PAD 5384 lecture eight

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Master of public administration program

PAD 5384 Civic groups & public policy

Summer 2014

Implementation Implementation gaffe of the week

Photo credit

American Red Cross

Post- 12 Sep 2001 fundraising *

Lecture goals: Discuss the role of civic groups in policy implementation.

As discussed earlier in the class: Brewer and deLeon (1983) introduce implementation as

"Implementation is an important but frequently overlooked step in the general policy process

model. Lacking proper implementation, policy innovation and selection may end up being

little more than intellectual exercises; indeed, faulty policy implementation can invalidate the

earlier, carefully considered steps in the policy process and thereby intensify the original

problem. The process, then, warrants our careful attention" (p. 249).

In this class on civic groups & public policy we are, of course, especially interested in thinking

about public policy in terms of how civic groups fit in. Implementation is hugely important

because of all the contracting out and/or downloading that 'we the people' are doing these days.

Nonprofits are often being contracted to implement public programs.

It is also important to remember that civic groups are also important autonomous actors in public

policy. Public policy is often seen (even defined) as that which government does; but a broader

definition would include action that is done in the public interest. Therefore, just as a

government initiative to educate children is public policy, so is a nonprofit program with the

same goal.

NPOs often serve a useful watchdog role in the implementation phase of public policy,

highlighting potential implementation failures.

Finally, while agenda setting and policy formulation are often the realm of policy advocacy

NPOs; policy implementation is often the realm of service provision NPOs.

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Gerston nicely introduces the problem with implementation: "most of the time we do not even

think about implementation, viewing it, instead, as an automatic extension of the policymaking

process. Naively, we tend to think that policies are preprogrammed into the implementation

mode" (2002, p. 109-10). He suggests smoking bans and fireworks bans as examples. Is it true

that an ordinance isn't enough, but legislation actually has to be implemented as well?

Early points from Gerston (here I draw on the book of his that I used in 2006)

Policy implementation requires change, which people often resist.

The implementation of public policy also involves a principal-agent problem: "it is enacted

by individuals or organizations who act on behalf of others” (p. 110).

Public policies are typically implemented by public servants!

o Yet government has increasingly 'devolved' implementation of public policies to NPOs (and

for profit contractors).

Requirements for implementation Translation ability: The policy must be understood by implementing agents. This applies in

terms of what the policy is, and how it is to be carried out.

Resources

o Self evident: you can't police a border if you don't have enough patrol agents on the

ground, enough court space to prosecute those caught, and enough jail space to

incarcerate them.

This can also apply not just in terms of the quantity of units deployed to implement a

policy, but also in terms of the quality of units deployed. Pay cuts, say for teachers, will

inevitably led to deterioration in the quality of implementing agents (see link and link).

o As succinctly put by that noted American social thinker and

philosopher, Pogo the Possum (right): we the People are often at

fault, too, as we want services but don't want to pay the taxes, or

even to borrow from China, enough money to support them.

Limited number of players

o Understood in terms of "relatively few agencies... involved in the

process" (p. 114). Think of the sixteen US intelligence agencies

implementing US security intelligence policy prior to 2002.

How likely was it all of these agencies would agree on anything?

o This is related to Gerston's next point: accountability. If there are too

many players involved, it is easy for one poorly performing player to

shift blame to another; the complexity of modern society makes these claims and counter-

claims hard to sort out.

America's intergovernmental system seems ideally built to lead to this plethora of

blame-shifting policy actors. There are some 90,106 ‘governments’ in the US alone.

Think of the flooding of New Orleans as a result of Hurricane Katrina: was the fault

the US Federal Government, State of Louisiana, City of New Orleans, Orleans Parish,

or the Orleans Levee Board?

Well, maybe the latter, but

surely some of the other actors bear part of the blame; the Federal government,

for instance, apparently had cut its flood prevention (levee building) grants, and

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what of the citizens, with their reluctance to pay taxes? There were no marches on

the streets prior to Katrina, demanding that the Levee Board raise the taxes to

build adequate levees. See, again, P. Possum, above.

o Accountability. Some entity (a public agency) needs to be responsible for implementation,

preferably accountable to someone else (an elected body or appointed official),

with a well-defined process for accounting,

including agreed on performance criteria.

Causes of faulty implementation 'Post-decision bargaining'

o Imprecision -- part of what Gerston seems to be getting at is lack of precision in the

legislation (or instruction) creating the program, so that the various parties haggle after

the fact to change things. This becomes especially critical when contracts are agreed to.

o Bureaucratic discretion -- Here, the implementing agents may just interpret the policy

differently, or intentionally disregard instructions. Often this is good, occasionally it isn't.

Poor oversight

o This was certainly alleged in terms of US military action under the previous US federal

administration. The argument goes that the President was too loyal to his senior

appointees (junior official Brown was out as a result of the fiasco in New Orleans; while

senior officials Rumsfeld, Rice et al remained despite the poor performance of their

implementation plan in Iraq), and the pre-2006 Congress was reluctant to challenge an

administration that demanded loyalty from its party. As a result, too few questions were

asked about priorities (more resources devoted to nation-building in Iraq, rather than the

'war on terror' in Afghanistan) and methods (number of troops deployed, availability of

body armour and armour for humvees, etc.).

o Lack of stakeholder buy-in: The idea here is that a policy is more likely to enjoy successful

implementation if no one is trying to prevent this. Intuitive enough, yes?

Some policies are inherently conflictual, as contrary to policies of others:

China's desire to export conflicts with America's desire to reduce imports! Not to

mention that American desires for jobs conflict with American desires for

inexpensive Chinese-made goods.

The Bush administration's desire for peace and democracy in Iraq conflicted with the

nationalist insurgency's desire to continue fighting until (at least) American troops are

out of the country. Or: the Bush administration's assertion that "we can't lose" in

defeating the insurgents in Iraq conflicted with the views of the insurgents that they

can't lose in kicking the Americans out.

Society's desire for no drugs conflicts with the desire for drugs of sellers and users.

Some policies simply require buy-in.

An anti-smoking policy would be more likely to be smoothly implemented if the

private establishments where smoking still takes place agreed with the policy. This

might require some give on the part of the city, with some exemptions, provisions for

smoking-only areas, and such.

An anti-crime program in a high-crime area will be more likely to succeed if the

community sees the police as law enforcers, rather than as intruders. This may

simply require talking to community leaders!

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A decision to consolidate a couple of schools is more likely to avoid resistance if

community members are part of the decision-making process, so they understand why

the consolidation is being proposed, and at least feel like they've been shown the

courtesy of consultation.

Some policies are (or appear to be) unethical, and implementing officials will balk.

Implementation models

In terms of our discussion so far, the table below indicates different perspectives on the role of

civil society in three different stages of public policy:

Table 1

Models of public policy

in three governance paradigms and three stages of the policy process

Traditional public

administration New public management New public service

Key

characteristics

Bureaucracy and

democracy

Market-mediated

decisions

Civic dialogue-mediated

decisions

PAD 5384

sources

Woodrow Wilson and

Larry Lynn Goldsmith and Shughart

Denhardt & Denhardt,

Thomas

Agenda setting

Legislators (in

consultation with

public) put issues on

the policy agenda.

Bureaucrats may also

do this, within the

realm of their

technical expertise.

Irrelevant: market

choice decides what gets

done.

Legislators (in

consultation with public)

put issues on the policy

agenda.

Bureaucrats may also do

this, again interacting

directly with the public.

Formulation

Largely a function of

bureaucrats, drawing

on their technical

expertise.

Again, market-mediated

choice decides how

goods & services will be

provided, to whom.

Public dialogue is

emphasized.

Implementation Bureaucrats do this, in

public agencies.

Markets do this, either

directly through private

markets, or through

business and nonprofit

organizations contracted

to provide public

services.

Interaction between

government and civic

groups still featured, but

formal contracting de-

emphasized. Instead

government works with

civic groups.

The ‘traditional bureaucratic’ approach

The logic is simple: form an agency → hire personnel → implement policy. What could go

wrong?

The justification is simple: market failures! As discussed in week two. Many types:

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Justice

National defence

Major infrastructure

Public goods, with education specifically mentioned

Monopoly or oligopoly

Asymmetric information -- if one party in an exchange (usually the seller) knows more than

the purchaser.

Externalities -- when A sells to B, but in the process of the production or use of the product,

C is affected.

Equity concerns -- when the benefits of the increase in societal wealth accrue to a narrow

few. In the US, especially, with its reverence both of the Constitution and of the Bible, this is

doubly disturbing, as undercutting the Constitutional charge to promote the general welfare;

and as contrary to the fundamental Christian charge to 'do unto' 'the least among us'.

Principal/agent problems -- when employees act in their own, rather than the organization's

interest.

Irrationality -- Markets assume rational decision-making on the part of consumers and

suppliers. Yet as especially the spate of recent bubbles has shown (not to mention personal

bankruptcies), this is an at least questionable assumption.

The criticisms of the bureaucratic approach to implementation are myriad: government failure!

Advocates of privatization/marketization present these failures, ad nauseum. Goldsmith and

Bridgeland provide a good example of this, with two passing slaps:

“The legislation puts its faith in civil society, not distant government bureaucracies…”

“The bill will require that any new funding be offset from other programs, – and there are

more than enough failed government programs that could be converted…”

Etzioni, on the other hand, provides a more balanced perspective:

“Ideologues have pretended for more than 200 years that there is a choice between free

markets – and all the alleged blessings thereof – and big government, which ‘interferes’ in

the markets, curtails efficiency, and kills jobs. Actually, an honest argument would …be

limited to questions of whether specific areas need more or less regulation, what kinds of

regulation are most suitable, and how tightly they ought to be drawn” (2009, p. 41).

Still…as noted below, public accountability requires a contract management process, and so an

“irony that the regulations which accompany government contracts with nonprofit service

providers tend to reduce the flexibility, autonomy, and discretion of the contracting agency –

that is, the regulations weaken those features which make the nongovernment agency an

attractive alternative in the first place” (Johnston and Romzek, p. 389).

Other models

Smith and Larimer identify 'three generations' of studies of implementation, as people who think

about this sort of thing have tried to make sense of it. The first generation (pp. 158-62) was just

the observation that implementation matters. Think, again, of the post-invasion plan in the US

invasion of Iraq. However brilliant the plan might be, you have to "go to war with the Army you

have. They're not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time" (Ricks 2004, p.

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A1). And so if the implementing agency isn't up to the task of carrying out the brilliant plan...

maybe a plan should have been written up that was implementable by the army you have?

Top down approaches to policy implementation. Smith and Larimer's second generation of

implementation studies focus especially on the distinction between top down and bottom up

approaches. By 'top down' approaches to implementation Smith and Larimer essentially refer to

those characterized by planning from the top, so the emphasis is on managers directing the

process, leadership, and all that (crikey, I can hardly type that 'leadership' codswallop' without

wanting to barf me guts up...). They open with Bardach's notion of 'implementation games':

The games metaphor focuses "analysts attention on the actors involved in implementation;

the stakes they played for; they rules they played by; and the tactics, strategies, and resources

each brought to the table" (Smith & Larimer 2009, pp. 162).

Smith and Larimer (pp. 164-6) then refer to Sabatier and Mazmanian's model of the

implementation process. I happen to have it reproduced electronically, so by way of example,

I'll reproduce it in Figure 2.

Figure 2

Sabatier and Mazmanian's model of the implementation process

Tractability of the Problem 1. Availability of valid technical theory and technology

2. Diversity of target-group behavior

3. Target group as a percentage of the population

4. Extent of behavioral change required

↓ ↓

Ability of stature to structure

implementation 1. Clear and consistent objectives

2. Incorporation of adequate causal

theory

3. Financial resources

4. Hierarchical integration with and

among implementing institutions

5. Decision-rules of implementing

agencies

6. Recruitment of implementing officials

7. Formal access by outsiders

Nonstatutory variables affecting

implementation 1. Socioeconomic conditions and

technology

2. Media attention to the problem

3. Public support

4. Attitudes and resources of

constituency groups

5. Support from sovereigns

6. Commitment and leadership skill

of implementing officials

↓ ↓

Stages (dependent variables) in the implementation process)

Policy

outputs of

implementing

agencies

→

Compliance

with policy

outputs by

target groups

→

Actual

impacts

of policy

outputs

→

Perceived

impacts of

policy

outputs

→

Major

revision in

statute

Source: Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980, p. 154

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For what it's worth, I find these sorts of frameworks to be useful if only as checklists that the

public or nonprofit manager might consult to ensure that s/he has considered everything before

implementation (or when formulating policy proposals!).

Bottom up approaches to policy implementation. 'Top down' approaches to implementation

might best be understood in contrast to their implied opposite: 'bottom up' approaches. As

Birkland indicates, 'bottom up' approaches focus on what Lipsky famously termed 'street level

bureaucrats'. Implementation here is critically dependent not on what the manager wants done,

but on what the official on the street actually does. For Smith and Larimer:

"For the 'bottom-uppers,' it is down at the street level where implementation really happens,

and to favor a center over a periphery perspective is to ignore the practical realities of

delivering public services. A number of scholars pitched the argument that because

implementation was ultimately dependent on street-level bureaucrats, they had to take center

stage in any theory of the implementation process. Actually, the bottom-uppers' argument

went even further. Given that street level bureaucrats were clearly making policy. and given

that compliance issues with the center were virtually inevitable. it made sense to start

thinking of implementation as an important stage of the policy formulation process. From

the bottom-up perspective, it made sense to make the periphery's implementation perspective

(and the target population's) a key issue in the process of resolving questions of 'what should

we do?'" (pp. 167-8)

To belabor the Iraq invasion example: Rumsfeld was probably wrong that 'the army he had', his

implementing agency, was where his plan to invade Iraq went awry. The invasion went well,

with the Ba'athists collapsing quickly, and a relatively small level of civilian 'collateral

damage'. Instead, it was the consolidation -- the nation-building phase -- where things went

awry. It is hard to blame this on the implementing agency, for as the administration well knew:

"The President must remember that the military is a special instrument. It is lethal, and it is

meant to be. It is not a civilian police force. It is not a political referee. And it is most

certainly not designed to build a civilian society. Military force is best used to support clear

political goals, whether limited, such as expelling Saddam from Kuwait, or comprehensive,

such as demanding the unconditional surrender of Japan and Germany during World War

II. It is one thing to have a limited political goal and to fight for it; it is quite another to apply

military force incrementally, hoping to find a political solution somewhere along the way"

(Rice, 2000, p. 53).

Instead, a major flaw in the plan was in not taking into consideration the views of what the

'bottom uppers' refer to as the 'target population': the Iraqi people. US troops were not 'greeted

as liberators', at least not both in a sustained fashion, and in a fashion that would lead a

substantial portion of Iraqis to ‘dob-in’ insurgents. In short, divisions within Iraq were making

political reconciliation impossible (see link), and for the US to police this society would require

too many resources potentially needed elsewhere.

Load shedding. Another type of relationship between government and civic groups is what has

been referred to as ‘load shedding’. Metaphorically, government throws momma off of the train,

and hopes (or not!) someone will care enough to catch her. Rather than contracting out, where

government funds but private actors implement (Johnston and Romzek, p. 385); here private

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actors implement without funding assistance. Incremental load shedding. We have also seen

what might be termed incremental load shedding: government shifts implementation to a

nonprofit group, then slowly cuts funding.

Contract management. As

Johnston and Romzek note (p.

384), legislators seeking to cut

costs by contracting out often

overlook costs of contract

management. This is despite

“The logic of accountability

under contracting is that of

specifying the mutual

expectations, responsibilities,

and obligations of the

contracting parties. Some

government actor, as principal,

monitors the agent for

compliance with the terms

specified in the contract for

performance outcomes” (p.

387).

This is reflected in their Figure 1

(from page 386) at the right.

Compare, for instance, the

contracting out of the construction

of a new school, with Medicaid

case management services.

Ignoring this can have disastrous consequences, as the experience of contracting in Iraq

illustrated. By 2004 warnings were already being sounded (source), and a 2006 report stated:

“Instability—such as when wants, needs, and contract requirements are in a state of flux—

requires greater attention to oversight, which in turn relies on a capable government

workforce. Managing the attendant risks in unstable situations grows in both importance and

difficulty. Unfortunately, attention to oversight and a capable government workforce has not

always been evident during the reconstruction effort. Such workforce challenges are not

unique to Iraq. DOD’s civilian workforce shrank by about 38 percent between fiscal years

1989 and 2002, but DOD performed this downsizing without ensuring that remaining staff

had the specific skills and competencies needed to accomplish future DOD missions. In other

cases, contractors have taken over support positions that were traditionally filled by

government personnel” (source).

By 2011, a DoD report stated that:

“At least one in every six dollars of U.S. spending for contracts and grants in Iraq and

Afghanistan over the past decade, or more than $30 billion, has been wasted…

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“Tens of billions of taxpayer dollars have been wasted through poor planning, vague and

shifting requirements, inadequate competition, substandard contract management and

oversight, lax accountability, weak interagency coordination, and subpar performance or

outright misconduct by some contractors and federal employees…

“the United States embarked on operations in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003

without adequate planning or contract-management personnel to handle the enormous scale

and numbers of contracts” (source).

Problems: lack of competition

(Johnston and Romzek, p. 384), among

others.

Implementation failure

Johnston and Romzek’s analysis of the

Kansas Medicaid reform shows a

complex accountability relationship

between the nonprofit contractors, and

the state government. They reflect this

in their Figure 3, which I copy in at the

right. Their key observation is that

there are hierarchical, legal,

professional and political types of

accountability relationships with, in

this case, all four functioning at once.

Keep in mind, too, that this is a

relatively complex example of

contracting, as we discussed above.

Birkland notes that:

"both journalists and policy

scientists like bad news: Journalists

will report when government has

lost a lot of money, but will ignore

evidence of those instances when

the government has saved money

through some sort of

innovation. At the same time, most

of our books on policy

implementation describe policy

failures." (p. 189-90)

Birkland presents a useful table with 'explanations for policy failure.' I'll reproduce it below,

with suggested examples of each in a third column:

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Table 3

Examples of Birkland's 'explanations for policy failure' Type Explanation Example

Alternatives to

policies tried

Failure needs to be assessed

in terms of the 'do nothing'

option, and in terms of the

likelihood that other options

would have been more or

less successful.

Critics note that despite $billions in anti-

poverty programs, poverty in the US has

stayed stubbornly at 12-15%, creeping up a bit

since 2000. But poverty was 10% higher in the

1950s, so how bad would it be if there were no

anti-poverty programs (see link)?

The impact of

changing

circumstances

Changing circumstances can

render policies less

successful

Low 1980s energy prices lead to less

conservation, and so more foreign dependency

in the 2000s (see link)!

Relationships of

one policy to

another

Policies are interrelated. Tax cuts will hurt the federal budget,

increasing the national debt (see link).

The boundary

question

Political boundaries will

influence policy success. The Northwest Atlantic cod collapse.

Excessive

policy demand/

realizable

expectations

We may expect too much.

Building a democracy at the point of a gun, in

a region with little experience with democracy,

a cultural world with little success with

democracy, and a multi-ethnic state (see link).

Accurate theory

of causation

Policy will fail if it is not

based on sound casual

theory.

What impact will the current immigration

reform proposals have on illegal immigration:

will prospective immigrants queue in orderly

fashion; continue to enter illegally, induced by

the 'amnesty', or will current immigrants 'self

deport' (see link)?

Choice of

effective policy

tools

The choice of ineffective

tools will likely yield

failure.

"The President must remember that the

military is a special instrument. It is lethal, and

it is meant to be. It is not a civilian police

force. It is not a political referee. And it is

most certainly not designed to build a civilian

society." -- Condoleezza Rice Foreign Affairs

79/1 (2000). See link for full article.

The vagaries of

implementation

The problems inherent in

policy implementation can

contribute to policy failure.

Hmmm...

Failure of

political

institutions

"Policy failure is simply a

symptom of more profound

ailments within our political

institutions..."

Perhaps disengaged voters, coupled with a

Congress (Democrats included from 11 Sep

2001 to about November 2006) that lacked the

courage to assume its Constitutional role as an

equal branch of government, explains much of

the policy failure in Afghanistan and Iraq (see

link). Source: adapted from Birkland, p. 191

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Weak research! It may well be that policy research has focused overmuch on failure, and this

reflects a faulty research design, with no variance on the dependent variable. You'd need to

incorporate both success and failure into an analysis, so that the unique characteristics of the

failures can be identified through contrast with the successes (or at least non-failures!).

Similarly, some criticisms of 'atheoretical', practitioner-based research on public policy argue

that these present 'best case' examples of success. In other words, you find a program that

appears to have succeeded and try to figure out why. Look at almost anything Goldsmith has

published. This sort of backward-induction, though, is prone to biased analysis. If you're a

Marxist, you're going to find a class-based explanation for success. If you’re Goldsmith, you’re

going to find a market-based explanation for success.

But as for the news, it is certainly true that good news is no news!

*

Termination! Our model of the policy process has been as follows:

Agenda setting – an issue gets the attention of the public, and/or policy makers.

Estimation – these actors try to figure out the parameters of the issue, as well as policy

response options.

Selection – a choice is made (or not made) from these options (hopefully).

Implementation – actually carry out the program resulting from the policy analysis.

Evaluation – try to figure out if it has worked as a response to the initial issue.

Termination – the subject of this lecture.

Brewer and deLeon describe termination as follows:

“Termination generally refers to the adjustment of policies and programs that have become

dysfunctional, redundant, outmoded, unnecessary, or even counterproductive. As termination

is the finish of one set of expectations, rules and practices, a sense of finality is easily seen in

the concept; however, less evident but perhaps more important is the idea that termination is

frequently only the replacement of one set of practices with another. Termination signals the

beginning of the policy process as much as it does its end” (p. 385).

Adjustment. Note that, especially with reference to the week six criticism of the stages model by

Guy Peters, the model is not simplistic in its assumption that a policy starts at agenda setting,

progresses through the different stages, and then is terminated at some point. Brewer and

deLeon, at any rate (see also Geva-May, p. 310), note that issues often cycle through the policy

process, with evaluation often setting the stage for ‘adjustment’, which may include considering

termination (or modifying elements of) one approach and setting the agenda to try to determine a

better policy response.

Unintended consequences. Brewer and deLeon provide the example of the termination of state

mental institutions in California:

“…a strong presumption was that those released would somehow be cared for, probably in

community-based facilities. It was an erroneous presumption, particularly for the seriously

disabled. While the closure of the state facilities struck a certain note of finality in one

sector, it merely initiated a whole series of new problems for several others – cities, counties,

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the community mental health systems, the criminal justice system, the welfare system, and

various private mental health providers. The problem did not go away, it got shifted

elsewhere” (p. 386).

Equally important: the net cost to society very likely exceeded the savings in the state budget

with the closure of the state institutions.

Practical questions.

“Who will suffer from the termination and in what ways?

“What obligations do authorities have to those disadvantaged, such as due process, severance

and other compensation, or ethical and moral responsibilities?

“What costs -- not limited to simple monetary ones – accrue to individuals affected by

termination? “Can these be accounted and compensated for” (p. 386). Related to all of

these, think of defense downsizing:

Defense contractors are an obvious example, given the number of US weapons systems

that we build that DoD doesn’t want (source).

Members of the armed forces who are being, or going to be downsized (source).

But then, given the need for recruitment bonuses during the tougher days of the Iraqi

occupation (source), hasn’t this always been a market deal, anyhow?

The Iraqi people (source)? The people of Afghanistan (source)? Do we owe them

anything

Morality. Brewer and deLeon go on to discuss the ‘ethical, moral and legal dimensions’ of

termination, with these implied in some of the questions above.

Conceptual challenges. A number of conceptual challenges exist for understanding termination:

Strong negative connotations. We don’t like to think about death (?!).

Too little data. “…only 27 federal agencies out of a sample of 421 had gone out of business

since 1923” (p. 390)!

Fuzziness. It is hard to differentiate between termination; and policy fine-tuning,

reorganization, and such.

Geva-May similarly notes that “termination can be applied to functions, organizations,

policies, and programs. Sometimes these are so tightly connected that it is hard to identify

them as separate entities…” (p. 312).

Few incentives….

…to study termination. Times were good (Brewer & deLeon published in 1983, don’t

forget), termination wasn’t a hot topic.

…to terminate. Elsewhere Brewer & deLeon point out that there are generally supporters

for any program (otherwise it wouldn’t be there!). These generally have strong feelings in

favour of the program, and often benefit directly and handsomely from it. Opponents,

though, hardly know the program exists.

Concentrated benefits and diffuse costs. This phenomenon goes a long way to explain

why a handful of goat herders have been able to game 100,000,000s of Americans for

so long. For a Cato discussion, see Boaz 2001).

An example of staying power. See Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1789.

This identifies a number of powers of the US Congress.

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How many of these have since been terminated, 223 years later?

Does this mean that we are reluctant to change, and that powerful forces are preventing this?

Termination strategies

How to terminate those relentless, indestructible cyborgs: Angora

goats (see right)? Geva-May suggests the logic of Kingdon’s

policy windows. As she puts it:

“My” (see instructions: ‘Do not use first person -- e.g. my…’)

“underlying assumption is that termination, possibly more

than any other optional avenue can occur in decision windows

that open and close as political, policy, and problem streams

converge… or in opportunity windows that may be induced or

enlarged by agendas and related dimensions” (p. 310) .

Impediments to termination.

‘Nonchoice’. For Geva-May, the difficulties involved in policy termination can be seen as a

good example of what we earlier termed ‘non-decisions’. Here, the ultimate exercise of

power is not to influence decisions that favour oneself; but to influence the policy agenda so

that issues that threaten you are not even put on the agenda.

Factors impeding termination:

“Politicians’ reluctance to damage an existing program apparatus,

“The initial design of the policy,

“The brutality of conflicts around an issue, and, finally,

“The dearth of effective political incentives” (p. 312).

High startup costs (think of the Duval County Courthouse).

Strategies to avoid termination.

Fake stuff. Kind of like what the conspiracy theorists think happened during the moon

landings (source).

Hide stuff. “obscurity, secrecy, and technical and scientific reputation” (p. 315).

Raise political costs. Build coalitions that will punish anyone who threatens your goats.

Financial and legal costs.

Emotional costs. Shortly after election Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels proposed

abolishing Indiana’s townships, and drastically reforming local government through

consolidation (source). As the report noted: “Indiana is blessed with a wealth of dedicated

elected officials and government employees. But because many of them work in a local

government model that dates back to the mid-1800s, they’re often hindered in their desire to

better serve their communities” (p. 8). Despite this obsolete system of local government,

the proposal went nowhere. Too many residents of townships, the smallest unit of

government in Indiana, had an emotional attachment to these places, however obsolete.

The logic of policy windows. As indicated, Geva-May sees successful termination as an agenda

setting issue, in terms of Kingdon’s policy windows. When problems, policies and politics line

up, there is an opportunity to terminate. As indicated in lecture seven, For Kingdon, three things

have to come together for a policy to get on the institutional agenda:

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Page 14 of 15

Problem. An issue is identified by all (or significant number of) actors, and/or gatekeepers to

the institutional agenda (Kingdon, ch. 5).

Policy. Solutions are identified, or it is believed something can be done about the problem

(Kingdon, ch. 6).

Politics. It is in the interests of enough legislators to get a bill passed (Kingdon, ch. 7).

Strategies to terminate.

Think ahead: sunset! Include sunset clauses. The Bush administration tax cuts, for instance,

were meant to be short term. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of

2001 (114 pages, just to change a percentage?) was passed on June 7, 2001. As its name

implies, it sought to do two things:

Grow the economy.

Weak before the act. The economy had been in a short recession, with growth of 0.3%

in the 3rd

quarter of 2000, 2.4% in 4th

quarter 2000, and -1.3% in 1st quarter 2001.

Weaker after the act.

The economy had returned to growth in 2nd

quarter 2000, then immediately on

enactment, slipped back to -1.1% in 3rd

quarter 2001.

Tepid subsequent growth. From 2002 through 2007, average growth was 2.6%, only

1% lower than the average 3.5% average rate of growth of the Clinton years, which

began with a tax hike.

Armageddon. Of course, the GW Bush record presented above ignores the economic

debacle of 2008-9.

Provide tax relief.

Surplus. The logic presumably was that taxes were too high. Indeed, in 2001 the US

federal government was actually taking more money from citizens in taxes than it was

paying out for public goods, running what accountants refer to as a ‘surplus’ (a sort of

rarified creature seldom seen in US federal fiscal policy) equal to 1.3% of GDP. So

citizens were ‘relieved’ of the excessive burden of this surplus, rather than using this

surplus for some frivolous purpose like paying down debt.

Debt. What wasn’t well explained at the time was why these surpluses were not

continued, given that the US had debts of some $3.5b at the time, and the previous

four years of surpluses had resulted in the debt being lowered (from 49% of GDP in

1993 to 32% in 2001.

The Act was set to expire, though, on December 21, 2010, when presumably the tax relief

and economic growth purposes were no longer relevant.

Success thresholds. Write into the program that it will expire if measures of the underlying

policy issue reach a certain level. Reduce youth crime to x,

increase job growth to y, etc.

Build coalitions. Or, given that advocates of the status quo are

building coalitions to keep the program in place, build a

counter-coalition.

Evaluation. Make your case. For all the science-bashing and

systematic spin that characterizes the current policy scene,

reality does still matter, at some level.

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Page 15 of 15

Buy off opponents. Want to bring in Social Security and Medicare reform but worried about

opposition from seniors? Buy them off, exempting them from any of the pain. A problem in

this case is that my generation, the folks being bought off, have not paid our fair share into

the system. This is indicated in the graphic at the end of the previous page, which is from the

linked source.

Mind the windows. Geva-May’s broader point, though, is to be conscious of opportunities.

If a problem becomes identified as such,

a solution can be identified and accepted by a coalition, and

the political time seems right,

termination has a better chance of occurring.

*

Summary: the best laid plans will come to naught, if not effectively implemented. Civic groups

can be a key player both in facilitating successful implementation, and in causing

implementation failure.

References

Birkland, Thomas (2005). An Introduction to the Policy Process. ME Sharpe.

Boaz, David (2011). “Well worth the money.” Cato Institute. Available online.

Brewer, Garry and Peter deLeon (1983). The Foundations of Policy Analysis, Pacific Grove:

Brooks/Cole.

Gerston, Larry (2002). Public Policymaking in a Democratic Society. M. E. Sharpe.

Rice, Condoleezza (2000). "Promoting the National Interest." Foreign Affairs, 79(1), pp. 45-

62. EBSCO link.

Ricks, Thomas (2009). "Rumsfeld Gets Earful From Troops." Washington Post, 9 December,

available online.

Sabatier, Paul and Daniel Mazmanian (1980). "A conceptual framework of the implementation

process." In Stella Theodoulou and Matthew Cahn Public Policy: The essential readings,

Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Smith, Kevin and Christopher Larimer (2009). The Public Policy Theory Primer. Boulder:

Westview.