Marshmeier - Imperial By Design

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Number 111 Jan / Feb 2011

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EJustine A. Rosenthal


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16 The National Interest Imperial by Design

I the first years after the Cold Wareded, may Americas had a profodsese of optimism abot the ftre of

iteratioal politics. Presidet Bill Clito

captred that mood whe he told the unGeeral Assembly i September 1993:

It is clear that we live at a trig poit i

hma history. Immese ad promisig chag-

es seem to wash over s every day. The Cold

War is over. The world is o loger divided

ito two armed ad agry camps. Dozes of

ew democracies have bee bor. It is a mo-

met of miracles.

The basis of all this good feelig was laidot at the time i two famos articles bypromiet eocoservatives. I 1989, Fra-cis Fkyama arged i The Ed of His-tory? that Wester liberal democracy hadwo a decisive victory over commismad fascism ad shold be see as the fialform of hma govermet.1 Oe co-seqece of this ideological evoltio,

he arged, was that large-scale coflict be-twee the great powers was passig fromthe scee, althogh the vast blk of theThird World remais very mch mired i

history, ad will be a terrai of coflict formay years to come. Nevertheless, lib-eral democracy ad peace wold evetallycome to the Third World as well, becase

the sads of time were pshig iexorablyi that directio.

Oe year later, Charles Krathammeremphasized i The Uipolar Mometthat the Uited States had emerged fromthe Cold War as by far the most powerflcotry o the plaet.2 He rged Ameri-ca leaders ot to be reticet abot sigthat power to lead a ipolar world, -ashamedly layig dow the rles of world

order ad beig prepared to eforce them.Krathammers advice fit eatly with F-kyamas visio of the ftre: the UitedStates shold take the lead i brigig de-mocracy to less developed cotries theworld over. After all, that sholdt be aespecially difficlt task give that Americahad awesome power ad the cig of his-tory o its side.

U.S. grand strategy has followed this

basic prescription for the past twentyyears, mainly because most policy makersinside the Beltway have agreed with thethrust of Fukuyamas and Krauthammersearly analyses.

The reslts, however, have bee disas-tros. The Uited States has bee at war for

John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wedell Harriso

Distigished Service Professor of Political Sciece

at the Uiversity of Chicago. He is o the Advisory

Cocil of The National Interest, ad his most

recet book, Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About

Lying in International Politics, was pblished iJaary 2011 by Oxford Uiversity Press.

Imperial by Design

By John J. Mearsheimer

1 Fracis Fkyama, The Ed of History? The

National Interest(Smmer 1989).

2 Charles Krathammer, The Uipolar Momet,Foreign Affairs70, o. 1 (1990/1991).


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Imperial by Design 17January/February 2011

a startlig two ot of every three years sice1989, ad there is o ed i sight. As ay-oe with a rdimetary kowledge of worldevets kows, cotries that cotiosly

fight wars ivariably bild powerfl atio-al-secrity breacracies that dermiecivil liberties ad make it difficlt to holdleaders accotable fortheir behavior; ad theyivariably ed p adopt-ig rthless policies or-mally associated with br-tal dictators. The Fod-ig Fathers derstood

this problem, as is clearfrom James Madisos ob-servatio that o atioca preserve its freedomi the midst of cotialwarfare . Washigtosprsit of policies like as-sassiatio, reditio adtortre over the past de-cade, ot to metio the

weakeig of the rle oflaw at home, shows thattheir fears were jstified.

To make matters worse, the Uited Statesis ow egaged i protracted wars i Af-ghaista ad Iraq that have so far cost wellover a trillio dollars ad reslted i arodforty-seve thosad America casalties.The pai ad sfferig iflicted o Iraqhas bee eormos. Sice the war bega i

March 2003, more tha oe hdred tho-sad Iraqi civilias have bee killed, rogh-ly 2 millio Iraqis have left the cotryad 1.7 millio more have bee iterallydisplaced. Moreover, the America militaryis ot goig to wi either oe of these co-flicts, despite all the phoy talk abot howthe srge has worked i Iraq ad how asimilar strategy ca prodce aother miraclei Afghaista. We may well be stck i

both qagmires for years to come, i frit-less prsit of victory.

The Uited States has also bee ableto solve three other major foreig-policyproblems. Washigto has worked over-timewith o sccessto sht dow Iras

raim-erichmet capability for fear thatit might lead to Tehra acqirig clearweapos. Ad the Uited States, able to

prevet North Korea from acqirig -clear weapos i the first place, ow seemsicapable of compellig Pyogyag to givethem p. Fially, every postCold War ad-miistratio has tried ad failed to settlethe Israeli-Palestiia coflict; all idicatorsare that this problem will deteriorate frther

as the West Bak ad Gaza are icorporatedito a Greater Israel.

The pleasat trth is that the UitedStates is i a world of troble today o theforeig-policy frot, ad this state of af-fairs is oly likely to get worse i the extfew years, as Afghaista ad Iraq ravelad the blame game escalates to poiso-os levels. Ths, it is hardly srprisig thata recet Chicago Cocil o Global Af-

fairs srvey fod that lookig forward 50years, oly 33 percet of Americas thik


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The National Interest18 Imperial by Design

the Uited States will cotie to be theworlds leadig power. Clearly, the headydays of the early 1990s have give way to aprooced pessimism.

This regrettable sitatio raises the obvi-os qestios of what wet wrog? Ad caAmerica right its corse?

The dowward spiral the Uited Stateshas take was aythig bt ievitable.

Washigto has always had a choice i howto approach grad strategy. Oe poplaroptio amog some libertarias is isola-tionism. This approach is based o the as-

smptio that there is o regio otsidethe Wester Hemisphere that is strategi-cally importat eogh to jstify expedigAmerica blood ad treasre. Isolatioistsbelieve that the Uited States is remark-ably secre becase it is separated from allof the worlds great powers by two giatmoatsthe Atlatic ad Pacific Oceasad o top of that it has had clear weap-osthe ltimate deterretsice 1945.

Bt i trth, there is really o chace thatWashigto will adopt this policy, thoghthe Uited States had strog isolatioisttedecies til World War II. For sicethe, a iteratioalist activism, fosteredby the likes of the Rockefeller Fodatio,has thoroghly delegitimized this approach.America policy makers have come to be-lieve the cotry shold be militarily i-volved o the world stage. Yet thogh o

maistream politicia wold dare advocateisolatioism at this poit, the ratioale forthis grad strategy shows jst how safe theUited States is. This meas, amog otherthigs, that it will always be a challege tomotivate the U.S. pblic to wat to r theworld ad especially to fight wars of choicei distat places.

Offshore balancing, which was Americastraditional grand strategy for most of its

history, is but another option. Predicatedon the belief that there are three regions

of the world that are strategically impor-tant to the United StatesEurope, North-east Asia and the Persian Gulfit sees theUnited States principle goal as making

sure no country dominates any of theseareas as it dominates the Western Hemi-sphere. This is to ensure that dangerousrivals in other regions are forced to con-centrate their attention on great powersin their own backyards rather than be freeto interfere in Americas. The best way toachieve that end is to rely on local powersto counter aspiring regional hegemons andotherwise keep U.S. military forces over

the horizon. But if that proves impossible,American troops come from offshore tohelp do the job, and then leave once thepotential hegemon is checked.

Selective engagementalso assmes that E-rope, Northeast Asia ad the Persia Glfare the oly areas of the world where theUited States shold be willig to deployits military might. It is a more ambitiosstrategy tha offshore balacig i that it

calls for permaetly statioig U.S. troopsi those regios to help maitai peace. Forselective egagers, it is ot eogh jst tothwart aspirig hegemos. It is also eces-sary to prevet war i those key regios,either becase pheaval will damage orecoomy or becase we will evetallyget dragged ito the fight i ay case. AAmerica presece is also said to be val-able for limitig clear proliferatio. Bt

oe of these strategies call for Washigtoto spread democracy arod the globees-pecially throgh war.

The root cause of Americas troubles isthat it adopted a flawed grand strategyafter the Cold War. From the Clinton ad-ministration on, the United States rejectedall these other avenues, instead pursuing

global dominance, or what might alterna-tively be called global hegemony, which

was not just doomed to fail, but likely tobackfire in dangerous ways if it relied too


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heavily on military force to achieve its am-bitious agenda.

Global domiace has two broad objec-tives: maitaiig America primacy, whichmeas makig sre that the Uited Statesremais the most powerfl state i the iter-atioal system; ad spreadig democracy

across the globe, i effect, makig the worldover i Americas image. The derlyigbelief is that ew liberal democracies willbe peaceflly iclied ad pro-America, sothe more the better. Of corse, this measthat Washigto mst care a lot abot everycotrys politics. With global domiace,o serios attempt is made to prioritize U.S.iterests, becase they are virtally limitless.

This grad strategy is imperial at its

core; its propoets believe that the UitedStates has the right as well as the respo-sibility to iterfere i the politics of othercotries. Oe wold thik that sch arro-gace might alieate other states, bt mostAmerica policy makers of the early ie-ties ad beyod were cofidet that woldot happe, istead believig that othercotriessave for so-called roge stateslike Ira ad North Koreawold see the

Uited States as a beig hegemo servigtheir ow iterests.

There is, however, a importat disagree-met amog global domiators abot howbest to achieve their strategys goals. Ooe side are the eocoservatives, who be-lieve that the Uited States ca rely heavilyo armed force to domiate ad trasformthe globe, ad that it ca sally act ilat-erally becase America power is so great.

Ideed, they ted to be opely cotemp-tos of Washigtos traditioal allies as

well as iteratioal istittios, whichthey view as forms where the Lilliptiastie dow Glliver. Neocoservatives seespreadig democracy as a relatively easytask. For them, the key to sccess is remov-ig the reigig tyrat; oce that is doe,there is little eed to egage i protracted

atio bildig.O the other side are the liberal imperi-

alists, who are certaily willig to se theAmerica military to do social egieerig.Bt they are less cofidet tha the eoco-servatives abot what ca be achieved withforce aloe. Therefore, liberal imperialistsbelieve that rig the world reqires theUited States to work closely with alliesad iteratioal istittios. Althogh

they thik that democracy has widespreadappeal, liberal imperialists are sally lesssagie tha the eocoservatives abotthe ease of exportig it to other states. Aswe set off to remake the world after the fallof the Berli Wall, these priciples of globaldomiace set the ageda.

Bill Clito was the first presidet togover exclsively i the postCold War

world, ad his admiistratio prsed globaldomiace from start to fiish. Yet Cli-tos foreig-policy team was comprised ofliberal imperialists; so, althogh the presi-det ad his lieteats made clear that they

were bet o rlig the worldblatatlyreflected i formerSecretary of State Mad-eleie Albrights well-kow commet thatif we have to se force, it is becase we are

America; we are the idispesable atio.

We stad tall ad we see frther tha othercotries ito the ftrethey employed

The United States has been at war for

a startling two out of every three years

since 1989, and there is no end in sight.


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military force relc-tatly ad prdet-ly. They may havebee gg ho abot

pshig the ipo-lar momet owardad pward, btfor all their eth-siasm, eve thesedemocracy promot-ers soo saw thatatio bildig waso easy task.

Drig his first

year i office, Cli-to carelessly al-lowed the UitedStates to get i-volved i atiobildig i Soma-lia. Bt whe eightee America soldierswere killed i a firefight i Mogadish iOctober 1993 (famosly redered i BlackHawk Down), he immediately plled U.S.

troops ot of the cotry. I fact, the ad-miistratio was so spooked by the fias-co that it refsed to itervee drig theRwada geocide i the sprig of 1994,eve thogh the cost of doig so woldhave bee small. Yes, Clito did com-mit America forces to Haiti i September1994 to help remove a brtal military re-gime, bt he had to overcome sigificatcogressioal oppositio ad he wet to

great legths to get a un resoltio spport-ig a mltiatioal itervetio force. Mostof the America troops were ot of Haitiby March 1996, ad at o time was there aserios attempt at atio bildig.

Clito did talk togh drig the 1992presidetial campaig abot sig Ameri-ca power agaist Serbia to halt the fight-ig i Bosia, bt after takig office, hedragged his feet ad oly sed airpower i

1995 to ed the fightig. He wet to waragaist Serbia for a secod time i 1999

this time over Koso-voad oce agai

wold oly rely oairpower, despite

pressre to deploygrod forces fromhi s n com-mader, Geeral

Wesley Clark, adtheBritish PrimeMiister Toy Blair.

By early 1998,the eocoserva-tives were pressr-

ig Clito to semilitary force toremove SaddamHssei. The presi-det edorsed thelog-term goal of

ostig the Iraqi leader, bt he refsed togo to war to make that happe. The UitedStates der Bill Clito was, as RichardHaass pt it, a relctat sheriff.

Althogh the Clito admiistratiomade little progress toward achievig globalhegemoy drig its eight-year reig, it atleast maaged to avoid ay major foreig-policy disasters. It seemed to derstadthe iheret difficlties of atio bildigad devoted either mch blood or mchtreasre i its prsit.

Nevertheless, give the America pblicsatral relctace to egage i foreig ad-

vetres, by the 2000 presidetial campaig,may were happy with eve this catiosliberal imperialism. George W. Bsh triedto capitalize o this setimet by criticizigClitos foreig policy as overzealosadas it trs ot, iroically, especially for doigtoo mch atio bildig. The Repblicacadidate called for the Uited States toscale back its goals ad cocetrate o rei-vigoratig its traditioal Cold War alliaces.

The mai threat facig the Uited States,he arged, was a risig Chia; terrorism was


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paid little attetio. I effect, Bsh was call-ig for a grad strategy of selective egage-met. Not srprisigly, his oppoet, VicePresidet Al Gore, called for prsig global

domiace, albeit i a mltilateral gise.Whe Bsh wo, it appeared that the

Uited States was abot to adopt a less am-bitios grad strategy. Bt that did ot hap-pe becase the ew Bsh admiistratiodrastically altered its approach to the worldafter 9/11.

There was ever ay qestio that Wash-igto wold treat terrorism as its maithreat after that horrific day. Bt it was ot

clear at first how the admiistratio wolddeal with the problem. Over the corseof the ext year, Bsh tred away fromselective egagemet ad embraced globaldomiace. Ulike his predecessor i theWhite Hose, however, he adopted the eo-coservative formla for rlig the world.Ad that meat relyig primarily o theilateral se of America military force.From the early days of Afghaista oward,

America was to eter the age of the BshDoctrie, which was all abot sig theU.S. military to brig abot regime chageacross the Mslim ad Arab world. It is easyto forget ow, bt Iraq was spposed to bea step i the remarkably far-reachig plato sow democracy i a area of the worldwhere it was largely abset, thereby creatigpeace. Presidet Bsh pt the poit sc-cictly i early 2003 whe he said, By the

resolve ad prpose of America, ad of orfrieds ad allies, we will make this a ageof progress ad liberty. Free people will setthe corse of history, ad free people willkeep the peace of the world.

By prsig this extraordiary scheme totrasform a etire regio at the poit of ag, Presidet Bsh adopted a radical gradstrategy that has o parallel i Americahistory. It was also a dismal failre.

The Bsh admiistratios qest for glob-al domiace was based o a profod

misderstadig of the threat eviro-met facig the Uited States after 9/11.Ad the presidet ad his advisers overes-timated what military force cold achieve

i the moder world, i tr greatly -derestimatig how difficlt it wold be tospread democracy i the Middle East. Thistrimvirate of errors doomed Washigtoseffort to domiate the globe, dermiedAmerica vales ad istittios o thehome frot, ad threateed its positio ithe world.

W

ith the attacks on the World Trade

Center and the Pentagon, the Bushadministration all of a sudden was forcedto think seriously about terrorism. Unfor-tunately, the presidentand most Ameri-cans for that mattermisread what thecountry was dealing with in two impor-tant ways: greatly exaggerating the threatsseverity, and failing to understand whyal-Qaeda was so enraged at the UnitedStates. These mistakes led the administra-

tion to adopt policies that made the prob-lem worse, not better.

In the aftermath of 9/11, terrorism wasdescribed as an existential threat. Presi-dent Bush emphasized that virtually everyterrorist group on the planetincludingthose that had no beef with Washingtonwas our enemy and had to be eliminatedif we hoped to win what became knownas the global war on terror (). The

administration also maintained that stateslike Iran, Iraq and Syria were not onlyactively supporting terrorist organiza-tions but were also likely to provide ter-rorists with weapons of mass destruction(). Thus, it was imperative for theUnited States to target these rogue states ifit hoped to win the or what someneoconservatives like Norman Podhoretzcalled World War IV. Indeed, Bush said

that any country which continues to har-bor or support terrorism will be regarded


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by the United States as a hostile regime.Finally, the administration claimed that itwas relatively easy for groups like al-Qaedato infiltrate and strike the homeland, and

that we should expect more disasters like9/11 in the near future. The greatest dan-ger for sure would be a attack againsta major American city.

This assessmet of Americas terrorismproblem was flawed o every cot. It wasthreat iflatio of the highest order. It madeo sese to declare war agaist grops thatwere ot tryig to harm the Uited States.They were ot or eemies; ad goig after

all terrorist orgaizatios wold greatlycomplicate the datig task of elimiat-ig those grops that did have s i theircrosshairs. I additio, there was o alli-ace betwee the so-called roge states adal-Qaeda. I fact, Ira ad Syria cooper-ated with Washigto after 9/11 to helpqash Osama bi Lade ad his cohorts.Althogh the Bsh admiistratio ad theeocoservatives repeatedly asserted that

there was a geie coectio betweeSaddam Hssei ad al-Qaeda, they everprodced evidece to back p their claimfor the simple reaso that it did ot exist.

The fact is that states have strog ice-tives to distrst terrorist grops, i partbecase they might tr o them someday,bt also becase cotries caot cotrolwhat terrorist orgaizatios do, ad theymay do somethig that gets their patros

ito serios troble. This is why there ishardly ay chace that a roge state willgive a clear weapo to terrorists. Thatregimes leaders cold ever be sre thatthey wold ot be blamed ad pished fora terrorist grops actios. Nor cold theybe certai that the Uited States or Israelwold ot icierate them if either cotrymerely sspected that they had providedterrorists with the ability to carry ot a

attack. A clear hadoff, therefore, isot a serios threat.

Whe yo get dow to it, there is olya remote possibility that terrorists will gethold of a atomic bomb. The most likely

way it wold happe is if there were politi-

cal chaos i a clear-armed state, ad ter-rorists or their frieds were able to take ad-vatage of the esig cofsio to satcha loose clear weapo. Bt eve the,there are additioal obstacles to overcome:some cotries keep their weapos disas-sembled, detoatig oe is ot easy ad it

wold be difficlt to trasport the devicewithot beig detected. Moreover, othercotries wold have powerfl icetives

to work with Washigto to fid the weap-o before it cold be sed. The obviosimplicatio is that we shold work withother states to improve clear secrity, soas to make this slim possibility eve morelikely.

Fially, the ability of terrorists to strikethe America homelad has bee blowot of all proportio. I the ie yearssice 9/11, govermet officials ad terror-

ist experts have issed cotless warigsthat aother major attack o Americasoil is probableeve immiet. Bt thisis simply ot the case.3 The oly attempts

we have see are a few failed solo attacksby idividals with liks to al-Qaeda likethe shoe bomber, who attempted to blowp a America Airlies flight from Paristo Miami i December 2001, ad the -derwear bomber, who tried to blow p a

Northwest Airlies flight from Amsterdamto Detroit i December 2009. So, we dohave a terrorism problem, bt it is hardlya existetial threat. I fact, it is a miorthreat. Perhaps the scope of the challegeis best captred by Ohio State politicalscietist Joh Mellers tellig commetthat the mber of Americas killed by

3 Ia S. Lstick, Our Own Strength Against Us: The

War on Terror as a Self-Inflicted Disaster (Oaklad,: The Idepedet Istitte, 2008).


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iteratioal terrorism sice the late 1960s. . . is abot the same as the mber killedover the same period by lightig, or byaccidet-casig deer, or by severe allergic

reactios to peats.Oe might arge that there has bee o

attack o America soil sice 9/11 becasethe has bee a great sccess. Bt thatclaim is dermied by the fact that al-

Qaeda was tryig hard to strike the UitedStates i the decade before 9/11, whethere was o , ad it scceeded olyoce. I Febrary 1993, al-Qaeda explodeda trck bomb i a garage below the WorldTrade Ceter, killig six people. More thaeight years passed before the grop strck

that same bildig complex for the secodtime. Noe of this is to dey that 9/11 wasa spectaclar sccess for the terrorists, btit was o Pearl Harbor, which lachedthe Uited States ito battles agaist Im-perial Japa ad Nazi Germay, two trlydageros adversaries. Roghly 50 milliopeoplethe majority of them civiliasdied i that coflict. It is absrd to com-pare al-Qaeda with Germay ad Japa, or

to like the to a world war.This cospicos threat iflatio has hrt

the America effort to etralize al-Qaeda.By foolishly wideig the scope of the ter-rorism problem, Washigto has ededp pickig fights with terrorist grops ad

cotries that otherwise had o iterest iattackig the Uited States, ad i somecases were willig to help s thwart al-Qa-eda. Elargig the target set has also ledAmerica policy makers to take their eyes

off or mai adversary. Frthermore, defi-ig the terrorist threat so broadly, copledwith the costat warigs abot loomigattacks that might be eve more deadlytha 9/11, has led U.S. leaders to wage warall arod the globe ad to thik of thisstrggle as lastig for geeratios. This is

exactly the wrog formla for dealig withor terrorism problem. We shold isteadfocs or attetio wholly o al-Qaedaad ay other grop that targets the UitedStates, ad we shold treat the threat as alaw-eforcemet problem rather tha a mil-itary oe that reqires s to egage i large-scale wars the world over. Specifically, weshold rely maily o itelligece, policework, careflly selected covert operatios

ad close cooperatio with allies to etral-ize the likes of al-Qaeda.


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To deal effectively with terrorism, it isimperative to derstad what moti-

vates al-Qaeda to target the Uited Statesi the first place. Oe also wats to kow

why large mbers of people i the Arabad Mslim world are so agry with Amer-ica that they spport, or at least sympathizewith, these types of terrorist grops. Simplypt, why do they hate s?

There are two possible aswers to thisqestio. Oe possibility is that al-Qaedaad its spporters loathe s becase of whowe are; i other words, this is a clash of

civilizatios that has arise becase these ex-tremists hate Wester vales i geeral adliberal democracy i particlar. Alterative-ly, these grops may hate s becase theyare frios with or Middle East policies.There is a abdace of srvey data adaecdotal evidece that shows the secodaswer is the right oe. Ager ad hatred

toward the Uited States amog Arabs adMslims is largely drive by Washigtos

policies, ot by ay deep-seated atipathytoward the West.4 The policies that havegeerated the most ati-Americaism i-clde Washigtos spport for Israels treat-

met of the Palestiias; the presece ofAmerica troops i Sadi Arabia after the1991 Glf War; U.S. spport for repressiveregimes i cotries like Egypt; Americasactios o Baghdad after the First GlfWar, which are estimated to have cased thedeaths of abot five hdred thosad Iraqicivilias; ad the U.S. ivasio ad occpa-tio of Iraq.

Noe of this is to say that the hard-core

members of al-Qaeda like or respect Ameri-ca vales ad istittios becase srelymost of them do ot. Bt there is littleevidece that they dislike them so mchthat they wold be motivated to declare

war o the Uited States. The case of Kha-lid Shaikh Mohammedwho the 9/11Commissio described as the pricipalarchitect of the 9/11 attackstells s agreat deal. The Palestiia isse, ot hatred

of the America way of life, motivated him.I the commissios words, By his owaccot, s aims toward the UitedStates stemmed ot from his experiecesthere as a stdet, bt rather from his vio-let disagreemet with U.S. foreig policyfavorig Israel. The commissio also co-firmed that bi Lade was motivated igood part by Americas spport for Israelsbehavior toward the Palestiias.

Not srprisigly, Presidet Bsh ad hisadvisers rejected this explaatio of 9/11,

4 Office of the Uder Secretary of Defese for

Acqisitio, Techology, ad Logistics, Report of

the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic

Communication (Washigto, : Govermet

Pritig Office, September 2004); Joh Zogby

ad James Zogby, Impressios of America

2004: How Arabs View America; How Arabs

Lear abot America (Washigto, : ZogbyIteratioal, 2004).


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becase acceptig it wold effectively havebee a admissio that the Uited Statesbore cosiderable resposibility for theevets of that tragic day. We wold be ac-

kowledgig that it was or Middle Eastpolicies that were at the heart of it all. I-stead, right after 9/11 happeed the presi-det stated, They hate or freedoms: orfreedom of religio, or freedom of speech,or freedom to vote ad assemble ad dis-agree with each other. Despite all the evi-dece to the cotrary, this argmet soldwell i Americaat least for a few years.Bt what were the policy implicatios of

portrayig the fight with al-Qaeda as a clashbetwee two differet ways of life?

There was o chace that the UitedStates was goig to chage its basic charac-ter to solve its terrorism problem. Istead,the Bsh admiistratio decided to carryot social egieerig o a grad scale.No lessos leared from the dismal recordof atio bildig i the Clito years.Yes! We wold brig liberal democracy ad

Wester vales to the Arabs ad the Irai-as, ad or trobles with terrorism woldgo away. The world has a clear iterest ithe spread of democratic vales, the presi-det said, becase stable ad free atiosdo ot breed the ideologies of mrder.

Given American military might and thebelief that democracy was sweeping theglobe, the Bush administration and its sup-porters reasoned that it would be relatively

easy to remake the Arab and Muslim worldin Americas image. They were wrong, ofcourse, for the Bush administration failedto understand the limits of what Americanmilitary power could do to transform theMiddle East.

The falty assmptio that Americacold perform social egieerig

throgh its idomitable military might

beyod the lofty theorizig of the eoco-servativesfod its roots i Afghaista.

By December 2001, it appeared that theU.S. military had wo a qick ad stigvictory agaist the Taliba ad istalleda friedly regime i Kabl that wold be

able to gover the cotry effectively forthe foreseeable ftre. Very importatly, thewar was wo with a combiatio of Ameri-ca airpower, local allies ad small SpecialForces its. How easy it seemed to de-liver that cotry its freedom. There was oeed for a large-scale ivasio, so whe thefightig eded, the Uited States did otlook like a occpier. Nor did it seem likelyto become oe, becase Hamid Karzai was

expected to keep order i Afghaista with-ot mch U.S. help.

The perceptio of a stig trimph iAfghaista was sigificat becase leadersrarely iitiate wars less they thik thatthey ca wi qick ad decisive victories.The prospect of fightig a protracted co-flict makes policy makers g-shy, ot jstbecase the costs are ivariably high, btalso becase it is hard to tell how log wars

will come to a ed. Bt by early 2002, itseemed that the Uited States had foda bleprit for wiig wars i the devel-opig world qickly ad decisively, thselimiatig the eed for a protracted oc-cpatio. It appeared that the Americamilitary cold exit a cotry soo after top-plig its regime ad istallig a ew leader,ad move o to the ext target. It lookedlike the eocoservatives had bee vidi-

cated. This iterpretatio coviced maypeople i the foreig-policy establishmetthat the road was ow ope for sig theU.S. military to trasform the Middle Eastad domiate the globe.

Ad with this hbris firmly i place,America attacked Iraq o March 19, 2003.Withi a few moths, it looked like theAfgha model had proved its worth agai.Saddam was i hidig ad Presidet Bsh

laded o the USS Abraham Lincoln witha big baer i the backgrod that a-


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oced: Missio Accomplished. Itseemed at the time that it wold ot be logbefore the ext war bega, maybe agaistIra or Syria, ad the the other states i

the regio might be so scared of Americathat merely threateig them with a attackwold be eogh to case regime chage.

It all tred ot to be a mirage, ofcorse, as Iraq qickly became a deadlyqagmire with Afghaista followig sit afew years later.

Indeed, what initially appeared to be adazzling victory in Afghanistan was not.There was little chance that the United

States would avoid a protracted occupa-tion, since we faced two insurmountableproblems. While it was relatively easy totopple the Taliban from power, it was notpossible for the American military and itsallies to decisively defeat that foe. Whencornered and facing imminent destruc-tion, Taliban fighters melted away into thecountryside or across the border into Paki-stan, where they could regroup and eventu-

ally come back to fight another day. This iswhy insurgencies with external sanctuarieshave been especially difficult to stamp outin the past.

Furthermore, the Karzai governmentwas doomed to fail, not just because itsleader was put in power by Washington,and not just because Afghanistan has al-ways had a weak central government, butalso because Karzai and his associates are

incompetent and corrupt. This meant thatthere would be no central authority togovern the country and check the Tal-iban when it came back to life. And thatmeant the United States would have to dothe heavy lifting. American troops wouldhave to occupy the country and fight theTaliban, and they would have to do so insupport of a fragile government with littlelegitimacy outside of Kabul. As anyone

familiar with the Vietnam War knows, thisis a prescription for defeat.

If more evidece is eeded that the Af-gha model does ot work as advertised,Iraq provides it. Cotrary to what the eo-coservatives claimed before the ivasio,

the Uited States cold ot topple Saddamad avoid a log occpatio, less it waswillig to pt aother dictator i charge.Not oly did Baghdad have few well-estab-lished political istittios ad a weak civilsociety, the removal of Saddam was certaito leash powerfl cetrifgal forces thatwold lead to a bloody civil war i theabsece of a large America presece. Iparticlar, the politically strog Sis were

sre to resist losig power to the more -meros Shia, who wold beefit the mostfrom the U.S. ivasio. There were alsoprofod differeces amog varios Shiagrops, ad the Krds did ot eve wat tobe rled by Baghdad. O top of all that, al-Qaeda i Mesopotamia evetally emergedo the scee. (Of corse, the Uited Statesdid ot face a terrorist threat from Iraq be-fore the ivasio.) All of this meat that a

protracted America occpatio wold beecessary to keep the cotry from tearigitself apart.

Ad log, messy occpatios were al-

ways ievitable. For thogh oe mightarge that the Uited States wold havescceeded i Afghaista had it ot i-vaded Iraq ad istead cocetrated obildig a competet govermet i Kabl

that cold keep the Taliba at bay, eveif this were tre (ad I have my dobts),it still wold have take a decade or moreto do the job. Drig this time the U.S.military wold have bee pied dow i

Afghaista ad ths available to ivadeIraq ad other cotries i the MiddleEast. The Bsh Doctrie, however, was de-pedet o wiig qick ad decisive vic-tories, which meas that eve a draw-ot

sccess i Afghaista wold have doomedthe strategy.


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Alteratively, oe might arge that themai problem i Afghaista ad Iraq wasthat the U.S. military had a flawed coter-isrgecy doctrie drig the early stagesof those coflicts. Accordig to this story,the Uited States evetally fod theright formla with the December 2006 edi-

tio of the U.S. Army ad Marie CorpsCounterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 (3-24). Ideed, the prported sccess ofthe Iraq srge is ofte ascribed to the im-plemetatio of the ew rles of egage-met. Some eve claim that it has helpeds achieve victory i Iraq. The problem

with this argmet is that Presidet Bshmade clear whe the srge was lachedi Jaary 2007 that tampig dow the

violece was a ecessary bt ot sfficietcoditio for sccess. He wisely empha-sized that it was also essetial that rivalIraqi grops ameliorate their differecesad fid a workable system for sharigpolitical power. Bt to this day there hasbee little progress i fixig Iraqs fractredsociety ad bildig a effective politicalsystem, as evideced by the difficlty Iraqipoliticias have had formig a govermet

i the wake of the March 7, 2010, parlia-metary electios. Hece, the srge has ot

bee a sccess. This failre is ot for lack oftryig; atio bildig is a datig task.The scope of the challege is still greateri Afghaista. So eve if oe believes thatthe America military ow has a smartcoterisrgecy doctrie, the fact is thatit has yet to scceed.

There is o qestio that it is possible todefeat a isrgecy, bt it is almost everqick or easy, ad there is o sigle formlafor sccess. As 3-24 wars, Politicalad military leaders ad plaers sholdever derestimate its scale ad complexi-ty. Eve i a best-case sceario like the Ma-laya Emergecy, where the British faced americally weak ad poplar Comm-ist gerrilla force based i the small Chi-

ese miority, pacificatio still took roghlya doze years. What makes the eterpriseso difficlt is that victory sally reqiresmore tha jst defeatig the isrgets ifirefights. It sally demads atio bild-ig as well becase it is essetial to fix thepolitical ad social problems that casedthe isrgecy i the first place; otherwise,it is likely to sprig back to life. So eveif it was a sre bet that the Uited States

cold scceed at coterisrgecy withthe right people ad doctrie, it wold still


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take may years to achieve decisive reslts.Isrgecies, as 3-24 otes, are pro-tracted by atre. This meas that whethe America military egages i this kidof war fightig, it will ed p pied dowi a legthy occpatio. Ad whe thathappes, the Bsh Doctrie caot work.

Bt the Bsh admiistratio ad its eo-coservative spporters badly miscal-

clated how easy it wold be to create free,stable societies i the Middle East. Theythoght that beheadig regimes was esse-tially all that was eeded for democracy totake hold.

It is hard to believe that ay policy makeror stdet of iteratioal affairs cold

have believed that democracy wold sprigforth qickly ad easily oce tyrats likeSaddam Hssei were toppled. After all,it is clear from the historical record thatimposig democracy o aother cotry isa especially difficlt task that sally fails.5Jeffrey Pickerig ad Mark Pecey, who i-vestigated the democratizig coseqecesof itervetios by liberal states from 1946to 1996, coclde that liberal itervetio

. . . has oly very rarely played a role i de-mocratizatio sice 1945.6

The Uited States i particlar has a richhistory of tryig ad failig to impose de-

mocracy o other cotries. New York Ui-versity professors Brce Beo de Mesqitaad George Dows report i the Los AngelesTimesthat:

Betwee World War II ad the preset, the

Uited States iterveed more tha 35 times

i developig cotries arod the world. . . .I oly oe caseColombia after the Ameri-

ca decisio i 1989 to egage i the war o

drgsdid a fll-fledged, stable democracy . . .

emerge withi 10 years. Thats a sccess rate of

less tha 3%.

Pickerig ad Pecey similarly fid oly asigle casePaama after the removal ofMael Noriegai which America i-

tervetio clearly reslted i the emergeceof a cosolidated democracy. Frthermore,

William Easterly ad his colleages at nulooked at how U.S. ad Soviet iterve-tios drig the Cold War affected theprospects for a democratic form of gover-met. They fod that sperpower iter-vetios are followed by sigificat decliesi democracy, ad that the sbstative ef-fects are large.

Noe of this is to say that it is impossiblefor the Uited States to impose democ-racy abroad. Bt sccesses are the excep-tio rather tha the rle, ad as is the case

with democratizatio i geeral, exterallyled attempts to implat sch a goverigstrctre sally occr i cotries witha particlar set of iteral characteristics.

5 Adrew Eterlie ad J. Michael Greig, The

History of Imposed Democracy ad the Ftre

of Iraq ad Afghaista, Foreign Policy Analysis

4, o. 4 (October 2008). I a examiatio of

forty-three cases of imposed democratic regimes

betwee 1800 ad 1994, it was fod that 63percet failed.

6 Jeffrey Pickerig ad Mark Pecey, Forgig

Democracy at Gpoit, International StudiesQuarterly50, o. 3 (September 2006).

By pursuing this extraordinary scheme to transform an entire

region at the point of a gun, President Bush adopted a radical

grand strategy that has no parallel in American history.


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It helps greatly if the target state has highlevels of ethic ad religios homogee-ity, a strog cetral govermet, reaso-ably high levels of prosperity ad some

experiece with democracy. The cases ofpostWorld War II Germay ad Japa,

which are ofte held p as evidece thatthe Uited States ca export democracy tothe Middle East, fit these criteria. Bt thoseexamples are highly sal, which is whythe Uited States has failed so ofte i itsfreedom-spreadig qest.

Eve Easter Erope circa 1989 doesot provide a sefl precedet. Democracy

qickly sproted there whe commismcollapsed ad the atocrats who rled ithe regio fell from power. These cases,however, have little i commo with whatthe Uited States has bee tryig to do ithe Mslim world. Democracy was ot im-posed o the cotries of Easter Erope;it was homegrow i every istace, admost of these cotries possessed mayof the ecessary precoditios for democ-

ratizatio. There is o qestio that theUited States has tried to help rtre theseascet democracies, bt these are ot caseswhere Washigto sccessflly exportedpoplar rle to foreig lads, which is whatthe Bsh Doctrie was all abot.

A good idicator of jst how imprdetthe Bsh admiistratio ad the eocoser-vatives were to thik that the Uited Statescold impose democracy with relative ease

is that Fracis Fkyama did ot believe itcold be doe ad therefore did ot sp-port the Iraq War. Ideed, by 2006 he hadpblicly abadoed eocoservatism adadopted the matle of liberal imperialism.7Fkyama did ot ditch his core belief thatdemocracy was ielctably spreadig acrossthe globe. What he rejected was his formercompatriots belief that the process cold beaccelerated by ivadig cotries like Iraq.

America, he maitaied, cold best prseits iterests ot throgh the exercise of

military power, bt throgh its ability toshape iteratioal istittios.

Moreover, it is worth otig that eveif the Uited States was magically able to

spread democracy i the Middle East, it isot clear that the ew regimes wold alwaysact i ways that met with Washigtosapproval. The leaders of those ew demo-cratic govermets, after all, wold have topay attetio to the views of their peoplerather tha take orders from the Americas.I other words, democracies ted to havemids of their ow. This is oe reaso whythe Uited States, whe it has toppled dem-

ocratically elected regimes that it did otlikeas i Ira (1953), Gatemala (1954)ad Chile (1973)helped istall dictatorsrather tha democrats, ad why Washig-to helps to thwart democracy i cotrieswhere it fears the otcome of electios, as iEgypt ad Sadi Arabia.

If all of this were ot eogh, globaldomiace, especially the Bsh admi-

istratios pechat for big-stick diploma-cy, egatively affects clear proliferatioas well. The Uited States is deeply com-mitted to makig sre that Ira does otacqire a clear arseal ad that NorthKorea gives p its atomic weapos, bt thestrategy we have employed is likely to havethe opposite effect.

The mai reaso that a cotry acqiresclear weapos is that they are the lti-

mate deterret. It is extremely likely thatay state wold attack the homelad of aclear-armed adversary becase of the fearthat it wold prompt clear retaliatio.Therefore, ay cotry that feels threateedby a dageros rival has good reaso towat a srvivable clear deterret. Thisbasic logic explais why the Uited Statesad the Soviet Uio bilt formidable

7 Fracis Fkyama, America at the Crossroads(New Have, : Yale Uiversity Press, 2006).


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stockpiles drig the Cold War. It also ex-plais why Israel acqired atomic weaposad refses to give them p.

All of this tells yo that whe the UitedStates places Ira, Iraq ad North Korea othe axis of evil ad threates them withmilitary force, it gives those cotries apowerfl icetive to acqire a clear de-terret. The Bsh admiistratio, for exam-ple, wold ot have ivaded Iraq i March2003 if Saddam had a atomic arseal be-case the Iraqi leader probably wold havesed it, sice he almost certaily was goig

to die ayway. It is ot clear whether Ira isprsig clear weapos today, bt givethat the Uited States ad Israel freqetlyhit that they might attack it evertheless,the regime has good reaso to wat a deter-ret to protect itself. Similarly, Pyogyagwold be foolish to give p its clear ca-pability i the absece of some sort of rap-prochemet with Washigto.

Ad there is o good reaso to thik

that spreadig democracy wold coterproliferatio either. After all, five of the

ie clear-armed states are democra-cies (Britai, Frace, Idia, Israel ad theUited States), ad two others (Pakistaad Rssia) are borderlie democracies

that retai sigificat athoritaria fea-tres.

I short, the Bsh admiistratiosfodess for threateig to attack ad-versaries (oftetimes with the additioalageda of forced democratizatio) e-coraged clear proliferatio. The bestway for the Uited States to maximizethe prospects of haltig or at least slow-ig dow the spread of clear weap-

os wold be to stop threateig othercotries becase that gives them a com-pellig reaso to acqire the ltimatedeterret. Bt as log as Americas leadersremai committed to global domiace,they are likely to resist this advice adkeep threateig states that will ot fol-

low Washigtos orders.

T

he Uited States eeds a ew grad

strategy. Global domiace is a pre-scriptio for edless trobleespecially iits eocoservative variat. Ufortately,the Obama admiistratio is poplatedfrom top to bottom with liberal imperial-ists who remai committed to tryig togover the world, albeit with less emphasiso big-stick diplomacy ad more emphasiso workig with allies ad iteratioal i-stittios. I effect, they wat to brig back

Bill Clitos grad strategy.The Obama teams thikig was clearly

laid ot i Secretary of State Hillary Cli-tos speech to the Cocil o Foreig Re-latios this past September. Sodig verymch like Madeleie Albright, Clito said:

I thik the world is cotig o s today as it

has i the past. Whe old adversaries eed a

hoest broker or fdametal freedoms eed a

champio, people tr to s. Whe the earthshakes or rivers overflow their baks, whe


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pademics rage or simmerig tesios brst

ito violece, the world looks to s.

Recogizig that may Americas are i

dire straits these days ad ot ethsiasticabot tryig to r the world, Clito re-mided them that:

Americas have always rise to the challeges

we have faced. . . . It is i or n. We do

believe there are o limits o what is possible

or what ca be achieved. . . . For the Uited

States, global leadership is both a resposibility

ad a paralleled opportity.

Presidet Obama is makig a serios mis-take headig dow this road. He sholdistead retr to the grad strategy ofoffshore balacig, which has served thiscotry well for most of its history ad of-fers the best formla for dealig with thethreats facig Americawhether it be ter-rorism, clear proliferatio or a traditioalgreat-power rival.

I geeral terms, the Uited Statesshold cocetrate o makig sre thato state domiates Northeast Asia, Eropeor the Persia Glf, ad that it remais the

worlds oly regioal hegemo. This is thebest way to esre America primacy. Weshold bild a robst military to iterveei those areas, bt it shold be statioedoffshore or back i the Uited States. Ithe evet a potetial hegemo comes o

the scee i oe of those regios, Washig-to shold rely o local forces to coterit ad oly come oshore to joi the fight

whe it appears that they caot do the jobthemselves. Oce the potetial hegemo ischecked, America troops shold go backover the horizo.

Offshore balacig does ot mea thatthe Uited States shold igore the rest ofthe world. Bt it shold maitai a sb-

statially lower profile otside of NortheastAsia, Erope ad the Glf, ad it shold

rely o diplomacy ad ecoomic statecraft,ot military force, to protect its iterests iareas of little strategic importace. Wash-igto shold also get ot of the bsiess

of tryig to spread democracy arod theglobe, ad more geerally actig as if wehave the right ad the resposibility to i-terfere i the domestic politics of othercotries. This behavior, which violates theall-importat priciple of self-determia-

tio, ot oly geerates resetmet towardthe Uited States, bt also gets s ivolvedi atio bildig, which ivariably leadsto o ed of troble.

Specifically, offshore balacig is the bestgrad strategy for amelioratig or terror-ism problem. Placig America troops i

the Arab ad Mslim world is a major caseof terrorist attacks agaist the Uited States,


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as Uiversity of Chicago professor Rob-ert Papes research shows. Remember whathappeed after Presidet Roald Reagaset maries ito Beirt i 1982? A si-

cide bomber blew p their barracks thefollowig year, killig 241 service members.Reaga had the good sese to qickly pllthe remaiig maries ot of Lebao adkeep them offshore. Ad it is worth otigthat the perpetrators of this act did ot pr-se s after we withdrew.

Reagas decisio was either srprisigor cotroversial, becase the Uited Stateshad a offshore-balacig strategy i the

Middle East drig this period. Washig-to relied o Iraq to cotai Ira drigthe 1980s, ad kept the rapid-deploymetforcewhich was bilt to itervee ithe Glf if the local balace of power col-lapsedat the ready shold it be eeded.This was smart policy.

After Iraq ivaded Kwait i Agst1990, the Uited States, oce agai actigas a offshore balacer, moved large m-

bers of troops ito Sadi Arabia to liberateKwait. After the war was wo ad victorywas cosolidated, those troops shold havebee plled ot of the regio. Bt that didot happe. Rather, Bill Clito adopted apolicy of dal cotaimetcheckig bothIra ad Iraq istead of lettig them checkoe aother. Ad lest we forget, the reslt-ig presece of U.S. forces i Sadi Arabiawas oe of the mai reasos that Osama bi

Lade declared war o the Uited States.The Bsh admiistratio simply made abad sitatio eve worse.

Sedig the U.S. military ito cotriesi the Arab ad Mslim world is helpigto case or terrorism problem, ot solveit. The best way to fix this sitatio is tofollow Roald Reagas example ad pllall America troops ot of Afghaista adIraq, the deploy them over the horizo as

part of a offshore-balacig strategy. To besre, the terrorist challege wold ot com-

pletely disappear if the Uited States wetback to offshore balacig, bt it wold bea importat step forward.

Next is to address the other cases, like

Washigtos yieldig spport for Is-raels policies i the occpied territories. I-deed, Bill Clito recetly speclated thatthe Israeli-Palestiia coflict is resposiblefor abot half of the terrorism we face. Ofcorse, this is why the Obama admiistra-tio says it wats to achieve a two-statesoltio betwee Israel ad the Palestiias.Bt give the lack of progress i solvigthat problem, ad the fact that it is goig

to take at least a few years to get all of theAmerica troops ot of Afghaista adIraq, we will be dealig with al-Qaeda forthe foreseeable ftre.

Offshore balacig is also a better policytha global domiace for combatig -clear proliferatio. It has two mai virtes.It calls for sig military force i oly threeregios of the world, ad eve the, oly asa matter of last resort. America wold still

carry a big stick with offshore balacig btwold wield it mch more discreetly thait does ow. As a reslt, the Uited Stateswold be less threateig to other co-tries, which wold lesse their eed to ac-qire atomic weapos to protect themselvesfrom a U.S. attack.

Frthermore, becase offshore balacigcalls for Washigto to help local pow-ers cotai aspirig regioal hegemos i

Northeast Asia, Erope ad the Glf, thereis o reaso that it caot exted its clearmbrella over its allies i those areas, thsdimiishig their eed to have their owdeterrets. Certaily, the strategy is ot per-fect: some allies will wat their ow clearweapos ot of fear that the Uited Statesmight ot be there for them i a ftrecrisis; ad some of Americas adversarieswill still have powerfl icetives to acqire

a clear arseal. Bt all thigs cosid-ered, offshore balacig is still better tha


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The Obama administration is populated from

top to bottom with liberal imperialists who

remain committed to trying to govern the world.

global domiace for keepig proliferatioi check.

Oddly eogh, before beig blow offcorse by 9/11, the Bsh admiistratiorealized the most serios challege that theUited States is likely to face i the decadesahead is dealig with a risig Chia. If

the Peoples Repblic grows ecoomicallyover the ext thirty years the way it has irecet decades, it is likely to traslate itsecoomic might ito military power adtry to domiate Asia as the Uited Statesdomiates the Wester Hemisphere. Bt oAmerica leader will accept that otcome,which meas that Washigto will seek tocotai Beijig ad prevet it from achiev-ig regioal hegemoy. We ca expect the

Uited States to lead a balacig coalitioagaist Chia that icldes Idia, Japa,Rssia, Sigapore, Soth Korea ad Viet-am, amog others.

Of corse, America wold check Chiasrise eve if it were prsig global domi-ace. Offshore balacig, however, is bet-ter sited to the task. For starters, attempt-ig to domiate the globe ecorages theUited States to fight wars all arod the

world, which ot oly wears dow its mili-tary i peripheral coflicts, bt also makesit difficlt to cocetrate its forces agaistChia. This is why Beijig shold hopethat the America military remais heavilyivolved i Afghaista ad Iraq for mayyears to come. Offshore balacig, o theother had, is committed to stayig ot offights i the periphery ad cocetratigistead o trly serios threats.

Aother virte of offshore balacig is itsemphasis o gettig other cotries to as-

sme the brde of cotaiig a aspirigregioal hegemo. Global domiators, icotrast, see the Uited States as the idis-pesable atio that mst do almost all ofthe heavy liftig to make cotaimet work.Bt this is ot a smart strategy becase thehma ad ecoomic price of checkig a

powerfl adversary ca be great, especiallyif war breaks ot. It almost always makesgood sese to get other cotries to pay asmay of those costs as possible while pre-servig oes ow power. The Uited Stateswill have to play a key role i coterigChia, becase its Asia eighbors are otstrog eogh to do it by themselves, bt aAmerica o loger weakeed by ecessaryforeig itervetio will be far more capable

of checkig Beijigs ambitios.Offshore balancing costs considerably

less money than does global dominance,allowing America to better prepare for thetrue threats it faces. This is in good partbecause this strategy avoids occupyingand governing countries in the develop-ing world and therefore does not requirelarge armies trained for counterinsurgency.Global dominators naturally think that

the United States is destined to fight morewars like Afghanistan and Iraq, makingit essential that we do counterinsurgencyright the next time. This is foolish think-ing, as both of those undertakings wereunnecessary and unwinnable. Washingtonshould go to great lengths to avoid similarfuture conflicts, which would allow forsharp reductions in the size of the armyand marine corps. Instead, future budgets

should privilege the air force and especiallythe navy, because they are the key services


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for dealing with a rising China. The over-arching goal, however, should be to takea big slice out of the defense budget tohelp reduce our soaring deficit and pay for

important domestic programs. Offshorebalancing is simply the best grand strategyfor dealing with al-Qaeda, nuclear prolif-erators like North Korea and the potentialthreat from China.

Perhaps most importatly, movig towarda strategy of offshore balacig wold helps tame or fearsome atioal-secrity state,which has grow alarmigly powerfl sice9/11. Core civil liberties are ow der

threat o the home frot ad the UitedStates rotiely egages i lawfl behav-

ior abroad. Civilia cotrol of the military isbecomig icreasigly problematic as well.These worrisome treds shold ot srprises; they are precisely what oe expects whe

a cotry egages i a broadly defied adedless global war agaist terror ad moregeerally commits itself to worldwide hege-moy. Never-edig militarizatio ivari-ably leads to militarism ad the demise ofcherished liberal vales. It is time for theUited States to show greater restrait addeal with the threats it faces i smarter admore discerig ways. That meas pttiga ed to Americas prsit of global domi-

ace ad goig back to the time-hooredstrategy of offshore balacig. n

Documents

Marshmeier - Imperial By Design