Marx on Religion (Tucker)

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    Marx on Religion

    1) Basis of Marxs Critique

    Opposition to Hegel. Marx criticizes German Idealism as espoused by Hegel,

    specifically because of the primacy it places on mind and spirit. Particularlydisturbing for Marx is the fact that Hegel starts out from the estrangement of

    substance (the abstractly universal) as embodied in religion and theology, leading

    him to conceive of material reality as entities of thought, and therefore simply an

    estrangement ofpure, i.e. abstract, philosophical thought (1844a: 77). Hegel posits

    that the process of dialectic undergirding all of reality ultimately culminates in

    absolute knowledge/spirit. For Marx, such an approach is flawed because of its basis

    on abstractly sensuous consciousness where the mind alone is the true essence of

    man and where sense perception, religion, the power of the state, etc., are spiritual

    entities (1844a: 79-80). Hegel thus falls into the trap of what Marx calls alienated

    self consciousness, which can only establish thingness, i.e. an abstract thing and nota real thing. Marx asserts that if religion results from alienated self-consciousness,

    then the self-consciousness which belongs to the essence of my own self is

    confirmed not in religion but in the destruction and supersession of religion (1844a:

    86).

    Acknowledgement of Feuerbach. For Marx, Feuerbachs appropriation of the

    dialectic represents an improvement over Hegel. Feuerbach acknowledges the

    importance of material realities, but Marx insists this is not enough because

    sensuousness is conceived in the form of the object or perception, but not as

    sensuous human activity [praxis] (1845: 182). Marx scores Feuerbach for merelymaking material reality the object of human contemplation, insisting that

    [Feuerbach] does not comprehend sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous

    activity (1845: 183).

    2) Historical Dialectical Materialism

    Marx formulates his alternative to both Hegel and Feuerbach by grounding

    human history not in the arbitrary premises of German Idealism, but in the

    existence of living human individuals and their production of a means of

    subsistence (1844-6: 149-50). The basis of history is a particular mode of production

    (the material and technological resources current in society), which gives rise to a

    particular intercourse or relation of men [other translations, a relation of production]

    (the allocation of production and the division of labor) [1844-6: 150-2, 176-86].

    There is a dialectic relationship between the mode of production and the relation of

    production as history moves along, leading ultimately to the union of the mode and

    relation of production in Communism. Communism is brought about by the

    inevitability of class conflict and ultimately, the triumphant revolution of the

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    proletariat. In this revolution, the Communist party serves as a transitory vanguard

    until the creation of a classless society with state ultimately withering away.

    One important aspect of Marxs historical system which will be reflected in his

    views on religion is that consciousness itself is a social product that is interwoven

    with the material activity and the material intercourse of men (1844-6: 158). Also,prior to the advent of Communism, Marx notes that the the ideas of the ruling class

    are in every epoch the ruling ideas (1844-6: 172). These dominant ideas and forms

    of consciousness have come to be known as the superstructure reflecting the

    material base of society.

    3) Critique of Religion

    Early on, Marx acknowledges that religion can have a place human society vis-

    -vis the notion of political emancipation. He is emphatic especially that the state

    should emancipate itself from state religion, i.e., by acknowledging no religion, by

    instead acknowledging itself as state (1843: 50). Religion should be banished fromthe province of public law to that of private law (1843: 53). In this manner, political

    emancipation allows religionbut not privileged religionto continue in

    existence. (1843: 57).

    Later however Marx becomes more critical of religion. He observes that

    religion is the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not won or

    has lost himself again (1844b: 171). He considers religion to be a product of the

    state and society (again, a part of the superstructure), and is thus an inverted

    consciousness of the world (1844b: 171). Marx does give some credit to religion in

    stating that religious suffering is at one and the same time the expression of realsuffering and a protest against real suffering; he grants to it a certain validity as a

    response to suffering, as the sigh of the oppressed creature the opium of the

    people (i.e. as bringing relief, not the popularized notion of pie in the sky, ref

    1844b: 171). Just as quickly, however, Marx declares that religion eventually has to

    go: The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand

    for their real happiness (1844b: 171). Marx therefore dedicates himself to the

    criticism of that vale of tears of which religion is the halo (1844b: 171) presumably

    the oppressive and alienating conditions of society.

    Marx, Karl. 1843. On the Jewish Question.

    _______ 1844a. Critique of Hegels Dialectic and General Philosophy.

    _______ 1844b. Critique of Hegels Philosophy of Right.

    _______ 1845. Concerning Feuerbach.

    _______ 1844-46. The German Ideology.

    _______ 1848. The Communist Manifesto.

    All the excerpts are taken from: Marx, Karl. 1978. The Marx-Engels Reader. Edited

    by R.C. Tucker. New York: Norton Press.