & safety, enhancing the
nutrition basket logistics. Well that’s all
nice, but unless you have the resources to
actually take that capacity, that knowledge
transfer, and actually do something with it,
it’s for not […]
The value of impact from partnerships
suffers when UN aid agencies don’t have
the capacity to absorb contributions from
private sector partners.
So that’s our current strategy, to pursue
partnerships that are a million dollars plus
in terms of cash, there’s a strategic
alignment in terms of the capacity that
we’re seeking, and we’re seeking a small
portfolio of partnerships that really are
quite meaningful and avoid getting
distracted with low-‐value partnerships that
either have only have couple of hundred
thousand dollars in revenue potential, or
have something that is interesting but not
strategic
WFP partnerships strategy one of high
financial value coupled with strategic
meaningfulness.
There is value in partnering. It can be
association with the UN, it can be what you
learn, access to market, employee moral etc.
But, if you try to put a value on some of
The current value proposition by the WFP
to the private sector is insufficient to bring
about increased engagement and
contribution of resources.
92
those different elements it is hard to get into
the big money […] So until we can figure
out how we can increase strength in our
value proposition I would say that we are
sort of operating near the limits of what we
can be receiving in terms of value to us […]
…if we as the UN, and we’re so into our UN
world and our rules and neutrality and all
of that I know why it’s there and I respect it,
so I am not criticising it, but we have
essentially determined that our business
model, our purpose is above influence and
cannot be used in any way for the benefit
for any one stakeholder or party. So a
business is going to look at that and say
why is that even interesting unless I can
participate in some way with the UN and
maybe in some way have influence on
economic progress in a country, policy.
Neutral and impermeable position of the
UN / WFP is a barrier to more strategic
engagement by the private sector
We sort of can’t say “give us your resources
and your knowledge but you can’t even
come to the table and help us solve world
problems, and by the way we’re smarter
than you and if you come you’ll just have a
selfish view and you really have nothing to
contribute – it’s insulting if you’re the
private sector
An imbalance between the UN / WFP’s
appeal for the increase private sector
participation and the lack of influence that
the UN / WFP allows the private sector.
So we sort of have to figure out if we want
to be impermeable and say we are above
everybody’s interests – the irony being we’re
run by governments and everyday I see how
governments influence and use us for their
own national ambitions. We are being
played every which way and another. But
we won’t let companies do that, or we don’t
The UN and its organisations faced with a
need to clarify its position in terms of how
it chooses to interact with the private
sector.
UN reluctant to allow businesses to
influence it in the same way governments
constantly do.
93
Appendix 2
Key Statement Central Theme
And just to give you the link to PLB, about 3
of our projects – out of the 2-‐3 dozen we
have done – were linked to PLB. Even those
projects were only bilateral with the WFP.
That is why I had a strong preference to talk
about the achievements of the broader
partnership because it is so much wider and
full of content than those 3 projects.
DSM’s work has been exclusively with the
WFP, also in the case of PLB.
So sustainability is a growth driver for our
company, we think that our future is in
making the world more sustainable […] we
look to where we can add value and we look
to partners who share similar goals and
Sustainability / future growth a key focus
for DSM in terms of partnering with the
WFP.
think that we have the good judgement to
say when do we let a company in the door.
When it comes to partnering […] if both
parties go into something and they’re
getting what they want and there is kind of
full transparency about that then who are
we to judge. And on some level we have to
say: Yeah, they’re trying to affect the policy
so that they can build their business, that’s
what they’re supposed to do or sell more
products. But if that policy, we feel,
advances a humanitarian or development
interest […] maybe that’s the cost. Our view
is that if we feel there’s any advantage for
the company, we’re not even interested in
talking with them or letting them being a
part of the process
Profit-‐seeking behaviour and separate
interests of the private sector is a
necessary compromise in order to achieve
humanitarian and / or development
objectives.
UN / WFP scepticism about private sector
motives and rewards leads to a rejection of
them as strategic partners.
94
who have complementary competencies to
ours. So at DSM – as the world’s largest
vitamin mineral producer – it made sense to
collaborate with the WFP, the world’s
largest food agency.
Within our project teams we carried on as if
they were regular projects, we didn’t do
anything very differently other than have
higher-‐level managements discussions with
the other partners and the WFP. The actual
project teams were just the same [as normal
projects].
Collaboration with WFP approached like
any other non-‐commercial project
There is a lot of room for better
understanding of either side. While we are
striving to better understand each other
and look forward, some preconceptions,
prejudices and limitations still remain. The
fact that the private sector is indeed driven
by profit is a fact. However, the negative
stigma around that or the
misunderstanding around that sometimes
can do more harm than good
Preconceptions and prejudices about
private sector motives are holding projects
back.
(In reference to a question posed by
Lawrence Haddad, author of the Global
Nutrition Report, at a conference hosted by
Unilever) What he said to the audience:
“How many people here working in the non-‐
profit sector have ever worked for a
corporation?” And the same question to
people working in companies – how many
people have actually worked during their
careers at an NGO. And the room was very
silent. A lot of our misunderstandings come
from that. There is simply such little cross
over, and perhaps this is different for our
Lack of cross-‐organisational experience
hurts mutual understanding of each actor’s
drivers etc.
95
generation, but I think it is true for
generations before us that we just don’t
have the knowledge of each other.
I don’t think it’s about working more
closely, because I feel that we work very
closely [already]. But I thinks it’s about
having an even deeper understanding of
each other’s drivers, and trust [… ] there is
always more to be gained as you get to
know each other more as there is in any
other relationship, even though we have
been – for all intents and purposes –
‘married’ for 8 years.
Better understanding of individual
objectives needed rather than closer
collaboration.
You also have the processes that are very
much ingrained into an organisation, which
are quite bureaucratic and sometimes for
good reasons. The UN is sometimes very
limited in how their agencies can work with
business – simply for legal reasons or
financial reasons and try to protect the UN
position, which of course makes sense to an
extent but sometimes can be limiting.
Organisations heavily influenced by
bureaucratic structures.
The bureaucratic mandate of the UN can
be limiting during partnerships.
I think the reason the WFP-‐DSM
partnership has been so successful is we
really keep our commercial relationship
very far from the partnership. So in the
work streams I mentioned to you and in the
pilot projects we do we are very much
working on developing a product that can
meet the needs of WFP beneficiaries
DSM’s commercial objectives are not a
part of collaboration with the WFP – focus
is on development / humanitarian needs.
The fact that sales people are not involved
in our partnership, because they are
involved in a commercial relationship, the
Non-‐commercial influence leads to better
trust.
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fact that we don’t talk about any of DSM’s
commercial interests within the partnership
makes it a very trusting [and cosy] place
They are strategically important projects,
but in the context of DSM’s broader
business, this is a very small part of our
business. Very, very small. So it is of
strategic importance but right now we are
making these investments without an
immediate pay-‐off in sight. This is a very
long-‐term project
Partnerships have strategic importance,
but far from the level of importance of
present commercial interests.
It does create value and our CEO does talk
about creating sustainable business
models… indeed it does give us a testing
ground for these ideas and as a whole DSM
is working with other partners as well, so fx
UNICEF and other partners to try to see
what we can do. But this is all a brand new
field. It is strategic, but it is also very much
learning by doing.
The pay-‐offs of DSM’s engagement are not
immediate. While it does have strategic
value, it is still uncharted territory.
Appendix 3
Key Statement Central Theme
For WFP there are a couple of reasons why
we partner with the private sector:
1) No. 1 is funding. Defintely we
consider it as a very good funding
source.
2) And no. 2 is that we want to have
technical expertise from the private
sector.
And from the private sector, their main
objective is to find the end-‐customers. If you
know the BOP theory – most of the people
Financial and strategic benefits the central
reasons for partnering with the private
sector for PLB.
The mutual benefit of market-‐building
aspirations of the private sector, WFP
developing country expertise and
development pay-‐offs were a key driver for
the implementation of PLB.
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in Bangladesh live in the BOP sector – so
[the] private sector want to reach that
group, and the development sector has got
better reach to those beneficiaries. So it
was a win-‐win situation for the private
sector and the WFP to get into a
partnership.
Not everything has happened so smoothly,
because it was the first of its kind initiative
– the electing of 12 partner input in the
local implementing partners and the
private partners who were funding us. It
was trickled down from the top – the
country office was not involved from the
very beginning. So that was one of the
lessons learned, that if these multi-‐
stakeholder initiatives happen field level
people should be involved from the very
beginning.
Process complicated by larger number of
partners. Difficulties compounded by the
fact that WFP’s country office was not
properly consulted during the initial phase.
Stakeholders on the ground need to a
bigger part of this phase of the process.
[From the private sector’s perspective], it
wanted to be more innovative. But that was
not possible for us because we work with
governments – same goes for other
implementing partners. We cannot do
whatever the private sector wants us to do
because all of us have certain mandates.
Before being innovative we have to follow
those mandates and follow our guidelines.
These are some the things that created
some sort of confusion
The WFP’s ability to facilitate private
sector innovation is restricted by its close
ties to national governments.
Mandates and operational guidelines
precede any accommodation of private
sector input.
We didn’t have proper interaction at the
very beginning so maybe the private sector
had the idea of being innovative from the
very beginning, but since we didn’t have
any sort of interaction from the very
Insufficient dialogue at the country level
led to misunderstandings among the
partners.
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beginning we didn’t know it – from the
country level. I would not say it’s a limiter
but if we have more brainstorming at the
beginning of the project, and if we really
have a 5-‐6 year long-‐term plan then it will
be easier for us in long-‐term partnerships
Closer interaction and better
understanding required when involving
multiple partners, as is a detailed long-‐
term plan.
Another thing is that there were 5-‐6 private
partners involved in PLB but there was no
agreement signed between the private
sector [partners]. So even if PLB was an
umbrella partnership – there was no
agreement between the private partners.
So that was another kind of limitation of
PLB.
Lack of formal agreement between the
partners beyond umbrella partnership ties
a key limiter of PLB.
If there are private sector, public sector,
development sector partners – none of us
speak the same language so there will be
some conflict of interest and you cannot
avoid that [...] but it really has created an
example where we can bring all the
partners together […] If we do more
collaboration at the beginning it is easier
for us to understand what we want at the
field level.
Different language – interaction at
beginning critical
If you consider the current development
sector – the private and public sector
partnership has to be there because of the
need to link everything with the market,
and we want to be innovative as well. So if
we want real development, sustainable and
systemic development there is no way that
WFP can ignore the private sector.
Aspirations of linking development to the
markets necessitate partnerships
WFP is quite cautious before partnering
with the private sector because we have
WFP exercises strict due diligence in
choosing partners to partner with.
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due diligence team who identify who we
can partner with, if there is any particular
issue like child labour – we don’t normally
partner with those sort of companies […] It
is definitely quite sensitive because the
private sector always has something in
their mind to market their product but
nothing such thing has happened in
Bangladesh.
Whenever we have partnered with Unilever
or with DSM, we didn’t do anything that
can create anger or sensitivity towards the
government of Bangladesh. So the private
sector was quite respectful to that …
WFP has always exercised care when
partnering to avoid tensions with
governments.
Appendix 4
Key Statement Central Theme
Indonesia was a little more than those
multinationals because the private sector in
Indonesia is much more advanced and
developed than it is in Bangladesh. And
there -‐ the way that they are run, they are
looking at more than just CSR, but a little
more than CSR, for example Indofood who
aren’t doing CSR to get more exposure but
because they are interested in the nutrition
issue. So for example Indofood, we worked
very closely with Indofood, they already had
stuff for us that were addressed to mothers
and to young children.
Key differences between Indonesia and
Bangladesh due to the fact that the
enabling environment for business is
much more advanced in Indonesia.
Similarly, businesses are much more
aware and involved in development issues.
As opposed to Indonesia, in Bangladesh the
home-‐grown private sector was not really
that into private contributions or any kind
of contributions. At the time I was working
A limiter in Bangladesh was the reluctance
of the private sector to contribute to
development – either financially or other
forms. WFP lacked close collaboration
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there was no real – we didn’t manage to
build as tight a relationship with local /
home-‐grown Bangladeshi companies like
we expected.
with the private sector within Bangladesh.
In Indonesia it was more successful and I
think it was good that we had local
companies – like GarudaFood that were
interested in making a contribution. Even
companies like Indofood are very big but
they also have a different mind-‐set -‐ they
knew there were certain issues in Indonesia
[…] that really helped because they have
also been very much involved with the SUN
Movement so they are quite active now also
with the SUN Movement in Indonesia and
also globally. And so that is a good example
that PLB had proved to be a driver in
getting companies more involved with the
SUN Movement.
Businesses in Indonesia are much more in-‐
tuned to development issues, which
helped foster a closer working relationship
in Indonesia compared to Bangladesh. A
better enabling environment in terms of
establishing future partnerships, such as
the SUN Movement.
The bottom line is that all these issues that
the WFP works on, we cannot do it
ourselves and that was [the main premise
for a broad approach]. As WFP, working
with the private sector, most places that we
operate in we purchase food for our
emergency operations so we have had
relationships with the private sector for a
very long time […]
Long history of collaboration with private
sector highlights strategic importance for
WFP.
WFP and private sector intersect in terms
of interests and areas of operation
…if we can work together with
multinationals, multinationals that have
strong investments locally, who are going to
stay for a long time, then they can build up
that market but not just for the profit side
of it [they are obviously companies who are
looking to make money], but there is a need
Strategically important to work together
with businesses with ambitions long-‐term
engagement in markets.
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/ a group of people who are not being
addressed.
I think that the dilemma is really where to
go [...] we incurred a little bit of discussion –
where do you make an investment, do you
make it somewhere where there is more
return for your investment whereas at the
same time where there is food insecurity,
where are there the highest level of is
malnutrition and usually in the poorest
parts.
Conflicting interests as to which areas to
invest activities in. Conundrum between
ROI and the degree of need / scope for
high impact.
Having the expertise of the WFP’s
nutritionists, WFP’s connections with
governments (minister of health, district of
health officials) we can come to the table
and bring these people together – including
the private sector and the government and I
think that link is very important
Important to leverage the resources of
stakeholders across all sectors.
So the premise is basically very simple: we
cannot do this alone. […] we really do have
to make sure that we group together with
everybody else to ensure that all those
resources that are available can be used to
the best [extent].
Resources are scarce in the development
sector, and therefore important to
leverage as many as possible.
Particularly in Indonesia [there was
disagreement about the] geographical
location. At the beginning of PLB there was
not a 100% understanding of the mutual
objectives. So from the WFP side there was
always a little bit of tension between WFP
and the partners on where we were at
geographically. Sometimes also some kind
of misunderstandings on what the WFP can
and cannot do – [even though we are quite
innovative – there are some things that we
Conflict among partners as to where to
invest, and the mandate restrictions /
obligations of the WFP.
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do, our procedures, that we have to follow
With the partnerships – and especially that
there were a lot of private partners in this
relationship with PLB – really
understanding from the very beginning. The
big picture is very clear – it was addressed
under nutrition but how were they [the
partners] to do that and what were the
roles and responsibilities of every partner –
this was one of our challenges. – WFP
country office representative in Indonesia
Clear difference between the extents of
mutual understanding of the overall
objectives as opposed to the plan of action
in reaching those objectives.
Part of all partnerships is really to at the
very beginning to be clear on what it is that
everybody is expecting from this
partnership, and PLB was just one example
where there was a little bit lack of clarity on
a number of – not the objectives – but a
number of specific activities that were
attributed to that particular goal.
Expectations need to be clarified from the
very beginning.
What differentiated it was the number of
partners from different angles […] Having
all of those different players / stakeholders
helped us to think through more what is it
that each partner could bring. And the fact
that we had everybody focusing on the one
district or one region was something where
you could actually have a focused impact.
[…] It was more the focus [that] was the
most interesting – everyone was focused on
the same area and then you can actually
have better impact.
[…] The way to address malnutrition is
multi-‐pronged, and this has been proven
PLB unique in terms of the incorporation
of different actors and singular focus.
Need for a multi-‐pronged approach to
address malnutrition, but on a bigger scale
in terms of geography and time-‐line.
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through PLB but it was proven in a small
area for a small period of time and we need
to scale it up because the issues of
malnutrition do not get solved in just a
couple of years.
So I think the message from PLB is that it is
a good pilot and a lot of achievements made
but it needs to be more sustained and that
will enable a UN entity to work closely with
the private sector and bring these issues to
the table and I think that that it is one of the
things that has made it a good partnership
because I think it would have been much
more difficult for a MNC to go directly to
government and talk some of these issues
that the WFP and others are more
recognized for by government and I think
having us all as one unit was something
that was very helpful.
Need to scale up
…our humanitarian and development
operations are in many countries covering
just the tip of the iceberg so we need to be
able to address everybody who needs help.
So working with the private sector is
absolutely key to addressing nutrition. Some
of the partners have the advantage that
they are very good at understanding the
consumers and their behavioural change, so
they can really help us understand
behavioural change and help us with
campaigns on nutrition..
Development and humanitarian initiatives
are at present not achieving enough
impact – therefore the need for the private
sector and its unique capabilities.
And of course we have to get -‐ the
government of course has to be involved, we
have to get some kind of policies that
Multi-‐stakeholder initiatives will not
succeed without strategic collaboration
with respective national governments.
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encourage investment in certain fields, is
also something that would be useful in the
whole chain of enabling us to help them.
Whether it is PLB with a larger number of
partners or if it just a partnership with one
or two private sector partners I think that is
the way that we have to go
Appendix 5 In your opinion, what worked well during the partnership and what did not?
What that report sort of delicately balances around is that for the most part PLB was a failure.
The reason being there was a number of challenges, and there is kind of spoken to or referenced
to in the report as challenges – but I want to be careful that you don’t go too far in your research
or your work and you hold up project laser beam to be a great success, because most parties if
you speak to them privately will say it was not and that that report was a little bit of face-‐saving
particularly for the donors, unilever in particular. But I think it provides a good example of what
are the challenges in the larger partnership space:
I’ll address them in no particular order:
Number 1: And I think the biggest flaw with project laser beam was that it was really from a ‘top-‐
up’ approach. It was an idea from Paul Polman at Unilever, he kind of twisted the arm of some of
his peers, they very far away in New York, London and Geneva, came up with what they thought
was an appropriate intervention for Indonesia and Bangladesh. The reality is that on the ground
the situation was much different – local NGOs, the communities themselves were never really
consulted and ended up with a programme that somebody else had designed. You can debate
whether it was right for them or not but they felt they did not have a buy-‐in and did not
participate in the process of creating it and therefore there was some resistance.
So that would be lesson number 1 it really is critical to involve all stakeholders and particularly
those that are most affected or will be responsible for implementation.
Number 2: The second challenge was just one of time – these things are inherently complex and I
don’t want this to be heard as making excuses but they just take time, and they –so I think that
the time-‐line on PLB was too short, and probably had we had another couple of years some of the
problems would most likely had worked themselves out – it took time to discover them and then
it would have taken some time to figure out how we respond. So time is very important.
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Number 3. The third is that the complexity -‐ and I would say – potentially, the likelihood of
failure or low impact increases proportionally based on the number of participants. So while we
hold out in the space, and speak to the power of multi-‐stakeholder partnerships – yes in a perfect
world when you bring different parties together that have respective capabilities, resources or
expertise – theoretically that is all, great, but given that these kind of initiatives tend to not be
over-‐arching corporate priorities – there is competition for resources, there is competition for
time – it is hard to have truly shared objectives. They are hard to implement and more times than
not they kind of turn out like a PLB where they’re either ineffective or low impact. And that
creates this real kind of conundrum: do you do a lot of little things that have lower potential for
great impact but they are lower in complexity because there are only one or two partners, or do
you continue to strive for these multi-‐stakeholder that if executed well and you have the right
partners really can be transformational, and I don’t have an answer for you there but it’s a
conundrum and a tension that we face every day, making that decision: what’s the right level of
complexity where we think the thing has a reasonable chance of succeeding.
Number 4: And then the last kind of learning is: resources. And there was a lot of talk-‐talk about
bringing all these entities together but at the end of the day the amount of resources brought to
bear against the challenges is pretty small. (And) often times we have reasonably good ideas but
they are under-‐resourced and then don’t perform to our expectations. One of the challenges with
PLB -‐ it was over-‐ambitious for its budget. Had it been in a single country [implementation] that
probably would have given us adequate budget. We would have been able to manage it, all of us
collectively more effectively, and I think the two countries was too ambitious for the resources
and commitment that were in place.
How has the WFP’s collaboration has changed from traditional fundraising and
procurement to more strategic collaboration as seen with PLB? How do you view this
development?
Here has been the evolution. First, I would say we were very fortunate as an organisation to have
had our first partnership with TNT – which is 10 years or so ago – really be either by accident or
brilliant design and effort at the time, was all in all a really good partnership. It included
resource-‐mobilisation components and it also included elements of capacity development – what
we mean by that is the transfer of knowledge, expertise, technologies, business processes etc.
There is actually a build-‐up or retention of new capacity within the organisation. That was way
ahead of its time that idea, and I don’t think we even fully appreciated it at the time, but it gave us
a good model that in a perfect world partnership brings a capacity that has a strategic
importance, and with that capacity come resources that enable us to leverage it or absorb it.
(And) what happens in an academic / high-‐level way – two things happen in an organisation like
the WFP: 1) We just raise money – we’re a $5 billion + organisation, and if you think about what
the private sector given that their model is profitability, we’re unable to provide commercial gain
or benefit, so when there’s partnership or fundraising it tends to be a couple of hundred
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thousand, maybe it’s a million, maybe it’s a couple of million – but in the grand scheme of a $5
billion budget, one million dollars doesn’t really matter and we burn through it really fast. It’s
nice, it’s incremental funding, but in the grand scheme of things it’s 2-‐3-‐4 per cent of our total
budget.
So for the amount of time and energy we put into engaging with the private sector – it has, I
would say, (an) insignificant element in terms of our total revenue picture. But what he have
learned with TNT is that there are things that – either we don’t have the money to buy or our
rules and how we procure prohibit us from buying it, and that can be brought to us from the
private sector. Now many organisations -‐ and we’ve done some of this, but I think we’ve been
more disciplined than others – say: Oh great, I’ll partner with the private sector and they can help
with data management or in our case food quality & safety, enhancing the nutrition basket
logistics. Well that’s all nice, but unless you have the resources to actually take that capacity, that
knowledge transfer, and actually do something with it, it’s for not. So we need both, and what we
sell is, we’ve mapped, here are the white spots, here’s the capacity we need to achieve our
corporate objectives. But with that we need to develop resource-‐mobilisation elements, whether
it’s a corporate contribution, maybe it’s from the foundation, maybe it’s consumer fundraising,
but we also need resources to be able to absorb that capacity that you’re providing us.
So that’s our current strategy, to pursue partnerships that are a million dollars plus in terms of
cash, there’s a strategic alignment in terms of the capacity that we’re seeking, and we’re seeking a
small portfolio of partnerships that really are quite meaningful and avoid getting distracted with
low-‐value partnerships that either have only have couple of hundred thousand dollars in revenue
potential, or have something that is interesting but not strategic. And an example of that would
be, we have had several companies come to us with new water purification techniques. Yes, we
purify water, particularly in emergency response, it’s important to us.. is it important enough to
be spending staff time and effort advancing new technologies in water purification? Probably not
for us.
And we have come to the conclusion, maybe the best strategy for us is to just go buy state-‐of-‐the-‐
art water purification equipment rather than trying to be the people trying to pioneer the next
class or standard or technology in the space – maybe that’s UNICEF’s job, not ours. So we’re
trying to be more disciplined in saying we want partnerships that bring a higher level of cash and
we want partnerships that bring us a capacity that really has the potential to transform our
business. So those capacities that have the potential to transform are in spaces such as cash and
vouchers, so working with Mastercard on the piping system for how we handle cash transfer –
whether that be through pre-‐paid debit cards or mobile phones; it’s in food quality & safety -‐ as
we procure most of our food locally we’re exposed to increasing risks in terms of contamination,
mislabelling and mispackaging, so how can we learn from the private sector that has standards
and protocols and traceability… Nutrition, you would think we are good at nutrition. We’re
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actually great at distributing calories, we actually know very little about nutrition.. how can the
private sector help us increase the nutritional value of our food baskets. So we’re trying to be
more deliberate as to what we’re going after on the capacity side.
Is there a dilemma then between having many partners and the capacity to absorb what
these partners can give? And focus on as few partners as possible to utilize their resources
as best possible?
I would not say as few as possible, but it is really thinking about the pareto principle –it applies
here to both our fundraising and our capacity partnerships that we have 20 per cent of the
portfolio that provides 80 per cent of the value, and an interesting example on the cash side: We
had 161 partners last year, we reduced the portfolio by approximately 40 partners and we
increased revenue by close to $30million, so that sort of supports less is more. The interesting
little fact that I learnt a couple of weeks ago is that if we were to eliminate the – of that 121 – if
we were to eliminate the bottom 25 per cent of that, so lose roughly 30, we would be conceding
$2 million. So we’ve got 25 per cent, arguably, of our work that’s representing a fraction or two of
our total revenue. So you can optimize to a point and we’re nearing the end of how much we can
optimise, but I am a big believer in that just because it’s free, more doesn’t mean more.
Could you expand on some of the main challenges in partnering with the private sector?
I think one of the biggest limiters – what is the value that we can provide in exchange? There is
value in partnering. It can be association with the UN, it can be what you learn, access to market,
employee moral etc. But, if you try to put a value on some of those different elements it is hard to
get into the big money. There is only so much value with the WFP logo or employee engagement
programme and on and on. So until we can figure out how we can increase strength in our value
proposition I would say that we are sort of operating near the limits of what we can be receiving
in terms of value to us. So that is the big conundrum, nobody will talk about that but it’s.. when
we as the UN go public and say we are looking for the private sector to step up, play a bigger role,
fill the gap and funding bla bla – it’s like: well why should they? What’s in it for them? And how
does it meet their obligations to their shareholders and their investors? And until we can answer
that question we’re going to have a hard time getting more.
Where do you see the limits of the private sector in development going forward? Do you see
the private sector being expected to engage more strategically?
The answer is yes – there is an expectation that they engage and partner more broadly. But why
should they? There is a number of models and examples that you could look at. If we as the UN,
and we’re so into our UN world and our rules and neutrality and all of that I know why it’s there
and I respect it, so I am not criticising it, but we have essentially determined that our business
model, our purpose is above influence and cannot be used in any way for the benefit for any one
stakeholder or party. So a business is going to look at that and say why is that even interesting
unless I can participate in some way with the UN and maybe in some way have influence on
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economic progress in a country, policy.. We sort of can’t say “give us your resources and your
knowledge but you can’t even come to the table and help us solve world problems, and by the
way we’re smarter than you and if you come you’ll just have a selfish view and you really have
nothing to contribute – it’s insulting if you’re the private sector. I’m surprised they are as
interested as they are. So we sort of have to figure out if we want to be impermeable and say we
are above everybody’s interests – the irony being we’re run by governments and everyday I see
how governments influence and use us for their own national ambitions. We are being played
every which way and another. But we won’t let companies do that, or we don’t think that we have
the good judgement to say when do we let a company in the door.
I think we, as a system, have to be more honest with ourselves how attractive are we and why
would someone be interested in investing in us in the way that we think they should be investing
in us. Just because we are the UN, and we are above all, business doesn’t care.
Where do you see the limits of the advocacy role of business?
I am going to give you a quote, and this is from our legal council: When it comes to partnering
and we get into these spaces where we want everything to be perfect, it is sort of like (and we’re
always judging) – it’s like consenting adults. He said if both parties go into something and they’re
getting what they want and there is kind of full transparency about that then who are we to
judge. And on some level we have to say: Yeah, they’re trying to affect the policy so that they can
build their business, that’s what they’re supposed to do or sell more products. But if that policy,
we feel, advances a humanitarian or development interest, although not perfectly, but it gets us
forward much further than we can ever get on our own – maybe that’s the cost. Our view is that if
we feel there’s any advantage for the company, we’re not even interested in talking with them or
letting them being a part of the process. I think that’s what we need to get over is that if it moves
us forward, we’re getting what we want out of it then let’s see how we work together. We can’t be
above that. One other thing too, and I don’t want to pick on Unilever because they are a great
supporter of ours and they do a lot for us, but if you look at their total kind of philanthropic
giving to the development / humanitarian space, it’s about $10-‐12 million a year, and in the great
scheme of things – big whoop. For all the credit and attention and the reports, and Paul Polman
receiving awards, he’s gotten out on the cheap. Particularly when you put that in comparison to
what member states are paying for this work – he’s sort of getting a free ride. That’s another
thing-‐ to what degree are they sort of just buying their way into the conversation.
What I would say in closing: Please don’t hear me that I’m negative about partnerships, I actually
think that they have great value and there is so much more potential. It’s just that we as the UN,
or even the INGO space, need to get out of our own way to be able to realise that potential and if
we can I think we can have a much greater impact for the people that we serve around the world,
if we can get over our holiness and figure out how, we can have greater impact through engaging
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with the private sector. So I am a big believer, I just get frustrated because I think we’re our own
worst enemy.
Follow-‐up Q in email correspondence:
A follow-‐up question was posed in order to clarify the answer regarding the neglect of key
stakeholders, and clarify whether this referred to internal WFP stakeholders as well as external
ones.
In your opinion, were WFP country offices not sufficiently included in the design and roll-‐out
of PLB. If so, what were the consequences of this?
WFP offices as well as local partners were not adequately consulted in the program design.
Consequences included lack of important operational insight incorporated into the project design
and reduced ownership and buy-‐in from local actors including the WFP Country Offices.
Appendix 6
What is your role at DSM?
Originially what I am tasked to is to coordinate the partnership that DSM has with the WFP. It has
been in [trade] since 2007, so it is by far our largest and most in-‐depth partnership, and most
successful, in terms of the output. We are now in our third MOU – each of them last for a 3-‐year
period – which means that we are currently gearing up for MOU 4 – which will begin in 2016.
In terms of the WFP partnership we have done more than 30 projects in about 15 countries, so
when I talk about the partnership I talk about an umbrella framework that includes these many
different projects. These projects fall under several specific work streams. Our current work
stream – the up-‐scaling of fortified rice, of micro-‐nutrient powders, the nutrition academy and
capacity-‐building…[audio unclear around 3:20] and ‘fifth work stream’ is new product
development and food quality. So those are the major buckets that we have and then we have
different project under each of those.
And just to give you the link to PLB, about 3 of our projects – out of the 2-‐3 dozen we have done –
were linked to PLB. Even those projects were only bilateral with the WFP. That is why I had a
strong preference to talk about the achievements of the broader partnership because it is so
much wider and full of content than those 3 projects.
What was the strategic reasoning behind Project Laser Beam – and pursuing a broad multi-‐
stakeholder approach?
Our CEO – NAME – strongly believes that a company cannot do well in a world that is failing
around us. So he takes that responsibility very seriously… and we look at where we can add value
with our core competencies. So sustainability is a growth driver for our company, we think that
our future is in making the world more sustainable [6:00 – 6:10 unclear] … so we look to where
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we can add value and we look to partners who share similar goals and who have complementary
competencies to ours. So at DSM – as the world’s largest vitamin mineral producer – it made
sense to collaborate with the WFP, the world’s largest food agency.
In your opinion, what worked well during the partnership and what did not?
Our projects actually worked quite well because we simply carried them out in the same manner
that we carry out our normal projects. Within our project teams we carried on as if they were
regular projects, we didn’t do anything very differently other than have higher-‐level
managements discussions with the other partners and the WFP. The actual project teams were
just the same [as normal projects]. So it is difficult for me to say because our interaction is
primarily with the WFP. You will find most of the learnings are in the PLB report
Does business need to be given a greater voice by UN agencies on how projects are
implemented?
What we strive to do [at DSM] is that we must indeed recognise indeed the differences, the
strengths and limitations that different parties bring to the table. And the management of that –
walking down that very fine line is really an art…
There is a lot of room for better understanding of either side. While we are striving to better
understand each other and look forward, some preconceptions, prejudices and limitations still
remain. The fact that the private sector is indeed driven by profit is a fact. However, the negative
stigma around that or the misunderstanding around that sometimes can do more harm than
good. So we have a long way to go – as partners, as a private sector, everyone working in the field
to make the world a better place. We can still get a lot further in accepting each other’s
differences.
(In reference to a question posed by Lawrence Haddad, author of the Global Nutrition Report, at
a conference hosted by Unilever) What he said to the audience: “How many people here working
in the non-‐profit sector have ever worked for a corporation?” And the same question to people
working in companies – how many people have actually worked during their careers at an NGO.
And the room was very silent. A lot of our misunderstandings come from that. There is simply
such little cross over, and perhaps this is different for our generation, but I think it is true for
generations before us that we just don’t have the knowledge of each other.
Is there scope for collaboration to improve and broaden? Can UN-‐Business work even more
closely?
I don’t think it’s about working more closely, because I feel that we work very closely [already].
But I thinks it’s about having an even deeper understanding of each other’s drivers, and trust
[which I am sure is an important theme that you are going to come across]. Within our
partnership with the WFP – we have very good trust. But there is always more to be gained as
you get to know each other more as there is in any other relationship, even though we have been
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– for all intents and purposes – ‘married’ for 8 years. You need to always keep working on the
relationship and making it better. That’s on a [portional] level. You also have the processes that
are very much ingrained into an organisation, which are quite bureaucratic and sometimes for
good reasons. The UN is sometimes very limited in how their agencies can work with business –
simply for legal reasons or financial reasons and try to protect the UN position, which of course
makes sense to an extent but sometimes can be limiting.
What are the main barriers in building mutual trust?
I think the reason the WFP-‐DSM partnership has been so successful is we really keep our
commercial relationship very far from the partnership. So in the work streams I mentioned to
you and in the pilot projects we do we are very much working on developing a product that can
meet the needs of WFP beneficiaries, or very much working on doing research on the ground,
piloting a project, donating materials to the WFP for them to try. Working at an earlier stage than
the customer-‐supplier relationship that we have on a commercial level. The fact that sales people
are not involved in our partnership, because they are involved in a commercial relationship, the
fact that we don’t talk about any of DSM’s commercial interests within the partnership makes it a
very trusting [and cosy] place. When we are together as a partnership team – which is about 25
people – we never discuss money, profits or potential sales. That is not what the partnership is
about.
Despite the fact that you keep the commercial side separate, how important are these
projects / this partnership for DSM on a strategic level?
They are strategically important projects, but in the context of DSM’s broader business, this is a
very small part of our business. Very, very small. So it is of strategic importance but right now we
are making these investments without an immediate pay-‐off in sight. This is a very long-‐term
project.
How important is it for the private sector to have a long-‐term perspective? How influential is
the CSV perspective for the business?
Indeed, it is a case study of just that. It does create value and our CEO does talk about creating
sustainable business models… indeed it does give us a testing ground for these ideas and as a
whole DSM is working with other partners as well, so fx UNICEF and other partners to try to see
what we can do. But this is all a brand new field. It is strategic, but it is also very much learning by
doing. Nobody thought 8 years ago that we would be where we are today.
Has working with the WFP and other development partners changed the approach of DSM?
Absolutely. The types of organisations we are dealing with , some of which are customers such as
the WFP or UNICEF -‐ outside the partnership of course -‐ we get to know a lot more about our
customers. And any business that you are in – whether you are in a B2B business or in a B2C
business – you do want to know about what your customers’ needs are. So you do get to know
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about your customer, as well as the ‘end consumer’ / beneficiary. You get to tailor your approach
to their needs.
Appendix 7 What was your role during Project Laser Beam and at the World Food Programme at
present?
I joined WFP in 2011 when PLB had already started. I was recruited particularly for PLB to
coordinate with private donors that we already had in PLB – Unilever, DSM, Kraft and Rabobank.
And then we had several partners on the ground as well – Water Aid, BRAC, Helen Keller Int.
Coordinating with local partners, other NGO partners, was another major responsibility. I was
involved in donor relations, particularly for PLB and also communicate regularly with our HQ,
regional bureau, and top management of WFP Bangladesh country team.
M&E responsibilities…
What was the strategic reasoning behind Project Laser Beam – and pursuing a broad multi-‐
stakeholder approach?
PLB actually happened at the headquarter level – the country office was not involved when it was
declared at the Clinton Global Initiative. So the country office only knew about PLB when there
was an agreement already at the HQ level.
It actually trickled down from the top.
For WFP there are a couple of reasons why we partner with the private sector:
1) No. 1 is funding. Defintely we consider it as a very good funding source.
2) And no. 2 is that we want to have technical expertise from the private sector.
And from the private sector, their main objective is to find the end-‐customers. If you know the
BOP theory – most of the people in Bangladesh live in the BOP sector – so [the] private sector
want to reach that group, and the development sector has got better reach to those beneficiaries.
So it was a win-‐win situation for the private sector and the WFP to get into a partnership. And the
end goal was reducing child malnutrition. So that was pretty much the idea of having a multi-‐
stakeholder partnership through PLB.
In your opinion, what worked well during the partnership and what did not?
Not everything has happened so smoothly, because it was the first of its kind initiative – the
electing of 12 partner input in the local implementing partners and the private partners who
were funding us. It was trickled down from the top – the country office was not involved from the
very beginning. So that was one of the lessons learned, that if these multi-‐stakeholder initiatives
happen field level people should be involved from the very beginning. From the funding
Bangladesh did quite well. But at the beginning the expectation was not higher than what we had
actually received.
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[From the private sector’s perspective], it wanted to be more innovative. But that was not
possible for us because we work with governments – same goes for other implementing partners.
We cannot do whatever the private sector wants us to do because all of us have certain
mandates. Before being innovative we have to follow those mandates and follow our guidelines.
These are some the things that created some sort of confusion. Then again, when involved in
multi-‐stakeholder partnerships these are normal things that happen.
Are WFP mandates a limiter in partnerships?
I would not say it is a limiter, but this is a very good lesson learned. We didn’t have proper
interaction at the very beginning so maybe the private sector had the idea of being innovative
from the very beginning, but since we didn’t have any sort of interaction from the very beginning
we didn’t know it – from the country level. I would not say it’s a limiter but if we have more
brainstorming at the beginning of the project, and if we really have a 5-‐6 year long-‐term plan
then it will be easier for us in long-‐term partnerships because – say for example the school-‐
feeding programme, we actually work with government and complement governments. That’s
our main goal – and improve our micro-‐nutrient fortified biscuit. After two years Unilever
wanted to reduce money for the school-‐feeding programme and give the money for some other
purpose, which was actually quite dangerous for us because our relationship with the
government would have been hampered. So this sort of sensitivity was there – that we have
learned from the private sector. So if we take care of that in a next partnership, that would be
good. Another thing is that there were 5-‐6 private partners involved in PLB but there was no
agreement signed between the private sector [partners]. So even if PLB was an umbrella
partnership – there was no agreement between the private partners. So that was another kind of
limitation of PLB.
Project Laser Beam has been hailed as a transformational partnership (addressing a
systematic issue, leveraging core competencies, involving appropriate set of stakeholders,
capacity to reach scale and impact) by the UN Global Compact LEAD taskforce. This could be
said of most multi-‐stakeholder partnerships.
-‐ In your opinion is there a single or a series of factors that differentiate PLB from
other partnerships?
From the field level there are lots of stakeholders involved which is a very good success factor of
PLB and that could create an example in terms of implementing a multi-‐party project.
In your opinion, is there a limit to the number of partners involved?
It had both positive and negatives sides to it. One of the benefits of having multi-‐party partners,
as I said Unilever, DSM – the main founders of PLB. Whereas GAIN did not fund anything directly
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to the implementing partners, rather they were involved on the M&E side, which was a unique
example of having these sorts of partnerships. If there are private sector, public sector,
development sector partners – none of us speak the same language so there will be some conflict
of interest and you cannot avoid that. There were 4-‐5 partners, everyone had their own mandate,
and those private partners sat different time at the headquarter level, all the representatives
from the private partners came to the country level, they have been to the project areas, they
have interacted with the beneficiaries. In preparation of the “Lessons Learned” document all of
the partners have actively participated. And Accenture was there to steer all the partners. So
definitely there were some ups and downs in the project but it really has created an example
where we can bring all the partners together. What I will recommend – all the partners did not
meet before designing the project. If we do more collaboration at the beginning it is easier for us
to understand what we want at the field level.
What factors do you see as having a positive and negative impact on future initiatives to
address malnutrition together with the private sector?
Involvement of the local offices, local partners is one of the crucial things to consider / one of the
big lessons learned from this project.
In your opinion, is the increase in partnerships with the private sector attributed to a
change in ideology on the part of Multinational companies and the WFP?
If you consider the current development sector – the private and public sector partnership has to
be there because of the need to link everything with the market, and we want to be innovative as
well. So if we want real development, sustainable and systemic development there is no way that
WFP can ignore the private sector. Bangladesh is not an emergency country, but if you take the
example of emergency countries and how the private sector is helping us in terms of distribution
– for example logistics and transportation, mobile money transfers, cash transfers to the
beneficiaries – we cannot imagine those sort of projects without the proper involvement of the
private sectors. WFP has to collaborate with the private sector, there is no alternative to that.
From the country perspective in Bangladesh we have PLB that we have successfully
implemented. Beyond PLB Unilever will also be a continued partnership with WFP in
Bangladesh, and DSM is also continuing its partnership in rice fortification projects so things are
continuously moving forward. WFP and private sector partners are working closely at the
country level in Bangladesh and in other countries as well.
How difficult has it been to build trust with the private sector, and how do you view this
progress?
WFP is quite cautious before partnering with the private sector because we have due diligence
team who identify who we can partner with, if there is any particular issue like child labour – we
don’t normally partner with those sort of companies. Those sort of things are actually tackled at
the HQ level so that no sensitivities are created at the country level when we actually start
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implementing that project. It is definitely quite sensitive because the private sector always has
something in their mind to market their product but nothing such thing has happened in
Bangladesh. Whenever we have partnered with Unilever or with DSM, we didn’t do anything that
can create anger or sensitivity towards the government of Bangladesh. So the private sector was
quite respectful to that and WFP always tackled such things quite well so no such things happen
at the ground level as well.
Appendix 8 What was your role during PLB?
When I started working in Project Laser Beam I was working based in Jakarta. As you know PLB
was piloted in two countries, Bangladesh and Indonesia, specifically [three – find out!] districs
within those two countries. I started working as project coordinator, but my background at the
time was coming from fundraising. My role was to link between different partners who were on
PLB, mainly the multinations / original partners – Unilever, DSM and Kraft. [Role was] to bridge
and have regular contact between what was being implemented under PLB with the partners and
seeing how best we could utilize the strength of the private sector to reach the goals together.
Indonesia was a little more than those multinationals because the private sector in Indonesia is
much more advanced and developed than it is in Bangladesh. And there. the way that they are
run, they are looking at more than just CSR, but a little more than CSR, for example Indofood who
aren’t doing CSR to get more exposure but because they are interested in the nutrition issue. So
for example Indofood, we worked very closely with Indofood, they already had stuff for us that
were addressed to mothers and to young children. And we worked with them to develop a
product that was [?] and also accessible to the BOP.
I would say that PLB was very – the concept / idea of working in a holistic approach with
humanitarians, national development partners like the WFP and the private sector to address a
particular issue was the same but how it was implemented was quite different – just because of
the landscape and what was going on at the time in Bangladesh versus what was going on in
Indonesia. For example in Bangladesh we had an initiative called REACH.
As opposed to Indonesia, in Bangladesh the home grown private sector was not really that into
private contributions or any kind of contributions. At the time I was working there was no real –
we didn’t manage to build as tight a relationship with local / home-‐grown Bangladeshi
companies like we expected. In Indonesia it was more successful and I think it was good that we
had local companies – like GarudaFood that were interested in making a contribution. Even
companies like Indofood are very big but they also have a different mind-‐set -‐ they knew there
were certain issues in Indonesia. From what I been following from behind the scenes that really
helped because they have also been very much involved with the SUN Movement so they are
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quite active now also with the SUN Movement in Indonesia and also globally. And so that is a
good example that PLB had proved to be a driver in getting companies more involved with the
SUN Movement.
In your opinion, what worked well during the partnership and what did not?
Particularly in Indonesia [there was disagreement about the] geographical location. At the
beginning of PLB there was not a 100% understanding of the mutual objectives. So from the WFP
side there was always a little bit of tension between WFP and the partners on where we were at
geographically. Sometimes also some kind of misunderstandings on what the WFP can and
cannot do – [even though we are quite innovative – there are some things that we do, our
procedures, that we have to follow, fx in PLB there was a case where one of the multinationals
had a product that they wanted to donate to WFP as part of their contribution and it was not
accepted. This caused a little bit of tension within the relationship. It could not meet some of the
objectives on the nutritional specifications. With the partnerships – and especially that there
were a lot of private partners in this relationship with PLB – really understanding from the very
beginning. The big picture is very clear – it was addressed under nutrition but how were they to
do that and what were the roles and responsibilities of every partner was one of our challenges.
The other challenge was our M&E – how do you really measure all of these things that your are
doing and how do you attribute any changes to specific interventions. Collecting this information
was not easy at all. Also the roles and responsibilities, there was a long discussion about the
governance structure – was it going to be sitting with WFP, was it going to be sitting with
Accenture development partners. That said, we had [regular coordination meetings] with all the
partners in our offices in the US and Indonesia to discuss key issues.
I think we did have some successes. Part of all partnerships is really to at the very beginning to
be clear on what it is that everybody is expecting from this partnership, and PLB was just one
example where there was a little bit lack of clarity on a number of – not the objectives – but a
number of specific activities that were attributed to that particular goal.
What was the strategic reasoning behind Project Laser Beam – and pursuing a broad multi-‐
stakeholder approach?
The bottom line is that all these issues that the WFP works on, we cannot do it ourselves and that
was [the main premise for a broad approach]. As WFP, working with the private sector, most
places that we operate in we purchase food for our emergency operations so we have had
relationships with the private sector for a very long time. Fx DSM we buy from them
micronutrient powders that we use in our different activities. So we have a relationship with
them for a long time in different forums and they have products that are not necessarily used in a
humanitarian operation but are available commercially and if we can work with them to actually
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help with is especially the messaging -‐ I think that is one of the things that is especially
important because they have a private sector who are involved with marketing and selling their
products all over the world. They are very much aware of how to target different communities,
understanding what is needed.. And together with the private sector, understanding what are the
deficiencies that micronutrients that need to be in food – and is there somewhere that we can get
a product on the market that is available and everybody understands why it is important… if we
can work together with multinationals, multinationals that have strong investments locally, who
are going to stay for a long time, then they can build up that market but not just for the profit side
of it [they are obviously companies who are looking to make money], but there is a need / a
group of people who are not being addressed.
I think that the dilemma is really where to go, fx going back to Indonesia, one of the things that
was not very successful in Indonesia is that the private sector (I think) would have preferred that
we were in Java where there was a bigger market than in [Kupang] in the east because that is
without a [properly functioning] market. So we incurred a little bit of discussion – where do you
make an investment, do you make it somewhere where there is more return for your investment
whereas at the same time where there is food insecurity, where are there the highest level of is
malnutrition and usually in the poorest parts. Having the expertise of the WFP’s nutritionists,
WFP’s connections with governments (minister of health, district of health officials) we can come
to the table and bring these people together – including the private sector and the government
and I think that link is very important, whether it is MOH, Minister of Agr, and whether it is
private sector coming in and giving better advice to farmers on how to improve their yield, what
kind of crops to grow that will actually help them whether it is increasing their yields for their
own consumption or for [producing crops] that can be used by company X to produce nutritious
blended food.
So it is the whole chain that connects everybody including potential beneficiaries who can stand
on their own. So the premise is basically very simple: we cannot do this alone. I think having the
private sector involved is something that – you know, if the private sector is [invested in a place
for a long time] – one of the things that the WFP, sometimes we have a problem with funding for
our operations. Fx, we really do have to make sure that we group together with everybody else to
ensure that all those resources that are available can be used to the best [extent]. I would say that
would some of the reasons that we should we working with the private sector…
What differentiates PLB from previous partnerships has worked on?
What differentiated it was the number of partners from different angles. We had DSM, who are
less commercial than Kraft or Unilever – so they are coming from a different angle. Having all of
those different players / stakeholders helped us to think through more what is it that each
partner could bring. And the fact that we had everybody focusing on the one district or one
region was something where you could actually have a focused impact. [We could better
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understand] what resources were available, who is doing what. It was more the focus [that] was
the most interesting – everyone was focused on the same area and then you can actually have
better impact.
Since it was only a pilot I think the fact that it did have its successes and you could say it is like a
model that could work, and it was proven to work [in some areas it didn’t work very well] but
you could then take this model and say it doesn’t have to be in just the [shakira district], it needs
to be expanded more – similar to the Millennium Village Project – how can we expand that more.
The way to address malnutrition is multi-‐pronged, and this has been proven through PLB but it
was proven in a small area for a small period of time and we need to scale it up because the
issues of malnutrition do not get solved in just a couple of years. So I think the message from PLB
is that it is a good pilot and a lot of achievements made but it needs to be more sustained and that
will enable a UN entity to work closely with the private sector and bring these issues to the table
and I think that that it is one of the things that has made it a good partnership because I think it
would have been much more difficult for a MNC to go directly to government and talk some of
these issues that the WFP and others are more recognized for by government and I think having
us all as one unit was something that was very helpful.
How do you view the role of the private sector going forward?
The private sector is [clearly] a development partner… our humanitarian and development
operations are in many countries covering just the tip of the iceberg so we need to be able to
address everybody who needs [help]. So working with the private sector is absolutely key to
addressing nutrition. Some of the partners have the advantage that they are very good at
understanding the consumers and their behavioural change, so they can really help us
understand behavioural change and help us with campaigns on nutrition. One of the things we
have to ensure together with the private sector is to ensure that these products that are available
are available for everybody. And of course we have to get -‐ the government of course has to be
involved, we have to get some kind of policies that encourage investment in certain fields, is also
something that would be useful in the whole chain of enabling us to help them. Whether it is PLB
with a larger number of partners or if it just a partnership with one or two private sector
partners I think that is the way that we have to go.
