Marketization and Economic Performance

This article was downloaded by: [McMaster University]On: 28 October 2014, At: 06:43Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,UK

Public Management ReviewPublication details, including instructions for authorsand subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpxm20

Marketization and EconomicPerformanceMorten Balle Hansen aa Department of Political Science and PublicManagement , University of Southern Denmark ,Odense M, DenmarkPublished online: 03 Mar 2010.

To cite this article: Morten Balle Hansen (2010) Marketization andEconomic Performance, Public Management Review, 12:2, 255-274, DOI:10.1080/14719031003616644

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14719031003616644

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all theinformation (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform.However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, orsuitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressedin this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not theviews of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content shouldnot be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions,claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilitieswhatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connectionwith, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpxm20

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/14719031003616644

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14719031003616644

forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McM

aste

r U

nive

rsity

] at

06:

43 2

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

MARKETIZATION ANDECONOMICPERFORMANCECompetitive tendering in thesocial sector

Morten Balle Hansen

Morten Balle HansenDepartment of Political Science and PublicManagement

University of Southern DenmarkOdense MDenmark

E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract

The public management reforms of the past

three decades have been characterized by

organizational innovations usually associated

with New Public Management (NPM) and

reinventing government. In particular, neo-

liberal ideas of strengthening market me-

chanisms in the public sector have been

prominent. In the empirical literature focusing

on the consequences of marketization, most

studies have examined technical services

such as refuse collection while very few have

focused on the social sector.

In this article, an example of the general

trend towards marketization conducted within

the social sector is analysed. A reform

enforcing compulsory competitive tendering

in homecare for elderly people in Denmark is

analysed and its relation to measures of

economic performance is explored.

Two competing models of marketization

are contrasted in the analysis: a problem

solving model inspired by public choice

ideology, in which marketization processes

are seen as driven by work-related concerns

for efficiency and performance, and a macro

phenomenological institutional model, in

which innovation processes are seen as

driven by factors related to hegemonic

ideologies, legitimacy concerns and coercive

enforcement.

Very little impact on economic perfor-

mance is found, which lends support to an

institutional interpretation of the findings.

Key wordsCompetitive tendering, consequences of in-

novation, diffusion, innovation, institutional

theory, New Public Management, organiza-

tional performance, productivity, public

choice

Vol. 12 Issue 2 2010 255–274

Public Management Review ISSN 1471-9037 print/ISSN 1471-9045 online

� 2010 Taylor & Francis

http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals

DOI: 10.1080/14719031003616644

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McM

aste

r U

nive

rsity

] at

06:

43 2

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

INTRODUCTION

the current Zeitgeist of reform in government is to use the market . . . the operative assumption appears

to be that the best or even the only way to obtain better results from public-sector organizations is to

adopt some sort of market-based mechanism to replace traditional bureaucracy.

(Peters 1996: 21)

Since the 1980s a number of organizational innovations often associated with NewPublic Management (Hood 1991) and reinventing government (Osborne and Gaebler1992) have been adopted in the public sector in many countries (Kettl 2005). Inparticular, neoliberal ideas of strengthening market mechanisms in the public sectorhave been prominent.

What have been the consequences of these transnational trends towards public sectortransformation in terms of societal and organizational performance? Although many ofthese reforms have had an explicit focus on measuring the performance achieved bypublic sector activities, there has been a paradoxical lack of interest in the impact ofthese innovations on societal performance (Pollitt 1995; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). Interms of organizational performance, however, the situation is somewhat different inthe case of marketization. There is a body of empirical literature that examines theconsequences of different versions of marketization on selected measures ofperformance (Boyne 1998b; Hodge 2000; Boyne et al. 2003). The overwhelmingmajority of these studies, however, have been done in Anglo-Saxon countries and focuson technical services such as refuse collection and transportation services. Very fewstudies have examined the social sector or the consequences of public sectormarketization outside Anglo-Saxon countries.

The present article provides an analysis of such a case. The marketization process infocus is an instance of compulsory competitive tendering in the Danish municipaleldercare sector. In 2002 a new law concerning compulsory competitive tendering wasadopted by the Danish parliament. From January 2003 all municipalities were requiredby law to have approved at least one private provider of eldercare services.Municipalities with no approved private providers of eldercare services in 2003 or later(in 2004, approximately one-third of the municipalities) were in principle breaking thelaw.

In the analysis provided here, the relation between this instance of competitivetendering and different indicators of economic performance in the relatively short runis explored. Two theoretical models are contrasted in the analysis. First, a problemsolving model inspired by public choice is presented, which sees competitivetendering as a means to solve the problems of public sector inefficiency. Second, amacro phenomenological institutional model is discussed, which sees competitivetendering as an instance of a global neoliberal ideology diffusing into all parts ofthe public sector regardless of whether it addresses concerns for organizationalefficiency.

256 Public Management Review

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McM

aste

r U

nive

rsity

] at

06:

43 2

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

THEORY, HYPOTHESES AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH CONCERNING THECONSEQUENCES OF MARKETIZATION

The aim . . . is to assess the empirical validity of the core public choice proposition that competitive

pressures lead to superior performance in the public sector.

(Boyne 1998b: 1)

The consequences of public management reforms, whether they take the form of full-blown top–down reforms or more bottom–up local innovation processes, arenumerous and hard to pinpoint although analytical distinctions and typologies providesome guidance. Desirable consequences suggested in the performance literature includewell-established concepts such as the three E’s of performance: Efficiency, Effectivenessand Equity (Johnsen 2005), but extend much further (Le Grand and Bartlett 1993;Vedung 1997; Boyne 2003; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Rothstein and Teorell 2008)and trade-offs between different objectives are often unavoidable. Thus, when analysingthe consequences of public management reforms, some reduction in the complexity ofthe task is unavoidable.

The present analysis explores the possible causal relations between competitivetendering in the public sector and the costs, output and economic efficiency ofproviding eldercare services in the short run.

Drivers of marketization: Efficiency or legitimacy?

Since the early 1960s the literature on organizations has been highly influenced by variousversions of an open systems perspective in which the relation between the organization and itsenvironment is in focus (Thompson 1967; Lawrence and Lorsch 1969; Mintzberg 1979).Until the late 1970s these perspectives were almost entirely dominated by assumptions ofefficiency driven processes. An efficiency of history is envisioned in which organizations adoptthe most efficient technologies and modes of organization in order to survive and prosper in ahighly competitive environment. Basically, such theories imply a problem solving model, inwhich innovation processes are driven by work-related concerns for efficiency andperformance. The public choice version of this model expects that increased competition willbe superior to a public (or private) monopoly on service provision1 (Boyne 1998b). Althoughcontingency theories of competition have been suggested, the basic logic of the argumenttends to be generic, claiming that competitive tendering will (almost) always be superior to amonopoly system of service delivery.

In the late 1970s these theories were challenged, but not replaced, by a newinstitutional perspective emphasizing legitimacy and hegemonic ideologies as coredrivers in the diffusion of new organizational structures and modes of organization(Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Brunsson 1989; Orton andWeick 1990; Powell and DiMaggio 1991) and suggesting that decoupling and

Hansen: Marketization and economic performance 257

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McM

aste

r U

nive

rsity

] at

06:

43 2

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

organizational hypocrisy are often the consequences of novel structures and technologies,at least in the short term: ‘the formal structures of many organizations in postindustrialsociety (Bell 1973) dramatically reflect the myths of their institutional environmentsinstead of the demands of their work activities’ (Meyer and Rowan 1977: 341). Throughcoercive, mimetic and normative mechanisms, institutionalized environmental factorsenhance new structures and technologies that are often inconsistent with the demands ofthe work activities of the organization. In some versions of this line of reasoning (Meyeret al. 1997), a rationalized world culture is envisioned in which specific modes oforganization have acquired legitimacy and thus suggest themselves as natural solutions toalmost any problem. In an institutional perspective, the expected relation betweenmarketization reforms and measures of performance is less clear-cut. It is perfectlyplausible that institutional pressures encourage organizations to import novel strategies illsuited to enhance organizational efficiency.

The diffusion of marketization models in the public sector can be interpreted bymeans of both the problem-solving and the institutional model. Usually, marketizationmodels are presented as problem-solving activities, but it is also obvious that certaininnovations have acquired legitimacy in many countries as an obvious means ofreorganizing the public sector and they are often enforced by state legislature in verydifferent settings even though not all (perhaps not even many) may be suited tomarketization.

Competitive tendering as problem-solving based on public choice assumptions

In a problem-solving perspective, our expectations to the consequences of competitivetendering for organizational performance are reasonably straightforward. On average,we expect adopters of competitive tendering to be better performers than non-adopters. The arguments of the public choice literature are based on neoclassicaleconomic reasoning translated into the setting of public bureaucracy in the 1960s andearly 1970s in the seminal works of Tullock (1965), Downs (1967) and especiallyNiskanen (1971). The general recommendation in this literature is that a monopoly ofpublic service provision should be substituted with competition between differentservice providers. The assumption is that competition will force service providers tolower costs and increase efficiency. Organizations that adopt competitive tendering aretherefore expected to spend significantly less, produce significantly more and thus havesignificantly greater efficiency than organizations that do not.

H1: Non-adopters of competitive tendering have significantly lower organizational performance than

adopters in terms of:

(a) more spending;(b) less output; and(c) higher costs per unit delivered (worse efficiency).


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McM

aste

r U

nive

rsity

] at

06:

43 2

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

On the basis of the same logic, we furthermore expect early adopters to be betterperformers than late adopters. This is because they have had more time to get used tothe new innovation and to integrate and adapt it to the routines of the organization. Inthe case of compulsory competitive tendering it is also because they, in contrast toother adopters, have deliberately adopted competitive tendering before they wererequired by law to do so and are thus, based on a problem-solving logic, more likely tobe able to harvest the advantages of competitive tendering. We would also expect thatthe more extensive adopters of competitive tendering, as indicated by the number ofprivate providers, the types of services provided and the number of receivers, wouldshow higher organizational performance than non-adopters of competitive tendering.

H2: Early adopters and extensive adopters of competitive tendering have significantly better organizational

performance than late and non-adopters in terms of:

(a) less spending;(b) more output; and(c) lower costs per unit delivered (better efficiency).

Competitive tendering as a legitimacy driven fashion

A problem-solving perspective presumes that organizations adopt new practices such ascompetitive tendering in order to enhance efficiency or other criteria for improvement.This is not the case for the new institutional perspective. In this perspective, legitimacyand fashion are emphasized as core drivers in the diffusion of new organizationalpractices such as competitive tendering. Especially in the relatively short run analysedhere, one would expect decoupling or loose coupling between the practices prescribedby the government reform of compulsory competitive tendering and the practicesactually implemented in local government. Thus, insignificant impact on organizationalperformance would be expected and, since the introduction of a new reform may beexpensive, even a significant negative impact on performance could result.

H3: There is no significant difference in organizational performance between non-adopters, early adopters

and extensive adopters in terms of:

(a) spending;(b) output; and(c) unit costs (efficiency).

Empirical research on the consequences of competitive tendering

As mentioned in the introduction, empirical research on the consequences ofcompetitive tendering in non-Anglo-Saxon countries has been scant and social service


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McM

aste

r U

nive

rsity

] at

06:

43 2

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

provision in particular has rarely been examined. However, the body of literature thatincludes the Anglo-Saxon countries and technical services, especially refuse collection,was reviewed around a decade ago by Boyne (1998a, 1998b) and Hodge (2000). A briefreview of that literature is provided below.

In his 1998 review of evidence from the UK and USA Boyne (1998b: ch. 5) found fourstudies of voluntary competitive tendering and five studies of compulsory competitivetendering in the UK in the 1980s and 1990s. Five of the nine studies from the UK wereon the impact of refuse collection and none focused on the social service sector. In theUSA, he found ten studies of contracting for refuse collection and seven studies of otherservices. The other services comprised primarily technical services such as fire andhighway services, while no studies of the impact of competitive tendering on the socialservices were found. In his interpretation of the findings, Boyne emphasizes that:

claims that empirical studies find ‘consistently’ and ‘without exception’ that contracting is more efficient

than municipal supply are demonstrably untrue. Even taken at face value, only around half of the

studies . . . find that contracting out is associated with lower spending and higher efficiency.

Furthermore, virtually none of the evidence can be taken at face value. . . . Most of the studies contain

specific methodological flaws.

(Boyne 1998c: 162–3)

The review and meta-evaluation provided by Hodge (2000) have a different andbroader perspective. The review includes empirical evidence from all the countrieswhere data were available and is not primarily focused on local government. Theanalysis includes studies of the private as well as the public sector. Of the twenty-sevenstudies included in Hodge’s (2000: 85–7, Table 6.2) meta-analysis of privatization ascontracting out, however, only one study from Switzerland in 1977 represents a non-Anglophone context while 81 per cent of the studies are from the USA or the UK.Furthermore, the majority of studies focus on refuse collection and other technicalservices while very few if any deal with social services. Based on his analysis of theavailable empirical evidence, Hodge (2000: 246–7) concludes that:

Clearly, there are real cost savings to be gained through establishing competitive contracting

arrangements, albeit that savings are likely to be quite different for different services. . . . Expecting

contracting to be a panacea for all public sector services, though, would be foolish. . . . When contracting

reforms are applied to governments in a wholesale manner, there is a real danger that the market/

contracting model will be emphasized at the expense of sensible alternatives.

Although the evidence is mixed, the empirical findings of Boyne and Hodge seem tosupport the public choice propositions of increased economic performance, at least interms of reduced costs if not efficiency.

Elements of the institutional story, however, can also be seen in the reviewsprovided by Boyne and Hodge. Boyne shows how data are often interpreted as being


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McM

aste

r U

nive

rsity

] at

06:

43 2

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

much more favourable to public choice assumptions than is reasonable given theempirical evidence. And Hodge warns against the wholesale manner in which thecontracting reforms are sometimes applied.

Almost all the findings, however, are very different than the present study in termsof both the national context and the services provided.

The two literature reviews referred to above were made a decade ago or more,but I have been unable to find more recent systematic assessments of the empiricalevidence of the impact of competitive tendering. A search on articles citing the booksreferred to above reveals a lively especially Anglo-Saxon literature, but few articlesdirectly relevant to the issues addressed here. For instance, Chen (2009) utilizes someof the same theoretical ideas as elaborated in the previous section to interpret thefinding that while 96 per cent of American local government authorities contractedout at least one service between 1992 and 1997, 88 per cent brought at least onecontracted-out service back in-house in the same period. A second example from theAmerican non-technical service context is perhaps the most relevant here. Inexamining the contracting behaviour of Texas school districts, Meier and O’Toole(2009; O’Toole and Meier 2004) found that the extent of contracting was unrelatedto performance measures. Instead of performance they found that: ‘Increases incontracting resulted in subsequent increases in central office bureaucracy, which inturn resulted in more contracting out’ (2009: 8). They labelled the phenomenon‘Parkinson’s Law of Contracting’ (2009: 8) and their findings can be interpreted aslending support to the radical institutional perspective outlined above, in whichperverse effects in some contexts of public service provision are expected. A thirdexample, arguing that New Public Management reforms based on marketization havelargely stalled (Dunleavy et al. 2006: 472), provides the following interpretation ofthe literature: ‘The large-scale cost reductions and quality enhancements of theplanning and management functions anticipated by privatization enthusiasts in the1980s and 1990s are no longer anticipated.’

In conclusion, the literature of the last decade seems to confirm the findings of adecade ago, namely, that the literature is (1) overwhelmingly Anglo-Saxon, (2)focuses almost entirely on the provision of technical services and (3) provides mixedevidence concerning the impact on economic performance, but tends to be lessoptimistic than a decade ago concerning the possible economic gains of competitivetendering.

Control variables

The hypotheses suggested in H1, H2 and H3 constitute the direct relations that thetheories suggest can be found between competitive tendering and organizationalperformance in the present study. We do, however, need to control for a number ofother variables that may have a direct impact on organizational performance or on the


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McM

aste

r U

nive

rsity

] at

06:

43 2

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

expected relationship between the competitive tendering and organizationalperformance.

First of all, other organizational innovations associated with New Public Managementand neoliberal ideas (Drori et al. 2006; Prasad 2006) took place within the Danishmunicipal eldercare sector at the same time as the compulsory competitive tendering infocus here. Organization of the formal structure according to a purchaser–provider splitmodel, Management by Objectives or Management by Contract were among the mostwidely used ways to reorganize municipal eldercare.

Second, differences in the political leadership of the municipality may have an impacton organizational performance. The relative strength of political actors in charge of themunicipal eldercare sector, who are presumed to play a role as sector advocates inpolitical theories of budgeting, as compared to political actors presumed to be guardiansof the overall cost efficiency of the municipal system may be related to differences inorganizational performance. Also, the political party of the mayor should be accountedfor.

Third, a number of structural background variables should be controlled for. Thedemography in terms of the share of population aged 67 and over and demographicalchange diminishing or increasing that share may have an impact on organizationalperformance. Also the wealth of the municipality may be important and should becontrolled for in the quantitative analysis. Finally, the size of the municipality may beimportant due to economies of scale and problems with establishing an efficientmarket.

DATA AND METHODS USED IN THE ANALYSIS

The data on which the article is based were generated primarily on the basis ofquantitative data from yearbooks and municipal accounts published by StatisticsDenmark and the Danish Ministry of the Interior. These data have been supplementedby survey data generated in a research project conducted from 2002 to 2005 (Hansenand Vedung 2005). The ten dependent and sixteen independent variables utilized in theanalysis are described briefly below.2

Measures of input, output and productivity

The dependent variable, organizational performance, was measured by ten indicators.The first two indicators measure municipal spending (or input) and change in spendingon eldercare. Indicators three and four provide two measures of output in 2004, whileindicators five and six show changes in output from 2002–4. Based on these measures ofinput and output, four measures of productivity (indicators 7 and 8) in 2004 and changein productivity 2002–4 (indicators 9 and 10) are constructed.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McM

aste

r U

nive

rsity

] at

06:

43 2

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

Measures of independent variables

The independent variables included in the analysis are organized in five groups:competition variables; other NPM intervention variables; size variables; politicalvariables; and demography and wealth variables. The first group of variables is relatedto our hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 and is described below in some detail. The onevariable in group B including other NPM interventions will also be explained in somedetail, while the last three groups of variables are control variables and will not bedescribed further here.

Competition variables

11 Early voluntary adoption before 2003: A dummy variable for those municipalities that had private

providers of eldercare services before 2003 (around 21 per cent – see Table 1). The measure is based

on survey responses in 2004.

12 Compulsory adoption 2003: A dummy variable for those municipalities that adopted at least one

private provider of eldercare in 2003. The measure is based on survey responses in 2004.

13 Private provider practical help (fifteen or more receivers) 2004: Municipalities in which fifteen or

more people receive practical help from an approved private provider of eldercare, financed by taxes

in 2004. The indicator is based on municipal reports to Statistics Denmark.

14 Two or more private providers 2004: Municipalities in which two or more private providers were

approved to provide practical help or nursing or both to elderly people in 2004. The indicator is based

on municipal reports to Statistics Denmark.

15 Private providers of both nursing and practical help 2004: Municipalities in which private eldercare

providers of both simple tasks of practical help (primarily cleaning and bathing) as well as more

complex nursing tasks such as giving medicine and changing bandages were operating in 2004. The

indicator is based on municipal reports to Statistics Denmark.

16 No private providers 2004: Dummy variable indicating the municipalities with no private providers of

eldercare. The indicator is based on municipal reports to Statistics Denmark.

Other NPM interventions

17 Adoption of NPM innovations: Index measuring the extent to which the municipality has

adopted new ways to organize associated with New Public Management. The index was

constructed from dummy variables of seven types of innovations: Outsourcing; Purchaser–

Provider Split Model; Management by Contract; Free Choice Users; Management by Objectives;

Value-based Management; and other innovations (Cronbach’s alpha¼ 0.623). It can be perceived

as a measure of whether the organization tends to adopt new ways to organize associated with

NPM or not.

Below, the data are analysed by means of descriptive statistics and OLS regressionanalysis.3 Tests of the OLS regressions indicate no presence of multicollinearity (VIFvalues between 1.050 and 2.01).


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McM

aste

r U

nive

rsity

] at

06:

43 2

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables included in the analysis

N Mean Standard Dev. Min. Max.

Dependent variables

1. Costs eldercare per inhabitant

67þ 2004 (in 1000 Danish Crowns)

271 39,56175 5,771333 13,89624 59,56985

2. Change costs 2002–4 (in 1000 Danish

Crowns)

270 2,877747 3,200293 712,0557 19,86419

3. Receivers eldercare per inhabitant 67þ 2004 271 0,264744 0,044108 0,118391 0,413281

4. Hours per week per inhabitant 67þ 2004 271 1,500379 0,561013 0,415213 3,190207

5. Change receivers 2002–4 266 1,346417 13,36505 749 158

6. Change hours per week 2002–4 266 21,84846 411,665 71303,68 6386

7. Prod1 Costs per receiver 2004

(in 1000 Danish Crowns)

271 152,5791 29,63678 71,68561 256,4809

8. Prod2 Costs per hour/week 2004


271 30,79764 14,37502 10,65184 101,7858

9. Change Prod1 2002–4


270 14,2893 24,45846 754,373 111,466

10. Change Prod2 2002–4 (in 1000 Danish Crowns) 270 4,53867 12,20968 740,1965 53,8186

Independent variables

A. Marketization variables

11. Early adoption before 2003 238 0,210084 0,408227 0 1

12. Compulsory adoption 2003 238 0,411765 0,49319 0 1

13. Private provider practical help

(fifteen or more receivers) 2004

271 0,309963 0,463334 0 1

14. Two or more private providers 2004 271 0,424354 0,495159 0 1

15. Private providers of both nursing

and practical help 2004

271 0,158672 0,366046 0 1

16. No private providers 2004 271 0,350554 0,478026 0 1

B. Other interventions

17. Index NPM adoptions 2004 189 0,503401 0,223253 0 1

C. Size variables

18. Less than 10,000 inhab. 271 0,472325 0,500157 0 1

19. More than 35,000 inhab. 271 0,121771 0,327626 0 1

D. Political variables

20. Same politician Soc. Serv. 00–05 256 0,398438 0,490535 0 1

21. Same mayor 00–05 271 0,555556 0,497827 0 1

22. Mayor Social Democrat 250 0,312 0,464239 0 1

E. Demography and wealth

23. Share 67þ 2004 271 13,77454 2,722032 6,2 25

24. Change 67þ 1998–2004 270 0,25037 0,928594 73,1 3,4

25. Wealth 2004 271 135218,7 7574,343 122625 160699

26. Change in wealth 1998–2004 270 25956,91 3122,297 8927 47074


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McM

aste

r U

nive

rsity

] at

06:

43 2

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

COMPETITIVE TENDERING IN THE DANISH MUNICIPAL ELDERCARE SECTOR

Until 2002, competitive tendering in Danish municipal eldercare was a voluntaryphenomenon diffusing into the sector through normative and mimetic processes. Asshown in Table 1 (variable 11), around 21 per cent of the 271 municipalities had privateproviders before this time.

In 2002 a new law was enacted with effect from 1 January 2003. This law enhancedcompetition in eldercare provision by giving elderly people the right to choose betweenmunicipal and private services. In the spring of 2004, more than a year after the law onprivate providers of eldercare services came into effect, around one-third of the Danishmunicipalities had yet to approve any private providers of these services.

These variations in the adoption of innovations provide an opportunity to examinethe relatively short-term consequences of competitive tendering for organizationalperformance.

FINDINGS

Basic descriptive statistics showing the mean, standard deviation, minimum andmaximum measures of each variable included in the analysis are provided in Table 1.

The dependent variables of the analysis, the indicators of organizational performanceof the present study, will now be described in some detail.

As can be seen from the table, the average net expenses for municipal homecare forelderly per inhabitant aged 67þwere DKK 39,562 (approx. EUR 5300), varyingbetween a minimum of DKK 13,896 (approx. EUR 1860) to a maximum of DKK59,569 (approx. EUR 7950) per inhabitant aged 67þ.

The average net expenses per municipal inhabitant aged 67þ increased from 2002 to2004 by DKK 2878 (approx. EUR 385), varying between a decrease in expenses ofaround DKK 12,000 (approx. EUR 1600) and an increase of almost DKK 20,000(approx. EUR 2700).

Looking at the output measures reported by the municipalities, on average around 25per cent of the elderly aged 67 and over received some kind of homecare in 2004. Theindicator includes all handicapped persons (also young people) but the huge majorityreceiving homecare are the elderly. The share of receivers ranges from less than 12 percent to more than 41 per cent. Since there are some problems with the comparability ofthis indicator, caution is necessary in its interpretation.

The average number of hours of homecare provided per week in 2004 as reported bythe municipalities was one and a half hours per inhabitant aged 67þ, varying betweenless than half an hour and more than three hours per inhabitant aged 67þ. Thisindicator, however, should be interpreted with caution since serious problems ofcomparability between years and municipalities are reported by Statistics Denmark.Since the number of hours spent per week on homecare is included in indicators 5, 8


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McM

aste

r U

nive

rsity

] at

06:

43 2

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

and 10, these indicators should also be interpreted very cautiously. The other sixperformance measures are calculated on the basis of the first four indicators from 2002to 2004 respectively and will not be discussed further here.

The frequencies of the measures of the independent variables related to theformulated hypotheses (variables 11–16 in Table 1) should also be commented on.From variables 11, 12 and 16 it can be seen that around 21 per cent of themunicipalities had private providers before 2003, 41 per cent adopted private providersin 2003, while around 35 per cent did not have any private providers in 2004. Variable13 shows that in around 31 per cent of the municipalities 15 or more elderly and/orhandicapped inhabitants received practical help from private providers in 2004. Variable14 shows that around 42 per cent of the municipalities had two or more privateproviders of homecare to compete with the municipal homecare. Finally, variable 15shows that around 16 per cent of the municipalities had private providers of bothpractical help and of more complex nursing tasks in 2004.

The results of the multivariate OLS regression analyses are shown in Tables 2 and 3.Table 2 shows the regression results on the measures of input (costs) and output(receivers and hours), while Table 3 shows the findings concerning efficiency measuredas unit costs.

As can be seen from the R2 values, the explanatory power of the ten models variessubstantially from 3.2 per cent (model 10, change in costs per hour) to 28.5 per cent(model 1, net expenditure on homecare per inhabitant aged 67þ 2004). Generally, themodels explain input (costs) better than output (receivers and hours) and theperformance in 2004 better than the change in performance from 2002 to 2004.

The findings related to the competitive tendering variables and the three hypothesesare presented below.

Hypothesis 1 suggested that non-adopters of competitive tendering (variable 6 inTables 2 and 3) have significantly lower organizational performance than adopters interms of (a) more spending, (b) less output and (c) higher costs per unit delivered(worse efficiency).

The findings of the multivariate regression analysis do not support the hypothesis.The only significant relations show that non-adopters in 2004 tended to have a higheroutput in terms of the share of receivers of homecare among inhabitants aged 67þ andto spend more hours per week than those municipalities using private providers. Thisfinding directly contradicts our expectations.

Hypotheses 2 suggested that early adopters (variable 1) and extensive adopters(variables 3–5) of competitive tendering have significantly better organizationalperformance than late (variable 2) and non-adopters (variable 6) in terms of (a) lessspending, (b) more output and (c) lower costs per unit delivered (better efficiency).

Concerning early adoption (variable 1), the hypothesis cannot be confirmed in termsof lower costs (H2a) or higher output (H2b), but hypothesis 2c is partly confirmed bythe findings in terms of significantly lower costs per receiver of eldercare, while theother measures of productivity and change in productivity show no significant relations.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McM

aste

r U

nive

rsity

] at

06:

43 2

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

Concerning extensive adoption (variables 3–5), hypothesis 2a is rejected by thefindings. No significantly lower costs were found on any of the three indicatorsof extensive adoption. Hypothesis 2b concerning higher output finds some,

Table 2: Regression analysis of organizational performance (input and output)

Model numbers 1 2 3 4 5 6

Dependent variables

Costs/

67þ 04

Change

costs

Receivers

04

Hours

04

Change

receivers

Change

hours


1. Early adoption before 2003 70,111 0,028 0,051 0,039 70,043 0,088

2. Compulsory adoption 2003 70,111 0,037 0,063 0,102 70,053 0,018

3. Private provider practical

help (fifteen or more

receivers) 2004

0,060 70,046 0,177^ 0,090 0,050 70,117

4. Two or more private

providers 2004

0,075 70,043 0,106 0,088 0,054 70,035

5. Private providers of

both nursing

and practical help 2004

0,048 70,052 70,0154 0,017 0,065 0,174*

6. No private providers 2004 0,060 70,000 0,180* 0,192* 70,051 0,007


7. Index NPM adoptions 0,037 0,141* 0,037 0,028 0,210** 0,143*

C. Size variables

8. Less than 10,000 inhab. 70,016 70,150* 70,088 0,095 0,046 70,023

9. More than 35,000 inhab. 0,191** 70,078 0,119 70,024 0,012 0,113


10. Same politician Soc.

Serv. 2000–5

0,027 70,029 70,117^ 70,086 70,011 70,024

11. Same mayor 2000–5 70,078 70,050 0,031 0,095 0,073 0,091

12. Mayor Social Democrat 70,062 0,063 0,048 70,047 70,086 70,126^


13. Share 67þ 2004 70,268*** 0,174** 70,061 70,170** 70,037 0,012

14. Change 67þ 1998–2004 70,290*** 70,300*** 70,134* 70,022 70,042 70,017

15. Wealth 2004 0,096 0,127^ 70,203** 70,231** 70,049 70,003

16. Change in wealth

1998–2004

0,127* 0,092 0,180** 0,147* 0,030 0,050

R2 0,285 0,147 0,156 0,103 0,083 0,086

Adjusted R2 0,239 0,094 0,103 0,046 0,025 0,028

Notes: ***Coefficient is significant at the 0.001 level; **Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level; *Coefficient is significant at

the 0.05 level; ^Coefficient is significant at the 0.1 level. Entries are standardized Beta coefficients; N¼ 271 in all models.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McM

aste

r U

nive

rsity

] at

06:

43 2

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

albeit rather weak, support. Municipalities with more than fifteen receivers ofpractical help from private providers (variable 3) tend to have a higher, althoughbarely significant, share of receivers among the elderly while municipalities withprivate provision of both practical help and nursing (variable 5) tend to have asignificantly higher increase from 2002 to 2004 in the number of hours provided(model 6). With regard to hypothesis 2c concerning unit costs (models 6–10), nosignificant relations were found in the unit costs for 2004 (models 7–8). In terms of

Table 3: Regression analysis of organizational performance (productivity)

7 8 9 10

Model numbers

Dependent variables

Prod1 04

Costs/receiver

Prod2 04

Costs/hour

Change Prod1

Costs/receiver

Change Prod2

Costs/hour


1. Early adoption before 2003 70,151* 70,077 0,064 0,038

2. Compulsory adoption 2003 70,129^ 70,115 0,010 70,010

3. Private provider practical

help (fifteen or more

receivers) 2004

70,010 70,074 70,212* 70,113

4. Two or more private providers 2004 70,021 70,011 70,012 70,030

5. Private providers of both

nursing and practical help 2004

0,030 70,015 0,023 70,012

6. No private providers 2004 70,102 70,142 70,006 70,045


7. Index NPM adoptions 70,013 70,039 0,002 0,004

C. Size variables

8. Less than 10,000 inhab. 0,067 70,072 0,052 70,021

9. More than 35,000 inhab. 0,055 0,098 0,100 0,161^


10. Same politician Soc. Serv. 2000–5 0,155* 0,095 0,008 70,002

11. Same mayor 2000–5 70,101^ 70,142* 70,001 70,049

12. Mayor Social Democrat 70,087 0,011 70,031 70,062


13. Share 67þ 2004 70,154* 0,121^ 70,035 70,003

14. Change 67þ 1998–2004 70,071 70,086 70,042 70,033

15. Wealth 2004 0,228** 0,298*** 0,100 0,040

16. Change in wealth 1998–2004 70,073 70,117^ 0,048 0,023

R2 0,132 0,141 0,050 0,032

Adjusted R2 0,078 0,087 70,010 70,029

Notes: ***Coefficient is significant at the 0.001 level; **Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level; *Coefficient is significant at

the 0.05 level; ^Coefficient is significant at the 0.1 level. Entries are standardized Beta coefficients; N¼ 271 in all models.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McM

aste

r U

nive

rsity

] at

06:

43 2

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

change from 2002–4, however (models 9–10), a significant reduction in costs perreceiver (model 9) was found for one of the indicators of extensive adoption(variable 3).

It can be concluded that H2a was clearly rejected by the findings. No significantreduction in costs was found by either the early adopters or the extensive adopters ofprivate provision of eldercare services. Concerning H2b, the evidence is mixed, as willbe discussed in the next section, but it tends to favour a rejection of the hypothesis.Concerning H2c, the evidence is also mixed, as will also be discussed in the nextsection, but tends to favour a partial confirmation of the hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3 suggested that no significant difference would be found inorganizational performance between non-adopters, early adopters and extensiveadopters in terms of (a) spending, (b) output and (c) unit costs (efficiency).

Strictly speaking the hypothesis is confirmed for H3a, since no significant relationswere found for costs and change in costs (models 1–2, variables 1–6), but rejected forH3b and H3c, since some significant relations were found on these two dimensions.

However, since twenty of the twenty-four measures of relations between competitivetendering and output were insignificant (models 3–6, variables 1–6) an alternativeconclusion suggesting that H3b was partly confirmed could be suggested. Following thesame logic, since twenty-one of the twenty-four measures of relations betweencompetitive tendering and unit costs and change in unit costs were insignificant (models7–10, variables 1–6) it could also be argued that H3c is partly confirmed by our findings.

Finally a few remarks should be given concerning the relations between the extent ofadoption of NPM innovations (variable 7 in Tables 2 and 3) and the dependentvariables. The variable is a measure of the degree of adoption of organizationalinnovations associated with NPM. It is significantly and positively related to model 2(change in costs), model 5 (change in receivers) and model 6 (change in hoursdelivered). Thus apparently organizations adopting these NPM innovations also tend tohave increased the spending as well as the output to eldercare. It is however beyond thescope of the present article to dig deeper into this finding.

DISCUSSION

Hypothesis 1 was rejected by our findings, which is surprising from a public choiceperspective. Municipalities with no private providers do not perform worse thanmunicipalities with private providers in terms of the performance measures utilized inthe analysis. In terms of output, on the contrary, they perform significantly better thanmunicipalities with private providers. A plausible rational interpretation may be thatmunicipalities that deliberately break the law by not approving a private provider do sobecause they find it efficient in terms of economies of scale. For instance, geographicallylarge municipalities with long distances between receivers of homecare can minimizetransportation costs by exact planning for the one municipal provider, while such


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McM

aste

r U

nive

rsity

] at

06:

43 2

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

planning would be less efficient with more providers. Such municipalities maylegitimize their behaviour by referring to the difficulties in finding capable privateproviders willing to enter the market. Another interpretation, supporting believers inthe efficiency of competition, is that it would take more time than allowed for in thepresent study for the advantages of competition to become evident in performancemeasures. One should remember however, that there was plenty of experience withcompetitive tendering within the Danish municipal context, since a number ofmunicipalities had private providers since the 1990s. Thus, those implementing the lawfor the first time could look for feasible models to the municipalities who already hadprivate providers before 2003. Furthermore we do have a pretty large group ofmunicipalities who implemented the system voluntarily before 2003 (21 per cent).Some of these did it already in the 1990s. For that group of municipalities the timeproblem is even smaller. Finally, the finding can also be interpreted as supporting theinstitutional perspective that the introduction of marketization practices should be seenas driven by fashion and legitimacy concerns rather than by attempts to increaseefficiency in the delivery of public services.

Hypothesis 2a, suggesting that early and extensive adoption would lower costs, wasalso rejected by the findings. This is a surprise from a public choice perspective andgiven the evidence provided in the empirical literature. The type of competitivetendering analysed here however, is different from many kinds of contracting utilized inthe technical services. Private providers are approved in order to give users ofhomecare services free choice and thereby increase the responsiveness of the publicsector. They are not approved because they are cheaper than other providers. Thus, thealmost automatic cost-lowering mechanisms, characteristic of many contractingprocesses in the technical services, are not present here.

Concerning hypotheses 2b and 2c as well as hypotheses 3b and 3c, the findingsprovided mixed evidence, lending some support to all the hypotheses. Thus, a numberof interpretations can be suggested. First, if one does not distinguish between thedifferent characteristics of different performance measures, the sheer number ofinsignificant performance measures may be interpreted as an indication of stronglegitimacy drivers (supporting H3b and H3c) rather than efficiency drivers in theprocess of marketization. Second, as suggested earlier, the fact that some measures doshow significant impact in the direction expected in H2b and H2c lends some support tothe public choice assumption. Combined with the time argument, namely, that in duetime the positive impact of competition on economic performance will be seen, thislatter interpretation saves the public choice perspective on public sector performance.

The time argument mentioned above raises an important question in terms ofresearch design. How long should a competitive tendering reform be allowed to takeeffect before its impact on economic performance is measured? If one measures shortlyafter the reform, as in the present study in which the latest adopters of the reform hadused private providers of homecare for only one or two years, one can more reasonablyascribe results to the reform and not to other factors. On the other hand, it may take


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McM

aste

r U

nive

rsity

] at

06:

43 2

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

longer before the reform has any impact at all. Thus, using a longer time perspectivemay disclose consequences of reforms that were not visible in the short perspective.One problem with the longer time perspective, however, is that other factors, such asother reforms and organizational changes are more likely to interfere. It is moredifficult to demonstrate that the findings are really the result of the reform in focus.This study has focused on the short-term consequences of competitive tendering interms of economic performance. Whether the results can be confirmed using a longertime perspective remains to be seen in future research projects. However, when thefindings of this study are seen in relation to the overall tendency to find relativelymeagre economic performance gains from competitive tendering, it seems likely thatthey will be relatively robust over time.

The ceteris paribus assumption used in the study can and should of course bequestioned. Increased efficiency in terms of lower costs per unit may be followed by alower (or higher) quality of the services delivered. The available data, however, do notpermit any test of the quality of the services provided. It can be seen from theregression analysis (models 7–8), that the more wealthy municipalities (variable 15)tend to have significantly higher unit costs. However, there are at least two reasonableinterpretations for this finding. First, the inhabitants of the more wealthy municipalitiesdemand a higher level of quality, thus indicating that higher unit costs imply higherservice quality. Second, rich municipalities have too much slack and therefore are lessefficient in their utilization of resources. This second interpretation saves the ceterisparibus assumption from the available evidence of the present study.

Finally, it should be recognized that this study has focused on the impact ofcompetitive tendering on economic performance in terms of costs, output andefficiency. Other performance measures have not been examined. Another explicitpurpose of introducing this exit mechanism to the Danish eldercare sector was toenhance responsiveness to the needs of the elderly. Whether this purpose has beenfulfilled has not been examined in the present study.

CONCLUSION

The overall conclusion is that marketization has had a weak impact – if any – oneconomic performance in the short run analysed here. This finding is largely in line withother findings from the literature of competitive tendering. A contrast of the twotheoretical perspectives, Public Choice and the new institutionalism, thus, lends moresupport to an institutional interpretation of the findings.

However, some support for a public choice interpretation was also found.Furthermore, when interpreting such results, one should be careful not to overestimatethe importance of short-term performance. A long-term perspective on marketizationreforms encourages us to be patient and accept short-term relatively small gains andlosses.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McM

aste

r U

nive

rsity

] at

06:

43 2

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

The alternative, more sceptical interpretation of the small or perverse impact ofmarketization on organizational performance was deduced from the institutionalperspective in which many innovation processes are seen as triggered by legitimacyconcerns often loosely coupled to organizational practices and with modest andsometimes perverse impact on organizational performance.

Whether competitive tendering processes in the public sector should be understoodas serious attempts to improve organizational performance, as ideological trends withlittle, no or even perverse impact on performance or as a mixture of both cannot beconcluded on the basis of the current study. But contrasting the two perspectivesprovides an exciting and challenging framework for future research projects examiningthe impact of organizational innovations on measures of organizational performance inthe short as well as the longer term.

Finally, in terms of the consequences of NPM reforms for accountability, thefindings in this article may have two important and related messages. First theyillustrate with painstaking clarity the difficulty in establishing reliable knowledge of theconsequences of reforms and thus the difficulty in holding reformers accountable fortheir consequences. Second, they may also illustrate that as long as beliefs are strongenough, that does not seem to matter. Some reforms are so deeply embedded in thecurrent neoliberal world culture that no evidence for their positive impact is required,it is just presumed.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Research for this article has been supported by the Danish Ministry of Social Welfareand Department of Political Science and Public Management at University of SouthernDenmark. I want to thank my colleagues Asbjørn Sonne Nørgaard and Jørn HenrikPetersen, the editors Koen Verhoest and Paola Mattei and two anonymous reviewersfor useful comments and suggestions for improvement. Earlier drafts of this articlewhere presented at the ECPR conference in Rennes and the EGPA conference inRotterdam in 2008 and I also want to thank participants at these conferences for usefulsuggestions and comments.

NOTES1 This expectation should not be confused with a psychological focus on the subjective motives of individual

decision-makers. The analysis of this article should be understood at the sociological level, not the

psychological.

2 A more detailed description of the variables can be provided by the author on request.

3 Due to shortage of space, a bivariate Pearson correlation table and its analysis has been excluded from the

article. It can be provided by the author on request and is included in a longer version of the article on the

personal home page of the author.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McM

aste

r U

nive

rsity

] at

06:

43 2

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

REFERENCESBoyne, G. A. (1998a) Competitive Tendering in Local Government: A Review of Theory and Evidence, Public

Administration. 76: 4 pp695–712.

—— (1998b) Public Choice Theory and Local Government : A Comparative Analysis of the UK and the USA, Basingstoke:

Macmillan.

—— (2003) What Is Public Service Improvement? Public Administration. 81: 2 pp211–27.

Boyne, G. A., Farrell, C., Law, J., Powell, M. and Walker, R. M. eds (2003) Evaluating Public Management

Reforms: Principles and Practice, Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press.

Brunsson, N. (1989) The Organization of Hypocrisy: Talk, Decisions and Actions in Organizations, New York: John

Wiley & Sons.

Chen, C. A. (2009) Antecedents of Contracting-Back-In: A View Beyond the Economic Paradigm, Administration

& Society. 41: 1 pp101–26.

DiMaggio, P. J. and Powell, W. W. (1983) The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective

Rationality in Organizational Fields, American Sociological Review. 48: 2 pp147–60.

Downs, A. (1967) Inside Bureaucracy, Boston, MA: Little, Brown.

Drori, G. S., Jang, Y. S. and Meyer, J. W. (2006) Sources of Rationalized Governance: Cross-National

Longitudinal Analyses 1985–2002, Administrative Science Quarterly. 51: 2 pp205–29.

Dunleavy, P., Margetts, H., Bastow, S. and Tinkler, J. (2006) New Public Management Is Dead – Long Live

Digital-Era Governance, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 16: 3 pp467–94.

Hansen, M. B. and Vedung, E. (2005) Common Language in the Organization of Elder Care: Evaluation of a

Standardized Classification System [in Danish: Fælles sprog i ældreplejens organisering: Evaluering af et

standardiseret kategorisystem], Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag.

Hodge, G. (2000) Privatization: An International Review of Performance, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Hood, C. (1991) A Public Management for All Seasons, Public Administration. 69: 1 pp3–19.

Johnsen, A. (2005) What Does 25 Years of Experience Tell Us about the State of Performance Measurement in

Public Policy and Management? Public Money & Management. 25: 1 pp9–17.

Kettl, D. F. (2005) The Global Public Management Revolution (2nd edn), Washington, DC: Brookings Institutions Press.

Lawrence, P. R. and Lorsch, J. W. (1969) Organizations and Environment: Managing Differentation and Integration,

Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin.

Le Grand, J. and Bartlett, W. (1993) ‘The Theory of Quasi-Markets’ in J. Le Grand and W. Bartlett (eds) Quasi-

Markets and Social Policy, London: MacMillan Press.

Meier, K. J. and O’Toole, L. J. (2009) The Proverbs of New Public Management: Lessons from an Evidence-

Based Research Agenda, American Review of Public Administration. 39: 1 pp4–22.

Meyer, J. and Rowan, B. (1977) Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, American Journal of Sociology. 83

pp340–63.

Meyer, J. W., Boli, J., Thomas, G. M. and Ramirez, F. O. (1997) World Society and the Nation-State, American

Journal of Sociology. 103: 1 pp144–81.

Mintzberg, H. (1979) Structuring of Organizations, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Niskanen, W. A. (1971) Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Chicago, IL: Aldine-Atherton.

O’Toole, L. J. and Meier, K. J. (2004) Parkinson’s Law and the New Public Management? Contracting

Determinants and Service-Quality Consequences in Public Education, Public Administration Review. 64: 3

pp342–52.

Orton, J. D. and Weick, K. E. (1990) Loosely Coupled Systems: A Reconceptualization, Academy of Management

Review. 15: 2 pp203–23.

Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T. (1992) Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public

Sector, Reading: Addison-Wesley.

Peters, B. G. (1996) The Future of Governing: Four Emerging Models, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McM

aste

r U

nive

rsity

] at

06:

43 2

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

Pollitt, C. (1995) Justification by Works or by Faith? Evaluating the New Public Management, Evaluation. 1: 2

pp133–54.

Pollitt, C. and Bouckaert, G. (2004) Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Powell, W. W. and DiMaggio, P. J. eds (1991) The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Chicago, IL:

University of Chicago Press.

Prasad, M. (2006) The Politics of Free Markets: The Rise of Neoliberal Economic Policies in Britain, France, Germany, & the

United States, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Rothstein, B. and Teorell, J. (2008) What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government

Institutions, Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration. 21: 2 pp165–90.

Thompson, J. D. (1967) Organizations in Action, New York: McGraw-Hill.

Tullock, G. (1965) The Politics of Bureaucracy, Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press.

Vedung, E. (1997) Public Policy and Program Evaluation, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

McM

aste

r U

nive

rsity

] at

06:

43 2

8 O

ctob

er 2

014

Documents

Marketization and Economic Performance