Marx and Foucault: On Ideation

Byron HarmonPhilo 335 Dec. 15th

Marx, Foucault and the production of ideology

Ideology is fundamental to the continuance of a particular power relation in society. Both

Foucault and Marx agree that ideology is reproduced and propagates itself. However, there is

ambiguity and disagreement between the two writers regarding the nature of power relations.

This essay shall attempt to elucidate their differences and commonalities. I will begin by

directing my attention solely at Marx and attempting create a coherent framework regarding the

production of ideology, noting ambiguities where they arise. Foucault will then be explored,

comparing and contrasting his analysis of power with Marx.

Jumping straight into Marx. Marx famously asserts that “The ideas of the ruling class are

in every epoch the ruling ideas” he continues adding “ie the class which is the ruling material

force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of

material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental

production.”(German Ideology p172) If we take this passage at face value, Marx appears to be

positing that the ruling class has a degree of class consciousness and a clear understanding of

itself as the producers of knowledge and ideology. This interpretation is reinforced mere lines

later when he states “Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and

compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other

things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of

the ideas of their age… (German Ideology p173) In this latter instance, the activity of the ruling

class appears directed and conscious. The ruling class has objectives and aims as the ruling class

and consequently take an active role in the production of their ruling ideas. Problematically,

Marx then claims that “inside this class one part appears as the thinkers of the class… Within

this class cleavage can even develop into a certain opposition and hostility between the two parts,



which however, in the case of a practical collision, in which the class itself is endangered

automatically comes to nothing.” (German Ideology p 173) This passage is problematic as it

seems on a certain level to contradict his previous assertion. His earlier assertion seemed to treat

the ruling class as a monolithic whole, actively and with consciousness creating and distributing

its ruling ideology. Here, in contrast, he portrays the ruling class cleft in half, between a mental

laboring half and the other material laboring half. Within this division the mental laborers “make

the perfecting of the illusion of the class about itself their chief livelihood” (p 173) but they seem

to go about it on their own accord at times running into contradiction with their larger class

interest, in which case he asserts that that fold like a house of cards. While, this does feature the

ideologues ultimately yielding to class interest, it suggests a degree of autonomy between

ideation and the interests of the ruling class; that ideas are not monolithically produced and

promulgated by the ruling class with a singular class aim in mind.

With greater certainty we can assert that Marx was not an idealist. For Marx, ideas

unquestionably do not have a life of their own. In this vein he writes “If now in considering the

course of history we detach the ideas of the ruling class from the ruling class itself and attribute

to them an independent existence, if we confine ourselves to saying that these or those ideas

were dominant at a given time, without bothering ourselves about the conditions of production

and the producers of these ideas, if we thus ignore the individuals and world conditions which

are the source of the ideas…” (p173) Here Marx is stating that if we give ideas a life of their own

we are not “bothering ourselves about” or “ignoring” where ideas actually come from. That is,

ideas do not spontaneously arise and dominate in an epoch, rather they are the product of

individuals within a particular productive context. In a similar tone Marx asserts that “…a



division of material and mental labor appears. From this moment onwards consciousness can

really flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice, that it really

represents something…” He continues later “But even if this theory… comes into contradiction

with the existing relations, this can only occur because existing social relations have come in

contradiction with existing forces of production…” (p 159) The key word here is flatter. That is,

consciousness, or the ideation of the ruling class may assert its universality, its timelessness, or

that it has “emancipate(d) itself from the world,” but this is a type of self-flattery. Here, again,

we run into the tension in Marx regarding the intentionality of the ruling class’ ideation. In

disagreement with his earlier contention regarding the intentionality of the ruling class’ creation

of ideas, this passage seems to be asserting a type of contradiction based causality. That is, the

creation of ideology is not something that happens independent of the world, but rather it can

only happen as a reflection of material realities. Here he is claiming that ideology can only come

into contradiction with the existing relations of production when social relations are also in

contradiction with the forces of production.

Marx seems to have a significant tension in the causal mechanism for the production of

ideology. Above, Marx states in no uncertain terms that the ruling class plays an active and

intentional role in the production of ideas. They have agency in the creation of ideology.

However, in the previous paragraph Marx implies that the production of ideas is causally related

to the existing forces of production. Elsewhere, Marx inclines toward ideation being causally

connected to man’s material existence, rather than being something that is guided intentionally

by the ruling class or having an existence of its own. To this end Marx posits that “The social

structure and the state are continually evolving out if the life process of definite individuals, but



of individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people’s imagination, but as they

really are; i.e., as they operate, produce materially, and hence as they work under definite

material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will” (p 154) That is, the

way that society is structured isn’t based on how we conceive of ourselves ideologically, but

rather that it is a consequence of our material existence. The forces of production are the root

cause of social organization. Marx then adds that (p154)

The production of ideas… of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the

material activity and material intercourse of men…. Conceiving, thinking, … appear at

this stage as the direct efflux of their material behavior. The same applies to mental

production… Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas… as they are conditioned

by a definitive development of their productive forces… Consciousness can never be

anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-

process.

In other words, what we think, ideate and the consciousnesses that we develop are causally a

product of our material existence. Here, agency does not factor in; thinkers cannot help but

create ideologies that reflect their material conditions. The bourgeoisie doesn’t intentionally

make a concerted effort to produce ideologies that justify its existence. It cannot do otherwise.

The production of the ruling ideologies is a result of the mode of production and material

relations. On the same note Marx asserts “It is self-evident, moreover, that “spectres,” “bonds,”

“the higher being,” “concept,” “scruple,” are merely the idealistic, spiritual expression, the

conception apparently of the isolated individual, the image of very empirical fetters and

limitations, within which the mode of production of life and the form of intercourse coupled with



it move.” (p 159) In other words we have this category of ideas, universals, obligations, relations,

that we think of as being ideological and separate from the world, idealistic or spiritual, when in

reality they are merely the expression of tangible material relations. The way we construct our

ideas of the world are dependent upon the mode of production.

It will be useful, both as a transition to discussing Foucault, and shedding further light on

Marx’s ambiguity regarding the intentionality behind the creation of ideology to examine Marx’s

discussion of the transition and creation of ideology. That is, how ideation is enacted and

reproduced. Marx’s simplest examples can be found in the Communist Manifesto when he

declares:

“The Bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his “natural superiors,” …. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom – free trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.”

Here Marx is asserting the ideational power of the bourgeoisie; that it has fundamentally changed

the ideological structure of society. Later he discusses the bourgeois imposition and reproduction

of itself upon backward nations stating “it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization

into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world in its own

image.” Both of these particular examples are vague as to the exact mode of mental production.

The first example is worded to suggest a very direct kind of class intentionality behind the ruling

class’ ideation. But at the same time the bourgeoisie is discussed in very abstract terms, as

having a kind of consciousness in itself independent of the members that constitute it.

Additionally, the first passage sheds light on the means by which ideas are warped or utilized for



the ultimate ends of class interests that reflect the mode of production. That is, it relates to his

earlier discussions on the creation of ideology; that mental production may seem to take on a life

of its own, positing universality, common social interest or rationality, but ultimately it is a

product of or reflection of the conditions of production. The second excerpt is helpful in that it

sheds light on the means by which bourgeois ideology is reproduced abroad. Here, his argument

is purely economic. “The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it

batters down all Chinese walls,” Bourgeois society reproduces itself through economic force; it

forces developing nations to adopt its mode of production. The result is that they come to mirror

the western ruling class. It is not through social imperialism that the ruling ideology reproduces

itself, but the adoption of the ruling mode of production. From this it might be deduced that

ideology is reproduced as a consequence of the mode of production not necessarily the concerted

intentional activity of the ruling class. The Communist Manifesto is commonly regarded as a

performance piece; it was a pamphlet written with the intent of inciting mass action.

Consequently, it is theoretically lacking and ambiguous.

For further example, it is prudent to turn to both the German ideology and Marx’s 1844

manuscripts. In particular, Marx discusses the ideological interplay between ethics and political

economy claiming: (p97)

am I not acting in keeping with political economy if I sell my friend to the Moroccans?... the political economist replies to me: you do not transgress my laws; but see what Cousin Ethics has to say… The ethics of political economy is acquisition, work, thrift, sobriety – but political economy promises to satisfy my needs….Thus M. Michel Chevalier reproaches Ricardo with having abstracted from ethics. But Ricardo is allowing political economy to speak its own language, and if it does not speak ethically, this is not Ricardo’s fault…. Besides, the opposition between political economy and ethics is only a sham opposition…. All that happens is that political economy expresses moral laws in its own way.



Here Marx is showing the ideational interplay between ethics and political economy. Political

economy, by simply following its own logic or speaking its own language is allowed to express

its own moral laws. Ideologically priority is given to the moral demands of political economy

over ethics because it has constructed itself as “promising to satisfy my needs” (p97) and its

logic demands we ask ourselves “but how can I live virtuously if I do not live?” (p97) In other

words there is an internal logic to the ideology of the ruling class that rationalizes their material

existence; intentionality is thus removed. Self-interest becomes normalized. The German

ideology, like the Communist Manifesto, is problematic. In it Marx states “It destroyed as far as

possible ideology, religion, morality, etc., and where it could not do this, made them into a

palpable lie… It made natural science subservient to capital…” (p185) And, later “The modern

French, English and American Writers all express the opinion that the State exists only for the

sake of private property, so that this fact has penetrated into the consciousness of the normal

man.” (p178) Like the Manifesto, Marx is ambiguous as to the means by which these changes

come about; he seems content with the assertion their transition.

Enter Foucault. Foucault’s analysis of bio power has the possibility of operating in two

ways in regards to Marx. His framework for the reproduction and creation of discourses has the

possibility of filling in the gaps in Marx. To be clear, I am making the assumption that Marx’s

references ideology and consciousness are loosely equivalent to Foucault’s discourses and

knowledges. To begin, he postulates “The society that emerged in the nineteenth century –

bourgeois, capitalist, or industrial society, call it what you will – did not confront sex with a

fundamental refusal of recognition. On the contrary, it put into operation an entire machinery for

producing true discourses concerning it. Not only did it speak of sex and compel everyone to do



so; it also set out to formulate the uniform truth of sex.” (p69 The History of Sex) That is,

knowledge and discourses are created and reproduced through a kind of logical/discursive

machinery. Specifically Foucault gives the example of the creation of the homosexual “The

nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in

addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and

possibly a mysterious physiology. Nothing that went into his total composition was unaffected

by his sexuality.” (p43) One could imagine applying this model to bourgeois discussions of other

peripheral groups that were defined in contrast to the normal bourgeois household, the poor

laboring man, the delinquent, the effeminate oriental man, and the barbarous Zulu. In each case

the presumed normalcy of the bourgeois family would be confirmed in the many ways that each

of these identities was examined and placed on every facet of their subjects’ lives. The poor

laboring man has his social station written into every aspect of his upbringing, he becomes a way

of life in contrast the bourgeoisie. His class and economic position cease to be the result of an

economic system but are made to be a reflection of his worth and character, his life story, his

childhood. He is made something undesirable, a lesson to the proletariat, something to be kept at

bay. Foucault also discusses the construction of the sexuality asserting “In actual fact, what was

involved, rather, was the production of sexuality. Sexuality must not be thought of as a kind of

natural given which power tries to hold in check, or as an obscure domain which knowledge tries

gradually to uncover. It is the name that can be given to a historical construct: not a furtive

reality that is difficult to grasp, but a great surface network in…” (p105) This framework for the

construction of natural givens fits neatly into Marx, it need only replace sexuality with free-trade,



self-interested human nature, capitalism, liberalism, and other ideas that Marx claims the ruling

class attempts to universalize and push back into timelessness.

In contrast, Foucault also raises a number of objections. Marx unambiguously holds that

power is directional, that ideology is generated by the ruling class and absorbed by society.

Foucault claims that: (p94

Power comes from below; that is, there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations… no such duality extending from the top down reacting on more limited groups to the very depths of the social body. One must suppose rather that the manifold relationships of force that take shape and come into play in the machinery of production, in families, limited groups, and institutions, are the basis for wide ranging effects… These then form a general line of force that traverses the local oppositions and links them together… Major dominations are the hegemonic effects that are sustained by all these confrontations

In other words, power is not unidirectional. It is not imposed top down by the ruling class and

imposed upon the lower classes. Instead power is generated in our multitudinous relationships, in

our groups, families, work environments, and institutions. Power is generated both by

normalizing discourses and by oppositional discourses. Larger power relations, like Marx’s class

structure, is the cumulative effect of these power relations.

Foucault draws another line in the sand regarding the subjectivity of power, or the lack

thereof. For Marx ideology is created by the ruling class, with their subjective interests intrinsic

to it. The ruling class mental laborers are the class that is responsible for the mental production

of ideas and consciousness that form the ruling ideas of an epoch. Theoretically, one could point

to this group of individuals and say that they created the ideology. Foucault vehemently

challenges this assertion: (p95, my clarification)



(T)his does not mean that it (power) results from the choice or decision of an individual subject; let us not look for the headquarters that presides over its rationality; neither the caste which governs, nor the groups which control the state apparatus, nor those who make the most important economic decisions direct the entire network of power that functions in a society… the logic is perfectly decipherable, and yet it is often the case that no one is there to have invented them…

That is, simply, that power does not result from the decision of a single individual nor a

particular group. There is no metaphorical dark musky room from which society is directed.

Ideas may originate from particular individuals, but that does not mean that they created a

discourse or participate in a discourse with the intent of enacting their own ends. There is no

subject behind power, rather a bunch of individuals who participate in reproducing power and

discourses, following the logic of a system.

Due to his inconsistency, it is difficult to pin down Marx’s stance on the ruling class’

production of ideology. He flounders between consistently asserting that ideation being causally

a reflection of the material relations in the world and occasionally suggesting that ideology is

intentionally created and directed by the ruling class for their ends. However, in either

framework he is vague as to the actual means by which ideology is created. Foucault enters as a

double edged sword. On the one hand Foucault stands in filling the gaps in the creation of

ideology. On the other hand he objects to some of the foundational claims made by Marx.

Documents

Marx and Foucault: On Ideation