Marriage Settlements

7/24/2019 Marriage Settlements

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PIO BALATBAT,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and DOMINGOPASION, respondents.Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance for petitioner.Roberto Y. Miranda for private respondent.Ponente: DAVIDE

FACTS:

Petitioner is the agricultural lessee of a parcel of landlocated at Santiago, Sta. Ana, Pampanga which isowned by Daniel Garcia. The latter sold the land toprivate respondent Domingo Pasion and had declaredfor taxation purposes. Sometime after the sale,respondent, on a claim that he will personallycultivate the land, filed with the ourt of Agrarian!elations a complaint to e"ect petitioner allegingtherein that he had notified petitioner of his intentionto personally cultivate the landholding, but despitethe lapse of one #$% agricultural year from receipt ofthe notice thereof, petitioner refused to vacate theland.&n his amended answer with counterclaim, petitionerdenied having received any notice from the privaterespondent and by way of special and affirmativedefenses. The trial court ruled against petitioner. Theourt of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trialcourt.ISSUE:'hether or not the ourt of Appeals correctly gaveretroactive application to Section ( of !A )*+.HELD:-o. Petition was dismissed for want of merit.RATIO:The Supreme ourt ruled that Section ( of !.A. -o.)*+ cannot be given retroactive effect because,while during the debates on the bill which waseventually enacted into !epublic Act -o. )*+, therewere statements made on the floor that the ownerwill lose the right to e"ect after the enactment of thismeasure/ even in cases where the owner has notreally succeeded in e"ecting the tenants. ongressfailed to express an intention to ma0e !epublic Act-o. )*+ retroactive and to cover e"ectment cases on

the ground of personal cultivation then pendingad"udication by the courts.Since under the original provision of Section *)#$% of!.A. -o. *+11, the dispossession of the agriculturallessee on the ground of personal cultivation by theagricultural lessor2owner can only ta0e place whenauthori3ed by the ourt in a "udgment that is finaland executory,/ it follows then that since the repeal of

the provision too0 effect before the "udgment in thiscase became final and executory, private respondentmay no longer dispossess petitioner on that groundbecause it had been removed from the statute boo0s.

ERECTORS, INC. VS. NATIONAL LABORRELATIONS COMMISSIONGR. NO. 104215MA !, 1""#PETITIONER:

4!4T5!S, &-.

RESPONDENTS:

-AT&5-A6 6A75! !46AT&5-S 588&SS&5-,

9:6&5 A-D!4S,9!. A-D ;65!4-&5

7:!G5SP5-4-T4< P:-5, 9.?? and an allowance of :S= $)>.?? permonth. They agreed that private respondent shall

be entitled to a bonus of :S= $,???.?? if after

the $@month period. e renews or extends his

employment contract without availing of his vacation

or

homeleave. Their contract dated September @?, $(

was duly approved by the 8inistry of 6abor and

4mployment but it was not implemented. &n

December $(, petitioner notified that the position

of a service driver was no longer available. 5n

December $1, $(, they executed another contract

which changed the position of private respondent into

that helperBlaborer with a salary of :S= $?>.?? and

an allowance of :S=$?>.?? per month. The second

contract was not submitted to the 8inistry of 6abor

and 4mployment for approval. 5n December $+,

$(, private respondent left the country and wor0ed

at petitionerCs 7uraidah Sports omplex pro"ect inSaudi Arabia performing the "ob of a helperBlaborer.

e received a salary and monthly allowance of

:S=@$?.?? in accordance with the second contract.

Private respondent renewed his contract of

employment after one year. is salary was increased

to :S=@*$.??. Private respondent returned to the

Philippines on August @1, $+$. e then invo0ed his

first employment contract. e demanded from the

petitioner the difference between his salary and

allowance as indicated in the said contract, and the

amount actually paid to him, plus the contractualbonus which should have been awarded to him for

not availing of his vacation or home leave credits.

Petitioner denied private respondentCs claim.

5n 8arch *$, $+@, private respondent filed with the

6abor Arbiter a complaint against the petitioner for

underpayment of wages and non2payment of

overtime pay and contractual bonus. 5n 8ay $, $+@,

while the case was still in the conciliation stage,

4xecutive 5rder #4.5.% -o. (( creating the

Philippine 5verseas 4mployment Administration

#P54A% too0 effect. Section 1#a% of 4.5. -o. ((

vested the P54A with

original and exclusive "urisdiction over

all cases, including money claims,

involving employer2employeerelations arising out of

or by virtue of any law or contract involving ;ilipino

wor0ers for overseas employment.

ISSUE:

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'hether the -6! committed grave abuse of

discretion tantamount to lac0 of "urisdiction in

affirming the 6abor ArbiterCs void "udgment in the

case a uoE

HELD:

-5. The respondent -6! did not commit grave

abuse of discretion in upholdingthe "urisdiction of respondent 6abor Arbiter over the

complaint filed by privaterespondent against the

petitioner.

Albino o vs. ourt of Appeals #G.!. -o. $??(().

5ctober @+, $*%

$1MA

ALBINO S. CO,petitioner,

vs.COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, respondents.

Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for the people.

Ponente: NARVASA

FACTS:

A criminal complaint for violation ofBatasPambansa Bilang was filed by the salvage

company against petitioner with the !egional Trial

ourt. The case eventuated in petitionerCs conviction

of the crime charged on the basis that a chec0 issued

merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation

is nevertheless covered by 7.P. 7lg. @@. Pending

litigation, 8inistry of 9ustice ircular -o. 1 #which

excludes guarantee chec0 from application of 7.P.

7lg. @@% was subseuently reversed by 8inistry

ircular -o. $@ which ruled that a chec0 issued

merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation

is nevertheless covered by 7.P. 7lg. @@. Petitioner

appealed to the ourt of Appeals. There he sought

exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible

error for the !egional Trial ourt but the ourt of

Appeals affirmed his conviction.

ISSUE:

'hether or not 8inistry ircular -o. $@ dated

August +, $+1 declaring the guarantee chec0 will no

longer be considered as a valid defense be

retroactively applied.

HELD:

-5. Decision of the ourt of Appeals and !T were

set aside. riminal prosecution against accused2

petitioner was dismissed.

RATIO:

&t would seem that the weight of authority is

decidedly in favor of the proposition that the ourtCs

decision of September @$, $+( in !ue v.People,

$>1 S!A $)? #$+(% that a chec0 issued merely to

guarantee the performance of an obligation is

nevertheless covered by 7.P. 7lg. @@ F should not be

given retrospective effect to the pre"udice of the

petitioner and other persons situated, who relied onthe official opinion of the 8inister of 9ustice that

such a chec0 did not fall within the scope of 7.P. 7lg.

@@.

This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which,

pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be

resolved in favor of the accused. 4verything

considered, the ourt sees no compelling reason why

the doctrine of mala prohibitashould override the

principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications

as herein above set out and discussed, negating

criminal liability.

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G.R. N%. &"0#0 D'(')*'+ !, 1"!"ANICETO C. OCAMPO,petitioner,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES Un-'+/- % 3'P3---n'/6,respondents.Pedro ". Martine# for petitioner.

PARAS,J.:This is a petition for review on certiorarito reverseor set aside the "udgment of public respondent ourtof Appeals dated 8ay +, $+( which affirmed thetrial courts decision finding petitioner guilty ofviolation of Presidential Decree -o. ((@ #Anti2Suatting 6aw% and sentencing him to sufferimprisonment for one #$% year, with the accessoriesprovided by law and to remove the house constructedon the land in uestion within thirty #*?% days fromthe finality of "udgment, otherwise, privaterespondent :niversity of the Philippines wasauthori3ed to demolish or dismantle the house at theexpense of the petitioner.The facts are not disputed.At about $?


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$. 'hether or not the failure of the prosecution topresent evidence of ownership is not a fatal defect infinding the accused2petitioner guilty beyondreasonable doubt of the crime of suattingH and@. &s the 8otion to Dismiss filed by accused2petitioner a bar for him to present evidenceE;or failure of the petitioner to file his reply within theperiod which expired on December @?, $+(, this

ourt, in a resolution dated ;ebruary *, $++,resolved to dispense with the aforesaid reply andconsidered the case submitted for deliberation.Petitioner alleges that the very essence of the case isthe proof of ownership of the land involved herein.'e do not agree.The law involved in this case is Section $ ofPresidential Decree -o. ((@, otherwise 0nown as theAnti2Suatting 6aw, which embraces three #*%elements, namely< #a% accused is not the owner of thelandH #b% that he succeeded in occupying orpossessing the property through force, intimidation,or threat or by ta0ing advantage of the absence ortolerance of the ownerH and #c% such occupation of theproperty is without the consent or against the will ofthe owner. &n the case at bar, all three #*% elementshave been established beyond reasonable doubt.The evidence presented by the prosecutionmanifested that Aniceto 5campo was not the ownerof the land on which he constructed his house andthat he did so against the owners will or without itsconsent. Prosecuution witnesses testified that as earlyas 8ay, $+*, petitioner was told that the area is :.P.propertyH that he began constructing his housewithout a permit from the ownerH that petitioner hadno building permit and that he had been informed thathe was violating the Anti2Suatting 6aw. 7esides, itwas also confirmed that petitioner had never showntitle to the land he claims to have purchased from one!oberto Pael. Let, he failed to present any deed ofsale or any title in his name. This alleged sale is adefense which the petitioner could have successfullyutili3ed to his advantage but failed to substantiate itwith evidence at the trial. 'hen petitioner moved fordismissal of the case, he forfeited his chance to provehis claim. &t must be noted also that this !oberto Pael

was shown by testimonial evidence to be not theowner of the land and that said land is the sub"ect of acriminal case against Pael for suatting.-either did the petitioner exhibit any building orsanitary permit to the :.P. Security ;orce or in court,such being attached only to his motion forreconsideration. 'orthy of note is the fact that suchpermits are both dated 9une @), $+>, which is more

than ten #$?% months after the illegal constructiontoo0 place and three #*% months after the case hadbeen filed against petitioner. #p. @, !ello%'e concur with the ourt of Appeals in affirming thetrial courts decision which maintained that the failureof the prosecution to present title to prove ownershipby the :niversity of the Philippines of the land inuestion is not material in proving the guilt of thepetitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The ownershipof :.P. is not in issue in this case. 'ithal, theproperty has been widely and publicly 0nown to bepart of the :.P. grounds. The crucial issue is the actof suatting of the petitioner and his non2ownershipof the property, both of which have been provenbeyond reasonable doubt.As regard the second issue presented, the answer is inthe affirmative. Section $>, !ule $$ of the !ules onriminal Procedure, as amended, provides.$emurrer to %vidence. F after theprosecution has rested its case, the court may dismissthe case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence#$% on its own initiative after giving the prosecutionan opportunity to be heardH or #@% on motion of theaccused filed with prior leave of court.&f the court denies the motion for dismissal, theaccused may adduce evidence in his defense. 'henthe accused files such motion to dismiss withoutexpress leave of court, he waives the right to presentevidence and submits the case for "udgment on thebasis of the evidence for the prosecution. #4mphasissupplied%.The amendment to Section $>, !ule $$ of the $+>!ules on riminal Procedure too0 effect only on5ctober $, $++, but the same was given retroactiveeffect in the case of 7onalos vs. People, in itsresolution dated, September $, $++. 'ell2settled is

the rule that Jstatutes regulating the procedure of thecourt will be construed as applicable to actionspending and undetermined at the time of theirpassage. Procedural laws are retrospective in thatsense and to that extentJ #People vs. Sumilang, ((Phil. (+1H Alday vs. anilon, $@? S!A >@@%. Theamendment would therefore apply in this case.&n the case at bar, nowhere does the record show that

accused2petitioners demurrer to evidence was filedwith prior leave of court, the retroactive effect of theamendment aforestated would therefore wor0 againstherein petitioner.7y moving to dismiss on the ground of insufficiencyof evidence, accused2petitioner waives his right topresent evidence to substantiate his defense and ineffect submits the case for "udgment on the basis ofthe evidence for the prosecution. This is exactly whatpetitioner did, and he cannot now claim denial of hisright to adduce his own evidence. As the SolicitorGeneral aptly opined, Jpetitioner gambled onsecuring an acuittal, a gamble which he lost.J #pp.*$2*@, !ollo%8ore than that, petitioner raises as issue whether hismotion to dismiss bars him from presenting hisevidence, but nowhere in his petition does heendeavor to argue in his favor. Such a uestionshould have been raised by the petitioner in the courta uo and on appeal yet he failed to do the same.'4!4;5!4, the petition is D4-&4D. Thedecision of the public respondent is herebyA;;&!84D in toto.S5 5!D4!4D.

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G.R. N%. !2!05 78n' 2", 1"!"BRIAD AGRO DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION,petitioner,vs.HONORABLE DIONISIO DELA SERNA, INHIS CAPACIT AS UNDERSECRETAR OFTHE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ANDEMPLOMENT, TRADE UNIONS OF THE

PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICESTUPAS69FTU LOCAL CHAPTER NO. R019005, ALFRED DELA CRU;, ETAL., < respondents.G.R. N%. !$225 78n' 2", 1"!"L.M. CAMUS ENGINEERINGCORPORATION,petitioner,vs.THE HON. SECRETAR OF LABOR, THEHON. UNDERSECRETAR DIONISIO C. DELASERNA, VICTORIANO ATIEN;A, 7R.,7OSNERI DIOCARES, RENALDO PARE=O,INNIE ORTOSIT, NELEN SEVERINO,MARLON RESONABLE, ROLANDOALDANESE, ALICIO SEBIAO, CARLINTOPA>UERO, 7ULIAN GOSONA, ROLANDOCASIMERO, ALFREDO DE LEON,VICTORIANO MACHANG, ARMANDOSALA;AR, ANITO DE 7ESUS, FRANCISCODELGADO, PA>UITO PITULAN, DANILOCENTINO, ROMEO DELOS SANTOS, RUBENLARA, ROGELIO MAGHUOR, BEN ABDANI,RUD PALASUGLO, ILLIAM BALDADO,ROMEO LABIGAN, TANN 7ANOLO andEDGAR A. ORE;, respondents.&ora#on R. Paulino for petitioner in G.R. 'o. (()*.

Raoul B. Agrava + Associates for petitioner in G.R.

'o. (,*.

Lar- &omia- Manala + Associates for respondents in

G.R. 'o. (()*.

esus Balicanta for respondents in G.R. 'o. (,*.

SARMIENTO,J.:Submitted for decision are these two consolidatedcases, both in the nature of challenges to the"urisdiction of the various !egional Directors of the

Department of 6abor and 4mployment to act onmoney claims. 1

A-T44D4-T ;ATS A-D P!544D&-GS.&. G.!. -o. +@+?>.This case originated from a complaint filed on;ebruary @$, $+( to recover unpaid wages and wagesupplements filed with !egional Director ;ilomeno7albin of the 6abor Departments !egional 5ffice-o. & sitting in San ;ernando, 6a :nion. The factsappear in his order,*),?.*?% in the manner above2stated, withinfifteen #$>% days from receipt hereof, and to submitproof of payment within the same period. 5therwise,a 'rit of 4xecution win be issued to the propersheriffs to enforce this 5rder. The claims for non2payment of overtime pay and night shift differentialpay, are hereby D&S8&SS4D for lac0 of merit.6et the parties be notified accordingly.S5 5!D4!4D. $

&n its appeal to the -ational 6abor !elationsommission, 7riad Agro Development contendedthat the !egional Director has no authority toentertain pecuniary claims of wor0ers, following thisourts ruling in/ambales Base Metals- 0nc. v.Minister of Labor-4in which we held that moneyclaims are the exclusive domain of the labor arbiters.The -ational 6abor !elations ommission dismissedthe appeal on the strength of 4xecutive 5rder -o.$$$, 5amending Article $@+#b% of the 6abor ode, inwhich "urisdiction to so act on monetary claims wassupposedly granted to regional directors. &n itspetition to this ourt, 7riad Agro Developmentreiterates its "urisdictional challenge.&&. G.!. -o. +*@@>.The money award in this case, as and for unpaidemergency cost of living allowances, and thirteenth2month and holiday pays, was granted originally infavor of seventy2four employees of 6.8. amus4ngineering following an inspection by !egionalDirector David Nong of the Department of 6abors

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!egional 5ffice -o. &M, Oamboanga ity. &n hisorder, issued on 8ay $), $+*, Director Nongcondemned the corporation to pay a total ofP$1),$+$.@?. ;orty2seven employees were, however,later dropped from the case following an amicablesettlement with the petitioner. The facts are asfollows

'e can no longer accept the contention that the!egional Directors singular concern, under the saidprovision, is to ensure compliance with laborstandards, such as industrial safety and similarconcerns. &n/ambales Base Metals, it was ourreading of Section $@+#b% of the ode that theaforesaid labor officials authority stopped there,1$butwe have, in view of the amendment under 4xecutive5rder -o. $$$, since ta0en a second loo0. As we said,the 4xecutive 5rder vests in !egional Directors

"urisdiction, JtQhe provisions of Article @$( of thisode to the contrary notwithstandingJ, it would haverendered such a proviso2and the amendment itself2useless to say that they #!egional Directors% retainedthe self2same restricted powers, despite such anamendment. &t is fundamental that a statute is to beread in a manner that would breathe life into it, ratherthan defeat it. At any rate, and as we have observed,the language of 4xecutive 5rder -o. $$$ iscomprehensive enough to extend to the resolution of

employer2employee controversies covered by Article@$(.&t is interesting to note that the Government itself#through the Solicitor General% considers/ambalesBase Metals v. Minister of Labor as 4xecutive 5rder-o. $$ls very raison d8etre.14&f this is so, the intentof the legislator to grant !egional Directors the"urisdiction now impugned cannot any more beclearer.7eing a curative statute, the 4xecutive 5rder inuestion has retrospective effect. &n Garcia v.Martine#- 15we held that legislation Jwhich is in thenature of a curative statuteJ 1#has Jretrospectiveapplication to a pending proceeding.J 1&ence, thesecases should be decided in the light of thepresidential issuance in uestion, although they mighthave come pending further proceedings. 7e that as itmay, the records show that G.!. -o. +@+?> had comeabout during the effectivity of 4xecutive 5rder -o.$$$. #&n G.!. -o. +@+?>, the complaint was filed on;ebruary @$, $+(H in G.!. -o. +*@@>, the materialdates do not appear in the records but the orderdecreeing the money award was issued on 5ctober@>, $+@ and a subpoena duces tecum appears tohave been issued, in connection with the inspectionsthat prefaced the complaint, on August @?, $+@. 1!%'ith respect to G.!. -o. +@+?>, therefore, the4xecutive 5rder suarely applies, while insofar asG.!. -o. +*@@> is concerned, we give it a retroactiveoperation.'ith respect moreover, to amus 4ngineeringspetition #G.!. -o. +*@@>%, it is the ourts consideredopinion that the petitioner is estopped from assailing

Director Nongs "urisdiction. The rule is that a partymay not attac0 a tribunals "urisdiction and at thesame time as0 for affirmative relief 1"The recordsdisclose that the petitioner had entered into anamicable settlement with a total of forty2sevenemployees and had it approved by Director Nong.The petitioner must, therefore, be said to haveaccepted Director Nongs "urisdiction. &t cannot nowassail it.Accordingly, we sustain the "urisdiction of therespondents !egional Directors.

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'4!4;5!4, these petitions are D&S8&SS4D. -ocosts.S5 5!D4!4D.Melencio9:errera- Paras- "eliciano- Ganca6co

Padilla- Bidin- &ortes- Gri;o9A2uino- Medialdea and

Regalado- .- concur.

"ernan- &.. and &ru#- Gutierre#- r. .- concur.

S'a+a' O-n-%n/NARVASA,J., oncurring 5pinion)S!A >?? #Dec. $1, $+(%, involving, among others,employees whose employment had beenterminated, 1!and ng v. Parel, $>) S!A ()+ #Dec.@$, $+(%, in which the employerinter alia disputedthe adeuacy of the evidentiary foundation#employees affidavits% of the findings of the laborstandards inspectors. -oteworthy is that, as observedin ng v. Parel-the Solicitor General had ta0en theposition #as late as 9anuary, $+(% that the respondent!egional Director was Jnot empo7ered to ad3udicate

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mone6 claims because such authorit6 is reposed in

the Labor Arbiter and the 'ational Labor Relations

&ommission as provided under Art. 45 of the same

&ode- as amended... #and% that the visitorial andenforcement powers of the public respondent underArt. $@+ of the 6abor ode are limited to awards notexceeding P$??,???.?? pursuant to 8564 Policy&nstruction -o. (.J 1"

1.Amendments Dnder % 444. F Anotheramendment of paragraph #b% of Article $@+ of the6abor ode was made by 4xecutive 5rder -o. $$$which too0 effect, as aforestated, on 8arch *, $+(.The amendment consisted merely in the intercalationof two #@% clauses, to wit< #a% JThe provisions ofarticle 45 of this code to the contrar6

not7ithstanding and in cases 7here the relationship

of emplo6er9emplo6ee still e


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$% the alleged violations of the employer involvepersons who are still his employees, i.e., notdismissed< and@% the employer does not contest the findings of thelabor regulations officer or raise issues which cannotbe resolved without considering evidentiary mattersthat are not verifiable in the normal course ofinspection.These propositions relative to uncontested cases arereflected in !ule &&& of the !ules &mplementing4xecutive 5rder $$$ governing the J4ndorsement ofases to the -ational 6abor !elationsommission,J vi#. Policy &nstructions-o. $1, on the sub"ect, JTermination ases,J effectiveApril @*, $(), recogni3ed the "urisdiction of the!egional Director to conduct a summaryinvestigation of applications for clearance to dismissemployees and decide whether or not to deny theapplicationH but Jif he does not deny the application,he shall immediately certif6 the case to the %


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adduced by parties involved in a labor standardscontroversy, determine on the basis thereof thefactual issues, and apply the law to the facts thusdeemed established, in order that the controversy orlitigation might be authoritatively resolved. e didnot have the power to resolve controversies#understood in the popular sense, as clashes ofopposing views%. e merely had functions that canonly be described as ministerial. e had visitorialpower, as representative of the 8inister or Secretaryof 6abor, to cause inspection of establishments toascertain observance of labor standards provisions,and in the event of discovered violations thereof, toreuire compliance therewith if the employeradmitted the infractionsH but if it should appear, at thehearing reuired to be held after discovery of theinfractions, that a controversy existed, i.e., theemployer was not accepting but was on the contrarycontesting said officers findings, or that noemployment relationship existed any longer, the!egional Director himself could not try and decide

the case but had to refer or certify it to theappropriate 6abor Arbiter for hearing and "udgment.There was, in fine, no sharing by the !egionalDirector of the original and exclusive "urisdictionreposed by law in 6abor Arbiters even with respect tomoney claims arising from alleged breach of laborstandards provisions of the 6abor ode.*.Relevant urisprudence. F &t was in this sense Fof the regional Directors lac0 of ad"udicatoryauthority, or the power of compulsory arbitration Fthat the law was applied in/ambales Base Metals v.Minister of Labor, $1) S!A >? #-ov. @),$+)%,

concerning money claims 1&arising from allegedviolations of labor standards provisions notdiscovered in the course of normalinspection, reshoot Mining &o. v. Arellano, $>)S!A >?? #Dec. $1, $+(%, involving, among others,employees whose employment had beenterminated, 1!and ng v. Parel, $>) S!A ()+ #Dec.@$, $+(%, in which the employerinter alia disputedthe adeuacy of the evidentiary foundation#employees affidavits% of the findings of the laborstandards inspectors. -oteworthy is that, as observed

in ng v. Parel-the Solicitor General had ta0en theposition #as late as 9anuary, $+(% that the respondent!egional Director was Jnot empo7ered to ad3udicatemone6 claims because such authorit6 is reposed in

the Labor Arbiter and the 'ational Labor Relations

&ommission as provided under Art. 45 of the same

&ode- as amended... #and% that the visitorial andenforcement powers of the public respondent underArt. $@+ of the 6abor ode are limited to awards notexceeding P$??,???.?? pursuant to 8564 Policy&nstruction -o. (.J 1"

1.Amendments Dnder % 444. F Anotheramendment of paragraph #b% of Article $@+ of the6abor ode was made by 4xecutive 5rder -o. $$$which too0 effect, as aforestated, on 8arch *, $+(.The amendment consisted merely in the intercalationof two #@% clauses, to wit< #a% JThe provisions ofarticle 45 of this code to the contrar6

not7ithstanding and in cases 7here the relationship

of emplo6er9emplo6ee still e


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enforcement of their order, except in cases where theemployer contests the findings of the labor regulationofficer and raises issues which cannot be resolvedwithout considering evidentiary matters that are notverifiable in the normal course of inspection.&n other words, even without the ualifying phrase,Jthe provisions of Article @$( of this ode to thecontrary notwithstanding,J the Secretary of 6abor orhis duly authori3ed representatives already JsharedJin some measure the "urisdiction of 6abor Arbiters toorder observance of labor laws F denominatedexclusive and original in said Article @$( F in that in:-5-T4ST4D 85-4L 6A&8S 5; P4!S5-SST&66 48P65L4D, !egional Directors had powerto Jorder and administer ... compliance with the laborstandards provisions ... and to issue writs ofexecution to the appropriate authority for theenforcement of their order.J The principle has notbeen changed. 4ven under 45 $$$ no other aspect ofthe 6abor Arbiters "urisdiction may be deemed to beshared by the Secretary or his representatives, in view

of the retention of the provisos reuiring #$% theexistence of the employment relationship and #@% theabsence of a contest or issue raised by the employeranent the findings of the labor regulations officers.'hether under 45 $$$ or the prior law, therefore, theSecretary of 6abor or his representatives could,notwithstanding the exclusive original "urisdictionconferred on 6abor Arbiters, order compliance withthe legal provisions governing wages, hours ofemployment and other terms of employment, foundto have been violated in the normal course ofinspection, provided that #$% the employment

relationship still existed and #@% the case wasuncontested, i.e., the employer did not contest orraise any issue relative to the findings of the laborstandards officers.To recapitulate, under 45 $$$, the !egionalDirectors, in representation of the Secretary of 6aborF and notwithstanding the grant of exclusiveoriginal "urisdiction to 6abor Arbiters by Article @$(of the 6abor ode, as amended F have power tohear cases involving violations of labor s tandardsprovisions of the 6abor ode or other legislation

discovered in the course of normal inspection, andorder compliance therewith, provided that of the ivil ode. #9a-o exceptions wereprovided under the said article, henceforth, none shallbe considered. ;urthermore, the 6abor ode wassigned into 6aw decades after the ivil ode too0

effect.&n:erman vs. Radio &orporation of thePhilippines-&this ourt declared that whenever twostatutes of different dates and of contrary tenor are ofeual theoretical application to a particular case, thestatute of later date must prevail being a laterexpression of legislative will. Applying the aforecitedcase in the instant petition, the ivil ode provisionscited by the petitioner must yield to Article $$? of the6abor ode.

8oreover, 5ur pronouncement inA. &. RansomLabor Dnion9&&LD vs. 'LR&, !reinforces theabove2mentioned interpretation where this ourt,spea0ing through Associate 9ustice 8elencio2errera, explicitly stated that J#t%he wor0erpreference applies even if the employers propertiesare encumbered by means of a mortgage contract ...So that, when #the% machinery and euipment of!A-S58 were sold to !evelations 8anufacturingorporation for P@8 in $(>, the right of the @@laborers to be paid from the proceeds should havebeen recogni3ed ... J "

!eliance by the petitioners on !epublic vs. Peralta iswithout basis. The said case involved a uestion ofwor0ers preference as against the tax claims of theState. &n the said case the ourt held that the Statemust prevail in that instance since Jit has beenfreuently said that taxes are the very lifeblood ofgovernment. The effective collection of taxes is a tas0of highest importance for the sovereign. &t is criticalindeed for its own survival .J 10

-evertheless, under Article $$? of the 6abor ode asamended, the unpaid wages and other monetaryclaims of wor0ers should be paid in full before theclaims of the Government and other creditors. Thusnot even tax claims could have preference over thewor0ers claim.onsistent with the ruling of this ourt in FolschelLabor Dnion vs. Bureau of Labor Relations, 11thiscourt adopts the doctrine that J#i%n theimplementation and interpretation of the provisionsof the 6abor ode and its implementing regulations,the wor0ingmans welfare should be the primordial

and paramount consideration.J 127earing this inmind, this ourt must reiterate the dictum laid downin A.. !ansom that the conflict between Article $$?of the 6abor ode and Article @@1$ to @@1> of theivil ode must be resolved in favor of the former. Acontrary ruling would defeat the purpose for whichArticle $$? was intendedH that is, for the protection ofthe wor0ing class, pursuant to the never2ending uestfor social "ustice.Petitioner next advances the theory that Jeven if thewor0ers lien applies in the instant case, the same

should cover only unpaid wages excludingtermination or severance pay. 1$To support thiscontention, petitioner cites Section (, !ule $, 7oo0I& of the !ules and !egulations implementing the6abor ode which provides that #@% #e%, ofthe onstitution and Section #*%, of 7atas 7lg. $@,Jis whether the ity ouncil of 8anila still has thepower to appoint ouncil officers and employeesunder !epublic Act -o. 1?, otherwise 0nown as theharter of the ity of 8anila, or whether the poweris now vested with the ity 8ayor pursuant to!epublic Act -o. >$+>, the Decentrali3ation 6aw,and 7atas 7lg. **(, the 6ocal Government ode. Thefacts are as follows, of said !epublic Act -o. 1?, asamended, which reads. . . . .x x x x x x x x x. . . The 7oard shall appoint and the Iice 8ayor shallsign all appointments of the other employees of the7oard.$

The ity 7udget 5fficer of 8anila later sought fromthe Personnel 7ureau of the 8ayors office JcommentandBor recommendationJ on whether the payroll of

the newly appointed employees of the ity ouncilmay be paid on the basis of appointments signed bythe Iice28ayor.@The Personnel 7ureau thenforwarded the uery to the ity 6egal 5fficer who, ina *rd endorsement dated September $,$++,*rendered an opinion that the proper appointingofficer is the ity 8ayor and not the ity ouncil.This opinion was transmitted by the Secretary to theity 8ayor to the ommission.

5n ;ebruary $, $+, the ommission promulgated!esolution -o. +2?(>, and held that contrary to theopinion of the ity 6egal 5fficer, it is the ityouncil to which the appointing power is vested. Thedispositive portion thereof is as follows$+> and 7atas 7lg.**(, which apply to municipal governments ingeneral, are general laws. As the Solicitor Generalpoints out, and we agree with him, it is a canon ofstatutory construction that a special law prevails overa general law F regardless of their dates of passageF and the special is to be considered as remaining anexception to the general.$?

So also, every effort must be exerted to avoid a

conflict between statutes. &f reasonable constructionis possible, the laws must be reconciled in thatmanner.!epeals of laws by implication moreover are notfavored, and the mere repugnancy between twostatutes should be very clear to warrant the court inholding that the later in time repeals the other.$$

'hy a special law prevails over a general law hasbeen put by the ourt as follows$H Philippine !ailway o. vs. -olting *1 Phil.,1?$.%$@

&n one case, we held that !epublic Act -o. >$+> did

not divest the 8ayor of 8anila of his power underthe harter of the ity of 8anila to approve the citybudget.$*

'e also agree with the ivil Service ommissionthat the provisions of !epublic Act -o. >$+>, givingmayors the power to appoint all officials Jentirelypaid out by city funds$1and those of 7atas 7lg. **(,empowering local executives with the authority toappoint Jall officers and employees of thecity,J$>were meant not to vest the city mayorspersewith comprehensive powers but rather, to

underscore the transfer of the power of appointmentover local officials and employees from the Presidentto the local governments and to highlight theautonomy of local governments. They were notmeant, however, to deprive the ity ouncil of8anila for instance, its appointing power granted byexisting statute, and after all, that arrangement issufficient to accomplish the ob"ectives of both theDecentrali3ation Act and the 6ocal Government

ode, that is, to provide teeth to local autonomy.&n the light of an the foregoing, we do not find anygrave abuse of discretion committed by therespondent ommission.'4!4;5!4, the petition is D&S8&SS4D. -ocosts.S5 5!D4!4D."ernan- &..- 'arvasa- Melencio9:errera- Gutierre#-

r.- &ru#- Paras- "eliciano- Ganca6co- Padilla-

Bidin- Gri;o9A2uino- Medialdea- Regalado and

$avide- r.- .- concur.

21
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G.R. N%. L9552$0 N%')*'+ !, 1"!!HON. RICHARD 7. GORDON, -n 3-/ (aa(- a/C- Ma%+ % O%n@a%,petitioner,vs.7UDGE REGINO T. VERIDIANO II and S%8/'/EDUARDO and ROSALINDAAMBAO, respondents.CRU;,J.:The issue before the ourt is the conflict between the;ood and Drug Administration and the mayor of5longapo ity over the power to grant and revo0elicenses for the operation of drug stores in the saidcity. 'hile conceding that the ;DA possesses suchpower, the mayor claims he may nevertheless, in theexercise of his own power, prevent the operation ofdrug stores previously permitted by the former.There are two drug stores involved in this dispute, towit, the San Sebastian Drug Store and the 5longapoity Drug Store, both owned by private respondent!osalinda Lambao. 1 They are located a few metersfrom each other in the same building on ospital!oad, 5longapo ity. 2They were covered by8ayors Permits -os. $>1 and $>>, respectively,issued for the year $+?, $and licenses to operateissued by the ;DA for the same year. 4This case arose when on 8arch @$, $+?, at about>


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Department of ealth and exercised through an officein the 7ureau of ealth 0nown as the Drug&nspection Section. This section was empowered Jtoauthori3e the opening of pharmacies, drug stores anddispensaries, and similar establishments afterinspection by persons authori3ed by law.JThe ;ood and Drug Administration was created under!.A. -o. *(@? #otherwise 0nown as the ;ood, Drugand osmetic Act%, approved on 9une @@, $)*, and

vested with all drug inspection functions in line withJthe policy of the State to insure safe and gooduality supply of food, drug and cosmetics, and toregulate the production, sale and traffic of the same toprotect the health of the people.J Section > of this Actspecifically empowers it, $)+,Administrative 5rder -o. )?, series of $)+, layingdown the reuirements for the application to be filedwith the ;DA for authori3ation to operate or establisha drug establishment. The order provides that uponapproval of the application, the ;DA shall issue to theowner or administrator of the drug store or similarestablishment a J6icense to 5perateJ which Jshall berenewed within the first * months of each year uponpayment of the reuired fees.J This license containsthe following reservation, $+?, at which private respondentLambao, assisted by her lawyer2husband, appearedand testified. 2!7y contrast, the revocation of themayors permit was communicated to her in aletter 2"reading simply as follows?.?? was the share of the nationalgovernment and P)>?.?? is the share of the city

government, which salary was P>??.?? below thebasic monthly salary of a ity 9udge of a third classcityH that under !epublic Act -o. >)(, the differencebetween the salary actually being received by a ity9udge and the basic salary established in said act shallbe paid by the city governmentH that from 9une @$,$) up to the filing of the petition on 9anuary @$,$($, the petitioner was entitled to a salarydifferential of P,>??.?? with the respondent ity of

San arlos #Pangasinan%H that the petitioner hadrepeatedly reuested the respondents to enact thenecessary budget and to pay him the said differentialbut the respondents, without any "ustification,whatsoever, refused and still refuse to do the sameHthat it is the clear duty of the respondent to enact thenecessary budget providing for the payment of thesalary of the petitioner as provided for in !epublicAct -o. >)(H that petitioner has no other plain,adeuate and speedy remedy except the presentaction for mandamusH and that because of the refusalof the respondent to comply with their obligation as

provided in !epublic Act -o. >)(, the petitionerwas forced to engage the services of a lawyer to filethis action for which he was to pay the sum ofP@,???.?? as attorneysfees. 2

&n their answer dated ;ebruary $?, $($, therespondents admitted and denied the allegations inthe petition and alleged that !epublic Act -o. >)(further provides, among other things, that the salaryof the city "udge shall at least be one hundred pesosper month less than that of a city mayorH that the city"udge receives an annual salary of P$@,???.?? which

is P$??.?? per month less than the salary beingreceived by the city mayor which is P$*,@??.??yearlyH that assuming the existence of a salarydifference, in view of the provision of !epublic Act-o. >)(, that the payment of the salary differenceshall be sub"ect to the implementation of therespective city government, which is discretionary onthe part of the city government as to whether it wouldor would not implement the payment of the salarydifference, and in view of the financial difficulties ofthe city which has a big overdraft, the payment of the

salary difference of the city "udge cannot be madeHand that the petitioner should pay his lawyer andshould not charge the attorneys fees to therespondents who have not violated any rights of thepetitioner. $

The ourt of ;irst &nstance of San arlos ity#Pangasinan%, 7ranch M, rendered its decision dated8ay *$, $($ dismissing the petition, withoutpronouncement as to costs.

The pertinent portion of Section (, !epublic Act -o.>)( reads)( would beinterpreted as the controlling measure for fixing the

salary of the city "udges, then the principal provisionof Section ( fixing the salaries of ity 9udges at ratevery much higher than that of a ity 8ayor#particularly in the case of second and third classcities% would be rendered totally useless.J Thepetitioner submitted Jthat since the principal intentionof the legislature in enacting Section ( of !epublicAct >)( is to increase the salary of the city "udges,then the last proviso of said Section ( should giveway to the provisions of said section preceding saidproviso.J

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The record shows that when !epublic Act -o. >)(too0 effect on 9une @$, $), San arlos ity#Pangasinan% was a third class cityH that the petitioneras city "udge received an annual salary ofP$@,???.??H and that the city mayor of San arlosity received an annual salary of P$*,@??.?? whichwas exactly P$??.?? a month more than the salary ofthe city "udge.During the deliberation in the Senate on ouse 7ill

-o. $(?1), which became !epublic Act -o. >)(,the following discussion too0 place)( was that the salary of a city "udge should not behigher than the salary of the city mayor. The savingclause JProvided, however, That the salary of a city

"udge shall be at least P$??.?? per month less thanthat of the city mayorJ ualifies the earlier provisionwhich fixes the salary of city "udges for second andthird class cities at P$+,???.?? per annum.The primary purpose of a proviso is to limit thegeneral language of a statute. 'hen there isirreconcilable repugnancy between the proviso andthe body of the statute the former is given precedenceover the latter on the ground that it is the latestexpression of the intent of the legislature.&nasmuch as the city mayor of San arlos ity#Pangasinan% was receiving an annual salary of

P$*,@??.??, the respondents cannot be compelled toprovide for an annual salary of P$+,???.?? for thepetitioner as city "udge of the said city.'4!4;5!4, the petition for review is herebydismissed and the decision appealed from is affirmed,without pronouncement as to cost.S5 5!D4!4D.Teehanee- &hairmanC Maasiar- Mu;o# Palma and

Guerrero- .- concur.

G.R. N%/. 120!#59&1 D'(')*'+ &, 1""5LAGUNA LA?E DEVELOPMENTAUTHORIT,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS HON. 7UDGEHERCULANO TECH, PRESIDING 7UDGE,BRANCH &0, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OFBINANGONAN RI;AL FLEETDEVELOPMENT, INC. and CARLITO

ARROO THE MUNICIPALIT OFBINANGONAN and%+ MAOR ISIDRO B.PACIS, respondents.LAGUNA LA?E DEVELOPMENTAUTHORIT,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS HON. 7UDGE AURELIOC. TRAMPE, PRESIDING 7UDGE, BRANCH1#$, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIGMANILA MARINE LIFE BUSINESSRESOURCES, INC. +'+'/'n'd *, MR.TOBIAS RENALD M. TIANGCO

MUNICIPALIT OF TAGUIG, METROMANILA and%+ MAOR RICARDO D. PAPA,7R., respondents.LAGUNA LA?E DEVELOPMENTAUTHORIT,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS HON. 7UDGEALE7ANDRO A. MAR>UE;, PRESIDING7UDGE, BRANCH &", REGIONAL TRIALCOURT OF MORONG, RI;AL GREENFIELDVENTURES INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION and R. 7. ORION

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONMUNICIPALIT OF 7ALA97ALA and%+MAOR ALFREDO M. DE LAVEGA, respondents.LAGUNA LA?E DEVELOPMENTAUTHORIT,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS HON. 7UDGE MANUELS. PADOLINA, PRESIDING 7UDGE, BRANCH1#2, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG,METRO MANILA IRMA FISHING

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TRADING CORP. ARTM FISHING CORP.BDR CORPORATION, MIRT CORPORATIONand TRIM CORPORATION MUNICIPALITOF BINANGONAN and%+ MAOR ISIDRO B.PACIS, respondents.LAGUNA LA?E DEVELOPMENTAUTHORIT,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS HON. 7UDGE ARTURO

A. MARAVE, PRESIDING 7UDGE, BRANCH&!, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG,RI;AL BLUE LAGOON FISHING CORP. andALCRIS CHIC?EN GROERS, INC.MUNICIPALIT OF 7ALA97ALA and%+MAOR ALFREDO M. DE LAVEGA, respondents.LAGUNA LA?E DEVELOPMENTAUTHORIT,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS HON. 7UDGE ARTUROA. MARAVE, PRESIDING 7UDGE, BRANCH

&!, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG,RI;AL AGP FISH VENTURES, INC.,+'+'/'n'd * -/ PRESIDENT ALFONSOPUAT MUNICIPALIT OF 7ALA97ALAand%+ MAOR ALFREDO M. DE LAVEGA, respondents.LAGUNA LA?E DEVELOPMENTAUTHORIT,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS HON. 7UDGEEUGENIO S. LABITORIA, PRESIDING7UDGE, BRANCH 1#1, REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA SEAMAR TRADING CO. INC. EASTERNLAGOON FISHING CORP. MINAMARFISHING CORP. MUNICIPALIT OFBINANGONAN and%+ MAOR ISIDRO B.PACIS,respondents.HERMOSISIMA, 7R.,J.:&t is difficult for a man, scavenging on the garbagedump created by affluence and profligateconsumption and extravagance of the rich or fishing

in the mur0y waters of the Pasig !iver and the6aguna 6a0e or ma0ing a clearing in the forest sothat he can produce food for his family, to understandwhy protecting birds, fish, and trees is moreimportant than protecting him and 0eeping his familyalive.ow do we stri0e a balance between environmentalprotection, on the one hand, and the individualpersonal interests of people, on the otherE

Towards environmental protection and ecology,navigational safety, and sustainable development,!epublic Act -o. 1+>? created the J6aguna 6a0eDevelopment Authority.J This Government Agency issupposed to carry out and effectuate the aforesaiddeclared policy, so as to accelerate the developmentand balanced growth of the 6aguna 6a0e area and thesurrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the actclearly named, within the context of the national andregional plans and policies for social and economicdevelopment.Presidential Decree -o. +$* of former President

;erdinand 4. 8arcos amended certain sections of!epublic Act -o. 1+>? because of the concern for therapid expansion of 8etropolitan 8anila, the suburbsand the la0eshore towns of 6aguna de 7ay, combinedwith current and prospective uses of the la0e formunicipal2industrial water supply, irrigation,fisheries, and the li0e. oncern on the part of theGovernment and the general public over< F theenvironment impact of development on the wateruality and ecology of the la0e and its related riversystemsH the inflow of polluted water from the Pasig!iver, industrial, domestic and agricultural wastes

from developed areas around the la0eH the increasingurbani3ation which induced the deterioration of thela0e, since water uality studies have shown that thela0e will deteriorate further if steps are not ta0en tochec0 the sameH and the floods in 8etropolitan8anila area and the la0eshore towns which willinfluence the hydraulic system of 6aguna de 7ay,since any scheme of controlling the floods willnecessarily involve the la0e and its river systems, Fli0ewise gave impetus to the creation of theAuthority.

Section $ of !epublic Act -o. 1+>? was amended toread as follows percent goes to thePro"ect Development ;und and the remaining )?percent shall be retained by 66DAHProvided-ho7ever, that the share of 66DA shall form part of its

corporate funds and shall not be remitted to the-ational Treasury as an exception to the provisionsof Presidential Decree -o. $@*1. #4mphasis supplied%&t is important to note that Section @ of PresidentialDecree -o. +$* defined the term J6aguna 6a0eJ inthis manner27,for Prohibition, &n"unction and Damages, !egionalTrial ourt, 7ranch (?, 7inangonan, !i3al, filed by;leet Development, &nc. and arlito ArroyoH #b% ivilase -o. )1?1, for &n"unction, !egional Trial ourt,

7ranch $)@, Pasig, filed by &!8A ;ishing andTrading orp., A!T8 ;ishing orp., 7D! orp.,8&!T orp. and T!&8 orp.H #c% ivil ase -o.>)), for Declaratory !elief and &n"unction, !egionalTrial ourt, 7ranch $)*, Pasig, filed by 8anila8arine 6ife 7usiness !esources, &nc. and Tobias!eynaldo 8. TiancoH #d% ivil ase -o. >>)28, forProhibition, &n"unction and Damages, !egional Trialourt, 7ranch (+, 8orong, !i3al, filed by AGP;ishing Ientures, &nc.H #e% ivil ase -o. >@@28, forProhibition, &n"unction and Damages, !egional Trialourt, 7ranch (+, 8orong, !i3al, filed by 7lue

6agoon and Alcris hic0en Growers, &nc.H #f% ivilase -o. >>12, for &ertiorariand Prohibition,!egional Trial ourt, 7ranch (, 8orong, !i3al, filedby Greenfields Ientures &ndustrial orp. and !.9.5rion Development orp.H and #g% ivil ase -o.)1$@1, for &n"unction, !egional Trial ourt, 7ranch$>, Pasig, filed by S4A28A! Trading o., &nc. and4astern 6agoon ;ishing orp. and 8inamar ;ishingorporation.The Authority filed motions to dismiss the casesagainst it on "urisdictional grounds. The motions todismiss were invariably denied. 8eanwhile,

temporary restraining orderBwrits of preliminarymandatory in"unction were issued in ivil ases -os.)1$@1, (> and >)) en"oining the Authority fromdemolishing the fishpens and similar structures inuestion.ence, the herein petition for certiorari, prohibitionand in"unction, G.!. -os. $@?+)>2($, were filed bythe Authority with this court. &mpleaded as parties2respondents are concerned regional trial courts andrespective private parties, and the municipalitiesandBor respective 8ayors of 7inangonan, Taguig and

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9ala2"ala, who issued permits for the construction andoperation of fishpens in 6aguna de 7ay. TheAuthority sought the following reliefs, vi#.?, as amended,empowering the Authority to issue permits forfishpens, fishcages and other aua2culture structuresin 6aguna de 7ay and that, the Authority thegovernment agency vested with exclusive authorityto issue said permits.7y this ourts resolution of 8ay @, $1, theAuthoritys consolidated petitions were referred to theourt of Appeals.&n a Decision, dated 9une @, $>, the ourt of

Appeals dismissed the Authoritys consolidatedpetitions, the ourt of Appeals holding that< #A%66DA is not among those uasi2"udicial agencies ofgovernment whose decision or order are appealableonly to the ourt of AppealsH #7% the 66DA charterdoes vest 66DA with uasi2"udicial functions insofaras fishpens are concernedH #% the provisions of the66DA charter insofar as fishing privileges in 6agunade 7ay are concerned had been repealed by the 6ocalGovernment ode of $$H #D% in view of theaforesaid repeal, the power to grant permits devolvedto and is now vested with their respective local

government units concerned.-ot satisfied with the ourt of Appeals decision, theAuthority has returned to this ourt charging thefollowing errors? AS A84-D4D 7L P.D.+$* A-D 4.5. @( S4!&4S 5; $+* AS 744-!4P4A64D 7L !4P:76& AT ($)?. T4 SA&D!:6&-G &S 5-T!A!L T5 4STA76&S4DP!&-&P64S A-D 9:!&SP!:D4-4 5;STAT:T5!L 5-ST!:T&5-.*. T4 5-5!A764 5:!T 5; APP4A6S588&TT4D S4!&5:S 4!!5! '4- &T!:64D TAT T4 P5'4! T5 &SS:4 ;&SP4-

P4!8&TS &- 6AG:-A D4 7AL AS 744-D4I56I4D T5 5-4!-4D #6AN4S5!4%65A6 G5I4!-84-T :-&TS.'e ta0e a simplistic view of the controversy.Actually, the main and only issue posed is< 'hichagency of the Government F the 6aguna 6a0eDevelopment Authority or the towns andmunicipalities comprising the region F shouldexercise "urisdiction over the 6aguna 6a0e and itsenvirons insofar as the issuance of permits for fisheryprivileges is concernedESection 1 #0% of the charter of the 6aguna 6a0e

Development Authority, !epublic Act -o. 1+>?, theprovisions of Presidential Decree -o. +$*, andSection @ of 4xecutive 5rder -o. @(, cited above,specifically provide that the 6aguna 6a0eDevelopment Authority shall have exclusive"urisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surfacewater for any pro"ects or activities in or affecting thesaid region, including navigation, construction, andoperation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals andthe li0e. 5n the other hand, !epublic Act -o. ($)?,the 6ocal Government ode of $$, has granted tothe municipalities the exclusive authority to grant

fishery privileges in municipal waters. TheSangguniang 7ayan may grant fishery privileges toerect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other auaticbeds or bangus fry area within a definite 3one of themunicipal waters.'e hold that the provisions of !epublic Act -o. ($)?do not necessarily repeal the aforementioned lawscreating the 6aguna 6a0e Development Authorityand granting the latter water rights authority over6aguna de 7ay and the la0e region.

The 6ocal Government ode of $$ does notcontain any express provision which categoricallyexpressly repeal the charter of the Authority. &t has tobe conceded that there was no intent on the part ofthe legislature to repeal !epublic Act -o. 1+>? andits amendments. The repeal of laws should be madeclear and expressed.&t has to be conceded that the charter of the 6aguna6a0e Development Authority constitutes a special

law. !epublic Act -o. ($)?, the 6ocal Governmentode of $$, is a general law. &t is basic in statutoryconstruction that the enactment of a later legislationwhich is a general law cannot be construed to haverepealed a special law. &t is a well2settled rule in this"urisdiction that Ja special statute, provided for aparticular case or class of cases, is not repealed by asubseuent statute, general in its terms, provisionsand application, unless the intent to repeal or alter ismanifest, although the terms of the general law arebroad enough to include the cases embraced in thespecial law.J$

'here there is a conflict between a general law and aspecial statute, the special statute should prevail sinceit evinces the legislative intent more clearly than thegeneral statute. The special law is to be ta0en as anexception to the general law in the absence of specialcircumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This isbecause implied repeals are not favored and as muchas possible, effect must be given to all enactments ofthe legislature. A special law cannot be repealed,amended or altered by a subseuent general law bymere implication.4

Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the

Authority should prevail over the 6ocal Governmentode of $$.onsidering the reasons behind the establishment ofthe Authority, which are environmental protection,navigational safety, and sustainable development,there is every indication that the legislative intent isfor the Authority to proceed with its mission.'e are on all fours with the manifestation ofpetitioner 6aguna 6a0e Development Authority thatJ6aguna de 7ay, li0e any other single body of waterhas its own uniue natural ecosystem. The ?? 0m

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la0e surface water, the eight #+% ma"or rivertributaries and several other smaller rivers that draininto the la0e, the @,@? 0m basin or watershedtranscending the boundaries of 6aguna and !i3alprovinces, greater portion of 8etro 8anila, parts ofavite, 7atangas, and Kue3on provinces, constituteone integrated delicate natural ecosystem that needsto be protected with uniform set of policiesH if we areto be serious in our aims of attaining sustainable

development. This is an exhaustible natural resourceF a very limited one F which reuires "udiciousmanagement and optimal utili3ation to ensurerenewability and preserve its ecological integrity andbalance.JJ8anaging the la0e resources would mean theimplementation of a national policy geared towardsthe protection, conservation, balanced growth andsustainable development of the region with dueregard to the inter2generational use of its resources bythe inhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors of!epublic Act 1+>? have foreseen this need when they

passed this 66DA law F the special law designed togovern the management of our 6aguna de 7ay la0eresources.JJ6aguna de 7ay therefore cannot be sub"ected tofragmented concepts of management policies wherela0eshore local government units exercise exclusivedominion over specific portions of the la0e water.The garbage thrown or sewage discharged into thela0e, abstraction of water therefrom or constructionof fishpens by enclosing its certain area, affect notonly that specific portion but the entire ?? 0m ofla0e water. The implementation of a cohesive and

integrated la0e water resource management policy,therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect andsustainably develop 6aguna de 7ay.J5

The power of the local government units to issuefishing privileges was clearly granted for revenuepurposes. This is evident from the fact that Section$1 of the -ew 6ocal Government ode empoweringlocal governments to issue fishing permits isembodied in hapter @, 7oo0 &&, of !epublic Act -o.($)? under the heading, JSpecific Provisions 5n The

Taxing And 5ther !evenue !aising Power 5f 6ocalGovernment :nits.J5n the other hand, the power of the Authority togrant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aua2culture structures is for the purpose of effectivelyregulating and monitoring activities in the 6aguna de7ay region #Section @, 4xecutive 5rder -o. @(% andfor la0e uality control and management.#&t doesparta0e of the nature of police power which is the

most pervasive, the least limitable and the mostdemanding of all State powers including the power oftaxation. Accordingly, the charter of the Authoritywhich embodies a valid exercise of police powershould prevail over the 6ocal Government ode of$$ on matters affecting 6aguna de 7ay.There should be no uarrel over permit fees forfishpens, fishcages and other aua2culture structuresin the 6aguna de 7ay area. Section * of 4xecutive5rder -o. @( provides for the proper sharing of feescollected.&n respect to the uestion as to whether the Authority

is a uasi2"udicial agency or not, it is our holdingthat, considering the provisions of Section 1 of!epublic Act -o. 1+>? and Section 1 of 4xecutive5rder -o. @(, series of $+*, and the ruling of thisourt inLaguna Lae $evelopment Authorit6vs. &ourt of Appeals, @*$ S!A *?1, *?), which weuote? and its amendatory laws tocarry out and ma0e effective the declared nationalpolicy of promoting and accelerating thedevelopment and balanced growth of the 6aguna6a0e area and the surrounding provinces of !i3al and6aguna and the cities of San Pablo, 8anila, Pasay,Kue3on and aloocan with due regard and adeuateprovisions for environmental management andcontrol, preservation of the uality of human life and

ecological systems, and the prevention of undueecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.:nder such a broad grant of power and authority, the66DA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously hasthe responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the6aguna 6a0e region from the deleterious effects ofpollutants emanating from the discharge of wastesfrom the surrounding areas. &n carrying out theaforementioned declared policy, the 66DA is

mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve ordisapprove all plans, programs, and pro"ects proposedby local government officesBagencies within theregion, public corporations, and private persons orenterprises where such plans, programs andBorpro"ects are related to those of the 66DA for thedevelopment of the region.xxx xxx xxx. . . . 'hile it is a fundamental rule that anadministrative agency has only such powers as areexpressly granted to it by law, it is li0ewise a settledrule that an administrative agency has also such

powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise ofits express powers. &n the exercise, therefore, of itsexpress powers under its charter, as a regulatory anduasi2"udicial body with respect to pollution cases inthe 6aguna 6a0e region, the authority of the 66DA toissue a Jcease and desist orderJ is, perforce, implied.5therwise, it may well be reduced to a JtoothlessJpaper agency.there is no uestion that the Authority has expresspowers as a regulatory and uasi2"udicial body inrespect to pollution cases with authority to issue aJcease and desist orderJ and on matters affecting the

construction of illegal fishpens, fishcages and otheraua2culture structures in 6aguna de 7ay. TheAuthoritys pretense, however, that it is co2eual tothe !egional Trial ourts such that all actions againstit may only be instituted before the ourt of Appealscannot be sustained. 5n actions necessitating theresolution of legal uestions affecting the powers ofthe Authority as provided for in its charter, the!egional Trial ourts have "urisdiction.&n view of the foregoing, this ourt holds thatSection $1 of !epublic Act -o. ($)?, otherwise

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0nown as the 6ocal Government ode of $$, hasnot repealed the provisions of the charter of the6aguna 6a0e Development Authority, !epublic Act-o. 1+>?, as amended. Thus, the Authority has theexclusive "urisdiction to issue permits for theen"oyment of fishery privileges in 6aguna de 7ay tothe exclusion of municipalities situated therein andthe authority to exercise such powers as are by itscharter vested on it.

!emoval from the Authority of the aforesaidlicensing authority will render nugatory its avowedpurpose of protecting and developing the 6aguna6a0e !egion. 5therwise stated, the abrogation of thispower would render useless its reason for being andwill in effect denigrate, if not abolish, the 6aguna6a0e Development Authority. This, the 6ocalGovernment ode of $$ had never intended to do.'4!4;5!4, the petitions forprohibition, certiorariand in"unction are herebygranted, insofar as they relate to the authority of the6aguna 6a0e Development Authority to grant fishing

privileges within the 6aguna 6a0e !egion.The restraining orders andBor writs of in"unctionissued by 9udge Arturo 8arave, !T, 7ranch (+,8orong, !i3alH 9udge erculano Tech, !T, 7ranch(?, 7inangonan, !i3alH and 9udge Aurelio Trampe,!T, 7ranch $)*, Pasig, 8etro 8anila, are herebydeclared null and void and ordered set aside forhaving been issued with grave abuse of discretion.The 8unicipal 8ayors of the 6aguna 6a0e !egionare hereby prohibited from issuing permits toconstruct and operate fishpens, fishcages and otheraua2culture structures within the 6aguna 6a0e

!egion, their previous issuances being declared nulland void. Thus, the fishing permits issued by 8ayors&sidro 7. Pacis, 8unicipality of 7inangonanH !icardoD. Papa, 8unicipality of TaguigH and 'alfredo 8. dela Iega, 8unicipality of 9ala2"ala, specifically, areli0ewise declared null and void and orderedcancelled.The fishpens, fishcages and other aua2culturestructures put up by operators by virtue of permitsissued by 8unicipal 8ayors within the 6aguna 6a0e!egion, specifically, permits issued to ;leet

Development, &nc. and arlito ArroyoH 8anila8arine 6ife 7usiness !esources, &nc., represented by,8r. Tobias !eynald 8. TiangcoH Greenfield Ientures&ndustrial Development orporation and !.9. 5rionDevelopment orporationH &!8A ;ishing AndTrading orporation, A!T8 ;ishing orporation,7D! orporation, 8irt orporation and TrimorporationH 7lue 6agoon ;ishing orporation andA6!&S hic0en Growers, &nc.H AGP ;ish Ientures,

&nc., represented by its President Alfonso PuyatH S4A8A! Trading o., &nc., 4astern 6agoon ;ishingorporation, and 8&-A8A! ;ishing orporation,are hereby declared illegal structures sub"ect todemolition by the 6aguna 6a0e DevelopmentAuthority.S5 5!D4!4D.$avide- r.- Bellosillo and apunan- .- concur.

S'a+a' O-n-%n/

PADILLA,J., concurring?, as amended, with !ep. Act-o. ($)?, the 6ocal Government ode. &t will alsoenable small towns and municipalities in the la0earea, li0e 9ala29ala, to rise to some level of economicviability.

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G.R. N%. 14$5"#. D'(')*'+ 11, 200$7UDGE TOMAS C. LENES,petitioner, vs. THECOMMISSION ON AUDIT COA6, HON.GREGORIA S. ONG, DIRECTOR,COMMISSION ON AUDIT and HON.SALVACION DALISA, PROVINCIALAUDITOR, respondents.D E C I S I O NCORONA,J.:

7efore us is a petition for certiorariunder !ule )> inrelation to Section @, !ule )1 of the !ules of ourt,see0ing to reverse and set aside the decision$QdatedSeptember $1, $ of the ommission on Audit#5A%, affirming the resolution of 5A !egionalDirector Gregoria S. 5ng dated 8arch @, $1which in turn affirmed the opinion dated 5ctober $,$* of the Provincial Auditor of5riental 8indoro, Salvacion 8. Dalisay. All threedenied the grant of P$,)?? monthly allowance topetitioner 9udge Tomas . 6eynes bythe 8unicipality of-au"an, 5riental 8indoro.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTSPetitioner 9udge Tomas . 6eynes who, at present, isthe presiding "udge ofthe !egional Trial ourt of alapan ity,5riental 8indoro, 7ranch 1? was formerly assignedto the8unicipality of -au"an, 5riental 8indoro asthe sole presiding "udge of the 8unicipal Trial ourtthereof. As such, his salary and representation andtransportation allowance #!ATA% were drawn fromthe budget of the Supreme ourt. &n addition,petitioner received a monthly allowanceof P11from the local funds@Qof

the 8unicipality of -au"an starting $+1.*Q

5n 8arch $>, $*,the Sangguniang Ba6an of -au"an, through!esolution -o. ?>(, sought the opinion of theProvincial Auditor and the Provincial 7udget 5fficerregarding any budgetary limitation on the grant of amonthly allowance by the municipality to petitioner"udge. 5n 8ay (, $*,the Sangguniang Ba6an unanimously approved!esolution -o. $?$ increasing petitioner "udgesmonthly allowance from P11 to P$,)?? #an increase

of P)>)% starting 8ay $*.1Q7y virtue of saidresolution, the municipal government #the 8unicipal8ayor and the Sangguniang Ba6an% approved asupplemental budget which was li0ewise approvedby the Sangguniang Panlala7igan and the 5ffice ofProvincial 7udget and 8anagement of5riental 8indoro. &n $1, the 8unicipalGovernment of -au"an again provided for petitioner"udges P$,)?? monthly allowance in its annual

budget which was again approved bythe Sangguniang Panlala7igan and the 5ffice ofProvincial 7udget and 8anagement of5riental 8indoro.>Q

5n ;ebruary $(, $1, ProvincialAuditor Salvacion 8. Dalisay sent a letter to the8unicipal 8ayor andthe Sangguniang Ba6an of -au"an directing them tostop the payment of theP$,)?? monthly allowance or!ATA to petitioner "udge and to reuire theimmediate refund of the amounts previously paid tothe latter. She opined that

the 8unicipality of -au"an could not grant !ATA topetitioner "udge in addition to the !ATA the latterwas already receiving from the Supreme ourt. erdirective was based on the following, General AppropriationsAct of $*!epresentation and Transportation Allowances. Thefollowing officials and those of euivalent ran0 asmay be determined by the Department of 7udget and8anagement #D78% while in the actual performanceof their respective functions are hereb6 grantedmonthl6 commutable representation and

transportation allo7ances pa6able from theprogrammed appropriations provided for their

respective offices- not e


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Petitioner "udge appealed the unfavorable resolutionof the !egional Director to the ommission on Audit.&n the meantime, a disallowance of the payment ofthe P$,)?? monthly allowance to petitioner wasissued. Thus he received his P$,)?? monthlyallowance from the 8unicipality of -au"an only forthe period 8ay $* to 9anuary $1.5n September $1, $, the 5A issued its decisionaffirming the resolution of !egional

Director Gregoria S. 5ng+#a%#$%#xi% and 1)+#a%#$%#xi% of the ode.5n 8arch $>, $1, the D78 issued 6ocal 7udgetircular -o. >> #hereafter 67 -o. >>% setting outthe maximum amount of allowances that 6G:s maygrant to "udges. ;or provinces and cities, the amountshould not exceed P$,??? and formunicipalities, P(??.5n December *, @??@, we struc0 down the abovecircular in$adole- et al. vs. &A.$1Q'e ruled there

that the 6ocal Government ode of $$ clearlyprovided that 6G:s could grant allowances to"udges, sub"ect only to the condition that the financesof the 6G:s allowed it. 'e held that setting auniform amount for the grant of allowances #was% aninappropriate way of enforcing said criterion.Accordingly, we declared that the D78 exceeded itspower of supervision over 6G:s by imposing aprohibition that did not "ibe with the 6ocalGovernment ode of $$.$>Q

ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES INVOLVED

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;rom the foregoing history of the power of 6G:s togrant allowances to "udges, the following principlesshould be noted #theGeneral Appropriations Act of $*% and 67 -o. >*dated September $, $*.$)Q

&t is elementary in statutory construction that anadministrative circular cannot supersede, abrogate,modify or nullify a statute. A statute is superior to anadministrative circular, thus the latter cannot repealor amend it.$(Q&n the present case, - -o. )(,being a mere administrative circular, cannot repeal asubstantive law li0e !A ($)?.&t is also an elementary principle in statutoryconstruction that repeal of statutes by implication isnot favored, unless it is manifest that the legislatureso intended. The legislature is assumed to 0now theexisting laws on the sub"ect and cannot be presumed

to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.$+Q!espondent 5A alleges that Section *) of !A()1> #the GAA of $*% repealed Section 11(#a%#l%#xi% of !A ($)? #the 6G of $$%. A review of thetwo laws, however, shows that this was notso. Section *) of !A ()1> merely provided for thedifferent rates of !ATA payable to nationalgovernment officials or employees, depending ontheir position, and stated that these amounts werepayable from the programmed appropriations of theparent agencies to which the concerned nationalofficials or employees belonged. ;urthermore, there

was no other provision in !A ()1> from which arepeal of Section 11(#a% #l%#xi% of !A ($)? could beimplied. &n the absence, therefore, of any clear repealof Section 11(#a%#l%#xi% of !A ($)?, we cannotpresume such intention on the part of the legislature.8oreover, the presumption against implied repealbecomes stronger when, as in this case, one law isspecial and the other is general.$QThe principle isexpressed in themaximgeneralia specialibus non derogant- a generallaw does not nullify a specific or special law. The

reason for this is that the legislature, in passing a lawof special character, considers and ma0es specialprovisions for the particular circumstances dealt withby the special law. This being so, the legislature, byadopting a general law containing provisionsrepugnant to those of the special law and withoutma0ing any mention of its intention to amend ormodify such special law, cannot be deemed to haveintended an amendment, repeal or modification of the

latter.@?Q&n this case, !A ($)? #the 6G of $$% is a speciallaw@$Qwhich exclusively deals with local governmentunits #6G:s%, outlining their powers and functions inconsonance with the constitutionally mandated policyof local autonomy. !A ()1> #the GAA of $*%, onthe other hand, was a general law@@Qwhich outlinedthe share in the national fund of all branches of thenational government. !A ()1> therefore, being ageneral law, could not have, by mere implication,repealed !A ($)?. !ather, !A ($)? should be ta0enas the exception to !A ()1> in the absence of

circumstances warranting a contrary conclusion.@*Q

The controversy actually centers on the seeminglysweeping provision in - -o. )( which states thatno one shall be allowed to collect !ATA from morethan one source. Does this mean that "udges cannotreceive allowances from 6G:s in addition to the!ATA from the Supreme ourtE ;or reasons that willhereinafter be discussed, we answer in the negative.The pertinent provisions of - -o. )( read #the GAAof $*% invo0ed by respondent 5A itself and, infact, by all subseuent GAAs for that matter, becausethe GAAs all essentially provide that #$% the !ATA ofnational officials shall be payable from the budgets oftheir respective national agencies and #@% thoseofficials on detail with other national agencies shall

be paid their !ATA only from the budget of theirparent national agency, General Appropriations Act of$** of the D78 may be considered

within the ambit of the Presidents power of generalsupervision over 6G:s,@+Qwe rule that Section *,paragraph #e% thereof is invalid. !A ($)?, the 6ocalGovernment ode of $$, clearly provides thatprovincial, city and municipal governments maygrant allowances to "udges as long as their financesallow.Section *, paragraph #e% of 67 -o. >*,by outrightly prohibiting 6G:s from grantingallowances to "udges whenever such allowances are#$% also granted by the national government or #@%similar to the allowances granted by the nationalgovernment, violates Section 11(#a%#l%#xi% of the

6ocal Government ode of $$.@Q

As alreadystated, a circular must conform to the law it see0s toimplement and should not modify or amend it.*?Q

8oreover, by prohibiting 6G:s from grantingallowancessimilarto the allowances granted by thenational government, Section * #e% of 67 -o. >*practically prohibits 6G:s from granting allowancesto "udges and, in effect, totally nullifies their statutorypower to do so. 7eing unduly restrictive therefore ofthe statutory power of 6G:s to grant allowances to"udges and being violative of their autonomyguaranteed by the onstitution, Section *, paragraph

#e% of 67 -o. >* is hereby declared null and void.Paragraphs #a% to #d% of said circular, however, arevalid as they are in accordance with Sections*@1*$Qand *@>*@Qof the 6ocal Government ode of

$$H these respectively provide for the budgetaryreuirements and general limitations on the use ofprovincial, city and municipal funds. Paragraphs #a%to #d% are proper guidelines for the conditionprovided in Sections 11(, 1>+ and 1)+ of the 6ocalGovernment ode of $$ that 6G:s may grantallowances to "udges if their funds allow.**Q

!espondent 5A also argues that !esolution -o. $?$of the Sangguniang Ba6anof -au"an failed to

comply with paragraphs #a% to #d% of 67 -o. >*,thus it was null and void.The argument is misplaced.Guidelines #a% to #d% were met whenthe Sangguniang Panlala7igan of5riental 8indoro approved !esolution -o. $?$ ofthe Sangguniang Ba6an of -au"an grantingthe P$,)?? monthly allowance to petitioner "udge aswell as the corresponding budgets of the municipalityproviding for the said monthly allowance topetitioner "udge. :nder Section *@( of the 6ocalGovernment ode of $$,

the Sangguniang Panlala7iganwas specificallytas0ed to review the appropriation ordinances of itscomponent municipalities to ensure compliance withSections *@1 and *@> of the ode. onsidering saidduty of the Sangguniang Panlala7igan- we willassume, in the absence of proof to the contrary, thatthe SangguniangPanlala7iganof5riental 8indoro performed what the law reuired itto do, that is, review the resolution and thecorresponding budgets of the 8unicipalityof -au"an to ma0e sure that they complied withSections *@1 and *@> of the ode.*1Q'e presume the

regularity of the Sangguniang Panlala7igansofficialact.8oreover, it is well2settled that an ordinance must bepresumed valid in the absence of evidence showing

that it is not in accordance with the law.*>Q!espondent 5A had the burden of proving that!esolution -o. $?$ ofthe Sangguniang Ba6anof -au"an did not complywith the condition provided in Section 11( of theode, the budgetary reuirements and generallimitations on the use of municipal funds provided inSections *@1 and *@> of the ode and theimplementing guidelines issued by the D78, i.e.,

paragraphs #a% to #d%, Section * of 67 -o.>*. !espondent 5A also had the burden of showingthat the Sangguniang Panlala7iganof5riental 8indoro erroneously approved saidresolution despite its non2compliance with thereuirements of the law. &t failed to discharge suchburden. 5n the contrary, we find that the resolution ofthe 8unicipality of -au"an granting the P$,)??monthly allowance to petitioner "udge fully compliedwith the law. Thus, we uphold its validity.&n sum, we hereby affirm the power ofthe 8unicipality of -au"an to grant the uestioned

allowance to petitioner 9udge 6eynes in accordancewith the constitutionally mandated policy of localautonomy and the provisions of the 6ocalGovernment ode of $$. 'e also sustain thevalidity of !esolution -o. $?$, Series of $*, ofthe Sangguniang Ba6an of-au"an for being inaccordance with the law.HEREFORE, the petition is herebyG!A-T4D. The assailed decision dated September$1, $ of the ommission of Audit is hereby S4TAS&D4 and Section *, paragraph #e% of 67 -o. >*is hereby declared -:66 and I5&D.

-o costs.SO ORDERED.

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