Marine Forces Reserve Operational History

Global War on Terror(2004 – 2007)

byColonel David T. Watters, USMCR

Intheperiodcoveredbythisbook,ReserveMarinesembarkedonanincreasinglycomplexanddangerousseriesofmissions.Whileindividualsaugmentedcommandsaroundtheglobe,entireReservebattalionsandsquadronsfoughtalongsidetheiractivecomponentcounterpartsagainstanadaptivelyeffectiveenemyinIraqandAfghanistan.DecadesmaypassbeforetheMarineCorpsproducesacomplete,accurateaccount of the first significant era inourfutureTotalForceconstruct;however,thisvolumeprovidesacompelling first look at how Reserve unitsandpersonnelwereeffectivelytransformedintoanOperationalReservecapableofsustained

warfighting contributions.

AsCommander,IamextremelypleasedtoreportthatMarine

Reservistscontinuetorespondatasustainedrategreater

andlongerthananyonewould

havepredicted.Assignedtonotablychallengingenvironments,theseCitizenMarines

consistentlydemonstrated

a flexibility, adaptability,and

maturitythatallowedthemtosucceedacrossthe

fullspectrumofkinetictonon-kineticoperations.

InIraq,theperiodfrom2004to2007wasunique.Ashit-and-runguerrillatacticsandimprovisedexplosivedevicesbegantakinganincreasingly

Forwardby the

Commander, Marine Forces Reserve

�

heavytollonAmericanlives,MarinesintheAnbarProvincewereprimetargetsforinsurgentsandforeignfighters infiltrating along the cities that straddledtheEuphratesRiver.Astheonce-ambiguousconceptofaGlobalWaronTerrortransitionedslowlyinto“TheLongWar,”manyopponentsoftheAmericanefforthopedthetideofbattlewasslippingawayfromtheCoalitionthathadtoppledSaddamHussein.ItwasatthistimethataMarine-ledforcefoughtthedecisivebattleinFallujah.ManypeopleviewthesecondbattleforFallujahassettingthestageforaremarkabletransformation, first in the Anbar Provinceandtheninmuchoftherestof Iraq. Throughout this magnificent effort,Reservesstoodshoulder-to-shoulderwithactivecomponentMarines.ThisbookgivesmanyofouryoungMarinestheopportunitytodescribeindividualbattlesinIraqandAfghanistanfromtheirperspective.Thesenarrativesarecompellingintherichdetailthattheyprovide.

ServingasCommander,MarineForcesReserveduringthisdemandingperiodhasbeenanawe-inspiring,motivatingpersonalexperience.IwillneverforgetthemanyMarines

andSailorswhomadetheultimatesacrifice. Such complete dedication andrawcourageenabledCoalitionForcestoachieveremarkableresults.OurmenandwomenhavemadeextraordinarycontributionstotheGlobalWaronTerror,andthereputationoftheMarineCorpsReservehasbeenforeverenhancedbytheiractions.

SemperFidelis,JackBergmanLieutenantGeneralUnitedStatesMarineCorpsReserve

�

�

ThisbookrepresentsanefforttocapturetheessenceofMarineReservecombatactivitiesfrom2004to2007.WhileeachchapterisdiscretewithrespecttothetypeofReserveunit,thephaseofthewar,andthegeographicregion,theycollectivelypaintapictureofaReservethat,whencalledtoactionintheGlobalWaronTerror,wasreadyandrelevant.

Asauthor,itwasmyprivilegetointerviewmorethan300Marinesandsailorsforthisbook.Toaperson,eachexhibitedthestoicattitudeof,“Iwasjustdoingmyjob.”Butwhenthismeantstrappingonbodyarmor,strugglingagainstheatorcold,andfacinganadaptiveand ruthless enemy, “just doing a job” was a significant accomplishment.

Manywereluckytobealive.TwoCobrapilotswalkedawayfromanemergencylandingafteramissiledestroyedtheirhelicopter’senginesduringacombatmissionoverFallujah. One corporal faced withering fire from inside the HadithaHospitalashealternatedbetweenamachinegunand an M-16 rifle to turn the tide of an IED-initiated ambush.AsshownbyhisSilverStarcitation,hisactionssavedfellowMarines.

WhileAmericafrequentlyhonorsthosewhowerekilledorwoundedincombat,myinterviewswereaconstantreminderthatallwhoservedinAfghanistanorIraqfaceddangerintheireverydaylives.Operationsinextremeenvironmentscreatehazardsthataremoredangerousthancombat.WhileIraq’sheatwasaconstantthreat,Afghanistan’sthinmountainairforcedoneCH-53pilottobouncehisaircrafttoasafelandingoffoftherunwaywhenitsrotorbladessimplyranoutoflift.Demonstratingitscommitmenttohistory,theMarineCorpshasamassedanextensivecollectionoforalinterviewsduringtheGlobalWaronTerror.ThesethousandsofindividualimpressionsprovideavividmosaicoftheMarineCorps’responseto21stCenturyTerrorism.Startedwithindaysofthe2001terroristattacksonAmerica,theoralhistorycollectionhasgrowntothousandsofinterviews,withmorebeingarchived every day. Interviews with senior officers, like Gen.JamesConwayorMaj.Gen.DouglasO’Dell,provideabroadoverviewoftheaccomplishmentsoftheMarineCorpsanditsReserve.ButitisthenumerousinterviewswithMarinesofallranksandspecialtiesthatprovidegrippingdetailsofthedailyroutineofwar.Forexample,onesergeantwhodidtwotoursinFallujahdescribedthe

stenchofdeathinthaticoniccityafterOperationAlFajrin November, 2004. Another noncommissioned officer told ofdaytimetemperaturesthatweresohighthatheraviationordnanceteamswouldgetblisterswhileloadingbombs,bullets, and missiles. As difficult and painful as it was, she said,theseMarinesknewthattheircomradesonthegroundwerelookingtothemforsupport,andtheylearnedtoreloadanaircraftinminutes.

ManyMarinesdescribedthepainoflosingafellowMarine.OneinfantrysquadleadertoldhowherushedtothesiteofanattackinFallujahafterhearingthedistinctcrack of two shots from an AK-47 rifle, then helped loadtwowoundedMarinessotheycouldbecarriedtoanearbymilitaryhospital.Inavoicethatwasheavywithemotion,hedescribedthegut-wrenchingsenseoffutilitythatenvelopedhimwhenhelearnedthatoneofthemhadsubsequentlydiedonanoperatingtable.

Todate,onlyafewoftheseinterviewshavebeenprocessedforreleasetothepublic.Thosewhoareinterestedinmilitaryhistory,particularlyMarineCorpshistory, should be confident that the Marine Corps has fulfilled its obligation to preserve, in real time, the stories ofitsheroicyoungmenandwomenwhoservedonthefrontlinesoftheGlobalWaronTerror.Induetime,thesestorieswillbeavailabletoallwhowanttolistentothem.

I cannot sufficiently thank the Marines who provided mewiththisinformation.Formany,tellingcertaincombatstoriesexposedemotionalwoundsthattheystruggledtosuppress.MarinesofallranksweptopenlywhendescribingwhathadhappenedtotheirMarines.Whileitwasaspainfulasrippingbandagesfromfreshwounds,theyfeltcompelledtosufferthatburdeninordertohonorthelivesanddeathsoftheirfriends.Byrelatingthestoriesofthosewho,byluckorfate,wereunabletoreturnorwerescarredon the battlefield, these Marines have lived up to the warrior’scodeofhonoringtheircomrades.

ThisbookisdedicatedtothoseMarinesandSailorswhoservedtheircountryandMarineForcesReserveduringthischallengingperiod.TheMarineCorps’ReservefunctionedcapablyandhonorablyduringtheearlyyearsoftheGlobalWaronTerror.Whilethefullstorywillnotbetoldforsomeyears,thisgenerationofMarines,bothactivedutyandReserve,hasearnedaproudplaceinMarineCorpshistory.

DavidWattersColonel,USMCR

Preface

Table of ContentsFOREWORD

PREFACE

I.SettingtheStage................................................................................................................

MarinesReturntoIraqin2004....................................................................................

TheAnbarProvince.....................................................................................................

II.ReserveContributionstotheGlobalWaronTerror.........................................................

1.4thMarineDivisionUnitsinIraq............................................................................

A.3rdBattalion,24thMarines....................................................................... B.2ndBattalion,24thMarines....................................................................... C.1stBattalion,23rdMarines........................................................................ D.3rdBattalion,25thMarines....................................................................... E.1stBattalion,25thMarines........................................................................ F.1stBattalion,24thMarines......................................................................... G.14thMarines...............................................................................................

2.4thMarineAircraftWing.........................................................................................

InIraq: A.HMLA-775................................................................................................. B.HMM-764andHMM-774.......................................................................... C.VMGR-452................................................................................................. D.VMFA-112................................................................................................. E.VMFA-142..................................................................................................

InAfghanistan:

A.HMH-769................................................................................................... B.HMLA-773.................................................................................................

3.4thMarineLogisticsGroup.....................................................................................

III.TheLastJourney.............................................................................................................

GlossaryofTermsandAbbreviations...................................................................................Endnotes...............................................................................................................................

6

6

10

11

11

13162028404855

59

6167707274

7982

85

93

105106

�

Setting the Stage:Marines Return to Iraq in 2004

Eighteenmonthsafterthe2001terroristattacksonthePentagonandWorldTradeCenter,UnitedStates-ledactionsinAfghanistanandIraqseemedtohavedefeatedtheforcesthathadpanickedmuchoftheworld.

Inthoseheadydaysinearly2003,AmericaandtheUnitedStatesCentralCommandclaimedresoundingvictoriesovertheTalibaninAfghanistanandSaddamHussein’sforcesinIraq.High-techcommunicationsandprecision-guided firepower had provided the means for quickstrikesthatsurprisedandimpressedmuchoftheworld.ButenemiesinAfghanistan,Iraq,andotherpartsoftheworldprovedtobeelusive,cunninganddetermined.SomewerelinkedbytiestoAlQaeda,butmanysimplysharedaloathingofAmericaorthewest.Otherswerecriminalswhosawopportunityamidthechaosofwar.

Whatevertheirmotive,theirpersistenceandresilienceforcedplannersandpolicy-makerstochangeAmerica’sexpectations,recastingtheGlobalWaronTerrorisminto“TheLongWar.”

ForaneconomicgiantliketheUnitedStates,supplyingbullets,beansandbandageshalfwayaroundtheworldwasrelativelysimple.Puttingbootsontheground,however,proved to be much more difficult. In an ambiguous war withnoclearendstateorenddate,planningasustainableflow of soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines was a formidablechallenge.“TotalForce”requiredtheArmyandMarineCorpstotapbackintotheirReservesjustmonthsafterAmericahadbeentoldthatthemissionhadbeenaccomplished.FormanyReserveMarines,thismeantrepackingtheirseabagswithbattle-scarredutilitiesthathad

�

justbeenstowedaway.

Operation Iraqi Freedom becomes part of The Long War

WithinamonthofMarinescrossingintoIraqin2003,United States policymakers were so confident of victory that they began firming up plans to dramatically reduce the numberofAmericanforcesinIraq.1ThinkingthatMarineswould not be needed in a pacified Iraq, United States CentralCommanddirectedtheMarineCorpstowithdrawforcesfromIraqthatsummerandfall,2andbyyear’send,fewerthan250MarinesremainedinIraq.

BeforethelastmajorMarineunitreturnedtotheUnitedStates,itwasapparentthatmanyassumptionsinvolvingIraq, including the flow of American forces, would have tobechanged.3WhiledebateovertheIraqwarcontinuedinmilitaryandpoliticalcircles,guerrillatacticsbyhome-grown insurgents and foreign fighters reminded the world thatadiversesetofenemiesstillhadavoiceinhowthingsturnedout.4Asviolenceincreasedandsecuritybecameaparamountconcern,CentralCommandrealizedthatthetroopnumbersinIraqwouldhavetoreturntolevelsthatapproximatedthenumbersfortheinitialdrivetoBaghdad.5

Inearly2004,then-Lt.Gen.JamesConwayled24,000MarinesunderIMarineExpeditionaryForce’scolorsbackintoIraq.Inadditiontosixactive-dutyinfantrybattalions,his1stMarineDivisionwasaugmentedbyoneReserveinfantrybattalion,3rdBattalion,24thMarines.The3rdMarineAirWinggainedaReserveLightAttackHelicopterSquadron,HMLA-775.4thMarineLogisticsGroup,thenknownas4thForceServiceSupportGroup,providedhundredsofMarinesforcombatsupport.ManyotherReservessignedonas“individualaugmentees”tovariouscommands.

IMEFtookovertheAnbarProvincefromtheU.S.Army’s82ndAirborneDivisioninMarch2004.6Withinweeks, Marines faced a grave crisis with significant internationalimplications.InearlyApril,fourciviliancontractors for Blackwater, a private security firm, were ambushedandkilledinFallujah,andtheirbodiesweresubsequentlymutilatedandputondisplay.Photographsshowedthecontractor’scharredbodiesstrungupfromwhatbecameknownasBlackwaterBridge.ThisenragedAmericans,inpartbecausethephotographsremindedthecountryofthe“BlackhawkDown”humiliationfromSomaliain1993.Marineswereorderedtoclearinsurgentsfrom Fallujah immediately. In a week of fierce fighting that resulted in significant casualties from both sides, a Reserve squadron of Huey and Cobra helicopters added significant punch to the fight for Fallujah. As these Reserves worked

seamlesslywiththeiractive-dutycounterpartsduringOperationVigilantResolve,theirperformancebolsteredothers’ confidence that Marine Reserves were ready for whatevercametheirway.

Maj.Gen.DouglasO’Dell,CommandingGeneralof4thMarineDivisionformostoftheperiodcoveredbythisbook,saidReservesconsistentlyperformedaspromised.7Willingtorespondonshortnotice,unitsatthebattalionandsquadronlevelwereabletofunctionindependentlyaselementsofmuchlargercommands.ThroughoutIMEF,individual Reserves filled staff slots. Many units whose militaryskillswerenotconsiderednecessaryinthistypeofcombatwerewillingtoretrainandformprovisionalunits in high-demand fields like military police or motor transportation.8Whilethe“WeekendWarriors”weredifferentthan365-day-a-year“regular”Marines,theDepartmentofDefenseandthenationcametoappreciatethattheReservesbroughtacombinationofmaturityandcivilian skills to the fight that more than compensated for anyshortcomingstheymayhavehadinmilitaryskills.

Lt.Col.HaroldR.“Odie”VanOpdorp,anactivedutyMarinewhocommanded1stBattalion,24thMarines,aReservebattalion,inFallujahin2006-2007,describedhisReservesas,“someofthebestthatAmericahastooffer.”9AfterholdinghislastbattalionformationbeforesendinghisReservestotheirHomeTrainingCenters,hesaid,“IwouldgobacktoIraqinaheartbeatwithaReservebattalion,becausetheseguyshaveauniquesetofcapabilities,aboveandbeyondbeinggoodMarines.Thethingsthattheycanaccomplish,andthelevelsofmaturityanddecision-makingprocessthattheyhave,isjustphenomenal.”10

Maj.Gen.O’DellsaidseniorMarineswouldagree.“Every officer who has commanded Marines in combat in thisperiodoftime,bothfrom[IMEFandIIMEF],would

Photo By Pfc. Frans E. LabrancheMaj. Gen. Douglas V. O’Dell talks with Lt. Gen. John W. Bergman during 2005.

�

saypointblank,‘WecouldnothavedonewhatwehavedonewithoutelementsoftheFourthMarineDivision,includingitsinfantrybattalionsandartillerybattalionsandassociatedunitsthatwereorganized,trained,andequippedto fight in a cohesive, coherent and seamless fashion alongsidetheiractivedutycounterparts.’”11

VanOpdorp’sbattalionpatrolledFallujahatatimewhenmanyfactorscametogethertoallowIraqisoldiersandpolicetotakecontrolofmuchofthecity.WhilecreditingpreviousMarineactivitiesandexternalcircumstancesforpartofthissuccess,VanOpdorpsaidcivilianskillsthathis Reserves brought to the fight helped tremendously. Oneofhiskeyassetswasapolicelieutenant12whohadspenttwenty-nineyearsmappinggang-relatedactivitiesinChicago.Thepoliceman,whohadservedaprevioustourinIraq’s“TriangleofDeath”withadifferentReservebattalion,foundthattheactivitiesofgangsandtherequirements for intelligence to fight them were remarkably similartowhathisbattalionencounteredinFallujah.AnotherReservewhohadadramaticimpactonFallujahwas a charismatic New York City firefighter who served as a Civil Affairs officer. Van Opdorp said the firefighter broughtachutzpahtohisrolethatwaseffectivewithIraqis,particularlythesheikswholedtribesofvarioussizeandinfluence. Van Opdorp also described one team of young computer-savvyMarines,knownas“TheHobbits,”whocreatedcomputermodelstoanticipateproblemareas.ThisteamcollecteddatafrompatrolsandindividualMarinestocreatefunctionalsystemsforidentifyingtheenemyandthe

patternstheyexhibitedastheyemplacedIEDsandattackedMarines.Withthissystem,VanOpdorpsaid,thecompanywasabletoremovethe“invisibilitycloak”thatinsurgentshadusedsoeffectivelytotheiradvantage.AstheChicagopolicemannoted,“Identifyingtheenemyisveryhard.Onceyoudothat,it’srelativelyeasytokillthem.”13

Community and Continuity

A significant difference between “Regular” Marines and theirReservecounterpartsisthefactthatmostReservesareolderandeitherhaveacollegedegreeorareworkingtowardsone.Themostimportantadvantage,however,relatestothecivilianjobskillsthattheybringtotheirMarinework.Lt.Col.MarkSmith,anIndianaStateTrooperwhocommanded2ndBattalion,24thMarinesduringa2004-2005deploymenttothenorthernpartoftheBabilProvince,saidthelawenforcementbackgroundsofmanyofhisReservesallowedhisbattaliontoconductpatrolsthatlookedlike“communitypolicing”throughouthisareaofoperations.14Inreviewingthisbattalion’ssuccess,O’Dellsaid,“Thevalueof[civilianskills]cannotbeoverstated,andthathasnotbeenlostontheactivecomponentleadership,whohavegraspedthatintangiblevalueofstreetlevelpoliceskills.”15

O’DellalsonotedthatthefactthatmanyReserveMarinescomefromthesameregionandservelengthytoursinthesameunitbringsalong-termcontinuitytotheirworkthatactivedutyunitsdonothave.

“IfthereisonedistinguishingfeatureofaReserveMarine,itisthattheygenerallycomefromthesamecommunity....sothereisacommunallinkinadditiontothefraternallinkasMarines,”hesaid.“Moreover,there’satimecontinuumaspecttothis.WhenaReserveMarinearrivesathishomestationfromtheSchoolofInfantry...hecanexpecttoserveeightyearsinthatunitwithoutinterruption.Thepersonalbondsthatareformedasaconsequenceoverthateightyearsormoreexperiencearedurableandimpenetrable,andleadstogreaterunitcohesion....Thatgives[Reserves]alegup,inthesensethatwecancomeonactiveduty,maybenotatquitethesamelevelofpredeploymenttrainingasanactivedutybattalion,butwecanplaycatchupveryquickly,tothepointthat...ourperformanceincombatisequaltoanyrifle platoon, any rifle company, any infantry battalion in theTotalForce.”16

Maj.MarkC.Boone,whocommandedCompanyBof6thEngineerSupportBattalion(ESB)whenitwasassignedto9thESBinIraq,saidthestrengthofcommunityintheMarineReservewasdemonstratedclearlywhenoneofhisMarines,Cpl.AaronSeal,waskilledbyasniperin

�

Photo By Cpl. Paul Leicht

Armed with a Squad Automatic Weapon and cold weather gear, Lance Cpl. William English of Company B, 1st Battalion, 23rd Marine Regiment, participates in a security patrol in the vicinity of Ramadi in December 2004. At the time, infantry Marines were trying to reinforce the relationship between the American military and local government and civilians, with foot patrols serving as the initial line of defense against the insurgency.

thevillageofBaghdadi.17Boone,whodescribedSealas“theheartbeatofthecompany,”saidthathisdeathhadaprofoundeffectonthecompanybecausemanyofhisMarineshadgrownuptogetherbeforejoiningtheMarineReserve.

CompanyBisheadquarteredinSouthBend,Indiana,wherestrongfamilyvaluesareatthecoreofcloselyknitcommunities.ThesefactorsmeantthathisdeathhadastrongimpactontheMarineReservecommunitythere,aswellasthelocalcommunity.“[Cpl.Seal’sdeath]wasreallytough,”Boonesaid.“Cpl.SealhadspenthislifewithsomeofmyMarines.Hehadgonetokindergartenwithsome,andtheyhadgonetohighschool,playedsports,andevendatedmanyofthesamewomenalongtheway.Cpl.Seal’sdeathreallytookthewindoutofoursails.”18

Col.TracyGarrett,whoservedasActingCommanderof4thMarineLogisticsGroupin2006-2007,saidReservesalsoallowthemilitarytobridgethegapbacktotheirciviliancommunities.GarrettsaidthatReserveshumanizethemilitarybecausepeoplethroughouttheUnitedStateshavetheopportunitytoseethattheirneighborsserveinthemilitary.“Itbecomesmuchlesslikesomeonewhoisfromouterspacethanthewomanwholivesnextdoor,”shesaid.19

Flexibility

Intheever-changingenvironmentspresentedbyIraqandAfghanistan,Reservesfrequentlydemonstrateda“SemperGumby”abilitytoadapt.20Manyunitsunderwentsignificant retraining in order to qualify them to perform services in high demand fields, such as military police and motortransportation.While14thMarines,theartilleryregiment for 4th Marine Division, provided some firing batteriestoIraq,mostofitsunitswereretrainedasmilitarypolicebecausedemandforsecurityonbasesandroads,andwithconvoysanddetaineeswashigh.

Ofallprovisionalmissionsassignedto4thMarineDivision,oneofthemostchallenginginvolvedthetransitionofReservesfrom4thLightArmoredReconnaissanceBattalionand4thAmphibiousAssaultVehicleBattalionto“DamSupportUnits,”responsiblefor riverine operations in a strategically significant section oftheEuphratesRiver.Tradingtheirarmoredvehiclesfor waterborne combat vessels, they learned how to fight inauniqueenvironmentastheyprotectedtheareathatstretchedfromRamaditotheHadithaDam.

“TheenemypreviouslyhadusedtheEuphrateswithimpunitytomovereinforcements,explosives,andotherarmsandequipmentintothepopulationcentersfromthewesternbordersofIraq,intoFallujahandRamadiand

ultimatelyintoBaghdad,”O’Dellsaid.“It’sbeentheDamSupportUnit,asbothamobilityassetandatacticalcombatasset,thathasdeniedthemtheuseofthatavenuethattheypreviouslyhadusedwithimpunity.”21

The willingness to adapt to a battlefield is a hallmark of any effective military unit, so the flexibility that many Reservesdemonstratedinnewmilitaryspecialtiesdidnotsurprisecommanders,O’Dellsaid.“Marinesofeverystripeand grade and affiliation are known for their flexibility and adaptability.Giventheopportunitytotrainandbetrainedtotheprovisionalmission,anyMarineunitcanprepareitself for success on the battlefield.”22

�

Photo By Pfc. Mary A. Staes

Lt. Gen. Jack W. Bergman speaks to Marines from 1st Battalion, 24th Marine Regiment, and 3rd Bn., 14th Marine Regiment, at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, Calif., Aug. 22.

The Anbar Province

ThegeographicchallengeoftheAnbarProvinceisdemonstratedbytwocontrastingfacts:WhileitisIraq’slargestprovince,italsoisitsmostsparselypopulated.ForaprovincethatisapproximatelythesizeofCalifornia,itwashometofewerthan1.8millionIraqis.Mostofthepopulationlivedinthemajorcities,likeRamadiandFallujah,andalmosteveryoneelselivedwithinashortdistanceoftheEuphratesRiverthatsnakedfromBaghdadtotheSyrianBordernearAlQa’im.

Itsstrategicchallengewasdemonstrated,inpart,bycasualty statistics. During the first four years of Operation IraqiFreedom(OIF),theAnbarProvincewasthedeadliestprovinceforAmericanservicemembers,claimingapproximatelyone-thirdofAmericanfatalities.1

InacountrywheremostwereassociatedwiththeShi’iabranchofIslam,theAnbarProvincewastheSunnistrongholdthathadlongprovidedSaddamHusseinwiththesupportheneededtoremaininpower.DuringtheearlyyearsofOIF,itprovidedanimportantbaseforAlQaedaandinsurgentoperations.2 Part of its significance came fromthefactthattheWesternEuphratesRiverValleyserved as an important infiltration route for foreign fighters

headedtoIraq’sheartland.3TheNewYorkTimescomparedthisregiontotheVietnamWar’sHoChiMinhTrail,asforeign fighters and insurgents used the river valley to moveinrelativesafetyfromtheSyrianbordertocitieslikeBaghdad,RamadiandFallujah.

ThecontrastbetweenthefertileEuphratesRiverValleyandtherestoftheprovinceisstriking.AlongtheEuphrates,grovesoffruitsandvegetablesandacreafteracreofdatepalmsaresurroundedbyalushnessthatpaintstheareaavividgreen.JustafewmilesfromtheEuphrates,however,thebarrenlandscapeturnsbrown.WiththeexceptionofanoccasionalBedouin,thedesertisessentiallyempty.

Whethertravelingbyaircraft,vehicle,oronfoot,theAnbarProvinceisvast.Duringatimewhenimprovisedexplosivedevices(IEDs)becametheweaponofchoiceforinsurgents,theneedtopatrolandtravelthroughouttheprovincebecameoneoftheMarineCorps’greatestchallenges.Thethreatofinsurgentactivity,whencombinedwiththechallengesthatlong-distancetravel,chokingdust,and stifling heat created, made the Anbar Province one of themostinhospitableareasonEarth.

10

Reserve Contributions to the

Global War on Terror

4th Marine Division In Iraq

11

1�

�rd Battalion ��th Marines

OneweekafterthestatueofSaddamHusseinwaspulleddowninBaghdad’sFirdosSquare,CentralCommandconsideredplanstodrasticallyreduceAmericanforcesinIraq,andsubsequentlydirectedtheMarineCorpstowithdrawallforcesduringthesummerandfallof2003.2Bytheendoftheyear,fewerthan250MarinesremainedinIraq.ButevenbeforethelastMarineinfantrybattalionreturnedtotheUnitedStates,anemerginginsurgencyforced the Pentagon to reverse its flow of forces.3GuerrillaoperationsconductedbyamixofSaddamloyalistsandforeignterroristsshowedtheworldthat,fromtheirperspective,thewarwasfarfromover.4ThisviolenceagainstCoalitionforcesandIraqicitizensmeantthatthe

numberofAmericansinIraqwouldhavetostayroughlythesame.5AsMarinesreviewedrequirementsforupcomingtrooprotations,theylookedtotheReservesformanpower.

TheonlyReserveMarineinfantrybattalionmobilizedforOIFPhaseIIwas3rdBattalion,24thMarines.BasedprimarilyinMissouri,Indiana,andTennessee,itsMarineslearnedinDecember2003toexpectmobilizationthefollowingmonth.HavingheardrumorsthattheywereslatedtogotoOkinawa,mostwereelatedwiththedecision that would put them in the fight in Iraq.6TheyweremobilizedonJanuary5,2004,andweresoonenroutetoCampPendletonforsixweeksofimmunizations,training,uniformsandequipment,aswellasacrashcourse

Photo By Sgt. Chad R. KiehlMarines with Company I, 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines conduct a memorial service for Cpl. Bradley P. McCormick, who was killed in combat in An Najaf on Aug. 19, 2004.

1�

inSecurityandStabilizationOperations(SASO).ThisReservebattalionbecamepartofwhatgrewtothe24,000MarinesandSailorsofIMEF,whichreturnedtoIraqinFebruaryandMarch.7

WithOperationIraqiFreedomintransition,Marinesencountered difficulties in deciding how to prepare. Returningveteransknewtheirworkwouldbedifferent,buttheydidnotknowifthismeantcombatoperationsagainstinsurgentsor“heartsandminds”interactionswithcivilians.NotknowingwhatmissiontheywouldbeassignedtoinIraq,andcompetingwithactivedutybattalionsforlimitedtrainingopportunities,3rdBattalion,24thMarinesfocusedonbasicsecurityoperations.ItsMarinesfirst went through a fast-pacedweaponstrainingcyclethatfamiliarizedeachMarinewiththeweaponstheymightuseinIraq.8

Thetrainingplanusedabuilding-blockapproachthat trained at the fireteam andsquadlevelsbeforemovingtocompany-andbattalion-levelexercises.Italsogavethebattalionstaff,whichincludedmanynewmembers,achancetofunctionasateam.

Theone-weekSASOtrainingpackagewasheldatMarchAirForceReserveBaseinCalifornia.Conductedby1stMarineDivisionandtheMarineCorps’ Warfighting Laboratory,SASOtrainingsimulatedthemulti-spectrumenvironmentthatMarineswereexpecting,fromdiehardinsurgentswearingsuicideveststopeacefulcitizenstryingtorebuildtheircountry.RealizingthatMarineswouldfacevastlydifferentchallengeseachday,SASOemphasizedsmall-unitleadership.Expandingtheconceptofthe“StrategicCorporal,”SASOtaughttheMarinesthatanimportant

elementtooperationsinIraqwouldbetheyoungMarineleaderwhohadaclearunderstandingofhiscommander’sintentwhilealsoappreciatingthatactionsatthetacticallevelcouldreverberateattheoperationalandstrategiclevels.9

WhileawaitingtransitfromKuwaittoIraq,thebattalionlearnedthatitsprimarymissionwouldbetoprovide

securityatfoursites.10

ThebattalioncommanderassignedCompanyItoCampFallujah,CompanyKtotheprisonfacilityatAbuGhraib,andCompanyLtotheairbaseatalAsad.Theremainingunits,includingBattalionHeadquarters,HeadquartersandServicesCompany,andWeaponsCompany,wenttothe1stFleetServiceSupportGroup’s(FSSG)largesupportbaseatCampTaqqadum.

Lt.Col.GaryS.Johnston,whobecame3/24’sInspector-Instructorafterthedeployment,describedtheforceprotectionandconvoyescortservicesthat3/24providedasessentialenablersforcombattocivil-militaryoperations.“Itmaynothavebeena‘sexy’mission,butitwasabsolutelyaverycriticalmission....Themanpowerdrain,tryingtoprotectyourselfwhileyouarestillconductingSASOaswellashumanitarian-typecivil-militaryoperations,is significant. So [3/24’s] abilitytodowhattheydid,andspreadthemselvesouttomultipleFOBsaswellas

supporting convoy operations... contributed significantly to the fight out there.”11

Maj.MarkA.LamelzawasCompanyI’sExecutiveOfficer when Marines took over Camp Fallujah, a former militarybase10kilometerseastofFallujahthatservedasheadquartersforIMEFand1stMarineDivision.Company

Photo By Sgt. Chad R. Kiehl

Marines with Company I, 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines conduct a memorial service for Cpl. Bradley P. McCormick who was killed in combat in An Najaf, Iraq.

1�

I’s170Marinestookchargeofperimetersecurityandthequickreactionforce(QRF),aswellasoperationsatthebase’sthreeentrycontrolpoints(ECPs).Theirmostdifficult challenge, he said, was the ECP used for Iraqis whoworkedonbase.ThisECPusedguarddogs,acargoinspectionsystem,andcarefulsearchesofindividualsandvehiclestoprotectthebase.12DuringtheearlyphaseofbuildingaMarinepresenceintheAnbarProvince,muchofCompanyI’sworkinvolvedinspectinglargeconvoysofpersonnel,suppliesandequipment.13

“Wehadtobevigilanteveryday,”Maj.Lamelzasaid.Inadditiontointernalsecurity,CompanyImaintainedanambitiousscheduleofmountedanddismountedpatrolstothwartmortarandrocketattacks.

Usingtheircivilianskills,CompanyIMarinesimprovedthecamp’sdefensesinmanyways.SeveralciviliancontractorsworkedwithNavySeabeestostrengthenguardtowersandotherpotentialtargets.CompanyIconductedanassessmentofthecamp’sinfrastructureandproposedconstructionprojectsthattouchedallpartsofthebase,Lamelzasaid.“Weleftthatcampcompletelydifferentthanwefoundit.Whenwebuiltabunker,wereallybuiltabunker.”14

Inthemiddleofhistour,Lamelzawastransferredto1stFSSG’ssupportbaseatCampTaqqadum,wherehetookcommandofthebattalion’sWeaponsCompany.CampTaqqadumincludedtwolongrunwaysandwassurroundedbyanumberofsmallvillages.Atthetime,itwasmuchmoreopenthanCampFallujah,withnobarriersaroundmuchofitsperimeter.ItsprimaryprotectionconsistedofaseriesofobservationtowersandanactiveQRF.

MarinesreportedthattheIraqipopulationwas,atbest,neutraltoCoalitionefforts;neitherfriendlynorhostileto the Marines. Camp Taqqadum was hit by indirect fires severaltimesduringthedeployment.ThebeliefthatnearbyIraqis would not prevent insurgents from firing on the base promptedWeaponsCompanytoundertakeanaggressivescheduleofaround-the-clockpatrollingoutsidethebase.15

Chief Warrant Officer Robert A. Bauer, a maintenance officer in the battalion’s logistics section, described Camp Taqqadumasrelativelyprimitiveinearly2004,withMarinessleepingoncotsin25-mantents.16Electricitywasprovidedbygenerators,whichfrequentlyfailedwhenhightemperaturescausedspikesindemand.Limitedaccesstowater meant that water tanks for showers had to be refilled bytruck.Onapositivenote,hesaid,thebasehadasmallgymnasiumandgoodfoodfromacontractor-serviceddininghall.

CompanyKwasassignedtotheU.S.Army’s16thMilitaryPoliceBrigadeatAbuGhraibprison.17TheMarinesarrivedatasensitivetime,lessthantwomonths

aftertheArmyconvenedaninvestigationintodetaineeabuseatthehandsofU.S.ArmyReservemilitarypolicemen.18AfternegotiatingtheirrolewiththeirArmycounterparts,Marinestookresponsibilityforthebase’sexternalguardtowers,ECPs,andQRF,aswellasamortarteam trained to respond quickly to indirect fire attacks. They hardened the base by filling thousands of sandbags, layingmilesofconcertinawire,andclearingandchartingtheir fields of fire. These precautions proved to be prudent, asMarinesdefendedtheprisonduringseveralinsurgentattacksthatincludedmortar,rocket,RPG,andsmallarmsfire.19

ForCompanyL,mostofitstourinvolvedsecuritydutiesatalAsad,alargeairbasethatservedasheadquartersandprinciple airfield for 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW). Asthebase’sonlyinfantryunit,CompanyLearnedareputationastheWing’s“securityblanket,”patrollingnearbyneighborhoodsonfootandinHumvees.TheWingalsousedCompanyLMarinestocoordinateandprovidesecurityforconvoysthroughouttheAnbarProvince.During one five-week period, it conducted 26 convoys betweenalAsadandbasesnearalQa’im,alTaqqadum,Haditha,arRutbah,andRamadi.20

ShortlyafterarrivinginIraq,CompanyLMarinesweregivenabriefopportunitytoworkforaregimentalcombatteam,relievinganactivedutycompanytoallow it to fight with its battalion for Operation Vigilant ResolveinFallujah.Forthreeweeks,TheCompanywasresponsiblefortheHaditha-HitareanearalAsad.DuringfootpatrolsinHit,theMarineslearnedthatmanyinsurgents fleeing Coalition operations in Fallujah had settledinHit.CompanyLalsofoundnumerousweaponscaches,includingtwoofthelargestcachesthathadbeenlocatedintheAnbarProvincetothattime,whilesearchingpalmgrovesontheneighboringEuphratesRiverValley.WhileCompanyL’soperationsnearHitandHadithawererelativelysmall,thecompany’ssuccessinthesemissionshelpedsetthestageforexpandedReserveactivitiesduringthenextrotation.

1�

�nd Battalion��th Marines

After3/24’sinitialsuccessastheonlyReservebattalionin Iraq during the first months of Phase II, the 4th Marine DivisionassignedtwomoreReservebattalions,1stBattalion,23rdMarinesand2ndBattalion,24thMarines,tothenextrotation.Bothbattalionsreceivedmissionsandareasofoperations(AOs)thatweremorechallengingthanthesecuritymissionsassignedto3/24.1/23wasgivenaneconomyofforcemissionoverabroadexpanseoftheAnbarProvince.ItsAOincludedopendesertandmuchoftheWesternEuphratesRiverValley,whichservedasamajorconduitforinsurgentsmovingtoandfromSyriaandBaghdadandallpointsinbetween.1Incontrast,2/24operatedinasmall,dense,andurbanAOthatincludedthe“TriangleofDeath”2afewmilessouthofBaghdad.3Forlargeoperations,itcouldrequestassistancefromnearbyArmyunits.Forday-to-dayoperations,2/24wasstretchedthin,withtoofewMarinestokeepatightgriponescalatingviolence.TheTriangleofDeathwaslocatedonafaultlinebetweenlargeSunniandShi’iapopulations.4Iraqi-on-Iraqiviolencewassocommonthatmanyresidentstookstepstomake their religious affiliation more ambiguous, providing somemeasureofsafetyinareasthatotherwisewouldbetoodangerousfortravel.5

Theprimarymissionfor2/24wastoestablishconditionsforafairandfreenationalelectiononJanuary30,2005.6Thiscarriedanimpliedmissionofkeepingamainsupplyroute, MSR Tampa, open to Coalition traffic. With insurgentattackstakingplaceagainstCoalitionforcesandcivilians on a daily basis during its first few weeks, 2/24 decidedthattheunderlyingmissionforalloperationsinitsAOcalledforconductingthefullspectrumofcombatoperationsagainstinsurgents.

Lt.Col.MarkA.Smith,anexperiencedIndianastatetrooper and 2/24’s commanding officer, told his Marines totakeamoreforcefulstanceagainsttheviolence,challenginginsurgentswithaggressivepatrolsthroughouttheAO.7 With law enforcement professionals filling manyof2/24’sbillets,incorporatingtheconceptof“communitypolicing”inoperationswithintheTriangleofDeathcamenaturallyfor2/24.ThispushedMarinesintoIraqineighborhoodswithwhatSmithcalleda“zipcodeoffensive.”8Tohim,improvingsecuritymeantthathisMarineswouldbuildinroadsintocommunitiesand

improvethelivesofcommonIraqis,eveniftheywerenotwanted there at first. While this philosophy entailed risks, Smithandhisintelligencesection’s“RedCell”determinedthatthepotentiallong-termgainoutweighedtheinitialshort-termrisk.9Whiletherewasnodoubtthatincreasedpatrolswouldcauseinsurgentactivitiestospike,thefactthatMarineswereexertingcontrolinareaspreviouslydominatedbyinsurgentsultimatelywouldcurtailmuchoftheviolence.

Toaccomplishthesemissions,Smithreliedupondistributedoperations,allowinginfantrycompaniestoconductindependentoperationsfromsatellitebases.HavinginheritedaforcelaydownthatputanentireU.S.ArmybattalioninoneForwardOperatingBase(FOB)inMahmudiyah,heimmediatelycreatedtwosmallerFOBsin the nearby cities of Yusufiyah and Lutafiyah.10WhilethebulkofhisforceswouldstayatFOBMahmudiyah,thereinforced companies in Yusufiyah and Lutafiyah were able topatrolremoteareasaroundtheclock.

The new force configuration provided strongpoints in the

1�

Photo By Lance Corporal Ryan B. Busse

United States Marine Corps Cpl. Erin Black directs Iraqi women and children to line up so that the may be searched in a quick and orderly fashion at Entry Control Point 5 on the outskirts of Fallujah, Iraq on December 28, 2004. Black, a Nashville, Tenn. native, is a Military Police reservist by trade but has been attached to the “Females Searching Females” detachment for current operations.

threelargestcitiesintheTriangleofDeath:11Mahmudiyah,locatedonly15kilometerssouthofBaghdad,wasthelargest. Yusufiyah, which bordered a community of Islamicextremiststothewest,was10kilometerswestof Mahmudiyah. Lutafiyah was 10 kilometers south of Mahmudiyah. Some considered Lutafiyah the most dangerous of the three, as insurgents with keffiyehs, orcheckeredscarveswrappedaroundtheirheads,andAK-47swouldintimidateIraqisonadailybasis.Theyconductedsurprisecheckpointsthatoftenendedwithsummary executions. Smith believed that Yusufiyah presented a more significant threat to Coalition efforts. Baseduponintelligencereportsthathard-coreIslamistswithconnectionstoalQaedaweredistributingmoneyandweaponsthroughouttheregion,Smithbelievedthatmanyanti-CoalitionoperationsincentralIraq,includingBaghdad,FallujahandRamadi,wereinitiatedinhisAO.

AfterestablishingthenewFOBs,2/24startedexploring

theAOduringallhoursofthedayandnight.12Thisearnedthebattalionthenicknameof“TheMadGhosts”fromIraqiswhowerenotusedtosuchfrequentCoalitionpresence.13SmithsaidthathisMarineshadtopatrollikethistoensurethatthemapstheywereusingaccuratelyreflected the terrain. Many roads were unsafe because theywouldcollapseintocanals,andtheterrainchangedfrequentlyasIraqiscreatedirrigationcanalsormovedroads.

Threeterrainfeatures,clusteredaroundtheEuphratesto the west, dominated 2/24’s activities. The first was a weaponsmanufacturingandstoragefacilitythatgaveinsurgentsalltheammunitiontheyneeded.Smithdescribedthesizeofthestoragefacilitiesasbeyondbelief,manytimeslargerthananyammunitionsupplypointhehadseenduringhisyearsintheMarineCorps.AfterthefallofBaghdad,theunguardedfacilityprovidedmunitionstoinsurgents,whousedtheordinancetocreateanunknown

Photo By Cpl. Ben EberleStaff Sgt. Eric F. Gross, a 35-year-old from Sturtevant, Wis., takes a knee to chat with an interested toddler during a Cooperative Medical Engagement (CME) event in as Saqlawiyah. The event took place at the village schoolhouse and provided free medical care for more than 200 civilians in the community. Iraqi culture discourages male-female interaction in public, so a female team provided care and posted security for women and children. The CME events was part of the Iraqi Women’s Engagement program coordinated by the U.S. Department of State.

1�

numberofcachesonbothsidesoftheEuphrates.Bytheendof2/24’stour,MarineandArmyunitshaddestroyedhundredsofweaponscaches.

ThesecondwastheJurfasSukhr(JAS)Bridgethatprovided the only fixed crossing point over the Euphrates Riverformiles.WhilethebridgewassturdyenoughtohandleCoalitionvehicles,itwasalsoanobviousambushpoint and had been the site of a significant battle between insurgentsand2/24’spredecessors.AnygroundefforttosearchthedesertwestoftheEuphratesrequiredcrossingtheJASBridge,sotheforcewouldneedtobelargeenoughtopreventanambushatthebridge.Formostofitstour,2/24didnothavetheassetstocrossthebridgesafely,soinsurgentsmoveunchallengedinthedesert.Insuchanenvironment,itwasunlikelythatinsurgentswouldbestopped,andthedesertalwaysofferedmorecachesofweaponsandammunition.

The third was an affluent community of hard-coreIslamistswholivedinCargoul(orKaragol),ashort distance from Yusufiyah. Intelligence reports showedCargoulwasunderthecontrolofAlQaedainMesopotamia. Army Times reported that, “Yusufiyah is[AbuMusabal]Zarqawicountry.”14CargoulwasthesiteofaU.S.Armycheckpointfromwhichtwosoldierswerekidnappedduringa2006ambush.Thetwoweresubsequentlykilledandtheirbodiesweremutilated.15Publicityresultingfromtheambushwasconsideredasignificant public relations victory for insurgents.

SmithsaidthatCargoulrepresentedaheartofinsurgentoperationsthroughoutcentralIraq,asithousedthebestfundedandmosthard-coreIslamists.ResidentsofCargoulexerted control over an area that stretched from Yusufiyah tothedeserttothewestoftheEuphrates.During2/24’sdeployment,Smithsaid,hecametobelievethatCargoulwastheinceptionpointfortheconstantupheavalinBaghdad,asitcouldsupplyallthemoney,equipment,andmunitionsthatanygroupofinsurgentswouldneed.16

ThewealthoftheCargouldistrictwasastarkcontrasttothepovertythatpervadednearbyShi’iaregions.MostCargoulhouseswereelegantmansionsthatwouldcomparefavorably to the finest houses in the world, and they lined aroadthatstartedneartheJASBridgeandfollowedtheEuphrates north for about 10 kilometers to the Yusufiyah PowerPlant.17

FortheMadGhosts,makingtheAOmoresecurewasgoingtobeachallenge.Inadditiontobeingwellarmed,theinsurgencyseemedtobebettertrainedthaninotherpartsofIraq,asitsranksincludedmanyfromcountriesoutsideIraq.Inadditiontotheirequipment,theforeignfighters could be distinguished by their advanced tactics. Smith said that foreign fighters knew how to maneuver and

use suppressive fires effectively.In2/24’sAO,MSRTampawasa35-kilometersegment

oftheimportanthighwaythatlinkedKuwaittocentralIraq,and was open at first only to military and Coalition traffic. Smithsaid2/24keptMSRTampaopenbyprovidingasmallsecurityforceonthehighwayandconvincingeveryCoalitionconvoythatitwasthatconvoy’sresponsibilitytoprovideitsownlocalsecurity.

OneplatoonfromCompanyGwasassignedtoMSRTampa,andSmithhadthemontheroadalmostallthetime.TheplatoonessentiallylivedonMSRTampa,sleepingunderbridges,eatingMREs,andgoingwithoutshowersforlengthyperiodsastheygatheredintelligenceandlookedforinsurgentsandIEDs.Byprovidingaconstantpresence,thisplatoonimprovedsecuritytoadegreethateventuallyallowedtheCoalitiontoopenMSRTampatociviliantraffic.

Early in its tour, Company F defended FOB Yusufiyah against a fierce attack from a company-sized group of insurgents.ForsixhoursonNovember12,Marineswenttoe-to-toewiththeinsurgents.18ManyMarinesconsideredthis type of force-on-force fighting to be a welcome relief fromanonymousIEDattacks,buttheyultimatelywereimpressedwiththeinsurgents’abilitytoplanandexecutesuchacomplicatedattack.

“Theinsurgentstookanabsolutebeating,buttheydidnot run,” Smith said. “They kept coming. We finally got whatwewanted,becauseasgoodasourMarinesare... they wanted to fight. They wanted to kill a lot of these guys, and they did on that day. It was quite the fight.”19

The insurgents used indirect fires, then maneuvered underthecoverofcombinedarmstotrytoadvanceon FOB Yusufiyah. By the end, Company F was using helicoptersandjetsforcloseairsupport,aswellasindirectfires from artillery and 81mm and 60mm mortars. The resultswerelopsided,withapproximately70insurgentskilledcomparedwithonlyoneMarine,butSmithsaidthebattledemonstratedtohigherheadquartersthatinsurgentshadthetrainingandcapabilitytoconductalarge-scaleattack.

FortheJanuary30elections,2/24selectedeightpollingsites,twoeachinthethreemaincities,plustwoinRasheed,avillagenorthofMahmudiyah.Thelocationofthesesiteswasnotannounceduntil48hoursbeforepollsopened,whenMarinesseizedthesitesandimposedprotective measures that included barriers, controlled traffic patterns,anddetailedvotingprocedures.20Iraqisoldierswerepositionedattheinnercordonsofthepollingsites,and hundreds of officials and election officers were posted atthesites.

Onelectionday,eachsiteexperiencedinsurgentactivity

1�

designed to shut it down. For example, a site in Yusufiyah drew 20 separate mortar attacks, but counterbattery fire fromCompanyFrenderedthoseeffortsineffective.21Despitethesethreats,thousandsofIraqiswalkedtopollingsitesandstayedinlineuntiltheycouldcasttheirballots.22Bythetimevotesweretallied,morethan16,000Iraqis,or71percentoftheregisteredvoters,hadcasttheirballotsinthehistoricelection.23SmithsaidthattheIraqispersevereddespite the challenges because they were confident that the MadGhostswouldprovideprotection.

AreporterforCBSNewssaidthatelectiondayintheTriangleofDeathtookonanairthatwasalmostfestive,despitetheattacks.24ShereportedthatLt.Col.AliZahawiBress,anIraqipolicecommanderinthepredominantlyShi’iacityofMussyiib,toldher,“Iamveryproudbecausethis is the first time for the Iraqi people to express their opinions and the first step to a real democracy.” He added thathewasparticularlysurprisedbythenumberofwomenwhovoted.“Thepeopleareveryexcitedtogototheelectioncentersandvote.Therearelargenumbersandno one expected that. Even when the mortars were fired, peoplewereexcitedtovote.”25

Whilemostofitsworkwasfocusedonsmall-unitactivities,2/24participatedinseveralmajoroperations.26OperationRiverWalk,inDecemberandJanuary,wasacordonandsearchoperationintheCargoul-controlledregion.ItincludedthreeArmybattalionsfromtheU.S.Army’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team. This force sufficiently cleared a broad area that included, for the first time, the desertwestoftheEuphrates.TheArmybattalionassignedtothatareafound112largeweaponscachesonthewestsideoftheriver.SinceCoalitionforcesrarelycrossedtheJASBridge,therewaslittleefforttotrytohidethecaches,Smithsaid.Inmostcases,thecachesweredunescreatedwithmunitionsandsand,withsomesortofsignalontop.Bythismethod,anyinsurgentneedingammunitioncouldtakewhateverheneededfromanystack.SmithsaidOperationRiverWalkincludedsearchingCargoulonahouse-by-housebasis.ThissurprisedresidentsandallowedhisMarinestodestroyanIEDfactoryandtworiggedvehicles.TheoperationalsoshutdownanalQaidapropagandafactory,whichcontainedstate-of-the-artcomputers,presses,andphotocopyingmachines.27Inawarfocusedoninformationoperations,thisrepresentedasignificant victory.

Insubsequentoperations,2/24wasreinforcedbysmallerArmyunitsforaseriesofoperationsknownasRedMayhemI,II,andIII.RedMayhemIwasacordonandsearchoperationsimilartoOperationRiverWalk,exceptthere were not sufficient forces to go into the desert. Smith said that this search of Cargoul confirmed that Coalition

forceshadthedesireandcapabilitytostrikedeepininsurgent-controlledareas.

RedMayhemIIwasanothercordonandsearch,butinvolved Company G sweeping through Lutafiyah and villages to its east. Lutafiyah was on the fault line between SunniandShi’iapopulations.Muchof2/24’sworkfocusedonSunniinsurgents,soRedMayhemIIwasdesignedtodeterminewhatShi’iaweredoingintheirneighborhoods.SmithsaidRedMayhemIIwassuccessfulbecauseitsurprisedtheShi’iacommunity,allowing2/24todocumentand destroy many significant weapons caches. Red MayhemIIalsoresultedinthecaptureofseveralinsurgentstargeted by intelligence officials.

The final operation, Red Mayhem III, involved Company E and Mahmudiyah. Company E was the first of Smith’s companiestopushplatoonsoutinsmallerFOBsinthecity.ThisdistributionofforcestiedCompanyEinmorecloselytothecommunity.WhenCompanyEwentthroughMahmudiyah,itwasabletolocatetargetedindividualsandweaponscaches.TheMarinesalsowereabletodevelopagreatdealofinformationfromMahmudiyahresidentswhobecameaccustomedtohavingMarinesintheirneighborhoods.

Inreviewinghistour,Smithsaidtheprecipitousdropininsurgentactivitywasthebestmeasureof2/24’ssuccess. At first, he said, 2/24’s AO was averaging 12 to 18hostileactsperday.Sixmonthslater,thatnumberhadbeenreducedtoapproximatelyoneperweek.28While2/24lost14Marinesduringthemobilization,Smithsaidtheselosseswerebalancedbythemeasureofhisbattalion’seffectivenessagainsttheinsurgency.HisMarinesknewtheyhadtakenthebattletotheinsurgents’doorsteps,withaggressivepatrollingthatpromptedinsurgentstochangetactics.Heestimatedthat2/24killed400insurgentswhiledetainingmorethan1,200others.29UsingcivilianskillsfromanumberofMarineswhowerealsolawenforcementofficers, 2/24 was able to prepare detainee packages that resultedinthelong-termdetentionof970inAbuGhraib.

The final metric of success, he said, was the fact that 71%oftheregisteredIraqisvotedintheJanuary30election.30Despitethefactthatinsurgentswereattackingelectionsites,hesaid,IraqiswhohadsufferedundertyrannyintheTriangleofDeathwerenotgoingtobedeprivedoftheirrighttovote.

1�

1st Battalion ��rd Marines

WhileoperationsintheAnbarProvinceplacedmanyMarinesinurbansettingslikeFallujahorRamadi,1stBattalion,23rdMarineswasassignedahugestretchofdesertwhenitreportedtoIraqinthefallof2004.Nicknamed“TheLoneStarBattalion,”becauseofitsheadquartersinTexas,itsMarineswereaccustomedtowideopenspaces.Lt.Col.GregoryB.Stevens,thebattalioncommander,understoodthechallengesthedesertwouldpresentasheledhisbattalionthroughaturnoverwith2ndBattalion,7thMarines.PatrollinganareathatextendedfromRamaditojustsouthofHaditha,hisMarineswould be stretched thin. At first, he considered the primary missionofkeepingamainsupplyroute(MSR)asbeingrelativelylowrisk,1eventhoughitincludedpartsoftheWesternEuphratesRiverValley.Duringthisdeployment,however, his intelligence officers learned that insurgents wereusingacenturies-oldsmugglersroutealongtheriverandnearbydeserttomovepeopleandweaponsthroughouttheregion.2Whilethingsappearedcalmonthesurface,the

LoneStarBattalionlearnedthatproblemswerebrewinginpartsofitsAO.

Thebattalionthatpreceded1/23hadfocusedmuchofitsattentiononprotectingtheMSR,soithadminimalcontactwithIraqisalongtheEuphratesRiverValley.ThesecondaryroadsthatconnectedvillagesalongtheriverwerelitteredwithIEDs,andthepreviousbattaliondidnothaveenoughMarinestocleartheareassurroundingtheroad.WhileitsleadershadsuspectedthatinsurgentswereoperatingneartheEuphrates,itdidnotinstigateactivitiesintheseunknownregions.Bythetime1/23arrived,intelligenceanalysts had pieced together a sufficiently clear picture of insurgentactivitiestoallow1/23toprobecertainareas.FortheLoneStarBattalion,thismeantsendingMarinesintovillageswithoutknowingiftheywouldbegivingawaysoccer balls or getting involved in firefights.3

Maj.Gen.RichardNatonski,CommandingGeneraloftheFirstMarineDivisionandsecondhighestrankingMarineinIraq,arrayedhisforcessothatRegimentalCombatTeam7(RCT-7),whichincludedthreeinfantrybattalions,wouldoccupythe350-kilometerstretchoftheEuphratesRiverValleyfromRamaditotheSyrianborder.Stevens’battalionwouldcontroltheHitregion,whichwasclosesttoRamadi.4FirstBattalion,8thMarineswouldcontroltheHadithasectioninthemiddle,while1stBattalion,7thMarineswouldcoverthealQa’imregionneartheSyrianborder.5

Stevensimmediatelylosttheservicesofoneofhisthreeinfantrycompanies,whentheCommanderofRCT-7,Col.CraigTucker,instructedhimtoattachacompanyto3rdLightArmedReconnaissance(LAR)Battalion.63rdLARhadbeenassignedanevenlargerpieceofdesertinwesternIraq,borderedbySyria,Jordan,andSaudiArabia.ItsLightArmoredVehiclesprovidedjusttherightbalanceofprotectionandmobilitythatallowed3rdLARtocoversuchanarea.Selectingacompanythathefeltcouldoperateeffectivelyonitsown,StevensattachedCompanyAto3rdLAR,basedatCampKoreanVillagenearalRutbah.7Thetaskforcecoveredanimportantarea,includingmajorroadsthatconnectedIraqtoJordanandSyria.TheareawassodistantfrommorepopulousandtroubledsectionsofIraqthatitwasrelativelyquiet.

RCT-7and1/23werebasedatalAsad,thesprawling

Photo By Cpl. Jan M. Bender

Lance Cpl. Guillermo Munoz, a machine gunner with a mobile assault platoon for Weapons Company, 1st Battalion, 23rd Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 7, and native of Austin, Texas, scans the area surrounding one of the supply routes. His platoon worked tireless hours to protect against the threat of improvised explosive devices and mines. The efforts of the platoon were credited with causing an 85 percent decrease in the total number of mines and IEDs used in their area of operation.

�0

airbasejust12kilometersfromtheEuphratesbetweenHitandHaditha.Alongwithhisheadquarterselement,StevensassignedCompanyB,elementsofWeaponsCompany,andHeadquartersandServicesCompanytoCampalAsad.CompanyB’smaintaskinvolvedkeepingRouteUraniumsecure.AmodernroadthatranparalleltotheoilpipelinetoSyria,RouteUraniumservedasamajorresupplyroutefortheCoalition.ItscriticalroleforcedtheCoalitionandIraqigovernmenttorestrictaccesstotheroad.

CompanyBassignedoneplatoontoAmmunitionSupplyPoint(ASP)Dulab8and another platoon to a traffic controlpointknownasthe“Bronze-UraniumSplit”southofHit.9RemainingelementsofCompanyBweretaskedwithconductingroutesecuritypatrols.StevensassignedCompanyCtoaformerIraqArmybasenearHit.10Thecompany’smissionincludedmonitoringthenearbycityandtraininganIraqiNationalGuardcompanythatlivedonthesamebase.

Hit, Camp Hit, and Ambush on the Division Jump

AsthelargestcityinitsAO,Hitquicklybecamethefocusof1/23’sattention.

ThebasethatCompanyCinheritedhadbeenaCoalitionbasesincethebeginningoftheoccupation.Located10kilometersnorthwestofHitandjustakilometerfromtheEuphrates,thebaseoccupiedoneofthefewlowhillsthatprovidedaviewofHitandtheEuphratesRiverValley.TheArmyhadcalleditForwardOperatingBase(FOB)Eden,11butitwasnoparadise.Withonlyfourbuildingsstandingamidtheruinsofadozenothers,itshotanddustyenvironmentpromptedoneMarinetodescribeitasa“thirdworldhellhole.”12Butpiecesofparadisewerewithinsight,

asthelushnearbyrivervalleyheldgrovesofdatepalms,pomegranates,andotherfruitsandvegetables.

WhiletheMarineCorpsrenamedthebaseCampHit,itremainedprimitive.SeveralhundredMarinesandIraqiNationalGuardsmenworkedatthebase,whichwasprotectedmorebyconcertinawirethanbarriers.TheirworkfrequentlywasinterruptedbymortarattacksorIEDstrikes.WhilealAsadhadplentyofrunningwater,MarinesatCampHitwerelimitedtooneshowerperweek,andeventhosewerein fiberglass containers with gravity-fedplumbingthatallowedthewatertobetoohotinthesummerandtoocoldinthewinter.SpaceinthethreebuildingsthatservedasbarracksformostMarineswassolimitedthatcotsalmosttouchedeachotherandgearwasstowedineverypossiblespace.Thefourthbuilding,ontheothersideofthecamp,housedtheIraqiNationalGuardsmenandaplatoonofCharlieCompanyMarinestaskedwithtrainingthem.13

ToCoalitionforces,thecityofHitwasanenigma.LocatedintheheartoftheSunni-dominatedAnbarProvince,itscrowdedstreetsandteemingmarketsgaveanappearanceofcalm.ButasMarinespatrolledHitmorefrequently,theyitrealizedHithadbecomeaninsurgentstronghold.

Hitprovidedamarketplaceforthestringoffarmingvillagesthatborderedtheriver.Itspre-warpopulationwas100,000,butMarinesestimatedthisnumberhaddroppedbyhalfsince2003.14ThemainpartofHitranforfourkilometersbetweentheEuphratesRiverandapavedroadthatwaspartoftheCoalition’sRouteBronze.Thecityhadalowskyline,withfewbuildingstallerthantwoorthreestories,punctuatedbytheoccasionalminaret.Itwassocrowdedthatonesoldiercomparedittoarabbitwarren.15

Hitalsocontainedoneofthefewbridgesintheareathat

Photo By Lance Cpl. Will Lathrop

Marines with 1st Battalion, 23rd Marine Regiment, attached to 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, move under the cover of M1A1 main battle tanks and helicopters in a patrol in the city of Hadithah, Iraq. The patrol was conducted to maintain a military presence and search for weapons and enemy activity.

�1

couldcarryheavymilitaryvehiclesacrosstheEuphratesRiver.16TheHitbridgeconnectedapavedroadfromthecity’s main traffic circle, known as Traffic Control Point 1 (TCP-1), to the small but affluent village of Turbah on the eastsideoftheEuphrates.SinceCoalitionbaseswerewestoftheEuphrates,thisbridgeprovidedtheonlyshortroutetoTurbah.Marinespatrolledinfrequently,soinsurgentsconsideredTurbahrelativelysafe.17

Manyofitsresidentswereneutralorsympathetictotheinsurgency.Atsomepoint,itbecameapparentthatinsurgentswereusingasmugglersroutethathadexistedforcenturiesinandaroundtheEuphratesRiverValleytotransport fighters, weapons, and ammunition to key cities likeRamadi,Fallujah,andBaghdad.18WhilenotaswellknownasIraq’slargercities,HitwasimportantenoughinIraq’sSunniregionthatSaddamHusseinuseditinhisflight from Baghdad in April, 2003. According to a study that remains classified, Saddam fled to Hit when a bomb destroyedthehousenextdoortoapurported“safehouse”during his first night outside Baghdad.19

LikemostIraqis,Hitresidentswereanxioustogetonwiththeirday-to-daylives.ManyseemedtoholdCoalitionforcesandinsurgentsequallyincontempt,butwerepowerlesstocomplain.Forthem,survivalmeantwalkinga fine line between the two sides, hoping to endure until a victoremerged.

Atthebeginningofitstour,1/23wasfocusedonmaintainingsecurityonMSRsBronzeandUranium.20TheseroutesbeganatanintersectionknownastheBronze-UraniumSplit,located15kilometerssoutheastofHit.ThetworoutesfollowedthesamegeneraldirectiontowardstheSyrianborder.ThepavedroadthatbecameRouteUraniumhadbeenbuiltalongtheoilpipelinetoSyria,andevenwhileSaddamHusseinwasinpower,ithadbeenreservedfor military and government traffic. With its controlled access,straightcourse,andfrequentMAPpatrols,RouteUraniumwastheIraqversionofasuperhighway,despitetheoccasionalIEDcrater.RouteBronze,incontrast,wasalocalrouteofcrowdedroadsconnectingvillagesalongthewestbankoftheEuphrates.ThethreatofambushorIEDwasmuchhigheronRouteBronze,socoalitiondriverssimplytriedtokeepmovingwhentheywereonit. Controlling civilian and military traffic at the Bronze-UraniumSplitwascritical,soCharlieCompanytypicallykeptaplatoonofMarinesatthecheckpoint.21

As1/23settledin,activitiesinnearbyFallujahwerechangingthedynamicsofthearea.Whilenotimmediatelyapparent, there was a significant spike in the number of insurgentsinHit,probablyasaresultofawidely-expectedCoalitionoperationtoclearFallujah100kilometerstothesoutheast.1stMarineDivisionhadclearedpartsof

FallujahhthepreviousApril,buthadbeenwithdrawnbeforetheirworkwascomplete.Thistime,theyweredeterminedthatOperationalFajrwouldchangethebalanceofpowerinFallujahinfavoroftheCoalition.22

Intelligence officers from 1/23 said that three factors contributedtotheincreaseininsurgentactivitiesinHit.23First,localpolicewereineptatbest,andmorelikelycomplicitinmanyinsurgentactivities.Forexample,inone firefight between insurgents and Coalition forces, menwearingpoliceuniformsfoughtwiththeinsurgents.24Second,Hit’sCityCouncilexhibitednointerestintryingto curtail insurgent activities, claiming that foreign fighters wereaCoalitionproblemsincetheCoalitionhadfailedtosecureIraq’sbordersafterthefallofBaghdad.Third,aninformalarrangementbetweenpriortrooprotationsandtheCityCouncillimitedCoalitionpresenceinHit,sotheCoalitionlackedgoodintelligence.MadeatatimewhenHitwasrelativelyquiet,thearrangementprovidedthatsolongasHit’spoliceandCityCouncilprovidedsecurity,Coalitionforcesessentiallywouldstayout.25Asaresult,insurgentactivitieswentuncheckedforsolongthatinsurgentstookcontrolofHit,patrollingwithAK-47assault rifles and bullying the residents. This took place at atimewhentheCoalitionclaimedthatHitwasamodelofIraqiself-governance.

AsMarineslearnedmoreabouttheAO,theinsurgentthreatbecamemoreevident.Forexample,MarinessuspectedthatanIraqiknowninformallyas,“TheMadMortarman,”wassupplyingmunitionsandothersupporttotheinsurgency.26WhentheyconductedasearchofhishomeneartheEuphratesRiver,theyfound,amongotheritems,16artilleryrounds,22mortarrounds,10grenades,twoRPGlaunchersandassociatedrounds,twoAK-47automatic rifles, 291 blasting caps, 15 landmine detonators, andavarietyofIraqipoliceandNationalGuarduniforms.

By early October, the insurgent influence in Hit had grown to such an extent that many wore uniforms identified withtheinsurgency,includingblackdisdashisandscarves.Atcheckpoints,theyintimidatedHit’scitizensandpolice.EvenmembersoftheIraqiNationalGuardfromTurbahcomplained that insurgents would harass them, confiscating theirweaponsandmoneyastheycrossedtheHitbridgeenroutetoCampHit.27AstheMEFpreparedforoperationsinFallujah,thesituationinHitdeterioratedrapidly.28NatonskilearnedhowbrazenlyuniformedinsurgentswereoperatinginHitwhentheyambushedaconvoythatwasenroutefromBlueDiamondtoalAsadtopickupNatonskiafterameetingwiththeSecretaryofDefense.29

Onthemorningoftheambush,constructiononRouteUraniumrequiredthattheplatoonattheBronze-UraniumSplit divert all Coalition traffic to Route Bronze. At

��

0700,asthe1stMarineDivision’sJumpCommandPostapproachedTCP-1inHit,itwasattackedbyinsurgentsfiring three RPGs and hundreds of AK-47 rounds.30Thepersonal security detachment (PSD) returned fire as they movedthroughtheambush,onlytocomeunderattackagain seconds later on the north side of the traffic circle. Thesecondattackwassynchronized,initiatedbyanIEDthatwasatriggeredblastbetweenthesecondandthirdvehicles, followed by an RPG round and more AK-47 fire.

NoCoalitionforceswerewounded,buttheambushimmediatelyraisedHit’svisibilityatalllevelsofcommand.Asinformationonthisambushwaspassedamongvariousheadquarters,MarinesrealizedthatthingsinHitwerenotastheyhadonceseemed.UnderstandingthedynamicsofinsurgentactivityinHitbecameaninstantpriority,and1/23respondedwithanoperationthatwouldcometobeknownasthe“BattleforHit.”

The difference between what Marines expected to find inHitandwhattheyencounteredinthecomingdaysdemonstratedthattheCoalition’sintelligenceregardingHitwasoutdated.31ManythoughtthatHitheldarelativelysmallnumberofinsurgents.Asaresult,1/23’sinitialresponseincludedsendingarelativelysmallforce,areinforcedplatoon,toinitiatetheoperation.Asthebattalionlaterlearned,Hitcontainedatleast200to400insurgents,manyofwhomprovedtheywerecapableandprofessionalfighters by their tactics of firing and maneuvering.32Theseunknownforcesincludedawelltrainedinsurgentgroupknownas“TheStrikeForce,”thathadcometoHitinrecentweeks.33SubsequentintelligencerevealedthatTheStrike Force focused its attention on the traffic circle where theDivision’sJumpCPwasambushed.34

Wantingtolearnmoreaboutthecityquickly,StevensinitiatedactivitiesinHitwithinhours,insertingthreetwo-mansniperteamsandathree-mancounter-sniperteamonanelevatedrailroadtrestlemorethan500meterswestofTCP-1.35HealsosentareinforcedplatoonfromCompanyBtoTurbahwithtwomissions:checkthePoliceStation,whichwassuspectedofhavingfallenintoinsurgents’control,andestablishablockingpositionatthebridgeleadingfromHitintoTurbah.WhenthelargerforcesweptthroughHitinthedaysthatfollowed,Stevenswantedtheblocking position to prevent insurgents from fleeing into Turbah.36

Maj.MichaelA.Miller,CompanyB’scommandingofficer, knew Turbah presented considerable dangers to theCoalition.37WhilelittlewasknownaboutthenumberofinsurgentsinHitorTurbah,hesensedthatoneplatoon,eventhoughreinforced,mightbetoosmall.HealsoknewthatifMarinesinTurbahcameunderheavyattack,gettingreinforcements to that area would be difficult. The shortest

routefromalAsadtoTurbahwasthroughHit,whichpresentednumerousambushsites.Notingtheseconcerns,heaskedtosendasecondplatoonwiththeoriginalforce.Thisrequestwasdeniedbecausetherestofhiscompanywasneededfortheplannedfollow-onsweepthroughHit.38

Knowinghewassendingarelativelysmallforce,MillerorderedhisFirstPlatoon,leadbyCapt.R.Shane“Skinny”McGinty,tomovetoTurbah,clearthePoliceStation,andestablishtheblockingposition.39 In a significant decision thatundoubtedlypreventedseveralcasualties,MillerrequiredMcGintytomaneuvertheplatoonbyalongsoutherlyroute,travelingalmosttoRamadibeforecrossingtheEuphrates.ThisallowedFirstPlatoontoenterTurbahfromthesouth,avoidingHitandtheHitbridge.WhilethelengthyroutegaveMcGintyonlyashorttimetoplanhisportionoftheoperation,iteliminatedmostofthethreatofambushwhileprovidinghisplatoonwiththeelementofsurprise.40At2200,justfourhoursafterreceivingawarningorder,McGintyloaded53MarinesandcorpsmenontothreeHumveesandthreeheavilyarmedseven-tonsforasix-hourtriptoTurbah.

Hourslater,asMcGinty’sforceapproachedTurbah,1/23’ssnipersobservedaburstofinsurgentactivitynearTCP-1.41Asniperteamleader,Sgt.ByronHancock,reported that he saw five insurgents with weapons near TCP-1.Hancock’ssniperskilledoneinsurgent,causingtheotherstosinkbackintothecity.Overthenextfewhours,between100and150insurgentspositionedthemselvesalong Route Bronze, primarily around the traffic circle, positionedtocounteranyattackthatmightcomefromthewest.Inadditiontobeinguniformed,Hancocksaid,theseinsurgentsappearedtobedisciplined,well-organized,andwell-armed.

AsHancock’ssnipersobservedTCP-1,FirstPlatoonpreparedtostormtheTurbahpolicestation.Sinceintelligenceindicatedthatinsurgentsmightcontrolthestation,McGintywantedtobesurehisMarineswerereadyto fight.42Haltingshortofthepolicestation,McGinty’splatoon dismounted and made final preparations. At 0410, mostofhisMarineschargedintothePoliceStation,andtotheirsurprise,foundonlyafewsleepyIraqipolicemen.Whilethiswasinprocess,McGintysentaHumveeloadedwith five Marines and a sailor to the Hit bridge so they couldbeginlayingconcertinaandotherobstacles.Witheverythingseeminglyontrack,Capt.McGintyinstructedhisHumanExploitationTeam(HET)totelltheIraqipolicementohandovertheirweaponsandgohomeuntilthepolicemenreceivedfurtherinstructions.

Inretrospect,McGintysaid,releasingthepoliceatthatpointwasamistake.43Therewereclosetiesbetweensomepoliceandtheinsurgency,andsomeoneapparentlywarned

��

theinsurgentsoftheMarines’arrival.Withinminutesofreleasingthepolice,Marinesheard

Arabicinstructionsfromamosqueloudspeakerashortdistancefromthepolicestation.SoundingnothinglikethechantstheMarineshadbecomeaccustomedto,thewordssoundedmorelikeacalltoarmsthanacalltoprayers.Within a minute, McGinty’s Marines started taking fire.44From the east, the small arms fire of 15 to 20 insurgents camefromtheareasurroundingtheTurbahmosque.Fromthewest,insurgentsonthefarsideoftheEuphrateswerefiring RPGs and heavy machine guns from near the Sharqi Mosque,justupahillfromthepointwherethebridgemet Hit. While these fires originated 600 meters from the Turbah traffic circle, they worried McGinty much more thanthesmallarmscomingfromtherear.Thereweremoreinsurgentsacrosstheriver,theirweaponsweremore powerful, and they were firing over his team that had been positioning the concertina wire. When the firing started,twoMarinesimmediatelydrovetheHumveebackto the traffic circle, but the remaining four were trapped. Assessingtheirpredicament,theyquicklydroppedintoacoveredpositionbehindalowbutsubstantialmetalabutment.Huddledinthiscrampedspaceashundredsofroundsimpactedtheotherside,theyknewtheywererelativelysafebutwouldhavetomovebeforedaybreak.

Bythistime,McGintyhadmostofhisplatooninaperimeter around Turbah’s traffic circle. Except for snipers, theonlyforceoutsidehisperimeterwastheteamatthebridge.Withroundscomingfromtheeastandwest,he

also started to see muzzle flashes to the south, showing thatanintrepidgroupofinsurgentswastryingtomaneuverthrough the thick palm groves. With fire coming from threesides,McGintydecidedtoaskforhelp.Hetoldthebattalion’soperationcentertosendCompanyB’sreinforcements,whowerestandingbyatalAsad.Thenheaskedforimmediatecloseairsupport.TheVipersofHMLA-169hadAH-1CobrasandUH-1HueygunshipsstandingbytoprovidecloseairsupportfromalAsad,andtheyrespondedquicklytoMcGinty’sreportthathisMarineswereincombatinHit.AsaformerDirectAirSupportController,hewasfamiliarwithhelicoptercapabilities.Knowingthatreinforcementswereseveralhoursaway,hefocusedonusinghelicopterstoturnthetideofbattle.Fortyminuteslater,withnoForwardAirControllertoassisthim,45McGintyguidedthehelicoptersinto the area and directed a series of strafing runs in thepalmgrovesthatessentiallyhaltedtheinsurgents’progress.46UndercoverofthesecondCobrarun,theteamthathadbeenstrandedatthebridgesprinted300metersback to the traffic circle so they could rejoin the rest of the platoon.

WithallMarinesaccountedfor,McGintyrealizedthathisplatoonhadsurvivedtheinitialonslaughtintactwithonlyonewounded.OneMarinehadtakena7.62mmroundtohislegwhenmovingtheHumveefromthebridgetothetraffic circle, but no other injuries were reported. As more helicoptersjoinedtheattack,McGintyfeltincreasinglycomfortablewithhisposition.Ashelicoptersstoppedtheinsurgents’progress,hisMarinesstartedpickingoffinsurgents,includingsomewhohadclimbedpalmtreestotry to get better fields of fire on the Marines.

ThemorningalsowasbusyforCoalitionsnipersonthewestsideofHit.Lookingthroughnightvisiondevices,thesnipersquicklyrealizedthattheinsurgentscontrolledHit.47When Hit came alive with pre-dawn fires directed towards theBravoMarinesinTurbah,Hancock’ssnipersengagedinsurgentsatTCP-1.Hissnipersimmediatelybecametargetsforacounterattack,andinsurgentsalongRouteBronze opened up with mortar and heavy machine gun fire.

“I had not expected them to return fire,” Hancock said. “We started taking them down with our M40 rifles, which drovethembackintobuildingsandbehindwalls.Thenwebrought out our 50-caliber rifles, which could fire through walls.Afterthat,theinsurgentsbackedupintobuildings,from which they could no longer provide accurate fires.”

Bymid-morning,thethreattothesnipershadincreasedconsiderably,asinsurgentsnearTCP-1startedtorangetheirpositions.Hancockrealizedthattheyneededtobewithdrawnimmediately.Withinminutesofhisrequest,thesnipersclimbedaboardthetrucksofapassingmobile

Photo By Cpl. Paul W. LeichtMarine scout snipers Sgt. Byron Hancock (left) and Cpl. Geoffrey Flowers conduct surveillance from a rooftop during a foot patrol through a Ramadi area village with fellow reserve Marines with Company B, 1st Battalion, 23rd Marine Regiment, Dec. 27, 2004. Near the end of their deployment, snipers like Hancock and Flowers are passing on valuable lessons learned during Operation Iraqi Freedom II.

��

assaultplatoonandspedaway.Company B’s Second Platoon, which was the first wave

ofreinforcementsandincludedMiller,arrivedshortlythereafterinTurbahtoaugmentMcGinty’sbeleagueredforce.48UsingthesamesoutherlyapproachthatMcGintyhad used, they were met at the Turbah traffic circle by an immediate surge in small arms fire from the area around the Turbahmosque,policestation,andanearbyneighborhood.Inahurriedupdate,McGintytoldhiscompanycommanderthatinsurgentswereusingtheSharqiMosque,withitstallminaretprovidinganunobstructedviewofTurbah,todirectmortarsontohisMarines.Astheywerespeaking,MillerandMcGintysawaseriesofmortarrounds“walk”upthe road, coming closer and closer until eventually a five-round salvo hit the Turbah traffic circle.49ThispromptedanimmediateandmassiveMarinebarragetowardstheSharqiMosque,followedbyarequesttoheadquarterstoallowthejetsorhelicopterstobombthemosque.

AsMillerreorganizedtheCompanyBMarines,heorderedMcGintytofocusoncontrollingairsupportandlettheplatoonsergeantrunFirstPlatoon.50Millerthendispatchedateamtoengagetheinsurgentstohisrear,halting harassing fire and enabling Company B to focus ontheincreasingthreatposedbyinsurgentsmaneuveringthroughthepalmgrovesouthoftheroadthatconnectedtheTurbah traffic circle to the Hit bridge. Helicopter and small arms fire had not been able to stop the insurgents in the thick grove, so he requested support from the F-18s flying nearby.

“Theaviatorswereveryconcernedbecausethey

[CompanyB]alreadywere‘dangerclose[fordroppingordnancefromtheaircraft],’”Millersaid.“Wetoldthem[theaviators]thatthemachinegunroundstheywerefiring were not effective, so they [the F-18s] came in there with two passes. . . . They dropped a five hundred pounderapproximatelytwohundredtotwohundredandtwentymetersoffourposition,between[theMarines]andthe river, and followed up with two quick strafing runs by the helicopters. After that, fire on our side died down significantly.”

Withinsurgentsshutdowntotheeastandsouth,MillerandMcGintyfocusedoninsurgentmachinegunandmortarfire reaching the traffic circle from the Sharqi Mosque. Engagingamosquerequiredhigh-levelapproval,andRCT-7 demanded proof that the mosque was being used to fire onMarines.“Wewerestillgettingsnipedat,andwewerestill getting observed fire. At this point, we could see people on the walls of the mosque, and we were confident the fires werecomingfromthere,”Millersaid.51

WithpermissiontoengagetheSharqiMosque,Millerdecided to first attack a machine gun position in a three-storybuildinginfrontofthemosque.ACobrahelicopterfired a Maverick missile into the building, prompting ahugesecondaryexplosionthatdestroyedit,asecondbuilding,andanammunitionsiteinanearbystreet.Thisseries of explosions took the fight out of the insurgents, as fires from Hit essentially ceased.52

Afterviewinghelicoptervideolater,MillersaidtheMaverick’seffectwasdevastating.“Youcanseethe[three-story]buildingblow,andyoucanseethebuildingrightbehindthethree-storybuildingblow,almostlikeasympatheticdetonation.Thenyoucanseethishumongousexplosion and fireball in a street right behind the second building.That’swherewethinktheyhadtheirmortars.”53

The first day in Turbah and Hit had been a major success,asMarineskilledanumberofinsurgentswhilesustainingonlytworelativelyminorwounds.Theturningpoint,Millersaid,waswhenthebombscutoffinsurgentsinthepalmgroveandtheMaverickmissilesilencedactivityfromtheSharqiMosque.

There was sporadic firing, but none of consequence as MarinescontinuedtoreduceinsurgentpositionsinHit.The Regimental Commander drove to the Turbah traffic circletoreviewthesituation,andbymid-afternoonMillerhadreceivedtwomoreplatoons,TheirThirdPlatoonandRCT-7’sQuickReactionForce.Withtheadditionalfirepower, Miller expanded his perimeter throughout the night,maneuveringtwoplatoonsthroughthepalmgrovestotheriverbankwhilesendingoneplatoontoanelevatedpositionthatallowedittoobservemuchofTurbah.54Withcontinuedsupportfromhelicoptersandjets,Miller’s

Photo By Cpl. Paul W. LeichtSeen through night vision gear, a machine gunner with 3rd Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 23rd Marine Regiment, is positioned for security during a nightly cordon and knock raid around Ramadi, Iraq, Dec. 23. The raid was part of a larger effort to maintain security and stability by disrupting the insurgency prior to elections.

��

Marinesfeltsecure.Topreparefortheseconddayofoperations,Stevens

orderedhissniperstomovetoCampHit,wheretheylinkedupwithapproximatelyadozensniperteamsfromvariousreconnaissanceandspecialforcesunits.55HancocksaidtheteamsreturnedtotherailroadtracksearlyonthemorningofOctober12,wheretheysawmorethan10insurgentsinthevicinityofTCP-1,carryingweaponsandprovidingclearevidenceofhostileintent.Mostworeblackuniforms,butsomewerewearingtheuniformofIraqipolice.56Hancocksaidtheseconditionsmadehimfeellikehewasparticipatingina“turkeyshoot.”

“Theinsurgentsknewwherewewere,andtheywerefiring at us,” he said. “There was a big athletic field on our sideofthecity,andithadalargecachewheretheywouldgoforweapons.Wewoulddropthemwhiletheywereenroutetotheweaponscache,andalsowhentheywerecomingout.Sometimestheywouldpopoutandshootatus,testingouraccuracy,andwewouldtakethemthere.”57

Hancock had two confirmed hits during this operation, oneat900yardsandtheotherat960yards.Foroneofthose,hesaid,hisobserverspottedaninsurgentusingascopetosearchforCoalitionsnipers.Hancockquicklyshottheinsurgent,butafterthat,“thewholecityopeneduponus,andacoupleofourguysgothitinthefacewithshrapnelfromheavymachinegunroundsthatglancedoffthenearbyrailroadtracks.”58Thesniperteamswerewithdrawn,havingaccomplishedtheirmissionofdisruptingtheinsurgents.

ForCompanyB,theseconddaywasveryquiet.59Millerhadimprovedpositions,pushinghisMarinesintoareasalongtheriverthatwouldallowthemtocontrolpartsofHit by fire. While sniper teams engaged insurgents along RouteBronzeandatTCP-1,Miller’sMarinessawfewarmedmenintheeasternsideofHitonthesecondday.Byapproximately 1700, he said, RCT-7 ordered a cease fire in HitandTurbah.

TuckerdecidedtousethethirddaytoclearHit.Thatmorning,hisstaffstartednegotiatinganagreementwithHit’scitycounselforatrucethatwouldallownoncombatantstoleaveHit.Inthelatemorning,elementsof1/8fromHadithaDam,reinforcedbyacompanyfrom3rdLAR,startedsweepingthroughHitfromTCP-1.Withinsixhours,thetaskforcehadgonethroughHitwithoutasingle shot being fired by either insurgents or Coalition forces.Tosignalthatitwassecure,TuckerrodethroughHitandlinkedupwithCompanyBontheHitbridge.60WhileMarineshopedinsurgentswouldtrytotesttheirblockingposition,theinsurgentsinsteadsimplymeltedbackintothecity.

The Battle for Hit was significant on several levels. On

theground,Marineswereabletoengageinsurgentsinalarge-scaleforce-on-forcebattle.Usingcombinedarmseffectivelyandarmedwithsuperiorequipmentandtraining,Marines were able to inflict significant damage on the insurgencywhilesustainingonlyminorwounds.ForseniorMarineheadquarters,however,theBattleforHitservedasanominouswarningthatthereweremanyinsurgentactivities,particularlyalongtheWesternEuphratesRiverValley,thatwerenotclearlyunderstoodorappreciatedbytheCoalition.

SoonaftertheBattleforHit,CompanyBwasabletoparticipateinIMEF’sassaultonFallujahinNovember.Attachedto3rdLightAmphibiousReconnaissanceBattalion,CompanyBwaspartofagroundattackonapeninsulasurroundedonthreesidesbytheEuphratesRiver.61AtthetipofthepeninsulawasahospitalthatinsurgentshadusedeffectivelyduringOperationVigilantResponse,thebattleforFallujahthepreviousApril.ThehospitalwasconnectedtoFallujahbyaskeletalmetalbridgethathadbecomeinfamouswheninsurgentsstrungupthemutilatedbodiesoftwoBlackwatercontractorsambushedinFallujahinMarch2004.

1stMarineDivisionwasdeterminedtopreventinsurgentsfromusingthehospitalareaagain,soitsentacombinedforceofIraqiandAmericantroopstosecurethepeninsulabeforeinitiatingthemaineffort.TheattackwasdesignedtocompletetheisolationofFallujahfromthewest,whileotherunitsisolatedthecityfromtheeastandsouth.62The36thIraqiCommandoBattalionseizedthehospital.Someinsurgentsthoughtthiswasthemainattack,so they called their fighters to battle stations a full day beforetherealattackbeganfromthenorth.63

DuringtheBattleforFallujah,Hancockreceivedcreditfor the longest confirmed sniper kills since the start of OIF,whenheshottwoforwardobserversforaninsurgentmortarteamat1,050yards.ThishappenedseveraldaysintoOperationalFajr,afterinsurgentshadworkedthemselvesintoapositiontotherearof1/23’spositionsonthepeninsula.Hancocksaidthataninsurgent120mmmortar team had been firing occasional rounds in the vicinity of Company B, and finally dropped rounds near the company’scommandpost.Toldtoreporttothecompanycommander, Hancock said that Miller pointed his finger at him and said, “You find that mortar team and you kill them!”64

Withindays,hesaid,heandhisobserver,Cpl.GeoffreyFlowers, found a five-man team dragging the 120mm mortaroutofahouseandsettingupforanothersalvoatCompany B. Flowers immediately requested a fire mission fromCompanyB’s60mmmortars.AsFlowersworkedupdata for the requested fire mission, Hancock determined

��

that his shot to the first forward observer would be from a distanceof1,050yards.Threeinsurgentswereoperatingthemortar,andtheothertwowereforwardobservers.Working with Flowers, Hancock timed his first M-40 shot so it would be fired when the first mortar rounds, aimed atthenearby120mmmortartube,landed.Synchronizingthese events meant that the sound of the rifle fire would belostinthemortarexplosions,maskingthefactthatinsurgentswerebeingtargetedbysnipersaswellasmortars.

The first salvo of mortars missed the insurgents by 200 meters, but Hancock’s first shot was dead on, dropping the first observer immediately. As Flowers struggled to adjustthemortars,Hancocktoldhimtohavethemortarteamshift200meterstotheright.Withinseconds,thenextsalvowasenroute,andHancockagainusedthesoundofthe exploding mortar rounds to conceal his fire. His second shotdroppedtheotherforwardobserver,whileatthesametimethe60mmmortarroundsfoundtheirtargets,killingthethreeinsurgentswhomadeupthe120mmmortarteam.65

Other Operations

WhiletheBattleforHitclearlywas2/23’smostsignificant action during the deployment, the battalion alsoparticipatedinanumberofotheroperations.Aspartofaprovince-wideefforttoincreasesecurity,1stMarineDivisionlaunchedOperationRiverBlitzinFebruary,2005.WhilemuchofRiverBlitzwasfocusedinRamadi,itincludedactivitiesinHitandHaditha.Hancockwastaskedwithconductingcounter-sniperoperationsinHittoeliminateasniperwhowassubsequentlydeterminedtobeofSyrianorigin.66HancocksaidthatthesniperhadbeenshootingatcoalitionforcesandcausingproblemsinHitforsometime.

Hancock’steamwasinsertedintoHitonFebruary22,andtheywereimpressedwiththeiropponent’straining.“Hewasusinghidesiteseffectivelyandmovingfrequently,” Hancock said. “He might fire only a few roundseachday,buthehadkilledseveralpeopleinthevicinityofHit.”67

Hancockspenttwodaysobservingthesniperandtryingtoconsiderthesituationfromhisopponent’sperspective.This exercise allowed Hancock to figure out where a sniper wouldpositionhimselftotargetCoalitionforcesfromHit.Aftertakingthetimetogainaclearunderstandingofhisopponent,hesaid,accomplishingthemissionwassimplyamatterofpatience.Hancock’steamspentlonghourssearchingfortheirprey.TheSyriansniperhelpedbyfiring a round in their direction. Knowing the approximate

directionanddistancetothehidesite,theywereabletospottheenemy’shidesitelaterthatday.

Thefollowingmorning,theSyrianmadethemistakeofreturningtothesamehidesite.That,Sgt.Hancocksaid,provedtobeafatalmistake.

AstheSyrianpeeredthroughhisscopeatpossibleCoalitiontargets,Hancockcaughttheglimmerofareflection off the scope. With this fix on the sniper’s position,hepreparedforashot.Withinminutes,thesniperfired one round. Hancock immediately fired one of his own, killingthesniper.Approximatelyanhourlater,hesaid,sixmeninblackdishdashascametothehidesiteandcarriedofftheremainsofthesniper.HancockreportedthattheresidentsofHitexpressedtheirreliefthattheinsurgentsniperhadbeenkilled.

��

�rd Battalion��th Marines

3rdBattalion,25thMarinescametoIraqduringaperiodofgreattransition.1AlmosttwoyearsafterthefallofBaghdadandmorethanayearafterMarineshadreturnedinforcetoIraq,itwasclearthatthethreeMarine regimental combat teams (RCTs) were fighting remarkablydifferentbattlesintheirrespectivesectorsoftheAnbarProvince.Insurgentsuseddifferentmethodsofopposing the Coalition and fledgling Iraqi government. SomeemplacedIEDsortargetedU.S.forcesandciviliancontractors. Others kidnapped and intimidated officials andreligiousleaderswhowereassistingtheCoalition.Throughoutthecountry,vastlydifferenttypesandlevelsofprogresswerebeingreported.Inadditiontothesechallenges,almostallMarinestaffsandunits,fromforceanddivisiontobattalionsandsquadrons,wereinthemidstofamajorturnover.2

During3/25’stour,fromMarchtoSeptemberof2005,theMarineCorpsadjusteditsapproachtoaccountforthedifferentexperiencesRCTswerereporting.AsuccessfuloperationinFallujahthepreviousNovemberallowedMarinestoreallocatesomeforcestotheWesternEuphratesRiverValley.3/25’sparentcommand,RCT-2,begantofocusonrivercitiesandinsurgenthavensalongtraditionaltraderoutesbetweenBaghdadandtheSyrianborder.

WhenRCT-2tookoverinMarch,itsmissionwastodisruptinsurgentactivitythroughoutthearea.ThisrequiredRCT-2toobtainaclearerunderstandingofwhathadbeenarelativelyambiguousintelligenceandoperationalpicture.Asaneconomyofforceoperation,ithad3,200MarinesandSailorsforanareastretchingover30,000squaremiles.EarlyoperationsfocusedondeterminingthelocationofinsurgentsinordertocreateopportunitiesfortargetingAlQaedainMesopotamianetworks.OthermissionsincludedcounteringtheIEDthreat,keepingtheMainSupplyRoutes(MSRs)open,andconductingcounterinsurgency(COIN)operationstoenhancesecurityandsetthestagefortheintroductionofIraqiforceswhentheybecameavailable.

Theincomingstaffs,whichhadmoretimetoprepareforthedeploymentthantheirpredecessors,broughtanincreasedsenseofaggressivenesstocounter-insurgencyoperations.IntheSunni-dominatedregionthatstretchedfromRamaditotheSyrianborder,Col.StephenW.Davis,theRCT-2commander,clearlywantedto“pokethehornetsnests”todeterminewhereinsurgentswerelocatedandhow

theywouldrespond.Davisgave3/25anAOthatextendedfromsouthof

Hit to north of the Haditha Dam. Directed to leave a rifle companyatalAsadforbasesecurity,3/25’scommander,Lt.Col.LionelUrquhart,hadenoughmanpowertoputareinforced rifle company at both Camp Haditha Dam, near themajorcityofHadithainthenorthwest,andCampHit,nearthecityofHitinthesoutheast.3Thesetwocitiesweretheanchorsofhisareaofoperations,connectedbyachainofvillagesalongthewestsideoftheEuphratesRiver,andtheoccasionalvillageontheeastside.UrquhartplacedhisbattalionheadquartersatCampHadithaDamanddividedWeaponsCompanyandHeadquartersandServicesCompanybetweenthetwobases.Thisdispositionallowedhimtofocusoninsurgent-controlledareaswhiletryingtokeepMSRUranium,andtosomedegreeMSRBronze,clearofIEDs.

3/25conductedmostofitspatrolsandoperationsonthewestsideoftheEuphratesRiverbecauseCoalitionbases,MSRs,andpopulationcenterswereonthatsideandbecausefewbridgescouldhandleheavymilitaryvehicles.Significant operational concerns, like how long it would takeforaquickreactionforcetorespondtoanattack,limitedthenumberoftimes3/25insertedMarinesontheeastside.DavisencouragedhisbattalionstoworkontheeastsideoftheEuphratesbecausesolittlewasknownaboutthearea,butasapracticalmatter,itwassimplymoredifficult and dangerous to operate there.

While3/25facedadauntingseriesofmissions,Urquharthad a force sufficient to keep Marines on the roads and eventuallyclearHitofinsurgentsandestablishtwobaseswithintheformerinsurgentstronghold.4

Operation al-Fajr, conducted in Fallujah just five months before3/25’sarrival,hadpromptedmanyinsurgents,likeAbuMusabal-Zarqawi,tomovetosmallercitiesalongtheEuphratesRiverValley.InanefforttobringmoreattentiontotheareabetweenBaghdadandSyria,Davisplannedtoaggressivelyusehisbattalionstotesttheinsurgencyanddeterminethelocationsofmajornetworks.HealsoplannedtouseembeddedmediatobringattentiontotheregionbydescribinghowsmallervillagesontheEuphratesRiverValleywestofRamadihadbecomehometomanyhigh-valueinsurgentsandtheiroperations.5

Oneof3/25’sprimarymissionswasmaintainingsecurity

��

alongMSRsandroadsneartheEuphrates,fromjustsouthofHittojustnorthoftheHadithahDam.TheAnbarProvinceisthemostsparselypopulatedpartofIraq,withmostofits1.8millionpeople6livinginvillagesalongthefertilelandnexttotheEuphratesRiver.7Withtheriver,roads,andopendesertprovidingeasymobility,theregionhadbeenasmugglers’paradiseforcenturies.Insurgentstookadvantageofthisbypreparingweaponscachesandsafehousesthroughouttheregion.8Insurgents,especiallyforeign fighters who typically crossed into Iraq from Syria, conductedviciousmurderandintimidationcampaignsagainstcitizensintherivertowns.

Before3/25arrived,ReserveMarinesfrom1/23hadbeenstretchedthinalongthissectionoftheEuphrates,conductinganeconomyofforcemissionthatgrewinimportanceasthenumbersofIEDsandcasualtiesgrew.9Inpreviousrotations,Marinespatrolledfromafewlargeandverysecurebases.Establishingapresenceinaclearedvillagewasnotpossiblebecauseofthelimitednumberofavailabletroops.WhenDavistookchargeofthisregion,hewantedinsurgentstoknowthingshadchangedandtheywould not find this area to be an uncontested sanctuary. He alsowantedtodisruptinsurgentoperationsbychanginganypatternsthatmighthavebeeninadvertentlysetbypreviousCoalitionunits.Heplannedtocutofftheinsurgents’lifelinealongtheEuphrates,inpartbyestablishingaMarinepresenceincertaincitiesandvillages.

Operation River Bridge

Davisimmediatelyput3/25toworkduringtheturnoverphase,instructingUrquharttoconductthebattalion’sfirst operation in country. Considered relatively low-risk, OperationRiverBridgewasdesignedtogetMarinesoutofthecampsandontotheMSRs,familiarizing3/25withtheareawhilemaskingthescheduledrotationsofMarinesateveryechelon.10

“ColonelDavissaidhewasgoingtoworkushard,andthatwewouldbeexhaustedbythetimewegotbackhome.Hewastruetohisword,”Urquhartsaid.Withhissmaller battlespace, Urquhart felt he had sufficient assets to keepinsurgentsoffbalancebyincreasingthenumberandaggressivenessofoperations.11

Thisaggressiveness,coupledwithasaseriesofunusualevents, led to a significant number of casualties.12Inthefirst three years of Operation Iraqi Freedom, no other battalion,activeorreserve,hadsufferedsuchlosses.WithMarinesprimarilyfromOhio,NewYork,WestVirginia,Oklahoma,andTexas,3/25becameknownasthebattalionthatlost49Marinesandsailors13bytheendofitsseven-month deployment. The battalion experienced its first

fatalityduringOperationRiverBridge,whenCpl.BrianRichardson,apopularradiooperatorforCompanyK,waskilledwhentheHumveehewasapassengerinstruckamine.14FourotherswereinjuredinthisexplosionjustoutsideCampHit,15adesertedIraqimilitarybasethathadbeenconvertedforusebyseveralhundredMarinesandIraqiNationalGuardsmen.

UrquhartsaidRichardson’sdeathreinforcedthefactthateverycornerof3/25’sareaofoperationscarriedapossibilityofdeathorinjury,eventherelativelysecurebasecamps.

“WhileCpl.Richardson’sdeathdidnotstopus,itdefinitely brought home the reality of what we were doing,” Urquhartsaid.“Thebattalionwassaddenedbyhisdeath,butwedroveon.WehadknownitwasarealpossibilitythatweweregoingtotakecasualtiesgoingintoIraq.Onthewhole,Cpl.Richardson’sdeathonlymadeusmoreresolved,aswewerenotgoingtobeintimidated.Hewasour first, but we knew he was not going to be our last.”16

Threeweekslater,Cpl.MichaelB.Lindemuthwaskilledbyamortarround.17Anactive-dutyMarineonWeaponsCompany’sInspector-Instructorstaff,hewaskilledwhena120mmmortarlandedinCampHit’smotorpool.

Operation Outer Banks

DuringApril,theBattalionparticipatedinanumberofsmalleroperationscollectivelyknownasOperationOuterBanks.18Withthegeneralmissionsofinterdictinginsurgents,locatingcaches,andclearingvillages,thebattalionconductedaseriesofthreeandfourdayoperationsinBarwanah,Baghdadi,AbuHyatt,Muhammadi,Kubasyah,Haditha,andHaqlaniyah.Inadditiontothrowinginsurgentsoffstride,OuterBankswasdesignedtoshowIraqisthatMarinesweresteppingupoperationsthroughouttheHit-HadithaCorridor.UrquhartsaidthatafterOuterBanks,insurgentsknewthattheCoalitionhadmoreMarinesintheregionandweredeterminedtoprevail.ToanIraqipopulationforcedtohedge its bets, walking a fine line between Coalition and insurgentforces,theactivityseemedreassuring.OperationOuterBankshadastrongimpactontheinsurgency,Urquhartsaid,asscoresofinsurgentsweredetained,hundreds were forced to flee, and dozens were killed. The most significant aspect of Outer Banks was that insurgents weredrivenoutofoneoftheirstrongpointsinthevillageofHaqlaniyah,southofHaditha.

Ambush at Haditha Hospital

Astheybecamemoreactivethroughoutthearea,3/25

��

Marines accepted that they were fighting a determined insurgency with some innovative foreign fighters. While adheringtotheCoalition’sRulesofEngagementandthelawsofwar,theirexperiencesquicklytaughtthemthatinsurgentswerenotconstrainedbysuchrestrictions.ThatfactwasdrivenhomeonMay7,whenMobileAssaultPlatoon(MAP)7,aheavyweaponsteamthatUrquhart

frequentlytraveledwith,washitbyacomplexattackthatincludeda“suicidevehicle-borneimprovisedexplosivedevice”(SVBIED),rocketpropelledgrenades(RPGs),andsmallarms.TheattackcamefrompreparedpositionsintheHadithaHospital,afterinsurgentsorderedpatientsanddoctorsawayfromthefrontofthebuilding.19

MAP7consistedof16MarinesandonecorpsmanloadedintothreeHumveesandoneseven-tontruck.TwoofthevehicleswerearmedwithM2407.62mmmachineguns,onewitha50-calibermachinegun,andonewithaMark19grenadelauncher.Duringtheevening,MAP7wenttoHadithaastheQuickResponseForce(QRF),withordersto clear an area from which insurgents had been firing on Marines.Followingtwotanks,MAP7reachedthecity’scenterasnightfell.Findingthenarrowstreetblockedbyavehicleandotherobstacles,theMarinesrecognizedthesignsofapreparedambush.

ManyMarinesgotoutoftheirvehiclestoprovideadditionalsecurityandmobilityasthevehicleswereturnedaround.Suddenly,avanwheeledintotheirmidstfromanalleybesidetheHadithaHospital.Itexplodedbetweentwovehicles,killingthreeMarinesandseriouslyinjuredseveralothers.20AsMarinesrecoveredfromtheblast,RPGs, machine guns and small arms fire rained down from

severalpositions,mostlyfromwithinthehospital,killingtheMAP’scorpsmen.21

Amid the chaos of a burning Humvee and heavy fires, Cpl.JeffreySchullersteppedintohisHumvee’sturrettoreplacehiswoundedgunner,LanceCpl.MarkKalinowski.Overthenexttenminutes,Schullerpumpedout750roundsof 7.62mm ammunition from the M240 machine gun, firing primarilyintothehospital.Theselengthyburstsexceededthegun’scapabilities,particularlyinahotenvironment.ButSchullerfelthehadnochoice,andwassurprisedthatthemachinegunnevermalfunctioned.Whenitwastimeto reload, he would fire the M-16 Kalinowski handed him untiltheinjuredMarinecouldgetanewammunitionbeltintothemachinegun.

Whilethetwotankspositionedthemselvesforahastydeparture,MarinesdiscoveredthatonlytheMAP’sseven-ton had any chance of moving. It had three flat tires, anemptyradiator,noheadlights,andadashboardwithwarninglightsblinkinglikeaChristmastree.Asbadasitseemed,thefactthatitcouldmovemeantitwasbetterthantheotherthreevehicles.WithSchullerprovidingmachineguncover,thefewhealthyMarinesstarteddodging fire to load their wounded friends on the truck. In additiontothreedeadMarines,theycarriedseveralwithlife-threateningwounds.Astaffsergeantwithatourniquetaroundonethighrealizedthatbothlegswerebleedingbadly.WithallbutonebodyrecoveredandSchullerproviding M-16 fire from the seven-ton’s cab, Lance Cpl. ToddCorbindrovethroughthedarkstreetsofHadithatotheHadithaDamtogetmedicalassistance.22Afollow-onQRFreachedthesceneoftheambushwithinminutes,recoveredthelastMarine,andclearedthehospitalofthefewremaininginsurgents.

This was 3/25’s first major loss. It affirmed two lessons ofinsurgentwarfare:expecttheunexpected,anddon’texpecttheenemytofollowtherules.

Operation Matador

OnthenightMAP7wasambushed,CompanyLMarineswere at Camp al Qa’im, in the final stages of preparing for aregimentaloperation.DavisdesignedOperationMatadortouseelementsofhistwoinfantrybattalions,3/2and3/25,foramajorsweepintotheRamanasectiononthenorthsideoftheEuphrates.23NoCoalitionforceshadbeeninthisareaformorethansixmonths.Davisattached3/25’sCompanyLto3rdBattalion,2ndMarines,underthecommandofLt.Col.TimothyS.Mundy.24

TheRamanaareaisaseriesofvillagesstartingneartheSyrianborderandrunningalongthenorthshoreoftheEuphratesRiverforapproximately20kilometers.Since

Photo By Cpl. Ken Melton

Sgt. James A. Angelone, a squad leader with Company K, 3rd Battalion, 25th Marines, watches as his younger brother, Pfc. Francis B. Angelone, sights in a potential threat during a mission.

�0

mostIraqislivedonthesouthsideoftheEuphratesandonlyonebridgeintheregionwascapableofcarryingheavymilitaryvehicles,theCoalitionkeptmostmissionsonthesouthsideoftheEuphrates.Thisallowedinsurgentstousethenorthsideasasanctuary,withlittlethreatofCoalitioninterferenceastheystoredweapons,movedthroughouttheregion,andpreparedforfutureoperations.WithOperationMatador,Daviswantedtochangethatdynamic.BorrowingelementsfromtheArmy’s20thEngineerBrigade,DavisinstructedMundytosetupapontoonbridgetocrosstheEuphratesnearthefarmingvillageofUbaydi.25Onceacross,theMarinesweretosweepthroughRamanatotheSyrianborder.Supportedbytanks,Amtracks,LARs,andapowerfulmixtureofjetsandhelicopters,Mundyplannedtoleadwithtwoheavilyreinforcedcompanies,K,3/2andL,3/25.

MundymovedhismassiveforcefromalQa’imtoUbaydiatnightsoArmyengineerscouldpositionheavyequipment by first light.26Buildingthe200-meterbridgewasscheduledtotakeonlyafewhours,butsoftsandthwartedthattimeline.27At0800,ashundredsofMarineswaitedimpatientlyintheopendesert,theleadelementscame under fire from mortars and small arms from New Ubaydi, a modern village. The harassing fires had little effectonthewaitingMarines,butaftertwohoursofintensifying fires, and with a sense that bridge would not be ready soon, Mundy and his operations officer, Maj.JohnDay,decidedtodealwithNewUbaydi.Asthefires continued, Mundy cleared his plan with Davis, then instructedthecompaniestopreparetoconductalimitedobjectiveattackonNewUbaydi.

NewUbaydicrowdedseveralhundredhomesinaspacenolargerthanasquaremile.Whilenotknownasasafehaven,Marinesquicklylearnedthatitcontainedscoresofinsurgents, including dozens of well-trained foreign fighters capable of fighting a withdrawing action.28FormanyMarines, this first taste of intense combat seemed chaotic, with heavy fires coming from all directions. Their leaders orchestratedthemovementsofthereinforcedcompanies,coordinatingaircoverfromhelicoptersandjets.Someinsurgents tried to flee by boarding small boats to cross the river.Thesemovementswereseenwithunmannedaerialvehicles,allowingRCT-2tocutthemoffwithtacticalaircraft.

Both companies conducted house-to-house fighting to cleartheirassignedsectionsofNewUbaydi.1stSgt.DanAltieriofCompanyLdescribedtheNewUbaydibattleasan “up-close fight,” with Marines throwing hand grenades andusingpoint-and-shoottechniquesthroughoutthebuilt-uparea.Whilemanyhousescontainedonlywomenandchildren, Marines frequently encountered teams of five or

sixinsurgentsinthestreetsorontheroofs.Usingpreparedpositions, insurgents would fire long bursts, then abandon bothweaponsandtheirpositionwhenammunitionranlow.29Fromnarrowvillagestreetsorrooftops,theywouldmovetonewpositionsandre-engage.AsAltierimovedthroughthecity,hewassurprisedbytheinexhaustiblesupply of new AK-47 assault rifles and RPK machine guns availabletotheinsurgents.Thiswaschallenging,hesaid,becauseMarineswouldthinktheyhadworndownateam,only to find that it had moved to another position with a freshsupplyofweaponsandammunition.

AltierisaidMarinesnipersprovedtobecrucialinNewUbaydi.30 Establishing positions on rooftops, snipers fired oninsurgentsmaneuveringthroughstreets.Insomecases,theyengagedinsurgentsmovingtowardsotherMarinepositionsbeforetheotherMarinesevenknewofthethreat. As the fight progressed, snipers adopted the tactic ofjumpingfromrooftoroof,whichinmanycaseswereseparated by only a few feet. The snipers also flushed out many insurgents who were then fired upon by helicopters.

Company L took no significant casualties for most of theday,butthisgoodfortuneranoutwhenasquadfrom1stPlatoonapproachedwhathadbeendesignatedasthe“lasthouse”fortheday.ItwasnotuntilthenextdaythatMarinesrealizedthehousehadbeenpreparedinawaytheyhad never seen before, allowing insurgents to fire armor piercing rounds up through the cement floor.31Whenthefirst fireteam entered the house, Cpl. Dustin A. Derga was killedbyanarmorpiercingroundtohisbackandtwootherMarinesandacorpsmanwerewounded.32

Not knowing where the fires were coming from, Staff Sgt.AnthonyL.Goodwin,Derga’splatoonsergeant,andLanceCpl.MarkCampwentintoclearthehouse.Theirinitial bursts flushed out two insurgents, who were brought down outside the house by fire from nearby Marines. As GoodwinandCampworkedtheirwaythroughthehouse,theysawastaircasewithashortclosetunderneathit.Campfired a burst into the closet through its door, but when Staff Sgt.Goodwinopenedthedoor,hewasmetwithahailofbullets that came up from the floor.33

Marines realized the foreign fighters in the house had planned to fight to their death. At some point, the enemy startedscreaming,“AllahuAkbar”(“Godisgreat”)astheyfired rounds with enough punch to cut through the floor and walls,threateningMarinesoutsidethehouse.34

Stillunsureoftheenemy’slocationinthehouse,Marines had a tank fire seven main gun rounds into it. WithMarinesstillhearingvoicesinthehouseasdarknessapproached,theycalledforanF/A-18tosilencetheinsurgentswithtwo500-poundbombs.35 The first failed to explodeandthesecondmissedthehouse.Thatnight,as

�1

Marinestriedtomakesenseofwhathadhappened,theycouldstillheartheoccasionaltauntof“AllahuAkbar,”whicheventuallyfadedoutduringthenight.

Thefollowingmorning,MarinesdestroyedsectionsofthehousewithtwoSMAWrounds.36Astheywalkedthroughtherubble,theydiscoveredthatpositionshadbeenpreparedinthecrawlspaceunderthecloset.Inessence,theenemyhaddugtheirownshallowgravesthatallowedthem to fire up through the floor.37Seeingtwobodiesinthespace, Marines tossed in a final grenade to ensure that there werenosurvivors.Bydawn’slight,Marinescouldseehowthearmor-piercingroundsandafewsmallaimingholescutinto the floor had allowed insurgents to create fields of fire frombelow.

ThissurprisefromOperationMatadorconvincedembedded reporters that foreign fighters were a significant force.38Physicalcharacteristicsofthedead,aswellasexpensiveequipmentthatincludedbodyarmor,suicidevests,andothersophisticatedexplosives,convincedAltierithatCompanyL’sMarineshadfoughtthe“ATeam”offoreign fighters.39

ForCompanyLMarines,Altierisaid,NewUbaydimarkedaturningpoint.

“ThisiswheretheMarinesbecamecombatwarriors,”hesaid.“Before,inplaceslikeHadithaandBarwanah,thefighting was a hundred or two hundred meters away. There werenocloseengagements.InNewUbaydi,Marinesweregetting confirmed kills from ten feet away. We were firing andmaneuvering,withMarinesthrowinghandgrenadeswithintenortwentymetersattheinsurgents,punchingthrough houses. One of our snipers got seven confirmed killsthatday.Inmyopinion,hesavedalotofMarines,becausehepickedoffinsurgentsastheyweremaneuvering.That’swherealotofthesepoint-blankencountershappened.Luckyforus,ourMarineswerequickeratthetrigger.40

“Underthoseextremeconditions,[theMarines]foughtferociouslyandcourageously,”Altierisaid.“Youcouldnotaskforanythingmoreofaunit.Evenaftertheygotwounded,theywerewillingtoexposethemselvestosmallarms fire and machine gun fire to save their buddies by pulling them out of the line of fire.”41

Lt.Col.MundyalsowasimpressedwiththewaytheReserveMarineskeptgoingaftertheytookcasualtiesinNewUbaydi.

“Deathisawakeupcall,remindingyouthatwhatyou’redoingisreal.Whileittakesyoubackalittlebit,[CompanyL]keptpressing,”Mundysaid.“TheyhadtogointotherubbleofonebuildinganddigoutthebodyofoneoftheirMarines,whichhasgottobeatoughthingtodo.Buttheypackedup,rolledacrosstheriverandthencoveredalotof

areaonthenorthernside.”42

WiththebridgereadyandnofurtheroppositionfromNewUbaydi,MarinesmovedacrosstheEuphratesonMay9.Theyencounteredlittleresistance,butfoundplentyofimprovisedexplosivedevicesandweaponscaches.FirstPlatoon,stillrecoveringfromthedeathsofGoodwinandDerga,receivedanewplatoonsergeantthefollowingday.StaffSgt.KendallH.IvyIIeagerlyrespondedtoarequirement to fill the vacant position left by Goodwin’s death.AsanexperiencedinfantryMarine,Ivywascomfortabletakinghispositioninthetroopcommander’shatch. He addressed his platoon the first day, but never metmanyofhisMarines.Thenextday,asCompanyLmovedtoavillageneartheSyrianborder,anIEDmadefromartilleryshellsexplodedunderhisAmtrack.ItblewStaffSgt.Ivyoutofthetroopcommander’shatch,cutatwo-foot-wideholeinthethickarmor,andcreatedaninferno that fired off other ordinance in the Amtrack.43FourMarinesdiedatthescene,andtwomore,includingIvy,diedshortlythereafter.

HundredsofMarinesfromdozensofunitsparticipatedinOperationMatador,butfateseemeddeterminedtodestroyonesquad,theFirstSquadofCompanyL’sFirstPlatoon.TheseMarineshadalreadylosttheirplatoonsergeantandateamleaderjustthreeshortdaysbefore.WhenIvy’sAmtrackwasdestroyed,theblastkilledorinjuredallremainingmembers.Atthatpoint,MundyorderedallofFirstPlatoontoreturntoCampalQa’imuntilFirstSquadcouldbereconstituted.44

WhileOperationMatadorwasdevastatingforCompanyL,Lt.Col.MundyandLt.Col.Urquhartagreedthatitwassignificant on several levels. First, it turned large numbers of Marines into battle-hardened fighters.45Asboth3/2and3/25 encountered many short-range firefights over the next fourmonths,thegrittylessonslearnedinNewUbaydiandRamanaprovedinvaluable.Second,itclearedapartofIraqthathadbeenuntouchedduringtheprevioussixmonths.Finally,theCoalitionacquiredagreatdealofintelligencefromaneight-vehicleMAPthatMundyhadplacedonthesouthsideoftheEuphrates,acrossfromRamana.

TheMAPwaspositionednearthebaseofthe“GoldenGateBridge”thatlinkedRamanaonthenorthtoKarabilahonthesouth.InsurgentsfromRamanawereexpectedtoflee across this bridge. The MAP Marines confirmed that the“GoldenGateBridge”wasavitalconduitbetweenplanningandpreparationcellsinRamanaandtheiroperationalareainthemoreheavilypopulatedsouthernsideoftheriver.46WhilemostMarinessawlittleactioninRamana,theMAP’soperationhelpedlaythegroundworkforOperationSpear,acordonandclearoperationinKarabilahthatMundycallshisbattalion’smostimportant

��

activity.

Operation New Market

TheBattalion’snextoperationwasinHaditha,justafewmilessouthofitsheadquartersattheHadithaDam.OperationNewMarketwasabattalion-sizedoperation,involvingcompaniesLandKfrom3/25andCompanyKfrom3/2.ItwasdesignedtoclearaportionofHadithawhereMap7hadbeenambushedonMay7.Well-plannedandseeminglyontrack,OperationNewMarketencountered difficulty from the most unexpected source – a dog.

AltierisaidtheplancalledforCompanyLMarinestodriveintothedesertatnight,dismountfourkilometersfromwesternoutskirtsofHaditha,andmaneuverindarknesstothecenterofthecity.47CompanyLwastobeinplacewhenthecitybeganstirringthatmorning,tolookforcachesandinsurgentsamongthesurprisedresidents.Thingswereontrackat4:00a.m.,withMarinesonly250metersfromtheobjective,whenadogsuddenlyawokeand

attackedoneoftheMarines.Capt.BillyBrown,2ndPlatoonCommander,waswithin

metersoftheMarine.“ThedogwasawakenedbyasquadofMarineswalkingnexttoit,”hesaid.“Itpanickedandattacked.TheMarinehadnochoiceinthematter.”48

Thesingleshotthatsilencedthedogawakenedtherestoftheneighborhood.AltieriheardthevoiceofaveryangryIraqireverberateinthenarrowstreet,thenthesoundofaboltofaweaponslidingforward.AltierisawamanarmedwithanAK-47stepoutofahouse10yardsfromhim,andherespondedwithtwoquickroundstotheIraqi’schest.49Other Iraqis soon began firing.

The battalion took its first casualty when a bullet shatteredthehipofCapt.RaymondS.Lopes,thecompany’sforwardaircontroller.WhileLopeswasbeingpulledtosafety,Brown’sMarinesfoundthemselvesinavicious fight, taking fire from both sides of the road as well as nearby rooftops. Since the firefight seemed to involve only local Iraqis armed with AK-47 assault rifles, both AltieriandBrowneventuallyconcludedthatitwasnothingmorethanashootoutwithanangryneighborhood.50

Photo By Cpl. Ken Melton

An unidentified Company L Marine climbs over a wall so he can advance in his mission in Karabilah during Operation Spear.

��

Whateveritscause,CompanyLMarinesweretakingheavyfire from multiple locations.

Accustomedtoclearingurbanbuildings,BrownorderedSgt.DavidN.WimbergtoclearanearbyhousethatwasspittingaheavyvolumeofAK-47roundsatMarines.As Wimberg and a fireteam were approaching the door, aMarinekickedthedoorthreetimesbeforeWimbergpushedthehandletoopenit.Whenheopenedthedoor,histeamwalkedintoanintensebarrage,andaroundpenetratedWimberg’sshoulderandlodgedinhischest.51AltieriandothersimmediatelypulledWimbergintoanearby courtyard. Marines silenced nearby fires with two fragmentationgrenades,thenturnedtotreatingtheinjuredMarine.Establishingacasualtycollectionpoint,AltierihelpedmedevacWimbergandLopesfromHaditha,onlytolearnlaterthatWimbergdied.52

Whileofftoanunexpectedstart,OperationNewMarketcontinuedinHadithaforseveraldays,asMarinesclearedtheareaandsecuredseveralweaponscaches.

Monthslater,Brownwouldshakehisheadinamazementwhendescribingthelossescausedbyastartleddog.Fromhisperspective,hesaid,itmighthavestartedovernothingmorethanadeaddoganditsangryowner.

Cpl.AllenPayneof2ndPlatoonsaidSgt.Wimberg’sdeathbroughttothesurfacethefrustrationandtensionthatMarinesfeltwhileworkinginanationwheretheydidnotseemappreciatedorwanted.53

“TheIraqipeoplereallydon’tcareifweareincontroloriftheinsurgentsareincontrol,”hesaid.“ItisreallyfrustratingtoknowthatIamherein[their]country,[their]town,andriskingmylifefor[them],and[they]don’tevenwanttohelpmeinanyway.”54

Operation River Sweep

AfterNewMarket,elementsofthebattalionsettheirsightsonOperationRiverSweep,designedtolocateweaponscachesthathadbeentakenfromAmmunitionSupplyPoint(ASP)Dulab,anIraqiammunitionpoint.55LedbyaRoyalMarinecommando,Maj.RichardMaltby,thetaskforceoriginallyconsistedofMarinesfromCompanyKandtwoWeaponsCompanyMAPS,buttwoplatoonsfromCompanyIwereaddedtoexploittheoperation’searlysuccess.

StockedwhileSaddamHusseinwasinpower,ASPDulabwasonthewestsideofabendintheEuphrates.AteamofAmericanengineershadbeentaskedwithdestroyingASPDulabin2003,butitheldsomuchmoreammunitionthanexpectedthattheirplantodestroyitwithexplosivesdidmoretospreadtheartillarythancontainit.Althoughsomeordnancehadbeensubsequently

destroyedbyciviliancontractors,thousandsofartilleryshells,rockets,andotherarmswasspreadover10squarekilometers.Asaresult,theASPessentiallyservedasasupplypointforinsurgents,ortheirproxies,whowoulddiguproundsatnight,transportthemacrosstheEuphrates,andhidethemforfutureuse.BeforeOperationRiverSweep,Urquhartsaid,theareaontheeastsideoftheEuphrateshadnotseenCoalitionforcesforsometime.56Thetaskforcewasinserted30kilometersnortheastofCampHit,andintheensuingdaysitsMarineswalkedaroundthebendontheeastsideoftheriver.WhileRiverSweepincludedsearchinghousesandcollectingintelligence,muchoftheoperation was simply walking through fields and looking forevidenceofweaponscaches.

LanceCpl.StefanJ.WhitewayofCompanyIsaidthatRiverSweepcalledforMarinestolineupabreastofeachotherandpatrolforkilometerafterkilometer,lookingforthingsthatseemedoutofplace.57Inadditiontoclearingeach house, he said, this meant checking fields for fresh dirt.Hismajorcontributionwasspottingonecornerofa field that ultimately yielded several hundred 155mm artilleryrounds.Whitewaysaidhewasonpatrolwhenhenoticedwhatlookedlikeapieceofpipe.Afterkickingawaysomedirt,herealizeditmightbeordnance.AnengineerwithametaldetectordeterminedthatWhiteway’sround was only one of a large field of artillery rounds buriedafewinchesbelowthesurface.Sincethereweretoomany rounds to destroy in the field, Whiteway’s reward for spotting the first round included spending the rest of his day loadingartilleryroundsontoseven-tontrucks.58

Operation River Sweep was an unqualified success, allowing3/25toclearterrainwheretherehadbeenlittleCoalitionactivitysincethebeginningofthewar.Sincemostof3/25’soperationswereonthewestsideoftheEuphrates,theelementofsurpriseprovidedMarineswitharelativelyrisk-freewayoflocatingnumerousweaponscaches.59

Operation Spear

FollowinguponintelligencethatKarabilah,neartheSyrianborder,wasafocusofinsurgentoperations,Davisagainteamedup3/25’sCompanyLwith3/2’sCompanyKforOperationSpear.Karabilah,whichincludedthesouthernendofthe“GoldenGateBridge,”wascentraltoinsurgentactivityintheregion.

Designedasamajor“cordonandknock”operationinthealQa’imregion,OperationSpearbecamewhatMundyconsidered3/2’smostimportantoperation.60

“We were confident that it was a headquarters or strong pointfortheinsurgents,andRegimentfeltthatweneeded

��

togobackintoKarabilah,”Mundysaid.61

Thisassaultbyareinforcedbattalionagainstaninsurgency headquarters was expected to meet significant resistance.Intelligenceshowedthattherewerelargenumbers of foreign fighters working from Karabilah. Much likewhatMarineshaddonepreviouslyinFallujah,Mundyconductedapsychologicaloperationsprograminvolvingleaflets and loudspeakers, telling all Karabilah residents thatMarineswerecomingsoonandnoncombatantsshouldleave via certain routes to avoid the fight. While some left, manyremained,displayingapillowcase,muchlikeawhitebanner,astheMarinesapproached.

MundycharacterizedOperationSpearasa“run-and-gun”battlebetweenCoalitionforcesandinsurgents,withmanyinsurgentsconductingadetermineddelayingoperation. Both companies experienced significant resistanceastheyclearedhousesintheirrespectivesectors.“Weknew,becauseoftheresistancethatweencountered,thattheremustbesomethingveryimportanttotheinsurgents,”hesaid.62

OperationSpearuncoveredthefollowing:63

– A regional command and control headquarters for theinsurgency.Marinesfoundcomputers,passports,andotherinformationthatdescribedtheinsurgency’strainingandoperationalfocus.Thisincludedinformationthatdemonstratingthatmanyoftheinsurgentswereforeignfighters.

– A torture house in which four Iraqis were found chainedtoawall,havingbeenbeatenbyinsurgents.ACNNcamerateamembeddedwithLt.Col.Mundy’sbattalionbroadcastthisimageofinsurgentbrutalitytotheworld.

– A program by insurgents to convert an elementary schoolintoaweaponsstoragefacility,withbomb-makinginstructionsonchalkboard.

– An elementary school that had been converted by insurgentsasatrainingfacilityforbombmakingandotherinsurgentactivities.Portionsoftheschoolhadbecomeaweaponsandammunitionstoragefacility.

– A four-bay garage that was a factory for preparing Vehicle-BorneImprovisedExplosiveDevices(VBIEDs).IntelligenceshowedthatKarabilahhadaVBIEDfactoryatasitethatlookedlikeanassemblylinewithausedcarlot.Mundydirectedthathistankplatoon,reinforcedbyaplatoonfromCompanyL,raidthefacility.Afterthetanksknockeddownwalls,Marinessawcarswithloosewiresandotherindicationsofbomb-makingequipment.Mundylettanksdestroymuchofthefacility,includingsixvehiclesbeingpreparedwithexplosives.MarineaircraftdestroyedsimilarfacilitiesinotherpartsofKarabilah.Inall,23vehiclesinvariousstagesofreadiness,alongwithbomb-

makingequipment,weredestroyed.MundyestimatedthatOperationSpearresultedin

thedeathof20to30insurgents.Itstruevalue,hesaid,was evidenced by the fierce delaying action that many insurgentsfoughtastheypushedoutofKarabilah.Theiractions helped him understand the significance of the insurgentheadquarterstoactivitiesthroughouttheregion.

An ancillary benefit was that Operation Spear demonstratedtoU.S.mediarepresentativesthatforeignersand jihadists were fighting in western Iraq.64SkepticalreporterswhohadnotbeenconvincedbywhattheyhadseeninOperationMatadorunderstoodthattheycouldnotrefuteproofthatincludedpassports,travelrecords,andcomputer files.

Operation Sword

AsCompanyLcompletedOperationSpearwith3/2inJune,CompanyIwasrelievedofitsdutiesatalAsadbyanArmyunitandallowedtorejoin3/25.AnIraqiArmyunitalsojoinedRCT-2and3/25,amovethatmanyconsideredvitaltotheCoalition’scounterinsurgencyefforts.WithmoreforcesthanhehadcontrolledsincecomingtoIraq,UrquhartfeltreadyforanorderhereceivedfromDavistohave3/25establishacombinedandpermanentpresenceinHit.65AprimarygoalwastosignaltheCoalition’sdeterminationtoremaininchargeofHit.66Davissaidhe expected five companies, including one Iraqi Army company,tocleartheinsurgent-infestedcity.67Moreimportantly,DaviswantedUrquhart’sbattaliontoestablishtwo firm bases inside Hit, to be occupied by American Marines and Iraqi soldiers. This was a first step in RCT-2’s counter-insurgency campaign plan, and the first opportunity tointroducethe“new”IraqiArmytothissectionoftheAnbarProvince.

Forabattalionthathadexperiencedmanytragedies,OperationSwordwasawelcomesuccess.AmassingforcesatAlAsadandCampHitthatincludedtworeinforcedMarine rifle companies, much of 3/25’s Weapons Company, onelightarmoredreconnaissance(LAR)company,oneU.S.Armymechanizedinfantrycompany,andtheIraqiArmycompany,Urquhartmaneuveredthetaskforceina way that caught insurgents so flatfooted that few shots were fired.68RealizingthatHitwasanattractivetarget,insurgentsorientedtheirdefensestowardsCampHittothenorth.TheyemplaceddozensofIEDsalongthesix-kilometerstretchofpavedroadbetweenCampHitandHit.Byapproachingatnightandusingthelongersoutherlyapproach,Urquhartavoidedmanyoftheproblemshisbattalioncouldhaveencountered.TheresidentsofHitwoke up to find Americans and Iraqis sweeping up from

��

thesouthernpartofHitonbothsidesoftheEuphrates.Insurgents provided no resistance, electing either to flee or blendinwiththeIraqis.Withitsmassiveforce,3/25easilytookcontrolofthisimportantcity.69

For insurgents, the real surprise came five days after theinitialassault,whenMarinescompletedtheclearingoperationandbegansettingupbarrierstosupporttheestablishment of two bases. When the first Jersey and Hescobarriersweresetup,insurgentsandresidentsofHitrealizedthattheMarinesweretheretostay.70FirmBase1was set up in a four-story school near the city’s main traffic circleatTCP-1.CompanyLoccupiedFirmBase1forapproximately30days,fortifyingitbeforerelinquishingittoCompanyIvsothatCompanyLcouldreturntotheHadithaDam.WhileFirmBase1providedlittlestandoffrangeforSVBIEDs,itslocationmadeastrongimpressiononlocalIraqis.

FirmBase2wastwokilometersaway,usingarecreationcenternearthecity’scenter.Whilesecurityseemedbetterduetoanine-foot-tallwallandalongerstandoffrange,MarineswereconstantlyawarethattheyweresurroundedbyIraqis.

GiventheCoalition’shistoryofleavingtownsoncetheyhadclearedthemsotroopscouldmoveontothenextmissionorreturntoasecurebase,insurgentsmusthavedoubtedthattheimprovementswouldbepermanent.Afteracoupleofweeks,Urquhartsaid,therealizationthattheCoalitionwouldnotinvestinsomanybarriersifitdidnotintendtostaybegantosinkin.Lookingattheirowninvestmentintheformofhousesandcachesthroughoutthecity,insurgentsrealizedthattheyhadtoomuchinHittoabandon it without a fight with the Coalition. Insurgents no longercontrolledthetown,buttensionswererising.

Both firm bases experienced SVBIEDs. While Firm Base2wasbeingimprovedbyCompanyKinearlyJuly,acarthatlookedlikeagovernmentvehiclemadeitswayinsidetheperimeter.Thebasehadseveralrecreationalfields, including one that had been drenched by a broken waterpipe.Thecarbecamestuckinsoftsandlongbeforeitreacheditstarget.71Unabletomove,thesuicidebomberdetonated the SVBIED where he sat, fulfilling his destiny butcausingnoinjuriestoCoalitionforces.

Marineswerenotasfortunatewithatwo-carSVBIEDthathitFirmBase1duringthelastmonthofthedeployment.CompanyIhadtakencontrolofFirmBase1fromCompanyLinmid-July.OnamorningwhenseveralIraqi officials were scheduled to visit the base, Lance Cpl. NicholasM.JohnsonofCompanyIwasassignedtomana50-calibermachinegunattheEntryControlPoint(ECP)onitsnortheastcorner.72Twosuspiciousvehiclesworkedtheirwayslowlythroughstaggeredbarrierstowardshis

position,whichwasprotectedbysevenfeetofconcreteandsandbags.Asthevehiclesapproached,thebasesuddenlycame under small arms fire from unknown positions. Johnson tried to fire the 50-caliber machine gun, but it malfunctioned.OtherMarinesengagedthevehiclesandresponded to the small arms fire. The lead vehicle exploded only five meters in front of Johnson. This detonation causinganimmediateexplosionoftheIEDinthesecondvehicle.Thecombinedblastdugacratereightfeetdeepand20feetwide.TheblastleftJohnsonunconsciousbutunhurt,whileinjuringapproximately15otherMarinesonthebase.73

ToprovidesecurityaroundtheFOBs,MarinespatrolledHitaroundtheclock.Sgt.FranklynG.MetzIIIofCompanyIsaidfootpatrolswereanessentialpartofthesecurityplanforthecrampedareaaroundFirmBase1.74Metzsaidatypicalpatrolincluded15to20Marines,sailorsandIraqisoldiers.Dependingonthetemperature,patrolswouldstayoutsidethewirefortwoorthreehours.Mostsquadsconductedatleasttwopatrolsperday.

WhilethebattalionenjoyeditssuccessinHit,thefactthatitestablishedtwoFOBsexposedittofrequentsmall arms fires, indirect fires, and IEDs. On July 10, two CompanyKMarines,StaffSgt.JosephP.GoodrichandLanceCpl.RyanJ.Kovacicek,werekilledby120mmmortar fire.75Fivedayslater,aCompanyLcorpsmen,HM3“Doc”TravisYoungblood,wasseriouslywoundedbyanIED.Sgt.GuyA.Zierk,hisplatoonsergeant,saidthatHM3YoungbloodwasonthelastlegofalongpatrolfromFirmBase1whenacommand-detonatedIEDblewchunksofcinderblockandmasonryathim.76Thebombhadbeenplacedinsideawallsurroundingamosque,andthedetonationwireranintothemosque.TheIEDkilledanIraqisoldier,butHM3Youngblood’swoundsdidnotappear to be life-threatening. He lost a significant amount ofblood,buthewascoherentandalmostcheerfulashehelpedhisplatooncommander,GunnerySgt.ShawnDelgado, administer first aid. HM3 Youngblood told Delgadonottogetareplacementbecauseheplannedtoreturntotheplatoon.Sixdayslater,however,HM3Youngblooddiedfromhisinjuries.

Operation Saber

Havingreturnedtofullstrength,UrquhartcouldhaveleftCompanyLatFirmBase1andassignedIndiaCompanytoHadithaDam,buthefeltthatHitwasthebattalion’smaineffortandthatitwouldexperienceincreasedactivityinthefinal two months of their deployment. Company I wanted to see action after five months of providing security for alAsad,andhewantedtogiveCompanyLabreakafter

��

what had already been a difficult deployment. In late July, heorderedCompanyLtoreturntoHadithaDamafterCompanyItookoveratFirmBase1.

WithindaysofitsreturntoHadithaDam,CompanyLconductedOperationSabertocleartheareanearanimportantoilpumpingstationknownastheK3station,nearHaqlaniyahandseveralsmallvillagesnorthwestoftheHadithaDam.ThisincludedthevillageofCykla,justoffaroadthatledfrom3/25’sAOtoalQa’im.ThevillageneededtobecheckedperiodicallybecauseofitsproximitytobothaCoalitionMSRandtheSyrianborder.Thetinyvillageheldonlyafewthousandpeople,buttheCoalitionfeltitwasimportanttounderstandwhatwasgoingoninthis area. So on July 28, two rifle platoons and Company L’sheadquarters,reinforcedbytwosquadsofIraqispecialforcessoldiersanddetachmentsoftanks,Amtracks,engineers, and Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO)Marines,conductedacordonandknockinCykla.77Capt.BillyBrown,PlatoonCommanderfor2ndPlatoon,saidtheoperationinvolvedMarinesmaneuveringonfootintoCyklaearlyinthemorning,with1stPlatoontakingonesideofthevillageandhisplatoontakingtheother.

The first part of the operation proceeded smoothly. BrownsaidthatmostIraqisweregenerallyreceptive,althoughsurprisedtoseeCoalitionforcesthatearlyintheday.AsMarinesmovedthroughthevillage,noonewarnedthem that a dozen foreigners had recently infiltrated from Syriaandhadstartedtointimidatetheresidents.78TheMarinesdiscoveredthiswhentheyreachedaclusteroffourhousesnearthecenterofthevillage.Cpl.AndreWilliamsraisedhishandtoknockonadoor,butitneverreachedthedoor,asinsurgentscuthimdownfrominsidethehouse.Within seconds, Brown said, Marines had a “major fight” going on against insurgents firing from the four houses. BrownrushedtothesitewhereWilliamswasbleeding.AshehelpedcarryWilliamsthroughagate,anRPGcrashedagainstanearbywall,shreddingBrown’sleftelbow.79

As the intensity of the firefight increased, all of 2nd Platoon focused on the four houses, pouring fire into them. One fireteam chased fleeing insurgents into another building.Atankpumpedseveralroundsintothebuildings,followed by jets dropping five 500-pound bombs. These actionskilledseveralinsurgents,butabloodtrailledthefireteam to a nearby building. Lance Cpl. Christopher Lyons, a radio operator who was the first to reach the door, wasbroughtdownbyahailofbulletsfrominsidethebuilding,anddiedshortlythereafter.80

Brown said the insurgents in Cykla were foreign fighters whowerewellarmed,welltrained,andwellfunded.81WhiletheyhadonlybeeninCyklaforafewweeks,they

had come to dominate the village. When the firefight stoppedafterthedeathofnineinsurgentsandthedetentionoftwoothers,theinventoryofseizeditemssurprisedBrown.Inadditiontostandardweaponsandammunition,therewerevialsofadrenalinandothermedications,leadinghim to believe the foreign fighters did not go down easily thatdaybecausetheywereusingdrugstoblockanypain.82

Three Days in August

CompanyLhadjustreturnedfromCyklawhen3/25experiencedsetbacksthatcapturedheadlinesthroughoutthe world. In the first three days of August, the battalion lost21Marines.83SixweresnipersfromHeadquartersandServicesCompany,onewasfromWeaponsCompany,andtheremaining14werefromCompanyL.TheMarinesdiedwheninsurgentstriggeredamassiveIEDunderneaththeirAmtrack.

Thedeathofthesniperswasaneventthatseteveryoneback.Snipersareunique,speciallytrainedtomaneuverwithoutbeingdetected.Forthismission,threesniperteamsofthreeMarineseachwereinsertedinthemiddleofthenighttoanareanorthofBarwanah,southoftheHadithaDamandontheeastsideoftheEuphrates.84Aftertheteamswereinserted,twoteamsdecidedtolinkupatalocationoverlookingtheriver.Thethirdteamwasafewkilometerstotheirnorth.Afterpreparingtheirrespectivesites,theMarinesusedbinocularsandscopestoobservethearea.Unabletomoveintheswelteringheat,theteamswerelookingforwardtotheirextraction,whichwouldoccurunderthecoverofdarkness.Intheearlyafternoon,thesixMarineswereambushedbyinsurgentsarmedwithAK-47s.85FiveMarinesdiedatthesite.One,LanceCpl.JeffreyBoskovitch,survivedtheinitialambush,butwaskilledashetriedtoescape.

Thethirdsniperteamheardtheambushbutcouldnotrespondintime.WhentheyreportedBoskovitch’sstatustotheOperationsCenter,activitiesatHadithaandHitwentinto high gear, as Marines did whatever they could to find themissingMarine.CompanyLwasimmediatelyorderedtosecuretheambushsite.Insecuringthesite,Marinesdetainedtwoinsurgentsfromahousenexttotheambushsite.CompanyLalsoconductedaseriesofengagementsfromtheeastsideoftheEuphratesagainstinsurgentswhofired on the Marines from Haditha, on the west side of the Euphrates.

MAP9,basedatCampHit,hadbeenpatrollingtheeastsideoftheEuphrates60kilometerssouthofwherethesnipershadbeenambushedwhenitsMarineslearnedofthemissingMarine.86TheMarinessetupaSnapVehicleCheckpointonRouteTrout,alightlytraveledroadrunning

��

paralleltotheEuphratesontheeastsideoftheriver.Thefirst vehicle, a seven-ton truck driven by Cpl. Thomas A.Manicciaandarmedwithamachinegun,setupthenorthern“gate,”positioningitsfrontinawaythatsignaledfor approaching traffic to stop. Two Humvees, one with a 50-calibermachinegunandonewithaMark19grenadelauncher,werepositionedinthemiddle.Thelastvehicle,anarmoredHumveearmedwithamachinegunandcontainingthreeMarinesandacorpsman,establishedthesoutherngate.Oncesetup,theMarinestypicallyallowed10vehiclesinsidethecheckpoint.Thentheywouldsignalforonevehicletocomeforwardatatimeforacloserinspection.Inthelateafternoon,awhiteFordBroncodrivenbyayoungmancameinasthelastvehicleinagroup.Afterstopping,thedriverdetonatedanSVBIEDsolargethatitshreddedthenearbyHumvee,sentahugefireball cloud into the air and shooktheearthatCampHit,severalkilometersawayacrosstheEuphrates.87Sgt.JamesR.GrahamIIIwaskilledimmediatelybythepowerfulblast,88andhisdriver,gunnerandcorpsmanwereseriouslyinjured,requiringanimmediatehelicoptermedevacfromanimprovisedlandingzone.Maniccia,whowashundredsofmetersfromtheblast,saidtheblastdestroyedthearmoredHumvee, flattening its tires and peelingbacktherooflikeasardinecan.

WithBoskovitchstillmissing,MarinesatHitandHadithamaintained their focus on finding him.AfterMAP9helpedthehelicoptercrewevacuateGrahamandtheotherthree,theremainingMarineshadtogetthemselvesandallfourvehiclesbacktoCampHit.ThismeanttyingthedestroyedHumveetoManiccia’sseven-tonandlimpingacrosstheHitbridgeatatimewheninsurgentssurelyknewanIEDhaddamagedtheHumvee.TheMarinesofMAP9weresuretheywouldbeambushednearthebridge.Manicciasaidtheinsurgentsdidnotdisappointthem.89AsMAP9approachedTurbah,threevansspedaheadtoreporttheirmovementtoothers.Withnightvisiongoggles,Maniccia

could see signal lights flashing in the palm grove ahead. Asheturnedwestonbridgeroad,theambushwasinitiatedwith an IED, followed by small arms and machine gun fire frombothsidesoftheroads.MAP9’simmediateresponsefromtwomachinegunsandagrenadelauncherslowedtheincoming fires. The Marines received additional support withinminutesfromaCoalitionescortforce,completewithtanksandAmtracks.ThisforcehadthemissionofensuringthatMAP9gotthroughHitandreturnedsafelytoCampHit.90

WithRCT-2controllingeffortstorecoverBoskovich,andwithadditionalsupportfromotherCoalitionelements,Marinesclosedoffallexitsfromtheambusharea.Thispromptedinsurgentstoprovideinformationonwherethebodyofthemissingsnipercouldbefound.Thiswasaccomplishedearlyinthemorningonthedayfollowingtheambush,andtheMarinewassubsequentlytakentoalAsadforconclusive identification.

Operation Quick Strike

RCT-2respondedtothesniperambushwithQuickStrike,atwo-battalionoperationtoclearHadithaandHaqlaniyahonthewestsideoftheEuphratesRiverandBarwanahontheeastside.Themissionwasstraightforward:Findtheinsurgentsandthenetworksthathadambushedthesnipers.Mundywouldtakehisbattalion,reinforcedbyanLARcompany,atankplatoon,andanIraqiArmycompany,tothetwolargercities.91UrquhartwouldfocusLimaCompanyon

Barwanah.WhileBarwanahwassmall,thefactthatitwasontheeastsidehadprovidedinsurgentswithameasureofprotectionagainstpreviousCoalitionoperations.

Urquhart described Barwanah as a difficult area for militaryoperations,dueinparttothefactthatheavymilitaryvehiclescouldnotnegotiatethesmallpontoonbridgethatconnectedHaqlaniyahtoBarwanah.92Inaconstantbattleofhide-and-seek,thefactthatlightcivilianvehiclescouldcrossthepontoonbridgeeasilygaveinsurgents a significant advantage because they could

Photo By Cpl. Ken MeltonA Marine forces his way into a house in the section of Haqlaniyah where Marines had been attacked earlier in the day.

��

movequicklybetweenBarwanahandHaqlaniyahwithlittleconcernthatCoalitionforceswouldfollow.HeaviervehicleshadtocrosstheriveratHadithaDamorHit,manykilometerstothenorthorsouth.

CompanyLhadsecuredtheambushsiteshortlyafterthesniperswerekilled.ItusedthefollowingdaytoprepareforaclearingoperationinBarwanah.InApril,MarineshadfoughtaviciousbattleagainstinsurgentsonandaroundthepontoonbridgeconnectingBarwanatoHaqlaniyah,so they knew there might be significant resistance.93AsCompanyLpreparedtocrossthelineofdepartureonthemorningofAugust3,itreceivedacompanyofIraqisoldiers.94TherewasnoroomintheAmtracksfortheIraqis,soitwasdecidedthattheIraqiswouldmoveintheirowntrucks.CompanyL’splanhadbeentoavoidthetwo-lanepavedroadthatledfromtheambushsitetoBarwanahbyfollowingaparallelrouteinthedesert.TheIraqitruckscouldnotmaneuverinthesoftsand,promptingCompanyLtoadjusttheplantoutilizetheroad.95Earlierinthemorning,aMAPandatankcompanycommanderhadtraveledoverthesamesectionofthepavedroadtogetintoanoverwatchposition.Thetankcommanderreportedthat,inhisopinion,theroadwasclearofIEDs.96

CompanyLbeganmovementtoBarwanahasfastasitsAmtracks could carry the Marines. In the final leg, as the company turned west to go into their final positions for the operation,tragedyagainstrucktheMarinesofCompanyL.AmassiveIEDhadbeenplantedundertheasphaltroadataspotthattheMAPandtankcompanycommanderhadpassedoverearlierinthemorning.97WhenanAmtrackcarrying15Marinesandaninterpreterpassedoverit,thecommand-detonatedIEDexplodedwithaforcethatsplitthe Amtrack in half, flipping the 25- to 30-ton vehicle intotheair,bringingitdownonitsback,andignitinginafireball that spewed thick black smoke straight up into the windlessmorning.FourteenMarinesandtheinterpreterwerekilledimmediatelyinablastthatdugacratersixfeetdeepand17feetacross.98

Whilethedeadlyblastslowedtheiradvance,MarinesquicklysecuredtheareaaroundthedestroyedAmtrackandevacuatedthesolesurvivor.TheyestablishedafootholdinBarwanah,securedthepontoonbridgeovertheEuphrates,andfoughtabriefengagementwithinsurgentsbeforecontinuingwiththeirmissionofclearingBarwanah.Otherunitshelpedrecoverbodiesandequipment,partsofwhichhadbeenblownhundredsofmetersfromtheblastsite.99CompanyL’sperseveranceinclearingBarwanahprovedthatMarinescouldpushoninthefaceofanyadversity,buttheyfoundlittleofvalueinBarwanah.ManypeoplehaddesertedthevillagebeforeCompanyL’sarrival,andtheremainingfewprofessedtoknownothingaboutthesniper

ambushortheIEDthathadclaimed14Marines.WhiletheAugustlossesweredevastatingfor3/25,the

first three days of August marked a significant turning point inAmerica’sawarenessofandappreciationforthetroopswho were fighting Operation Iraqi Freedom. In a war that hadlulledmanyintoasenseofcomplacency,thelossof21MarinesfromaReservebattalionfromAmerica’sheartlandshockedthenation.

AsAmericansponderedtheimpactofthesetragedies,UrquhartandhisMarinescontinuedworking.HehadmovedhiscommandpostfromHadithatoHitafterOperationSword,andfoundthatHitwasrelativelyquietformostofthereamaining75daysofthedeployment.100Marines were patrolling Hit in significant numbers, and Iraqiswerepleasedthatinsurgentsnolongerdominatedthecity.TherewereoccasionalIEDincidentsliketheonethathadtakenHM3Youngblood’slife,butHithadchangeddramaticallysincehistaskforcehadsweptthroughthecity.

��

1st Battalion��th Marines

LikeIwoJimaandHue,Fallujahhasbecomeanicon.BlackwaterBridgeandapairofmonth-longurban

battles have fixed Fallujah in America’s consciousness.1ConsecratedbythebloodofhundredsofMarineskilledorwoundedthere,itsstreetsandbuildingswillbestudiedby generations of future Marines, and the vicious fighting thattookplaceinthatdenseandgrimyenvironmentleaveslittledoubtthatthecity’snamewillbeetchedbesideotherfamousbattlesontheMarineCorpsWarMemorial.2

Both sides fought fiercely during Operation Vigilant Resolve,theCoalition’simmediateresponsetotheBlackwaterambushinthespringof2004,andOperationalFajr,aplannedattackthefollowingfalltooustinsurgentsandregaincontrolofFallujah.

Bothsidesknewthestakeswerehigh.Forinsurgents,Fallujahwasasafehavenandcenterforplanningandexecutingoperations.3FortheCoalition,FallujahwastheHeartofDarkness,aheadquartersforZarqawi’sAlQaedainMesopotamiaandthesiteofseveraltorturehouses.4WhenMarineshandedoverthecitytotheFallujahBrigade5afterVigilantResolve,manysawitasaninsurgentvictoryandasignofCoalitionweaknessandconfusion.Forbothsides,Fallujahbecameagaugeofthewar’sprogress.

ReserveMarinesof1stBattalion,25thMarinescameto Fallujah in March 2006, when the city was under firm Coalitioncontrol.InthemonthssinceOperationalFajr,activedutyMarinesmaintainedatightgriponFallujah,limitingaccessthroughaseriesofEntryControlPoints(ECPs)ringingthecity.7Iraqipoliceandsoldiersguardedthe ECPs, which bristled with firepower. Only registered residents, government officials, and contractors were allowedtopass,and“militaryagemales”(knownbytheacronym“MAMs”)wererequiredtoprovideirisscansandthumbprints.8Rebuildingwasinfullswing,andMarineswereconstantlypatrollingonfootorinHumvees,talkingwith residents and learning more about the city. The first five months of 1/25’s deployment were marked by the fact thattherewereremarkablyfewincidents.Thisturnedouttobethecalmbeforeastorm,asinsurgentswhograduallyworkedtheirwaybackintoFallujahweredeterminedtoreversetheirlosses.

ForReserveswhohadtrainedonvideosofVigilantResolve and al Fajr, it was difficult to appreciate how much

theenviromenthadchangedinFallujahbetween2004and2006.Sgt.Maj.BradleyE.Trudellof1/25saidmanysimply could not dismiss the image of the kinetic battlefield astheypreparedforthedeployment.9

Sgt.TimothyG.Wittmer,whofoughtwithanactivedutybattalioninFallujahduringalFajr,subsequentlytransferredto1/25sohecouldreturntoFallujah.Thedifferencebetweenthetwotourswasstaggering.10

“Whenweleft[inDecember2004],thecitybasicallyreeked...ofdieselfuelanddeath.Mostofthebuildingswereprettywelldestroyed,andtherewasnooneonthestreetsuntilweleteveryoneinbackinthroughtheECPs.Itwasaghosttown.Prettymucheveryonewhostayedaroundduring[OperationalFajr],withveryrareexceptions,wasaninsurgent,andmostofthosewerekilled.Whenwestartedlettingpeoplebackinside,itwasstillawasteland.Therewastrashandsewageandtheoccasionalcarcass,andalotofwilddogswereroamingthestreets.”11

Over14months,Fallujahwasquicklyrebuilt.Withaneconomybasedlargelyonsmallshopsandbusinesses,thedowntowndistrictsweresoonhummingwithactivity.

“Therewasanactivepopulation,andtheyhadstartedtherebuildingprocess....[Fallujah]wasanactivecity

Photo By Cpl. Brian ReimersMaj. Vaughn L. Ward, Company C commander, 1st Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 5, leads a patrol through the streets of Fallujah. The Marines conducted a security patrol and received fire from unwelcoming insurgents in the souk district. Vaughn is 37, from Arlington, Va.

�0

atthatpoint,whichwasreally,reallydifferentthanthepostalFajrFallujah.Thecityhadcompletelyrestarteditsdailyfunctions,thethingsyouwouldseeinanycity.Marketplaces.Peoplemovingtoandfroandgoingtoandfrommosques.Childrenintheneighborhoods.Youdidn’tseealotofthatrightwhenweleftbecausewewerestillgraduallylettingpeoplebackinsidethecity.Ijustrememberthinkinghowmuchbusieritwas,averyclaustrophobicfeeling,thereweresomanymorepeopleout, whereas before it was really desolate after the fight.”12

Fallujah’scensushelpstellthestory.Beforethewar,theUnitedNationsestimatedthatmorethan400,000peoplelivedinthecity.13MostwereSunnis,andtheyearnedtheirlivingfarming,trading,andoperatingsmallbusinesses.FromthestartofthewartoOperationalFajr,Fallujah’spopulationdwindledto300,000.WhenMarinesencircledthecityinNovember2004,1stMarineDivisiongavemostofthe300,000achancetoleave,andtwo-thirdsleft.14BasedonthepreviewprovidedbyOperationVigilantResolve,everyoneknewwhatwascoming.Marinesandinsurgentsalikepreparedfortheshowdown. Insurgents prepared hundreds of fighting positionsfromaseemingendlesslysupplyofweaponsandammunition,thenduginthroughoutFallujahtoprepareforbattle.Marinesbuilt“ironmountains”ofammunitionandotherequipmentatsupplypointsoutsidethecity,thenmaneuveredintopositionfortheassault.15Toroutetheentrenched insurgents, Marines inflicted significant damage onFallujah.Accordingtooneestimate,morethanhalfofFallujah’s39,000homessuffereddamage,withsome10,000housesrendereduninhabitable.16

AfteralFajr,accesstoFallujahwaslimited.ECPs

servedastheonlyentrypoints.Before1/25’sarrival,thepopulationgrewto250,000.17Asconditionscontinuedtoimproveandsecurityremainedintact,thepopulationgrew by more than 50,000 during 1/25’s tour. This figure included 35,000 Iraqis who fled violence or oppression in otherpartsofthecountryandwantedtosettleinFallujah.18

TrudellsaidFallujahwasaclassicexampleofa“ThreeBlockWar,”19requiringMarinestousefull-scalecombattotake control of the city, mid-intensity conflict in battling the insurgency,andstabilityandsupportoperations(SASO)withmoderateFallujans.Insuchascenario,MarinesareexpectedtointeractinafriendlywaywithlocalresidentswhileknowingthatIEDsarespreadthroughoutaneighborhoodandinsurgentsmightlurkrightaroundthecorner. The difficulty of conducting such a complex group oftasks,hesaid,wascompoundedbythepreconceptionofaverykineticenvironmentmanyMarinesbroughttoFallujah.

EvenasFallujahwasrebuilt,itremainedgrimandoppressive.MarinesspentmuchoftheirtimetryingtoappealtotheFallujanswhowere“onthefence,”neithersupportingnoropposingtheCoalition.Trudellsaiddisciplineprovedtobeakeyingredient.Marineshadtobeabletotransitionfromfootpatrols,providingameasureofinteractionwithFallujans,tooperationsthatinvolvedidentifying,locating,andseizinginsurgents.Thedifficult part, according to Trudell, was accomplishing both missionssimultaneously.Itwassimilartotheparadoxoftryingtoappearnon-threateningwhilewearingprotectivegearandridinginarmoredHumvees.

“Itwasjusthardwork.Itwashardworkpatrollingeverydayinthatheat.Itwashardworkputtingupwithalltheinconveniences.Itwashardworktoweareightypoundsofgear.Itwashardworktoremainmotivated,togetoutthereanddothateverysingleday,”Trudellsaid.“Insurgencies are hard work, with very little gratification. Butifyouquantifythatattheend,therecanbetremendoussatisfactiongainedoveralongperiod.”20

Amidtheday-to-dayproblems,Marinessawmanypositiveindicators.Acitycouncil,chairedbyFallujah’smayor,metweeklytoplanrepairsandotherimprovements.MarinesprovidedsecuritywhileIraqicontractorscleareddebrisandstartedrebuilding.IraqipoliceandsecurityforceswereworkingalongsideMarines.Theywerebettertrained,betterarmed,andbecomingmoreaggressive.

Lt.Col.ChristopherA.Landro,1/25’scommandingofficer, described the battalion’s mission as making “FallujahstayasafeandsecurecitysothatwecouldcontinuetodeveloptheIraqiSecurityForcesandconductthecounter-insurgencycampaignthat[theRegimentalCombatTeam(RCT)commander]hadsetforth.Sogoing

Photo By Sgt. Adaecus G. BrooksSgt. Jeremy L. Hager, an Information Operations representative with 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, passes out handbills during a cordon and search operation in selected regions of Fallujah as part of Operation Industrial Revolution.

�1

inthere,IknewthatitwasacontrolledenvironmentthatwaskeptsafebythepresenceofMarinecombatforcesandourdesiretobringtheIraqiArmyandthepoliceforceuptospeedasquicklyaspossible.”21

Marinesunderstoodthatpartoftheirjobwastoserveintheroleofan“olderbrother,”providingprotectionforthedeveloping Iraqi forces. In a figurative sense, Marines were crossingtheirarmsandstaringdownaneighborhoodbully,givingtheIraqiforcesachancetoacquireequipmentanddeveloptacticssotheycoulddefendthemselves.

InsurgentswhounderstoodFallujah’simpactonthe“Arabstreet”didnotstandidlyby.Havingexperiencedthe indignity of unqualified and undeniable defeat, they knewallowingalFajr’sresultstostandwouldamounttoastrategicdefeat.Eachnewbuildingorre-openedbusinesswaslikeapokeintheeye,asitdecreasedthelikelihoodofaninsurgentresurgence.Whilebidingtheirtime,theinsurgentswereintentonreversingtheCoalition’ssuccess.

1/25’sMarinescoveredFallujahfrominsidetheringofECPs.MostMarineslivedinthegovernmentcomplexinthecity’scenterorthetrainstationtothenorth,andalmosteveryMarineandsailorinthebattalionpatrolledregularly,eitheronfootorinHumvees.Landromademorethan200tripsthroughFallujah,loggingmorethan10,000milesandthreeIEDstrikesonhisHumvees.22Inadditiontoprovidinganadditionalquickreactionforce(QRF)tothebattalion,thesemissionsgavehimadetailedknowledgeofeachneighborhood,alley,andpossiblehidesiteinFallujah.

AnimportantpartofthesuccessinFallujahwasbasedonitsfunctioningcitycouncil.EveryTuesday,thecouncilwouldmeetatthegovernmentcentertodiscussissuesrelatingtosecurity,stability,andreconstruction.InadditiontoLandroandtheRCT-5commander,Col.LarryNicholson,itinvolvedmajorleadersfromthroughouttheAnbarProvince.Economicredevelopmentwashighontheagenda,aswereissuesrelatedtowater,electricity,andschools.23IntheyearsincealFajr,theCoalitionandcitycouncilhadworkedtoclearmuchofthedebrisfromFallujah,settingthestageforaconstructionboom.

“Reconstructionwasbooming,”Landrosaid.“Wehadonecommercialtruckentrancethatwouldhavetwotothreehundredtrucksbackedupalldaylong,tryingtogetin,fullofconstructionmaterials,durablegoods,andagriculturalproducts.Thecitywascomingbacktolife,andwewereprovidingthatstability....Therewerewholesectorsbeingrebuiltfromdestruction,andnewsectorswherenewconstructionwasoccurringaswell.Atanygiventime,therewere a thousand to fifteen hundred structures being built, so therewereFallujansworkingandthecitywascomingbacktolife.”

LandrosaidFallujahoperatedalmostasa“gated

community,”withMarinesandIraqisprovidingtheguardforce. The ECPs were well fortified, with strict procedures thatensuredthateveryonewasproperlyprocessed.TheseprocedurescauseddelaysattheECPs,butmostFallujansacceptedthedelaysasthepricetheypaidforlivinginasecurecity.

ConductingdistributedoperationsthroughoutFallujahrequired confidence in the knowledge and leadership skills ofyoungMarines.Landrosaidthatconstantpatrolling,ofteninrelativelysmallgroups,gavejuniorMarinesplentyofopportunitiestoexercisetheirleadershipanddecision-makingskills.

“ThestrategiccorporalandstrategicsergeantarealiveandwellinAORaleighandinIraq,”Landrosaid.24“Wehaddozensofpatrolsthatwerebeingledbysergeants,four-vehiclepatrolswithweaponsandcommunicationsgearandtheabilitytoreachbackforotherassets.Atanygiventimeofanygivenday,wehadthatsergeant,thatsquadleader,outthere,leadingapatrolandmakingdecisionsonhisown.”25

Deployment Chronology

During the first part of 1/25’s tour, Fallujah was relativelyquiet.ThreeMarineswerekilledbetweenMarchandJuly,26butoperationsduringthisperiodwerecharacterizedbymountedanddismountedpatrolsthatwereinterruptedonlyoccasionallybyIEDstrikesorbriefexchanges of small arms fire.

StaffSgt.MichaelS.Maslauskas,aplatoonsergeantforCompanyC,summedupthefeelingsofmost1/25Marines.“UntilAugust,weownedFallujah.Wewereunopposed,essentially.TherewereIEDsandsmallengagements,butforthemostpart,ourcompanyownedourareaofoperations,andwedidn’thaveanyseriousproblems.”27Maj.RaymondL.Adams,whoservedasplatooncommander and executive officer for Company C, agreed. “Priorto[August],wewouldfootpatrolwithimpunityanywhereinthecity.”28

In retrospect, Fallujah’s population changed significantly duringJuly.ItwasnotuntilAugustthat1/25appreciatedhowmuchthechangewouldimpacttheirwork.

ThechangewastheresultofadecisionbyIraq’snewprimeministertoinitiateaprisonerreleaseprogramforasignificant number of the prisoners who had been detained duringthewar.29NuriKamalAlMaliki,aShi’ia,designedtheprogramtoeasetensionsbetweenthetwomainsectariangroups,asmostprisonerswereSunniandmostpost-war government officials were Shiites.30Thereleasecreated significant troubles in Fallujah, as approximately 2,000formerprisonersmadetheirwaytoFallujahduring

��

July,causinganimmediateandprofoundimpactonCoalitionforcesandtheirinteractionswithFallujans.31

Marinesbelievedtheprisonswereessentiallyinsurgenttrainingcamps.ForMarinesonpatrol,theprisonerreleaseseemedlikeasurrealnightmaredrawnfromamilitaryexercise.Like“resetting”anopposingforceinamilitarywargame,allowingdefeatedforcestorisefromsimulateddeaths and fight again, the prisoner release gave insurgents who knew firsthand what worked and what did not another chance.32InFallujah,thereleasedprisonersseemedeagertoputtheirnewskillstothetest.

This influx of hardened young men brought what many Marinesdescribedas“thelook,”or“thestare,”backtothestreetsofFallujah.ItwasthesamesullenlookthatgreetedCoalitionforcesinFallujahshortlyafterBaghdadfell.Whenpressedtodescribedwhat“thelook”reallylookedlike,LandrosaiditwasasthoughtheglaringyoungmenweretellingtheMarines,“Ifyourcharredcarcasswerehere,we’dhangyoufromthe[Blackwater]bridge,too.”33

The Guns of August

InearlyAugust,alQaedainMesopotamiavowedtoregaincontrolofFallujah.34 Posting flyers in mosques andschools,itsleaderspromisedtoreturnFallujahtothe“glory”thecityhadenjoyedbeforetheU.S.attack.35Localleaderstookthisvowseriously,asitcameafteraspikeininsurgentactivityandthemurderoflocalreligiousleaderswhohadpushedforreconciliation.36

ForMaslauskasandtherestofthebattalion,everythingchangedonAugust3,whentwoCompanyCMarineswerehitbyasniper.37

MaslauskasandabouttwodozenMarineswerewrappingupalengthyfootpatrolinareaknownasthe“PizzaSlice,”insouthwestFallujah.Astheypassedacemeteryknownasthe“Martyrs’Cemetery,”twoshotsrangout.StaffSgt.Maslauskas, who could recognize AK-47 fire, understood thatthedifferentsoundofthesegunshotswascauseforimmediateconcern.

“YougetusedtowhatanAK-47soundslike,andweheard two really strange shots. The first thing I remember sayingtothesquadleader[was],‘Hey,man,whatwasthat?Get on the radio and find out what’s up.’” Learning there werecasualties,MaslauskasrushedtothesiteandfoundthatLanceCpl.AdamEscobarandLanceCpl.KurtE.Dechenhadbeenshotbyasniper.

“Itwascontrolled,butitwaschaoticbecauseeveryoneknewaMarinewashurt,”Maslauskassaid.OtherMarineshadthrownsmokegrenadestolimitthesniper’sview.AsMaslauskasapproachedthesite,hewasconcernedthat Marines working with the casualties might fire at the

approachingMarines.TheseverityoftheirwoundslimitedwhatotherMarinescoulddoforthetwo.MaslauskassaidtheQRFseemedtotakeaneternity,eventhoughthecompanycommander,Maj.VaughnL.Ward,wasonthesceneinminutes.“Secondsfeellikeminutesandminutesfeellikehourswhenyou’rewaitingtogetyourMarinestomedical,”Maslauskassaid.

Escobarhadbeenhitintheupperleg,withthebulletshatteringhisfemur.HewasbleedingsoheavilythatMarinesappliedatourniquetaftertheymovedhimtoanearbycourtyard.Dechenwashitonhisside,throughagapin his flak jacket. The bullet tore through his torso before exitingontheotherside.

DechenandEscobarwereloadedontoWard’sHumveeandtakentothesurgicalcenter.Thetwowerelaidoutonadjoiningtables,andmedicalteamsimmediatelywenttowork.Maslauskassaidthenexthourswasanemotionalrollercoaster,aspeoplewouldreportchangestoDechen’scondition.Finally,someonebroughthimthenewsthatDechenhaddied.Forthepatrolleader,everythingchangedinthatmoment.“[Itwas]likesomeonepunchedmeinthestomachandthere’snothingyoucandoaboutit,”Maslauskassaid.

Capt.SeanD.Miller,Dechen’splatooncommander,hadgatheredhisMarinesatthecompanyheadquarterstobringthemuptodatewhenMaj.AdamslearnedbyradiothatDechenwasdead.Adamsquietlypassedthisinformationtotheplatooncommander,buttheplatooneruptedwithemotionwhenMillerrelayedittothem.OneMarinethrewachairacrossaroomwhenhelearnedofDechen’sdeath.Othersweresimplynumb.

Inretrospect,CharlieCompanyMarinesrealizedthattheir earlier confidence in their ability to patrol safely in Fallujahmighthavebeenmisplaced.“Inthebeginning,Idon’tthinkIreallyhadanunderstandingofwhatitwaslike,”Maslauskassaid.“Wewerejustdoingourmissions,goingonpatrols,doingwhatwehadtodo.”

Adams,agreedthat,inretrospect,theearlymonthswererelativelyeasy.Inadditiontopatrols,hemonitored“snapvehiclecontrolpoints”thatwereputupfrequently,aswellas “BOLOs,” shorthand for “be on lookout for” specific vehiclesorpeople.“WeknewthereweresnipersoperatingouttherebecauseWeaponsCompanytookasniperKIA,andwehadalargenumberofsingleshot,veryaccurateshotstakenbywhatwethoughtwasasniperorsnipersoperatinginthecity....Forus,everythingchangedAugustthird,becausewerealizedthatwecouldnotjustoperateintheoldfashionedway,whichwastoputapatrolout,makeitlooklikealargefootprint,beingobviouswhatweweredoing,andthencomebackthreeormaybefourhoursatthemost....Itreallydidchangethewayweoperated.”

��

“Ithadatremendouspsychologicalimpact,Ithink,onthecompanyasawhole,”Maslauskassaid.“IfIhadtotellyouwhentheturningpointtoFallujahwas,psychologicallyforthecompany,Iwouldsayitwasthedaytheyreleasedtheeighteenhundredprisoners,becausethatledtowhathappenedwithDechen.Subsequently,therewasmuchdebateonhowbesttooperateasasquadorplatooninourAO. Basically, it came down to a fifty-fifty mix. You had to havesomearmorouttherewithyouatalltimes,anytimeyouleftthewire.”

Hiscompanycommander,Maj.Ward,wasmorebluntindescribingtheimpactoftheprisonerrelease.“Theprisonerrelease...wasthesinglebiggestblunderthathasresultedinthedeathsofU.S.MarinesandSailors....IhavenodoubtsthatMarinesdiedandSailorsdiedbecausewehadthereleaseprogram.Thosewereprisonersofwar,andtheyreleased them. You will find that there are a lot of Marines whoareupsetaboutthat...AllIcantellyouisthattheyreleasedthem,andallofasuddenwestartedhavingahell

ofalotmoreproblems.”Marinesnoticedthattheinsurgentswhoattacked

themaftertheprisonerreleaseweremuchmoreskilled.“Companycommanderswerelike,‘Thevarsityishere,’”Wardsaid.“Weknewsomethinghadchanged...[and]therewasahellofalotofviolenceovertherethatstartedcomingatus,andthelethalityofit,thesophisticationofitwassuchthattheywerenolongerthejayvee.Thevarsityhadcomeonboard.”

ThreeweeksafterthesniperattackonDechenandEscobar,anotherCompanyCMarinewaskilledbyasniper,againinthevicinityofthePizzaSlice.Whileproviding flank security just a few steps away from Maj. WardonAugust25,Cpl.JordanC.Piersonwasshotoncethroughtheshoulder.Hediedlaterintheday.

Anotherthreeweekspassed,andagainMarinestookcasualties.ThreeMarineswouldbekilledandtwootherswouldloseonelegapieceinseparateIEDattacksthatturned their Humvees into molten fireballs.

Photo By Cpl. Brian Reimers

Three Marines from to Weapons Company, 1st Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment, kneel during a memorial service for Lance Cpl. Eric P. Valdepenas, Petty Officer 2nd Class Christopher G. Walsh and Cpl Jared M. Shoemaker, who were killed Sept. 4, 2006 while conducting combat operations in Fallujah, Iraq. Hundreds of Marines and sailors from the battalion met at a memorial service held at Camp Baharia to remember their friends and fellow servicemembers.

��

ThedeadlyHumveeattackhitaMobileAssaultPlatoon(MAP)fromWeaponsCompanythathadbeenpatrollinginaresidentialneighborhoodinthesouthernpartofFallujah,lookingforpossibleinsurgentmortarsites.Towardstheendofthepatrol,theHumveesturnedontoanarrowdirtalleyrarelyusedbyCoalitionforces.Therewasasuddendeafening roar and a brilliant flash, and one of the Humvees was immediately engulfed in flames. The explosion killed Hospitalman2ndClassChristopherG.Walsh,Cpl.JaredM.Shoemaker,andLanceCpl.EricP.Valdepenas,andseverelywoundedthefourthpersonintheHumvee,LanceCpl.CodyW.Hill.

Maj.ArmandoAcosta,WeaponsCompany’sexecutiveofficer, described Sept. 4 as a defining point for 1/25, becauseinsurgentsbeganusingdeadlierandmorecreativetactics.38Attributingthechangetotherecentprisonerrelease,hesaidtheSept.4explosionsintroducedanIEDtechniquethatwasnewtoFallujah,witha“pressureplate”mountedontopofexplosives.Inthiscase,hesaid,insurgentspackedabucketwithaplasticexplosiveandconnectedthedetonatortoapressureplatethatwascoveredbydirt.39WhentheHumveedroveoverthedevice,theresultingexplosionshotthepressureplateupthroughtheHumvee’s floor, with deadly results.

Thatevening,aHumveefromadifferentMAPwashitbyasimilardevice,shearingoffonelegfromeachofthetwoMarinessittinginthefrontseats.Sgt.Wittmer,whoseHumveepassedovertheIEDjustsecondsbeforeit exploded, said the blast and ensuing fire lit up the immediate area. “This was a fireball, which made us instantly turn around. . . . It was like a giant bonfire.”

Theblasttookofftherightlegofthedriver,Cpl.PatMurray,andtheleftlegofhispassenger,Sgt.TerranceBurke.LanceCpl.JohnGoldman,theMarineintheturret,wasblownclearoftheHumvee,aswasMurray.Burke,who was on fire, initially had to drag himself from the burningvehicle.Cpl.BrianJ.TomsovicdashedovertoBurke and tried to pull him to safety and put out the flames, butthateffortceasedwhentheycameundersmallarmsattackfromtwonearbyinsurgentpositions.Shortlythereafterandaidedbyacorpsman,TomsovicmovedBurketoasafe position and extinguished the flames.

Changing Tactics

InadditiontoincreasingthenumberandlethalityoftheirattacksonCoalitionandIraqiforces,theinsurgentsstartedtargetingFallujansthroughaseriesofbombattacks.Forexample,onSeptember15,abombataFallujahsoccerfield killed eight young men and injured more than a dozen others.40WhileAmericanstookthisasasigntheinsurgents

Pfc.FredM.LinckiseithertheluckiestReserveintheCorps,ortheonewiththehardesthead.Maybeit’sboth.

WhileworkinginFallujahonMay5,2005,Linckwasstruckintheheadbyasingleroundfromaninsurgent’srifle.47Theshotdroppedhimimmediately,andallhecouldhearwashisMarinesyelling,“Mandown.Mandown.”

Whilebloodied,Lincksufferedlittledamage.The7.62mmroundboredaholeallthewaythroughhisKevlarhelmet.AfragmentcutthroughtheheadbandandintoLinck’sforehead,butthat’swherethefragmentstopped,leavinglittlemorethanascratchandabadheadache.

LinckisaReservefromWestbrook,Connecticut,assignedto1stBattalion,25thMarines.Hewasshotduring his first month in Iraq.

AspartofaQuickReactionForce,hewascalledontogointoFallujahafterreportsofanIED.SomeMarinessuspectedasetup,buttheyshowedupatthesite,gotoutoftheirHumveesandestablishedaprotectivecordon.

A single shot, fired from a site not known to Marines, suddenlycrackedthroughtheair.

Seeingbloodcomingfromaheadwound,MarinesrespondedbyimmediatelyevacuatingLinck.HewastakentoaCoalitionhospital,wherehewastreatedandreleasedwithoutsomuchasastitchforthesmallcutonhisforehead.

Lincksaidthattheincidentgavehimanew-foundrespectforhisequipment.

“Ifitwasn’tforthathelmet,Iwouldn’tbestandinghererightnow,”Lincktoldareporter.“Itpaystowearallthegearthewayit’ssupposedtobeworn.”

(Story By Cpl. Brian Reimers)

Of Interest

��

weredesperate,itsentatremorthroughthecity.CompanyC’sWardsaidthathisMarineswereabletousethatattacktotheCoalition’sadvantage,astheyspreadthenewsofwhattheinsurgentshaddonethroughouttheirsectionofthecity.

WardsaidhisMarinesusedapublicaddresssystemto influence Fallujans and insurgents. Working with a U.S.Armydetachment,hisMarineswouldbroadcastnewsonCoalitionredevelopmenteffortsaswellas“badnews”eventstiedtotheinsurgents.Hesaidthatthenews of the September 15 bombing of the soccer field turnedmanyFallujansagainsttheinsurgency.41BytakingthisinformationdirectlytocitizensandinvitingthemtocompareinsurgentactivitiestowhattheCoalitionwasdoingtoimprovethecity,hisMarineshelpedswayopinions.

Wardsaidthepublicaddresssystemalsowasusedtoinciteinsurgentswithvariousinsults,promptingthemtorespondandthereforeexposethemselvestotheMarines.“MyinitialconceptofusingPsyOpswasjusttogettheenemy to come out and fight . . . to try to get them to try to shutusdownimmediatelybygoingintoanengagement.”42

Ward found that Fallujans were inclined to be influenced excessivelybydemonstrationsofaggressionandforce.Whenairsupportwasavailable,hesaid,CompanyCwouldrequest that F/A-18 jets fly low over the city to remind the FallujansthattheMarineshadsuchassetsattheirdisposal.Thedeepsoundofthe.50-calibermachinegun,whilerarelyused,alsomadeaprofoundimpressioninacitythatwasaccustomedtoviolence.43

CompanyC’saggressivefootpatrolsgaveitsMarinesamuchclearerpictureofinsurgentactivityinitsAOthanhadbeenprovidedtothem.WardsaidthatthepreviousMarinecompanythoughttherewererelativelyfewinsurgentsoperatinginthesector,butCompanyClearnedotherwise.“IthinkthethingthatIwasmostproudofwasthefactthat[bytheendofthetour],weknewexactlywhatwasgoingoninsidemyAO.Iknewthepulse,theMarinesknewit,andwhenanotherunitcameintotakeitover,Ishowedthemwhatweweredoing[and]whatthecitywaslike....Wewentintothecityaggressively,wefoughtontheenemy’sground,westoodourground,wedidnotlettheenemydictatetouswhatweweregoingtodoandnotgoingtodo.”

Maj.BrianT.Hofmann,thecommanderofCompanyB,saidthedifferenceinFallujahaftertheprisonerreleasewas significant. “Initially, [Fallujah had been] more passive thanIhadanticipated,especiallygiventhewell-knownhistoryofFallujah....Weallcametotheconclusionthatthere certainly was a significant insurgent presence when wegotthere,butDarwinhadtakenhistollonthemore

amateurandlessintelligentinsurgents.Theoneswhowereleftwerefarcraftierandfarmoresubversiveintheirtactics.Weweretaskedmorewithactuallyhavingtohuntthem down and find them because they did not come out overtlyandattackus.”44Hoffman’sMarinesfeltrelativelysecure during the first five months of the deployment, but Fallujah’senvironmentchangedaftertheprisonerrelease.

OnAugust16,CompanyBsuffereditsonlytwofatalities,bothatthehandsofasniper.45ThecompanyhadbeenconductingaseriesofsaturationpatrolsinsectionsofthecenterofFallujahwhenareturningpatrolwashitjustoutsideObservationPost(OP)Fenton,acompactfortressonthemaineast-westroadthroughFallujah.46Capt.JohnJ.McKenna,platooncommanderforThirdPlatoon,wasleading the nine-man patrol back into the OP. The first MarinemadeitsafelyacrossasideroadandintotheOP’sentrance,butthenextone,LanceCpl.MichaelD.Glover,wasfelledbyasingleshottohishead.ThisshotwasasignaltoothernearbyinsurgentstoinitiateacomplexsmallarmsattackfromnorthandsouthofOPFenton.Withinseconds,McKenna’sMarinesandthoseinOPFentonwerereturning fire. As several Marines popped smoke grenades totrytoconcealthemfromthesniperandotherinsurgents,McKennadashedintotheroadinanattempttopullGlovertosafety.

HoffmansaidthatMcKennainsistedonrunningtotheaidofGlover,eventhoughroundsweresnappingallaroundhispatrol.TotrytoprotectthetwoMarines,severalmoresmokegrenadesweretossedintotheroad,andMarinesincreased their fires. “Capt. McKenna ran out to where LanceCpl.Glover’sbodywasandtookaknee,”Hofmannsaid.“Hewasfacingsouth,withhisbacktothesniper.Atsomepoint,forwhateverreason,heturnedaroundandfullylookedoverhisshoulder,andtookaroundinhishead.Singleshot.”

Thesniperalsoshottwoothermembersofthepatrol,butbothwereprotectedbySAPIplates.LanceCpl.JosephJ.SchillerwasshotintherightsideandLanceCpl.DanielF.Murphywasshotinthecenterofhischest.BothMarineswereknockeddown,buttheSAPIplatesstoppedtherounds and they were able to return to the fight.Operations

ForFallujans,theconstantpatrollingandclosecooperationbetweenMarinesandIraqisoldiersandpolice built confidence that Fallujah would remain secure. This confidence became evident, Landro said, when 1/25Marinesbegantoreceiveinformationthatwascharacterizedas“actionableintelligence”ofimmediateuse.Forexample,inaseriesofthreeoperationswith2ndBrigadeoftheNewIraqiArmy,Landro’sMarines

��

conductedgroupsofpinpointraids,seizingofindividualsandweaponscaches.

“TheRapidDepartureoperationswerereallysomeofour finer moments,” he said. “Rapid Departure was our first operation where we received intelligence from local policeandlocalpoliticalleadersonwhothebadguyswere. . . [something like], ‘Here are twenty-five names, and here’swheretheylive.’Weputtogetherallthetargetinginformationandasmuchevidenceaswecouldbeforestriking,sowecouldputtheseguysawayforawhile.Inconjunctionwith[theNewIraqiArmy’s]SecondBrigade,we’dlookatthemapandseewhereallthetargetswere.We’dcreateadividingline,andSecondBrigadewouldgethalfthetargetsand[1/25]wouldgethalfthetargets,and we’d do near simultaneous operations on twenty-five separatelocations....Wedidthreeofthem,andtheyallwent off flawlessly.”

Inanotherintelligence-drivenoperation,1/25MarinesrescuedIraqihostageswhohadbeentakencaptivebyinsurgentsatcheckpointsabout12milessouthofFallujah,nearthecitiesofAmiriyaandFerris.Landrosaidthataerialimageryshowedthecheckpoints,aswellashostagesbeingputinspiderholesorotherundergroundcomplexes.InoperationsthatincludedMarinesfrom2ndReconnaissanceBattalionandtheIraqiSecondBrigade,1/25rescuedthreehostages,detainedthreeinsurgentguards,andfoundaweaponscachethatincludedadozenmortartubes,severalmachineguns,andhundredsofartilleryrounds.Thiswasaccomplished with no shots being fired, as Coalition forces surprisedthethreesleepingguards.

“ThehostageswereuncoveredinaspiderholethatIwentdownintomyself,andIcantellyouitwasnotaniceplacetobe.”Landrosaidthespiderholewassosmallthathecouldnotstandupinsideit,yetitstillheldacagewheretheyfoundthehostages.

IntheirlastmonthsinFallujah,1/25playedaleadingroleinaseriesofoperationsthatprovidedinformationonvarioussectionsofthecitythatwerethoughttorepresentathreattotheCoalition.

OperationIndustrialRevolutionwasdesignedtogenerateinformationonbusinessactivitiesinthebustlingsoutheastquadrantthathousedmanyofthecity’smid-sizedandlargebusinesses.Theoperation,conductedwithIraqisoldiersandpolice,producedlittleevidenceofinsurgentactivity,butcensusoperationsallowedMarinestogatherinformationonabroadrangeofsmallandmedium-sizedbusinesses.TheclosecoordinationbetweenAmericansandIraqisimpressedlocalbusinessmen,whowereconstantlyassessingthelevelofsecurityinFallujah.

InOperationMatador,aone-dayoperationintheAndaloosdistrictofthePizzaSlice,MarinesandIraqis

workedside-by-sidetoclearaportionofthecityjustnorthofthePizzaSlice.Again,therewaslittleevidenceseizedduringtheoperation.LandrosaidthattherealsuccessoftheoperationwasfeltinthestaffoftheIraqiArmy,whichwasdemonstratingamuchbettergraspofcommandandcontroltechniques.HealsosaidtheIraqisshowedamarkedimprovementintheirabilitytoplanandconductsuchoperations.Whiletherewasaleveloffrustrationwithanymajoroperationthatdidnotproduceweaponsordetainees,LandrosaidthatthestrongpresencecertainlydisruptedinsurgentactivitiesinthatpartofFallujah.

The battalion’s final operation occurred in the “souk,” ormarketdistrictofFalljua,justnorthofthePizzaSlice.Themarketareacontainshundredsofhousesandsmallbusinesses,andhoardsofshoppersvisititeachdayforbasicsupplies,includingproduceandconsumergoods.Inanotherone-dayoperation,CompanyCMarinesandtheirIraqicounterpartsmovedintothedistrict,whichhasdozensofnarrowsidestreetsandcrampedalleys,beforemostIraqiswereawake.Theirpainstakingbuilding-by-buildingsearchproducedonlyonecache,butLandrosaidthattheIraqis again demonstrated significant improvement in their activities. Another benefit, he said, was that Operation Souktookplaceduring1/25’stransitiontoanotherReservebattalion,1/24,soitgavetheincomingstaffanopportunitytoseehowtheRCTandtheIraqiArmystaffplannedsuchmissions.

��

1st Battalion��th Marines

FirstBattalion,Twenty-FifthMarinesturnedoveritspositionsinandaroundFallujahtoanotherReservebattalion,1stBattalion,24thMarines.Buildingontheimprovementsthat1/25hadmadetoFallujah’sinfrastructureandcommunityrelationsafterOperationalFajr,1/24alsoborrowedtheconceptof“communitypolicing”fromthesuccessfulIraqtourthatitssisterbattalion,2/24,hademployedintheTriangleofDeathtwo

yearsearlier.Usingaggressivepatrollingandintelligenceoperationsthattransformedinformationregardingtribalactivitiesandrelationshipsinto“actionableintelligence,”1/24mademajorcontributionstowhathasbecomeknownasthe“SunniAwakening,”orthe180-degreetransitionofmanySunnitribesintheAnbarProvincefromsupportingtheinsurgentstosupportingtheAmerican-ledeffortinIraq.

Lt.Col.HaroldR.“Odie”VanOpdorp,2/24’sbattalioncommander,creditedmuchofthebattalion’ssuccesstoitsS-2section,andhowithadcloselyintegratedintelligenceonIEDsandotherenemyactivitieswithcurrentoperations.For1/24’sdeploymenttoFallujah,itrecruitedtwokeyintelligence officers from 2/24. Capitalizing on their experienceandthesystemsthattheyhaddevelopedintheBabilProvince,1/24wasabletocaptureandunderstandingofitsareaofoperationsthatallowedtheMarinestooperateinacoordinatedandintelligence-drivenfashion.

The first was Chief Warrant Officer James Roussell, alieutenantintheChicagoPoliceDepartment.Roussellhadspentmostofhis29yearsasapolicemanwithcounter-gangoperations,andheappliedthemethodshelearnedfromthestreetsofChicagototheheartofFallujah.Thekey,hesaid,wasturningeachMarineintoanintelligencecollector.Roussellsaidthatusing1,000Marines,empoweredwiththeideathattheirobservationswerecriticaltothesuccessofthebattalion,allowedhimtogatheranintelligencepictureofFallujahthatallowedthebattalion to fight smarter.

ThesecondMarinewasMaj.DanielP.Whisnant,whocommandedCompanyA.WhisnanthadbeentheS-2fortheearlier2/24deployment,soheandRoussellintuitivelyunderstoodeachothers’needsandproducts.

RoussellsaidthekeytocounteringtheIraqiinsurgencywastodeprivethemoftheirabilitytohideamongthepopulation.IntheVietnamWar,hesaid,insurgentsweredescribed as fish who were able to swim unnoticed in a pond filled with other fish. Borrowing from the popular HarryPotterseries,Roussellsaidthat1/24hadtostripthe“invisibilitycloak”fromtheinsurgency.“Onceweknewwheretheywere,wecoulddowhatweneededtodo.”

WhiletheIraqiinsurgencymighthavemanyparts,Roussellsaidthatforthemostpartitwasmadeupofrationalandintelligentpeople.Expressingalevelof

Photo By Lance Cpl. Stephen McGinnis

Lance Cpl. Jade A. Tanguay, a mechanic assigned to a personnel security detachment, shakes the hand of a child from Fallujah at the home of a girl Marines visited. A Navy physician talked with the family to see if the U.S. military could provide medical assistance.

��

respectfortheshrewdnessthatinsurgentsbroughttothebattle,RoussellsaidthatanunderstandingbyMarinesthatindividualinsurgentswererationalmadetheinsurgentsactivitiesmorepredictable.This,hesaid,ledtotheopportunity for 1/24 to target specific activities. With more than1,000MarineintelligencecollectorsmaneuveringconstantlythroughouttheAO,theIntelligenceSection’sresponsibilitybecamecollectingtheinformationandplottingthedatasothattheIntelligenceSectioncould“connectthedots,”andpushthatinformationouttotheusingunits.

“Identifyingtheenemyishard,”Roussellsaid.“Butonceyoudothat,youcankillhim.OurgoalwastodriveawedgebetweenthepeopleofFallujahandtheinsurgents.”

RepeatedanalysisofthepatternsofIEDsledthebattaliontoinnovativewaystoavoidthemandalsopreventthemfrombeingemployed.Roussellsaidthebattalionidentified the following as its main threats, in order of importance:Improvisedexplosivedevices(IEDs),directfire (particularly from snipers), indirect fire (typically mortars),vehicleborneIEDs,amedium-sizedattack

(such as two dozen insurgents attacking a fixed position), alarge-sizedcounterattack(suchasahundredinsurgentsjoininganattackonapatrol),andacomplexattackthatmightinvolveseveralofthepreviously-describedmethods.Roussellsaidthatsimplifyingthetypesofthreatstoamanageablenumber,thenforcingeachMarineto“wargame”hisresponsetoeachthreatsituation,wastremendouslyvaluablebecauseitallowedMarinestorespondinstinctively.

AtthispointintheIraqWar,thecentralandprovincialgovernmentswereprovidingenoughpoliceandsoldierstoprovide a significant boost to American efforts. Roussell saidthatakeydecisionwithin1/24wastolettheIraqiPolicetakealeadingroleinmostoperations.ByaskingtheIraqistotakechargeofdaytimeoperationsandassigningMarinestoworkunderthecoverofdarkness,1/24employeditsMarinesinamoreprotectedenvironmentwhilepushingcreditforsuccessinFallujahtolocalIraqis.

RoussellsaidhisconceptofvictoryinIraqinvolvedbuildingthelocalpoliceandmilitaryforcestotheextentthattheywouldbeabletocountertheinsurgency.Atthis

Official Marine Corps PhotoActor Chuck Norris made an unscheduled stop in the battalion aid station to visit with wounded Marines during a visit to Camp Baharia.

��

point,hesaid,theseforcesneededAmericansupport,andpartofthetrickwasprovidingthesupportinawaythatgaveIraqisadominantrole.

1/24alsocreatedopportunitiesfor“localheros,”orpeoplewithinthecommunitieswhowerewillingtostanduptotheinsurgentsandcomplainaboutthedamagethattheinsurgentswerecausingtothecommunity.Oneofthese,hesaid,wasanewFallujahpolicechiefwhowaswillingtoleadthecommunityawayfrominsurgents.Marinessaidthepolicechiefwasjustwhatthecityneeded.TheMarinesalsosaidthatduring1/24’stour,agroupoftriballeaders,orsheiks,werewillingtoassisttheU.S.-Iraqieffortbecausetheyhadgrownwearyoftheheavy-handedtacticsoftheinsurgents.

Roussellsaidthatinhisopinion,thewillingnessofthesetribal leaders to provide major assistance in the fight against al Qaeda marked a significant turning point in the war, whenIraqinationalistswerewillingtoplayanimportantrole, in combating al Qaeda, at a significant risk to their livesandstatus.

Roussellsaidthatmuchofhissection’sworkwascollectingdatafromMarinesandthenplottingitinawaytocreateagraphicviewofinsurgentactivities.Hesaidthatthisgraphicrepresentationwasapowerfultoolbecauseitenabledcommandersandpatrolleaderstoenvisionhowinsurgentswouldplantheirattacks.HavingthisknowledgeallowedthemtoplanroutesthatwouldavoidandevencountertheIEDthreat.

Intelligence Officer as Company Commander

Maj.DanielP.Whisnanthadbeenacounter-intelligenceMarineduringhisearlyenlistedcareerbeforebecominganIntelligence Officer with a specialty in collecting human intelligence.Heputhisstrongintelligencebackgroundtouse when he served as Commanding Officer of Company Afor1/24.Atacompanylevel,hesaid,hefeltthathisprimarymissioninvolvedcounter-intelligenceoperationsinhiscompany’sAO,alargeruralregionsouthwestofFallujah.Operatingremotelyfromtherestofthebattalion,Whisnantsaidthatcompany-levelcounterintelligenceoperationswouldcreatetheopportunityforsquad-sizedpatrolstodowhatsquadsdobest:locate,closewith,andtakewhateveractionisnecessarywithrespecttoenemyforces.

CompanyAmeasuredsuccessbytheabilityofMarinestointeractwithIraqis.Whilecrediting“hutzpah”forpartofhiscompany’ssuccess,Whisnantsaid,themostsuccessfulMarinesinhiscompanywerethosewhotrulyenjoyeddealingwithIraqis.WithaboutadozenMarineswhoknew

basicIraqiArabicphrases,andothersoperatingfromwhathecalled,“pointee-talkee”cardswithEnglishandIraqiphrases,hesaidthathefoundtheycouldmovereasonablywellthroughoutthearea.1

Aggressivepatrollingthroughoutthe82-square-kilometerAOgaveCompanyAMarinesathoroughunderstandingoftheagriculturalarea.Whisnantsaidthatcensusoperationsallowedthecompany’ssmallintelligencesectiontounderstandthecompany’schallenges.CompanyA was located on a boundary between areas influenced bytribalsheiksandareasunderthecontrolofAlQaeda-relatedinsurgents.

WhisnantsaidhewasimmediatelystruckbythesimilaritiesbetweenwhatmostIraqiswantedandwhatmostAmericanswanted.BothwantedtheAmericanstoleaveIraqassoonaspossible,hesaid,butheaddedthattheIraqisalsowantedthesamethingsfortheirchildren – security, good schools, and an opportunity for a prosperous future – that his friends in the United States wantfortheirfamilies.UnderstandingthecommonalityoftheirgoalsallowedhimtodevelopanegotiatingstrategythattheIraqisunderstoodwellandthatworkedduringhistenure.Describedasa“somethingforsomething,nothingfornothing,”strategy,WhisnantsaidthathewasveryopenwiththeIraqiswithwhomhedealt.Oncebothsidesclearlyexpressedtheideathattheywantedsomethingthattheotherhadandthattheywerewillingtoworktogether,hesaid,itwasmucheasiertoreachcommonunderstandingfor the benefit of both sides.

Information Operations

1/24 also benefited from the work of an Iraq War veteran whohadservedasWeaponsCompanyCommanderfor1/23intheHit-Hadithacorridor.As1/24’sS-3A,Maj.SheaRussellwasinstructedtofocusoninformationoperations, targeting specific people or regions with non-kineticactivities.InamannersimilartowhatothersweredoinginputtingIraqiPoliceintheleadingroleinFallujah,theInformationOperationsteamputanIraqiwrapperontheinformationthat2/24wantedtocommunicatetotheIraqipeople.2/24’sinformationoperationsfocusedonnewspapers,cableTV,andposters,becausethatishowmostpeopleintheFallujahareareceivedtheirnews.RussellsaidthatmuchoftheirworkwasdirectedtowardSunnimothers,becausetheMarineslearnedthatmotherswerethecenterofgravityformostSunnifamilies,andthereforeanimportantinformationpoint.

RussellsaidhequicklyrealizedthattheIraqiArmywaslesseffectiveinFallujah,withitsstrongmajorityofSunniMuslims,becausetheIraqiArmywasperceivedtobea

�0

toolofthecentralgovernment,withitspredominanceofShi’ia influence. Focusing their efforts on bolstering the IraqiPolice,whohadmuchgreatercredibilitythroughoutFallujah,hisMarinesconductedamajorcampaigntoworkwiththeIraqiPolicetopromotemessagesthatwerepositivefortheMarinesaswellastheIraqiPolice.

Themostimportantthing,hesaid,wasputtingaSunni“face”onallformsofcommunication.Thismeantthatwhen2/24’steamprintedbannersorposterstoputupthroughoutthecity,theyhadtohavea“lookandfeel”oftheIraqiPolice.ThiswasonefactorthatpromptedtheMarinestochangea“tip”telephonelinetoanIraqiPolicetipsline.Bymakingitlooklikealocaltipline,hesaid,itsusageincreased160%inashortperiod.

RussellsaidhisIOteamborrowedinformationfromAlJezeeratocreate“truthsandwiches.”UsingprintingtechniquesidenticaltoonesIraqiswereusedtoseeing,theIOsectionwouldinsertaMarineCorpsmessagebetweenapairofAlJezeerastoriesthatpositivelyportrayedtheAmericaneffortinIraq.ByimplyingthatthisinformationwasgeneratedbyIraqis,andbyborrowingthecredibilityofinformationthatwasalsoreachingIraqihomesthroughAlJezeera,theIOsectioncreatedbelievablenewsaboutwhattheMarinesweredoingthatkeptthingsinapositivelight.

1/24realizedthatthedynamicsoftheIraqiPoliceForce changed significantly in December 2006, when anewchieftookoverthedepartment.Thenewchiefundertookaleadingroleinrootingouttheinsurgency.Withhisenthusiasm,Russellsaid,theinformationcampaignprovidedtremendoussupporttohisefforts.ThechiefandotherIraqiPolicehadmessagesthattheyneededtopushoutwithinthecommunity,andRussellsaidthat1/24provided significant assistance. For example, he said, the IraqiPolicewouldinitiatethemessagetheywantedtoconveytothepeopleofFallujah,andtheMarineswouldprovidesupportbyprintingthemessages.

“TheFallujanslovedit,becauseviolencedroppedsignificantly under the new chief,” Russell said noting that the number of significant events that the battalion reported went from a high of 21 in one day to a period of five days in which the battalion reported no significant incidents, like IEDsorsniperattacks.

RussellsaidthatFallujah’s“atmospherics”alsoimproveddramaticallyduringthisphase.InJanuary,CompanyCmovedfromitsdowntownbasenearFallujah’sgovernmentcentertothesouthernpartofFallujah,allowingtheIraqiArmytotakeoveritsformerbaseinthecity’sGovernmentCenter.

Commander’s Perspective

Lt. Col. Van Opdorp, 1/24’s Commanding Officer, said thathisbattalionassumedresponsibilityforaverydifferentFallujahthanthepreviousbattalion,1/25,experienced.FromtheashesofOperationAlFajr,muchofFallujahhadbeenrebuiltduring1/25’stenureoverarelativelyshortperiod,anditspopulationhadgrowntomorethan350,000.Incredibly,thenewresidentsincludedIraqisfromotherpartsofthecountrywhosoughtsafetyinFallujah.

Insurgentsknewhowtotakeadvantageofthedenseurbanenvironment,VanOpdorpsaid,inwhichitwasrelativelyeasyto“hideinplainsight.”Hesaidthatinsurgentcellswouldfrequentlyhaveseveralhousesfromwhichtheywouldoperate,movingfromhousetohousetostayaheadoftheMarinesandIraqiSecurityForces.DuringtimeswhenIraqipoliceandsoldierswerenotfunctioningeffectivelywithMarines,insurgentsblendedinbecauseAmericaneyesandearscouldnotdistinguishtheirfacesorclothesoraccentsfromothers.WhenlocalsupportturnedtofavortheAmericans,hesaid,itbecameanentirelydifferentbattle.

VanOpdorpsaidthatseveralimportanteventstookplaceduring1/24’stenureinIraqthateventuallyallowedtheMarinestoyieldcontrolofFallujahtotheIraqiSecurityForces.WhilesomethoughtanAmericanwithdrawalwaswrong,VanOpdorpsaidthatthetransitiontoIraqicontrolwasthelogicalextensionoftheearlierbattlesforFallujah.Theendstate,hesaid,wasforFallujanstotakecontroloftheirowncity,andhesaidthatthedegreetowhichFallujansacceptedresponsibilityforthatduring1/24’stenurewasremarkable.

VanOpdorpsaidthatMarineassistanceallowedformanypositiveeventsduring1/24’stenure:

--Col.Faisal,aformerIraqiArmySpecialForcesleader,wasnamedChiefoftheIraqiPoliceinFallujah.VanOpdorp said that Faisal was a leader by anyone’s definition. “He reaffirmed the belief that that one man can make a difference,”VanOpdorpsaid.“HewasaMarine’skindofleader.Heledfromthefront.Hedidnotacceptmarginalperformance....Hegotimmediateresultfromhisyoung[Iraqi Policemen]. He really got them fired up about being responsibleforthesecurityofFallujah....Heunderstoodwhatwasrequiredforlong-termsuccessinFallujah,andthefactthatarobustpoliceforceisthekeytothesecurityprobleminFallujah.”

--Col.AliGarzawasnamedthecommanderoftheIraqiArmy’s2ndBrigadeofthe1stIraqiArmyDivision,withtroopsinFallujah.VanOpdorpsaidthenewcommanderdismissedsomeofhissubordinatecommanders,eliminatedthecorruptionthathadcreatedsuchacorrosiveeffectonthesoldiers,andwenttohisleaderstoobtaintimelypayfor

�1

Iraq

��

IraqAl

Anbar

Baghdad��

histroops.-- Capt. Jason Bressler, a Civil Affairs officer, worked

withIraqiandAmericanleadersattheProvinceandMEFlevels to bring about a significant change in the Fallujah CityCouncil.Asaresultofhisefforts,FallujahobtainedanewmayorandnewcitycouncilthatweremuchmoreresponsivetotheneedsofaverageFallujans.This,VanOpdorpsaid,didmuchtogivecredibilitytothenew“team”ofleadersthroughoutFallujah.

--AlargetribelocatedintheruralareawestofFallujah,the Albu Issa tribe, made a firm commitment to support an independentFallujahandopposethealQaeda-linkedforcesoperatingnearby.VanOpdorpcreditedthistotheinitiativeofMaj.Whisnant,theAlphaCompanyCommander,whoconvincedtheRCTCommandertotraveltoJordanandencourageSheikKhamis,theAlbuIssaleader,toreturnfromaself-imposedexiletoprotecthistribefromtheAlQaeda.VanOpdorpsaidthatthiswaspartofalargermovementofSunniSheiksintheAnbarProvincedecidingthatitwasintheirinteresttoworkagainstAlQaeda.SheikKhamis’immediatesuccessencouragednearbytribestojoinhisefforts.VanOpdorpsaidtheMarinesknewthatSheikKhamishadbecomeaforcewhenAlQaedalaunchedasophisticatedsuicidechlorinebombattackthatcameupshortjustafewhundredmetersfromSheikKhamis’home.

WhileviolencecontinuedinandaroundFallujah,IraqiSecurityForcesincreasinglyhandledtheviolence.1/24wasinwhatVanOpdorpdescribedasan“overwatch”positionontheoutskirtsofFallujah,providingassistancewhenneeded.Animportantbreakthroughtookplace,hesaid,whenCol.FaisalaskedtheMarinestoprovideapermanentQuickResponseForce(QRF)thatwouldbededicatedtosupportingIraqiPoliceoperations.Recognizingtherisks,VanOpdorpsaidthathealsorecognizedthatthispresenteda tremendous opportunity to let the Iraqi Police flex their muscles,sohetaskedBravoCompanywithprovidingthisforce.Maj.JeffreyM.O’NeillsaidthattheQRFwassomething like a portable fire station, able to respond immediatelyiftheIraqiPolicegotintosomethingthatwastoolargeforthemtohandle.Thiscombinationwaseffective,hesaid,becausetheIraqisknewhowtogettheinformationandactquicklyontips,whiletheAmericanshad the backup firepower to embolden the Iraqi Police to takemeasuredrisks.WithMarinesprovidingacordonandIraqiPoliceservingastheassaultteam,theIraqisdetained82suspectsintwomonths.Thiswasatotalturnaround,hesaid,asMarineswentfrombeingverysuspiciousofIraqiPolicetoworkingside-by-sidewiththem.

TheemergenceofIraqiSecurityForcesthroughoutFallujahallowedtheMarinestoconsideraCivilAffairs“heartsandminds”programthatmanythoughtMarines

would be doing when they first returned to Iraq in 2004. Inthisoperation,coordinatedbyBressler,Marinesconductedatwo-dayoperationinSheikKhamis’areathatincluded Civil Affairs Officers, Legal Officers, physicians andveterinarians.VanOpdorpsaidthephysiciansandveterinarianstreatedhundredsofIraqisandherdsofsheepand cattle. The Legal Officers, he said, made payments for varioussmallclaimsthatIraqisinthatareahadagainsttheAmericanforces.Theoperationwasatremendoussuccess.“Whenyoudosomethinglikethat...theycometorealizemoreandmorethattheseguysaren’toccupiers,theyarejusttryingtocontinuetohelpussowecanhelpourselves.”

VanOpdorpsaid,“IthinkthatthetransitionofFallujahtothe2ndBrigade[oftheIraqiArmy]andtotheIraqiPolicewasatremendousaccomplishmentthat1/24willlookat.”Hecreditedthe60%reductioninviolentactsduringhisbattalion’stenureinFallujahtotheworkhisMarinesdidincreatingconditionstoreturnresponsibilityforcertainfunctionstoIraqicontrol.

VanOpdorpsaidthattheReservesliveduptotheirreputations.“Iamnotsurethatanactivedutybattalioncanenjoythesuccessthatwehad,becauseyou’renotgoingto have a twenty-eight-year Chicago Police officer dealing with anti-gangs, or a New York city firefighter who has the amazingcharismatogooutandconductthetypeofthingsthathedidwithhisCAGdetachment,oraformer[counter-intelligence]MarineasacompanycommanderwhosetsuponeofthemostphenomenalintelligencedatabasesandsituationalawarenessforhisAO.These[Marines]aresomeofthebestthatAmericahastooffer,andtheyjustdidaphenomenaljob.”

��

1�th MarinesInawarthatcreatedmanynewparadigms,theGlobal

WaronTerrorism(GWOT)reinforcedthewell-knowntenetthat every Marine is a rifleman.

TheGWOTleviedcontinuouslargerequirementsforMarines.TheMarineCorps’TableofOrganization,designedmoreforconventionalwarfare,didnotmatchthedemandsofthisdifferenttypeofwar.Inresolvingshortfalls,thefactthateveryMarinehadbasicinfantryskills gave the Marine Corps tremendous flexibility in shiftingindividualsandunitstomeetneeds.

As planners worked to fill undermanned specialties, one of their first targets was the Reserves’ artillery regiment, 14thMarines.With3,700Marines,itconstitutedthelargestregimentintheMarineCorps.1Asoperationstransitionedfromcombattosecurityandstabilityoperations(SASO),the demand for firing batteries dropped significantly.2Whilesomemighthavecomplainedthattheirrecruitersneverwarnedthemtheymightendupdrivingatruckordirectingtraffic, the needs of the Marine Corps made “Semper Gumby”3awayoflifeforReserveartilleryMarines.From2003toMarch2007,morethan2,900ofthoseMarinesdeployed.4Whilesomeusedtheirartilleryskills,mostmadeatransitiontoadifferentoccupationalspecialty.Inthatsameperiod,allbuttwooftheRegiment’s17batteriesreceivedbasictraininginnew,or“provisional,”MilitaryOccupationalSpecialties(MOSs),suchasinfantry,militarypolice,orcivilaffairs.5TrainingoftenwasfollowedbyanimmediatedeploymenttoacombatenvironmentinIraqorAfghanistan.

Col. Paul J. O’Leary, commanding officer of 14th Marines,saidhisMarinesembracedtheprovisionalmissions,consistentlyprovingthattheycouldquicklytransitiontonewmilitaryskillsthatarevastlydifferentfromartillery.ThefactthatseveralrotationsofReserveartilleryunitsmadesimilartransitionshelped,hesaid,asMarineslearnedfromtheirpredecessorsandimprovedtheirperformancewitheachrotation.

“FromwhatI’veseen,artilleryMarineshavebeenveryenthusiasticaboutperformingtheseprovisionalmissions,particularlythemilitarypolice(MP)mission,”hesaid.“I’vebeenveryimpressedwiththeirabilitytomakethetransition and accomplish a difficult group of subordinate missionsthateachtaskforcehashadtohandle.I’vealsobeenveryimpressedwiththeabilityofourMarinestoaccomplishtheMPmissionwiththeshortamountoftimethey’vehadtotraintoit.”

HavingcommandedanartillerybattalioninIraqduring

Phase I, O’Leary knew there would not be a significant demand for firing batteries when Marines transitioned toSASO.Whilecommandersandplannersthroughout14thMarineswerenotsurewhatmissionsmightbeassignedtotheirunits,theyunderstoodthevalueofbasicinfantryskills.KnowingthatmostwouldendupinIraq,theyappreciatedthatregardlessofthemission,astronggroundinginfundamentalswouldpaydividends.

WhilesomeMarinesfrom14thMarineswereassignedtoinfantryorinteriorguardmissions,mostendedupinoneofthreeprovisionalMPbattalionsthatrotatedthroughIraqfromSeptember2005toMarch2007.6Sgt.Maj.BobbyL.Allen,sergeantmajorfor14thMarines,saidthatthetransitionwasfacilitatedbytwofactorsthatwereconsideredduringtheplanningprocess:manyartilleryReservistshadcivilianjobsrelatedtolawenforcement,andthebasicartillerymissionreliesheavilyontwoskills,movingandcommunicating,whicharecriticaltoMPoperations.Healsonotedthatartilleryunitsareresponsibleforprovidingtheirownsecurityforconvoyoperations,soservingasconvoysecurityforprivateIraqiandAmericancontractorsmovingsuppliesthroughouttheAnbarProvincewasastraightforwardtransition.7

FromthestartofOIF,ReserveartilleryMarinesaugmentedunitsinIraq.DuringPhaseI,BatteryAof1/14providedadetachmenttoCampalTaqaddumtoassist1stForceServiceSupportGroup’sMortuaryAffairsDetachment.8Thatsameyear,14thMarinesassignedmorethan100individualaugmenteestobilletsinIraq,Afghanistan,andtheHornofAfrica.9

ThepushforartilleryMarinestotransitiontoprovisionalunitspickedupsteamwhenMarinesreturnedinforcetoIraqinearly2004.Morethan600Marinesandsailorsfrom14thMarinesdeployedtoIraqthatspringandsummer,typicallyinsmallunitsspreadthroughouttheAnbarProvince.Whilethecounter-batteryradarplatoonretained its artillery mission, tracking indirect fires from detachmentsatalAsad,arRamadi,alQa’im,andFallujah,otherunitsmovedtoprovisionalroles.HeadquartersBatteryof2/14providedtwoprovisionaltruckplatoons,onetoAbuGhraibandonetoalQa’im,whileBatteryPof5/14providedpartofthesecurityforceatalAsad.

Themobilizationofmostof4/14foradeploymentinthe fall of 2004 demonstrated the flexibility needed for thetypeofwarfareIraqpresented.BatteryMretaineditsartillerymission,asitprovideddirectsupportto1stMarineDivision and fired a significant number of rounds into

��

FallujahandnearbyareasduringOperationalFajr.10

Sisterbatteries,augmentedbydetachmentsfrom4/14’sHeadquartersBattery,deployedinprovisionalroles.BatteryKservedasaprovisionalinfantrycompany,supportingIMEFatCampFallujahand3rdMAWatalAsad.BeforeOperationalFajr,BatteryKrepeatedlydefendedCampFallujahfromenemyattacks,asthepopulationofthebaseincreasedtomorethan14,000coalitiontroops.BatteryLprovidedaprovisionalMPcompanyto1stFSSGatCampalTaqaddum.Inadditiontoconductingsecurityanddetentionoperations,itdistinguisheditselfbyescortingconvoysthroughouttheAnbarProvinceunderunpredictablecombatconditions.11Thisdeploymentprovedtobe4/14’slast,asthebattalionwasdeactivatedonAug.14,2005.12

Thenextdeploymentofprovisionalunitsfrom14thMarines,beginninginMarch2005,wassimilarinscopeandmissiontothatoftheartilleryunitstheyreplaced.13BatteryEwassplitintotwoprovisionaltruckplatoons,withoneattachedtoanactivedutyinfantrybattalion,3rdBattalion,2ndMarines,whiletheotherwasattachedtoareserveinfantrybattalion,3rdBattalion,25thMarines.ThesetwobattalionswereresponsibleforthedangerousWesternEuphratesRiverValleyfromHittotheSyrianborder,whichwasanareaofintenseactivityduringthisrotation.14Detachmentsfrom14thMarines’HeadquartersBatteryand2/14’sHeadquartersBatteryprovidedaprovisionaltruckplatoonto2ndBattalion,2ndMarinesand3rdBattalion,6thMarines,respectively.BatteryD,attachedto2ndMPBattalionatCampFallujahasaprovisionalMPcompany,15wasassignedthreedistinctMPfunctions.OneplatoonprovidedforceprotectionatCampFallujah,oneconducteddetentioncenteroperationsatCampRamadi,andtheremainingplatoonconductedconvoymissionsandsecuritypatrolsfromCampTaqaddum.16BatteryE’ssuccessinthesedistinctmissionsgave14thMarinesapreviewofthemissionstocome,includingthereliefofanactivedutyMPbattalionbyoneof14thMarines’battalionsservingintheprovisionalrole.

Artillery Battalion Assumes MP Role

Thedeploymentof5thBattalion,14thMarinestoIraqastheleadelementofaprovisionalMPbattalionmarkeda significant increase in responsibilities assigned to a 14thMarines’unit.WhileLt.Col.JohnC.Hemmerling’s650Marineswereaugmentedbyapproximately200active duty Marines, many from the MP field,17thisrotationdemonstratedthatareserveunitcouldprovidetheheadquartersandmostoftheMarinesneededtostaffanMPbattalion,ratherthansimplyservingasone

ofitselements.18The5/14(-)ReinforcedMPBattalionwasresponsibleformuchofIIMEF’sAOintheAnbarProvince.

WhiletheMarineCorps’emphasisoncombatskillsallowedindividualMarinestotransitionquicklytoinfantryorsecuritybillets,shiftingtopoliceduties,whichrequired more specific training, proved more difficult. Hemmerlingcalledthetransformationa“majormissionmetamorphosis.”19Herealizedthatthisconversionrequiredtrainingthatfarexceededthetraditionaloneweekendamonthandtwoweeksofannualtraining.Beforemobilization,5/14usedfour-daydrillperiodstolearnhowtorundetentioncentersandparticipateininfantrytrainingthatincludedvirtualconvoycombattraining,indoorsimulatedmarksmanshiptraining,advancedweaponsmaintenance,andtheMarineCorps’MartialArtsProgram.EvenafterthebattalionwasmobilizedanddeployedtotheMarineCorpsAirGroundCombatCenteratTwentyninePalms,Calif.forbattalion-leveltraining,Lt.Col.Hemmerlingsetasidelargeblocksoftimeforsmall-unittraining,soindividualMarinescouldhonetheirinfantryskills.Hiscommander’sintentemphasizedthisfocus:“[W]ewillbegoodatthebasicsandwewillnotadvancebeyondthebasicsuntilwehavethemmastered.Thebasicswillsaveourlives.”20

InadditiontotheworkofBatteryD,3/14asmilitarypoliceduringthepreviousrotation,theworkofthreecompaniesfrom4thTankBattalionalsohelpedsetthestagefor1/14’ssuccessasanMPbattalion.21CompanyAwasassignedaforceprotectionmissionwithIMEF’s

Photo By Lance Cpl. Samantha L. Jones

Marines of Gun 4 of Battery M, 4th Battalion, 14th Marines ((left to right) Sgt. Justin Grafton; PFC Matthew Camp; Sgt. Mike Dasher; Lance Cpl. Josh Rosenberger; Cpl. Will McGee; Cpl. Jonathan Layman; and Lance Cpl. Jonathan Fox) firing an M-198 155mm howitzer from firing positions near Camp Fallujah into Fallujah on November 11, 2004.

��

HeadquartersGroupatCampFallujah.CompanyBconductedmaneuverandmobilitysupportoperations(MMSO)aspartof2ndMPBattalionatCampFallujah,whileCompanyCperformedasimilarmissionfor2ndMarineDivisionatCampRamadi.

Capt. David C. Hyman, an active duty MP officer who joined 5/14 in Iraq as the assistant operations officer, said that5/14’stransitiontoleadingaprovisionalMPbattalionwasmademucheasierbythefactthatcertainspecialties,likecriminalinvestigationsanddoghandling,werehandledbyactivedutyMPMarineswhohadworkedinthosefields for many years. Marines with artillery backgrounds, typicallyassignedtoconvoysecurityorregionaldetentionfacilitymissions,wereabletofocusonthetypesofbasicsecurity principles that Marines learn from their first days intheCorps.22

Capt.Hyman,whoseprimarymissionwascoordinatingconvoysecuritywithIIMEF’sLogisticsMovementControlCenter,saidtherewasagreatdealofrespectbetweenactiveandreserveMarinesfortheskillsthateachbroughttothebattalion.

“WhenIjoinedthebattalion,itwasnotcleartomewhowasactivedutyandwhowasreserve,”hesaid.“Theymeshedwelltogether,andtherewasnotadivisionbetweenthetwo.”23

When5/14deployedtoIraq,itsHeadquarters,MP,andAreaSecuritycompanieskeptmostoftheirMarinesatCampFallujah,24whiletheDetentionCompanywasspreadover five bases. Within Camp Fallujah, the MP battalion workedinsideasmallcompoundknownasCampFarrar.25HeadquartersCompanyincludedthecriminalinvestigativedivisionandthemilitaryworkingdogs,butmostoftheMarinesandthe57dogsassignedtothoseunitswereattachedtoothercommands.

Hemmerlingsaidthathefeltthebattalion’sriskiestmissionbelongedtoMPCompany,whichhadthreeplatoonsresponsibleforconvoysecurityandmaintainingclearMSRs.26Helaterstatedthatthroughoutthedeployment,theseMarineswereconstantlyontheroad,conductingmorethan400missionsanddrivingthousandsofkilometersthroughdangerousterritory.HeestimatedthatMPCompanyMarinesaveragedapproximatelyoneIEDincidentandonesmallarmsattackonaconvoyperweek.Inadditiontoaccompanyingconvoysforprivatecontractors,likeKellog,BrownandRoot,theyalsowereassignedtoprovidesecurityformovementsofIraqiArmyandpoliceunits,whichwerefrequenttargetsforinsurgentattacks.HemmerlingsaidthatcombiningescortdutywithkeepingroadsclearofIEDsandotherinsurgentactivitieswas,“ahellofamission,[inwhich]evenamomentofcomplacencycanbefatal.”27

Whileeachconvoymissionwasunique,onefromJanuary2006providesdetailonthedangerofoperatingoncertainroads,andhowconvoysecurityworkedinIraq.Onthismission,3rdPlatoonfrom5/14’sMPCompanywastaskedwithaccompanyingalargeconvoyofIraqiArmyvehiclesfromCampTaji,justnorthofBaghdad,toHabbaniyah,betweenFallujahandRamadi.28Theconvoysecurityteam,consistingof10militaryvehiclesand40Marinesandsailors,wasassignedtoaconvoythatincluded57vehiclesandalmost300IraqiArmysoldiers.Travelingatnight,themainbodyoftheconvoywasprecededbyateamofscoutvehicles.AMarineintheleadvehiclespottedatrashbagintheroadandhisdriverswervedtoavoidit.ThisvehiclethencircledbacksoMarinescouldmarktheareafortherestoftheconvoy.TheMarinesalsowanted to confirm that it was an IED and determine if therewereothersthathadbeenemplacedinthevicinity.Astheyapproachedthetrashbag,theIEDwasdetonated,causing some damage to the vehicle but no significant injuriestotheMarines.OtherscoutsimmediatelysearchedforapersonwhocouldhavedetonatedtheIEDandotherexplosives.Themainbodyoftheconvoy,whichcoveredsixkilometers,conductedasecurityhalt.SeveralteamsfromthesecuritydetailswepttheareaforIEDs.Nothingwasfound,andshortlythereaftertheconvoycommanderinstructedthemtocontinuetheirmission.29

Thebattalion’sAreaSecurityCompany,consistingofBatteryN,aplatoonfromBatteryCandtheTOWPlatoonfrom25thMarines,providedforceprotectiontoCampFallujahaswellastoportionsofalAsad.Inadditiontoprovidingcampsecurityandmanningthewatchtowers,theseMarinespatrolledintheareaimmediatelysurroundingthebases.ThecompanythatwasmostwidelydispersedwasDetentionCompany,whichstaffedregionaldetentionfacilities(RDFs)atalQa’im,alAsad,Ramadi,Fallujah,andFOBKalsu.30IntheaftermathoftheAbuGhraibprisonscandal,31operationsatdetentioncentersthroughoutthecountryreceivedagreatdealofscrutinyfromalllevelsofcommand.Mostdetaineeswerecapturedduringlocaloperationsbyinfantryorreconnaissanceunits,thentransferredtoRDFs,wheretheycouldbeheldforupto14days,untiltheyeitherwerereleasedormovedtoAbuGhraibforfurtherprocessing.

IntelligencecollectionwasconductedattheRDFs,anditwasdonebyintelligenceteamsmonitoredbymembersofthedetentionunits.

Maj. Trevor D. Devine, the operations officer for 5/14, saidthatthedetentioncentershadbeencreatedfromwhateverfacilitieswereavailableandmostappropriateateach of the five bases.32Thesewere“low-tech”prisons,typically combining a significant number of Marine guards

��

withagreatdealofbarbedwire.DetaineeswereprovidedorangejumpsuitsandwereissuedKoransorBiblesandprayerrugsandprovidedwithappropriatefoodandmedicalattention.

DevinesaidthattheaverageRDFheld150detainees,althoughthiscouldincreaseifmilitaryoperationsrequiredatemporarysurge.WhilesomeRDFsmightprovideforoneortwodetaineeslivinginoneroom,therewerecasesinwhichuptoeightdetaineeswereheldinasingleroom.Duringitstour,5/14’sDententionCompanyprocessedmorethan6,000detainees.

Detentioncentersweretemporaryholdingpointswheredetainees were held after being apprehended in the field but beforebeingtransportedtoAbuGhraib.Whileadetaineemighthavepresentedathreattocoalitionforcesoutsidethecamp,DevinesaidthatDetentionCompanyMarineswereinstructedtoassumethatadetaineewasnotathreatinsideanRDF,andthereforewouldbetreatedlikean“involuntaryguest”ina“secure”hotelratherthanlikeaprisonerinjail.“Wemadesurethattheydidnotescape,butwealsomadesurethattheyweretakencareof,andnotabusedorhurt.OurMarineswerestrictandforcefulwhennecessary,buttheyalsowerefair.”33

DevinesaidthatheattributedmuchoftheMarines’successattheRDFstotheirabilitytocommunicatewiththedetainees.Whiletheyusednon-verbalcommunicationswhennecessary,severallearnedenoughArabicinpre-deploymentandon-the-jobtraininginIraqtoallowthemto communicate at an elementary level sufficient for most detaineeinteractions.

As O’Leary and his staff planned for the final rotation ofreserveartilleryMarinesinaprovisionalMPmission,oneofhisgreatestconcernswashowlongitmighttakesuchaunittoreturntoitsoriginalartillerymission.34WhileharboringnodoubtsthathisMarinescouldreverttotheircustomarymission,hesaidthattheenthusiasmwithwhichmanyofhisMarinesembracedtheMPandotherprovisionalmissionsmightpromptsomeofhisMarinesto transfer to other units. This was not a reflection on theirfeelingstowardsartillery,butsimplydemonstratedapreferencetoreturntothecurrentbattleratherthanpractice in a field for which there was not a strong demand. AllensaidthatwhenhespoketoprovisionalMPMarinespreparingtodeployinthefallof2006,manyindicatedthattheyhadtransferredintoa3/14unittogetasecondMPtourinIraq.35

AfterthelastprovisionalMPbattalionreturnedto14thMarinesinthespringof2007,O’Learyplannedtohavearegimental-levelannualtrainingexerciseforthatsummer.Asapreviewtothistransitionbacktotheartillerymission,BatteryP,whichdeployedtoIraqasasecurityforcein

2004, executed a significant training and firing exercise atCampPendletonin2006.O’Learysaidthatevaluatorshadgiventhebatteryexcellentmarksonallaspectsoftheexercise, which supports his confidence that the regiment’s weaponscanbereadiedanditsMarinescanregainproficiency in a relatively short period.36

“ArtilleryMarineswerewillingtovolunteertomoveintoanotherlineofworkbecausetheywereanxioustoget into the fight in Iraq,” O’Leary said. “From what I’ve seen,theynowwanttogetbackintothebusinessofdoingartillerymissions.”37

InadditiontodeploymentstoIraq,14thMarineshassentmorethan60Marines,mostlyfromtheregiment’sHeadquartersBattery,toDjiboutitoserveonthestaffoftheCombinedJointTaskForcefortheHornofAfrica(CJTF-HOA).38TwentyoftheseMarinesservedwiththeprovisionalsecuritycompany,whichprovidedsecuritytotheformerFrenchForeignLegionbaseinDjibouti,asmallcountrytuckedbetweenSomalia,Ethiopia,andEritrea.The remaining Marines filled CJTF-HOA staff billets in DjiboutiandothercountriesintheHornofAfrica.

WhileeventsinIraqandAfricaplacedcontinuingrequirementsonreserveartilleryMarines,thedevastationcausedbyHurricaneKatrinaontheGulfCoastoftheUnited States in 2005 also required significant assistance fromvariousunits.39AsHurricaneKatrinawaspoisedtocomeashore,theMarineForcesReserveand4thMarineDivisionstaffsexecutedtheirrespectiveplansforevacuatingtoalternateoperatingsites,includingreservetrainingcenters(RTCs)inTexas.MarineForcesReservetookoverportionsofthe14thMarinesheadquartersinFortWorthand4thMarineDivisionoperatedoutoftheheadquartersof2ndBattalion,14thMarinesinGrandPrairie.WhiletheMarineReserveheadquartersonDauphineStreetinNewOrleanswasnotbadlydamaged,significant damage to the city’s infrastructure forced portionsoftheMarineForcesReserveand4thMarineDivisiontoremainwiththeir14thMarineshostsinTexasforthreemonths.WhileNewOrleans-basedMarinesweremovingtotheseandotherlocations,4thMarineDivisionimmediatelylookedto14thMarines,whoseMarineswerenotinKatrina’spath,toassistinhumanitarianoperationsthroughouttheGulfCoastregion.Onshortnotice,75Marinesfrom14thMarinesreportedfordutyinMississippi.Forthreemonths,thesereserveartilleryMarinesprovidedvaluableassistanceinmovingsuppliesandevacueesthroughoutthedevastatedarea.

��

4th MarineAircraft Wing

In Iraq

��

�0

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron

���WhenIMEFreturnedtoIraqinearly2004,commanders

atalllevelsaskedtheirMarinesto“pokethehornetsnest,”toseewhatcameout.

TheMarineaircrewsofMarineLightAttackHelicopterSquadron775(HMLA-775),aReservesquadronknownasthe “Coyotes,” flew right into the hornets nest of Fallujah.

Shortlyaftertheirarrival,theCoyoteslearnedthatfoursecuritycontractorshadbeenkilledandtwohadbeenhungfromwhatwouldbecomeknownas“BlackwaterBridge”inFallujah.Aweeklater,aspartofOperationVigilantResolve,theCoyotesprovidedrooftop-levelcloseairsupporttotroopsbattlinginsurgentsthroughoutFallujah.TheirCobrasandHueyshelpedshapethebattlespace,eitherprotectingMarinesorturningthetideofbattle.Withatoe-to-toeslugfestontheground,theCoyotes’rockets,missiles,andmachinegunsrepresentedawelcomeadditiontotheMarines’punch.

VeteransofVigilantResolvedescribeditasoneofthefiercest battles in Iraq to that point. As a major city that housedmorethan400,000atonepoint,Fallujahprovidedhundreds of fighting positions for an insurgent force estimatedat1,200.1InresponsetotheBlackwaterincident,IMEFwasorderedtoattackinsurgentsinsideFallujahbefore developing sufficient intelligence on the city, and it encounteredanenemythatwaslargerandbetterpreparedthantheMarinesexpected.2Thedeathofmorethan30Americantroopsdemonstratedthescopeandferocityofthefighting on the ground. In the air, eight Coyote helicopters receivedbattledamage,showingthepotencyoftheinsurgents’AK-47s,machineguns,andRPGs.

AsaReservesquadron,HMLA-775tookmanyexperiencedpilotsintoFallujah.Mostwerelieutenantcolonels with more than 2,500 flight hours, and many had previouscombatexperience.3Thiscombatexperiencewasa significant advantage when the Coyotes were thrust into theFallujahbattlealmostassoonastheyarrived.Thesquadroncommander,Lt.Col.BruceS.“Tramp”Orner,saidthatVigilantResolvesetthepaceforahigh-tempodeployment that saw the Coyotes record 4,599 flight hours

in2,858sorties.4

“WetookalotofourbattledamageinFallujah,”Ornersaid.“AsfarasprovidingsupporttotheMarinesontheground,wereceivedverygoodfeedback...TheysaidtheylovediteverytimetheCoyoteswereinthearea,becausewe’dstayonstationuntilwewereeitheroutofordinanceoroutoffuel.”5

TheCoyoteswerebasedatCampTaqqadum,betweenthemajorAnbarcitiesofFallujahandRamadi.WhileFallujah’sreputationasatoughSunni-dominatedinsurgenthubplaceditinAmerica’sconsciousness,manyMarinesconsideredRamadianequalthreattothecoalition.Maj.MichaelP.“Citizen”Kane,wholedatwo-aircraftsectionconsistingofhisHueyandaCobraintobothFallujahandRamadiontheseconddayofVigilantResolve,foundouthow dangerous ground fire could be.6Forbothmissions,hesupportedinfantryMarinesinprecarioussituations.Hiswingman took significant battle damage in the first mission, andKanewasforcedtoreturnearlytoCampTaqaddumfromthesecondmissionwhenpartsofhisengineandtransmission were shattered by small arms fire.

For the first mission, his section responded to a call for immediateassistancefromabeleagueredpatrolfrom2ndBattalion,4thMarinesthatwasworkinginthenearbycityof Ramadi. While most fighting was taking place that day inFallujah,insurgentsinRamadiwerecreatinghavocforasmallnumberof2/4Marinesthathadbeencutofffromtherestofthebattalion.Thepatrolwasspreadthinlyovertwoblocks,hadseveralwoundedMarines,andwaspinneddown by RPGs and intense small arms fire.

Afterarrivingonstationandradioingthepatrolleader,Kane flew his section over the Marines to let each of themknowthathelphadarrived.Afteridentifyingseveralenemypositions,Kane’shelicopterprovidedcloseairsupportfromtheHuey’s.50-caliberand7.62mmmachineguns. In some cases, he reported, his helicopter fired on insurgentpositionsthatwereonlyahundredmetersfromthe Marines. After suppressing insurgent fires, he further directedambulancesandotherrelieftotheMarines.It

�1

wasonlyaftertheinjuredhadbeenevacuatedandthereliefforcewasinplacethatKane’ssection,includingthedamagedCobra,returnedtoCampTaqqadum.

Withinminutesofrefuelingandrearming,KanewasorderedtoconductasimilarmissioninFallujah.FlyingwithadifferentCobrawingman,Kanerespondedtoamissionfrom1stBattalion,5thMarines.LearningthataMarineplatoonhadbeenstoppedbyacompany-sizedinsurgentstrongpoint,Kanemadetwopassesoverthestrongpoint and had his crewmen provide suppressive fires untilhisHueywashitbyseveralroundsofsmallarmsfire that damaged major components. One round even penetratedthewindscreen,sprayingshardsofPlexiglasthroughoutthecockpitandcuttingKane’sface.

Low-Level Close Air Support

Orner said that throughout the Fallujah fight, and for thedurationofthedeployment,hissquadronusedlow-level flying tactics that essentially put them on top of Marinesandinsurgents.Thismadethehelicoptersmoreaccessible to small arms fire, but it reduced the threat from portable surface-to-air missiles. An added benefit, according to Orner, was that low-level flying allowed pilots todistinguishwhichinsurgentswereusingnon-combatantsasshields.

“Therewerestillalotofciviliansintown,andtheinsurgents,alotoftimes,wouldusewomenandchildrentohidebehind,”hesaid.“Wehadanincidentwhereasectionwas flying low and started taking fire, and there were severalinsurgentsholdingwomeninfrontofthemandshootingAK-47sintotheaircraft.”7

Lt.Col.StevenL.Held,aCobrapilotwhoservedasabattlecaptaininthesquadron’soperationscenterduringOperationVigilantResolve,saidthesquadron’slow-levelsupport was a significant boost to the Marines on the ground.

“Our pilots were flying around-the-clock close air supportinsupportofthoseMarines,”Heldsaid.“Theywerereallygladtohavethattypeofcloseairsupport.It’saverypersonalrelationshipwhenasectionof[helicopters]showsup,because[theMarines]canhearit,theycanseeit...andthecommunicationsaregoodbecausewe’realwaysline-of-sightwiththem.”8

While insurgents in Fallujah occasionally fired surface-to-airmissiles,mostofthethreatcamefromRPGsandmassed fires from AK-47s and machine guns. Lt. Col. Peter “Ditto”DiTulliopilotedthreehelicoptersoverFallujahthatreceived significant battle damage. He said that low-level flying attracted fires from insurgents who would dart into roadsashelicopterspassedoverhead.

EventhoughallHMLA-775helicoptersreturnedsafelyto Al Taqqadum during the intense first week of fighting inFallujah,therewereanumberofclosecalls.Inonecase,asingleroundtothecockpitofaCobracommandedbyDiTulliocameperilouslyclosetodowninghisCobra.FlyingwithcopilotMaj.RonanJ.“Waldo”Lasso,DiTulliowasprovidingearlymorningcloseairsupportoverFallujahwhenasingleAK-47roundhitthecockpitbesideLasso.Theroundpassedthroughthefrontseatcyclic,9destroyingitandcausingthehelicoptertolurchtoonesidebeforestriking a sea signal flare attached to Lasso’s vest and setting it off. In an instant, the cockpit filled with smoke, effectively blinding both pilots as flames spread to Lasso’s chest,lap,andlegs.

Assoonastheaircraftwashit,DiTullioradioedhisdistresscall.“Mayday,Mayday,Mayday.Tycoonisgoingin!”10

DiTullioquicklyrecoveredfromtheinitialjolt,butitwas difficult to put the helicopter on a level course because smokeinthecockpitobscuredboththecontrolsandthehorizon.Atonepoint,smokewassothickthathecouldnotseehishandsonthecontrols.11Althoughhiswingman,Lt.Col. Karl F. Frost, flew his Cobra alongside DiTullio’s as soon as he heard the Mayday call, DiTullio knew that flying blindatonly400feetcreatedaprecarioussituation.WithFrost’s help, he was able to maintain level flight, stabilizing the situation as Lasso labored to beat down the flames, whichwerespreadingtohismapandseat.

Asventsclearedthecockpitofsmoke,Maj.Lassoused a fire extinguisher to put out the remaining embers. Whileinstinctivereactionsbroughtvariousproblemsundercontrol,DiTulliorealizedthathisvisionproblem

Official Marine Corps Photo

This photograph shows where the 7.62mm round entered the cockpit before striking Maj. Ronan J. Lasso’s signal flare.

��

was caused, in part, by a grey film that the flare’s smoke hadleftonhisvisor.Pushinghisvisorup,herealizedthatwhile much of the smoke had cleared, the same film coated theinsideofthecanopy.Ashewipedoffthisresidue,heregainedvisibilityoutsidethecockpit.AfterDiTulliomadesurethatthemajorcomponentswerefunctioningwellenoughtokeepthehelicopteraloft,thesectionreturnedtoCampTaqqadum.

BecausetheCobra’scontolswereheavilydamaged,therewasnochancethedamagedCobrawouldbesafetofly without significant repairs. After a brief rest, DiTullio andLassolearnedthesquadronhadanotherCobrareadyfor the fight. Later that day, the two were able to extract a measureofrevengefortheshotthatalmostbroughtthemdown by firing two Hellfire missiles into an insurgent positioninFallujah.

Deployment to Iraq

WhileVigilantResolvesetthetoneforthedeployment,thehighlevelofactivitythroughouttheAnbarProvincekept the Coyotes busy. The 2004 deployment was the first oftwoplannedseven-monthdeployments.Thefactthatthesquadron saw its heaviest fighting in the first month helped prepareitfortherestofthedeployment.

TheCoyoteslearnedtheywouldbemobilizedinlate2003,afterrisingunrestpromptedtheJointChiefsofStafftoorderMarinestoreturntoIraq.Theyreceivedtwo-year orders in January. This included a firm plan for the first deployment and a tentative plan for a second one in2005.Afterrecruitingadditionalpilotsandconductingcompressedtraining,thesquadronpacked18AH-1WCobrasandnineUH-1NHueysontoAirForceC-5s,andreachedIraqinearlyMarch2004.

Afterabriefturnover,IMEFtookovertheAnbarProvincefromtheArmy’s82ndAirborneDivisiononMarch24.Aweeklater,plansforanorderlyaccelerationofoperationswereabandonedwhentheBlackwatercontractorswereambushedinFallujah.Withthebodiesbeatenandburnedbeyondrecognition,andtwohungfromasteelbridge,thisattackwasseenasachallengefromtheinsurgents.DespitemisgivingsfromseveralseniorMarinecommanders,12threebattalionsfrom1stMarineDivision,augmentedbyasimilarnumberofIraqisecurityforces,attackedinsurgentsinFallujahthefollowingweek.

OrnersaidthathelicopteroperationsforVigilantResolvewereintense.Taskedwithproviding24-hour-a-daysupportoverFallujah,hisCobraandHueyhelicoptersteameduptorespondquicklytoapprovedrequests.13Thedemandsfor kinetic support were so frequent and significant that manypilotsreturnedtoCampTaqqadumforammunition

resupplylongbeforetheywerelowonfuel.Flyingatlowaltitudes,typically200-300feetandsometimesmuchlower, the pilots used Hellfire and TOW missiles, 20mm cannons,2.75-inchrockets,and.50caliberand7.62mmmachinegunstoengageinsurgentsanddestroytargetslikebuildingsandvehicles.

After several days of fierce fighting, infantry Marines weregivenanordertopullbackfromFallujahtoprovidesenior Coalition officials the opportunity to sort through the situation.14Asdiscussionsfounderedinthecomingweeks,Marinesreturnedtooffensiveoperationsinspurts,andtheCoyotescontinuedtosupporttheseoperations.Eventually,VigilantResolvesputteredtoanend,andcontrolofthecitywashandedovertotheinfamousFallujahBrigade.15The first battle for control of Fallujah ended with more of a whimperthantheexpectedbang.

Aviation Ordinance and Maintenance in the Heat of Battle

EvenwithconfusioninpoliticalcirclesandbetweenseniormilitaryleadersregardingactionsinFallujah,16thepilotsofHMLA-775understoodtheirmissiontopourasmuch firepower onto insurgents as they could. Staff Sgt. AllisonR.Rosebrough,anaviationordinancespecialist,saidtheamountofordinanceexpendedduringthatmonthkeptherMarinesworkingatafranticpace.17Her35ordinanceMarinesworked12-hourshifts,frequentlyinconditionsofextremeheat,tomakesurethatallweaponssystemsworkedandthathelicopterswerealwaysfullyloaded. If pilots were in a rush to get back into the fight, a five-Marine ordinance crew could reload a Cobra in 15 minutes.Duringtheseven-monthdeployment,HMLA-775fired more than 30,000 20mm rounds, 54 TOW and hellfire

Official Marine Corps Photo

Two Cobra helicopters from HMLA-775 hover over the airfield at Camp Taqqadam in May, 2004.

��

missiles,and3382.75”rockets.18

Hightemperaturesmadestoringordinanceandreloadingthe aircraft much more difficult than under normal conditions.Marineshadtokeepordinanceinpitsneartheflightline in such a way that prevented the ammunition from becomingunstable.Inthedesertinferno,Roseborough’sMarineshadtowearglovesandotherprotectivegeartopreventthemfrombeingburnedbyhotmetalontheaircraftortheordinance.

Maintenance was a significant issue, according to Orner. ThefactthattheCoyoteswereengagedincombatmeantitshelicopters accumulated large numbers of flight hours and significant amounts of damage. In combat, the maintenance sectionwasrequiredtokeepasmanyhelicoptersmissioncapableaspossible.Withmorethan200Marinesassignedtomaintenance,manyworkedbothdayandnighttokeepthe helicopters flying during Vigilant Resolve.

Ornerstatedthatmostbattledamageinvolvedsmallarmsroundsthroughrotorblades.Whilesomedamagedbladescouldbepatchedover,moreseriousdamagerequiredthemaintenancesectiontoreplacetherotorblades.Exteriorandinteriorpanelsalsohadtobepatchedorreplaced.Themostseriousmaintenanceissues,hesaid,involvedinternalcomponentsrangingfromenginestoradios.Whentheseweredamaged,theyhadtobereplacedorrepaired.

Themostintensepartofthesquadron’sdeploymentwas flying combat missions over Fallujah, but the CoyoteshandledothermissionsthroughouttheAnbarProvince.Theseincludedprovidingarmedescortsforotherhelicopters,liketheCH-46sandCH-53s.19Thesehelicopters,designedtomovepersonnelandequipment,frequentlyrequireescortgunshipslikeCobrasorHueystoprovide additional maneuverability and firepower.

ThesquadronalsomaintainedasectionofCobrasonalertatalltimestoescortanyArmyorMarinehelicoptersprovidingcasualtyevacuation.Twoother“mixed”sections,consistingofoneCobraandoneHuey,remainedonstripalerttoprovidesupportfortroopsincontactorothershortfusedcallsforsupport.Whilecallstosupporttroopsincontactfrequentlywerefruitless,becausecombatwouldbeoverandinsurgentslonggonebeforethehelicoptersjoinedthe fight, the pilots said that responding to such calls among theirthemostimportantmissions.

TheCoyotesfrequentlyprovidedcontinuouscoverageoversupplyconvoys.Theselargeconvoystypicallytraveledbetweencoalitionbasesatnight.Lt.Col.HeldsaidthatamixedsectionofaHueyandaCobratypicallyescortedsuchconvoys,scoutingaheadforanytroublethatmightdevelopandlookingforevidenceofimprovisedexplosivedevices.Thesquadronalsoprovidedintelligence,

bothintheformofwhattheycouldseefromabovethe battlefield and from what their instruments showed regardingthemovementofinsurgentsontheground.

Duringthedeployment,3rdMAWdecidedtotransferadetachmentofCoyoteCobrastoaForwardOperatingBase(FOB)inthewesternpartofIraq,nearitsborderwithJordan.FOBKoreanVillage20waslocatednearthevillageofarRutbah,nearthejunctionofonehighwaythatledtoJordanandanotherthatledtosouthernSyria.Theseroads carried significant traffic, especially after Iraq fell totheCoalition.MarinestaskedwithcontrollingtheareahadpreviouslyreceivedsupportfromhelicoptersbasedinalAsad.ThetransferofthreeCobras,12pilots,and25Marines from HMLA-775 significantly improved coverage ofthearea.

Squadron Commander Downed by Missile

WhilemanyCoyotehelicopterssufferedbattledamage,only one was brought down by enemy fire. This occurred duringacloseairsupportmissionnearFallujahonJune24, when the Cobra that Orner and Held were flying was broughtdownbyasurface-to-airmissilethatstruckjustbehindthemainrotor,destroyingbothengines.

Marines from 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines were fighting adeterminedgroupofinsurgentsinthevicinityofamajorhighway cloverleaf east of Fallujah. Insurgents fired from a nearbybuildingwithsmallarms,RPG’s,andmortars.After

Official Marine Corps PhotoThe Cobra helicopter flown by Lt. Col. Bruce S. Orner and Lt. Col. Steven L. Held sits in a field east of Fallujah shortly after it was brought down during combat operations. The pilots, including the commanding officer of HMLA-775, were rescued shortly after Orner used the autorotation technique to bring the powerless helicopter to a safe landing.

��

several passes, a section of Cobras identified the insurgents’ building and fired rockets into it. As the two helicopters flew away from the cloverleaf, the Cobra flown by Orner andHeldwashitfrombehindbyasurface-to-airmissile,immediatelyknockingoutbothengines.

Heldsaidtheimpactwasloudandunexpected,butdidnot disrupt the Cobra’s flight path significantly.

“I didn’t know what it was, to be honest. At first, I thoughtwehadbeenhitbyanotheraircraft,”hesaid.“Fortunately,ColonelOrnerimmediatelypickedupthattheengineshadbeenblownoutbytheimpact,andheenteredintoalow-altitude,relativelyhighairspeedautorotation.21Wehadnochoiceastowhereweweregoing,wecouldonlygostraightahead....Ofcourse,amainconcerntomewaswherewewerelanding,inregardstowhomightbethere.”

Therewereonlyafewsecondsbetweenwhenthehelicopterwashitandwhenitlanded.Asthetwopilotsheadedtowardstheground,HeldsaidthathewasrelievedtoseeaMarineHumveeheadingintheirdirection.

Justbeforeimpact,Ornerpulleduponthehelicopter’scollective,22providingjustenoughlifttocushionthelanding.TheCobra’sskidscollapsedwhenithittheground, then it lurched forward a final time when the main rotorhittheground,rippingthetransmissionoutoftheaircraft.Whenthedustsettledseveralsecondslater,thetwopilotsopenedthecanopy,grabbedtheirM-4carbines,andscrambledfromthedamagedhelicopter.Totheirrelief,theyweregreetedwithinsecondsbyMarinesfrom2/1,whoeffectivelyrescuedthemwhileprovidingsecurityforthedownedhelicopter.

Heldsaidthatthelandingwassurprisinglysoft,whichheattributedtoOrner’scivilianpositionasahelicoptersimulatorinstructor.ThisjoballowedOrnertopracticethedifficult autorotation maneuver hundreds of times.23Orner’sinstinctsandtrainingtookoverassoonastheaircraftwashit,sothathehadregainedcontroloftheaircraftwithinseconds and flew it to a safe landing.

Death of a Pilot

InJuly,thesquadronsuffereditsonlyfatalitywhenLt.Col.DavidS.“Rhino”GreenewasshotwhilepilotingaCobraoverRamadi.24A1986NavalAcademygraduatewho served as the squadron’s maintenance officer, Greene was flying a route reconnaissance mission for a patrol moving into Ramadi when ground fire hit his helicopter. During a low-level attack in which Greene was flying while hiscopilotandgunner,Maj.JosephH.“Snooze”Crane,searched for targets, their helicopter took five 7.62mm rounds.OneroundcausedoneoftheCobra’stwoengines

toshutdown,andthreeotherroundsdamagedothercomponents. The fifth round penetrated the cockpit and passedthroughGreene’sneck,mortallywoundinghim.

Inthefrontseat,CraneknewthatwhatsoundedlikeabaseballbathittingthehelicoptermeanttheCobrahadbeenhit.Hedidnotrealizethathispilothadbeenhituntilhefeltthehelicopterdriftonadangerouspathonly100feetabovetheground.Takingthecontrolstoavoidapproachingpowerlines, he felt no resistance from the flight controls. A quick glance at the bloodied rear cockpit confirmed his thought thatGreenehadbeenhit.

Notwantingtobroadcastthatapilothadbeenshot,Craneinstructedhiswingman,Orner,tocomealongside.Thesquadron’scommandercouldsensetherewasaproblem.Whentheyweretogether,Cranereported,“Iamsingleengine,andIthinksinglepilot.”SeeingGreeneslumped over in the cockpit, Orner confirmed that message withaterse,“Yes,itlookslikeyouaresinglepilot.”

For Crane, flying on one engine was complicated by the fact that he was flying from the Cobra’s front seat, orgunner’sseat.Shiftingimmediatelytotheroleofthepilot,Cranewasconcernedthatothersystemsmightfailor ordinance might fire off. As he headed towards Camp Taqqadum,allradioswentdead.Strippedofhispilotandcommunications,hewasenvelopedbyanintensesenseofisolation for the brief trip to the airfield. “I was all alone, withRhinointhebackseat....Iwonder[ed]ifRhinoisjusthurtrealbad,maybehehasachanceifIhurry.”25

Cranedecideditwouldbeprudenttolandawayfromthewaiting doctors, ambulances, and fire trucks. Unable to ease the damaged helicopter onto the airfield, his landing ended witha20-foot-longslideofaluminumskidsdiggingintotheasphaltrunway.Ornerlandednearby,andhiscopilot,alieutenant,rantoCrane’sCobra,climbeduptotherearseatandopenedthecanopy.Takingcareofthemostimportantsafety issue first, the lieutenant turned off the master armingswitch,whichisonlyintherearseat,ormainpilot’sseat.ThenhelookedatCraneandshookhishelmetedheadgrimlyfromsidetoside.Greenehadnotsurvived.

TheimpactofGreene’sdeathwaswasdeeplyfeltthroughoutthesquadron.Thecombinationofhispersonablenatureandhispositionasthesquadron’smaintenance officer meant he knew most of the Marines in thesquadron.

“YoucouldseethesenseoflossonthefacesoftheMarines,”Ornersaid.SpeakingfortheyoungerMarines,RoseboroughsaidthatGreenemadeapointoftalkingwitheveryMarine.“Hewouldtalktoallofus,itdidn’tmatterwhatourrankwas,whatourpositionwas.Thetroopsreallylikedthat,becauseherespectedthemandwhattheydid.”26

Thefollowingmonth,inaceremonythatincludedthe

��

commandinggeneralofthe4thMarineAircraftWing,Brig.Gen.HaroldJ.Fruchtnicht,theMarineCorpsrenamedtheCamp Taqqadum airfield in Greene’s memory.27

Second Deployment

InAugust,HMLA-775wasrelievedbyanactivedutysquadron,HMLA-367.WhiletheCoyotes’aircraftstayedinIraqwiththenewsquadron,itsMarinesreturnedtotheirbasesatCampPendleton,Calif.,andJohnstown,Pa.inearlySeptember.Theyenjoyedsomevacationtimeduringthissix-monthbreak,butalsofocusedtheireffortsontraining,knowingtheywouldreturntoIraqearlythefollowingyear.

WhentheCoyotesreturnedtoIraqthefollowingspring,itseemedthatlittlehadchanged.Theyreturnedtothesame billeting and office spaces at Camp Taqqadum that theyhadrelinquishedsixmonthsbefore,aswellastothesameaircraftandessentiallythesamemission.AlthoughtheystillwererequiredtomaintainconstantstripalertsaswellasadetachmentatKoreanVillage,theCoyotesfeltthattheir2004experiencemadetheworkloadseemlighter.Several pilots noted that they were not fired at as often. As MarineinfantrybattalionsbecamemoreactivealongtheEuphratesRiverValleybetweenRamadiandtheSyrianborder,theCoyotesweretaskedwithsupportingtheiroperations.Forexample,theCoyotessupportedOperationMatador,whichwasaregimental-sizedoperationtoclearseveraltownsbetweenHitandalQa’im.28AfterOperationMatador,theCoyotesshiftedthehelicopterdetachment

fromKoreanVillagetoFOBalQa’im,duetothehigherlevelofinsurgentactivitynearalQa’im.

WhiletheCoyotes’greatestcontributioncamefromtheir firepower, the ability to view the battlefield from abovewasalsoveryvaluable.Thiswasdemonstratedduringtheseconddeployment,whenasectionofCobraspreventedaunitofReserveMarinesfrommaneuveringintoaninsurgentambushonMay8,2005.Marinesfrom3rdBattalion,25thMarinesrespondedtoamajorambushof a five-vehicle civilian convoy on Route Bronze near thecityofHit.29Asectionoftankshadpreviouslylocatedtheburningvehicles,alongwithnumerousvictimsoftheambush.Asthe3/25Marinesmovedtothesite,Kennedy’ssectionconductedcriticalareareconnaissanceandspottednumeroussuspiciousvehiclesenroutetothearea.30

After refueling, Kennedy flew back to the ambush site, wherehediscoveredthatbodiesthathadpreviouslylitteredtheareawerenowneatlystackedapproximately30metersfromtheburningvehicles.Providingthiswarningtotheapproaching3/25Marinesallowedthemtosearchanddiscoverthatwiresranunderthestackofbodies.Assessingthatthebodiesofthecontractorshadbeenbooby-trapped,the3/25Marinesretreatedfromthesiteandallowedthehelicopterstoengagethesitewithmissiles.31Kennedy’ssection fired Hellfire missiles at the sites, and both missiles ignitedsecondaryexplosions.

AsaresultoftheCoyotes’action,thetankandinfantryMarinesreturnedtoCampHitwithnocasualties.Intelligencesourceslaterrevealedthatmorethan40individualswerepreparedtoattackMarinesrespondingtotheoriginalambush.Lt. Col. Bruce S. Orner

A Cobra helicopter flies over Iraq during low light conditions during HMLA-775’s tour of Iraq in 2004.

��

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron-���

andMarine Medium

Helicopter Squadron-���CH-46s,affectionatelyknownas“Phfrogs,”areamong

theoldesthelicoptersintheMarineCorps.ProducedduringtheVietnamera,theyare“analoghelicoptersinadigitalage.”1FortheMoonlightersofHMM-764,the12CH-46s that they flew during two Iraq deployments in 2004 and2005wereolderthanmostMarinesinthesquadron.Despitetheirage,thePhfrogs’versatilityandreliabilitymadethemessentialtooperationsinIraq.

Col.JeffreyL.Marshall,whocommandedMAG-46,theMoonlighters’parentcommandduringthetwodeployments, said the helicopter’s flight characteristics madeitagreatchoiceforoperationsinIraq.2Inadditionto the ability to fly low and fast, thereby minimizing its exposure to small arms fire, a CH-46 has a smaller “signature”onradarandotherimagingdevices.Thiscombination meant that CH-46s could fly over parts of Iraq thatwereconsideredhigh-risk,andthereforeofflimits,forothertypesofhelicopters.3

Frominsertingparatrooperstomovingtonsofordinanceandsuppliesthroughoutthetheater,themediumlifthelicopterswereindispensable.Mosttroopspreferredhelicopters to Humvees, as the flying “air taxis” eliminated therisksofIEDsorambushesthatwereinherenttoconvoyoperations.Lt.Col.ClarkA.Taylor,aMoonlighterpilotwho became the squadron’s operations officer for the 2005 deployment,saidthatthesquadron’sprimarymissioninIraqwasmovingMarinesandsoldiersthroughouttheMarineCorps’areaofoperationsintheAnbarProvinceandthenorthernsectionoftheBabilProvince.4

The ability to fly with night vision goggles added a

significant measure of safety to these operations, Taylor noted.“Itwasfairlycommontogetshotat,especiallyduring the first deployment. We got shot at almost every nightyouwentout.Youcouldseesometracerscomingupatyou.Thesecond[deployment]wasnotsobad,becausewehad[stopped]Fallujahprettywell,andthathadbeenthehotbed.”5

TwoMoonlighterhelicoptersweredamagedbysmall arms fire during the 2004 deployment, but they wererepairedquicklyandputbackintoaction.Threeothers were damaged more significantly during the 2005 deployment,whenshrapnelfromarocketthatlandedin their midst on the al Asad flight line tore through the helicopters.

Taylor noted that crew fatigue was a significant issue, duetodemandsonthesquadronandadearthofpilots.Thesquadronhadbilletsfor28pilotsbuttookonly21 for the first deployment. The issue was exacerbated forthe2005deploymentbecauseseveralMoonlighterpilots had to rotate out after the first deployment. This promptedMarshall,despitethefactthathewasthegroupcommander, to volunteer to fly with the Moonlighters fortwomonthsinIraqwhileseveralincomingpilotscompletedrefreshertraining.

WhentheMoonlightersweremobilizedinJanuary2004,theirorderswerefortwoyears.Mostrealizedthatthisprobablymeanttwoseven-monthdeploymentstoIraq. The squadron prepared for their first deployment to IraqbyparticipatinginDesertTalonattheMarineCorpsAirStationinYuma,Ariz.Inadditiontoallowingpilots

��

to hone their flying skills and listen to Army and Marine CorpspilotswhohadrecentlyreturnedfromIraq,DesertTalonallowedthesquadronswhowouldbeworkingfor3rdMarineAircraftWingtocreaterelationshipsthatwouldbenefit all when they reached Iraq. Several months before, theMarineCorpshadbroughtallsquadronsassignedtoIraqbacktotheUnitedStates.ThedecisiontoreturnmanysquadronstoIraqbytheendofFebruaryforcedlogisticianstotransporttheaircraftbyanypracticalmeans.SomesquadronsusedC-17orC-5airplanestocarrytheirhelicopterstoIraq,buttheMoonlighterswereforcedtosendtheirsbyship.Thisrequiredthemaintenancecrewstopartiallydisassemblethehelicoptersandcoverthemwithshrink-wrap,topreventexcessivecorrosionduringthevoyagefromCaliforniatoKuwait.

After rebuilding the helicopters in Kuwait and flying to alAsadinIraq,theMoonlightersbegantheirmissionofthe next six months – ferrying personnel and equipment throughouttheAnbarProvinceandthenorthernpartoftheBabilProvince.Withinweeks,theyfoundthemselvesinvolvedinOperationVigilantResolveinFallujah.The

MoonlightersfocusedonhaulingordinanceandothersupplieswhileHueys,Cobras,andjetsprovidedcloseairsupport for Marines fighting in the urban environment.

Lt.Col.JacquesC.NaviauxII,adeputyoperationsofficer who became the squadron’s commander for the 2005deployment,saidresupplymissionsforVigilantResponse were difficult.6Supportingthreereinforced

infantrybattalions,theMoonlightersspentmostoftheirtimeprovidingtankandartilleryroundsfromanammunitionsupplypointatCampTaqqadumtothe1stMarineDivision’sheadquartersatCampFallujah.TheseresupplymissionsbecamesofrequentthatthesquadroneventuallytransferredsevenCH-46stoCampTaqqadumforeaseofoperations.

ThehelicoptersatCampTaqqadumcarriedloadsthatapproachedtheaircraft’sweightlimitundertheextremelyhotweatherconditions.Packingtankandartilleryroundsinto the CH-46s presented a significant problem because certain crates would not fit into the aircraft. To resolve thisproblem,crewchiefsandaerialobservershadtoopencratesofartilleryandtankroundsandcarryindividualroundsontosmallerpalletsintheaircraft.“Therewasalotofbackbreakinglabor,”Naviauxstated,addingthatthistypeofeffortwascontinuouswhilehisMarinessupportedVigilantResolve.7

HMM-764alsoprovidedgeneralsupporttoIMEF,whichincludedcasualtyevacuations,quickreactionforcemissions,andtacticalrecoveryofaircraftandpersonnel(TRAP)missions.ExceptforVigilantResolve,muchofIMEF’smissioninvolvedSecurityandStabilityOperations(SASO),whichtheMoonlighterssupportedbytransportingMarines,suppliesandequipmenttominimizeexposuretothethreatsalongmanyofIraq’sroads.8

PartofmovingpersonnelthroughthetheatermeantthattheMoonlightersfrequentlycarrieddetaineestoAbuGhraibPrison.Sgt.ShanahanNelsonandSgt.ShawnBlalock,whoservedascrewchiefs,saidthatwhilethedetaineeswererestrainedbeforetheywerebroughtonboardthehelicopterandtypicallywereescortedbymilitarypolice,theystillposedadangertoahelicopter,itscrew,andotherpassengers.9

“Theywouldtrytohurtus,”Blalocksaid.“Wecaughtthemtryingtoripoutwiresfromthefuselage.”10

TheMoonlightershadseveralopportunitiesduringthefirst deployment to work with special operations forces andreconnaissanceMarines.InMay,twoCH-46sinsertedspecialoperationsforcesintoanareajustnorthoftheborderwithSaudiArabia.Thisraidresultedinabattleinwhich 11 insurgents were killed and significant amounts ofdrugswereseized.11Forthislong-rangemission,theMoonlightershadtorefuelataforwardsitebeforedeliveringthetroopsatdawntoanobjectiveareathathadjustbeenhitbyanAC-130gunship.Afterthebriefmission,theMoonlightersretrievedthespecialoperationsforcesandreturnedthemtotheirbase.12

InJuly,thesquadronconductedalow-levelparachutedropof1stReconnaissanceBattalionMarinesintoavillagenearAbuGhraibaspartofamissiontocounterIED

Photo By Sgt. Juan Vara

AL ASAD, Iraq – Two CH-46E Sea Knight helicopters from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 764 take off from one of the runways here while on their way to one of their missions May 23, 2004. The squadron, based at Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., was on its second tour in Iraq since their activation to support Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2004.

��

operationsoriginatinginthatregion.13InadditiontohavingsixMarinesinsertedbyparachutefromaC-130aircraft,theMoonlightersinsertedtwosix-Marinereconnaissanceteams by helicopter. This represented the first combat static-linejumpfor1stReconnaissanceBattalionMarinessinceVietnam.

Due in part to the success of the first parachute insertion, theMoonlighterswerecalleduponduringAugusttoinsertanotherteamof1stReconnaissanceBattalionMarinesintoapositiontotakeactionagainstinsurgentswhowereputting indirect fires into Camp Fallujah. This four-aircraft nighttimejumpwasconductedwithoutincident.14

After seven months of mishap-free flying, the Moonlightersturnedovertheirhelicopters,maintenancematerialsandsparepartstotheonlyotherReserveMarineMediumHelicoptersquadron,HMM-774.Inessence,HMM-764andHMM-774teamedupforaseriesoffourseven-monthdeployments,withbothsquadronsusingthesame12helicoptersthattheMoonlightersshippedtoKuwaitinearly2004.Whileindividualscoulddeploywithlittlemorethantherequiredseabags,thetwosquadronsrotatedinawaythatputMoonlightersinIraqforthesummerdeploymentsfor2004and2005,whiletheWildGeeseofHMM-774tookoverforthewinterdeploymentsof2004-2005and2005-2006.

ThereturntotheUnitedStatesin2004wasbittersweetfortheMoonlighters,becausetheyrealizedthatmostofthemwouldbereturningtoIraqshortly.Navaiuxsaidthetwo-yeartourswerehardestonMarineswhoweregeographicallyremovedfromtheirfamilies.ForthosewholivednearEdwardsAirForceBase,themobilizationincludedperiodsofcalmfollowedbyintenseactivity;forthosewholivedawayfromtheirfamilies,themobilizationessentiallyrepresentedtwoyearsawayfromhome.ManyMarineswereanxioustoreturntoIraqassoonaspossiblesotheycouldcompletetheirmobilizationandreturnhome.

HMM-764 Returns to Iraq

“IknewIwouldbebringingthembacktowar,andcertainlythemainconcernwashowtokeepthemoralehigh;howdowekeepthesquadrontogether,”Naviauxsaid.Forthosewhohadparticipatedinthepreviousdeployment,therewasanelementof“GroundhogDay,”15totheirreturntoIraq.ThesquadronarrivedagainatalAsadinthespring,tookoverthesamebuildings,andconductedsimilarmissions.16Onedifference,hesaid,wasthattherewasmuchlessactivityinFallujahandmuchmoreinRamadi.AnotherdifferencewasthattheMoonlighterswereconductingmissionsalongtheEuphratesRiverValley,westofRamadiandtowardstheSyrianborder.

For Lt. Col. Navaiux, staffing for the second deployment hadbeenchallenging.SomeMarineshadreachedtheirrotationorendofservicedates,sotheyhadtobereplaced.Fiveofthe21pilotswereinthisgroup,andthiscreatedashortageofpilots.Navaiuxspentmuchofhistimebetweendeploymentsrecruitingnewpilots,manyofwhomhadnotflown in several years. Requalifying some of the new pilots meantputtingthemthroughafulltrainingpackagethattookseveralmonths,andmanywerestillintrainingwhenthesquadronleftfortheseconddeployment.NavaiuxsaidthatthedelaytocompletetrainingwasworthwhilebecausethesevenpilotswhojoinedtheMoonlightersinIraqinJuneprovidedimmediaterelieffortheothers.17

Duringthisdeployment,theMoonlightersparticipatedinamajortroopliftaspartofOperationRiverBlitz.18Sincetheclosestbridgethatcouldhandlemilitaryvehicleswasmorethan30kilometersaway,RiverBlitzcalledforinsertingataskforcefrom3/25acrosstheEuphratesfromthevillageofBaghdadibyhelicopter.Thisoperationwassuccessful, as Marines discovered significant quantities ofweaponsandammunition.AfterRiverBlitz,IEDandmortarattacksonCampHitandCampalAsaddroppedsharply.

Photo By Lance Cpl. Brandon L. Roach

Two CH-46 Sea Knights with Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 774 stop at the Hot Pits at Al Asad, to get refueled. HMM-774, Marine Aircraft Group 16 (Reinforced), 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, finished its second deployment to Iraq April 1, completing a total of 14 months in the desert over a period of 19 months.

��

Marine ArialRefueler Squadron

���ForMarineAerialRefuelerSquadron452,theGlobal

WaronTerrorismprovidedaninstant,continuous,andworldwidedemandforrefuelingcapabilities.

In2002,adetachmentof“Yankee”refuelersmovedtroops,cargo,andfuelthroughouttheMiddleEast,theMediterranean,andtheHornofAfrica.1Overthenexttwoyears,partsofthesquadronweremobilizedfortwo additional deployments, first in support of Phase I operationsinIraq,theninsupportofcoalitionactivitiesprimarilyintheAnbarProvince.

VMGR-452compiledadistinguishedrecordduringthe“MarchtoBaghdad”phaseofOperationIraqiFreedom.WhileitsprimarymissionwasrefuelingjetssupportingMarinesthroughoutKuwaitandIraq,VMGR-452probablywas best known for being the squadron that flew seven formerAmericanprisonersofwaroutofcaptivityinIraqduring the first month of the war.2

ThesquadrondemobilizedinJanuary2004,onlytobemobilized again five months later for a second tour in Iraq.3

Lt.Col.BradleyS.James,thesquadron’scommander,saidthe150MarinesandsixC-130shetooktoalAsadinAugust2004representedabouthalfofthesquadron’saircraftandpersonnel.4WhilemuchoftheirworkinvolvedrefuelingtheF/A-18andHarrieraircraftthatweresupportingMarinesontheground,5theYankeesalsoconductedscheduledresupplyoperationsthatmovedtroopsandcargothroughoutthetheater.

Asthecoalitionworkedtodevelopsafermethodsofdeliveringsuppliestotroopsindistantoutposts,theYankeeswereinstructedtoparticipateinaseriesofexperimentsthatinvolvedGPS-guided6parachutes.7DevelopedbytheU.S.ArmySoldierSystemsCenterinNatick,Mass.,theSherpaGuidedParachuteCargoSystemwaspartoftheJointPrecisionAirdropDeliverySystem’s(JPADS)“ExtraLight”program.Intheseexperiments,theYankeesdroppedMREpalletstobasesthatwerefarremoved from any airfield that could handle a C-130.8

“Angel Flights” are Number One Priority

Aswithallairunits,movingCoalitioncasualtieswasaprioritymission.

“Ournumberoneprioritywas‘AngelFlights.’9

Wheneverwelostsomebody,[thegoalwas]togettheremainsoutofcountrywithintwenty-fourhours,”Jamessaid.“Sonomatterwhatwasgoingon,whenweknewan“Angel”wascoming,thatwasournumberonepriority.”

James said that most other flights were scheduled, both

forrefuelingandfortransportingpeopleandcargofrombasetobase.

Onadailybasis,thesquadronlaunchedseveralrefuelingmissions,includingonethatwouldremainaloftthroughoutthenighttorefueljetsprotectingsupplyconvoys.Thenight flight also provided radio relay service for convoys, whichhadtotravelgreatdistancesbetweencoalitionbases,especiallyintheAnbarProvince.10

Photo By Sgt. Beth Zimmerman

The first of four KC-130T Hercules aircrafts carrying the Marines of VMGR-452 taxis on the runway before arriving at the hangar in Newburgh, N.Y.

�0

DuringOperationalFajr,theYankeesfocusedtheirefforts on providing refueling support to jets flying into Fallujah.Usingfourairplanestoprovide24-hour-coverage,the Yankees flew in two refueling tracks, one between al AsadandFallujahandtheotherjustnorthofFallujah.11BecausetherefuelingtracksweresoclosetoalAsad,theYankeeswereabletogiveawaymostofthefueltheycouldcarrytoMarinejets.DuringNovember,whichincludedtwoweeksofintenseoperationssupportingalFajr,theYankeespumped4.3millionpoundsofaviationfueltomorethan500jets.12

JamessaidthattherefuelingtrackwastoofarfromFallujahforhispilotstoseetheaerialattacks,buttheirradios and radar screens conveyed the fact that a significant numberofcoalitionjetsandhelicopterswereworkingtosupporttheinfantry.Therewere“stacks”ofcloseairsupportaircraftcirclingjustoutsideFallujah,waitingtobecalledintoaction.13

ThebulkoftheremainingYankeemissionsinvolvedascheduledroutebetweenseveralairbasesinIraqandKuwait.Theseone-daymissionsprovidedcoalitionunitswiththeabilitytomovetroopsandcargothroughoutthetheater.Whiletherewasaroutinequalitytothesemissions,theyprovidedavitalcapabilitytoacoalitionthatwastrying to minimize its traffic on Iraqi roads.

Sherpa Parachutes

TheYankeeloadmasterswereabletoworkwithanairdeliverysystemthathadbeenindevelopmentforseveralyearsbutnotfullytestedincombat.JamessaidIraq’sAnbarProvincehadarelativelysmallbaseneartheborderwithJordanthatpresentedaresupplychallengebecauseitwasfarfromotherbasesbutwasnotsupportedbyasecure airfield nearby. This prompted the Marine Corps to implementtheregularuseoftheSherpaGuidedParachuteCargoSystembyVMGR-452.TheMarineCorps’AirDeliveryPlatoonshavelonghadthecapabilitytopush“dumb”cargopacksoutofairplanes,butthesetypicallyrequired low-altitude flights that could attract enemy fire and still miss a target by a significant distance.14

The“smart”parachuteallowedaC-130crewtolaunchapalletduringdayornightfrommuchhigheraltitudes,expectatingthatitwouldlandwithinashortdistancefromthetarget.15TheSherpasystemcombinesarectangularparachutewithacomputer,aGPSreceiver,andtwosteeringlinesthatallowthecargotoberedirectedtothelandingsite.Thesystemrequiresasmalldrogueparachutetostabilizethecargosothemainparachutecanopenproperly.

TheYankeesusedtheSherpasystemwithgreatsuccess

attheremoteKoreanVillageFOB.Jamessaidthatsystemoperatedverywellforhissquadron,allowinghispilotstodropsloadsveryclosetothebase.MuchofthesuccesswasduetotheSherpasystembecausetheaccuracyofthesystemfromhigheraltitudesgavethecrewsgreatlatitudeonwhentolaunchthecargo.16

Supporting Election Operations

WhileYankeemissionsfocusedprimarilyoncarrying,refueling,orresupplyingcoalitionforces,oneofitsmostimportantandsatisfyingmissionsinvolvedcarryingIraqistoparticipateintheJanuary30,2005nationalelection.17The Yankees carried approximately 400 polling officials to thecoalitionairbaseatalTaqaddumand270toBalad,thenbrought back almost 1,100 officials from several polling sitestotheirhomeregionsurroundingNajafaftertheelections.

Jamessaidhissquadroncreatedseveralsecurityteamstoprovideassistanceforthecrewsandpassengersforthese special flights. The squadron combined Reserve MarineswhohadlawenforcementoremergencymedicinebackgroundswithinstructorsfromtheMarineCorps’martialartsprogramtocreatefour-Marine“airmarshal”teams.Afterabrieftrainingperiod,theseteamsperformedinamannerthatwassoprofessionalthatseveralIraqiscommentedthattheyfeltverysecureduringtheirtripfromaShi’iaregionofIraqtoSunniorKurdishregions.Theteamswouldsuperviseapproximately75passengerson each flight, most of whom had never flown before andcertainlyhadnevervisitedSunnicitieslikeFallujah,Ramadi,ortheKurdishcityofMosul.

On the return flights, the VMGR-452 crews hung bannersthatread,inArabic,“CongratulationstotheWorld’sNewestDemocracy,”alongwithside-by-sideAmerican and Iraqi flags. James said that many of the Iraqi officials were confused at first by the greeting, but thenrealizedthatitsymbolizedthefactthattheU.S.andIraqwereworkingtogethertogiveindividualIraqisameaningfulrighttovote.18

�1

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron

11�IntheearlyyearsoftheGWOT,the4thMarineAircraft

Wing(4thMAW)usedallofitsaircraftincombat,exceptfortheonethatmanywoulddescribeasthemostlethalin its inventory – the F/A-18 Hornet. As the fight in Iraq becamepartofwhatU.S.CentralCommandcalled,“TheLongWar,”againstterrorism,4thMAWdecideditwastimetounleashitsmostpotentweaponssystem.

BeforetheMarineCorpswoulddeployReserveF/A-18stoIraq,ithadtodemonstratethatReserveswereuptothetask.

Pilotswerenottheissue,asmostReserveF/A-18pilotshave more flight time and combat experience than their activedutycounterparts,fromplaceslikeIraqorBosnia.

ThecriticalissuewaswhetheraReservesquadroncould fly the aircraft to a distant battlefield and maintain adozenofthesingle-seat,multi-missiontacticalaircraftthat utilized digital fly-by-wire control systems and multi-functiondisplays.WhilemodernF/A-18sareextremelyversatile,theyalsoarecomplex.

TodemonstratethatReserveF/A-18squadronscouldmeetthechallenge,4thMAWsentasquadronofF/A-18A+HornetsfromMarineFighter/AttackSquadron112(VMFA-112) to the Western Pacific in 2004 for a 3½-monthevaluationdeployment.1WithHornetsthathadbeenrecentlyupdatedtomatchandevenexceedsomecapabilitiesofitsactivedutycounterparts,the“Cowboys,”basedinFortWorth,Texas,hadtheopportunitytoconducta“proofofconcept”deploymentthatincludedfrequenttrainingandoperationsinOkinawa,Guam,andAustralia.

Lt.Col.StevenM.Roepke,thesquadron’sexecutiveofficer during the deployment, said every Marine knew the deployment’simplications.2

“Itwascriticallyimportant,”hesaid.“Atthattime,theactivedutyforcesweregettingprettytiredandwornprettythinwithback-to-backdeploymentsovertotheGulfregion,andIknowthattheywerelookingattheReserveforsome[operational]relief.”3

TheWestPacdeploymentgavetheCowboysfouropportunitiestoprovetheycouldloadupthesquadronand

movetoadistantlocation.The Cowboys flew 12 F/A-18s to Okinawa on a route

thatincludedanine-hourlegfromTexastoHawaii,asecondlegofsimilarlengthtoGuam,thenarelativelybriefhop to Okinawa. While it was difficult to avoid boredom in the cramped cockpits for such long flights, the constant requirementforaerialrefueling,brokenupbyoccasionalroundsof“TrivialPursuit”overtheradio,helpedkeepthepilotsalert.

Roepkesaidthedeploymentinvolved200Marines,including65activedutyCowboys,asimilarnumberofReserves,andlargesupportingelementsfromMarineAirLogisticsSquadron41(MALS-41)anditsparentheadquarters,MarineAircraftGroup41(MAG-41).Roepkecreditedthedetachmentfromthelogisticssquadronwithkeepingtheaircraftingoodshape.BecauseF/A-18shaveamaintenanceschedulethatrequiresnumerous inspections, one of the most difficult parts of thedeploymentwassynchronizingmaintenancesothatall12 aircraft were available to fly together to Okinawa. The squadroninvested15,000maintenancehourstopreparethejetsfordeployment,withone-thirdofthatbeingperformedbyReserveswhohadbeenactivatedforthedeployment.4

Beforethedeployment,theCowboyHornetswereupdatedwithenhancedradar,night-vision,andnavigationalcapabilities, earning the “A+” designation that signifies a Hornet has received major warfighting enhancements. TheseupgradesincludedtheTacticalAircraftMissionPlanningSystem(TAMPS),adigital-basedcloseairsupportsystem,andtheforward-lookinginfrared(FLIR)pods.5TAMPSgivesacrewtheabilitytoprogram“smart”weapons,likejointdirectattackmunitions(JDAMs)andjointstand-offweapons(JSOWs),sothatinformationcanbetransferredbetweentheaircraftandaweaponssystemduring flight. The FLIR systems uses thermal imagery to enhancethepilot’sabilitytolocatepotentialtargets.

RoepkesaidthedeploymentprovidedVMFA-112pilotswithexcellenttrainingopportunities.Inadditiontoconductingair-to-groundandair-to-airmissions

��

inOkinawa,theywereabletoparticipateinExerciseJungleShieldinGuamandExerciseSouthernFrontierinAustralia.6ThesejointexercisesallowedtheCowboystoimprovetheirair-to-airskillsagainstAirForceF-15sandF-16s.

“EveryReservepilotthatwehave,hadanumberofdeploymentsalready,andhadspentanywherefromeighttotwelve years on active duty,” he said. “Our average flight hoursintheF/A-18,perReservepilot,wasinthe1900hourrange.Soyou’retalkingaboutalotofguyswithalotofexperiencewhoareabletopickuponsomeofthenewthingswewerelearningwiththe“A+,”likeJDAMandJSOW,relativelyeasilybecausetheyaresoexperiencedwiththeairplane.”7

TheCowboysfeltthatthisadvancedtrainingwasappropriatebecausetheyknewtheycouldbeorderedtoIraqatanytime.Thispushedthepilotstohonetheirair-to-groundskillsateveryopportunityduringthedeployment.

MostofthesquadronthoughttheywouldimmediatelybetappedforanIraqdeploymentupontheirreturnfromWestPac,but4thMAWdecidedtosendanotherReservesquadron,theFlyingGatorsofVMFA-142.RoepkesaidtheCowboys’maintenanceteamworkedhardthroughout

thedeploymenttokeepthejetsinpristinecondition,sothesquadronwasabletotransfersevenofitsHornetstoVMFA-142foritsdeploymenttoIraq.TheCowboysalsogavetheGatorsnotebooksfullofinformationfromthedeployment, so VMFA-112 could benefit from the lessons thathadbeenlearnedbytheCowboys.“Wehadahugenumberoflessonslearned,andwecommunicatedthoseviavoicemailande-mail,backandforth,betweentheirsquadronandours.”8

Photo By Sgt. Joel A. Chaverri

The beautiful mountains of Hawaii lie in the background as Col. Juergen ‘Baron’ Lukas, commanding officer, Marine Aircraft Group 41 refuels his F/A-18A+ Hornet off the back of a KC-130T Hercules with Marine Aerial Refueler Squadron 234 during a Hawaii Combined Arms Exercise Jan. 16. Based out of the Naval Air Station-Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, Texas, MAG-41 provided transport, refueling, and close air support for 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, who was training for deployment to Iraq

��

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron

1�� Asaciviliancommercialpilot,Maj.RobertA.“Norm”

Petersonwasusedtodeliveringlargepackages.AsaReserveMarineF-18pilot,hisfavoritedelivery

wasasingle500-poundbombinIraq.1

In 16 years as a Marine, including 2,500 flight hours andnumerouscombatmissions,nothingcameclosetothemomenthispinpointstrikedestroyedaninsurgentpositionin Hit in February 2005. In a career filled with such deliveries,Petersonsaidthatsupportingtroopsincontactwasincrediblysatisfying.Whenhisbombexploded,hesaid, enemy firing ceased.

“YougothroughyourwholeMarineCorpscareertrainingtosupportMarinesontheground.I’vebeenindifferentcontingenciesincombatwhereI’vedroppedordinanceonbuildings,butneverwerethereMarinestwoorthreehundredmetersawayfromthebuilding,takingfire from insurgents like that. [It was] very fulfilling, professionally, to be able to support the Marines for the first timeinaCAS(closeairsupport)situation.”2

Inthiscase,aplatoonofMarinespatrollingneartheEuphrates had come under heavy fire from insurgents inanearbybuildingandpalmgrove.Petersonandhiswingman,Lt.Col.KevinM.“Wolfy”IimesofVMFA-242,3reachedHitwithinminutesandbegantalkingwithaforwardaircontroller(FAC)assignedtotheplatoon.

“WecheckedinwiththeFAC,anditwasatroops-in-contactsituation.Wecouldseethe.50caliberandlarger machine guns that they were firing. [The Marines andinsurgents]wereprobablytwoorthreehundredmetersfromeachother.WhentheFACwaskeyingthemicrophone,youcouldhear,inthebackground,themortarroundsandthelargecalibermachineguns.ThatwassomethingIhadneverheardbefore....Youdon’tgetthatfeelingthatthereisactuallysomeonedownthere,shootingandgettingshotat,untilyoucanhearthoseroundsgoingdownrangeontheradio.”4

Bothpilotsdroppedasingle500-poundbomb,oneonthebuildingandoneonthepalmgrove.

PetersonwaspartoftheFlyingGators,aReserveF/A-

18A+HornetsquadronfromMarietta,Ga.,thatmadehistory in 2005 when it became the first Reserve fixed wing tacticalsquadrontodeployintocombatinmorethan50years.5

Itwasanactive,exciting,anddiversedeploymentfortheGators. In addition to firing all of the F-18s air-to-ground weaponsystems,6itspilotswereabletoprovidevaluablereal-timeinformationtogroundtroopsapproachingenemypositionsbyusinganenhancedinfraredsightingsystem.7

PetersonsaidtheHornetsrepeatedlyprovedtheirversatility by enabling pilots to adapt firepower to unique situations.Forexample,hesaid,hestrafedanambushsitewithhisjet’s20mmcannontodisperseinsurgentforces.Inthiscase,anunescortedconvoyofcivilianshadbeenattackedbyhundredsofmenwhothensetthevehiclesonfire and took several of the drivers as hostages. Ordered to clearthearea,Petersonandhiswingmanmadetwolow-level strafing runs that were perpendicular to the line of the convoy.

Theeffect,hesaid,waslikesomeonemightseeinamovie.Thepilotscouldseetheimpactofindividualroundsinthesandastheypassedovertheconvoy,withinsurgentsscattering to the left and right of their line of fire. When theyreturned45secondslaterforasecondpass,hesaid,therewasnooneinthearea.8

LikePeterson,mostoftheGatorpilotshadmorethan2,000 hours of flight time with F-18s, and many had flown together for more than five years. Many had combat experiencefrompreviousoperationslikeDesertStormorDesertFox.Eachpilotreturnedfromthisseven-monthdeployment with much more experience, as they flew almosteverydayandacquired300-400hoursapiece.

Toprepareforthedeployment,theFlyingGatorsparticipatedinDesertTaloninYuma,Ariz.ThisexerciseallowedthemtoworkwithaReserveinfantrybattalion,3rdBattalion,25thMarines,whichtheyfrequentlywouldsupportduringthedeployment.Lt.Col.J.A.Baumert,whobecametheGators’commanderduringthedeployment,said the training with 3/25 was a significant benefit.9

��

Thefactthatpilotshadmetthebattalion’sforwardaircontrollersandtrainedwiththemduringpredeploymentexercises meant that they had more confidence in working togetherthantheyotherwisemighthave.ThisteamworkwascalleduponwithinweeksoftheirarrivalinIraq.

BaumertsaidthatmuchoftheGators’workinvolvedsimplypatrollingtheskiesandbeingpreparedtorespondwhencalled.Somemissionsweredesignedtoprovideoverheadcoverforsupplyconvoys,whileotherssupportedMarinesandspecialoperationsforcesheadingintoareaswherecombatwasexpected.

Maj.EricD.KlepperdescribedtheactivitiesofanF-18pilotaslongperiodsofrelativequietmixedwithoccasionsofintenseactivity.“It’sexciting,butitcanbenerveracking...Sometimesthere’salotofboredomouttherecirclingaround,waitingforsomethingtohappen.Youhadtheselongperiodsofsittingthere...andsomethingcomesupandeverythingiscompressedintoasmallperiodoftime,totrytogetaweaponoffanddowhatwearetheretodo.”10

KlepperspentmuchofhistimesupportingspecialoperationsforcesoperatingneartheSyrianborder.Sincetheywereoperatinginsmallteamsdeepininsurgentterritory,thesupportprovidedbytheF-18swasvital.Forexample,onedaythespecialoperationsforcesweremaneuveringtowardstheEuphratesRiverinthedesertneartheSyrianborderwhentheysuddenlycameunderattackfrominsurgentsusingaparkedtruckforcover.Klepper’swingmandroppedtwo500-poundlaserguidedbombsonapalmgrove,andsecondaryexplosionsshowedtherewasa weapons cache nearby. Klepper then fired a Maverick

missileatthetruck,eliminatingthecoverithadbeenprovidingtheinsurgents.11

In a separate mission, Klepper fired his 5-inch Zuni rocketsasmarkingroundsforhiswingmaninsupportofspecialoperationsactivitiesneartheEuphratesRiverValley.Forthismission,hesaid,thetargetwasinapositionthat was difficult for ground forces to observe or describe to the pilots. Klepper fired several 5-inch rockets to a designatedpositionnearthetarget,andgroundforceswereabletousetheimpactstoguidehiswingmantothetarget,whichwasdestroyedwithtwo500-poundbombs.12

KlepperalsodescribedwhathecalledamundanebutimportantmissiononaplannedtargetinthedesertnearBaghdad.Intelligenceshowedthattwohouseswerecoveringundergroundbunkerscontainingbomb-makingoperations.Thepilotswereprovidedpicturesandthelocationofthebuildings,andthespecialforcesteamhadacontrolleronthegroundtohelpguidethejetstothetargets.Klepperandhiswingmandroppedthree500-poundbombsonthehouses.Astheyroaredoffintothesky,thecontrollerreportedthatbothhousesweredestroyed.13

Petersondescribedanothermissioninvolvingadaytimeraid on an Iraqi oil refinery that gave him a better sense ofthedevelopmentofthenewIraqiArmy.ConductedbyIraqispecialforceswithcoalitionassistance,themissionclearlywasledbytheIraqis.ThesensitivityofthemissionpreventedtheGatorsfrombeingbriefedpriortothemission,butwerecalledontoassisttheIraqiswhentheIraqi forces started taking heavy fire from a building the size of the football field. Peterson said that the Iraqi troops wereprofessionalandaggressive,andheandothersinthe

An F/A-18 Hornet from VMFA-142 prepares for takeoff at the al Asad Airfield in September 2005.

Photo By Lance Cpl. James D. Hamel

��

squadronweredelightedtoseethemtakealeadingroleinthistypeofthebattle.14

Most Gator pilots flew practically every day during the sixmonthstheywereinIraq,andPetersonestimatedthathe collected approximately 350 flight hours during his tour.WhilethisintensescheduleprovidedgreatcoverageforgroundMarines,italsocreatedextensiveworkfortheMarineschargedwithmaintainingtheF-18s.MasterSgt.StevenM.King,thesquadron’smaintenancecontrolchief,saidthatfromthedaytheGatorsreceivedmobilizationorderstolongafterthesquadronreturnfromIraq,hismaintenanceteamswereconstantlyworkingontheaircraft.15

Lt.Col.DwightSchmidt,thesquadron’smaintenanceofficer, said the squadron benefited greatly from the experienceofitsmaintenanceteam,whichconsistedofanevenmixofactivedutyandReserveMarines.16Thedeploymentrequiredthousandsofmaintenanceupgradesortestsonthejets.HecitedtheadditionofLITENINGpods17toeachofthe12F-18sthatweretakentoIraqasan example of the maintenance team’s proficiency. The upgradeswereinstalledonall12Hornetsin10days,whichwasmuchquickerthanexpected.

“TheseguysarebyfarthebestmaintenancecrewintheMarineCorps.Topulloffwhattheydid,intimetodeploy,theyhadtobe,”Schmidtsaid.AsanotherexampleofthequantityofworkrequiredoftheMarines,Schmidtstatedthatordnanceteamshadtoconductmorethan17,000ordnancetestsonthe12aircrafttoensurethatallweaponssystemswouldfunctionasdesigned.SincetheReserveHornetsfrequentlytrainedwithoutliveordinance,thistestingwasnecessarytoensurethattheaircraftwerepreparedforcombatoperations.

SeveralpilotssaidtheadditionoftheLITENINGpodsystemwascriticaltotheirabilitytosupporttroopsontheground.Thesystemincludesaseven-footlongpod,mountedtotheundersideofajet,thatcontainsahigh-resolutionforward-lookinginfraredsensor(FLIR),atargetacquisitioncapability,andalaserdesignatorforthedeliveryoflaser-guidedordnance.Inadditiontoimprovingajet’sabilitytotargeteffectivelyinmanydifferentweatherandlightingconditions,theLITENINGsystemalsoallowedthepilotstoprovideintelligenceongroundactivitynearinfantryMarines.

Agreatdealofthemaintenanceteam’sworkinvolvedperiodicinspections,suchasdailyinspectionsofeachaircraft,weeklyinspectionsofalloftheordnancesystems,and“phase”inspectionsthatessentiallyrequiretheaircrafttobestrippeddowntoindividualparts.Duringthedeployment,thesquadronconducted22phaseinspections,eachofwhichtakesseveraldays.18Onaweeklybasis,the

ordinanceinspectionrequiredallordinancetoberemovedfromanaircraftandallsystemsinspectedandtestedbeforethe ordinance was reloaded. King said this was difficult work,giventhearduousconditionsandthefactthatpilotswere using significant amounts of ordinance throughout thedeployment.HesaidthattheMarinesperformedatanincrediblyhighlevelthroughoutthedeployment,primarilybecausetheyrealizedthattheultimateconsumeroftheirworkwastheMarineinfantrymanwhomightbeoperatingunder fire.

KingstatedthatoneofthemostimportantmembersofthemaintenanceteamwasthePlaneCaptain,anenlistedMarinewhoisresponsibleforallaspectsofthecareoftheaircraft.19TheseMarinesconductedthedailyand“turnaround”inspectionsofeachHornet,inspectingtheaircraftfromnosetotail,lookingforbattledamageorothersignsofwearandtear.Theplanecaptainsalsocoordinatedthedeliveryofmaintenanceservices,whichcombinedtheeffortsofpeopleworkingwithfuel,ordinance,pilotejectionseats,airframe,communicationsandnavigation,andelectronics.

“Theyhavethemostimportantjoboutthere,”Kingsaid,describingthepositionofplanecaptainasajackofalltrades.“Theyarethelastguyapilotwillseeashetaxisaway, and the first guy a pilot will see when he gets back. Theyarealwaysoutthere.”20

Cpl.AndrewW.Bedford,anaviationmechanicwhoservedasaplanecaptainthroughouttheIraqdeployment,said the all-encompassing nature of the job simplified things,becausetheplanecaptainessentiallywasresponsibleforeverything.21

“Basically,allofthesystems,wemakesurethattheyareworkingproperly,”Bedfordsaid.GoingoveraHornetbothbeforeandaftereachmission,theplanecaptainsfollowachecklistofallmovingpartsoftheaircraftinasearchforbattledamage,cracks,leaks,andotherproblemsthatmaybecomeapparentduringsuchinspections.Theplanecaptainsworkscloselywiththepilots,whoreportonanyissuesregardingtheaircraftattheendofeverymission.22

��

4th MarineAircraft Wing

In Afghanistan

��

��

Marine HeavyHelicopter Squadron

���Cpl.TimothyD.Reed’senduringimageofhis2004

deploymenttoAfghanistanisofPresidentHamidKarzailookingoutofReed’sCH-53Ecrewchief’swindowastheyflew over the mountainous countryside.1Duringatwo-hourflight from Kabul to the Hindu Kush region of Central Afghanistan, the president spent much of the flight viewing thebreathtakingcountrysideasitunfurledbelowhim.

President Karzai cut an imposing figure in the aircraft, despitethefactthathehadtoreplacehistrademarkKarakulhatwithahelicoptercrewhelmet.

“Weputhimonagunner’sbeltandputhiminthewindow,andhestoodthereandlookedaroundthecountry,” Reed said. “We were flying over the mountains, anditgavehimtheopportunitytolookaroundandsee,sohewasalwaysreallyhappyandthankfulforusdoingthatforhim.”2

The helicopter was filled with Afghan politicians and securityforces;mostspentthebetterpartofthetripcraningtogetthebestpossibleviewofthecountryside.Forsome,it was their first time seeing Afghanistan from the air. Their pride,accordingtoReed,wasevident.

WhilenopassengermighthavebeenmoreimportanttotheRoadHogsofHMH-769thanPresidentKarzai,thelong-distancecapabilityoftheCH-53E,enhancedbyitsaerialrefuelingcapability,madeittheaircraftofchoiceformanyimportantmissions.Lt.Col.RickD.Mullen,the squadron commander, said the Road Hogs flew more than1,000sortieswithonlysixhelicoptersduringthissix-month deployment, averaging approximately 1.7 flight hourspersortie.3ThesemissionsincludedtripstoeverycornerofCJTF-180’sarea,fromKandaharinthesouth,ShindandandHeratinthewest,Faizabadinthenorth,andthemountainousregionofToraBoraneartheborderwithPakistan.Formanyoftheirmissions,theCH-53swerenotescortedbyattackhelicopters,allowingthehelicopterstoreachtheirmaximumspeedanddistancecapabilities.

ThesquadronrotatedintoAfghanistanforthehottestmonthsoftheyear,4forcingpilotsandcrewstoplanmissionscarefully,balancingexpectedtemperatures,lift

requirements,fuelweight,andfuelconsumptionrates.Lt.Col.JamesD.Barich,aHMH-769pilot,saidenginepowerwas his crew’s main concern with each flight.5RoutesthattooktheCH-53sover14,000-footmountainpeaksmadeplanning much more difficult.6

While HMH-769’s VIP flights included trips with PresidentKarzai,SecretaryofDefenseDonaldH.Rumsfeld,andAmbassadorZalmayM.Khalilzad,MullensaidthatthemissionwithperhapsthegreatestinternationalimplicationsinvolvedtheextractionofsixUnitedNationsAfghanistanMilitaryAssistance(UNAMA)observerswhowerechargedwithobservingthenation’selections.OnJuly15,shortlybeforethe2004elections,theU.N.decidedtoabandonAfghanistan’scentralprovinceofGhorafteritsoffice in Chaghcharan was attacked by a mob.7

TheUNAMAteamrealizedthateachmemberfacedsignificant personal risk due to their lack of friends and resourcesintheisolatedarea.Theyrequestedanimmediateextraction.Withonlytwohourswarning,thesquadronlaunchedtwoCH-53stoChaghcharanintheearlyhoursofthefollowingmorning.ThepilotshadonlyagridreferenceforaproposedlandingsiteandinformationthattheUNAMAmemberswouldlightchemlightswhentheyheardthe approaching aircraft. They flew more than 200 miles ataltitudesthatoccasionallyapproached14,000feetonamoonlessnighttorescuetheUNAMAteam.8AccordingtoLt.Col.Mullen,theabilityofthecoalitionandtheAfghangovernmenttohaveanimpactsofarfromKabulplayedalargeroleintheU.N.’sdecisiontocontinueitssupportfortheUNAMAmission.9

ThelandingatChaghcharanwasmadepossiblebythesquadron’sextensivetrainingforlandingsunderconditionsof poor visibility, such as when a combination of fine dustandlowlightwouldeliminateacrew’sabilitytoseetheground.AnticipatingsuchconditionsinAfghanistan,Mullenrequiredhispilotsandcrewstotrainwithequipmentthatwouldgivethemtheabilitytolandinsuch“brownout”conditions.Thistrainingcombinedtheoutputfromtwodevices,aninfraredandaDoppler-basedsensor,

��

to provide an artificial view of a landing area even with no naturalvisibility.FlyingtheCH-53thatprovidedairbornesecurityduringthemission,MullensaidthattheotherCH-53wasabletolandinChaghcharan,despitedisappearinginto a dustball above the dirt airfield, because its pilots were proficient with the new technology.10

TheRoadHogs’bread-and-buttermissionwasascheduledseriesofsupplymissionsthatreachedallCoalitionbasesinAfghanistan.11Calledthe“RingResupplyRun,”areferencetothecircularroadRussiansbuilttoconnectmajorAfghancities,thesystemprovidedascheduledrouteofdeliveriestoCoalitionbases.Therouteswerecolor-codedasblue,gray,orange,andkhaki,andallowedtroopsfromtheUnitedStates,Afghanistan,theUnitedKingdom,Germany,Australia,NewZealand,andEgypt,aswellascertaincivilianssupportingCoalitionefforts, to travel to various outposts. The flights also carried cargorangingfromfoodandordnancetorazorwireandtoiletpaper.

MullensaidtheRingsupplymissionwasaperfectmatchfortheRoadHogsbecausetheprimarymissionofaCH-53Esquadronistheheavyliftofcargoandpersonnel.“Wewerehappytodothismissionbecauseitisjustwhatweweretrainedtodo.”12

EverymissionalongtheRingRoutewasachallengebecausetheRoadHogsweretaskedwithdroppingofforpickinguppersonnelorcargoateachstop.Inaplanningenvironmentthatwasunforgivingwithrespecttoweightandpowercalculations,suchconstraintsforcedpilotstoprioritize loads for each leg of a flight. Over time, the Road Hogswereabletogettheirfuelplanningdowntoascience.

According to Mullen, the significance of cargo managementwasimpressedonthesquadronearlyin

thedeployment,whenoverloadedaircraftencounteredproblemswhiletryingtolandontwoseparateincidents.13In the first, the crew brought the aircraft down with a hard rollinglandingthatcarrieditashortdistanceoffofthelandingsite.Inthesecond,whichinvolvedMullenasthecopilot,thecrewhadtojettisonbothauxiliaryfueltankstopreventmoreseriousdamage.14 This flight from Bagram includedtheNewZealandambassadortoAfghanistan,NielsHolm,andagroupofNewZealandsoldiersreturningtotheirProvincialReconstructionTeambasenearBamiyanincentralAfghanistan.Bamiyan,whichisatanaltitudeofmorethan8,000feet,wasthelocationoftwomammothBuddamonumentswhichwerelocatedthereformorethanathousandyearsbeforetheyweredestroyedbytheTalibanin2001.

Mullen stated that passengers had significantly underestimatedtheweightofseveralcargoitems,sotheaircraftwascarryingaheavierloadthanhadbeenplanned.Temperatureswerealsohigh,despitethefactthatitwasanight flight. As they approached the landing zone, everyone onboardheardthemainrotorlosepower.

“Iheardasickeningsoundofthemainrotorgettingslower,whichIhadneverheardbefore,anditwasalotmorerapidthanIthought,aswewerecomingthroughabout75feet,”saidMullen.15

Thepilot,Lt.Col.JeffFreeman,stabilizedthehelicopter’s flight in a hover at 15 feet above the dirt field, but he was unable to land because the helicopter wassuddenlysurroundedbydust.Ascopilot,Mullenimmediatelypunchedtwobuttonstoinitiatesmallexplosionsthatwouldblowthetwoauxiliaryfueltanksoffofthehelicopter.Withthisimmediatelossofsuchweight,Freemanwasabletolandthehelicopterwithminimal

Photo By Lt. Col. Rick D. Mullen

�0

damage.Cpl. Dominick Castro II, a crew chief on the flight,

saidthelandingwasaharrowingexperience.“Aswewerecomingintothezone,DashOne[theleadaircraft]hadbrownoutconditions,andwewerecominginshortlythereafter. As we were flying over them to come into the leadspot...the[mainrotor]bladesstartedslowingdown,youcouldactuallyhearthemcuttingthroughtheair.Atthatpoint,thepilotswerecallingfor‘power...power...power,’andoneofthestaffsergeantsonboardwassaying,‘picklethetanks,picklethetanks,’”16whenMullenjettisonedthetwotanks.

Castrosaidthedamagecouldhavebeenmuchworse.“Itwasscarytoallofus.Iheardthepilotgoing,‘thereisnopowerleft,’andhe’sgotthecollectiveupinhisarmpit.[Thecrewchiefsarethinking],‘We’vegotproblemsthen.’”17

AccordingtoMullen,theculpritinbothcaseswasafailuretoknowtheexactweightofcargotheaircraftwascarrying.Fromthatpointon,hiscrewmenwererequiredtoweigheachpieceofcargobeforeitwasloaded.Bythe

endofthetour,thepilotsandcrewchiefshadfuel-loadcalculationsdowntoascience,whichallowedthemtooptimizetheload.

InadditiontoRingRoutemissions,HMH-769hadseveralopportunitiestoinserttroopsoverlongdistances.In one case, the squadron flew more than 800 miles to insert50AfghanNationalArmytroopswhorecapturedthe Shindand airfield in the Herat Province of Western Afghanistan.18 In previous days, fighting had broken out near the airfield between provincial troops and an opposing militia.Thenationalgovernmentdecidedtoassertitspower by inserting its soldiers into the Shindand Airfield. Two CH-53s from HMH-769 flew a route, which required two in-flight refuelings.19Twoweekslater,twomoreCH-53s flew again to Shindand Airfield to deliver more than16,000poundsofcommunicationsgearandotherequipmentforfollow-onoperations.20TheseeffortswereanimportantpartofPresidentKarzai’seffortstoassertnationalcontroloverwesternAfghanistanafterheremovedapowerfulwarlordasthegovernoroftheprovince.21

Inthefallof2004,ReedandotherHMH-769Marinesenjoyed their last flight with Karzai. During the last part of the flight, Karzai indicated to Reed that he knew the squadronwouldbeleavingAfghanistansoon,andReedrespondedbysaying,“Ihaveappreciatedtheopportunitytofly you around. I really do like your country, sir. You have a beautifulcountry.”22

Thetwoshookhands,andKarzairesumedhispositionatthewindow.AsthePresidentwatchedhiscountrypassbelow him, his face held a broad smile, filled with pride.

Photo By Lt. Col. Rick D. Mullen

�1

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron

���While the Coyotes of HMLA-775 were busy fighting

inIraq,theirMarineReservesistersquadron,HMLA-773, was just as busy fighting Al Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan.

Cpl.M.CoryWargofcak,acrewchiefwithHMLA-773,learnedtwovaluablelessonsasaHueycrewchiefinAfghanistan:Neverunderestimateyourterrain,andneverunderestimateyourenemy.

He learned the first when a team of U.S. Navy SEALs hadtobeextractedbyhelicopterfromamountainousposition,aftertheyrealizedtheycouldnotmaneuvereffectivelyonfoot.ThisforcedthepilotsofWargofcak’sHueytomakeaseriesofriskypickupsintightquarters,hoveringwithoneskidonarooftopwhilethemainrotorcameperilouslyclosetoanearbymountainside.

WargofcaklearnedthesecondwhenthesameSEALdetachment put two detainees on his Huey for a quick flight later that same day. In previous flights, the SEALs had accompaniedthedetainees.Thistime,however,theaircrewwasonitsown.Asthehelicopterliftedoff,oneofthedetaineesstruggledwithWargofcakandtriedtogetcontrolof a nearby M-16 rifle. Relying partly on instinct and partly ontrainingfromtheMarineCorps’martialartsprogram,Wargofcakfendedoffthedetainee’sattack.Hespenttherest of the brief flight kneeling on the detainee’s hands to preventanotherattack.1

Overan18-monthperiod,fromOctober2003toMarch2005,theRedDogsofHMLA-773learnedthatthebeautifulAfghanmountainsweredeceptivelydangerous.

Most of the threats were from flying conditions, as the Red Dogs flew their AH-1W Cobras and UH-1N Hueys athighaltitudesthroughnarrowcorridorsamongjaggedpeaks.LessfrequentbutmoreintensethreatscamefromadeterminedenemythatoperatedintheKhowstBowlnearthePakistanborder.Patrollingtheskiesaboveaseriesofforwardoperatingbases(FOBs)alongtheborder,theRedDogsdefendedCoalitionbasesfromsporadicattacksbyAlQaedaandTalibanforces.

ServingasaQuickReactionForce(QRF),theRed

Dogsturnedthetideofbattleonseveraloccasions.In one incident, the Red Dogs saved five U.S. Special ForcespersonnelandmostoftheirAfghancolleagueswhenabordercontrolpoint(BCP)wasoverrunby300fighters linked to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Americans onthegroundlaterreportedthattheRedDogshelpedtheCoalitionandAfghangroundforceskill65attackers,wound60others,andcapture22prisoners.2

Maj.Raymond“Tarzan”Mederos,aCobrapilotwhosubsequentlybecametheRedDogs’commanderin2005,said the squadron faced significant challenges from the environmentinadditiontotreacherousmountainsandhigh altitudes. One of the challenges was the fine sand that permeated every opening, creating a significant hazard to thehelicopters.Theotherwasalternatingboutsofbittercoldandintenseheat,sometimeswithinthesameday,thatmade maintaining the helicopters so difficult.3

Staffing the Red Dog rotations was challenging. WhileCombinedJointTaskForce76,whichrequestedadetachmentofattackhelicopters,didnotneedafullsquadron,allofHMLA-773’sMarineswereeagertodeploy.Mederossaidthesquadronresolvedtheissuebysendinghalfofthesquadron,alongwithsevenAH-1WCobrasandfourUH-1NHueys,4 on the first six-month rotation.HeusedtheremainingMarinesforthesecondrotation,thenputtogetheracompositegroupconsistingprimarily of Marines from the first rotation for the last six months.

OriginallyassignedtothelargeCoalitionbaseinBaghram,theRedDogswerequicklyrelocatedtoFOBSalerno, a fortified helicopter base near the Afghan-Pakistanborder.TheirmainmissionwasprovidingimmediatecloseairsupporttoFOBs,aswellastheBCPsthatweremannedbyCoalitionSpecialForcesandAfghanNationalArmysoldiers.WhilethelargerFOBsweremorelikely to receive indirect fires, the BCPs were the subject of frequentgroundattacks.TheRedDogsescortedconvoysthatweresupplyingCoalitionbases.Othertasksincludedsupportingspecialoperationsmissionsagainsthigh-

��

valuetargets,escortingunarmedBlackHawkMedevachelicopters,andprovidingstripalertcoverageforaround-the-clockprotectionfromenemyattacks.

Red Dogs Defend Coalition Base in Khowst

MederosbetterunderstoodthevalueofaQRFinthistypeofcampaignafterheledasectionoftwoCobrasrespondingtoarequestforimmediateassistancefromBCP4intheKhowstarea.DuringtheearlyhoursofAugust1,2004,theBCPwassubjectedtoamassiveenemyattack.TheresponsebyMederos’Cobraswascreditedwithpreventing significant Coalition losses.5

BCP4,whichwasapproximatelythesizeoftwofootballfields, contained five special operations troops and 70 KhowstProvincialForce(KPF)soldiers.TheSpecialForcestroopsknewtheyneededhelpwhentheycameunderintenseattackfromseverallocationsnearthecamp.FlyingfromFOBSalerno,Mederosandhiswingman,Maj.DerrickR.Heyl,couldspotthecampfrommorethansevenmilesawaybytheglowoftracerroundsfocusedonone spot. As they approached, Mederos saw tracer fire and RPGs flying towards the compound from several directions. Respondingtothegroundcommander’sinstructions,Mederos’ Cobras first used their 20mm rounds to silence an enemyforceonaridgelineeastoftheBCP.DodgingRPGsand small arms fire, the Cobras swept through the area to gainabetterunderstandingoftheenemy’sdisposition.Thepilotsreportedtothegroundcommanderthattheenemyhadoverrunthewesternsideofthecompoundandwasfiring at KPF troops and the Cobras from inside the wire. After the ground commander confirmed that only enemy forcesoccupiedthewesternsideofthecamp,Mederosledhissectiononaseriesofdivingattacksonthatarea,firing 2.75-inch rockets and 20mm rounds on an enemy forceestimatedat50to75.TheactionsofMederosandHeylwerecreditedwithturningbacktheinitialattack,thenpursuingtheenemyasitmeltedintothewoodsandmountainsneartheborderwithPakistan.

Inanafteractionbrief,theBCP’sgroundcommanderdescribedtheactionsofHMLA-773helicoptersasbeingdecisive.Withoutthem,hesaid,theenemywouldhaveoverruntheBCP,killingCoalition,specialoperations,andKPF forces. The Cobras’ ability to view the battlefield providedtimelyintelligencetothegroundcommander,andtheir firepower turned the battle into a rout that caused “the largestdestructionofenemyforcesinasingleengagementsincethefalloftheTalibanregimeinlate2001.”6

Attack on FOB SalernoSevenmonthslater,anotherRedDogsectionresponded

toanattackonadifferentBCP.ThesophisticatedattackontheBCPincludedarocketattackonnearbyFOBSalerno,inordertodelaytheQRF’sresponse.Startingwithseveralenemygroundelementsmaneuveringunderthecoverofcombined arms to attack BCP 6, the enemy then fired a series of 122mm rockets towards FOB Salerno’s airfield.7Whilerocketswereexplodingwithin50metersofthehelicopters,Maj.JayD.BorellaledhisQRFtothetwoCobrasamidshrapnelandotherdebris.8Minuteslater,asthe Cobras were flying towards the site where the 122mm rockets were operating, Borella saw tracer fire near BCP 6.BreakingimmediatelyinthedirectionoftheBCP,BorellaradioedforadditionalsupportfromotherRedDoghelicopters.Onreachingthesmallcamp,heobserveddozens of enemy fighters attacking with small arms, machineguns,andRPGs.HedirectedtheCobras’TOWmissiles,2.75-inchrocketsand20mmroundstowardstheattackers.WhentwoHueysreachedthecamp,hedirectedthemtoattackenemyforcestothewestwhileheandhiswingmanconductedaseriesofferociousattackrunsonthe east. Realizing that Coalition forces were fighting a complex battle in difficult terrain, Borella climbed to an overwatchpositionthatallowedhimtofeedthegroundcommanderinformationonthestatusofthebattle.Afterthefourhelicoptershelpedrepeltheattack,hedirectedtheHueys to fly to the 122mm rocket site and take command of effortstoshutdowntherockets.Previouscounterbatteryfires had been ineffective because no Coalition forces had eyesonthetarget.WithHueypilotsobservingboththerocket positions and the incoming fires, the adjusted fires hadadevastatingeffectontherocketsite.

Inthemidstofthisactivity,twoBritishHarriersandanAirForceAC-130gunshipcameonstation,promptingthegroundcommandertopasscontrolofallaircrafttoBorellaso he could direct the air-to-ground fight for the rest of the night.Thecollectiveeffortsoftheseaircraftprovedtobeoverwhelming.Atdawn,groundforcesfoundthebodiesof 44 enemy fighters from an Al Qaeda-Taliban force estimatedat120.

The Beauty and Danger of the Afghan Mountains

WhilemaintainingfocusonAlQaedaandTalibanfighters, Red Dog pilots had to consider the difficulties ofoperatinginthejaggedmountainsthattheenemyfrequentlyusedtoitsadvantage.Lt.Col.DanC.Nestor,who served as the squadron’s executive officer for half of the18monthsitwasdeployed,saidtheterrainwasboth

��

Photo By Cpl. Rich Mattingly

Two AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters from Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 773, “Red Dogs,” fly near Salerno Forward Operating Base in Khowst province to provide Marines on the ground the opportunity to practice joint close air support. The training allowed Marines in squad-sized elements to practice talking on the radio with the pilots and call in air support to targets on a firing range.

themostbeautifulandthemosttreacherousthathehadexperienced in more than 20 years of flying Hueys.9

“Therearen’tmanyroads,andwhatyouseebelowyou...islikegoingbackintimethreethousandyears,”hesaid.“It’sanamazingsystem.It’sveryfeudal,withwarlordsandthingslikethat.Thepeopleoutthereareekingoutaliving.Youmightseetrucksandmodernvehicles,butotherthanthatitwasirrigationbyhand,thingsdugintothesidesofmountains,andmudhutswithwallsaroundeveryoneofthemtoprotecttheirassets.Someofthemissionswedidwentwayupintothemountains.Itwasprettyremote,andtherehadnotbeenAmericansinalongtime,ifatall.That’swheresomeofthebadguyshungout.”10

ThethinairathighaltitudespresentedaconstantchallengetotheRedDogs.WithFOBSalernoatmorethan3,500feet,the Red Dog helicopters flew mostoftheirmissionsbetween4,000and6,000feetandfrequentlyclimbedover10,000-footpeaks.Altitudeslikethesemadefuelconsumptionratesandpowerissuescontinuousconcerns,sopilotswerebalancingseveralcompetingfactorswhentheyplannedtheirmissions.TemperaturesintheKhowstregionvariedfromthebrittlecoldinthewintertoablazingheatinthesummer,whichmadeconductingtherequiredhelicoptermaintenanceincredibly difficult. To top off thesechallenges,theruggedterrainofferedfewemergencylandingzonesforpilotsintrouble.Withareasthatwerelarge, flat, and clear enough tolandatroubledhelicopterbeingfewandveryfarbetween,apilotencounteringsuchmechanicalproblemscouldonlyhopethatthehelicoptercouldlimpbacktoFOBSalerno.

NestorsaidthatthemissiontoextracttheSEALs,alsodescribedbyWargofcak,wasparticularlydangerousduetothesteepandremotemountainousterrain.11ItrequiredNestor’s Huey to fly with its rotor blades almost touching

thesideofthenearbymountain.Themissiongrewintomorethanjustabasicextraction,astheHueycrewassisteda SEAL team who had underestimated the difficult terrain. TheSEALswerepursuingahigh-valuetargetinthevicinityoftheKhyberPass.

AftertheSEALswereinserted,theyrealizedthattheterrainessentiallypreventedthemfrommovingtotheintendedobjectivearea,andtheyrequestedthataHuey

movethemtoadifferentlocation.Nestorsaidtheywerelocated on an isolated finger surroundedbysteepmountains.PickingthemuprequiredclosecoordinationbetweenthetwopilotsandtwocrewchiefsastheyinchedthehelicoptertowardsthemountainuntilNestorcouldplaceaskidontoarooftop.TheHueycouldonlyferrytwoorthreeSEALspertrip,Becauseofpowerandweightconsiderations,somovingthemrequirednumerousflights. Their alternate site was notmuchofanimprovement,asNestorlandedonadriedmudandwoodenbeamrooftopthatwasapproximately10feetby10feet.

“It’shardtoexplainhowbeautifulitis,howstunninglybeautiful,”Nestorsaidafterdescribingthehardshipsofmaneuveringevenarelativelysmall helicopter in the confined spaces.“Onethingthatprobablysticksouttome,asmuchasallthegoodwedidandeverythingelse,isthesheerbeautyofthecountry.”12

��

4th Marine Logistics Group

��

��

AstheReservecommandthatsustainsthewarriors,4thMarineLogisticsGroup(MLG)hasalsofocusedonsustainingitsoperations.

Brig.Gen.EugeneG.Payne,whocommanded4thMLGfrom2005to2007,saidthatafterinitiallysendinglargenumbersof4thMLGMarinesandSailorstoIraqforPhaseIandtheearlydaysofPhaseII,hiscommandestablishedatrooprotationthatprovidedasustainablemodel.1WorkingcloselywithactivedutyandReservecommands,4thMLGformulatedamobilizationschedulethathedescribedasappropriate for providing the required staffing for The LongWar.For2005and2006,thismeantdeployingapproximately1,2004thMLGMarinesandSailorseachyear,orabout13%of4thMLG’stotalforce.BasedonmodelsofwhattheMarineCorpsexpectstoneedinIraq,Afghanistanandelsewhereinthecomingyears,4thMLGleadersbelievetheycanmaintainthislevelofinvolvementindefinitley.

PayneusedtherotationofMotorTransportationdetachmentsasanexampleofwhathedescribedas4thMLG’s“measuredpace.”

“Wewerefortunateinthiscommand...[that4thMLGwas]notcalledupontoutilizeallofourmotortransportcapabilityintheearlygoing....Whenwewentback[forOIFPhaseII],wedidnothavetoputalargepercentageof our motor transport battalion into the fight in any given rotation.Bytakingsmallerincrements,bytakingtwoplatoons, we feel confident that we can sustain that going forward,”Paynesaid.“Iftheyhadcometousandsaid,‘Weneedtwocompanies,’thenyougetabigspike,andthatwouldhurtyoulater.Sowe’vebeenabletoworkwiththeactivecomponenttokeepameasuredpace.”2

Inadditiontothis“measuredpace”ofmobilizations,Paynealsonotedthatanimportantcomponentof4thMLG’ssuccesswasthewillingnessof4thMLGMarineswithspecialskillstovolunteerwhenneeded.HepointedtotheuniqueeffortsofthePersonnelRetrievalandProcessing(PRP)Unitasanexampleofvolunteersplayingacrucialrole.PRPwascreatedduringOIFinresponsetotheMarineCorps’plantoplayalargerroleinhandlingtheremainsofthosekilledinthelineofduty.Itsmemberswereinitiallydrawnfromtwoorganizationsthatwerebeingdisbanded.

PaynesaidthatthenumberofMarinessuppliedfromthose two units was not sufficient to staff continuous PRPdetachmentswithoutvolunteersforsecondandthirddeployments.

Deployment Methods

4thMLG,withitsheadquartersstaffandeightlinebattalions,hasamissionandorganizationthatrequiresittodeployitsMarinesandsailorsinamannerthatisdifferentthancombatarmsbattalionsorsquadrons.Insteadofdeployingitslineunitsasbattalions,4thMLGhasitsbattalionsmobilizedetachmentsthatwillformpartofatask-organizedCombatServiceSupport(CSS)element. A CSS element will require a specific number of troops from various military occupational fields or specialties.Detachmentsfromafunctionalspecialtylikecommunications,motortransportation,orengineersupportmightbetaskorganizedtoformaCombatServiceSupportCompany(CSSC),CombatLogisticsCompany(CLC),orCombatLogisticsBattalion(CLB).ThroughoutPhaseIIofOIF,4thMLG’sbattalionsprovideddetachmentslikethisonaregularbasis.SomedetachmentswouldbecomepartofaReservelogisticsorservicesupportelements,whiledetachmentsduringotherrotationswouldbeusedtoaugmentactive-dutylogisticsunits.

Forexample,duringonerecentrotation,4thMLGdeployed109militarypolicemenandacompanyof265MarinesthatwouldprovideinternalsecuritytooneofthemajorMarinebasesinIraq.Inadditiontothosesecurityforces,4thMLGprovided400Marine“Augments”fromthefollowingunitstoanactivedutyCombatLogisticsBattalioninIraq:

Maintenance 127MotorTransportation80BulkFuel 43Communication37LandingSupport 36PersonnelRetrieval 36Medical29MedicalLogistics12

�th Marine Logistics Group

��

Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Commands Com-bat Logistics Battalion

ForLt.Col.GreggL.Moore,OIFprovidedauniqueleadershipopportunitywhentheReservelogisticianwasofferedtheopportunitytocommandanactivedutyCombatLogisticsBattalion.The870MarinesandsailorsassignedtoCLB-5during2006-2007camefrom82different“sourcingunits”fromallovertheworld.3Ofthatnumber,allbut70werefromactivedutyunits.Whilethereweremanychallengesassociatedwithbringingtogethersucha unit, one of the most difficult involved the fact that the Marinesweresourcedfromaroundtheworld.TopreparehisMarinesforthedeployment,MoorehadtocoordinatepredeploymenttraininginNorthCarolina,California,andJapan.

WiththemissionofprovidingcombatservicesupporttoRCT-5(andlatertoRCT-7),MooresaidthatmoldingtheactiveandReservetroopsintoacohesiveunitwasmucheasierthanhehadexpected.“Wewereanincrediblytightteam.Wemeldedintoacohesive,organized,focusedCLBwithaclearviewofourmission.”4

Thebattalion’soperationscenterwasatCampFallujah.WhilemostofCLB-5’sMarineswerebasedatCampFallujah,theirmissionsrequiredmanytotravelconstantlybetweenbaseslocatedthroughouttheregion.CLB-5alsohadasmalldetachmentlocatedatabaseinthevicinityofHabbaniyah,locatedneartheEuphratesRiverbetweenFallujahandRamadi.5

OperatingindirectsupportoftheRCT,CLB-5providedservicestoimprovethesecurityofCoalitionforces,rangingfromweldingthicksheetsofmetalonvariousvehiclestoprovidingsecurityforconvoys,IEDteamsandvehiclerecoveryteams.CLBMarinesalsoimprovedthesurvivabilityofmanybasesorpositionsthroughouttheregion.Mooresaidthatmuchofthebattalion’ssuccesswasderivedfromatrainingpackagethatfocusedoneveryMarinehavingsecurityoperationskills.“WewereallMarines first, with a mission to perform,” he said. “We were all riflemen.”

CLB-5workedintheFallujahareaduringaperiodinwhichoneReservebattalion,1stBattalion,25thMarines,controlledthecityandthenhandeditovertoanotherReservebattalion,2ndBattalion,24thMarines.MooresaidthatwhiletheatmospherethroughmostoftheAnbarProvincewasrelativelycalmandstable,Fallujahwasin the midst of significant transition in response to what becameknownasthe“AnbarAwakening.”AsinsurgentsrespondedtoSunnitribespledgingtheirallegiancetotheIraqigovernment,thetenseatmosphereofFallujahstoodinmarkedcontrasttotherestoftheprovince.Additionally,thesteadilyimprovingIraqiSecurityForcesinFallujah

wereanxioustotakemoreresponsibilityforoperationsinthecity.Afterassessingseveraloptions,theMarinesdecidedtobuildaForwardOperatingBase(FOB)intheoutskirtsofFallujahtoallowacompanyofReserveMarineswhohadbeenoperatinginthecenterofthecrowded city to give up a significant portion of their AO to theIraqiSecurityForces.Bybuildingthe“SouthernFOB,”CLB-5createdasecurebasethatcouldaccommodatethecompany.ThelocationofthisFOBallowedMarinestopatrolneartheirIraqicounterparts,sotheycouldrespondasneeded,butinamannerthatallowedtheIraqistodemonstrate their own firm control of the center of the city.6

Thebattalion’smaintenancecompany,withapproximately200Marinesandapoolofciviliancontractors,wastheCLB’slargestunit,andMooresaiditprobably was his busiest. Its Marines and affiliated civilians workedaroundtheclocktorepairandmaintainvehiclessotheycouldgetbackoutontheroad.HealsonotedthatmaintenanceMarinesfrequentlywentoffbasetorecovervehiclesthathadbeenrenderedinoperable,eitherbyenemyactionoramechanicalissue.

Reserves Augmenting Senior MLG Staff

SincethebeginningofOIF,seniorMarineReserveofficers and staff noncommissioned officers often deployed as“augments”forasenioractive-dutystaff,suchasattheregimental,division,andevenforcelevel.Thissystemallowedthe“gainingforcecommander”todeterminewhere an individual Marine best fit into the staff. On an ongoingbasis,4thMLGsponsoredReservedetachmentslocatedwith1stMLGatCampPendletonand2ndMLGatCampLejeune,tohelpindividualMarinescreateworkingrelationshipswiththeiractive-dutycounterparts.Theserelationships allowed Reserves to step in quickly and fill significant positions, such as during 1st MLG’s major operationrelatingtoOperationAlFajrinFallujah.Atthattime,ReserveMarinesfromMLG’sWestCoastdetachmentwereassignedtoserveas1stMLG’sChiefofStaff,G-1,G-3,andG-4.7

1stMLGprovidedcombatservicesupporttoIMEFwhenIMEFtookoverresponsibilityfortheAnbarProvincefromthe82ndAirborneDivisioninearly2004.Lt.Col.ErickP.Thomas,whohaddrilledwith4thMarineLogisticsGroupForward-West,servedas1stMLG’sG-4whenhewasmobilizedforadeploymenttoIraqin2004-2005.HesaidthattheMarinesimmediatelyfacedsignificant supply issues. Thomas said the amount of potablewateronmanybaseswascriticallylow,frequentlylessthanwhatwouldbeneededfortwodaysofoperations.HesaidtheMLGstaffquicklylearnedtoworkclosely

��

withKBR,whichwastheprimarycontractorforsuchprovisions,andtheU.S.Army.MuchoftheMEF’sproblemwastryingtomatchitschangingoperationswithKBR’sschedulingconstraints.Marineoperationsweredynamicand fluid, he said, so trying to synchronize long-term planning with a fluid tactical environment created daily challenges.8

Compoundingtheproblem,Thomassaid,wasthefactthat convoy operations were difficult and very restricted during1stMLG’searlydaysinIraq.AmajorbreakthroughoccurredduringhisdeploymentwhenMarineslearnedthattheycouldbesuppliedwithvehiclescomingfromthewest,fromJordan,ratherthanfromthesouthandeast,fromKuwait and Baghdad. This greatly simplified the process of gettingsuppliestoCampTaqqadumbecausetherunfromtheJordanianborderwasmuchlesstreacherousthanotherroutes.

ThomassaidthatmuchoftheMLG’sworkintheearlymonthsinvolvedrelativelyshortconvoysfromCampTaqqadumtotheFallujaharea.Whiletheywereshort,theyalsowereconsideredhighlydangerousbecauseoftheinsurgentthreatinthearea.

ReserveshelpedIMEFimplementalogisticsstrategyforAlFajrthatensuredtherewouldbenooperationalpauses,nomatterhowintensethekineticoperations.Toaccomplishthis,1stMLGcreatedaseriesoflogisticsnodes,knownas“IronMountains”thatcontainedlevelsofcombatessentialsustainmentsuppliesthatultimatelysupported the operations of eight U.S. battalions and five IraqibattalionsduringAlFajr.HavingthesesustainmentsuppliesstagedatseverallocationsnearFallujahmeantthat Coalition forces had access to sufficient supplies when needed.9

ItwasduringThomas’tourthatCoalitionforcesusedthese supplies in the successful fight against insurgents in Fallujahduringthefallof2004.Duringthemonth-longAlFajrcampaign,Marineswereabletocordonoffthecity,then fight their way through the remaining insurgent forces. Itwasabloodyandviciouscampaign,andThomassaidthat the MLG’s resupply efforts played a significant role, both during and after the campaign. During the initial fight, hesaid,MLGMarinesweremonitoringthetacticalradionetworkssotheycouldanticipatetheneedsofCoalitionforcesattackingtheinsurgents.Afterthebattle,hesaid,MLGMarinesplayedanimportantroleinthecleanupandrebuildingeffortsinFallujah.10

“OurOperationsCentertrackedeverythingincombat,andrespondedappropriately,reallyleaninginto,‘Wherearewegoingtoneedtorespondtowhateverhadhappened.’”Hesaidthatanticipatingvariousrequirements,likesupplyingvariousitemsorrecoveringdestroyed

vehicles,allowedMLGMarinestoberesponsivetotherequirementsofCoalitionleaders.”11

Reserve Combat Service Support Company

IncontrasttoMoore’scommandofanactivedutyCLBandThomas’workontheMLGstaff,Maj.PatrickSweenytookaReserveCombatServiceSupportCompanytoCampTaqaddumfromAugust2004toMarch2005.His210MarinesandsailorsbecameCombatServiceSupportCompany113(CSSC-113),whichwastheonlyReserveelementofCombatServiceSupportBattalion1(CSSB-1).WhilemanyofSweeny’sMarinesessentiallyaugmentedthebattalion’sadministrativestaff,hisotherMarinesstaffedthemotortransportationdetachment(approximately60Marines),theutilitiesdetachment(approximately50Marines,primarilywaterandairconditionerspecialists),thebulkfueldetachment(50),thecombatengineersdetachment(40),andaportionofthemaintenancedetachment(36).

ThetimingofCSSC-113’sdeploymentmeantthatmuchofthecompany’sworkrelatedtoOperationAlFajrinFallujah.Taskedwithsupporting3rdLightArmoredReconnaissanceBattalion,Sweenysaid,hisMarinessupportedtheestablishmentofan“anvil”alongtheEuphrates River, designed to stop insurgents from fleeing to thewestasCoalitionforcessweptthroughthecity.12

Aftermobilization,thecompanypreparedforitsdeploymentwithathree-monthtrainingcycleconductedprimarilyinthevicinityofBattleCreek,Michigan.Thehands-ontrainingwasdesignedtoprepareSweeny’sMarinesforwhattheywouldseeinIraq.Forexample,theheavyequipmentplatooncreated,gradedandpavedmilesofroadsduringpredeploymenttraining.InIraq,itsMarinesconductedrouteclearancemissionsalong41milesofroadsinthevicinityofFallujahandCampTaqaddum.InadditiontousingarmoredTPKD-7bulldozerstoremovedebris,whichfrequentlycontainedIEDs,theMarinesclearedobstaclesandgradedroadways,allowingforasmoother flow of Coalition traffic.13Sweenyalsocreditedpredeployment training with allowing his water purification specialiststooperateindependently,therebycontributingsignificantly throughout their tour in Iraq. After purifying thousandsofgallonsofwaterinMichigan,theseMarinesweredispatchedwithindaysoftheirarrivalinIraqtowater purification operations at eight bases, where they subsequentlyhelpedpurifymorethan26milliongallonsofwater.

IMEF’spreparationfortheassaultonFallujahwasconductedoverseveralmonths,andaspartofthat,CSSC-113builtarampontotheEuphratesRiverforthedivision’s

��

smallboatcompany.Sweenysaidthecompany’sheavyequipmentplatoonwasabletobuildarampatCampHabbaniyahinoneday,despitethefactthatthebuilderscameundersmallarmsattackduringthisproject.14

InOctober,CSSB-113wastaskedwithprovidingdirectsupportto3rdLightArmoredReconnaissance(LAR)BattalionforOperationAlFajr.3rdLAR,whichwasdesignatedTaskForceWolfpackwhenitwasaugmentedbyIraqiSecurityForcesandotherCoalitiontroops,hadthemissionofseizingofapeninsulaformedbyabendintheEuphratesRiverwestofFallujahandthetwosteelbridgesthatconnectedFallujahtothepeninsula.BycuttingoffthisavenueofegressfromFallujah,theTaskForcewastoserve as an “anvil,” stopping the anticipated rush of fleeing insurgents.

Topreparefortheattack,CSSC-113strengthenedmanyoftheTaskForce’svehiclesandfabricatednumerousobstaclesthatwereemplacedalongmajorroutes.15CSSC-113weldershelpedattacharmortotheundercarriageandsidesof18Humvees.Theyalsohelpedcreatesix“hedgehogs,”six“tetrahedrons,”andsixspikestripsfromavailablesteelsupplies.

Knowingthatthelongandthinpeninsulawouldchannelvehicle traffic in a certain way, leaders of Task Force Wolfpack decided to establish five vehicle checkpoint sites justnorthoftheareawhereitplannedtopositionitsrearareaheadquarters.CSSC-113’sheavyequipmentoperatorsalso helped construct five large protected working and livingareas,andestablishedmorethan40hidingpositionsforvehicles,gear,andpersonnel.16Thesesitesultimatelyservedmorethan325Marinesand125IraqisinthedayspriortotheassaultonFallujah.

TaskForceWolfpackinitiatedtheNovember7,2004assaultonFallujahbyattackingthetwobridgesonFallujah’swestside.Withinhoursoftheinitialassault,MarinesfromCSSC-113’sheavyequipmentplatoonescortedelementsofTaskForceWolfpacktothenorthernendofthepeninsula,wheretheyhelpedbuildaforwardoperationscenter.Theyalsohelpedpreparedefensivepositionsforvarioustypesofvehiclesalongthebanksofthe Euphrates River, even though they were under fire from insurgentsjustacrosstheriver.17

Thenextday,CSSC-113lostfourofitsMarinesintwoseparate incidents. In the first, two Marines died when a D-7bulldozerwentintotheEuphratesRiverinthepre-dawnhours.Accordingtoreports,LanceCpl.JeffreyLamwaspreparing a position for a Bradley fighting vehicle near the riverwhenalargepieceofshorelineapparentlycollapsedintotheriver.Cpl.JoshuaD.Palmer,whohadbeenservingasagroundguideforLam,immediatelystrippedoffhisflak jacket and helmet and dove in after Lam, but neither

madeitoutofthewateralive.18

Hourslater,twomoreCSSC-113MarineswerekilledbyanIEDthatdestroyedtheleftsideoftheHumveetheywereridinginonamainroadinthepeninsula.19Aconvoyofengineershadestablishedthreevehiclecheckpoints(VCPs)onthepeninsula’smainroad,thenfoundthemselvesunderfrequent small arms and indirect fires attack throughout the dayastheyemplacedsixserpentinebermsand120HESCObarriersdesignedtoincreaseforceprotectioninthevicinityoftheVCPs.20Whilereturningfromthesemissions,aHUMVEEintheconvoywashitbyanintegratedIED-smallarmsambush.LanceCpl.ThomasJ.Zapp,whowasridinginthebackseat,waskilledimmediately,whileStaffSgt.DavidG.Ries,whowasmanningthegunner’sturret,diedshortlythereafterfromwoundsreceivedintheblast.21

InadditiontohelpingclearFallujahafterAlFajr,CSSC-113wastaskedwithclearinganalternatesupplyroutebetweenCampTaqqadumandFallujahwhichrequiredmovingvariousdebris,includingdisabledvehicles,dirtroadblocks,andevenasteelpowertransmissiontower.22Formanyreasons,thisrequiredextensivecoordinationwithanArmyEODunitandsecurityelementsfrom3rdLAR. Sweeny later reported that this mission significantly improved traffic flow on this route, having removed ten disabledcivilianvehiclesandnumerousroadblocksfromthearea.

Combat Engineers Attached to 9th Engineer Support Battalion

Maj.MarkC.BoonewasthecommanderofCompanyB,6thEngineerSupportBattalion(ESB)whenhis167Reserveswereattachedtoanactivedutybattalion,9thESB,inIraqduring2006-2007.23Whilehewasimmediatelyrequiredtodetachapproximatelyone-thirdofhis Marines for the benefit of other ESB sections, such as theadministrativesectionorthemotortransportsection,theremaining105combatengineerswereabletofallinonacollectionofheavyequipmentvehiclesandotherconstructiontools,includingmanydifferenttypesofrouteclearingvehicles.24

CompanyB’smissionfocusedonclearingmajorroutesandbuildinguporimprovingthesurvivabilityofmanyFOBsandObservationPosts(OPs).WhilethisworkexposedhisMarinestocombatoperations,Boonesaidthatthey were driven by the sense that they were significantly enhancingtheforceprotectionavailabletoAmericanandIraqiunits.AsrelationshipsbetweenMarinesandIraqiSecurityForcesdevelopedduringthedeployment,Boonesaidthathisengineersspentmoretimeworkingwiththemilitarytransitionteams(MTTs),whichweresmallteamsofMarinesthatwereassignedastrainersandadvisorsfor

�0

largeIraqisecurityforces.TheMTTswantedtheIraqistofeelliketheywerebeingprotectedbytheCoalition,sotheyfrequentlyrequestedengineeringassistancetofortifyIraqibases.25

Boone’scombatengineersquicklyrealizedthatthiscombatdeploymentwouldbemuchdifferentthansomeofthemhadexperiencedinPhaseI.Intheirinitialturnoverpatrol,Boonesaid,theReservecombatengineerswereambushedbyinsurgentsusingIEDs.Whilethisseemedat first to be a significant event, Boone soon learned that theblastinvolvedacomparativelysmallIEDandwassimilartomanyotherencountersthathisMarineswouldparticipateinduringtheirtour.Gainingthisexperienceandunderstandingofinsurgentoperations,particularlyduringaturnoverwithcombat-seasonedMarines,turnedouttobevery positive, as Boone’s Marines learned first-hand how torespond.BoonesaidthatassoonastheIEDexploded,theveteranMarineslocatedandpursuedthemenwhohadtriggeredtheIED,successfullydetainingthem.26

Boone,whohadcommandedabridgingcompanyinIraqduringPhaseI,saidthisIEDdemonstratedimmediatelythatthewarhadchangedconsiderably.“Irememberthinking,‘SothisiscombatintheAnbarProvince.’”hesaid.“ItwasvastlydifferentthanthemarchuptoBaghdad[in2003].”27

OnemonthafterCompanyBarrivedinIraq,itsufferedoneofthefewfatalitiesthat4thMLGhasexperiencedinIraq.OnOctober1,2006,Cpl.AaronSealwasshotbyasniperashehelpedbuildabunkerforMarinesontopofaroofinthevillageofBaghdadi,nearAlAsad.28Boonedescribedtheworkasa“survivabilitymission,”inwhichhisMarinesweretryingtostrengthenpositionsthatwereusedbyMarinesinBaghdadi.AsSealwasworkingonthebunker, Boone said, two shots from a sniper’s rifle rang out, withthesecondonehittingSealinthehead.

WhilemostofCompanyB’srouteclearancemissionswereintheFallujah-Ramadiarea,thecompanywastaskedonetimewithalong-distancemissionthatrequireda700-kilometermotormarchfromitshomebaseatCampTaquaddumtothecityofRutbahneartheJordanianborder.ThemissionwasrequestedbyaMEUcommanderwhohadbeentemporarilyassignedtoCampKoreanVillage,justoutsideRutbah.Afterreviewingrecentreportsofnumerousincidentsintheregion,MarinesdecidedthattheRutbahneededtobecleared.BoonesaidthattheMEUcommander,knowingthathisMarineswouldneedengineeringassistancetocleartheroutefromthelineofdepartureintoandthroughoutthecity,requestedsupportfromtheclosestavailableunit.Withlessthan24hourswarning,elementsofCompanyBbeganthelongdrivetoRutbah.29LinkingupwiththeMEUatthelineofdeparture,Boonesaidthat

theMEUcommanderorderedthecombatengineerstoimmediatelybeganclearingtheroute.WhilethetripfromCampTaqaddamtoRutbahhadbeendrainingbecauseMarineswereconstantlylookingforIEDs,thefactthatthecombatengineerswereengagedbyarmsandindirectfires as soon as they started operating in Rutbah made them realizethatthemissionwasgoingtobechallenging.BoonesaidthatwhilehisMarines,servingasaleadingelement,werenotheavilyengagedduringtheoperation,theMEU’smovementswerecharacterizedbyfrequentperiodsofheavy fighting.30

BoonedescribedanotherchallenginganduniquemissionforCompanyBastheonethatinvolvedtheclearingofnumerousroutesinasmallareabetweenthecitiesofFallujahandRamadi.Knownas“alJazerra,”or“theisland,”theareahadnotbeenactivelypatrolledbycoalitionforcesforanextendedperiod.AlthoughIraqiforceswereprimarilyresponsibleforthearea,theMarineMTTrequestedtherouteclearancemissionsothattheirIraqi counterparts could establish more firm control of the area. Boone said that five of his vehicles were attacked by IEDsduringthetwo-weekoperation,butheaddedthattheworkofhisMarinesallowedtheMTTsandtheIraqiForcestoestablishcontrolofthearea.31

Inthelattermonthsofitsdeployment,CompanyBwasallowedtoconductdistributedoperationsinsupportofinfantryunitsthatwereoperatinginrelativelysmallFOBsnearFallujah.Boonesaidthattheseoperationsallowed him to give significant responsibilities to junior officers and noncommissioned officers, as they worked insmalldetachmentstoreinforceandexpandtheFOBs.BoonesaidthathebelievedthemostimportantaspectofthisworkwasthatittaughtrelativelyyoungMarinestocoordinatetheiractivitieswithotherunits.HesaidtheyoungMarinesquicklylearnedhowtorelyontheirowninitiativetoacquiretheresourcesnecessarytostrengthenthepositions.32

Personnel Retrieval and Processing Unit

For Marines and others who die on the battlefield, the MarineCorps’PersonnelRetrievalandProcessing(PRP)Unitischargedwithtakingtheinitialstepstopreparetheremains for the final journey. It is a unique unit that has servedwithdistinctioninwhatisconsideredoneofthemost emotionally difficult jobs in the Marine Corps. PRP Marinesspeakofthehonortheyfeelinbeingallowedtoservethedeceasedwiththeappropriaterespect,buttheirworkisgut-wrenching.Itsomecases,theyarecalledontosearchanextendedareainanattempttorecoveritems.Inothercases,theyhavecollectedbodypartsfromthetwisted

�1

hulkofavehiclethathasbeendestroyedbyanIED.33

PRPissimilartotheArmy’sMortuaryAffairsunits,butit includes the difficult field work of locating and gathering bodilyremainsandotheritemsassociatedwithafallenservicemember.WhileotherMarinesmayassist,PRPMarines take the primary role in this difficult task because commandersconsidersitimportanttohaveMarinesfromunitsotherthanthatofafallenMarinesearchfortheremainsorotherpersonalitems.

Aftercollectingtheremains,PRPMarineswouldbring them to one of three bases with PRP units – Camp Taqqadum, Al Asad Air Base, or Camp Fallujah – where theyweretendedtobeforethejourneybacktotheUnitedStates.

Sgt.SusannahF.Wood,whowasassignedtothePRPPlatoonatAlAsadforsixmonthsin2004-2005,saidthatone of the things that made PRP work more difficult was thatitwasalwaysdoneunderatimeconstraint,asthemilitarytriedtoreturntheremainstotheUnitedStatesasquicklyaspossible.34

PRP’smission,Woodsaid,wastorecoverandprocessanindividual’sremainsandpersonalproperty,whichincludedcleaningandrecomposingtheremainsandidentifyinganddocumentingwounds.PRPMarinesworkedinteams,withoneortwoMarinessearchingeachpocketorpouchoranyotherrelateditemthatmightbeusedtoconfirm the identify of the remains. This search included acarefulreviewofmilitaryequipment,becauseMarinesfrequentlystoredpersonalitemsamongtheirmilitaryequipment,subsequently,PRPMarinewoulddocumenteachitem.Theteamwouldalsolookforotherinformation,such as scars or marks, that would help confirm an identity.

PRPhelpedcoordinatearrangementstohavetheremainsevacuated to Kuwait for another flight to a centralized receivingpointatDoverAirForceBase.AtDoverAFB,shesaid,theremainswerecheckedagainstrecordsforfingerprints, dental work, and DNA. These tests allowed the military to conclusively identify a specific individual and possiblyidentifythecauseofdeath.

WoodsaidthattherewasanairofreverencethatsurroundedPRP’swork.Someoftheworkwasintenselypersonal,suchaswhenpropertylikejewelryorlettersthateitherhadcomefromhomeorhadnotyetbeenmailedhome were inventoried. Acknowledging that it was difficult work,shesaidthatsheandherfellowMarinestookgreatprideinknowingthattheyweretreatingtheremainswithextraordinaryrespect.35

Shereiteratedthatworkingwithremainstookpriorityoveranyotherworkthroughoutthetheater.“Everyonegoesoutoftheirwaytoensurethatwegetthe‘Angel’home,”shesaid,usingthenamethathasbeenadoptedtoidentify

anydeceasedAmericanservicememberwhoisbeingreturnedtohisorherhome.

Brig.Gen.PaynedescribedthePRPasastoryofdedicationofMarineReserves.Withlittlemorethan100 Marines qualified to serve in PRP, he said, the MLG hasstaffedatleastoneplatoonofPRPMarinesineveryrotation.“WeranoutofMarinesonpaperoverayearago,”hesaid.“Thereasonweareabletosustain[PRPoperationsis]becauseofvolunteerism,peoplewillingtogobackforasecondorthirdtour.AlotofourPRPMarineshavebeenthreetimesnow.”36

��

The Last Journey

��

��

The Last JourneyTheMarineCorpshascalledonReserveMarinesfor

manyaspectsoftreatingthosewhohadbeenwoundedorkilledinbattle.Atoneendoftheprocess,ReservesfromthePersonnelRetrievalandProcessing(PRP)Unit gathered, identified, and processed the remains of adeceasedservicemember.Attheotherend,Reservesfrequentlyweretaskedwithmakingcasualtycallsandconductingfuneraldetails.MuchoftheU.S.-basedcasualtyworkwasdonebyReserves,inpartbecauseofthedistributionofReserveunitsthroughoutthecountry.ThesearemissionsthatMarineshandlewithpride,respect,andgreatdistinction.

Lt.Gen.JackW.Bergman,CommanderofMarineForcesReservebetween2005and2008,toldaU.S.Senatesubcommitteein2006thatmorethan90percentoftheMarineCorps’casualtycallshadbeenhandledbyMarinesassignedtotheReserve.1

“In recognition of this greatest of sacrifices, there is no dutythatwetreatwithmoreimportance,”Bergmantoldthe Senators. “The duties of our casualty assistance officers go well beyond notification, . . . [and include] planning the return and final rest of their Marine, counseling [the family] on benefits and entitlements, [and] providing a strong shoulderwhenneeded.”2

DuringtheGlobalWaronTerror,theservicesadoptedtherespectfulcodenameof“Angels”torefertotheremainsofservicemembersbeingprocessedortransportedto their families and final resting sites. According to those whotookpartinsuchsacredduties,therewasnomissionthathadahigherpriority,andnonethatreceivedthesamelevelofattentionorcare,asamissionthatinvolvedan“Angel.”

Flying with Angels

ForLt.Col.JacquesC.NaviauxII,whocommandedHMM-764inIraqin2005,oneofthemostpoignantmomentsofhiscareeroccurredwhenheandhiscrewwerediverted to pick up the remains of five U.S. Army soldiers whohadbeenkilledincombat.3Hissection’soriginalmissionhadbeentoextractareinforcedplatoonofsoldierswho had been conducting field operations for more than twoweeks,butthemissionwaschangedenroutetothepickupsite.Toldthathissectionwouldbecarryingtheremainsofthesoldiers,Naviauxmadesurethatthecrewsunderstoodthattheyhadbeenassignedasacredduty.4

Afterthebodieswereloaded,thecommanderoftheArmyunitwalkeduptothecockpitandextendedhishandinasimplegestureofappreciation.Naviaux,whoreturnedhishandshake,saiditwasmeaningfulforbothmen.Withnowordspassingbetweenthem,theArmycommandermadesurethatNaviaux’MarinesknewthathewasentrustingthemwiththemostpreciousandimportantloadthattheMarineswouldevercarry,andtheMarineacknowledgedthemessage.Bothcommandersconveyedtoeachotherthatthelossofaservicememberissharedbyallservices.

Minuteslater,astheAngelsbegantheirascent,50soldierscametoattentionandsalutedtheirfallencomradesas the final journey home began.5

Personnel Retrieval and Processing Unit

Reservesoftenusecivilianskillswhencalledtoactiveduty.ForSgt.DanielCotnoir,hisbackgroundasafuneraldirectorinMassachusettsprovidedtheexperiencethattheMarineCorpsneededwhenhewasmobilizedforadeploymenttoIraqin2004-2005.Trainedasanarmorer,hewasassignedtothePersonnelRetrievalandProcessing(PRP)Unit,whichworkedwiththeremainsofMarinesandotherswhodiedinawarzone.6Inadditiontootherduties,CotnoirregularlycleanedandrecomposedthebloodiedbodiesandfacialfeaturesofMarineskilledincombat.7

While the gruesome work is difficult from an emotional perspective,Cotnoirsaidthatitwasatremendouslyrewardingjob.Theworkrangesfromsearchingforbodypartsafteranexplosiontocombingthroughaservicemember’swalletbeforepackagingpersonalbelongingstobeshippedtothedeceased’sfamily.

Cotnoir’seffortsaspartofaunitofapproximately20Marinesthathandledtheremainsof182peopleledtohisselectionasthe2005MarineoftheYearbytheMarineCorpsTimes.8Whilehisciviliantraininggavehimtheskillstocleanandrecomposetheremainsattheoutsetofthejourney,healsodemonstratedleadershipbyheadingupteamsthatsearchedlargeareastorecoverbodypartsandpersonalitemsofdeceasedservicemembers.AccordingtotheMarineCorpsTimes’citation,heoncecrawledintotheburned-outhulkofaLightArmoredVehicletorecovertheremainsofaMarinewhohadbeentrappedinthewreckage.9Whilesuchworkwasphysicallyandemotionallytaxing,CotnoirsaidthePRPunitstookgreat

��

prideinknowingthatthedeadweretreatedwithrespect,therebybringingsomemeasureofclosuretothedeceased’sfamily.

WhileCotnoirwasassignedtoCampTaqaddum,otherPRPunitswerebasedatCampFallujahandAlAsadAirBase.Sgt.SusannahF.Wood,whowaspartoftheAlAsadunit,saidthatPRPoperationswereconstantlyundertighttimeconstraints,asthemilitarytriedtoreturntheremainstotheUnitedStatesasquicklyaspossible.

Despitetighttimeframes,WoodsaidthattherewasanairorreverencethatsurroundedPRP’swork.Someoftheworkwasintenselypersonal,suchasdealingwithanindividual’scombatgearorlettersfromhome. While it was difficult, shesaidthatsheandherfellowMarinestookgreatprideinknowingthattheyweretreatingtheremainswithanextraordinarilyhighlevelofrespect.

Shereiteratedthatworkingwithremainstookpriorityoveranyotherworkthroughoutthetheater.“EveryonegoesoutoftheirwaytoensurethatwegettheAngelhome,”shesaid.

Notifying the Next of Kin

WhileanAngelwasbeginningthejourneyhome,ReservesoftenwerecalledupontonotifyaMarine’sfamilyofthedeath.Ithasbeendescribedasoneofthehardestjobsinthemilitary,becausefamilymembersunderstandthemeaningofuniformedMarinesattheirdoor.

Symbolizedbyaknockonthedoor,thepassingofacasualtymessageisthethingthatmilitaryfamiliesdreadmost.Whileitsimpactonthedeceased’sfamilyisapparent,it also leaves an indelible impression on the Notification Officer.10 Most Notification Officers describe that the responsibilityasasacredduty,buttheyalsonotethatitishaunting. One Notification Officer said that simply wearing

hisServiceAlphauniformremindshimofeachofthefamilies he has come to know through this difficult duty.11He recalled one notification visit to a mother who originally thoughthehadsimplycomeforasocialvisit.Whenshelookedintohiseyes,hesaid,sheimmediatelygraspedthe

sombermeaningofhisvisit.

WhenaMarinedies,a Notification Officer providesthefamilywiththe formal notification of the death. The Notification Officer is typically joined byaCasualtyAssistanceCalls Officer (CACO), and possiblyachaplain.Itisdoneassoonaspossible,dayornight,sofamilymembersreceivetheinformationfromaMarineCorpssourceratherthanareporterorsomeoneelse.

Maj.KirkA.GreinerhadbeentheInspector-InstructorforLimaCompany,3rdBattalion,25thMarines,foronlythreedayswhenhehadtonotifythefamiliesoftwoMarinesthattheirlovedoneshadbeenkilledinIraq.12GreinersaidthattheOICofLimaCompany’sPeacetimeWartimeSupportTeam,ChiefWarrant Officer 4 Orrin H. Bowman,hadconductedseveral notification visits

beforeGreinerjoinedtheunit.ThisallowedhimtoprepareGreinerforthedutiesaswellasanyonecouldhave.

Greiner’s first question to Bowman was how to respond toacasualtycall.“IwantedtomakesurethatIknewwhatIwasdoingif,Godforbid,thathappened.Loandbehold,threedayslaterithappened,[andBowman]hadpreparedmeverywell.”13

BowmanhadpreparedemergencyinformationfoldersforeachdeployedMarineandSailorthatincludedmapstothehomesofthenext-of-kin.14ExperiencehadtaughtBowmanthateachfamilywouldresponddifferently,soheadvisedGreiner,atwo-tourveteranofOperationIraqiFreedom,tobepreparedforabroadrangeofpossible

��

responses.Greinersaidheencouragedthefamiliestositdown

first, while he asked a few brief questions to ensure he wastalkingwiththerightpeople.Then,hesaid,hewoulddeliverashortstatementofregretfromtheCommandant,suchas:“TheCommandantoftheMarineCorpshasentrustedmetoexpresshisdeepregretthatyourson,LanceCpl.JohnA.Marine,waskilledinactioninBaghdad,Iraq,onNovember10,2005.TheCommandantextendshisdeepestsympathytoyouandyourfamilyinyourloss.”15

This is the most difficult part, he said. Until the words “killedinaction,”arespoken,thefamilyishopingthenewswillbethatthepersoniswoundedormissinginaction.Withthatoneword,hesaid,thefamily’shopesaredashed.16

WhileaninitialPersonnelCasualtyReportmayhavecontainedabriefdescriptionofhowanindividualdied,17Greinersaidthathepreferredtoprovidelittleinformationduringtheinitialvisit.Toavoidconfusionortheneedforlater clarification, he said, most Notification Officers told familiesthattheCACOwouldprovidethemwithaccurateinformationassoonasitwasavailable.

The CACO follows up on the Notification Officer’s initialvisitbyprovidingwhateverassistanceisneededbyafamily.Greiner,whosupervisedmanyMarineswhoserved

asCACOs,saidthattheGoldenRuleforaCACOistoaccomplishwhateverthefamilywants.ThishighstandardfrequentlyrequiresnumerousphonecallstotheMarineCorps’Headquartersforspecialrequests.Forexample,Greinersaid,frequentlyboththeparentsandthespousemightrequestthattheyreceivetheirMarine’sPurpleHeart and accompanying certificate. While Marine Corps directivesrequirethatthistypeofrequestbeclearedattheHeadquarterslevel,GreinersaidthatCACOskeepcallinguntiltheyreceivedtheappropriateauthorization.

InawarthathasresultedinmoreU.S.fatalitiesthananymilitary action since Vietnam, Marine Notification Officers and CACOs have earned a reputation for doing a difficult jobaswellaspossible.18Lessthanaweekafterconductinghis notification calls for families of the two Marines who diedonhisthirddayasCompanyL’sInspector-Instructorstaff,GreinerhadtonotifythefamiliesofsixmoreMarinesthattheirsonsorhusbandshadbeenkilledinanIEDblastnearHadithaonAugust3,2005.TheIEDdestroyedtheAmtrakinwhichtheMarineswereriding,killing14Reserves.Morethananyothersingleincident,thisIEDbrought home to America the significant losses that Marine ReservesweresufferinginOperationIraqiFreedom.

Photo By Cpl. Brian Rheimers

��

A Final Goodbye With The Lord’s Prayer

Inthefallof2006,when1stBattalion,25thMarinesreturnedfromIraq,itsMarineswererequiredtospendtwoweeksatCampPendletonpriortoreturningtotheirfamiliesandrespectivehometrainingcenters.Whilethisperiodprovidedampletimetotakecareofroutineadministrativematters,italsoprovidedsomedecompressiontimetohelpMarinesandSailorsmakethetransitionfromacombatzonetoacivilianenvironment.

Lt.Col.ChristopherA.Landro,thebattalion’scommander,usedthe“LibertyWeekend,”totake13ofthebattalion’sleaderstovisitsomeofthebattalion’smostseverlywoundedMarines.19Inadditiontothebattalion’sCommanding Officer, Sergeant Major, and Operations Officer, Landro had the Company Commanders and First Sergeants from each of the battalion’s five companies participateinthevisits.20“IttrulywasoneofthemostinspiringthingsthatI’veeverdone,”Landrosaid.21

The Marines first went to San Antonio, Texas, where theyvisitedtwoMarineswhowerebeingtreatedattheU.S.Army’sburncenter.BothMarinessufferedseverewoundsaswellasdeepburns,butLandrosaidthattheirattitudeswereundaunted.22One,hesaid,wasessentiallyrunninghis hospital floor, making sure that every service member maintainedhighspiritswhilegettingtoallappointmentsandphysicaltherapysessions.Theother,whohadgrownupinthewest,toldhisbattalioncommanderthathe,“couldnotwaittogetbackuponahorse.”23

The leaders then flew to Washington, D.C., where they first visited two of their Marines at the Bethesda Medical CenterbeforespendingtimewithathirdMarine,whowasonconvalescentleavewithhisfamilyintheWashingtonarea.Stillwearingtheirdesertutilities,the13thendrovetoArlingtontosaytheirgoodbyestotwoMarines,Capt.BrianS.LetendreandCpl.JordanC.Pierson,whohadbeeninterredatArlingtonNationalCemeteryduringthedeployment.

Maj.BrianT.Hofmann,whocommandedBravoCompany,saidthetriptoArlingtonwasanimportantpartofhispostdeploymenthealingprocess.“Itwasverysomber,butitwasverygood,”hesaid.“Ithinkthattherewasalittlebitofacatharsisthere.”24

“Forthosewhohavebeenincombatandlostpeople,[ArlingtonCemetery]becomesamonumentuntoitself,”said Hofmann, who had lost two Marines to sniper fire in the center of Fallujah. “It definitely was an emotional experienceforallofuswhowerethere.”25

Capt.LetendrehadbeenkilledinanattackinRamadijustthreeweeksintohisdeployment,whileservingonan11-personMilitaryTransitionTeam(MTT)trainingIraqi

recruits.26ThestandardandsimplewhitegraniteheadstonehadbeenplacedatLetendre’sgravebythetimebattalion’sleadersvisited.SeveralofLandro’scolleagueskneltbyLetendre’sgravetowhisperaprivategoodbyebeforetouchingtheheadstone.“Weallknewhimwellandwereveryfondofhim,”Hofmannsaid.“Hewasaverypopularcaptaininthebattalion.”27

AstheMarinesgatheredaroundthegrave,Lt.Col.LandroaskedtheBattalionSergeantMajor,Sgt.Maj.BradleyE.Trudell,ifhewouldleadtheminaprayer.28Withoutfurtherwords,all13removedtheircoversandkneltaroundthegrave.

“WegatheredthereandkneltandsaidaprayeroverLetendre’sgravesite.TheSergeantMajorledit.ItwassimplytheLord’sPrayer,withthethirteenofuskneelingdownaroundhisgravesite,”Landrosaid.29AsTrudellbegantospeakthosefewwords,manyoftheMarinesjoinedhim.

Landrosaidtheprayerwasthehighlightofatripthatprovidedan“absoluterelief”tothebattalion’sleaders.30

“It’shardwithaReservebattalionbecauseyouknowthatyouropportunitiesaregoingtobelimitedtogettotheseguysasaunit,todoitasacommand,tosay,‘It’snotjustLt.Col.Landrocomingtoseeyou,it’s[FirstBattalion,Twenty-FifthMarines]comingtoseeyou.It’syourbrothers.Ifwecouldallbehere,wewould...butIbroughtwhoIcould.”31

��

Photos

Official Marine Corps Photo

��

On 16 April 2006, Marines of 4th Platoon, Company A, 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, Regimental Combat Team 5, kneel in front of a house being searched for weapons in Saqlawyia, Iraq while looking for possible improvised explosive devices (IED’s), and meeting and greeting Iraqi citizens. RCT-5 was deployed with I MEF in support of Operation Freedom in the Al Anbar Province of Iraq (MNF-W) to develop the Iraqi Security Forces, facilitate the development of official rule of law through democratic government reforms, and continue the development of a market based economy centered on Iraqi Reconstruction.

Photo By Cpl Adaecus G. Brooks

Cpl Brian Reimers

An assault team from Company B, 1st Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 5, conducts a raid on a possible suicide vehicle bomb workshop in central Fallujah. The Marines searched the vacant garage after receiving intelligence that the owner might be supporting insurgents to harm coalition forces and innocent civilians.

100

Capt. Raymond L. Adams, executive officer assigned to Company C, 1st Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 5, passes out candy to children. The Marines traveled with candy, toys and hygiene items for the kids in different neighborhoods in the city. Adams, 33, is from Deerfield, Mass.

Photo By Cpl Brian Reimers

December 30, 2004 Iraq: Lance Cpl. Wesley A. Edgemon, a Motor T Tech from Orangeburg, S.C. attached to the 4th Civil Affairs Group (4th CAG), loads rounds into a HMMWV before heading out on a convoy to the Village of Harwan, Iraq. The 4th CAG, attached to the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, conducted Security and Stabilization Operations in the Western Al Anbar Province in Iraq.

Gunnery Sgt. Kevin W. Williams

101

Photo By Cpl Brian Reimers

Staff Sgt. Joey M. Davis, platoon sergeant assigned to Company C, 1st Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 5, helps hand out candy, hygiene items and toys to more than 100 different kids in Fallujah, Iraq. The Marines passed out the goods that brought upon smiles and laughs from the local children. Davis is 28, from Wichita Falls, Texas.

On 16 April 2006, Captain Matthew M. Hodges, Platoon Commander of 4th Platoon, Company A, 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, Regimental Combat Team 5, hands out candy to an Iraqi child while patrolling through Saqlawyia, Iraq to search for possible improvised explosive devices (IED’s), and meeting and greeting Iraqi citizens. RCT-5 deployed with I MEF in support of Operation Freedom in the Al Anbar Province of Iraq (MNF-W) to develop the Iraqi Security Forces, facilitate the development of official rule of law through democratic government reforms, and continue the development of a market based economy centered on Iraqi Reconstruction.

Photo By Cpl Adaecus G. Brooks

10�

Cpl. Rocco DeFilippis

An F/A-18C Hornet from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 142 receives fuel in mid-flight courtesy of the Marines and sailors of Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 252. Refueling near the fight allows close-air support aircraft the ability to stay on station longer and assist the Marines on the ground.

Photo By Cpl. James D. Hamel

A CH-46 helicopter from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 764 starts one of the squadron’s many daily missions. HMM-764 boasts one of the most experienced pilot rosters in the Marine Corps, despite its reserve status.

Photo By Cpl Brian Reimers

HN Cameron R. Cleveland, Company A, 1st Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment, Regimental Combat Team 5, makes it a point to stop and interact with the local Fallujans while patrolling. A few Marines and sailors from Company A joined forces with Company B to do a variety of missions inside the city.

10�

HMH-769 Group Photo

Official Marine Corps Photo

Sgt. Chad R. Kiehl

Marines with Company I, 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines conduct a memorial service for Cpl. Bradley P. McCormick who was killed in combat in An Najaf, Iraq.

10�

Glossary of Termsand Abbreviations

AK-47 – Kalashnikov automatic rifleAO – Areas of OperationASP – Ammunition Supply PointBCP – Border Control PointCACO – Casualty Assistance Calls OfficerCJTF – Combined-Joint Task ForceCOIN – CounterinsurgencyECP – Entry Control PointsFAC – Forward Air ControllerFLIR – forward-looking infrared radarFOB – Forward Operating BaseFSSG – Fleet Service Support GroupGPS – Global Positioning SystemGWOT – Global War on TerrorismHET – Human Exploitation TeamIED – Improvised Explosive DeviceJDAM – joint direct attack munitionsJPADS – Joint Precision Airdrop Delivery SystemJSOW – joint stand-off weaponsJump CP – Mobile Command PostKPF – Khowst Provincial ForceLAR – Light Armed ReconnaissanceMAG – Marine Aircraft Group

MALS – Marine Air Logistics SquadronMAM – Military Age MaleMAP – Mobile Assault PlatoonMAW – Marine Aircraft WingMMSO – Maneuver and Mobility Support OperationsMOS – Military Occupational SpecialtiesMP – Military PoliceMRE – Meals Ready-to-EatMSR – Main Supply RouteOP – Observation PostPSD – Personal Security DetachmentQRF – Quick Response ForceRCT – Regimental Combat TeamRDF – Regional Detention FacilitiesRPG – Rocket Propelled GrenadeSASO – Security and Stabilization OperationsSVBIED – Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive DeviceTAMPS – Tactical Aircraft Mission Planning SystemTCP – Traffic Control PointTRAP – tactical recovery of aircraft and personnelUNAMA – United Nations Afghanistan Military AssistanceVBIED – Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device

10�

EndnotesSetting the Stage

1.MichaelGordon,“TheStrategytoSecureIraqDidNotForeseea2ndWar,”TheNewYorkTimes,19Oct04,p.1(describingadiscussionbetweenGENTommyFranks,CommanderofU.S.CentralCommand,andhisseniorsubordinatecommandersonApril16,2003inBaghdad,regardingapossiblereductionofU.S.forcesinIraqtooneArmydivisionof30,000soldiers).

2.GunnerySgt.DavidA.Shackleton,“FW:MarForResOperationHistory--RFIrepersonnelinIraq.”E-mailtoauthor,23Aug06,hereafterShackletone-mail.GunnerySgt.ShackletonwrotethatCentralCommandauthorizedtheMarineCorpstostartreturningMarineunitstotheUnitedStatesinMay2003.BeforethelastIMEFunitwasbroughthomeinOctober,theMarineCorpsandCentralCommandpreparedplanstobringMarinesbacktoIraqforOIFPhaseII.1.ThelastPhaseIMarinebattalionwasremovedinOctober2003,andsixactivedutybattalionsandoneReservebattalionreturnedtoIraqinFebruaryandMarch2004.

3.Ibid.4.GENJohnAbizaid,GENFranks’successoras

CommanderofU.S.CentralCommand,saidinapressconferenceatthePentagononJuly16,2003thatCoalitionforceswerefacinga“aclassicalguerrilla-typecampaign.”See,e.g.,ThomShankar,“U.S.CommanderinIraqsaysYearlongToursareOptiontoCombat‘Guerrilla’War.”TheNewYorkTimes,17Jul03,p.1.

5.BryanBender,“NumberoftroopsinIraqtoexpand:USforcetogrowbyupto50,000,”TheBostonGlobe,6Nov03,p.1.Seealso,L.PaulBremerIII,MyYearinIraq,(NewYork,N.Y.,Simon&Schuster,2006),p.31,hereafterBremer,YearinIraq(quotingGENJohnAbizaid,duringasecurevideoteleconferencewiththeSecretaryofDefenseandAmbassadorBremeronMay14,2003,assaying,“Noforceswillbereleasedforredeploymentuntilwehavesecurityinplace.”).

6.Cpl.PaulaM.Fitzgerald,“1stMarineDivisioncolorsfly again in Iraq,” March 20, 2004. The relief-in-place ceremonywasheldatDivisionHeadquartersnearRamadi.

7.Maj.Gen.DouglasO’Dellintvw,24Jan07(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterO’Dellintvw.

8.Forexamplesofsuchtransitions,seethechapteron14thMarines,infra.

9.Lt.Col.HaroldR.“Odie”VanOpdorpintvw,27Apr07(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterVanOpdorpintvw.

10.Ibid.11.O’Dellintvw.12. Lt. Col. Van Opdorp identified the police officer as

CWO-5JamesRoussell.13CWO-5JamesRoussellintvw,24Apr07(Oral

HistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterRoussellintvw.

14.Lt.Col.Mark.A.Smithintvw,16June06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterSmithintvw.

15.O’Dellintvw.16.Ibid.17.Maj.MarkC.Booneintvw,16May08(OralHistColl,

MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterBooneintvw.18.Ibid.19.Col.TracyGarrettintvw,20Jan07,(OralHistColl,

MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterGarrettintvw.20.SemperGumbywasaddedtotheMarinelexicon

duringDesertStorm,when“hurryupandwait”becameafactoflife.“SemperGumby”translateslooselyas“AlwaysFlexible.”Itisbasedontheanimatedclaytelevision figure known as Gumby, which is constantly remolded.

21.O’Dellintvw.22.Ibid.

The Anbar Provience

1.Thesestatisticswerecompiledbyicasualties.org,whichcompiledinformationprovidedbyvariousdefensesources.InformationdownloadedonJune17,2007,showedthatof3,785AmericanfatalitiesattributedtoOIF,1,232wererelatedtoincidentsintheAnbarProvince.(DownloadedinformationcontainedinWattersWorkingPapers,MCHC,Washington,D.C.).

2.JonathanKarl,“PentagonConsidersMovingTroopsFromal-AnbarProvincetoBaghdad,”ABCNews,28Nov06.

3.See,generally,JohnBurns,“Iraq’sHoChiMinhTrail,”TheNewYorkTimes,5June05,TheWeekinReview,p.1.(“FromHusaybaontheSyrianfrontierthroughQaimandthesand-blowntownsofRawa,Haditha,

10�

AsadandHit,onwardthroughRamadiandFallujahtoBaghdad,thecorridorhasbecometheHoChiMinhtrailofthiswar.”)

�/��

1.MichaelGordon,“TheStrategytoSecureIraqDidNotForeseea2ndWar,”TheNewYorkTimes,17Jul03,

2.GunnerySgt.DavidA.Shackleton,“FW:MarForResOperationHistory--RFIrepersonnelinIraq.”E-mailtoauthor,23Aug06,

3.Ibid.4.GENJohnAbizaid,GENFranks’successoras

CommanderofU.S.CentralCommand,saidinapressconferenceatthePentagononJuly16,2003thatCoalitionforceswerefacinga“aclassicalguerrilla-typecampaign.”See,e.g.,ThomShankar,“U.S.CommanderinIraqsaysYearlongToursareOptiontoCombat‘Guerrilla’War.”TheNewYorkTimes,17Jul03,p.1.

5.L.PaulBremerIII,MyYearinIraq,(NewYork,N.Y.,Simon&Schuster,2006),p.31,hereafterBremer,YearinIraq(quotingGENJohnAbizaid,duringasecurevideoteleconferencewiththeSecretaryofDefenseandAmbassadorBremeronMay14,2003,assaying,“Noforceswillbereleasedforredeploymentuntilwehavesecurityinplace.”).

6.CWO-2RobertA.Bauerintvw,6Sept06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterBauerintvw.CWO-2BauerestimatedthatthedecisiontodeploytoIraqwaswellreceivedby95%ofthebattalion.Ibid.

7.Ibid.Asamemberofthebattalion’slogisticssection,CWO-2Bauersaidthatmuchofthebattalion’spredeploymentfocusinvolvedcollectingitsequipmentandpacking120shippingcontainersthatcarriedtheequipment,viaship,toKuwait.Thefactthatmuchof3/24’sequipmentwasenroutetoKuwaitandthebattalionwascompetingwithseveralactivedutybattalionsfortrainingareasandsupportatCampPendletonhampereditstrainingefforts.

8.ICo3/24ComdC,15Jun04,p.3.9.GenCharlesC.Krulak,“TheStrategicCorporal:

LeadershipintheThreeBlockWar,”MarinesMagazine,January1999,hereafterKrulak,StrategicCorporal.GenKrulakhadanticipatedthatMarineswouldbeparticipatinginmoreoperationsthatmix“militaryoperationsother-than-war” with “middle-intensity conflicts.” His “Three Block War”conceptemphasizestheideathatfutureMarineswillfacetheentirespectrumoftacticalchallenges,frommajor combat to middle intensity conflict to Security andStabilizationOperations,ofteninashortperiodaninalimitedgeographicregion.GenKrulaksaidMarinesmayfacethedifferentchallengesposedbythedifferent

environmentsoverthecourseofafewhoursandwithintheconfines of a few contiguous city blocks.

10.Lt.Col.GaryS.Johnstonintvw,6Sept06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterJohnstonintvw.

11.Ibid.12.Maj.MarkA.Lamelzaintvw,7Oct06(OralHistColl,

MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterLamelzaintvw.13.ICo3/24ComdC,15Jun04,p.3.14.Lamelzaintvw.15.Ibid.16.Bauerintvw.17.3/24ComdC,15Jun04,18See,e.g.,Article15-6

Investigationofthe800thMilitaryPoliceBrigade,knowninformallyastheTagubaReport,afteritsleadinvestigator,MGAntonioM.Taguba.(MGTaguba’sreportcanbefoundonline,andacopyisinWattersWorkingPapers,MCHC,Washington,D.C.)MGTagubafoundthatbetweenOctoberandDecember2003,therewerenumerousincidentsofcriminal abuses inflicted on several detainees at Abu Ghraib Prison.

19.KCo3/24ComdC,22Jun04,p.2.20.LCo3/24ComdC,15Jun04,p.5.

�/��

1.Seethesectionofthisbookrelatingto1/23’sactivitiesinIraq.

2.“TheTriangleofDeath”isanicknamegiventoanareasouthofBaghdadbylocalresidents.Itsboundariesareambiguous.SomeclaimitisboundedbythetownsofMahmudiyah, Yusufiyah, and Iskandariyah, with the most dangerous town, Latifiyah, located between Mahmudiyah andIskandariyah.See,e.g.,AnthonyShadid,“Iraq’sForbidding‘TriangleofDeath’:SouthofBaghdad,aBrutalSunniInsurgencyHoldsSway,”TheWashingtonPost,23Nov04,p.A-1.OtherdescriptionsoftheTriangleofDeath are more expansive, extending from Yusufiyah in the northwesttothetownofJurfasSukhrinthesouthwestandtotheseriesofsharpbendsintheTigrisRiversoutheastofBaghdad. Whatever definition is used, 2/24 operated in the heartoftheTriangleofDeath.

3.Lt.Col.Mark.A.Smithintvw,16June06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterSmithintvw.

4.KenSengupta,“TheTriangleofDeath,”TheIndependent,22Nov2004(quotingLt.Col.SmithandotherMarinestosupportSengupta’sstatementthatfollowingtheNovember2004assaultonFallujah,theTriangleofDeathwasthemostdangerousregionofIraq).

5.TheWashingtonPost,23Nov04,P.A-1(notingthat

10�

policemenwouldchangeintocivilianclothestoavoidcontactwithinsurgents,anddescribingtheeffortsofone Shi’ia man to avoid conflict by removing a poster ofaShi’iasaintfromhiscarandplayingacassettetapecelebratingtheSunniinsurgencyinFallujah).

6.Ibid.7.Ibid.8.Smithintvw.9.Ibid.Seealso2/24S-2Mid-DeploymentReport,

undated,pp.3-4(CopyinWattersWorkingPapers,MCHC,Washington,D.C.)(describing2/24’sCombatIntelligenceCenterandThreatAppreciation).

10.Smithintvw.11.2/24includedmapsofitsAOinreports.Adetailed

copyisprovidedinasummaryoftheinterviewwithLt.Col.Smith(CopyinWattersWorkingPapers,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),p.4,showingtherelativepositionsofMahmudiyah, Lutafiyah, and Yusufiyah.

12.Smithintvw.Subsequentdescriptionsof2/24’sAOinthetextcomefromthisinterview.

13.Ibid.Seealso,Lt.Col.MarkA.Smith,“LetterfromMayhemSix,”E-mailandelectronicdocumentforfamiliesof2/24Marines,3Feb05,(copyinWattersWorkingPapers,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterSmithE-mail.

14.SeanD.Naylor,“SpecOpsUitNearlyNabsZarqawi,”ArmyTimes,28Apr06.NaylordescribesseveralraidsbyTaskForce145,consistingofDeltaForceandSEALTeam6members,onheadquarterselementsinYusufiyah associated with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaida’sleaderinIraq.IntelligencesourcestoldArmyTimesthatZarqawiprobablywasnearbywhenaraidinYusufiyah took place on April 16, 2006. Zarqawi was killed inadifferentpartofIraqonJune8,2006.

15.EmmaPerez-Trevino,“Armygeneralpromisestotrackdownsoldiers’killers,”TheBrownsville(TX)Herald,29June06,p.1.

16.Ibid.Lt.Col.Smithsaidthatintelligenceindicatedthat most significant activities in his AO had some connectionwiththeCargoularea.

17.Ibid.18.Ibid.19.Ibid.20. Smith E-mail. (“Identification of, keeping secret

until48hoursout,seizingandestablishingforceprotectionofpollingsitesisnotaneasytask....But,hereiswhathappened:8sites,2perurbancenterintheMayhemAO,wereseizedandsecured.Forceprotectionbarriersandprocedureswereemplaced.OurIraqiArmycounterpartsassumedtheinnercordonsandhundredsofIraqiElectionWorkers and Officials were moved into the sites.”)

21.Ibid.

22.Ibid.(“But...themiraclewastheIraqipeople.Withallthethreatenedviolence,andmostimportantlyalltheREALviolencethatwasgoingonaroundthem,theyVOTED!Theyneverbrokeandran.Theyneverhesitated.Theystayed,andtheyVOTED.Why?Because,theyhadtastedthepowerofFREEDOM.”)

23.Smithintvw.24.CamiMcCormick,“Votinginthe‘TriangleOf

Death,’”CBSNews,30Jan05(copyinWattersWorkingPapers,MCHC,Washington,D.C.).CBSNewsincludedacommentthatMcCormickwas,“reportingfromoneofIraq’smostdangerousareas,BabilProvince.”

25.Ibid.26.Smithintvw.DescriptionsofOperationsRiverWalk

andRedMayhemI,II,andIIIareintheinterview.27.Ibid.28.Ibid.2/24AAR,OIFII-2,17May05(CopyinWatters

WorkingPapers,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafter2/24AAR,17May05.(“Violenceandintimidationagainstthe Iraqi people was significantly decreased during our tenure.”)

29.Smithintvw.30.2/24AAR,17May05.(“On30January2005,71%

oftheeligiblevoters(over16,000Iraqis)votedinNationalelections.”)

1/��

1.Lt.Col.GregoryB.Stevensintvw,10Sept05(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterStevensintvw.

2.1/231-31Sept2004ComdC,undated,p.7.3.Ibid.4.Ibid.5.Ibid.6.Ibid.7.Ibid.8.ASPDulabwasanammunitionstoragefacility

north of Hit. For a discussion of its significance to insurgentsoperatinginthisarea,seethesectionofthisbookdescribingtheactivitiesof3rdBattalion,25thMarines.ASPDulabwassolargeandcontainedsomuchammunitionthatoneattempttodestroyitbyAmericancontractorsinsteadsimplymadethousandsofroundseasilyavailabletoinsurgents.

9.1/231-31Sept2004ComdC,undated,p.6.10.Ibid.11.1stSgt.DanielHendrex,ASoldier’sPromise:The

HeroicTrueStoryofanAmericanSoldierandanIraqiBoy(NewYork:SimonSpotlightEntertainment,2006),p.30,hereafterHendrex,ASoldier’sPromise.

10�

12.Sgt.BenChristensen,“Re:Greetings.”E-mailtoauthor,9June06.HereafterChristensencorrespondenceno.1.

13.Christensencorrespondenceno.1.Sgt.Christensen’scolorfuldescriptionsofthebaseincludethefollowing:“TheFOBwasessentiallyaThirdWorldhellhole,primitivechowhallwithA-rationsandtray-rationstwiceaday,breakfastandsupper.”“TheFOBwasmortaredandrocketedjustabouteverysingleday,82mmmortarsand122-mmrockets,Ibelieve.Nocasualtiesfromanyofthistype of fire except 2nd platoon’s corpsman, Doc Edes, whoreceivedasmallbitofshrapnelinhishandonce.Mortarsandrocketswereanacceptedpartoflife,andmostofthetimeCharlieCompany’smortarmenrespondedimmediately with return fire, sometimes having mortar duels,backandforth,withtheinsurgents.”“Showerswerein fiberglass cans, and were generally available only one perweek,onrotationwithdifferentplatoons.”“FirstFSSGprovidedlaundryservice,onceaweekifyouwereattheFOB, otherwise, we were just filthy all the time. It was a deploymentspentinthedirt.”

14.UnitedNation’sstatisticsfrom2003showHit’spopulationat105,825.

15.Hendrex,ASoldier’sPromise,p.30.16.Capt.RonaldShayne“Skinny”McGinty,16Oct04

(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterMcGintyintvw,andMaj.MichaelR.Miller,16Oct04(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterMillerintvw.BothinterviewswereconductedbyCWO-3WilliamE.Hutson,aFieldHistorianwiththeMarineCorps’HistoryDivision,withindaysoftheactionthathascometobeknownasthe“BattleforHit.”Capt.McGintyledtheinitialplatoonintothisaction,andhiscompanycommander,Maj.Miller,broughtreinforcementstothescenewhenitwasapparentthatthestrengthofinsurgentsinHithadbeengrosslyunderestimated.BothinterviewsprovideexcellentdescriptionsofHitandtheactionsofMarinesduringtheBattleforHit.

17.Millerintvw.Maj.Millerindicatesthatpreviousunits had avoided Hit, so there was a significant lack of informationregardingactivitiesthere.

18.JohnBurns,“Iraq’sHoChiMinhTrail,”TheNewYorkTimes,5June05,TheWeekinReview,p.1.(“FromHusaybaontheSyrianfrontierthroughQaimandthesand-blowntownsofRawa,Haditha,AsadandHit,onwardthroughRamadiandFallujahtoBaghdad,thecorridorhasbecometheHoChiMinhtrailofthiswar.”)

19.MichaelR.GordonandLt.Gen.BernardE.Trainor,USMC(Ret.),CobraII:TheInsideStoryoftheInvasionandOccupationofIraq(NewYork:Pantheon,2006),Chapter 22, fn. 2 (citing p. 80 of a report, classified secret,

entitled,“U.S.JointForcesCommandCombatStudy:IraqiPerspectiveonOperationIraqiFreedomMajorCombatOperations.”)

20.Stevensintvw.21.Stevensintvw.(TheBronze-UraniumSplitrequired

“areinforcedsquadataminimum,butusuallytherewasaplatoonthere.”)

22.ForadescriptionofactivitiesinFallujahduring2004,see,e.g.,Lt.Gen.JohnF.SattlerandLt.Col.DanielH.Wilson,“OperationALFAJR:TheBattleforFallujah—PartII,”MarineCorpsGazette,July05,p.12,hereafterBattleforFallujah,andBingWest,NoTrueGlory:AFrontlineAccountoftheBattleforFallujah(NewYork:Bantam,2005),hereafterNoTrueGlory.

23.1/231-31October2004ComdC,undated,p.7.24.Ibid.(“Duringengagementson12October,Scout

Snipersobservedindividualswearingpoliceuniformsparticipatingininsurgentactivities.”)

25.Ibid,p.8.(“[I]nsurgentsunderstandthedynamicsofthepoliciesmadebetweenU.S.Marinesandthecityleadership.AninformalagreementwasmadebetweentheMarinesandCityCounselleadershipthatstatedifthePoliceandCityCounselcouldprovidesecurityinHit,Marineswouldstayoutofthecity.Thisagreementlimited Marine presence in the city that cause as influx of insurgentsfromoutlyingareastogainafootholdinHit.WithalackofMarinepresence,theinsurgentswereabletofester,unchecked.Theinsurgentsusedthisagreementtofosterpowerfortheircause.”)

26.Ibid,p.4.TheMadMortarman,subsequentlyidentified as Mullah Ibrahim, was detained following a cordonandknockoperationataresidenceapproximately2.5kilometersnorthwestofCampHit.Ibid,p.14.

27.Stevensintvw.Atonepoint,manyINGsoldierswouldnotwearuniformsenroutetoCampHit,toavoidattractingtheattentionofinsurgents.

28.1/231-31October2004ComdC,undated,p.5.CharlieCompanyreportedfromCampHitthat,“DuringthemonthofOctober,wenoticedanincreaseininsurgentactivity....LackofpresenceinHitproperalsoallowsinsurgentcellstogatherandplanmissionsnotonlyfortheDenverAObutothercitiesaswell.”Thisinformationisalso reflected in the intelligence section’s discussion in the samedocument.

29.Maj.P.RayRoberson,“RE:MarForResOperationalHistory.”E-mailtoauthor,20Nov06.Maj.RobersonwastheAide-de-CampforLtGenNatonski,whowastheDeputyCommandantforPlans,Policies&Operations.Maj.Roberson’se-mailcontainedinformationfromLtGenNatonskiregardingtheambushonthe1stMarDivJumpCP.

30.1/231-31October2004ComdC,undated,p.8.

10�

(“The insurgency’s tactical proficiency heightened as seenduringthecomplexambush,10Oct2004,ontheCG 1stMarDiv convoy through Hit traffic circle number 1.Atapproximately0700,theCG’s[personalsecuritydetachment]wastraveling[north]onMSRBronzewhenit came under fire . . . . Around 100-200 small arms rounds and 3x RPG rounds were fired in the direction of the PSD. . . . [J]ust past the traffic circle, PSD was struck again; this timebyoneIED,1xRPGandapproximately100smallarms rounds. . . . PSD also stated that when the firefight startedthereseemedtobesomeoneoneveryroof.”)

31.Stevensintvw,Millerintvw,andMcGintyintvw.Each officer describes the difference between what had beenexpectedinHitandthemuchlargerinsurgentforcethatCapt.McGinty’sreinforcedplatoonencountered.Inexpressinghissurprise,Lt.Col.Stevensnotedthattheinsurgentforceincludedsnipersperchedinpalmtrees.Capt.McGintysaid,“Weunderestimatedhowmany[insurgents]wereinthatarea....TheS-2toldme[afterthebattle]therewereprobablyfourhundred[insurgents]intheHit-Turbah area, and we rolled in with fifty-three. It was a pretty tough fight.” McGinty intvw.

32.1/231-31October2004ComdC,undated,p.8.Thebattalion’s intelligence officer moved from al Asad to Camp HitforcombatoperationsinHit.Hereported:“TheHitinsurgentattacksfrom10Octoberto16October...pointstoatrainedandsophisticatedenemy.Priorto10October,5-10mancellsconductedthemajorityoftheattacks....However,thelargeunitsthatattackedBravoCompanyandScoutSnipersneededmilitarytrainingtoorchestratethesetypesofunits.”Ibid.

33.1/231-31October2004ComdC,undated,p.7.(“Anelitegroupofmujahadeennamed“TheStrikeForce”enteredthecityasinsurgentsoccupiedvehiclecheckpointsinandaroundHit....InsurgentsstoppedcarssuspectedofbeingeitherINGsoldiersorciviliancontractorsworkingforcoalitionforces.Theyalsointerrogatedtheoccupants,confiscated ING weapons, money, identification, and beatindividualsassociatedwiththecoalitionorIraqigovernment.”)

34. The insurgents expected their first ambush to elicit a Coalition response, and were so confident of their strength inHitthattheyconductedtwomoreambushesatTCP-1withinthenext24hours.1/231-31October2004ComdC,undated, p. 8. The first, involving a convoy of American contractors,resultedinadestroyedvehicle.Thesecond,againstaconvoyofBritishcivilians,wasmorecomplex.ItstartedwiththreesynchronizedIEDs,followedbyRPG,machine gun, and small arms fire.

35.SummaryofSgt.BryanHancockintvw,26June06(CopyinWattersWorkingPapers,MCHC,Washington,

D.C.),hereafterHancockintvw.36.Stevensintvw,Millerintvw.37.Millerintvw.38.Ibid.39.Millerintvw,McGintyintvw.40.Capt.McGintysaidthatthedecisiontoapproach

from the south almost certainly prevented significant losses tohisplatoon.WhentheydroveintoTurbah,hisMarinessaw a significant amount of insurgent activity in Hit, especiallyaroundtheSharqiMosque.MostresidentsofTurbahwereasleepatthetime,allowingCapt.McGinty’splatoon to establish its position at the Turbah traffic circle without incurring the fires that they almost certainly would havereceivedhadtheytriedtodrivethroughHit.McGintyintvw.

41.Hancockintvw.42.McGintyintvw.43.Ibid.44.Ibid.45.ThefactthatCapt.McGinty’splatoondidnothave

aFACassignedtoitforthisoperationcouldhaveprovedsignificant. Fortunately, Capt. McGinty had significant exposuretoMarineaviationduringhisinitialtourofactiveduty.

46.McGintyintvw.47.Hancockintvw.48.Millerintvw.49.Ibid.50.Ibid.51.Ibid.52.1/231-31October2004ComdC,undated,p.16-17.

Perhaps anticipating a possible ramification for firing in thevicinityoftheSharqiMosque,1/23describedintheCommand Chronology’s “Sequential Listing of Significant Events”thebattalion’seffortstouse“[e]scalatorymeansofdefeating AIE fires . . . against AIE firing from the mosque. AIE fires originating from the structure did not abate after several hours of 1/23 returning fire.”

53.Ibid.54.Ibid.55.Hancockintvw.56.Ibid.57.Ibid.58.Ibid.59.Millerintvw.60.Ibid.61.BattleforFallujah,p.20.Foramoredetailed

accountofthe2004battlesforFallujah,see,NoTrueGlory.

62.BattleforFallujah,p.20.63.Ibid.

110

64.Hancockintvw.65.Ibid.66. Hancock intvw. This one-on-one sniper fight is

similartoonedepictedin,“EnemyattheGates,”apopular2001movieinwhichopposingsnipersplaycat-and-mouseduringtheBattleofStalingrad.

67.Ibid.

�/��

1.Theunderlyingfactsforthissectionwerederivedprimarilyfrom3/25’sCommandChronologiesfortheperiodsof1January-30June2005,1-31August2005,and1-21September2005.TheMarineCorpsCenterforLessonsLearnedpreparedasummaryofitsobservationsregardingthedeployment.MarineCorpsCenterforLessonsLearned:Pre-DeploymentTrainingLessonsandObservations:3rdBattalion,25thMarines,23Nov05.HereafterMCCLLObservations.Embeddedreporterswrotenumerousarticles.See,e.g.,EllenKnickmeyer,“DemiseofaHard-FightingSquad;MarinesWhoSurvivedAmbushBecomeCasualtiesofBlast,”TheWashingtonPost,12May05,p.A-1.OtherprinciplesourcesincludealengthyarticleinClevelandMagazineontheHadithaambushandatwo-hourdocumentaryfortheArts&EntertainmentNetworksonLimaCompany.JacquelineMarino,“BloodBrothers,”ClevelandMagazine,June2006,hereafterBloodBrothers;A&ETelevisionNetworks,“CombatDiary:TheMarinesofLimaCompany,”hereafterMarinesofLimaCompany.

2. The turnover of Coalition staffs was significant. II MarineExpeditionaryForceForward(IIMEF(Fwd)),2ndMarineDivision,andthreeregimentalcombatteamstaffsrelievedtheirIMEFcounterparts,manyofwhomhadbeeninIraqformorethanayear.Subordinateunits,includingbattalionsandsquadrons,alsoturnedoveraspartofthescheduledseven-monthdeploymentcycle.

3.Col.LionelB.Urquhart,memorandumofrecordofinterviewbyMarForRes,10Jun06(SummaryinWattersWorkingPapers,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterUrquhartintvw.Inadditiontothetwomainbases,KiloCompanyprovidedaplatoonformostofthedeploymenttoASPDulab,aswellasareinforcedsquadorevenaplatoontotheBronze-UraniumSplit,amajorroadintersectionsouthofHit.

4.Urquhartintvw.5.Maj.StevenJ.White,Memorandumofrecordof

interviewbyMarForRes,14Jun06(SummaryinWattersWorkingPapers,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterWhiteintvw.Maj.WhitesaidCol.DavisbelievedthatthefreemovementofinsurgentsalongtheWestern

Euphrates River Valley was contributing significantly to the oppositionthatCoalitionforceswereencounteringincitieslikeBaghdad,Fallujah,andRamadi.Maj.WhitesaidCol.DaviswascommittedtoshowingthataggressiveoperationsbetweenRamadiandtheSyrianbordercouldreduceinsurgentactivitiesincentralIraq.

6.UNdataindicatedthatfourAnbarcitiesheldmostofthepopulation:Ramadi(445,000),Fallujah(425,000),Hit(105,000),andHaditha(75,000).ThesamedatashowedAlQa’im’spopulationwas116,000,butthiswasspreadoverseveralcitieslikeHusaybahandKarabilahalonga10-kilometerstretchoftheEuphratesinthealQa’imregion.Exceptforthesepopulationcenters,theAnbarProvincewassparselysettled.(UNDatainWattersWorkingPapers,MCHC,Washington,D.C.)

7.JohnBurns,“Iraq’sHoChiMinhTrail,”TheNewYorkTimes,5June05,TheWeekinReview,p.1.,hereafterIraq’sHoChiMinhTrail(“[TheWesternEuphratesRiverValleyintheAnbarProvince]isthebackdroptooneofthemostimportant--and,sofar,undecided--campaignsof the Iraqi conflict: the American drive to close off insurgent infiltration routes that run into the Iraqi heartland downtheEuphratesRivercorridor.FromHusaybaontheSyrianfrontierthroughQaimandthesand-blowntownsofRawa,Haditha,AsadandHit,onwardthroughRamadiandFallujahtoBaghdad,thecorridorhasbecometheHoChiMinhtrailofthiswar....LikethebaneofAmericancommandersinVietnam,the300-milestretchofriverisnotsomuchasinglerouteasamulti-strandednetworkofpassages,somehewingclosetothelushsiltedlandscapeofpalmsandreedsthatrunalongthebanks,otherscrossingvastreachesofstonydesertoneitherside.”)

8. Ibid, p. 16. (“American intelligence officers say that trailsacrossthedesertusedfordecadestosmuggleherdsofsheepandgoats,leatherhides,carparts,gasolineandsundryothercommoditieshavenowbeenadaptedtotheinsurgents’needs.”)

9.Seethesectioninthismonographdescribingtheactivitiesof1stBattalion,23rdMarines.

10.Urquhartintvw.11.Maj.WhitesaidCol.Daviswarned3/25’sstaff

thatthebattalionis,“goingtogohometiredbecauseweare‘stirringthepot,’here.”ParaphrasingCol.Davis’discussion,Maj.Whitesaidthe3/25staffwastold:“Alotoftheareasaroundherehavenotbeentouchedsignificantly, and we are going to change that. We are going toconductaseriesofoperations,likeclearing,clearingandsearching,andinterdiction,thatwillimpacttheinsurgents.Wearegoingtoforcetheenemytoengageus.”

12.“Oversevenmonthsofoperations,thebattalionsustained49personnelkilled-in-actionandover650

111

wounded-in-action....Almost50%ofthecorpsmeninthebattalionwereawardedPurpleHeartmedals.”MCCLLObservations,p.7.Manyof3/25’sfatalitiesoccurredinlargeincidents.Forexample,14MarineswerekilledwhenanAmtrackwasdestroyedbyanIEDnearBarwanahonAugust3,sixsniperswereambushednearBarwanahonAugust1,andsixMarineswerekilledwhenanAmtrackwasdestroyedbyanIEDintheRamanaareaneartheSyrianborderonMay11.

13.AftertheirreturntotheUnitedStates,many3/25Marinescomplainedthatthenation’sobsessionwiththebattalion’s“casualtycount”detractedfromthebattalion’ssignificant accomplishments. For example, Lance Cpl. TrevorSmithsaidintheArts&Entertainmentdocumentarythat3/25wasrememberedprimarilyforitslosses,ratherthanthebattalion’scombatoperationsintheAnbarProvince.“Ijustfeellikeoneofthereasonswegotallthisattentionisbecausealotofuswerekilled....Ijustwantpeopletoknowaboutmyfriends.Theyweregreatpeople.Theydiedinthemosthorrifyingway....Ijustwantthemtoberememberedforwhattheydid,andnotjustbecausetheydied.”MarinesofLimaCompany,interviewwithLanceCpl.TrevorSmith.OperationSword,inwhich3/25clearedtheinsurgent-controlledcityofHitandinstalledtwopermanentFixedOperatingBases,wasthebattalion’smost significant accomplishment, but its significance was drownedoutbycommentaryconcerningthedeathsofsomanyofitsMarines.

14.K3/251January-1Sept2005ComdC,20Sept05,p.6.

15.Ibid.16.Urquhartintvw.17.3/251January-30June2005ComdC,15Aug05,p.9.18.Ibid,p.11,andUrquhartintvw.19.DetailsregardingtheHadithaHospitalambush

arederivedprimarilyfromalengthyarticleinClevelandMagazine,aswellasinterviewswithSgt.JeffreyW.Schuller,CplStanleyM.Mayer,andLTRichardE.Malmstrom,(battalionchaplain).BloodBrothers;CplJeffreyW.Schullerintvw,22June06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterSchullerintvw;CplStanleyM.Mayerintvw,22June06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterMayerintvw;LTRichardE.Malmstrom,USN,intvw,21June06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterMalmstromintvw.Seealso,3/251January-30June2005ComdC,15Aug05,p.8(“MAP7ofWeaponsCompanyandasectionfrom1stPlatoon,CompanyA,1stTankswasambushedinHadithahbyinsurgentswithasuicide,vehicle-borne,improvisedexplosive device, small arms fire and RPGs”) and pp. 9-10(listingonecorpsmanandthreeMarineskilledinthe

ambush).20.Schullerintvw,Mayerintvw.21.Schullerintvw.Sgt.Schullersaidthatwhilethere

weresomeinsurgentpositionsoutsidethehospital,mostof the insurgent fire came from inside the hospital or on its grounds.

22.Fortheiractionsinresponsetothisambush,LanceCpl.CorbinreceivedaNavyCrossandSgt.SchullerreceivedaSilverStar.ThemedalswereawardedonJuly4,2006attheClevelandIndiansbaseballgame.TashaFlournoy,“LocalMarinesHonoredatIndiansGame,”ThePlainDealer(Cleveland,Ohio),5Jul06.(“Thebattalionlost[threeMarinesandonesailor],butwitnessessaidthetollwouldhavebeenmuchworsewithoutthebraveryofCorbin and Schuller. . . . Under intense fire, the pair helped protectwoundedcomrades,hauledthemintothevehiclesanddrovethembacktothebasefortreatment.”)

23.NotethattheEuphratesRiveriseast-westinthissectionoftheAnbarProvince,sotheauthorreferstoitsbanksasthenorthorsouthsides.IntheHit-Hadithacorridor,theriverrunsmorenorth-south,sothebanksarereferredtoastheeastandwestsidesatthatpartoftheEuphratesRiver.

24.Lt.Col.TimothyS.Mundy,memorandumofrecordofinterviewbyMarForRes,19Jun06(SummaryinWattersWorkingPapers,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterMundyintvw.

25.Ibid.26.TheengineerunitwastheU.S.Army’s814thMulti-

RoleBridgeCompany.27.Ibid.Seealso,1stLtPaulL.CroomII,“Wagesof

War,”SanDiegoMagazine,March2006.(“InplanningforOperationMatador,thetimelineforbridgecompletionwasashortone.However,becauseofthesoftnessofthebanksonbothsidesoftheriver,thebridgewasnotcompleteeven16hoursafterwearrived.”)HereafterWagesofWar.

28.Sgt.Maj.DanN.Altieriintvw,22June06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterAltieriintvw.

29.Ibid.30.Ibid.31.EllenKnickmeyer,“‘TheyCameHeretoDie’;

InsurgentsHidingUnderHouseinWesternIraqProveFierceinHours-LongFightWithMarines,”TheWashingtonPost,11May05,p.A-1.(“WhentheMarinesentered a final time, the daylight finally showed them where the bullets had come from: the floor beneath their feet. The insurgentshadlainfaceuponthegroundbelow,withbarelyenoughroomtopointtheirweaponsupward,Marinessaid.They simply blasted through the floor.”)

32.MarinesofLimaCompany,descriptionofaction

11�

bySgt.SamuelE.Balla,squadleaderfor1stSquad,1stPlatoon.

33.Ibid,descriptionofactionbyLanceCpl.MarkCamp.

34.TheWashingtonPost,11May05,p.A-1.35.Altieriintvw.36.Ibid.37.TheWashingtonPost,11May05,p.A-1.38.Ibid.(“Thecostlyequipment,aswellasbody

armorlaterrecoveredfromthebodiesofdeadinsurgents,suggested that the fighters were foreigners, the military said.Thoughthelevelofforeigners’involvementintheinsurgencyhasbeendisputedfornearlytwoyears,MuslimmenhavecometoIraqfromneighboringcountriessuchasSaudiArabiaandfromasfarawayasChechnyaandIndonesia to fight the United States and its allies.”)

39.Altieriintvw.ShortlyafterOperationMatador,thekidnappedgovernoroftheAnbarProvincewaskilledduring a gunfight between insurgents and Americans in theRamanaarea.TheseveninsurgentswhowerekilledorcapturedwerefromAlgeria,Jordan,Morocco,SaudiArabiaandSyria.Iraq’sHoChiMinhTrail,TheNewYorkTimes,5June05,p.1.

40.Ibid.41.Ibid.42.Mundyintvw.43.EllenKnickmeyer,“DemiseofaHard-Fighting

Squad;MarinesWhoSurvivedAmbushBecomeCasualtiesofBlast,”TheWashingtonPost,12May05,p.A-1.WagesofWar,pp.197-198.

44.TheWashingtonPost,12May05,p.A-1.(“In96hours of fighting and ambushes in far western Iraq, the squadhadceasedtobe.”).WagesofWar,pp.197-198.(“Alltold,overthosefatefulfourdays,1stSquad,1stPlatoon...andtheAAVcrewthatwassupportingthem,sustained21casualties—eightkilledand13wounded.”)

45.Mundyintvw,Urquhartintvw.46.Mundyintvw.47.Altieriintvw.48.Maj.BillyBrownintvw,23June06(OralHistColl,

MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterBrownintvw.49.Altieriintvw.50.Brownintvw,Altieriintvw.51.Altieriintvw.52.Sgt.WimbergwasawardedaSilverStar,

posthumously,forhiseffortsinHadithathatmorning.MarineCorpsTimes,21Aug06,p.10.

53.MarinesofLimaCompany,interviewwithCpl.AllenPayne.

54.Ibid.55.Urquhartintvw.

56.Ibid.Col.UrquhartsaidthatbeforeRiverSweep,insurgentshadnotfeltcompelledtohideweaponscacheswellontheeastsideoftheEuphratesbecauseCoalitionforceshadnotswepttheareainsometime.Therefore,thereweremanycachesontheeastside,andmanywererelativelyeasytolocate.Col.UrquhartsaidRiverSweepwasoneofthebattalion’smostsuccessfuloperations.

57.Cpl.StefanJ.Whitewayintvw,22June06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterWhitewayintvw.

58.Ibid.59.Thesizeofsomeweaponscachesandbunkers

inIraqisstaggering.InJune2005,MarinesfoundanundergroundbunkersystembuiltintoaquarrynearFallujahthatmeasuredapproximately900feetby550feet.EdwardWong,“U.S.UncoversVastHide-OutOfIraqiRebels,”TheNewYorkTimes,5June05,p.1and14.

60.Mundyintvw.61.Ibid.62.Ibid.63.Ibid.64.Ibid.(“indisputableevidenceoftheexistenceof

foreign fighters”).65.Whiteintvw.(“BeforewewentintoHit,itwassort

ofthe‘Badlands,’aplaceyouwantedtoavoid,”Maj.Whitesaid.“Werarelywentinthere,andwewerenotsurewhatwewouldgetinvolvedinwhenwewentthere.”)

66.Urquhartintvw.67.ApartialOrderofBattleforTaskForce3/25for

OperationSwordiscontainedinthememorandumofrecordfromtheinterviewofthebattalion’soperationsofficer, Maj. White. The major units included: Lima Company,KiloCompany,andportionsofWeaponsCompanyfrom3/25;BravoCompanyof2ndLARBattalion,CharlieCompany(amechanizedcompany)oftheU.S.Army’s9thInfantryBattalion,andoneIraqiArmycompany.

68.Ibid.69.Ibid,andWhiteintvw.70.Whiteintvw.Animportantplanningfactorfor

Operation Sword was collecting sufficient barriers to allow thetaskforcetoprotectthetwoFOBs.

71.K3/251January-1Sept2005ComdC,20Sept05,p.12.

72.LanceCpl.NicholasM.Johnsonintvw,22June06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterJohnsonintvw.

73.Ibid.74.Sgt.FranklynG.MetzIIIintvw,22June06(Oral

HistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterMetzintvw.75.K3/251January-1Sept2005ComdC,20Sept05,p.

11�

12.76.MarinesofLimaCompany,descriptionofactionby

GunnerySgt.ShawnDelgado.Sgt.GuyA.Zierkintvw,23June06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterZierkintvw.

77.Brownintvw.78.Ibid.79.Ibid.80.MarinesofLimaCompany,interviewwithCplAllen

Payne.81.Brownintvw.82.Ibid.83.3/251-31August2005ComdC,1Sept05,pp.6-7.84.MarinesofLimaCompany,descriptionofactionby

GunnerySgt.ShawnDelgado.85.3/251-31August2005ComdC,1Sept05,pp.6.86.CplThomasA.Manicciaintvw,22June06(Oral

HistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterManicciaintvw.

87.Ibid.88.Manicciaintvwand3/251-31August2005ComdC,

1Sept05,pp.7.89.Manicciaintvw.90.Ibid.91.Mundyintvw.92.Urquhartintvw.93.Thefactthatthisareawasheavilyoccupiedby

insurgentswasdemonstratedduringOperationOuterBanks,whenLimaCompanyfoughtalargeenemyforceneartheBarwanahBridgefrom1-4April,killingapproximately48insurgents.Maj.StephenA.Lawson,“Re:MarForResOperationalHistory.”E-mailtoauthor,15Aug06,hereafterLawsone-mail.

94.MarinesofLimaCompany,descriptionofactionbyMaj.StephenA.Lawson.

95.Ibid.96.Lawsone-mail.97.ThiscommanddetonatedIEDhadbeenemplacedin

amuchmoresophisticatedwaythanusuallyencountered.Asubsequentinvestigationshowedthatinsurgentshadremovedalargesectionoftheasphaltroad,emplacedtheIED,andthenrepavedthatsectionoftheroad.Itwasestimatedthatthisworkwouldrequireseveraldays.Lawsone-mail.

98.3/251-31August2005ComdC,1Sept05,pp.7.JohnKifnerandJamesDao,“DeathVisitsaMarineUnit,OnceCalledLucky,”TheNewYorkTimes,7Aug05,p.1.

99.Altieriintvw.100.Urquhartintvw.

1/��

1.Foradetailedaccountofthe2004battlesforFallujahandthepoliticsinvolvedwithvariousmilitarydecisions,see,e.g.,BingWest,NoTrueGlory:AFrontlineAccountoftheBattleforFallujah(NewYork:Bantam,2005),hereafterWest,NoTrueGlory.

2.TheMarineCorpsWarMemorial,locatedneartheArlingtonNationalCemeteryinRosslyn,Virginia,isdedicatedtoMarineswhohavediedindefenseoftheircountrysince1775.

3.See,e.g.,RobertF.Worth,“CluesonHostagesEmergeFromHousesinFallujah,”TheNewYorkTimes,22Nov04, p.1. (“American and Iraqi government officials havelongsaidthatFallujahwasacenteroftheIraqiinsurgency.”)

4.Ibid.5.Foradiscussionofpoliticalandmilitaryfactorsthat

influenced the decision to allow the Fallujah Brigade to takecontrolofFallujah,seeThomasE.Ricks,Fiasco(NewYork:ThePenguinPress,2006),pp.344-345.

7.Lt.Col.ChristopherA.Landrointvw,24Oct06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterLandrointvw.

8.AnnScottTyson,“IncreasedSecurityinFallujahSlowsEffortstoRebuild,”TheWashingtonPost,19Apr05,p.A15.

9.Sgt.Maj.BradleyE.Trudellintvw,24Oct06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterTrudellintvw.

10.Sgt.TimothyG.Whittmerintvw,23Oct06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterWittmerintvw.

11.Ibid.12.Ibid.13.UNdataestimatedthepre-warpopulationofFallujah

at425,000.(UNDatainWattersWorkingPapers,MCHC,Washington,D.C.)

14.RichardA.OppelJr.,“FallujansinFlight:TransitCampsAreNotMuchSaferThanSiegeTheyLeft,”TheNewYorkTimes,18Nov06.Thereporternotesthatapproximately 100,000 Fallujans fled to Amiriya, 12 miles southofFallujahand30,000wenttoBaghdad,whileothercitiestookin10,000-20,000Fallujans.Ibid.

15.Maj.Gen.RichardS.KramlichandCol.TracyL. Mork, “Battlefield Logistics Support, 1st FSSG’s expeditionarylogisticscapabilitywaskeytotheMEF’sSuccessintheBattleofFallujah,”MarineCorpsGazette,July2005,p.25-27.

16.AnnScottTyson,“IncreasedSecurityinFallujahSlowsEffortstoRebuild,”TheWashingtonPost,19Apr05,

11�

p.A15.17.Landrointvw.18.Ibid.19.GenCharlesC.Krulak,“TheStrategicCorporal:

LeadershipintheThreeBlockWar,”MarinesMagazine,January1999,hereafterKrulak,StrategicCorporal.Acknowledgingthecomplexnatureofmodernmilitaryefforts,GenKrulakanticipatedthatMarineswouldbeseeingmoreoperationsthatmix“militaryoperationsother-than-war” with “middle-intensity conflicts.” Borrowing the MarineCorps’term,“TheThreeBlockWar,”GenKrulaksaidfutureMarineswillfacetheentirespectrumoftacticalchallenges,fromconductingmajorcombatandSecurityandStabilizationOperationstodealingwiththemediaand government officials. The term comes from the fact thatMarinesmayfacethisdisparatechallengesoverthecourse of only a few hours and within the confines of three contiguouscityblocks.

20.Trudellintvw.21.Landrointvw.22.CWO-3JamesL.Baileyintvw,23Oct06(Oral

HistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterBaileyintvw. CWO-3 Bailey was the OIC of a five-vehicle personalsecuritydetachmentforthebattalioncommander.Lt.Col.LandroandSgt.Maj.Trudelltypicallytraveledtogether,andCWO-3Baileysaidthecommander’sintentwastopatrolFallujahfrequently,providingthebattalionwith the firepower of an additional Mobile Assault Platoon andtheresponsetimeofaQuickReactionForce.Ibid.

23.Landrointvw.24.SeeKrulak,StrategicCorporal.(“Successorfailure

will rest, increasingly, with the rifleman and with his ability tomaketherightdecisionattherighttimeatthepointofcontact....[T]oday’sMarineswilloftenoperatefar“from the flagpole” without the direct supervision of senior leadership....Inordertosucceedundersuchdemandingconditionstheywillrequireunwaveringmaturity,judgment,andstrengthofcharacter.Mostimportantly,these missions will require them to confidently make well-reasonedandindependentdecisionsunderextremestress--decisionsthatwilllikelybesubjecttotheharshscrutinyofboththemediaandthecourtofpublicopinion.Inmanycases,theindividualMarinewillbethemostconspicuoussymbolofAmericanforeignpolicyandwillpotentiallyinfluence not only the immediate tactical situation, but theoperationalandstrategiclevelsaswell.Hisactions,therefore,willdirectlyimpacttheoutcomeofthelargeroperation;andhewillbecome,asthetitleofthisarticlesuggests – the Strategic Corporal.”)

25.Ibid.26.Sgt.MatthewJ.Fentonwasseriouslyinjuredbyan

IEDonApril26,andsubsequentlydiedatBethesdaNavalHospitalonMay5.Capt.BrianLetendre,amemberoftheInspector-Instructorstaffthatsupported1/25,waskilledMay3,2006inRamadiduringanattackonanobservationpoint.Althoughpartof1/25,Capt.Letendrehadbeenassignedtoan11-MarineteamservingasadvisorstoanIraqiinfantrybattalioninRamadi.E-mailfromCWO-2JasonForgashtohiswife,MariaForgash,8May06.(CopyinWattersWorkingPapers,MCHC,Washington,D.C.)Cpl.Paul“Nick”KingwaskilledbyasniperonJune25.

27.StaffSgt.MichaelS.Maslauskasintvw,24Oct06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterMaslauskasintvw.

28.Maj.RaymondL.Adamsintvw,24Oct06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterAdamsintvw.

29.JohnF.Burns,“Iraqtoreleasedetaineesinbidtoeasetensions,”theNewYorkTimes,7Jun07,P.1.DexterFilkins,“IraqStartstoReleaseDetaineesinGesture,”TheNewYorkTimes,8Jun06,p.6.

30.Ibid.31.Lt.Col.Landroestimatedthenumberofreleased

prisonersinFallujahbetween1,800and2,200.Landrointvw.Other1/25Marinesagreedwiththatestimate.

32.See,e.g.,LandrointvwandWardintvw.33.Landrointvw.34.AndyMosher,“Al-QaedainIraqVowstoRetake

City:InsurgentsSetSightsOnFallujah,”TheWashingtonPost,4Aug06,p.A10.

35.Ibid.36.Ibid.AnIraqipolicecaptainsaidFallujah’sleaders

tookthethreatseriouslybecauseofrecentassassinationsoftworeligiousleadersandonetriballeader.Ibid.

37.DetailsofthesniperattackarefrominterviewswithStaffSgt.Maslauskas,Maj.Ward,andMaj.Adams.

38.Maj.ArmandoAcostaintvw,23Oct06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterAcostaintvw.

39.Ibid.40.CNN.com,“Blastkills8atsoccermatch;more

bodiesinBaghdad,”15Sept06(CopyinWattersWorkingPapers,MCHC,Washington,D.C.).

41.Wardintvw.42.Ibid.43.Ibid.44.Maj.BrianT.Hofmannintvw,24Oct06(Oral

HistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterHofmannintvw.

45.Ibid.46.BCoreportdtd16Aug200647.CplBrianReimers,USMC,“SavedbyKevlar:

11�

MarineTakesHeadshot,WalksAway,”Marines,Jun06,p.

1�th Marines

1.14thMarines2004ComdC,23Feb05,p.7.Thisnumberdroppedafterbatteriesfrom14thMarinesweredeactivatedortransferredin2005and2007.

2.Col.PaulJ.O’Learyintvw,17Aug06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterO’Learyintvw.Thefact that the GWOT did not demand many firing batteries wasevidencedbythefactthat14thMarinesamendeditsmissionin2006toincludean“onorder”missiontoconductCivil-MilitaryOperationsifneeded.

3.SemperGumbywasaddedtotheMarinelexiconduringDesertStorm,when“hurryupandwait”becameafactoflife.“SemperGumby”translateslooselyas“AlwaysFlexible.” It is based on the animated clay television figure knownasGumby,whichisconstantlyremolded.

4.14thMarinesSummaryofActionforproposedMeritoriousUnitCommendation,28Apr06,hereafterMUC Summary. The deployment figures were updated bytheRegiment’sadjutant,Capt.MatthewD.Reis.Capt.MatthewD.Reis,“Re:MarForResOperationalHistory.”E-mailtoauthor,22Aug06.(“ByMarch2007,allofthe[battalions]within14thMarineswillhavebeendeployedinsupportofGWOT.(2/14wasn’ttasked

togoasaBN,butithassenteverybattery.)”)5.MUCsummary.6.14thMarines2004ComdC,23Feb05,and2005

ComdC,30Jan06.O’Learyintvw.7.Sgt.Maj.BobbyL.Allenintvw,17Aug06(Oral

HistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterAllenintvw.8.In2005,theMarineCorpschangedthenamesofits

fourForceServiceSupportGroupstoMarineLogisticsGroups.

9.Manyofthestatisticsforthissectioncomefrom14thMarines’MUCSummary.

10.MUCSummary,p.3.11.4/142004ComdC,17Dec04and2005ComdC,

12Nov05.12.While4/14wasdeployed,14thMarineslearned

thattheMarineCorps’ForceStructureReviewGroupwasplanningtodeactivate4thBattalionwithinmonthsofitsreturn.Twobatteries,KiloandMike,weretransferredtoother14thMarinebattalions(2ndand3rdBattalions,respectively),whileHeadquartersBatteryandLimaBatteryweredeactivatedandthenimmediatelyreactivatedastheheadquartersofanewinfantry-basedbattalion,the4thAnti-TerrorismBattalion.MUCnominationsummary.Asimilarfatebefell1/14uponitsreturninSeptember2006.Col.O’Learysaidthat1/14’sHeadquartersBatteryand

BravoBatterybecamereconnaissancecompaniesandAlphaBatterymovedto5/14,whileCharlieBatterywasdeactivated.O’Learyintvw.

13.2/142004ComdC,1Jan05and2005ComdC,1Jan05(sic).

14.Theaccountof3/25’sworkintheHit-Hadithaareaisdescribedelsewhereinthisvolume.

15.MUCSummary.16.D2/142005ComdC,31Dec05,p.3.17.Lt.Col.JohnC.Hemmerlingintvw,10Aug06

(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterHemmerlingintvw.

18.5/14’sPapaBatteryhaddeployedtoIraqthepreviousyear,so14thMarinessubstituted1/14’sCharlieBatteryforPapaBatteryinthisrotation.MUCnominationsummaryand5/142005ComdC1Dec05,pp.9-10

19.5/142005ComdC1Dec05,p.6.20.Ibid,p.7.21.2ndMPBn1Jul05-31Dec05ComdC8Feb06,p.9.22.Capt.DavidC.Hyman,28Aug06(OralHistColl,

MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterHymanintvw.23.Ibid.24.HeadquartersCompanyandMPCompanyalso

provideddetachmentstoalAsad.5/142005ComdC1Dec05,p20.

25.ThecompoundwasnamedforSgt.AndrewK.FarrarJr.,anactivedutyMPwhowaselectrocutedonJan.28,2005whenhecameincontactwithapowerlineduringaraidinFallujah.

26.Hemmerlingintvw.27.5/142005ComdC1Dec05,p.23(labeledp.2-18).28.UndatednominationforCombatActionRibbonsfor

membersof3rdPlatoonofMPCompany,hereafterCARnomination.

29.Ibid.30.FOBKalsuwasaMarinebasenearthe“Triangleof

Death,”approximately35kilometerssouthofBaghdad.ThedistancebetweenalQa’imandFOBKalsuwasmorethan330kilometers.

31.In2003,theAbuGhraibprison,locatedapproximately45kilometerswestofBaghdad,becameknownasthesiteofmistreatmentofIraqiprisonersbyReserveU.S.ArmyMPs.

32.Maj.TrevorD.Devineintvw,10Aug06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterDevineintvw.

33.Ibid.34.O’Learyintvw.35.Allenintvw.36.O’Learyintvw.37.Ibid.

11�

38.MUCSummary.39.Ibid.

HMLA-���

1.ThomasE.Ricks,Fiasco(NewYork:ThePenguinPress,2006),p.330-35,hereafterRicks,Fiasco.(“TheenemywasbetterpreparedthantheMarineshadbeentoldtoexpect.”Ibid,p.333.)InhissummaryofeventsleadingtoFallujahI,RicksnotedthattheArmyfeltconstrainednottopatrolaggressivelyintoFallujah,whiletheMarineCorps’perspectivewasdifferent.Withindays,hewrote,Marine patrols engaged in firefights that stirred up the cityandleftatleast15Iraqisdead.Afewdayslater,theBlackwatercontractorswereambushed.Ibid,p.330-31.

2.LtGenJohnConway,IMEFCommander,saidhisplanwastoallowFallujahtocalmdownbeforehisMarinesattackedinamethodicalfashion.HesaidIMEForderedtheimmediateresponseonlyafteritwasorderedtodosobyArmyLTGRicardoSanchez,thecommanderofU.S.forcesinIraq.TheIMEFChiefofStaff,Col.JohnC.Coleman,wasquotedinthesamearticleassayingthatsenior Marines did not anticipate the difficulties they would encounterinFallujah.“I’mnotsurewefullyunderstoodthehardnessofthecity,theharshnessoftheelementsoperatinginside.”

3.Lt.Col.BruceS.Ornerintvw,9Sept06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterOrnerintvw.

4.MAG-462004ComdC,10Feb05,p.6.5.Ornerintvw.6.Maj.MichaelP.Kaneawardcitation,undated

(RefSec,MCHC,Washington,D.C.)7.Ibid.8.Lt.Col.StevenL.Heldintvw,9Sept06(OralHistColl,

MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterHeldintvw.9.The“cyclic”isahelicoptercontrolthatgoverns

thepitchandbankattitudes.InaCobra,bothpilotshavecyclicsthatareconnectedtoeachother.Inthiscase,whentheAK-47roundhitthecyclic,itcausedthehelicoptertojumptooneside.TheroundsnappedMaj.Lasso’scyclic,butLt.Col.DiTulliowasabletoregaincontrolwithhiscyclic.

10.Lt.Col.PeterDiTulliointvw,10Sept06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterDiTulliointvw.

11.Ibid.12.See,e.g.,Ricks,Fiasco,pp.330-35,andRajiv

Chandrasekaran,“KeyGeneralCriticizesAprilAttackInFallujah,”WashingtonPost,13Sept04,p.A-17.

13.Ornerintvw.14.Ricks,Fiasco,p.342.TheauthorwrotethatMaj.

Gen.Mattis,commanderof1stMarineDivision,was“furious”withthisdecision.Col.JohnToolan,commanderof7thMarines,saidthattheDivisionCommandercouldnotunderstandwhyhehadbeenorderedtostop.Ibid.

15.CoalitionforcesandtheCIAhelpedformtheFallujahBrigadeinanattempttoimposeorderonthecity,butthebrigadewasdisbandedafteronlyafewmonths.Marineslatersaidthatthe800AK-47s,27trucks,and50radiosprovidedthebrigadeweregiventotheinsurgents,and Marines were fired on at one point by gunmen wearing FallujahBrigadeuniforms.Ibid,p.344-45.Seealso,U.S.CentralCommandNewsRelease,“1stBattalionoftheFallujahBrigadetohaveaRoleinFallujah’sSecurity,”30Apr04.(CopyinWattersWorkingPapers,MCHC,Washington,D.C.)(NotingthatIMEFwasoverseeingtheformationoftheFallujahBrigade.)

16.See,e.g.,Ricks,Fiasco,pp.330-335andBingWest,NoTrueGlory:AFrontlineAccountoftheBattleforFallujah(NewYork:Bantam,2005).

17.StaffSgt.AllisonR.Roseborough,10Sept06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterRoseboroughintvw.

18.MAG-462004ComdC,10Feb05,p.6.19.Heldintvw.20.ThebasewascalledKoreanVillagebecauseitonce

housedKoreanlaborerswhohelpbuildthehighwaylinkingAmman,JordantoBaghdad.

21.Autorotationisahelicoptermaneuverthatallowsapilottotradealtitudeforcontrolinadescentcausedbyenginefailure.Thepiloteffectivelygivesupaltitudeinexchangeforenergythatallowstherotorbladetoturnataratethatstabilizestheaircraftandallowsthepilottocushionthetouchdown.Whileitisacomplicatedmaneuver,itisonethathelicopterpilotspracticefrequently.

22.Thecollectiveisahelicoptercontrolthatdeterminesthepitchofthemainrotorblade.

23.Heldintvw.24.HMLA-7752004ComdC,31Dec04,p.16,andKatie

Nelson,“VermontMarinekilledinIraqattack:Helicopterpilotlovedhiscareer,”TheBostonGlobe,31Jul04.

25.Maj.JosephCrane,Diary,28Jul04,(CopyinWattersWorkingPapers,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterCraneDiary.

26.Roseboroughintvw.27.Sgt.NathanK.LaForte,“MarinesdedicateAl

Taqaddum airfield to fallen aviator,” USMC Story Identification #200482772511, 22Aug04.

28.HMLA-7752005ComdC,1Feb06,p.9.29.Foradescriptionoftheinitialambush,seeSharon

Behn,“AttackshitvitalsecurityinIraq,”TheWashingtonTimes,23May05.Insurgentskilled12of18international

11�

andIraqiconvoyguardsemployedbyHartSecurityLtd.andassignedtotheconvoy,thenstackedsomeofthecorpsesonalargebomb.

30.Maj.BrianM.Kennedyawardcitation,2005(RefSec,MCHC,Washington,D.C.).

31.K3/251January-1Sept2005ComdC,20Sept05,p.9.

HMM-��� and HMM-���

1.Col.StephenT.Ganyardintvw,12Sept06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterGanyardintvw.Col.GanyardsucceededCol.MarshallasCommanding Officer of MAG 46 in 2005.

2.Col.JeffreyL.Marshallintvw,4Oct06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterMarshallintvw.

3.Ibid.4.Lt.Col.ClarkA.Taylorintvw,11Sept05(Oral

HistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterTaylorintvw.

5.Ibid.6.Lt.Col.JacquesC.NaviauxIIintvw,10Sept05(Oral

HistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterNaviauxintvw.

7.Ibid.8.MAG462004ComdC,10Feb05,p.6.9.Sgt.ShanahanNelsonandSgt.ShawnBlalockintvw,

11Sept05(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterNelson-Blalockintvw.

10.Ibid.11.HMM-7642004ComdC,25Jan04(sic),p.6.12.Ibid.13.Ibid,p.9.14.Ibid,p.12.15.“GroundhogDay”isa1993movieinwhichthe

protagonist finds himself in a fictitious “time loop,” in whichhisdreadedGroundhogDaykeepsrepeatingitself.

16.Ibid.17.Naviauxintvw.18.Naviauxintvw,andHMM-7642004ComdC,

25Jan04(sic).ForamorecompletedescriptionofOperationRiverBlitz,seethesectionofthisbookdealingwith3rdBattalion,25thMarines.

VMGR-���

1.ThisbackgroundinformationcamefromVMGR-452’swebsite.Acopyoftheinformation,whichisabriefrecenthistoryofVMGR-452,isintheauthor’sWorkingPapers,MCHC,Washington,D.C.

2.StaffSgt.JohnC.DiDomenico,“VMGR-452delivers

POWstofreedom,”MarineCorpsNews,13Apr03.3.VMGR-4522004ComdC,31Jan05,p.4.4.Lt.Col.Jamesessentiallytookacomposite

detachmentthatincludedMarinesfromVMGR-452andVMGR-352.ThisincludedfourKC-130Taircraftandmorethan100MarinesfromVMGR-452andtwoKC-130F/Raircraftand49MarinesfromtheactivedutyVMGR-352.VMGR-4522004ComdC,31Jan05,p.5.

5.Lt.Col.BradleyS.Jamesintvw,17Nov06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterJamesintvw.

6.GPSstandsfor“GlobalPositioningSystem,”asatellite-basednavigationsystem.

7.FordetailsontheSherpaChute,seeStaffSgt.BillLisbon, “GPS-guided cargo chutes touchdown after first combatdropinIraq,”MarineCorpsNews,16Aug04.

8.Jamesintvw.9.Whiletheterm“Angel”canbeusedtorefertothe

remainsofanyservicememberbeingtransportedbyaircraft,Lt.Col.JamesisusingittorefertotheremainsofaCoalitionservicememberkilledinIraq.

10.Thesquadron’sCommandChronologydescribedtheConvoySecurity-RadioRelaymissionas“longandusuallyquiteuneventful,”itnotedthattheaircrewsappreciatedthefactthattheiraircraftwereprovidingasignificant element of security to “many I MEF convoys thatwerealwaysinimminentdangerofenemyattacks.”VMGR-4522004ComdC,31Jan05,pp.5-6.

11.Jamesintvw.12.Whiletwoweeksofsurgeoperationstosupport

OperationalFajrboostedthesquadron’sstatistics,VMGR-452maintainedaconstantworkloadthroughoutthedeployment.“ForthemonthofNovember,thesquadronagain set a KC-130 OIF-II record when it flew 341 sorties, logged 864.9 flight hours, transported 1,273,150 pounds of cargo and 1,980 personnel, and offloaded 4,324,300 poundsoffuelto502receivers.Duringtheperiodfrom1Septemberthrough31December,VMGR-452(-)(REIN)flew 1,049 sorties, logged 2,317.3 hours, offloaded 7,665,600poundsoffuelto843aircraft,airdropped340,000poundsofsupplies,andtransported7,542personneland4,524,033poundsofcargo.”VMGR-4522004ComdC,31Jan05,p.6.

13.Jamesintvw.14.JamesB.Hoke,“GPS-GuidedSherpasProvideSafer

SupplyDrop,”MarineCorpsNews,26Apr06.15.Jamesintvw.16.Ibid.17.Ibid.18.Ibid.

11�

VMFA-11�

1.VMFA-1122004ComdC,18Jan05,pp.6-7.2.Lt.Col.StevenM.Roepkeintvw,3Oct06(Oral

HistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterRoepkeintvw.

3.Ibid.4.VMFA-1122004ComdC,18Jan05,pp.6-7.5.W.G.Ford,“‘Cowboys’TametheFarEast,”The

MarineCorpsGazette,Oct04,p.26.6.VMFA-1122004ComdC,18Jan05,p.6.7.Roepkeintvw.8.Ibid.

VMFA 1��

1.Maj.RobertA.Petersonintvw,14Octt06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterPetersonintvw.

2.Ibid3. Lt. Col. Iimes was the Commanding Officer of

VMFA-242.Thisbombingoccurredduringaturnoverflight between pilots from the active duty VMFA-242 to the ReserveVMFA-142.

4.Ibid.5.CplC.AlexHerron,“Gatorsdeployintohistory,”

[[MarCorNewsService20055341326]]18Mar2005.6.Thesquadronexpendedthefollowingordinance

duringitsdeployment:10JDAMs,16LGBs,100LGTRs,90MK-82,61MK-83,3MK-84,4002.75”Rockets,2005”Rockets,and2,20020mmRounds.VMFA-1422005ComdC,dtd19Jan06,p.5.

7.TheLITENINGpodcontainsahigh-resolutionforward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensor that significantly enhancestheF-18’sabilitytoattackgroundtargetsatnightandinadverseweatherconditions.

8.Petersonintvw.9.Lt.Col.J.A.Baumertintvw,14Octt06(OralHistColl,

MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterBaumertintvw.10.Maj.EricD.Klepperintvw,14Octt06(OralHistColl,

MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterKlepperintvw.11.Ibid.12.Ibid.13.Ibid.14.Petersonintvw.15.MSgtStevenM.KingPeterson,14Octt06(Oral

HistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterKingintvw.16.Lt.Col.DwightSchmidt,14Octt06(OralHistColl,

MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterSchmidtintvw.17.Seefn7supraandtheaccompanyingtext.

18.VMFA-1422005ComdC,dtd19Jan06,p.5.19.Kingintvw.20.Ibid.21.CplAndrewW.Bedford,14Octt06(OralHistColl,

MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterBedfordintvw.22.Ibid.

HMH-���

1.Sgt.TimothyD.Reedintvw,11Sept06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterReedintvw.

2.Ibid.3.HMH-7692004ComdC,dtd31Jan04(sic),p.8.4.BBC’sWeatherServicestatesthatthemonthsofApril

throughOctoberarethehottestmonthsinAfghanistan,with“discomfortduetoheatandhumidity”rangingfrommoderatetohigh.

5.Sgt.FrankMagni,U.S.Army,“MarinesDoHeavyLiftingforCoalitioninAfghanistan,”AmericanForcesPressService,8Nov04.

6.Col.RickD.Mullenintvw,11Sept06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterMullenintvw.

7.CenterforDefenseInformation,ActionUpdate:July5-18,2004,dtd21Jul04.

8.The200nauticalmiledistancebetweenBagramandChaghcharanapproachedthelimitofhowfaraCH-53could fly without refueling. Mullen intvw. Lt. Col. Mullen alsonotedthatnootherhelicopterhadtherangeorspeedtoescortthesectionofCH-53sthatmorning,soitsescortwasaB-1bomber.Ibid.

9.Ibid.10.Ibid.11.HMH-7692004ComdC,dtd31Jan04(sic),p.5.12.Mullenintvw.13.Ibid.14.Ibid,andCplDominickS.CastroIIintvw,11Sept06

(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterCastrointvw.

15.Mullenintvw.Theprecipitousdropinthespeedoftherotorbladeindicatedthatthehelicopter’sliftwasnotsufficient for the load. Ibid.

16.Castrointvw.17.Ibid.18.Mullenintvw,andHMH-7692004ComdC,dtd

31Jan04(sic),p.7.19.HMH-7692004ComdC,dtd31Jan04(sic),20.Ibid,21.Col.DavidLamm,“TheRightStrategy:Success

inAfghanistanMeansFightingSeveralWarsatOnce,”ArmedForcesJournalInternational,Nov05.WithCoalitionassistance,Lammwrites,AfghanNationalArmysoldiers

11�

strippedProvincialGovernorIsmaelKhan’smilitiaofitsheavy weapons, ending the fight between warring militias. Ibid.

22.Ibid.

HMLA-���

1.CplM.CoryWargofcakintvw,10Sept05(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterWargofcakintvw.

2.Maj.RaymondMederosintvw,10Sept05(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterMederosintvw.

3.Ibid.4.ThesquadronoriginallytooksixCobrasandthree

Hueys, but added one of each during the first rotation. Mederosintvw.

5.Ibid.6.Maj.RaymondMederosawardcitation,31Jan05

(RefSec,MCHC,Washington,D.C.).7.HMLA-7732005ComdC,30Jan06,p.6.8.Maj.JayD.Borellaawardcitation,19Sept05(RefSec,

MCHC,Washington,D.C.).9.Lt.Col.DanC.Nestorintvw,10Sept05(Oral

HistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterNestorintvw.

10.Ibid.11.Ibid.12.Ibid.

�th MLG

1.BGenEugeneG.Payneintvw,14Sept06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterPayneintvw.

2.Ibid.3.Col.GreggL.Mooreintvw,17May08(OralHistColl,

MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterMooreintvw.4.Ibid.5.Ibid.6.Ibid.7.Col.TracyL.MorkservedasChiefofStafffor1st

MLGwhileitwaspreparingforOperationAlFajrinFallujahinthefallof2004.Lt.Col.ThomassaidthatheservedastheMLG’sG-4,whiletwootherReservesfrom4thMarineLogisticsGroupForward-WestservedastheGroup’sG-1andG-3.“Youcouldn’tswingacatintheheadquarterswithouthittingaReserve,”Lt.Col.Thomassaid.

8.Lt.Col.ErickP.Thomasintvw,13Sept06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterThomas

intvw.9.MajGenRichardS.KramlichandCol.TracyL.Mork,

“Battlefield Logistics Support,” Marine Corps Gazette, Jul05,pp.25-27.

10.Thomasintvw.11.Ibid.12.Maj.PatrickSweenyintvw,17May08(OralHistColl,

MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterSweenyintvw.13.UndatedSummaryofActionrelatingtoCSSC-113’s

mobilization(hereinafterCSSC-113SummaryofAction),preparedbyMaj.Sweeny.

14.Ibid.15.Ibid.16.Ibid.17.Ibid.18.Undatedreport,titledWIAandKIAreportand

hereinafterreferredtoas“WIAandKIAreport,”providedtoauthorbyMaj.Sweeny.Acopyisintheauthor’sworkingpapers.

19.Ibid.20.CSSC-113SummaryofAction.21.WIAandKIAreport.22.CSSC-113SummaryofAction.23.Maj.MarkC.Booneintvw,16May08(OralHistColl,

MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterBooneintvw.24.Ibid.25.Ibid.26.Ibid.27.Ibid.28.Ibid.29.Ibid.30.Ibid.31.Ibid.32.Ibid.33.Forexample,onePRPMarine,Sgt.DanielCotnoir,

crawledintotheburned-outhulkofaLightArmoredVehicletorecovertheremainsofaMarinewhohadbeentrappedinsidethewreckage.See,e.g.,MarineCorpsTimes,July2005,issuenamingSgt.CotnoirasitsMarineoftheYear.

34.Sgt.SusannahF.Woodintvw,18Jul06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterWoodintvw.

35.Ibid.36.Payneintvw.

The Last Journey

1.StatementofLtGenJackW.Bergman,CommandingGeneral,MarineForcesReserve,totheSenateArmedServicesCommitteePersonnelSubcommittee-Reserve

1�0

Matters,30Mar2006.2.Ibid.3.Lt.Col.JacquesC.NaviauxIIintvw,10Sept05(Oral

HistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterNaviauxintvw.

4.Ibid.5.E-mailletterfromLt.Col.Naviauxtorelativesand

friendsofHMM-764,24May05(copyinWattersWorkingPapers,MCHC,Washington,D.C.).

6.See,MarineCorpsTimes,July2005,MarineoftheYeararticleandaccompanyingcitation.

7.Ibid.8.Ibid.9.Ibid.10. For a detailed description of one Notification

Officer’s experience, see Jim Sheeler, “Final Salute,” RockyMountainNews,pp.1-24(specialsection).ReporterJimSheelerwasawardedaPulitzerPrizeforfeaturewritingforthearticle,andthephotographer,ToddHeisler,wasawardedaPulitzerPrizeforfeaturephotography.See,Final Salute: A Story of Unfinished Lives (New York, N.Y., PenguinPress2008).

11.Maj.KirkA.Greinerintvw,22Jun06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterGreinerintvw.

12.Greinerintvw.13.Ibid.14.Ibid.Maj.Greinernotedthatbecausetheparentsof

manyofthefallenMarineswereseparatedordivorced,Notification Officers often had to provide casualty informationtotwohouseholds.

15.MarineCorpsOrderP3040.4E,MarineCorpsCasualtyProceduresManual,27Feb03,P4-18(“Thefollowing is suggested and may be modified as appropriate:”)

16.Greinerintvw.17.ThePersonalCasualtyReport(PCR)isanelectronic

messagethatcontainsreportinginformation.ItistheprimarysourceofinformationusedtoinformaMarine’sfamilyoftheMarine’sstatus.Ibid,p.1-10.

18.See,e.g.,fn10,supra,andaccompanyingtext.19.Lt.Col.ChristopherA.Landrointvw,24Oct065

(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterLandrointvw.

20.Seealso,Sgt.Maj.BradleyE.Trudellintvw,24Oct06(OralHistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterTrudellintvw.

21.Landrointvw.22.Ibid.23.Ibid.24.Maj.BrianT.Hofmannintvw,24Oct06(Oral

HistColl,MCHC,Washington,D.C.),hereafterHofmann

intvw.25.Ibid.26.See,e.g.,KenByronandJesseHamilton,“Captain

MournedLikeANativeSon,”Hartford(CT)Courant,6May06,p.A-1.

27.Capt.Letendrehadvolunteeredforthedeployment,eventhoughhisdutiesasInspector-InstructorofCharlieCompany,1stBattalion,25thMarinesinPlainville,Connecticut,wouldhaveallowedhimtoremainintheUnitedStates.Hisfamily,inastatementpreparedshortlyafterhisdeath,said,“Brianjustdidn’tfeelrightbeingbackhereintheU.S.whileotherMarineswereservingoverseas,andwantedtogetbacktothefrontlinesassoonashecould.”WhileservinginConnecticut,Capt.Letendrewas the Notification Officer for the parents of Lance Cpl. LawrencePhilipponofWestHartford,Connecticut.LanceCpl..Philippon’smother,LeesaPhilippon,saidthatCapt.Letendredemonstratedalevelofcareandcompassionthatbrought light to a very difficult time in her life. See, “Cup’s VisitHonorsSon’sMemory,”Hartford(CT)Courant,16Aug06,p.D-1.

28.Landrointvw,Trudellintvw,andHofmannintvw.29.Landrointvw.30.Ibid.31.Ibid.

1�1