Journal of Economic Psychology S (19X4) 13% IS7

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139

MARITAL RELATIONSHIPS AND PURCHASING DEClSIOiVS - TO BUY OR NOT TO BUY, THAT IS THE QUESTION *

Wolfgang WAGNER, Erich KIRCHLER and Hermann BRANDSTATTER

Received July 29. 19X3; accepted February 6. 1984

Most purchasing decisions are not made by single individuals but by a group of pcoplc: interacting within II social setting, organizational units in business. governmcntul councils. or families. Converse et al. (1958) describe the family as the “most important business conference”. Paraphrasing Samuelson (1956: 8 f.), the fundamental unit in a theory

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of consumption is the family. Although the appropriate focus of studying consumer behavior should be the family. contemporary economists usually depict the consumer as individual decision maker. Ruhfus (1976). however. stresses the shortcomings of the approach where the private household is treated as a fictive individual (cf. Davis 1976; Kassarjian 1982; Jenkins 1980: Wiswede 1973). He characterizes the family as a multipersonal social system with complex patterns of interaction between the family members. A decision process within such a setting departs considerably from what could be regarded a rational evaluation of utilities and values involved. Moreover, social emotionaf processes, which are widely prevalent in families. as well as social role taking, will affect household decision making to a great extent (Scanzoni 1979; Kelley 1983). The family is a group with common experiences, relatively fixed patterns of behavior, cohesion and solidarity, hatred and envy, knowledge of the others’ desires. and. most importantly, the need for furture cooperation (Morgan 1961). Most research on household decision making focuses on different stages in the purchasing process of durabtes and other consumer goods and services (March and Simon 1958; Ferber 1971: 49). whereby it is assumed that the family as a whole demands a given commodity (Davis 1976). Little attention has been paid to the purchasing decision process of commodities desired by only one member of the family. We assume that the partner’s agreement or disagreement and the resulting interac- tion will considerably influence the buying decisions of family members regarding goods or services which are relevant only for one. The interested party, thus. will not only have to consider information regarding utilities, but also social costs resulting from egoistic decisions. “A member making an autonomous buying decision is likely to take into consideration specific requests and preferences of other members” (Sheth 1974: 26). It can be assumed that the impact af social costs will be reflected in the individual’s feelings of wellbeing in purchase deci- sion situ~itions.

The present study investigates how husband and wife cope with agreement versus disagreement in allocating the family budget. HOW does the wife’s agreement or disagreement affect the husband’s purchas- ing decisions when he desires a definitely male-specific product’? And vice versa: How does the husband’s opinion affect the wifes purchasing decision for a female-specific product. 9 In such a situation personal satisfaction with the outcome of his or her decision should result from a

combined effect of the attractivity of the commodity. the amount of expenditure, and of the partner’s agreement.

This interaction structure has something in common with Kelley and Thibaut’s (1978) conceptualization of personal relationships and inter- dependence analysis. There are two players. to use the language of game theory. wife and husband, each disposing of two behavior alterna- tives. In the case of a male-specific product the husband might buy or not buy, while the wife may agree or disagree, defining a 2 x 2 matrix. The same applies to female-specific products. where the wife is the potential consumer. In the following we will refer to the potential consumer as the active spouse - active as buyer - whereas the agreeing or disagreeing partner will be referred to as passive spouse. Both partners are interdependent in the sense that the active person’s deci- sion to buy or not to buy affects the wellbeing of the passive partner depending on their concordance. The same is true for the active spouse.

Kelley and Thibaut (1978) define three control concepts applicable to such a setting: (a) Bilateral reflexive control. the option of each partner to control his or her wellbeing by his or her own decision to buy. independent of the partnor’s behavior, (b) mutual fate control, rcflscting the influence of one’s partner’s behavior upon one’s wcllhc- ing, irrespective of one’s own choices. and (c) mutual behavior control, which deals with the “quantity” of wellbeing a person can gain if he or she acts concordantly or discordantly to his or her partner’s behavior. However. applying this approach to our present problem requires some precaution.

Kellcy and Thibaut analyse matrices with symmetrical behavior alternatives for both partners, say. both possess the same behavior alternatives. In the present problem, however, we have an asymmetrical setting: The active partner with his or her options to buy or not to buy

BUYb lhxa no1 huy

Paswe partner

Agrees

Actor partner

BU>S

01’

Disagrees A0 Sore: The lower left scores in each cell are the outcome wves for the pasive partner. the upper

right-hand scores in each cell are the outcomes for the active partner.

is always combined with a passive partner. whose alternatives are

agreement versus disagreement. Further, in their model Kelley and

Thibaut define the situations 2 and 3 (table I) as interpersonal conflict.

In the present study only situation 3 describes a conflict between the

spouses, where a buying decision is combined with the other’s disagrcc-

ment. Situation 2, where the active person dccidcs not to buy although

the partner agrees hardly characterizes a conflict situation. An analysis

different from Kelley and Thibaut’s suggestion for behavior control.

therefore. is appropriate. The new behavior control score was derived

by contrasting situation 3 to situations 1, 2. and 4.

Supposing the model of economic man (principle of rationality.

outcome maximization, and market transparency), the person desiring a

commodity gains most satisfaction if he or she buys, irrespective of any

objections by the partner i.e., he or she is completely under his or her

own reflexive control. Basically, the model of economic man does not

suggest any consideration of intrafamily interaction (table 2).

A social-psychological approach to the family interaction process,

besides product utility, should include the following dctsrminants of

the active spouse’s behavior control:

( 1) Contrihufiotz of ecot~o~~zic r(‘soww.s. Research on the detcrmi nants

of family decisions consistently suggests ;1 close relationship between

economic contribution and assigned authority. Blood and Wolfe (1960),

in their relative resource contribution theory, contend that income and

education determine relative power differences within the family. Hecr

(1965). in his least interested partner hypothesis, focuses more on the

importance attached to resources outside the household and not so much on the evaluation of resources by the family members themselves. Granbois (1962) shows joint and equal participation in the decision making process to be more likely, if both partners contribute resources comparable in value. Lupri (1969) shows that the autonomy of the wife increases when she is employed and earns money outside the family (Ruhfus 1976; Lee 1979; Chafe 1972). (2) Generd aurhoriry. In a correlational study on power and authority in the family, Wolfe presents evidence that the “spouse who is the dominant authority figure in the home, is generally most apt to handle the family money and bills” (1959: 116 f.). Authority of the wife, besides being active in a job outside the home, is higly correlated with low family income, a higher age of the wife. a low need for love and affection, and low marital satisfaction on the part of the wife. Although these correlational results are not conclusive with regard to the direc- tion of causality between the variables. the evidence, however, is indicative of a complex web of interdependences which have to be considered in determining the authority and interdependence pattern within families. (3) Pro&~ inool~enrent. Another finding is that the degree to which a product will be used by one of the spouses will give the rcspectivc person more weight in the decision (Granbois 1962). (4) Gender rolc~s. Gender roles are a determinant, which wilt be heavily confounded with other factors (Eagly 1978; Maccoby and Jacklin 1974). e.g. contribution to rcsourccs. Neverthclcss the role assignment of the husband as head of the household cannot be disregarded as a factor per se, at least in our still largely patriarchal societies. However, as Komarovsky (1961) points out, social class has a modifying influence upon gender role dominance, with the autonomy of the wife being more pronounced in the lower and upper class families. but tess so in the middle class. Another modifying variable is the family life cycle (Ruhfus 1976: 117). (5) Not to be disregarded is the specific history of the family, as reflected in murilul scirisjucrion. A mutually satisfactory family life, obviously, is a prerequisite for joint participation in consumer dcci- sions, unlike an atmosphere of distrust, envy, and hatred. Paraphrasing Safilios-Rothschild (1969: 7ff), the relative degree to which one spouse loves the other is the most crucial variable in explaining parental power structure (cf. Gray-Little and Burks 1983).

The present experiment was designed to assess the impact of some of these factors upon the wellbeing in purchasing decisions of one of the family members. We formulated hypotheses explicitly only for gender role. product value. and authority: (1.1) The wife3 weilbeing depends Iess thin the h~bund’s wef~be~ng on product utility, gitten that the partner objects to the purchase. This “reflexive” control score. conditional on partner objection, reflects, if positive. the higher evaluation of the product utility as opposed to the costs to the relationship. A negative score indicates that the product’s utility does not outweigh the expected costs to the marriage.

It conforms to traditional family roles that the wife’s contribution to the family budget is less than the man’s Therefore the wife is supposed to feel less free in spending money on an egoistic purchase. Moreover, since women are generally more partner-oriented than men, who are task-oriented, the product becomes less important for women if its purchase conflicts with the partner’s opinion, (1.2) This goes in pclrticukir for families dominated by the ~~li.s~~~~~~i~. The more dominant the husband. the less concern he will show for his wife’s wellbeing, and the more the product will gain in importance. (2.1 f The wife *s weiiheiq will depend more tharr the hushund‘?; wcllheing

on being in accord nith the pcvtner, ~Jrcn she or he decides for or qaiml the purchase of N comrnodily useful on!Y for hetxclf or himel/: ?-lx dependent variable is the redefined score of behavior control, contrast- ing situation 3 with situations I, 2, and 4.

In a married couple, satisfaction with the outcome of ;tn individual decision to buy or not to buy is partly determined by the c~~rnrn~~dity’s utility and partly by the expected effects of the decision on the marital relationship (social benefits and costs), According to gender roles. the costs of conflict should be higher for the wife than for the husband; that is, interpersonal relations figure as a prominent source of wellbeing for the woman, but less for the man (Eagiy 1978; Ickes 1981). (2.2) This /utter ussunrptiorr is expected to prooe uccurute especially in

rhe case of expensiue ~o~~lodi[ies, and

(2.3) in furnilies wirh u propounded do~iin~l~~~e of ihe husbmd. (3) Wellbeing in the cuse of conflict will he positiue!v relured wilh mule dominunce for rhe uctioe husband und negutiuely correluted with mule

donrintmce for the active wife. Whoever is dominant in a relationship is less apt to be influenced by the less dominant partner’s opinion in the case of conflict. This hypothesis refers to situation 3 only (table I).

Hir,qnrr ef al. / Mur~rul relurronshrps md purchusrng drctsrons 145

(4) Concordance of mutual appraisal of the situations one through four will be higher for happy marriages than for unhappy relationships. Happy marriages should be characterized by a shared concern for the other’s wishes, feelings and opinions. Therefore. the sources of wellbeing of the active and passive partner will be more similar in satisfactory than in emotionally disturbed marriages.

Method

Subjects

Ninety-five households in the city of Linz (Austria) were randomly selected and asked to participate in a scientific investigation. Of these, 70 agreed to cooperate and subsequently were approached by student interviewers. Data from 23 households had to be discarded, because of missing answers or incomplete scoring. The remaining 47 households were randomly assigned to two experimental conditions. with inexpen- sivc and expensive products, respcctivcly.

The instructions informed the subjects that the data were used for a scientific investigation only. No names appmui on the papers to

xssurc con~pldc imonymity.

The interviewer asscsscd the following social indicators: (a) Number of rooms in the home. excluding kitchen, bathroom etc., (b) number of children in the family, (c) years of marriage, (d) age of wife and husband. (e) educational Icvel attained by both partners, (f) employ- ment status of each, and (g) in the case that both earned money, who contributed more to the family budget.

Subsequently the subjects had to fiII out two parts of a questionnaire, each consisting of four questions. While doing so they had no eye contact with each other to ensure privacy. Part one of the questionnaire for the husband read: “Imagine you want to buy a desirable product, costing 500 Austrian Shillings (about US $27). e.g. a videogame. a ticket for a sporting event, or a tennis bag. You really would like to possess this commodity. It’s not very expensive. However, for your wife this product is not attractive at all. Moreover, she thinks the money

could be spent otherwise or be saved. Try to imagine the different situations below as vividly as possible and indicate how well you would feel in each of the situations’*_ The following text specified four differ- ent situations: The husband buying or not buying the product was contrasted with the wife agreeing or disagreeing with the purchase. These read as follows:

11) “Imagine you want to buy this inexpensive product. but your wife disagrees. After a short discussion, however. she agrees to the purchase. Subsequently you visit the shop and buy this product. Would you feel. . . ‘..

The scale nteasuring wellbeing ranged from - 10 (feeling very bad) through + 10 (feeling very good).

The three other situations read as follows:

(2) ” Imagine . . . After a short discussion, however, she agrees to the purchase. You consider the purchase once more and finally don’t buy this product”.

(3) “Imagine., . After a short discussion she still opposes the purchase. Nevcrthclcss you visit the shop and buy this product”.

(4) ‘* I magi nc . . . After ;I short discussion she still opposes the purchase. You consiclcr the pllKhilSC 0lICC ntorc and finally you don’t buy this product”.

The first part of the husband questionnaire was formulated activcty, with the husband buying a mate-specific product. The second part was worded passively, with the husband agreeing to or opposing a purchase of his wife. It rend as follows:

“Imagine your wife wants to buy a desirable product for herself. costing about 500 Austrian Shillings (e.g. a pcrfunte or 3 hilt). She really would like to possess this commodity. It’s not very expensive. For you, however. this product is not attractive at all. Moreover you think that the money could be spent otherwise or he saved. Try to imagine the different situations described below as vividly as possible and indicate how well you would feel in each of the situations”.

(1) “Imagine your wife wants to buy this inexpensive product. but you disagree. After a short discussion. however, you agree to the purctx~sc. Your wife visits the shop and buys this product. Would you feel . . . “.

(2) “Imagine.. .After a short discussion. however, you agree with the purchase. Your wife considers the purchase once more and finally does not buy this product”.

(3) ‘*Imagine.. . After a short discussion you still oppose the purchase. Nevertheless your wife visits the shop and buys this product”.

(4) “Imagine.. .After a short discussion you still oppose the purchase. Your wife considers the purchase once more and finally she does not buy this product”.

Each of the descriptions was followed by ;1 scale of wellbeing as shown

before. The female-specific version of the two questionnaire parts was con-

structed in an analogous way. Twenty-three of the households received ;1 version referring to art inexpensive product (AS 500). the other 24 received ;I version with an expensive product (AS 5000). Additionally the subjects rated their overall mnrriage satisfaction on ;I 7-point KuIliII-fr~ce-scale, as wefl as their impression of who dominated the ~~~~~tsel~~~l~~ on ;I S-point scale. After c~~t~~p~e~i~~~~ of the qitc~ti(~t~t~~tire the subjects were Uloroughly dchriefcd.

The houschc~ld was used as the unit of analysis. tlcsitlcs the expcrimcn- tally varied faclor (a) product value (incxpcnsivc versus cxpcnsivc). three ;I posteriori factors were in1roduccd: (b) Marriage satisfaction (low versus high), (c) sitiglc (hush;tnd only) versus douhic income (i~i~sh;~tid plus wife), (cl) rclativz dominance of spouses (fctiiaic

dominated and cg;tlit;tri:tn versus tnalc dominated marriages). Marriage satisfaction had been asscsscd by asking for the wifc:‘s and the husband’s impression scp;tr;ltely. The two scores were ;Lver;tgcd and fhe resulting scores dich~~t~)ti~i~ed at the median. Also, the relative d~)tlliti~tnce of the spouses had been measured separately. They were averaged and di- chotomized at the median to yield factor (d). Since our s;tmpIe -- as was to bc expected - contained only few couples who agreed on the dominance of the wife, the resulting factor was somewhat asymmetric. The lower scores mainly contained not definitely female-dominated homes, but egalitarian relationships. TRe higher scores clearly sub- sumed n~~tte-dotiiitl~tted families. The rcsuiting design was a 2 x 2 x 2 x

2 X 2 mixed between-within-units factorial. including sex of the active spouse as within-unit factor.

To test hypotheses (1.1) and (1.2) a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was computed with repeated measures on the factor sex. The dependent was the difference between the scores of wellbeing of the active partner between situations 3 and 4 (table 1). Thus. a positive score meant that buying provides more satisfaction than refraining from buying. despite the partner’s objection. whereas a negative score indicated the opposite. The main effect of hypothesis (1.1) was not significant (F(1, 31) = 2.26. p = 0.14). al h t ough men showed somewhat more satisfaction with buy- ing ( M = - 1.17) than did women ( AI = - 3.04). However. taken to-

RU

.l

A

I' cl .50 (22)

, I

I

I

,’ I

l -• WIFE

gether. both sexes tended to gain significantly less satisfaction from buying than from not buying, when the partner disagrees (total mean (M = -2.11) difference from zero t(46) = 2.53, p G 0.01, two-tailed test).

The interaction sex by relative dominance (hypothesis (1.2)) turned out as predicted (fig. 1). In a male-dominated family husbands were more controlled by the product’s utility than were wives, while no such difference appeared in egalitarian or female-dominated marriages ( F( 1.

31) = 3.94, p = 0.06). For hypotheses (2.1). (2.2). and (2.3). the dependent variable was

defined as follows: The respective behavior control score (BC) derived from contrasting situation 3 with situations 1. 2. and 4 (table 1)

BC = ((Situation 1 + Situation 2 + Situation 4)/3 - Situation 3).

“Situation i” refers to the score of wellbeing of the active partner. The higher the BC-score. the more the active partner conforms to his or her partner’s agreement or disagreement with his or her decision to buy.

1Iypothesis (2.1) was not supported by the data. Wives generally wcrc not mart’ behavior controlled than husbands ( F( 1, 31) = 2.32, H..s.). Also, bshavior control was not modified by product value ( F< 1.0). IIypothtAs (2.2) had to be rejected.

I’hc expcctcd interaction relative ciominancc by sex of family mcm- bcr (hypothesis (2.3)) was significant ( I’( 1, 31) = 4.76, p < 0.05). Table 3 shows the data pattern. Wives in nialc-dominatscl families clearly conform more to their husband’s opinion. than do husbands on the other hand ([(Zl) = 2.36. p < 0.05). No such diffcrencc exists for egali- tarian or fzniatc-Joniinatccf Ii~~lrri;~g~s.

f fowevcr, hypothesis (2.3) must be qualified with regard to marriage

Wife 3.45 (25) .‘.h 5.68 (72) *

f lushand ‘I.00 (5) * i.X2(22)h

Nure: The higher Ihe scores. the more beh;wior controlled by [hc spouse. The numhcrs in

p;ucnOwws indic;lte cdl frcqusncics. Means with different superscrip(s arc significmdy diffwenl.

satisfaction. as a significant interaction sex by relative dominance by marriage satisfaction indicates ( F( 1. 31) = 4.09, p =G 0.05). Fig. 2 depicts the tremendous differential impact of this factor upon wife’s and husband’s behavior control. Surprisingly. the expected wife-husband difference in behavior control can be found only in satisfying relation- ships and only for male-dominated couples (r(l1) = 4.38, p G 0.001).

Hypothesis (3) predicted a positive linear relationship between the active husband’s wellbeing and his dominance in the case of conflict. A negative linear rel~~tionship was expected for the wife‘s wellbeing. As

BC

10

8

6

4

2

(12) 9.86

0 l -. WIFE

n-----o HUSBAND

EGALITARIAN MALE-

MARRIAGE DOMINATED

MARRIAGE

HIGH

f’kRR I AGE SATISFACTION

EGALITARIAN MALE-

MARRIAGE DOMINATED

MARRIAGE

LOW

MARRIAGE

SATISFACTION

H’upwr et al. / Murttal relutronshrps and purchuwq decrsrons 151

expected. the husband’s wellbeing correlated positively with relative dominance (high dominance equals male dominance. low dominance equals wife dominance; r = 0.33. N = 47, p < 0.01). whereas the wife’s wellbeing did not correlate with dominance (r = -0.03. n.s.). The wife’s wellbeing in this case has been correlated with her scoring of dominance. her husband’s wellbeing has been correlated with his per- ception of who dominated the family. The average score was not used for this calculation. The result supports hypothesis (3) only for men. It points to crucial differences in male-female strategies for coping with dominance in interpersonal conflict.

Hypothesis (4) was tested by calculating an index of correspondence ( IC). according to Kelley and Thibaut’s (1978) suggestion:

The variances .v,: ,,,,, and s&, were calculated for each interdependence matrix within the family. The index varies from - 1 through + 1, with

IC 4

.4 -

.2

0.0 -

-.2 -

(24)

.32

ifx-;E%; SFACT 1 ON

,16 ‘*‘\. n-----n Low

(28) .‘=\\ ‘.

‘. ‘.

‘. -.

b

-,I8 (20) I

I

EGALITARIAN MALE-

MARRIAGE DOMINATELJ

MARRIAGE

positive scores indicrltin g high correspondence of situational appraisal.

and negative scores indicating conflicting appraisaf. so that \vhere one

partner feels well in a given situation. the other feels worse and vice

versa.

Within each household two indices could be defined. one for the

active husband/passive wife matrix, the other for the active wife/pas-

sive husband matrix. The resulting indices were subjected to ;\ 2 X 2 x 2

x 2 x 2 ANOVA with sex as repeated measures factor. The predicted

main effect for marriage satisfaction was significant (Ff 1. 31) = 4.25,

p 6 0.05). In a satisfying ref~ltionship correspondence was higher (M =

0.24) than in dissatisfying marriages ( M = 0.02). Here, again. a signifi-

cant a posteriori interaction marriage satisfaction by relative dominance

qualified the main effect (F(1, 31) = 5.35. p < 0.05: fig. 3). The hy-

pothesis holds only for male-domirllltrci families ( f( 1, 31) = 9.86. p <

0.005). but not for egalitarian and f~m~lfe-dominated housefwfcls.

‘I’hc rcsufts sflowcd that mcll in ;l rn;llc-d~llilin;ltcd family iIW controffcd

more by tfic utility of a dcsircd procfuct tflan arc ~v01w1~. despite tflc

opposition of tficir partners. ‘l’fic rcsufts also sfiowccf tfic assertion that

tvivcs arc more ~fepcndcnt on their hushand’s approval when tflcy arc

pf~inning ;t purchase, tflcn arc mw to hc true only umfcr ccrtzin

conditictns. I‘flc rtspcctivc fiypothais flacf to bc quafifietf with rcspccl

t{J the rcfativr: cfominance of spouses in the rcfati~>nship interacting with

m:\rri;lgc: satisfacticjn. Tfw cxpcctecf fligfwr dcpcncfc~~cy of WOIIICII than

ol’ nicn on tficir partner’s agt-ccmcnt holds only for happy, mifc- cloriiiriatccf mtrriagcs. In 110 singft: cftmin;~ncc concfition with an un-

happy niarrkrgc, nor in egalitarian or fcnl;tfe-cfonlir~;ltcd happy mar-

riagcs coufcf this effect hc ohscrvccf. Tfiis is ;I crucial fincfiny pointing to

serious flaws in the implicit picture of a typical household guiding our

reasoning, wficn we stated the fiypothescs. We set out from ;t happy and

niorc or fess mnfc-donninatcd marriage. where u’e cspcctccl tflc wife’s

depcncl~ncc to occur. Howcvcr, as sflo\vn by the Jatk thcrc illI! numcr-

011s structurally diffcrcnt forms of marriage relationships hesiclcs the

stera:otypic:if “soap opera-coupfc’:“. Lvidtfy ncglcctccl in scientific litcril-

turd. :\;lcmbcrs of thcst: other forms obviously execute different forms

of mutual influence and interdependence than does a happy family

headed by a patriarch. It is not far-fetched to reason that an unhappy marriage gives rise to

mutual emotional detachment resulting in less interdependence of both spouses, as indicated in fig. 2. Under these circumstances wife and husband experience an equal degree of dependence upon the partner. which is higher in egalitarian than in male dominated marriages ( I( 19) = 2.79. p < 0.01. two-tailed). A similar intermediate degree of both spouses’ mutual dependence as in unhappy egalitarian families was found in happy egalitarian marriages. which is not surprising. This equality of sexes in behavior control changes dramatically in happy marriages, given that the husband acquires a mutually acknowledged dominant position. Then the wife submits herself fully under her husband’s will.

A similar pattern is revealed by the relative utility scores of the product. Remember that relative utility here was defined as the relative degree of wellbeing which can be guincd by buying versus not buying the desired product. if the partner objects to the purchase. Thus, a positive score indicates that wcllbcing through buying - the product’s utility - is higher than the pcrccivcd costs for the m:lrriage. A negative

score. on the other hand. indicates that utility Jots not outweigh the

cxpcctcd social costs. The domin;mt husband clearly valued lhc product more than his spouse’s will. In all other conditions the rcvcrsc was true. This finding is in accord with social psychologists’ notion llial all decisions in a social setting involve social costs and that rcspcctivc consiclcrations of the family mcmbcrs must bc taken into account. if family purchasing decisions are to be fully understood. Neither is it surprising that emotional and dominance characteristics of the family play ;I prominent part in modifying the respective outcomes. Despite the fact that many economists investigating family consumer behavior stress the importance of intra-family interaction as a determinant of buying decisions (e.g. Ruhfus 1976). analyses using a rational economic man model still prevail. One of the reasons is that “no overall theories or well-defined concepts” (Davis 1976: 241) exist lo guide scientific research in the area of family matters. We encountered this problem when we formulated the present hypotheses. The luck of theoretical approaches to the field of close relationships and family consumer behavior misled us to consider only the stereotypic fairy tale family.

which. in fact, was the type of family in which our predictions were

confirnitxi.

Well-defined theories of family functioning would also be an im- portant prerequisite to understand the role of recent social and histori- cal changes in family structure and their impact upon consumer behav- ior. Our data revealed major differences in families which might be called emancipated. that is. families with an egalitarian, or if you like, autonomous and syncratic relationship (Wolfe 1959). as well as wife- dominated homes. However. the present sample did not contain enough cases of clearly female-dominated marriages to shed any light on this type. Egalitarian marriages in the present investigation showed equality of the partners” mutual dependence and consideration of the other’s wishes in deciding for or against an egoistic purchase. However, whether the clear dependence of the wife in husband-dominated families will be mirrored in a reverse dependence of the husband in definitely wife- dominated homes, remains an open question. Literature on the impact of social changes like the developing women’s lib movement on family structure and role-taking to date does not provide a straightforw~~rd answer (cf. Frieze et al. 1978).

There is a suggestion in the results, that female dominance may differ basically from male dominance. In hyp~~thesis (3) we expected husbands to feel better, the more they dominated the marriage, when they purchase a commodity despite their wife’s objection. The same tendency was expected for women that is, feeling better, the more they dominated the family in case of conflict. The expected linear relution- ship appeared as a significant positive correlation of male dominance with husband’s wellbeing in the conflict situation 3 (table l), but the correlation was not signific~lntly negative for women. This fin~iin~ implies a somewhat differing strategy of women as compared with men. in coping with conflict. While men care less about the costs to their partner’s wellbeing in conflict, if they dominate, the analogous tcnd- ency did not appear for wives. With wives it is not the dominance dimension that affects their wellbeing in conflict, but marriage satisfac- tion. There was a significant negative correlation of the wife’s wellbeing in conflict with her rating of marriage satisfaction (table 4). When buying an egoistic product opposed by her husband, the wife feels better, the less satisfying the relationship. The better the relationship, the less she risks conflict with her husband. We consider this finding as indicating basically different strategies of women in executing power and authority within relationships.

In his 1980 review, Jenkins cites two theories, which attempt to

explain dominance and power in families. The well-known resource contribution theory states that the family member contributing most to the family budget will dominate purchase decisions. The “least inter- ested partner-theory” states that the family member contributing more in the eyes of the outside world will take the dominant position. Both theories imply that the mutually acknowledged dominant partner will be defined by objective attributes, such as income, social position. education, etc. However, there was no indication in the present data that either participation of the wife in resource contribution. or wife and husband educational level determined the dominance status of the spouses. The respective partial and standardized regression weights in a path model were negligible. Although. of course, this finding is not a conclusive proof, it weakens in some sense the argument that economic factors are the major determinants of intra-familial reward and coer- cion power. The respective research really should include emotional as well as interactional determinants of family decision making. In the present study at least women’s behavior in purchasing decision conflicts can be explained better by social emotional characteristics of the marriage as determinants of women’s referent power (French and Raven 1959).

Finally we may conclude that the family is a highly sophistic~ltc~~ rational-emotional decision maker, involved in a contplcx process of mutual optimization of purchasing dcsircs of both, wife and husband. This process dcpcnds greatly on social-psychological parameters such as rclativc dominance of spouses and marriage satisfaction. Morcovcr, wife and husband sccni to employ different strntcgies for influencing the partner, granting freedom, and imposing coercion.

Tahlc 4

Correlation coefficients wellhcing of active prlner with rclativc dominance of spouses and

marri;rge satisfnction as ratcd by the rrspcctive spouse in cell 3.

Wcllheing of Dominance Marriage satkfnction

Active hushand 0.33 u - 0.05

Active wife - 0.03 - 0.32 a

N’otr: N = 47. The higher the score of wcllhciny. the hcttcr the feeling. the higher the dominance

scores. the more malt-dominatcxI. the higher s;~tisfx%on scores, the more wtisfying the marriage.

’ p < 0.01.

156 W’u_qwr et ul. / Mumal relutronshrps and purchussrnp dewtons

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