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Marie Curie Research Training Network The IFRS Revolution: Compliance, Consequences and Policy Lessons
MRTN-CT-2006-035850 INTACCT
Write-offs and profitability in private firms – disentangling the impact of tax-minimisation incentives
Urska KosiUniversity of Macedonia, Lancaster University
Aljosa Valentincic University of Ljubljana
Varna, Mar 2010
MRTN-CT-2006-035850 INTACCT
Motivation
Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz (2006, p. 988): Studies (e.g. Ball et al., 2000) hypothesize that the link between financial and tax accounting can play an important role in firms’ reporting behavior. … However, there is little direct evidence supporting this hypothesis.
Private-firms setting: Role of incentives on financial reporting outcomes Concentrated ownership agency conflicts, demand for financial reporting Accounting discretion governed by reporting incentives:
tax-minimisation, dividend payout, debt financing, employee relationsAccounting discretion captured by specific accrual asset write-offs (increase power of tests)Isolating specific reporting incentive exogenous change in tax legislation (type of a “natural experiment”)
One incentive changed, other remain unchanged
Approach substitutes for direct modelling of reporting incentives
MRTN-CT-2006-035850 INTACCT
Hypothesis
Relation between accounting discretion and firms’ reporting incentives asset write-offs and profitability
Accounting standards negative relationEmpirical literature positive relation (economic benefits)(e.g. Brown et al. 1992, Garrod et al. 2008, Szczesny, Valentincic 2009)
Important economic benefit tax-savings Change in corporate tax legislation from 2005 current and fixed asset write-offs no longer tax deductible
The same reporting incentives but different tax treatment of write-offs substitutes for direct modelling of firms’ (unobservable) reporting incentivesControlling for known factors in existing literature
H: The magnitude of write-offs will decrease if write-offs cease to be a tax-deductible expense, conditional on the decision to write off.
MRTN-CT-2006-035850 INTACCT
Data & sample
Small private firms in Slovenia: 2004 & 2005
2004 2005
Final sample of small private companies 20,505 (100.00%) 20,505 (100.00%)
Companies writing-off assets 6,126 (29.88%) 5,089 (24.82%)
Companies writing-off current assets 4,824 (23.53%) 3,723 (18.16%)
Companies writing-off fixed assets 2,262 (11.03%) 2,159 (10.53%)
Non-writing-off companies 14,379 (70.12%) 15,416 (75.18%)
MRTN-CT-2006-035850 INTACCT
Data & sample (cont.)
Mean SD Q25 Median Q75 Skew
Total assets 465,016 1,635,878 42,664 129,987 406,923 25.460
Debt 57,805 366,237 0 0 16,692 35.261
Current assets 148,564 506,105 11,576 39,301 136,154 33.320
Fixed assets (incl. intangibles) 200,558 943,159 5,896 29,791 139,526 37.739
Cash 21,485 78,767 1,052 5,016 17,280 36.126
Revenue 443,061 727,996 48,105 150,334 478,309 2.917
Operating profit (pre-write-off) 27,613 123,511 192 4,878 24,090 59.801
Net income 19,896 135,892 225 2,833 15,240 85.029
Tax 4,959 48,989 0 346 2,637 150.706
Audited 0.007 0.082 0.000 0.000 0.000 12.089
Big-4 auditor 0.002 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.000 21.390
MRTN-CT-2006-035850 INTACCT
Methodology
ttt
tttttt
tCAtttCA
Dummies IndustryYEARBIGAUDIT
EMPNLNPCASHDEBTCA
WOFFSOPADJWOFF
*)4
_(
1110
9876514
1,3210,
ttt
tttttt
tFAtttFA
Dummies IndustryYEARBIGAUDIT
EMPNLNPCASHDEBTFA
WOFFSOPADJWOFF
*)4
_(
1110
9876514
1,3210,
ttt
ttttt
tFAtCAtttFACA
Dummies IndustryYEARBIGAUDIT
EMPNLNPCASHDEBT
WOFFWOFFSOPADJWOFF
*)4
_(
1110
98765
1,'41,3210,&
MRTN-CT-2006-035850 INTACCT
Tobit regressionExplanatory Variables
Constant -0.1055 (0.000) -0.0771 (0.000) -0.0904 (0.000)
ADJ_OP_DEC t 0.0025 (0.000) 0.0005 (0.000) 0.0022 (0.000)
S t 0.0056 (0.000) 0.0035 (0.000) 0.0052 (0.000)
WOFF CA,t -1 0.4440 (0.000) 0.3811 (0.000)
WOFF FA,t -1 0.4752 (0.000) 0.3842 (0.000)
CA t -1 0.0055 (0.000)
FA t -1 0.0099 (0.000)
DEBT t -0.0022 (0.444) 0.0066 (0.003) 0.0012 (0.636)
CASH t -0.0092 (0.002) -0.0047 (0.069) -0.0107 (0.000)
NP t 0.0002 (0.001) 0.0000 (0.633) 0.0001 (0.048)
LP t 0.0015 (0.000) 0.0006 (0.029) 0.0012 (0.000)
EMP t 0.0001 (0.006) 0.0001 (0.000) 0.0001 (0.003)
AUDIT t 0.0119 (0.002) 0.0059 (0.035) 0.0104 (0.002)
BIG4 t -0.0051 (0.509) -0.0006 (0.916) -0.0037 (0.591)
YEAR 0.0079 (0.043) 0.0042 (0.193) 0.0086 (0.009)
Y*ADJ_OP_DEC t -0.0007 (0.000) -0.0001 (0.440) -0.0007 (0.000)
Y*OtherVariables t
IND j
Log likelihood 6,300.792 2,683.328 11,255.448
WOFF CA,t WOFF FA,t WOFF CA&FA,t
YES YES YES
YES YES YES
MRTN-CT-2006-035850 INTACCT
Reverse regressionExplanatory Variables
Constant -0.2082 (0.000) -0.2622 (0.000) -0.2333 (0.000)
WOFF CA,t 0.9225 (0.000)
WOFF FA,t 0.5134 (0.001)
WOFF CA&FA,t 0.8114 (0.000)
S t 0.0251 (0.000) 0.0282 (0.000) 0.0265 (0.000)
WOFF CA,t -1 0.0512 (0.581) 0.0227 (0.789)
WOFF FA,t -1 0.1708 (0.552) 0.1918 (0.469)
CA t -1 -0.0212 (0.017)
FA t -1 0.0117 (0.236)
DEBT t -0.0385 (0.024) -0.0329 (0.067) -0.0354 (0.014)
CASH t 0.1473 (0.000) 0.1660 (0.000) 0.1533 (0.000)
NP t -0.0006 (0.121) -0.0009 (0.021) -0.0005 (0.108)
LP t -0.0072 (0.002) -0.0094 (0.000) -0.0073 (0.000)
EMP t -0.0010 (0.000) -0.0009 (0.000) -0.0011 (0.000)
AUDIT t -0.0328 (0.069) -0.0513 (0.004) -0.0396 (0.013)
BIG4 t 0.0442 (0.206) 0.0230 (0.545) 0.0440 (0.171)
YEAR -0.0959 (0.000) -0.0024 (0.939) -0.0748 (0.001)
Y*Other Variables t
IND j
nAdj. R2
12,2520.102
9,6480.102
4,5240.110
YES YES YES
ADJ_OP t ADJ_OP t ADJ_OP t
YES YES YES
MRTN-CT-2006-035850 INTACCT
Sensitivity analyses
Test if write-offs signal weakening future performance insignificant coefficient estimates
Including loss dummy variable
Modelling decision to write-off (logit models) incremental decrease in the positive relation
MRTN-CT-2006-035850 INTACCT
Conclusions
Findings confirm that magnitude of write-offs, conditional on the decision to write-off, are positively associated to firm profitability
Accounting discretion used to extract economic benefits tax-savings, dividend payouts, employee relations
Econometric challenge to disentangle the tax benefit Type of a “natural experiment” (tax legislation change)Approach substitutes for direct modelling of (unobserved) reporting incentives direct evidence on the tax hypothesis
When tax incentives decrease, magnitude of write-offs, conditional on the decision to write-off, decreases
MRTN-CT-2006-035850 INTACCT
Thank you for questions, comments, suggestions!