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Market Enabling Network ArchitectureNSF FIND PI Meeting
Arlington, VAJune 27, 2007
John MusacchioAssistant ProfessorTechnology and Information ManagementUniversity of California, Santa [email protected]
Jean Walrand, Venkat Ananthram,Galina SchwartzEECSUniversity of California, Berkeley
Shyam ParekhAlcatel-Lucent
Shortcomings
Inconsistent Service Quality
Security
John Musacchio
Missing Markets
User with high willingness to payFor high rate, real time service.
ISPISP
Zzzz
Negative externality
John Musacchio
Approach
Ideal architecture:– Enable Markets
Service choice Security
– Flexible to allow innovation at the application layer– “Lightweight” – strongpoint of current Internet
Questions– What should be in the architecture?– What should not be in the architecture?
John Musacchio
Service Choice
Users offered real-time choice: “red” and “blue”– “Red” and “blue” not specified to users in detail
– ISP incentivized to improve along dimensions that matter
– Unlike ATM, IntServ, DiffServ, service definitions not standardized
John Musacchio
Service Choice: Issues
Coordination of service definitions
Getting ISPs to invest – No one wants to be first mover [1]– Quantifying value of differentiation [2]
Oligopoly pricing efficiency loss– Social welfare less than if social planner set prices– Studying effects of service choice on efficiency
loss [3]
John Musacchio
Net Neutrality: Issues
Would allowing 2 to charge A– encourage 2 to invest?– discourage A to invest?
What revenue sharing mechanisms should new Internet have?
Ongoing work: game model [4]
ISP 1ISP 1 ISP 2ISP 2
A
B
$
$
$
$ ???
John Musacchio
Content providerspay their ISP
Should A have to pay ISP 2?
Internet Today – Security Inadequacy
Users do not bear full cost of poor computer maintenance
Drivers do not bear full cost of reckless driving.
Liability insurance incentivizes drivers to be careful.
ANALOGY
John Musacchio
Zzzz
Markets for Security
Example:– Users pay to be certified by a Certification Agency (CA)
– CA takes on liability for attacks traced back to user
– CA incentivized to encourage users to take due care
$
Zzzz
John Musacchio
OS UpdateAntivirus Update
Markets for Security Possible incentives for users to go to CA
– Network drops discards uncertified packets in crisis.
– Adverse selection a problem Make insurance mandatory?
Architectural Requirements:– Improve traceability of attacks– Mechanism for dropping uncertified packets
John Musacchio
Conclusions
Internet is both– an engineered system– an economic system
We must consider engineering and economic issues jointly
John Musacchio
References + Work in Progress[1] J. Musacchio, S. Wu, “A Game Theoretic Model for Network Upgrade
Decisions,” Allerton Conference 2006.
[2] S. Ayani, J. Walrand, “Increasing Wireless Revenues with Service Differentiation,” in submission.
[3] J. Musacchio, S. Wu, “ The Price of Anarchy in a Network Pricing Game,” in submission.
[4] J. Musacchio, J. Walrand, “Economic Consequences of Weak Network Neutrality,” to appear at Asilomar 2007.
[5] P. Honeyman, G. Schwartz, “Interdependence of Reliability and Security,” Workshop on Economics of Information Security, CMU, June 2007.
