maritime security in a multipolar world - FIIAmaritime security in a multipolar world timo Behr, mika aaltola & erik Brattberg Fiia BrieFinG paper 130 • may 2013130 towards an eu

maritime security in a multipolar world

timo Behr, mika aaltola & erik Brattberg Fiia BrieFinG paper 130 • may 2013

130

towards an eu strateGy

For the maritime commons

• Recent yearshave seen a transformationof the globalmaritime security environment, drivenamong other things by the diffusion of maritime power, great power competition, the“territorialisation” of the seas, the rise of maritime non-state actors, changes in maritimegeography,andaracetoextractmaritimeresources.

• Inthischangingsecuritycontext,EuropeanaccessandinterestsintheglobalmaritimecommonscannolongerbeassuredbytheapplicationofUShegemonicpowerorthesoundnessofmultilateralregimes. Instead,theEUneedstodevelopanewproactivestrategyof itsownforsecuringthemaritimecommons.

• Thisstrategyshouldbebasedonensuringthe“securityofaccess”and“sustainablemanagement”oftheglobalmaritimecommons.Inparticular,theEUstrategyneedstofocusonsecuringsafepassage along its vital “sea lines of communication” (SLOCs), which are increasingly beingthreatenedbygreatpowerrivalries,territorialconflicts,areformulationofmaritimelawandtheproliferationofmaritimenon-stateactors.

• FailuretoformulateitsownstrategyandvisionforthemanagementofthemaritimecommonsmeansthattheEUwillbecomeincreasinglysidelinedindebatesoverthefuturegovernanceofthemaritimecommonsandmightfaceagrowingnumberofdisruptionsalongitsvitalSLOCsandwithinits“maritimemargins”.

maritime security in a multipolar world

Fiia Briefing paper 130

may 2013

towards an eu strateGy For the maritime commons

the Global security research programme

the Finnish institute of international affairs

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

mika aaltola

programme director


erik Brattberg

analyst

the swedish institute of international affairs

timo Behr

researcher


the Finnish institute oF international aFFairs 3

Introduction1

Europe’s future security is linked to the seas.Together, theEU’s27memberstatescommandacoastlineofover100,000kmthatcrossestwooceansandfourseas.MaritimeresourcesareanimportantsourceofenergyandnutritionforEurope’spopula-tion.Maritimeflows,representing90%oftheEU’sexternaltradeandover40%ofitsinternaltrade,arethelifebloodofEuropeantradeandcommerceandcrucial forEurope’sfutureeconomicwell-being.2AndEuropeanoverseasterritories,naviesandship-yardsremainpotentsymbolsandcrucialconduitsforEuropeanglobalpowerandinfluenceinanevermoreinterconnectedworld.

Sea-basedthreatsandopportunitiesarepivotalindetermining Europe’s future collective security.ImportantchallengestoEurope’sinternalsecurity–terrorism,organizedcrime,illegalmigration–allrequireamaritimeresponse.Mostexternalsecuritychallenges,includingstate-buildingandcrisisman-agementoperations,deterring rogueactors,pro-tectingcriticalmaritimeflowsandinfrastructure,or resolving territorial disputes and great powerrivalries,alsorequiresubstantialsea-basedpowerprojectioncapabilities.Theexploitationofseabedresources,theopeningofnewmaritimeshippingroutes,andthegrowingswayofmaritimenon-stateactors, all harbour unknown opportunities andchallengesanddemandanadjustmenttomaritimestrategy.

Inordertomeetthesechallengesandensurethesecurityandeconomicwell-beingofitspeople,theEUrequiresasecuritystrategythatlooksbeyondits immediatemaritimemarginsandtowardsthesecurityoftheglobalmaritimecommons.3WithUSglobalmaritimepowerindecline,maritimedisputesontherise,andinternationalmaritimelawbeingincreasinglytested,theEUcannolongertakethe

1 ThispaperdrawsontheEuropeanParliamentStudy“The

MaritimeDimensionofCDSP:GeostrategicMaritimeChal-

lengesandtheirImplicationsfortheEuropeanUnion”,EP/

EXPO/B/SEDE/FWC/2009-01/Lot6/21,January2013.

2 EMSA(2009),Quality Shipping, Safer Seas, Cleaner Oceans,

Luxembourg:EMSA.

3 Theconcept“maritimecommons”commonlyreferstoall

seaareaswithinwhichallnationshavefreedomofaccessand

actioninaccordancewithinternationallaw.

securityandopennessof themaritimecommonsasagiven.Norcanitresistongoingchangestothemaritimeenvironment.Instead,itneedstodevelopa maritime strategy that anticipates and shapeschangeintheglobalmaritimecommons.

DevelopinganEU strategy forensuring thesecu-rityandopennessoftheglobalmaritimecommonsisthereforenotsomuchamatterofchoiceandasignalofgrowingEuropeanambitions,butapre-requisite forsafeguardingEurope’svitalsea linesofcommunication(SLOCs)andensuringEurope’sownfutureasaglobalmaritimeactor.Thissuggeststhat maritime matters should take a prominentplaceintheongoingdiscussionsaboutarevisionoftheEuropeanSecurityStrategy(ESS)andpresenteffortstodrawupaEuropeanGlobalStrategy(EGS).ThispaperseekstosuggestsomeelementsofsuchastrategybysurveyingrecentchangestotheglobalmaritimecontextandexploringtheirconsequencesfortheEuropeanUnionasaninternationalsecurityactor.

Change factors

Recentyearshaveseenseveralradicalchangestothe internationalmaritime security environmentthathavebeentheresultofanumberofconcurrentandreinforcingglobaltrends.Thesegeo-political,environmental,legal,technologicalandevenphysi-calchangesarereshapingthenatureofthemaritimecommons.The result is a newmaritime securityenvironmentthatissimultaneouslymoreconnectedandmorecontested,inwhichdevelopmentsinfara-waymaritimeregionsreverberatearoundtheworld,andwherenationalrivalriesandresourcecompe-tition threaten to encroach on the internationalfreedomofnavigation.These“contestedcommons”arebeingconditionedbyanumberofchangefactorsrewritingtherulesofthegame.

Theglobaldiffusionofmaritimepowerasaresultofthe“riseoftherest”,aboveall,ischangingthegeostrategicmaritimebalance.Overthelastdecade,anumberofemergingandresurgentpowershaveinitiated a series of ambitious fleet building pro-grammes.Manyoftheseprogrammesareaimedatacquiringsea-basedpowerprojectioncapabilities.China,Russia,IndiaandBrazilareallintheprocessof developing their own carrier and amphibiouswarfarecapabilitiesthatwillenablethemtoproject


power beyond their territorial waters. Inevita-bly, neighbouring countries have responded bystrengtheningtheirownnavalforces,leadingtoaseriesofmajornavalbuild-ups.Atthesametime,thedevelopmentofnewanti-accessandarea-denial(A2/AD)capabilitieshasraisedquestionsoverthefutureviabilityoflargesurfacefleets,furtherblunt-ingtheconventionalsuperiorityoftheUSNavyandposingapotentlocalizedthreattothefreedomofnavigation.4

This“elegantdecline”ofWesternnavalpowerisnotachallengepersetotheglobalmaritimesecurityenvironment.5 On the contrary, if employed tostrengtheninternationalregimes,ithasthepoten-tialtoreinforcethesecurityandsafetyofinterna-tionalshipping.However,pairedwithgrowinggeo-politicalcompetitionintheAsia-PacificandIndianOceanregionsinparticular,theglobalshiftinmari-timepowerharbourssomepotentialforconflictandconfrontation;whetherintermsoflow-intensityconflictsandproxywarsbetweenmiddlingpowersor,lesslikely,greatpowerconfrontation.Byraisingthecostsofanyfuturemaritimeconfrontation,thediffusionofmaritimepoweraway fromtheWest,moreover,strengthenstheabilityofnewandrisingpowers tochallenge theexisting legalorderoverterritorialclaimsandexclusiveeconomiczones.

The“territorialisation”oftheseasappearstobeonepotentialconsequenceofthisdevelopment.Severalrisingpowershavedisplayedagrowingwillingnessto contest the existing limits of their territorialwaters and to regulate access to their exclusiveeconomic zones (EEZs). China, for example, hasmadeexpansiveclaimsintheSouthandEastChinaSeasandhassoughttoreinterpretinternationallawinordertodenyaccessofforeignmilitaryvesselstoitsEEZs.RussiahaslaidclaimtothecontrolofArcticSeaRoutesoutside itsownsovereignterri-tory.Turkeyhas threatenedtousenaval force tosupporttheimplausibleclaimsofNorthernCyprustoitsownEEZandtothreatengasexplorationsin

4 JamesR.Holmes,“U.S.ConfrontsanAnti-AccessWorld”,

The Diplomat,9March2012;RogerCliffetal.,Entering

the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Anti-access Strategies and the

Implications for the United States,SantaMonica:RAND,

2007.

5 RobertKaplan,“America’sElegantDecline”,The Atlantic,

1November2007.

theinternationally-recognizedCypriotEEZ.BrazilhasrejectedNATOinterferenceintheSouthAtlan-tic,whichitregardsasitsownstrategicbackyard.Duetothenatureofinternationallaw,theseclaimsmight leadtochanges incustomaryandregionallaw,allowingforagreaterregulationofnavigationthroughEEZs and ade facto territorialisation ofsomemaritimespaces.6

Thegeographyoftheseasisalsochanginginotherrespects.TheexpectedopeningofnewsearoutesacrosstheArctic,asaresultofclimatechange,islikelytoleadtoanadjustmentofglobalmaritimeflows as well as greater competition for Arctichalieutic and energy resources. New large-scaleinfrastructureprojects–includingtheexpansionofthePanamaCanal,theSino-Burmesepipelinepro-ject,andplansforacanalacrosstheKraaIsthmus–will leadtoadiversionofmaritimetrafficalongnewroutes.TheshalegasboomintheUnitedStatesandtheexpectedgrowthinLNGtrafficarechang-ingthepatternsofoiltradeandhaveraisedques-tionovertheUSwillingnesstocontinueguardingcriticalsealanes.WhiletheAtlanticislikelytoriseinimportanceasanenergysupplyrouteforEurope,IndiaandChinahaveseizedonreducedUSimportsfrom Latin America andWest Africa. Inevitably,thisredirectionofmaritimeflowsshiftsgeopoliti-calattentiontonewmaritimespaces,inparticulartheArctic,theIndianOcean,theSouthAtlanticandpotentiallytheCaribbean.

Growing commercial interest in the exploitationofmaritime resources is adding furtherpressureforinternationalcompetition,inparticularinthemorescantlyregulatedhighseasareas.Deep-seamining,longasailor’spipedream,isslowlycomingofageduetonewtechnologicaldevelopmentsandhighmetalprices.Competitionfortheextractionof polymetallic sulphides, cobalt-rich crusts andmanganesenodulesisfuellingafranticglobalraceamongstemergingeconomies.7RecentdiscoveriesofrichrareearthdepositsonthePacificseabed,inparticular,couldtriggeranewresourceraceandchallengeChina’srareearthmonopoly.However,

6 JonMVanDyke,“Thedisappearingrighttonavigational

freedomintheexclusiveeconomiczone”,Marine Policy29:2,

March2005.

7 PaulaParkandT.V.Padma,“Indiajoinsdeepseamining

race”,The Guardian,30August2012.


anyrushtodeveloptheextractionofthesemineralresources, regulated by the International SeabedAuthority,couldhavelastingenvironmentalconse-quencesifundertakenwithoutsufficientregulationandoversight.

Atthesametime,deepsea-miningisalsoaneffec-tivemeansofaccessingandmonitoringdisputedandstrategicwatersandassuchshouldbeseeninconjunctionwiththe increasingterritorialisationoftheseas.8ItisthereforenosurprisethatChina,India, Japan and SouthKorea are all locked in afrantic race to explore and extract the mineralresourcesoftheIndianOcean,SouthChinaSeaandEastChinaSea.TheyhaveallnowstakedclaimstovastareasforexploitationintheIndianOceanthatharbourthepotentialforfurtherpoliticisationandcompetition.Competitionfordwindlinghalieuticresources and the advent of large illegal fishingfleets,manyofthemChinese,havefurtheradded

8 Stratfor(2012),“Deep-SeaMiningasaPoliticalTool”,

2August2012.

tothemaritimeresourceracecurrentlyunderway.Illegal,unreportedandunregulated(IUU)fishingbyChinesefleetshasreachedcriticalproportionsespeciallyinWestAfrica,withestimatessuggestingthatChinaonlyreports9%ofitsannualcatch.Inthe Asia-Pacific, IUU incidents commonly sparksecuritystand-offsandpoliticalcrises,asrecentlybetweenthePhilippinesandTaiwan.9

Finally,statesandmultinationalenterprisesarenolongertheonlyactorswithinthediverseandcon-testedmaritimeenvironment.Thegrowingdensityandimportanceofmaritimeflowshasalsoencour-agedthegrowthofillegalmaritimenon-stateactors,suchaspirates,terroristsandcriminalsyndicates.Theseactorscancreateinternationalbottlenecksbylimitingthefreedomofnavigationinill-controlledareasandbyleachingontoexistingmaritimeflows.Statefailure,inparticulararoundtheHornofAfricaandWestAfrica,hasenabledillegalactorstogrow

9 RolandBlomeyeretal.,“TheRoleofChinainWorld

Fisheries”,EuropeanParliamentStudy,June2012.

Choke point European military assets

Pirate activity Major SLOC Minor SLOC

Figure 1: europe’s sea lines of communication


anddisruptinternationalcommerce.Inresponse,the use of private maritime security companies(PMSCs)hasbeenontherise.Therapidgrowthofprivatesecurityactorshasaddedfurthercomplexitytothesituation,asflagstatepoliciesconcerningtheuseofarmedguardsvary.10AlthoughPMSCshaveagreatpotential,theirregulationisnecessaryandrequiresacommonEuropeanresponse.

Together, thesechangesmake foran increasinglycomplex and contested international maritimestructure.Theexponentiallygreaternumberofstateandnon-statesecurityactorsincreasesuncertaintyandthepotentialforconfrontation.Newandrisingpowersarechallengingtheexistingrulesofthegameandpressingforaterritorialisationoftheseasandarevisionofexistingmaritimelegalnorms.Greatercompetitionforhalieuticandmineralresourcesarefuellingcompetitionanddegradethemarineenvi-ronment.Inordertoensureitsmaritimeinterestsinanincreasinglyfragmentedandcompetitivepost-Americanworld,theEUneedstodevelopitsownstrategyforsecuringtheglobalmaritimecommons.AnysuchstrategyneedstobebasedonaclearvisionoftheEU’smaritimeinterestsandthemainthreatstothoseinterestsposedbyachangingworld.

Maritime Interests

Due to itspositionasaglobal tradingpowerandits co-dependence on the maritime ecosystem,theEU’smain security interests in themaritimecommonsare:security of accessandsustainable management.11

Given the structure of today’s global politicaleconomy,Europeancountriesareevermoretightlyintegratedintoacomplexglobalsupplyandproduc-tionchainthatreliestoagreatextentonsea-basedtransportandtechnologies.Althoughintra-Euro-peantradestillrepresentsthelion’sshareofEuro-peaneconomicexchange,EUtradewiththerestoftheworld–andparticularlywithAsia–issteadilyincreasing.Moreover,thesupplyofenergyandrawmaterialsfromtheglobalmarketplacehasbecome

10 OceansBeyondPiracy,“AnIntroductiontoPrivateMaritime

SecurityCompanies”,http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/

11 GeraldStang(2013),“GlobalCommons:Betweencoopera-

tionandcompetition”,ISSEUBrief17,April2013.

vitalforthefunctioningoftheEuropeaneconomy.ThismakessecurityofaccesstotheglobalcommonsavitalstrategicinterestfortheEU.

MostofthesevitalmaritimeflowstraveltoEuropealong a limited number of highly congested andeasytodisruptsealinesofcommunication(SLOCs):Asoutherncorridor,connectingtheMediterraneanwiththeGulfofSuez,theRedSeaandtheGulfofAden,whereitbranchesoutintoconnectionswithEast Asia and the Arabian Gulf; an eastern cor-ridor, stretching from the East and South ChinaSeas through theMalacca Straits into the IndianOcean,whereitconnectswithothertrafficboundforEurope;andawesterncorridor,castingawidearcover theAtlantic toconnectEuropewith theAmericas.Inthefuture,theopeningofanortherncorridor,runningalongtheRussianArcticcoastandthrough theBeringStraits into thePacific,couldsignificantlycut transport timeandcosts toAsiaand takeonsimilargeo-strategic significance forEurope.12

MaintainingopenanduninterruptedaccesstoallfouroftheseSLOCsisvitalnotonlyforEuropeantradeandcommerce,butalsofortheprojectionofEuropeanpower.Whilesecurepassagealongtheseroutescanbeconsideredasharedglobal interest,thesouthern,easternandnortherncorridorsaredotted with strategic choke points, such as theMalaccaStraits,theBab-el-Mandeb,andtheStraitofHormuz,whichcaneasilybeblockedbystateandnon-stateactors.Onlythewesternroute,acrosstheAtlantic,remainsrelativelyinvulnerabletodisrup-tions,butalsomoredifficulttocontrolandpolice.Themere potential for disruptions along variousstrategicchokepointsmakes them lightning rodsof geo-strategic attention and encourages localfriction and global power competitionover theircontrol–ashasbeenthecaseinpreviouscenturies.Italsoprovideslittoralcountrieswithconsiderableleveragetoextractpoliticalandeconomicrents.

AssuringtheopennessandsecurityofitsSLOCsanddeterringanyattemptatexploitingstrategicchoke-points along these routes to extract economicorpoliticalrentsremainsavitalinterestforEuropean

12 HarriMikkola&JuhaKäpylä(2013),“ArcticEconomicPo-

tential:TheNeedforADe-HypedPerspective”,FIIABrief-

ingPaper127.


security.Europealsorequiresopenaccesstotheseroutestomaintaintheabilitytoprojectpower,bothinitsneighbourhoodandfarawayregions,aswellasinordertoprotectitsoverseasterritoriesfrompotentialaggressors.Europe’sabilitytoexploitthehalieuticandmineralresourcesoftheHighSeas,aswellasitsabilitytoprotectcriticalinfrastructureprojects, such as oil platforms, submarine com-munication cables, and offshore wind farms, isdependentonitssecureandassuredaccesstotheglobalmaritimecommonsfortheforeseeablefuture.

ButEuropeaninterestsintheglobalmaritimecom-mons go beyond security of access questions. Inordertoescapethe“tragedyofthecommons”,theEuropeanUnionalsohasaclearinterestinensuringthesustainablemanagementofcommonmaritimespaces. The overexploitation and unsustainablemanagementofmaritimeresourceshaveatendencytodirectlyaffecttheEUintoday’sinterconnectedworld.Pollution,overfishingandecologicaldisas-tershavedireconsequencesfor littoralcountries,butcanalsohaveglobalconsequences,duetotheirimpactonthemaritimeecosystem.Moreover,localmismanagementcanhavesignificantpoliticalspill-overeffectsby,forexample,encouragingthegrowthof illegalmaritime activities or fuelling resourcecompetition and regional crises.Thus, there hasbeen some evidence that overfishing around theHornofAfricainteractsinacomplexwaywiththepiracychallengeoffthecoastofSomalia.13

Sustainablemanagementandcontroloftheglobalmaritime commons is also important to preventtheirexploitationbyillegalmaritimeactors.Pirates,terroristsandcrimesyndicatesareable to thriveinthelawlessanduncontrolledspacesoftheseasaroundtheHornofAfricaandtheGulfofGuineaandcanfunctionasrefugesfromwhichtheseactorscanprojectpowerontoland.Finally,maritimesecurityandsafetystandardsandenvironmentalregulationsallrequireacommonglobalframeworktoensuretheirglobalapplication.Forthesevariousreasons,theEUhasavitalsecurityinterestinensuringthesustainablemanagementoftheseas.

13 StigJarleHansen,“DebunkingthePiracyMyth:HowIllegal

FishingReallyInteractswithPiracyinEastAfrica”,RUSI

Journal,156:6,December2012.

Inthepast,theEUcouldrelyonacombinationofarule-basedinternationalsystemandthethreatofAmericannavalpowertodeteranychallengetothe“securityofaccess”andmaintainaguaranteedlevelof“sustainablemanagement”.Whileinternationalrulesandcommonlyacceptedstandardsprotectedtheglobalmaritimecommonsfromtheworstcasesofoverexploitationandmismanagement,Americanpowerdeterredanythreattothefreedomofnaviga-tion,ortheabuseofstrategicchokepointstoextractpoliticalandeconomicrents.However,withintheevolvingglobalmaritimecontext,newthreatshaveemerged,whiletheabilityofoldtoolstomanagethesethreatshasdecreasedconsiderablysincetheUS-dominatedColdWarandpost-ColdWarera.

Emerging threats

In thenewmaritime context, characterizedby aproliferationofactors,adiffusionofpower,andaweakeningofglobalregimes,severalnewchallengestosecurityofaccessandsustainablemanagementhaveemerged.

Whiletheinternationaldiffusionofmaritimepowerdoes not necessarily represent a direct threat toEuropeansecurity,itharboursthepotentialforawider international confrontation; in particularbetweenemergingpowers and theUnitedStates.While it appears unlikely that any such confron-tationwill turn into a “hot conflict”, there is apotentialriskthatgreatpowercompetitionbetweentheUSandChinamightescalateintoanincipient“maritimecoldwar”intheIndianOceanandPacificregions. As China develops its blue water ambi-tionsandcapabilities,theUSisseekingtocontainChinesespaceforactionbycreatingcountervailingalliances.14Unlessproperlymanaged,thiscompeti-tionwillinevitablycreatefrictionandmistrustthatcouldthrottleanddisruptinternationalmaritimeflowsalongEurope’ssouthernandeasternmaritimecorridors.

Although a direct confrontation between theUSand China appears unlikely, growing competi-tive dynamicsmight encourage clashes between

14 MichaelT.Klare(2013),“TheUnitedStatesHeadstothe

SouthChinaSea:WhyAmericanInvolvementWillMean

MoreFriction-NotLess”,Foreign Affairs,February2013.


middlingpowers,proxywars, and low-intensityconflicts.With both China and theUS vying forallies, there is also a potential for brinkmanshipbehaviourbyregionalactors,suchasNorthKorea,eagertobolstertheirownlegitimacyorterritorialclaims.Similarly,thegreatpowersmightattempttouseproxiesinordertochangethestrategicbal-ance in contested regions,while avoiding directconfrontation.Clashesamongstrisingpowersoverterritorialboundariesandtheexploitationofmari-time resources also remain a realistic possibility.ExpansiveterritorialclaimsbyChinaandothersarefuellingthiscompetitivetrend.Theseconflictshavethepotentialofdrawinginawiderangeofexternalactors,includingtheEU.Theyalsocomplicatevitalinternationalcooperationoverthemanagementofmaritimeresources.

FailedandcollapsingstatesintheEU’sneighbour-hood,particularly in thewiderMiddleEast, alsopose a formidable challenge to Europe’s SLOCs.While there has been a visible trend away fromthecostlystatebuildingexercisesofthe1990sand2000s,statefailureandcivilwarswillcontinuetorequireEU andNATO intervention.Thesewill benecessarynotonlyforhumanitarianreasons,butalso to prevent the creation of lawless zones ontheEU’smaritimeborders andSLOCs that couldbeexploitedbyterrorists,piratesandotherillegalnon-stateactors.

The example of Somalia has shown the potentialof land-based instability toradiateoutwardsanddisruptmaritime flows.With theUS lesswillingtomanagetheseconflicts,partoftheburdenwillinevitablyfallontheEU.AlthoughtheEUhasmain-tainedarelativelyrobustcounter-piracymissioninthe region,OperationNAVFOR Atalanta, there isstillaneedforgreaterEuropeansea-basedpowerprojectioncapabilitiesthatareabletosupportbothaerial and landoperations,witnessedduring the2011Libyaintervention,aswellastheabilitytocon-trolandpolicevastungovernedmaritimespaces.Atthesametime,transatlanticcooperationonmari-timesecurityissueswillcontinuetobecrucialandshouldbefurtherexplored.

Regardless of Europe’s ability andwillingness tomustertheseresources,piratesandothernon-stateactorswillcontinuetoposeapalatablerisktothefreedomofnavigationwithintheforeseeablefuture.Piracyremainsaconsiderablethreat tomaritime

tradeinvariousregions,includingtheGulfofAden,theStraitofMalaccaandtheGulfofGuinea.15Piracyhasalsoprovedtobeaglobalandadaptablephe-nomenoninrecentyearsthathassoughttoexploitweaknessesintheinternationalsecurityarchitec-turewherevertheyarise.Thismeansthatlocalizedactionoftendoesnotsufficetoaddressthewiderchallenge,aspirateactivitiesshiftinlinewithinter-nationalattention.Non-stateandrogueactorshavealsobeenempoweredbytheavailabilityofA2/ADtechnologies.Actors,likeHezbollah,haveacquiredtheabilitytotargetanddisruptinternationalcom-merceandchallengeconventionalmaritimeforces,while Iran’s threat to theHormuzStraithasonlyincreased.16

Sustainablemanagementchallengeshavealsobeenexacerbatedbythenewinternationalcontext.Today,climate change, pollution, overfishing and theunsustainableexploitationofresourcesinotherpartsoftheworld’soceansdirectlyimpingeonthemari-timeneighbourhoodoftheEuropeanUnion.Thus,overfishingintheAsiaPacificregionhasledtoanuptakeofIUUactivitiesintheAtlanticandeventheMediterranean.TheopeningoftheArcticcorridorsandtheunregulatedexploitationofArcticresources–bothmineralandhalieutic–coulddirectlyaffectthe fish stocks and biodiversity of Europe’s ownmaritimeneighbourhood.Thenascentresourceracefortheexploitationofdeep-seamineralresourcesandanuptakeinbioprospectingcouldalsohavealastingimpactontheglobalmaritimeenvironmentwithsignificantconsequencesfortheEU.

Finally, the evolution of international maritimelaw,intheformoftheUNConventionontheLawoftheSeas(UNCLOS),willtoaconsiderableextentbeshapedbytheactionsofemergingpowersintheAsia-Pacificregion.Thesenewactorsarticulateafundamentallydifferentinterpretationofinterna-tionalmaritimelaw.IncontrasttoEurope,risingpowerstendtoemphasizenationalsovereigntyandthehistoricalnatureof claims in their territorialdisputes.While it can reasonably be argued thattheEUhasnointerestininterferinginterritorial

15 Hans-GeorgEhrhart(2013),“MaritimeSecurityandPiracy

asChallengesfortheEU”,EU-AsiaDialogue.

16 W.JonathanRue(2011),“Iran’sNavyThreatenstheSecurity

ofthePersianGulf:Tehran’sNewPlantoDominateitsRegion

-andBeyond”,Foreign Affairs,October2011.


disputesintheAsia-Pacificregion,thesedisputesarestartingtoshapecustomaryinternationallawandposeachallengetotheEU’sowninterpretationofmaritimelaw,emphasizingopennessandcollec-tivegovernance.17

Insum,theevolvingmaritimesecuritycontexthar-boursanumberofnewandunfamiliarchallengesfortheEU.Greatpowerrivalry,proxyconflicts,lawlessmaritimezones,empoweredrogueactors,abud-dingresourcerace,andfragileinternationalregimesthreatentounderminethesecurityofaccessandsustainable management of the global maritimecommons.Maritimesecuritychallengesarealsoofanincreasinglyglobalizednature,requiringactionat a systemic level just as international securitycooperation isdeclining.While it isnotyetclearwhetherthesedevelopmentswillleadtoanerosionofmaritimesecurity,systemicchangehasbecomeunavoidable.Whetherthiswillleadtomoreconflictorcooperationandwhetheritwillemphasizeglobalor regional solutions will determine the overallnatureoftheglobalmaritimecommons.

Overall,itseemsplausibletodistinguishbetweenfour differentmaritime governance scenarios forthefutureinthisregard:i)aglobal governancesce-nariothatwouldseeastrengtheningofmultilateral

17 JonathanHolslag(2012),“Crowded,ConnectedandContest-

ed:SecurityandPeaceintheEurasianSeaandwhatitmeans

forEurope”,Asia-EuropeCentre,2012.

frameworksandproblemsolvingmechanisms;ii)amaritime blocks scenario inwhich inter-stateconflicts and great power rivalrywill dominate;iii)aregional governancescenariothatwouldseegreater friction, but alsomore effective regionalgovernance; and iv) a contested commons sce-nario,wheremaritimepowerwillbehighlydilutedbetweenstateandnon-stateactorsandtherewillbenohegemonicor institutionalordering logic.18Ultimately, these scenarios ought to provide thebackdropforthefuturedevelopmentofEUcapabili-tiesandstrategies.

EU maritime strategy

ThecoreelementsoftheEU’sstrategyformaritimesecurity thus far include the European SecurityStrategy(2003)anditssubsequentimplementationreport(2008),theCommissioncommunicationonanIntegratedMaritimePolicy(2007),andtheCoun-cilconclusionsconcerningmaritimesecurity(2010).TheEuropeanSecurityStrategy(ESS)isremarkablysilentonmaritimeissues.Theonlyreferencetothetopicisinregardtoorganizedcrime,butevenhereit fails to provide specific details about how theEUshouldrespondtothischallenge.Severalotherchallenges and threats listed in theESS couldbeinterpretedasrelatedtomaritimesecurity,butnosuchconnectionisexplicitlymadebythedocument.

Incontrast,theImplementationReportontheESScontainsawholeseparateparagraphdevotedexclu-sivelytopiracy.Thereportstatesthatpiracyistheresultofstatefailureandpointsoutthedependenceoftheworldeconomyonmaritimetrade.Itspecifi-callynotesthepiracyactivitiesintheIndianOceanandtheGulfofAdenandpointstotheEU’strackrecordinrespondingtothesethreats.Inaseparatesection, the document also notes that “climatechangecanalsoleadtodisputesovertraderoutes,maritimezonesandresourcespreviouslyinaccessi-ble”.Writtenin2003and2008respectively,anothermajorshortcomingofbothdocumentsisthatnei-therofthemtakesintoaccounttheSolidarityClauseorthemutualassistanceclauseoftheLisbonTreaty.

18 TimoBehr,MikaAaltola,ErikBrattbergetal.(2013), “The

MaritimeDimensionofCDSP:GeostrategicMaritimeChal-

lengesandtheirImplicationsfortheEuropeanUnion”,

EuropeanParliament.

Contested commons

Maritime Blocks

Regional governance

Global governance

Conflict

Cooperation

Bila

tera

l

Mu

ltila

tera

l

Figure 2: Future maritime governance scenarios


Another landmark policy document guiding EUaction in themaritime realm is the CommissioncommunicationonanIntegratedMaritimePolicy(2007), which proposed an Integrated MaritimePolicy (IMP) for theUnion.19Thecommunicationstatedtwooverallobjectives.First,toworktowardsanintegratedmaritimepolicyfortheEUand,sec-ond,tofosteraknowledgeandinnovationbaseforthemaritimepolicy.Accompanyingthecommuni-cationwasanactionplanfortheimplementationoftheseefforts.Theactionplanmentionsanumberofdifferentprojects, includingaEuropeannetworkformaritimesurveillance–currentlyintheprocessof being implemented (e.g.MARSUR). AlthoughpotentiallyusefulfortheimplementationoftheESS,the IMP,whichwas completedbefore theLisbonTreaty,doesnothaveaspecificfocusonsecurity.

Furthermore,inaCounciloftheEuropeanUnionmeetingwiththeEUforeignaffairsministerson26April2010,briefconclusionsconcerningmaritimesecuritywereadopted.ThisstatementstressedtheneedfortheEUtotakeanactiveroleinpromotingglobalmaritimesecuritybyaddressingthetypeofthreatsidentifiedintheEuropeanSecurityStrategy.AkeydeliverableenvisionedbythestatementwastocallontheHighRepresentativetoworktogetherwith the Commission and themember states toexploreapossible“SecurityStrategyfortheglobalmaritimedomain,includingthepossibleestablish-ment of a Task Force”within the context of theCFSP/CSDPandwithintheframeworkoftheESS–somethingthathasyettomaterialize.EventhoughtheEuropeanCouncilinitsconclusionsonmaritimesecurity strategy in 2010 noted that a “SecurityStrategy for theglobalmaritimedomain” shouldbeexplored,nospecificmaritimesecuritystrategyhasbeenputforwardasyet,despitesomerecurrentoutsidecallsforsuchastrategy.20

Finally,inlightofthegrowingstrategicimportanceoftheHornofAfricatotheEU,on14November2011theEuropeanCounciladoptedastrategicframeworkfor theHorn ofAfrica calling for amultisectoralEUstrategy,encompassingfiveareasofEUaction:

19 EuropeanCommission(2007),AnIntegratedMaritimePolicy

fortheEuropeanUnion,COM(2007)575final.

20 BasilGermond(2011),“TheEU’ssecurityandthesea:defin-

ingamaritimesecuritystrategy”,European Security,Vol.20,

No.4,December2011,pp.563-584.

i)buildingrobustandaccountablepoliticalstruc-tures;ii)contributingtoconflictresolutionandpre-vention;iii)mitigatingsecuritythreatsemanatingfromtheregion;iv)promotingeconomicgrowth;andv)supportingregionaleconomiccooperation.21

Regardingmaritimesecurity,thestrategicframe-work notes the economic costs associated withpiracyoffthecoastofSomalia.ItfurtherassertsthattheEUwillworktocounterpiracythroughseekingtoenhancelocalandregionalcapacitytofightpiracy(includingmaritimecapacitiesandprosecutionanddetentioncapacities)andbettertrackfinancialflowsfrompiracy.Thestrategy,however,leavesittotheEU’sSpecialRepresentative(EUSR)fortheHornofAfricatodevelop“acoherent,effectiveandbalancedEUapproachtopiracy,encompassingallstrandsofEUaction”.Ingeneral,thestrategicframeworkfortheHornofAfricacanbesaid tobeapartof theUnion’s attempt to take amore ‘comprehensiveapproach’ to crises by integrating security anddevelopment/humanitarianassistancecomponentsunderoneoverarchingpolicyagendafortheregion.

While the EU has therefore developed certainincipientelementsofamaritimesecuritystrategy,theseremainnarrow,fragmentedandinsufficientlydeveloped.Moreover,EUmaritimepolicyremainsbyandlargefocusedontheEU’smaritimeneigh-bourhood,neglecting thegrowing importanceofmaritimeconflictsintheglobalcommonsandalongitssealinesofcommunication.InordertoguaranteetheEU’scoremaritimesecurityinterestswithinthechanging internationalcontext, theEUwillneedto develop a more comprehensive and strategicapproachwithaparticularfocusontheimportanceoftheglobalmaritimecommonsforEUsecurity.

Elements of strategy

Facedwithaquicklytransforminggeostrategiccon-textandanuncertainmaritimefuture,whatkindofstrategyforthesecurityoftheglobalmaritimecommons should the European Union adopt? Inordertoensuresecureandopenaccessforitsmari-timeflowsandencouragesustainablemanagementoftheglobalmaritimecommons,wesuggestthat

21 CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,Councilconclusionsonthe

HornofAfrica,16858/11,14November2011.


aEuropeanmaritimesecuritystrategyneedstobebasedonthefollowingcriteria.

First,andaboveall,itwillneedtobeglobal.WhileitistruethatEurope’s“maritimemargins”aregeo-strategically themost relevantmaritime areas fortheEU,developments in theglobalmaritimecom-monsandmaritimedisputesinAsiaandbeyondwillincreasingly impactEU security–bothbyshapingtheevolvinglegalcontextandthroughtheirimpacton the overall security environment. As a result,theEUhasavitalstakeintheiroutcomeandshouldencourageglobalmultilateralsolutionswheneverandwhereverpossible.Thatrequiresbothaglobalpolicyandaglobalpresence.Withoutthatpresence,theEUwillquicklyfinditselffrozenoutofrelevantdiscus-sionsand its ability to shape futuredevelopmentswillinevitablydissipate.Inparticular,theEUshouldconsiderwaysofincreasingitspresenceintheIndianOceanandtheArcticbymakingfulluseoftheover-seasbasesandterritoriesofEUmemberstatesand,ifnecessary,negotiatingadditionalbasingrights.

Second,theEUmaritimestrategyshouldbeproac-tive in that itaims tomould theemergingglobalgovernance context by putting forward its ownvisionofmaritimegovernance.Whilethere isnodenying that the protagonists in the changingsecuritycontextaretheemergingpowers,theEUshoulddoitsutmosttowintheseactorsovertoitsownvision.Todoso,theEUneedstobecomemoreassertive in opposing the rising sovereignist tideindealingwith territorial conflictsandexclusiveeconomiczones.ThisrequiresabalancingactinitscontactwithemergingpowerssuchasChinaandRussia.WhiletheEUoughttoshowsomewilling-nesstoaccommodatetheirconcernsbyengagingin more intensive maritime dialogues, it shouldunambiguouslyopposeanyattempttoundermineorreformulatefundamentalUNCLOSprinciplesandtheirapplication.

Third,theEUrequiresacomprehensivemaritimestrategythatreliesonthefullspectrumofitsexter-nalpolicies.ThisrequirescreatingfurthersynergiesbetweentheEU’sIntegratedMaritimePolicy(IMP),itsvarioussea-basinstrategies,aswellasallaspectsofCSDPpolicies.Foracomprehensiveapproachtowork, itmust combine surveillance, prevention,internationallegislation,coast-guardtrainingandcapabilitybuilding,anddevelopmentsupport.TheEU’s development of a “critical maritime route

programme”isan importantcontribution inthisregard,asarevariousotherEUactivitiesseekingtobuildregionalmaritimecapacities inkeyregions.However,furtheractioncouldbetakentoencour-agemaritimesecuritysectorreforminunstableandcontestedregionsandtoencouragetheconstructionofregionalgovernancesystems.MilitarydiplomacybyEUmemberstatescanalsoplayavital role inpromotingtheEU’smaritimevision,byconductingcommonexerciseswiththirdpartiesandincreasingthenumberofflagvisitsincriticalregions.

Finally,inanincreasinglyuncertainmaritimeenvi-ronment,theEUrequiresarobuststrategy,abletodealwiththefullspectrumofemergingmaritimethreats.This means that EU member states willneedtoprovidenavalcapabilitiesthatareabletotake on an increasingly broad catalogue of tasks.Thesewillrangefromprotectionoftheseasthroughmonitoringandsafetyoperations,tosecuringtheseasthroughcounter-piracyoranti-immigrationoperations,aswellastheabilitytoprojectpoweron land and to potentially faraway regions.Thisrequiresmodern,multipurposeplatformsthatareabletoremainatseaforextendedperiodsoftimeandareinteroperablewitheachotherandpotentialthirdparties.Inthefaceofdecliningdefencebudg-ets,theonlywayofprovidingthesecapabilitiesandmaintainingacredibledeterrentisthroughgreaterpooling and sharing amongstEUmember states.Moreover,thepotentialforacquiringcertain“com-monuse”assets,suchasdrones,surveillancesatel-litesorhospitalandanti-pollutionships,shouldbetakenseriouslyinthelongrun.


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