MARKET TESTING AND PRISON RIOTS: HOW PUBLIC-SECTOR COMMERCIALIZATION CONTRIBUTED TO A PRISON RIOT

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MARKET TESTING AND PRISON RIOTS:HOW PUBLIC-SECTORCOMMERCIALIZATION CONTRIBUTEDTO A PRISON RIOT

JOHN RYNNEGriffith University

RICHARD W. HARDINGUniversity of Western Australia

RICHARD WORTLEYGriffith University

Research Summary:Macroeconomic reforms have swept many modern Western correctionsjurisdictions into a world of commercial realities, privatization, andcompetition. The following case study reviews how competition (i.e., amarket test) between the public and the private sectors in tendering forthe operation of the Woodford Corrections Centre contributed to a riot.A combined model of the threshold and state-centered theories ofprison riots provides a template that clarifies the interactions of factorsthat contributed to the riot. Through document analysis and interviews,it is evident that despite producing a highly innovative bid judged supe-rior to the private sector, the public sector was caught in a policy bindthat led to a prison riot 3 weeks after the new center opened.

Policy Implications:This research highlights important policy considerations for govern-ments initiating policy-driven prison reform. First, the research high-lights the need for custodial policy development and implementation tobe strategic and part of an overall reform agenda that considers prisonriot theory. Second, if the public sector is to be involved in open com-petition with the private sector, then policy should be consistent with theconditions of the competition. Prisons, whether public or private, can-not cope successfully with reformist policy that does not consider ade-quately the interactions of the individuals in the prison.

KEYWORDS: prison reform, market testing, riot theory

Of all potential threats to safety and security in prisons, major riots holdsome of the greatest fears. At their worst, prison riots can lead to death,

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118 RYNNE, HARDING, & WORTLEY

serious injury, hostage taking, and infrastructure ruin. Threats are not lim-ited to the prison. The public is also at increased risk from concomitantprisoner escape and, at a minimum, is required indirectly to fund prisonrefurbishment costs and the inevitable internal reforms that flow frommajor disturbances. Although the frequency of major prison riots in mod-ern jurisdictions seems to be declining (Useem and Piehl, 2005), the poten-tially dreadful consequences of one major prison disturbance warrantongoing review of their origins to assist with prediction and prevention.

The following research builds on existing theoretical models that explainprison riots through introducing a new variable, market testing (Liebling,2004; Macionis, 1992; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000; Sparks et al., 1996).Recent developments in prison riot theory are applied to a major distur-bance at Woodford Correctional Centre in Queensland, Australia. Thenew Woodford Correctional Centre received its first prisoners on March10, 1997. Then 3 weeks later, on April 1, 1997, a major riot occurred(Queensland Corrective Services Commission (QCSC), 1997a, 1997e).Woodford prison is important for two reasons. First, the prison is unique incustodial corrections, as it was the first to be won in open competitionbetween the public and the private sectors for a contract to design, con-struct, finance, and manage the new facility.1 Second, when commissioned,the prison was touted as being at the leading edge of modern correctionalinfrastructure design and prisoner management processes (Courier Mail,1997; QCSC, 1997e).

The following research indicates how macroeconomic policy developedby a government-led agency external to the public provider of custodialservices created two conflicting demands and contributed to a riot. Thewhole-of-government commercialization initiative required the public sec-tor to act as a private enterprise entity and to compete against the privatesector for a prison contract. The first area of conflict was for the publicsector to implement the substantial organizational change required fromits successful reform-driven bid. The second area was that despite beingtreated as an external contractor in the tender process, when the systemwas confronted by burgeoning prisoner numbers, the public sector was

1. Modern prison privatization commenced in the United States in 1988, drivenby a need to relieve chronic overcrowding and to improve prison conditions (McDonaldet al., 1998). Apart from using the public sector to develop performance benchmarksfor private-sector contracts, U.S. jurisdictions have avoided direct competition betweenthe public and the private sectors (Harding, 2001). In the United Kingdom and Austra-lia, privatization has been used to drive organization reform through cross-sector com-petition (i.e., market tests). The Woodford Correctional Centre tender commenced in1994 and included all areas relevant to building and managing the new prison. The firstU.K. market test was for a management-only, service-level agreement of the existingManchester (Strangeways) prison. Bids were accepted in April 1993, and the agreementwas awarded to HM Prison Service in 1994 (Harding, 1997).


MARKET TESTING AND PRISON RIOTS 119

expected to revert to its traditional remit and to adjust to marketdemands, notwithstanding that these demands were external to contractedrequirements. In winning the tender, the public sector was required toanswer to two masters: the reform embodied in attaining the contract stan-dards and its traditional public-sector role.

No single prison riot model ever can explain completely the origins of ariot, as each unique ecology of a prison brings its own set of dilemmas(Carrabine, 2005; Harding, 1997). But, as indicated in the substantial liter-ature on prison riots (Goldstone and Useem, 1999; Useem and Goldstone,2002; Useem and Kimball, 1989; Useem and Piehl, 2005; Useem and Rei-sig, 1999; Useem et al., 1996), consistencies exist in prison behaviors thatadministrators need to be cognizant of to avoid repeating mistakes.

The study is in three sections. The first section reviews theory thatexplains and predicts prison riots. In the second section, these recent theo-retical advances are used to explain the 1997 riot at Woodford Correc-tional Centre. The third and final section summarizes the consequences ofthe riot and identifies significant policy implications.

PRISON RIOTS

Prison riot theory has evolved from the rich sociological tradition onlife, order, and control in prison (Adams, 1992; Carrabine, 2004; Cressey,1965; Goffman, 1961; Sparks et al., 1996; Sykes, 1958; Useem and Kimball,1989). To improve prediction, recent approaches have combined theoreti-cal models with situational data from actual riots. Prison riot research hasdeveloped through two broad approaches: a deprivation or inmate-bal-ance theory and disorganization or administrative control models (Car-rabine, 2004; Useem and Kimball, 1989; Useem and Reisig, 1999; Useemand Piehl, 2005; Wortley, 2002). The deprivation, or closely relatedinmate-balance theory, proposes that prison riots result from poor condi-tions and overly punitive internal controls (e.g., administrative disciplineprocesses) (Goldstone and Useem, 1999; Reid, 1994; Useem and Gold-stone, 2002; Useem and Piehl, 2005; Useem and Reisig, 1999; Wortley,2002). In this approach, oppressive regimes and poor conditions combinedwith a volatile population prime a constant state of readiness for a majordisruption; all that is required to trigger a rebellion is an opportunity.

The combination of poor conditions, violent prisoners, and over-zealousofficers does not imply automatically that prison riots are inevitable.Despite burgeoning prisoner populations and more psychologically puni-tive regimes like supermax prisons, recent research indicates that rebel-lious prisoner behavior is declining (Cunningham and Sorensen, 2006;Useem and Piehl, 2005). Improvements in infrastructure and prisonerrehabilitation programs that attend to the felt experience of prison and its



potential outcomes partially may explain the recent decline in riots. How-ever, the experience of the 1990 Manchester (Strangeways) prison riot inthe United Kingdom suggests that situational factors alone, like new infra-structure and program availability, do not guarantee a riot-free prison(Woolf and Tumim, 1991). In the Strangeways riot, prison conditions andprogram availability actually had improved (Boin and Rattray, 2004; Car-rabine, 2004; Woolf and Tumim, 1991).

Deprivation may contribute to riots; however, other research indicatesthat prison conditions alone cannot explain these disturbances fully(Useem and Reisig, 1999). Many prisons with poor conditions do not riot.In contrast, riots do occur in centers with good conditions (Woolf andTumim, 1991). An alternative explanation of prison riots that addressesissues not included by the deprivation approach is the administrativebreakdown approach (Useem and Kimball, 1989). Included under this lat-ter approach are related theories (e.g., resource mobilization, breakdown,and collective behavior) that focus on prison disorganization. The adminis-trative breakdown approach builds from the deprivation model by propos-ing that changes to the political structure, management, or social orderfabric of a prison will create the necessary conditions for a riot to occur(Carrabine, 2005; DiIulio, 1987; Goffman, 1961; Sykes, 1958; Useem andKimball, 1989; Useem and Reisig, 1999). That is, a riot may occur whenexisting cooperative power balances between prisoners and managementare disrupted by either internal or external forces. When the balance inthe unofficial relationship between prisoners and officers/management isconstant, prison life remains stable. A change to that balance can causeprisoners to question the legitimacy of the new arrangement and to causethe system to become unbalanced.

Relationship balance explains why the conditions or social order in oneprison are not necessarily available, applicable, or transferable to another.In new prisons, the new staff, infrastructure, and policies require a rework-ing of prisoner/officer relations to find the right balance. The legitimacy ofthe administrative agency seems to be critical in sustaining internal control(Carrabine, 2005; Useem and Kimball, 1989; Useem and Piehl, 2005).Franklin et al. (2006) suggest that the catalyst for a riot can be a change inthe perceived legitimacy by the prisoners of the method and style ofconfinement.

Methodological difficulties, including a reliance on case studies andquestionable sampling techniques in time-series multivariate analyses,have confused even more the development of a theoretical model that bestexplains prison riot origins (Useem and Reisig, 1999). To test whichapproach had the best fit to explain prison disturbances, Useem and Reisig(1999) compared prisons that rioted with those that did not in 49 of 50



U.S. state jurisdictions. These results indicated that although administra-tive control factors better explained a riot than the inmate-balance theory,ultimately, the best explanation might be in a combined approach.

Recently, two similar approaches to understanding prison riots havedeveloped. The first approach applies the state-centered theory of revolu-tion to prison riots (Goldstone and Useem, 1999; Useem and Goldstone,2002; Useem and Piehl, 2005). Based on Skocpol’s (1994) three-factor the-ory of state-centered revolution, Goldstone and Useem (1999) analyzed 13major U.S. riots from 1952 to 1993. They identified five causal factors: (1)new and increased demands on prison administrators from externalsources without any increase in resources, (2) internal pressures from cor-rectional staff that leads to dissension and alienation, (3) internal pres-sures from prisoners about conditions, (4) riotous prisoner ideologies thatimbue the population and justify the disturbance, and (5) internal actions,perceived as unjust, by prison administrators in response to externaldemands.

The second approach applies the threshold theory of prison riots. Thethreshold theory includes the factors of the state-centered theory of riotsbut in two broad categories: pathological prison administration and institu-tional (i.e., situational factors) breakdown (Boin and Rattray, 2004; Boinand Van Duin, 1995). The threshold theory has two primary elements(Boin and Rattray, 2004). First, pressure in the prison builds throughadministrative clashes between external head office management and thelocal prison management. Fiscal stress, inappropriate policy implementa-tion, and poor regulatory and monitoring processes are indicative of thistype of pathology. The second element is institutional breakdown. Sus-tained administrative pathology eventually creates the platform for institu-tional breakdown. As prison staff react to poorly construed orimplemented policy decisions, tensions build and the equilibrium betweenthe existing officer/prisoner social relations is disrupted. Unexplainedchange to ingrained routines threatens the perceptions by the prisoners ofconsistency. Feelings of unfairness grow as officers take punitive positionsbeyond those previously adopted as they attempt to implement new pol-icy. Prisoners react negatively as officers lose discretionary power and theflexibility to compromise. In losing this flexibility, the ability to maintainconsistency disintegrates. Successive incidents foster growing perceptionsof illegitimacy and dissatisfaction with the new relationship between theprisoners and the prison administrators until a final incident triggers a riot.

Boin and Rattray (2004) argue that the pathology that leads to prisonriots does not reside solely in prisoners. Administration or agency dysfunc-tion at senior external levels can transfer to internal prison operations andcan create dissatisfaction. This transfer creates pressure that leads to insti-tutional drift and the disintegration of existing informal behavioral norms



that keep the prison under control. If internal pressure builds sufficientlyto breach a prison-specific liminal, then a riot occurs. The riot attempts torestore the equilibrium of the prison by mitigating the prisoner discontentthat is created through the perceptions of illegitimate institutional change.

The structure and similarities in the state-centered theory of revolution(Goldstone and Useem, 1999; Useem and Goldstone, 2002; Useem andPiehl, 2005) and Boin and Rattray’s (2004) threshold theory of prisonallow the two approaches to fit together neatly. Boin and Rattray’s twobroad sequential categories (i.e., pathological prison administration andinstitutional breakdown) provide an overarching framework or broadheadings that Goldstone and Useem’s (1999) five state-centered theoryfactors fit into neatly; together these theories provide greater specificity inriot sequencing.

In both models, the first components concern the role of external cen-tral agents, which are often remote head offices. The first category of Boinand Rattray’s model (2004) refers to the pathological prison administra-tion caused by an external source, whereas the first factor in Goldstoneand Useem’s model (1999) focuses on external pressures or administrativeshifts that led to poorly developed and implemented policies. In complyingwith external demands, the perceived legitimacy of a balanced prison ecol-ogy is disrupted, which thereby destabilizes the functioning social orderand increases the likelihood of a riot to regain equilibrium. The remainingfour factors of Goldstone and Useem’s model are consistent with the insti-tutional breakdown element of the threshold theory. The two approacheshave strong empirical support and provide an excellent template to ana-lyze the impact of the head office agency and of faulty policy developmentand implementation as causal of a prison riot through fostering internalpressure.

Carrabine (2005) suggests that the weakness of these and similarapproaches is that they fail to acknowledge sufficiently the uniqueness ofeach prison. In grouping contingent factors, sensitivity to the interrelation-ship of causal factors that create a prison’s “drift” toward a riot is lost(Carrabine, 2004). Although it is unlikely that one theoretical model everwould explain fully the causal factors of a specific prison riot (Harding2001), the growing body of prison riot literature indicates that consisten-cies exist in events that precipitate major prison riots (DiIulio, 1987; Gold-stone and Useem, 1999; Smith et al., 1999; Useem and Goldstone, 2002;Useem and Kimball, 1989; Useem and Piehl, 2005; Useem and Reisig,1999; Useem et al., 1996).



METHODData for this research were collected over a 4-year period commencing

in December 1998. Two data collection approaches were used. First, theQueensland Department of Corrective Services (DCS) approved a searchof all relevant and available files on the Woodford Correctional Centretender, commissioning, riot, and its consequences. As this research waspart of a larger study on privatization, DCS had made all documents avail-able provided that commercial-in-confidence or Cabinet-in-confidenceprovisos were not contravened. Accordingly, some documents are referredto without references.

Second, to support organizational data or to develop greater under-standing of the riot, 17 officers and managers participated in semistruc-tured interviews. Given the qualitative nature of the research, anonprobability purposive sampling approach was used to identify staff thathad worked in the prison center from its commissioning and were involvedin the riot (Neuman, 2006). A similar approach was used to identify fiveprisoners that remained in Queensland prisons and indicated a willingnessto participate in semistructured interviews about the riot. All participantswere assured of anonymity when the findings were presented. In thisresearch, a prison riot is defined as a major disruption that involves mostof the staff of the prison, includes more than 15 prisoners, and results inpersonal injury and infrastructure damage (Reid, 1994).

WOODFORD CORRECTIONAL CENTRE

THE RIOT

The April 1, 1997 riot at Woodford Correctional Centre lasted for over 3hours and spread throughout the prison. For approximately 2 hours,officers lost control of the prison. A series of sequential situational lapses,of course, allowed the riot to commence and escalate. For example, the300-bed secure block had a panopticon-like design with a series of wingsradiating from a centralized control hub. Each wing was secured and sepa-rated from the central observation point and from the other wings by athick transparent screen that allowed officers an uninterrupted line ofsight. The riot began with an internal disruption. It escalated when prison-ers gained access to the central control area by smearing the supposedlyfireproof screen with butter and starting a fire at its base; the screenmelted, and prisoners had access to other areas (Prisoner A, personalcommunication, March 7, 2000). Once out of their cells, prisoners startedrandom fires, destroyed furniture and fittings, and caused major structuraland property damage that cost in excess of $1 million to repair (Murray,2006).



The mayhem was compounded by a lack of leadership because of officerinexperience, failure in some center facilities, and other situational lapses,some of which are identified below. Fortunately, only five officers and fourprisoners received minor injuries; one prisoner had an epileptic fit (QCSC,1997e). The human cost was indicated in two ways. First, 2 weeks after theriot, the QCSC Director–General, who had led the substantial and posi-tive transformation of the organization since 1989, was replaced (Niesche,1997). Second, the mayhem caused significant stress, particularly in inex-perienced officers; so much so, that it was not until 9 years after the eventthat some officers could confront publicly the events of that evening andreceive bravery awards (Murray, 2006).

It is beyond the scope of this research to review each situational contri-bution to the riot. Instead, the following discussion analyzes the manager-led reform events that led to the riot under the two primary headings ofthe threshold theory of prison riots (i.e., pathological prison administra-tion and institutional breakdown). Then, the five factors of the state-cen-tered theory of prison riots are used to disentangle the main events thatcreated the decline into a major riot.

RIOT ANALYSIS

PHASE ONE: PATHOLOGICAL PRISON ADMINISTRATION

FACTOR ONE: EXTERNAL PRESSURES OR ADMINISTRATIVE SHIFTS THAT

LED TO POORLY DEVELOPED AND IMPLEMENTED POLICIES

From its inception in 1988, the QCSC was at the forefront of Australiancustodial reform, having commissioned two private and three public cen-ters (Harding, 1997). Of these five new centers, only the privately man-aged Arthur Gorrie Correctional Centre had a major riot in its first year ofoperation (i.e., 1992). Given the organizational experience gained by theQCSC through 5 years of unprecedented reform and infrastructuregrowth, it would be expected that the Woodford Correctional Centretender process would have been the pinnacle of prison commissioning.

A QCSC Board paper that was prepared for its June 1994 meeting pro-vides evidence of the experiential learning of the organization in best-practice tendering of prisons. It documents how, for the first time in any ofits tender processes, the QCSC contracted an external agent to report onthe type of prisoners to be held, the preferred delivery method, and thefacility management options. In a greater shift to performance manage-ment, a senior central agency bureaucrat was included on the projectsteering committee, and this person indicated that quantitative and objec-tive correctional performance indicators should replace the existing sub-jective and qualitative indicators (QCSC Board paper, July 8, 1994).



The QCSC proposed that the preferred service delivery method for thenew prison would be determined best through an international compari-son of private-sector and public-sector prison performance (QCSC Boardpaper, July 8, 1994). The review concluded that a mixed-delivery method,including elements of the public and private sectors, could collaborate suc-cessfully in the one jurisdiction (External Consultants, 1994). The recom-mended option for the construction and operation of the new WoodfordCorrectional Centre was a public-sector/private-sector collaboration; theprivate sector would contribute infrastructure consultation and design, andthe public sector would take responsibility for prison management. Thereport suggested that the QCSC take advantage of the stable industrialrelations climate of the time and achieve private-sector efficiencies whileincorporating public-sector expertise (External Consultants, 1994).

The QCSC argued against this suggestion (QCSC Executive minutes,August 22, 1994). They indicated that the various organizational develop-ment strategies initiated since its inception in December 1988 (e.g., priva-tization) had transformed positively the previously archaic publicorganization into a highly efficient and effective service provider (QCSCExecutive minutes, August 22, 1994). The QCSC proposed that theintended consequences of privatization, like organizational learningthrough competition and cross-fertilization with the private sector, hadbeen achieved (Harding, 1997:19–20). By 1994, the public sector saw itselfas the “champion” of custodial innovation and service delivery (QCSCBoard paper, August 22, 1994). As indicated in the consultant’s report, theexisting positive industrial climate, which was achieved through earlierenterprise bargaining negotiations with the local trade union, negated thevalue of additional use of the “big stick” approach (QCSC Executive min-utes, August 22, 1994). Threatening public-sector staff with more privatiza-tion-based job losses would be counterproductive to ongoing reform. Theview of some senior QCSC bureaucrats was that a market test betweenitself and the private sector for the construction and management of thenew center was ill conceived and that the appropriate option was for thepublic sector to design, construct, and operate the center (QCSC Execu-tive minutes, August 22, 1994).

The construction and operation of the Woodford prison coincided withincreased interest in establishing Government Owned Enterprises (GOEs)as part of the National Competition Policy at federal and state levels ofgovernment (Queensland Government, 1996). The introduction of a Com-mercialization Policy Framework to drive even more the state-basedreform reinforced competition and effectiveness in Queensland (Queen-sland Treasury, 1994). The framework detailed commercialization as theglobal best practice in public-sector financial management and focused onreducing the size of government. Although originally not a target GOE,



the existence of private prisons in Queensland indicated to senior centralagency and noncorrections bureaucrats that the provision of correctionalservices was a competitive market. Therefore, the public sector as a GOEpotentially could be active commercially and compete against the privatesector. On November 21, 1994, the Queensland Cabinet endorsed anopen-market test that comprised a competitive tender for the design, con-struction, and operation of Woodford that would include a bid from theQCSC. Thus, prison reform in Queensland had moved beyond custodialservice delivery reform to be at the forefront of major public-sector policyreform as the first agency to be tested in the commercial market. The sub-sequent clash between external forces and contract management laterwould contribute to intolerable pressure that precipitated the Woodfordriot.

For the first time in Australian corrections’ history, a public-sector pro-vider was to compete against the private sector. However, in doing so, thepublic provider was in uncharted administrative waters and was vulnerableto aspects of competition in which it had no experience. Previously, therole of the public sector in prison privatization was to be the process arbi-trator and decision maker on the successful tenderer. The Woodford mar-ket test required the QCSC to undertake conflicting roles (Weller, 1998),which were to retain its purchaser functions but also to adopt a new role ascompetitor in an open market.

Winning the market test was of paramount importance to the publicsector (QCSC, 1995b). The market test outcome would determine whetherpublic-sector reform initiated in 1988 had been achieved (QCSC, 1995b).Failure by the public sector could be perceived as an inability by seniormanagement to achieve service delivery reforms and an admission ofongoing private-sector superiority. To be successful, the public-sector bidwas required to prove value for money and to show efficiency gains poten-tially superior to any private-sector competitor (QCSC, 1994a). Accord-ingly, the QCSC bid represented the culmination of organization reformand experiential learning since 1989. Combined with this correctionalexpertise was the external central agency pressure to succeed in the firstventure of the State into open commercial competition (Queensland Trea-sury, 1994).

The outcome of the competitive enthusiasm of the QCSC was a bidmodeling unheralded public-sector service delivery innovation within tightfiscal controls (Legislative Assembly of Queensland Public Works Com-mittee, 1996). The public-sector bid was the culmination of 200 years ofcorrectional experience, which was developed using the vast financial andpersonnel resources available to that sector (QCSC, 1995b-d). Those indi-viduals charged with developing the QCSC bid tendered a visionaryprison, one that included aspirational work practices that the public sector



previously had never had the opportunity or wherewithal to implement(Legislative Assembly of Queensland Public Works Committee, 1996).

The determination of the QCSC to win the market test was identifiablein the magnitude of the differences between existing public-sector servicedelivery and the proposed model. The QCSC Board paper of April 12,1995 indicates that the public-sector policy approach and bid emphasizedvalue for money, particularly in prisoner programs and staffing areas.Many proposed work practices were contrary to the hard-fought industrialgains won earlier by trade unions and were vastly different from existingservice delivery in the other public sectors of the State.

To present a viable alternative to the private sector, the QCSC bid wasrequired to prove greater effectiveness and efficiency than its competitors(QCSC, 1994). This financial pressure, coupled with the determination ofthe QCSC to be successful, heralded a new era of corrections industrialrelations. The tender provided the QCSC with sufficient industrial lever-age to force compliance from the State Public Service Federation ofQueensland (SPSFQ) in negotiating a new workplace agreement. To pro-duce an efficient service delivery model, the QCSC argued that labor-related costs consumed approximately 80% of recurrent prison centerexpenditure (QCSC internal memorandum, March 24, 1995). Given theprivate-sector experience at successfully tendering and operating efficientprivate prisons, the QCSC argued it would require similar efficiencies inits application of human resources.

On March 31, 1995, the QCSC and the SPSFQ signed a memorandum ofunderstanding agreeing to a new service delivery and staffing model forthe Woodford prison. The extent of this variation was such that the memo-randum detailed all new work practices and that these conditions appliedonly to the Woodford Correctional Centre (QCSC, 1995d). The staffingchanges were significant. In the existing public prison system, prisonofficer numbers were fixed, regardless of prisoner populations. The newWoodford model determined staffing numbers through a ratio of prisonersto officers, shift lengths varied from 8 to 12 hours and four 4 staffing types(i.e., full-time, part-time, casual, and temporary), and permanent nightshifts were introduced. A nonflexible wage was incorporated and annual-ized, which removed penalty rates and allowances. In a complete reformof work practices, innovative staff-absences programs that incorporatedsick and recreation leave, emergent leave, special leave and family leave,and meal breaks or reliefs for meals were canceled, and enhanced careerstructures through the development of multidisciplinary teams that pro-vided a total corrective service were introduced. Finally, all staff, regard-less of role or rank, had the same corporate uniform that replaced theexisting paramilitary style for all public prisons. In summary, the QCSC



made the most of the opportunity provided by the competitive tender totake a substantial reform leap in correctional work practices.

It is beyond the scope of this research to review the tender process otherthan to indicate that the QCSC was the successful tenderer (LegislativeAssembly of Queensland Public Works Committee, 1996; QCSC, 1997a,1997b, 1997e). The tendering process was controversial, with the privatesector arguing that it was impossible for the public sector to be impartialbecause it was both purchaser and provider. A parliamentary review laterindicated that no evidence suggested that the QCSC bid was not the bestvalue for the money nor that it should not have been successful (Legisla-tive Assembly of Queensland Public Works Committee, 1996; Weller,1998). However, the scepticism of the private sector about the ability ofthe public provider to deliver its reform agenda became another source ofexternal pressure. As per the state-centered theory, senior centralizedmanagement came under external scrutiny and pressure to ensure that theprison delivered its services as tendered.

Some members of the group that oversaw the letting process doubtedthe ability of the QCSC to deliver the contracted services given the sub-stantial gap between its existing and proposed services (QCSC Boardpaper, April 12, 1995). To maintain market credibility, it was determinedthat any service default by the QCSC would incur a financial penalty simi-lar to that which would have been leveled against the private sector insimilar circumstances. A service agreement to this effect was signedbetween the QCSC Board and the QCSC Director-General on September4, 1995, which indicates what amounts would be paid for various types ofdefault. In effect, the QCSC Board determined that in the event of a ser-vice default, the government would fine itself, which was surely evidenceof a rushed policy.2

PHASE TWO: INSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN

To prove that the previous 4 years had resulted in genuine work practicechange and to pursue alternative avenues for ongoing reform, the publicsector produced a service delivery model far beyond anything that cur-rently existed in that sector, an approach that potentially offered the gov-ernment considerable efficiencies (QCSC Board paper, April 12, 1995).The innovation of the QCSC bid not only won them the contract but alsobecome the catalyst for external pressure from two sources. First was therequirement to implement and attain the bid conditions as contracted.

2. In effect, insurance claims were made for the costs to repair infrastructuredamage (QCSC senior manager, personal communication, July 3, 2001). No availabledocumentary evidence indicates that a default payment ever was made as a result of theWoodford prison riot.



Unlike the contract demands, the second pressure was, to some extent,unexpected and out of the control of the QCSC. Across 1996 and 1997,prisoner numbers in Queensland grew considerably and prison beds werein high demand (QCSC, 1997, 1998). The opening of the Woodford Cor-rectional Centre provided a means to alleviate some of this burden.

The following section details how, in attempting to fulfil its contractualobligations, the management and prisoners of the Woodford CorrectionalCentre were under extraordinary external pressure. As indicated in thestate-centered and threshold theories of prison riots, this external pressureconverted to internal conflict, which primed the prison for a riot throughthe breakdown of fundamental situational controls. The following sectionreviews the worsening milieu created by the conversion of external pres-sure into internal conflict among prison management, officers, andprisoners.

FACTOR TWO: INTERNAL CONFLICT CREATED FROM DISSENTION

BETWEEN MANAGEMENT AND OFFICERS

The QCSC tender emphasized a complete correctional packagedesigned and staffed to deliver a custodial approach to the therapeuticmanagement of prisoners based on a structured day and progressive move-ment between classification levels determined by behavior improvement(QCSC, 1997a-e). To minimize the transfer of the existing public-sectorstaff culture perceived as overly punitive and illegitimate (QCSC internalmemorandum, May 22, 1997), 58% (131) of the staff of the new prison hadno custodial corrections experience (QCSC, 1997a-e).

The strategy of minimizing the transfer of prison officer culture throughemploying nonexperienced officers had been used by the two private pris-ons of the State (i.e., Borallon and Arthur Gorrie Correctional Centres).The Borallon Correctional Centre, which was the first private prison inAustralia, opened successfully in 1989 as a low-security prison. The prisonwas staffed by predominately former military personnel with very fewofficers having custodial experience (Rynne, 2005). Alternatively, in 1992,the Arthur Gorrie Correctional Centre opened as a high-security privateremand prison with very few officers, again, having custodial experience(Rynne, 2005). In November 1992, the prison experienced the first of twomajor riots (Harding, 1997). Among an array of changes mitigated by theriots at Arthur Gorrie Correctional Centre, more officers with public-sec-tor custodial experience were employed (Rynne, 2005).

The lessons from the Arthur Gorrie Correctional Centre riots did notseem to have been learned at the Woodford Correctional Centre. From itsfirst day, more than half of the officers had no prison experience. Further-more, the Woodford Correctional Centre prisoners were not low security.



The new prison had the majority of the highest security classified prisonersof the State; many prisoners were serving sentences for serious violentoffences (QCSC, 1995b). Officer inexperience was compounded by height-ened prisoner anxiety that was increased by the new environment (Har-ding, 1997). Prisoners dislike change (Sykes, 1958). At the new WoodfordCorrectional Centre, substantial change existed in every area of their lives(QCSC, 1995b, 1995c, 1995g); yet, the new prison opened with a lack ofcustodial experience in one of its most vulnerable areas.

The inexperience went as far as the general manager of the prison(QCSC, 1997a-e). Despite an extensive corrections background, the newlyappointed general manager had no previous experience in a similar posi-tion. By making this appointment, senior QCSC management was indicat-ing the strength of their commitment to delivering a new era in public-sector custodial corrections (QCSC, 1997a-e). In doing so, however, thenewest, largest, and highest security-rated prison of the State, one that wasto operate from a completely different service delivery approach, was tobe managed by a person with no previous experience as a prison generalmanager. These circumstances would have extended the most experiencedsenior manager.

A central theme of the new Woodford Correctional Centre servicedelivery model was a commitment to improve prisoner and officer interac-tions (QCSC, 1995b, 1997b). Between 1989 and 1997, the QCSC had madesome advances from the previously acrimonious relations between the twogroups with a gradual introduction of case and unit management and con-stant surveillance by officers in the prisoner units (QCSC, 1990, 1991,1995b, 1997e, 1998). Before 1997, officer supervision of prisoner units inthe public prisons of the State was via secured rooms adjoining prisonerunits. Officers and prisoners were separated physically and securely.

At Woodford Correctional Centre, the unit infrastructure and reducedstaffing levels required officers to adopt unit and case managementapproaches. That is, they had to be continually in the living space and inthe lives of the prisoner. For the first time in a Queensland maximum-security prison, no physical barrier existed between the keepers and thekept (QCSC, 1994). Initially, officers were not allowed even a desk andseat in the prisoner units (Officer D, personal communication, January 28,2001). Inexperienced new officers were unconcerned by this closeness.Such ignorance was dangerous because long-term prisoners transferredfrom other prisons found the closeness unheralded, threatening, and inap-propriate (Prisoner E, personal communication, March 10, 2000). Whenthe center opened, officers and prisoners immediately were confrontedwith a new closeness. The following quotes from prisoners in the centerbefore the riot indicate the prisoner discomfort associated with this newlevel of contact:



I don’t talk. It’s them and us and the two should never meet. Theyshould not be in here. The screws were tricking young prisoners intotalking to them. That is a problem because when you first start jailtime that can get you beaten up. (Prisoner E, personal communica-tion, March 10, 2000)

Go back to the old days (when prisoners and officers did not talk toeach other socially in the units). That way it’s less confusing, the linewas clearer. (Prisoner G, personal communication, March 7, 2000)

Over the initial 3 weeks, officers and prisoners requested a gradualimplementation of this new interaction level (Manager A, personal com-munication, July 4, 2001). Under pressure from external forces to fill theprison quickly and in keeping with the contract conditions, these requestswere dismissed by center management and senior external management(Manager A, personal communication, July 4, 2001).

As with any new prison, infrastructure and bedding-in problems existed(Harding, 1997). At Woodford prison, these problems were compoundedby the occupancy rate. The fill or occupancy rate of the new center was attimes as high as 20 prisoners per day, with the prison reaching maximumcapacity in 1 month (Manager A, personal communication, July 4, 2001).On one occasion, for 3 consecutive days, 20 new prisoners were receivedevery day. Difficulties with the excessive fill rate were compounded byinfrastructure failures. For example, the prison opened without the elec-tronic locking systems being fully functional (Officer A, personal commu-nication, January 24, 2000). These events contributed to officers beingridiculed and their authority being challenged; also they were vulnerableto the full range of potential dangers from erratic movement control ofprisoners. An example was when an officer was locked in an internal con-trol area between the secure units and the central movement area with oneof the most dangerous residents of the prison for over 2 hours while otherstaff attempted to correct the fault (Officer A, personal communication,January 24, 2000). Fortunately, the officer was one of the officers withprison experience and could keep the situation under control without inci-dent. Also, the policy and procedures documents for the center had notbeen completed when the center opened (Manager A, personal communi-cation, July 4, 2001). Therefore, inexperienced officers, in some cases, hadno rules or procedures to direct operations. Consistent with the secondfactor of the state-centered theory, these calamities created administrationpressure through dissention among officers, prisoners, and senior manag-ers. The latter were blamed and held accountable for failures that in hind-sight were recognized as beyond their control.



FACTOR THREE: PRISONERS PROTEST AGAINST PERCEIVED

ILLEGITIMATE, EXCESSIVE, AND INCOMPETENT MANAGEMENT

AND OFFICER CAPABILITIES AND ISSUE RESPONSES

At the new Woodford Correctional Centre prison, inmates were con-fronted with new and challenging situations that created feelings of illegiti-macy. In addition to having inexperienced officers continuously in theirliving space, a series of minor issues multiplied the negative consequencesof these changes. The prisoners perceived these challenges to be illegiti-mate and contrary to normative behaviors that existed in other prisons(Prisoner G, personal communication, March 7, 2000). For example, allstaff (i.e., prisoner program and correctional staff) wore the same corpo-rate uniform (QCSC, 1997e). As no clear identifier of duties and responsi-bilities existed on the uniform, prisoners, and in some cases new officers,could not distinguish prison personnel. Simple matters like asking anofficer for instructions became a problem (Officer A, personal communi-cation, 24 January, 2000). From the perspective of the prisoners, this con-fusion created undue stress in managing their daily lives because they wereunsure of whom they should speak with about problems (Prisoner B, per-sonal communication, April 6, 2000).

New staff experienced the same dilemma (Officer A, personal commu-nication, January 24, 2000). In the middle of the riot, the uniform similaritywent from an annoyance to a major issue. With the center under attack,inexperienced and new staff members were uncertain of lines of responsi-bilities and prisoners not involved in the riot were unsure of which staff toask for instructions (Officer A, personal communication, January 24,2000).

Another issue that under different circumstances may have been consid-ered of nuisance value was that the new meal preparation and deliverymethods often failed to deliver meals hot (Prisoner B, personal communi-cation, April 6, 2000; Manager A, personal communication, July 4, 2001).In a fully functioning prison, this failure would be a problem. In a newprison with many new and difficult situations requiring prisoner assimila-tion, this failure was one more irritant that added to the growing percep-tions of the prisoners of regime illegitimacy.

Insufficient staff, shift problems, and conflict between program, security,and unit staff, combined to cause considerable internal tension (Officer A,personal communication, January 24, 2000, Manager A, personal commu-nication, July 4, 2001). These types of issues were raised repeatedly withprison management and consequently senior external management but tono avail. The uniform issue had been referred repeatedly to senior man-agement. However, it was dismissed at this management level as beingofficer resistance to the de-emphasis of their paramilitary role (Manager



A, personal communication, July 4, 2001). Similarly, prison managementhad advised senior head office mangers that the fill rate was above thecapacity of the prison and that staffing levels were insufficient (QCSCinternal memorandum, May 22, 1997).

The evidence that management was aware of these issues that led to theinstitutional breakdown is in the postriot outcome (Manager A, personalcommunication, July 4, 2001). Late on the evening of the riot, in a hurriedmeeting outside the prison, it was agreed between the head office staff andthe trade union that no new prisoners would be accepted until additionalsupervisory staff were employed. The outcome negotiated outside theexternal perimeter of the prison required an increase of correctionalofficers in secure blocks from one to two per shift, which required an addi-tional ten positions. In even more evidence of institutional breakdown, theGeneral Manager, without approval from senior central management andcontrary to the service delivery agreement, had stationed two officers ineach secure unit (Manager A, personal communication, July 4, 2001). Thispre-emptive action was an intuitive decision based on safety concerns forthe officers and prisoners, given the inexperience of both and the unitinfrastructure problems.

To regain control of the center, staffing levels at the prison wereamended from those that were tendered (QCSC internal memorandum,May 29, 1997c). The numbers and work types of staff were altered fromthe bid by replacing prison program staff with security staff (QCSC inter-nal memorandum, May 29, 1997). The Offender Development division(i.e., psychologists, teachers, etc.) was reduced by approximately 20 posi-tions, and Offender Management (i.e., custodial correctional and securityofficers) was increased by approximately that number. Also, experiencedcustodial staff were imported through transfers from other centers. Fol-lowing later industrial negotiations (QCSC internal memorandum, May29, 1997), Woodford staffing levels were increased through transferringexisting surplus employees from other public centers. The goal of avoidingthe transfer of the perceived inappropriate public sector culture to the newprison had become redundant (QCSC internal memorandum, May 22,1997).

The staffing structure change following the riot represents the clashbetween aspirational managerialist reform and the realities of commission-ing and operating the new prison. Apart from the obvious increases inoriginal operational costs in the successful tender, the philosophical under-pinning and proposed efficiencies and value-for-money approach of thebid were eroded seriously. In reducing offender development staff byapproximately 20% and increasing offender management officers by13.2%, the staffing ratios altered in favor of the confinement componentsof imprisonment rather than the therapeutic approach detailed in the



tender (QCSC, 1995c). One of the greatest impacts of reducing offenderdevelopment staff was on the structured day detailed in the tender. Logis-tically, the day as planned in the tender would not have been possible.

The increase in staffing establishment and the consequential operationalcost increases negated some efficiencies proposed in the public sectortender (QCSC internal memorandum, May 29, 1997). The reformistapproach of one officer per unit had been compromised with the inclusionof a second officer, although two officers remaining in the unit still was asubstantial improvement in unit management compared with other publicsector prisons at that time.

FACTORS FOUR AND FIVE: SPREAD OF PRISONER IDEOLOGIES THAT

MOTIVATE INSURRECTION AND JUSTIFICATION THAT THE

SOLUTION TO INACTION OR INAPPROPRIATE ACTIONS BY

MANAGEMENT AND OFFICERS IS TO RIOT

Prisoners are not known for their flexibility to, and acceptance of,change (Cressey, 1965; DiIulio, 1987). The new Woodford CorrectionalCentre required them to make substantial change not in minor areas but infundamental prison lifestyle issues (QCSC, 1994, 1998). Many of thesechanges challenged and threatened the traditional unspokenofficer–inmate norms. The final aggravation, which unified prisonersagainst the perceived illegitimacy of the new approach and steeled them torebel, involved cigarette smoking. The new center was the first air-condi-tioned correctional facility in the jurisdiction, and external senior manag-ers were determined that smoking was not appropriate as a workplacehealth and safety issue. Therefore, prisoners were not allowed to smokecigarettes. This decision was extraordinary, given the importance prisonersplace on cigarettes (Belcher et al., 2006; Sykes, 1958).

The QCSC Director-General was advised repeatedly by prison manage-ment and external agents, such as prison visitors, that the nonsmoking pol-icy was a major issue for prisoners (Manager A, personal communication,July 4, 2001). This advice was ignored initially. In a belated and ineffectualattempt to quell the building pressure, the Director-General visited thecenter to speak with senior prisoners about the nonsmoking policy. Duringthat conversation, these senior prisoners advised the Director-Generalthat if the rule were not changed, then the center would “burn” (ManagerA, personal communication, July 4, 2001). After this incident, and in rec-ognition of the internal pressure building at the new prison, the rule wasamended approximately 10 days before the riot. However, the nonsmok-ing rule proved to be the final incident that consolidated prisoners to riotagainst the perceived illegitimacy of the prison operations. Prisoner ten-sion had breached its threshold and could not be alleviatedretrospectively.



CONCLUSION

A combined model of the threshold and social revolution theories ofprison riots provides an ideal template to explain the transition from disil-lusionment to rebellion at Woodford Correctional Centre on April 1, 1997.The two overarching dimensions of the threshold theory (i.e., pathologicalprison administration and institutional breakdown) provide global dimen-sions more fully explained by the five-factored, state-centered theory(Boin and Rattray, 2004; Goldstone and Useem, 1999; Useem and Gold-stone, 2002; Useem and Kimball, 1989; Useem and Piehl, 2005). Bothapproaches highlight the detrimental influence of externally driven poorpolicy on prison administrators. In the Woodford Correctional Centre riot,the combined model establishes how external pressure bore down oninternal prison life, disaffected the main players, and led to an institutionalbreakdown and, ultimately, to a riot. The neat fit of this research into thegrowing body of prison riot theory (Goldstone and Useem, 1999; Useemand Goldstone, 2002; Useem and Kimball, 1989; Useem and Piehl, 2005;Useem et al., 1996) adds more evidence that the factors that determine aprison riot are consistent and often originate in poor external policy. Thecritical point for correctional policy makers when planning custodialreform is that ignoring these factors could be perilous.

The Woodford Correctional Centre riot adds a new dimension to theexternal factors of the state-centered and threshold theories of prison riotsby including privatization and commercialization to potential sources ofpolicy pressure. The Woodford Correctional Centre opened with a newhighly reformist, public-sector, custodial policy agenda. Immediately oncommissioning, management and officers, many of whom were inexperi-enced, were confronted by seasoned high-security prisoners in a new facil-ity that was filled to capacity too quickly. As a consequence of this intenseinternal pressure, the prison buckled.

In this research, the successful public-sector bid in an open-market testcreated an additional external pressure other than coping with theexpected stresses of commissioning a new prison. The rapid influx of pris-oners exceeded the ability of the prison to initiate the contracted reformand to meet the generalized expectations of a public-sector prison, that is,to ensure public safety by accommodating all prisoners.

From the moment the public sector was successful in the market test, itwas under scrutiny. Unsuccessful private-sector operators were skepticalof the validity of the tender process and publicly doubted the ability of thepublic sector to deliver its bid (Weller, 1998). Anything other than thepublic provider implementing its bid in its entirety would have beenadmitting failure, acknowledging that the public sector was incapable ofdelivering a custodial service with the same efficiency and effectiveness as



the private sector, and proving that the cynicism of the market was correct.The public sector had spent the previous 10 years reforming and reposi-tioning itself just for the opportunity that the Woodford Correctional Cen-tre tender provided. It was this external pressure from the private sectorand some senior central agency bureaucrats that made it highly unlikelythat QCSC head office management ever would have complied withprison management and officer requests to change some aspects of servicedelivery. As proposed in the threshold and state-centered theories, exter-nal pressure, in this instance, lead agency and market pressure on seniorhead office managers, was transferred to prison management and, ulti-mately, to the officers and prisoners.

Experienced corrections professionals know that part of commissioninga new prison is the “test” by prisoners of officers and infrastructure (Har-ding, 1997:123–127). At the Woodford Correctional Centre, the prisoners’“test” was facilitated by the four remaining factors of the state-centeredtheory of prison riots included under the institutional breakdown categoryof the threshold theory. That is, external demands converted into internalsituational pressures (Wortley, 2002). New and inexperienced officerswere confronted by situations they could not control, experienced prison-ers had new policies and procedures forced on them, and faulty infrastruc-ture and overstretched resources could not cope with the excessive fillrate. The net effect of these issues was to facilitate prisoner unease.Finally, as suggested in Goldstone and Useem’s (1999) fourth and fifthfactors, prisoner discontent became unified around the perceived illegiti-macy of the new conditions, in particular, the nonsmoking policy. The evi-dence of the impending riot and that prisoners were imbued to riot was insenior prisoners advising the Director-General that the center would“burn” unless a change was made. The prison did just that 10 days later.

Carrabine (2005) is correct in that each prison is unique. However,venue uniqueness does not imply that a consistent path cannot exist fromconceiving to actioning a riot. The Woodford Correctional Centre wasunique in many ways. For example, it was the first open-market test for aDCFM prison and the first success by a public-sector agency in open com-petition. The organizational approach was so reformist and innovative thatit required a new industrial agreement and a totally new infrastructuredesign. Nevertheless, as Useem and Reisig (1999) propose and as thisresearch supports, considerable similarities exist in the combination of fac-tors that caused the riot, and these factors have organizational and inmate-behavioral links.

An interesting but unanswerable question is as follows: Would the out-come have been the same if the contract had been won by the privatesector? Previous research shows that the private sector is not devoid ofmajor prison disturbances and riots (Harding, 2001). However, other



research (Harding, 1997, 2001) also indicates that it would be unlikely thata private prison would be required to cope with the same demands madeof the public sector at the Woodford Correctional Centre. Unlike the pub-lic sector, before yielding to any pressure, the commercial realities ofprofit margin would drive the private sector to require a contract variationto fund more resources (McDonald et al., 1998).

The willingness and enthusiasm the QCSC brought to the Woodfordmarket test reflect its commitment to organizational reform and servicedelivery improvement. To win, the QCSC needed to, and provided, aninnovative, but unrealistic, bid. The aspirational model did not consideradequately the realities of changing prisoner perceptions of social order oradministrative legitimacy (Sparks et al., 1996; Sykes, 1958). Furthermore,regardless of winning the market test, the Woodford Correctional Centreremained a public-sector agency vulnerable to market demands and pres-sures. These two pressures combined to cause the riot. At face value, itseems that the full liability for the failures rests with the central actors;however, this is not entirely so. A fundamental policy weakness was thatthe spiral down to the riot was allowed to occur unchecked through imma-ture or nonexistent regulatory and inspection processes.

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Richard Wortley is a professor and head of the School of Criminology and CriminalJustice at Griffith University. His major research interest is the impact of the immediateenvironment, including institutional environments, on criminal and corrupt behavior.He has published widely in the areas of crime prevention, corrections, and sexualoffending.



Documents

MARKET TESTING AND PRISON RIOTS: HOW PUBLIC-SECTOR COMMERCIALIZATION CONTRIBUTED TO A PRISON RIOT