Marconi, D. Two-Dimensional Semantics and the Articulation Problem

8/13/2019 Marconi, D. Two-Dimensional Semantics and the Articulation Problem

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/marconi-d-two-dimensional-semantics-and-the-articulation-problem 1/30

DIEGO MARCONI

TWO-DIMENSIONAL SEMANTICS AND THE ARTICULATION

PROBLEM

ABSTRACT. David Chalmers’s version of two-dimensional semantics is an attempt at

setting up a unified semantic framework that would vindicate both the Fregean and the

Kripkean semantic intuitions. I claim that there are three acceptable ways of carrying out

such a project, and that Chalmers’s theory does not coherently fit any of the three patterns.

I suggest that the theory may be seen as pointing to the possibility of a double reading for

many linguistic expressions (a double reading which, however, is not easily identified with

straightforward semantic ambiguity).

1. INTUITIONS AND ATTITUDES

In spite of the Kripkean paradigm’s1 remarkable success, the Fregean in-

tuitions will not go away. By ‘Fregean intuitions’ I mean the feeling that

certain linguistic phenomena require the kind of semantic treatment that a

theory of meaning in the Fregean tradition would provide. Such phenom-

ena, on the other hand, are not easily accommodated within a Kripkean

framework. Let me briefly recall some of the phenomena in question:

• ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ and ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ differ in cognit-

ive value; a theory of meaning should account for the difference.

• ‘Lois believes that Superman can fly’ and ‘Lois believes that Clark

Kent can fly’ differ in truth value; a theory of meaning should account

for the difference (such an account is hard to provide if ‘Superman’

and ‘Clark Kent’ are assigned the same semantic value).

• It is not plausible that the word ‘Pegasus’ plays no role in our inquiry

aiming at establishing that Pegasus does not exist (Quine 1952); a

theory of meaning should account for that (if a name’s only semantic

value is its reference, this is hard).

• Oscar believes that the English sentence ‘Water is drinkable’ is true;

Twin Oscar believes that the Twin-English sentence ‘Water is drink-able’ is true. Such beliefs underlie patterns of behaviour that are

in systematic correspondence with each other. A theory of mean-

ing should account for the similarity (such an account is not easily

Synthese (2005) 143: 321–349 © Springer 2005



322 DIEGO MARCONI

provided if ‘water’ in English and ‘water’ in Twin-English have

radically different semantic values).

So, in David Chalmers’s words, “There remains an intuition that ‘Hes-

perus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ (or ‘water’ and ‘H2O’[. . . ]) differ in at least some

dimension of their meaning, corresponding to the difference in their cog-

nitive and rational roles” (2002c, 8; cf. 2002a, 3). There is an aspect of

content (or of meaning) that is not captured by the notion of reference.

Of course, the Kripkean (or ‘Millian’) intuitions are also here to stay:

among others, the intuition that the truth value of ‘Napoleon married

Marie-Louise’ does not depend on any non-trivial property of Napoleon,

except his having married Marie-Louise; the intuition that the truth con-

ditions of ‘Napoleon was P’ are not identical with the truth conditions

of ‘The so-and-so was P’, were ‘the so-and-so’ is any descriptive expres-

sion; and the intuition that in the sentence “If Napoleon had been British

he wouldn’t have become Emperor of the French” the name ‘Napoleon’refers to Napoleon, not to some individual more or less closely resembling

Napoleon but not identical with him.

Thus we have two sets of intuitions, pointing to different semantic

theories (or families of theories): the Fregean family and the Kripkean

family. Theories in the Fregean family identify an expression’s semantic

value with a property (usually called ‘sense’) that is strictly related with

the expression’s cognitive content while being distinct from its refer-

ence. They account for a number of intuitions, e.g., for the difference in

cognitive value between ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ and ‘Hesperus is Phos-

phorus’, but they run into trouble with several others, such as semantic

evaluation in counterfactual circumstances. Kripkean theories, on the other

hand, identify semantic value with reference; they are unsatisfactory as

accounts of belief ascriptions, differences in cognitive value, empty names,

and the explanation of behaviour, though they can successfully deal with

counterfactual evaluation, indexicals, and more.

In the face of such circumstances, three different attitudes are possible

in principle. We can insist that one and only one family of theories is on

the right track, and try to accommodate the recalcitrant intuitions: Sal-

mon (1986) was an attempt in this direction from the Kripkean standpoint,

while Evans (1982) was in some respects its Fregean analogue. Or, we may

search for a radically new theory, that would be free from the limitations of

both (in recent years, few have made this attempt, as far as I know). A third

option consists in trying to have the best of both worlds, i.e., to preservethe strengths of both approaches by combining them into a unified theory,

that would analyse each kind of phenomena pretty much along the lines of

the approach that is more successful in dealing with them.



TWO-DIMENSIONAL SEMANTICS AND THE ARTICULATION PROBLEM 323

In the late Seventies and early Eighties, many people came out in

favour of the third option: they were the proponents of so-called ‘two

factor’ or ’dual aspect’ semantic theories (Field 1977; Loar 1981; McGinn

1982; Block 1986; et al.). All such theories suggested that a linguisticexpression’s semantic value was twofold: one component was intended

to take care of differences of cognitive value and therefore of the con-

nection between content and behaviour, thus playing the role of Fregean

sense; the other component was meant to be identical with an expression’s

objective, externally individuated content. The first component or factor

was characterized as ‘narrow meaning’, narrow content’, ‘inferential role’,

‘functional role’, the second was called ‘wide meaning’ or ‘wide content’.

The first component was entirely ‘in the head’, the second was not. The

first component of the meaning of ‘water’ ignored the difference between

H2O and XYZ, the second was essentially about the difference.

One crucial point of two-factor theories was that neither semantic factor

suffices to determine the other (McGinn 1982, 211; Block 1986, 638–639, 643–644). Hadn’t both factors been fully independent of each other,

the theory would have been only superficially a two-factor theory. For

example, Frege’s theory of (1892) is not to be regarded as a two-factor

semantic theory, as sense is supposed to determine denotation. The inde-

pendence of both factors from each other was essential to the enterprise of

two factor semantics, for its main motivation was exactly that no single-

factor theory could account for all the relevant phenomena, directly or

indirectly.

There was, however, the risk that such independence, though declared,

was not really borne out by the theory. Perhaps the two factors had been

so designed that one factor could indirectly determine a value for theother factor; a value that might be incompatible with what had been inde-

pendently assigned to the other factor by the theory. Thus, against (some

versions of) two-factor semantics, Jerry Fodor pointed out that a thought’s

functional role did determine a propositional content which was bound

to have a truth condition; at the same time, another truth condition was

determined by that same thought’s causal connections with the world, and

‘the theory ha[d] no mechanism at all for keeping these two assignments

consistent ’ (Fodor, 1987, 82; Fodor’s italics). Indeed, for some thoughts

they were bound to be inconsistent. Take my thought that water is wet .

which supposedly has the same functional role as my Twin-Earthian twin’s

thought that water is wet . At the same time, my twin’s thought, being

causally connected with XYZ, is determined as being true if and only if XYZ is wet, whereas my own thought is similarly determined as being true

iff H2O is wet (this is the second factor). Now, what about the proposition






some syntactic category. In compositional semantic theories, the f i’s are

partly determined by the syntactic form of e, for each e. A semantic theory

specifies both the kind of semantic values that are assigned and how they

are assigned, i.e., both P and F ; the latter may be identified with a familyof f I ’s, F j = {f j 1, f j 2, . . .}. In practice, we shall not need to consider

individual f i’s or to distinguish between a semantic property P and the

particular way that property is assigned by a particular theory.

Two semantic properties are different if they assign semantic values of

different kinds to expressions of the same syntactic category; two proper-

ties are independent if neither property assigns, even indirectly, a value that

could be assigned by the other property (for example, in Fregean semantics

sense and reference are different, but not independent semantic properties,

for the assignment of a sense determines the assignment of a denotation).

Now suppose we have two theories that are different in that they ac-

knowledge different semantic properties, P 1 and P 2 (for expressions of the

same category); and suppose we want to combine them into one synthetictheory. In principle, there are three possible ways of doing this (i.e., of deal-

ing with the Articulation Problem). We can say, first, that the two theories

do not really account for the same phenomena in different ways: rather,

they account for two disjoint sets of phenomena. In each set, one (and only

one) semantic property is involved; each of our two putative theories is the

theory of one of the two properties. For an analogy from an entirely differ-

ent field, think of the theory of light: there, people sometimes say that we

have two theories, the electromagnetic theory and the particle theory: each

theory concerns a different property (electromagnetic radiation vs. stream

of photons) and each property is involved in a distinct set of phenomena. In

semantics, this is the solution that Frege adopted to account for reference inindirect contexts. There are two properties, ordinary reference and indirect

reference. Ordinary reference assigns ordinary denotations to expressions

in ordinary contexts, whereas indirect reference assigns indirect denota-

tions (i.e., senses) to expressions in indirect contexts. Correspondingly,

two different families of functions are involved, with disjoint domains and

disjoint ranges:

expression in direct context P 1−→ ordinary denotation

expression in indirect context P 2−→ indirect denotation

Considered as a solution to the Articulation Problem, this is entirely ac-

ceptable: every expression is assigned two semantic values, however, no

expression is assigned more than one value in the same context , so there is



326 DIEGO MARCONI

no risk that unwanted ambiguities may ensue. Context may be said to play

a disambiguating role.

Secondly, we can say that we are dealing with a single set of phenom-

ena and a single property, except that it is a complex property: it has twoaspects, or components, or factors. The property in question is really a pair

of properties, P = {P 1, P 2}; each of P 1 and P 2 maps entities in a single

domain to distinct ranges. This is the solution that was adopted by many

proponents of two-factor semantics: every linguistic expression in every

context has both a conceptual role (inferential role, narrow meaning, etc.)

and a referential role (truth conditions, wide meaning, etc.).

expression (in every context)

P 1−→ conceptual roleP 2

−→ truth conditions

In this solution, it is crucial that P 1 and P 2 are independent properties (not

just different): i.e., P 1 and P 2 never assign entities of the same kind toan expression, nor does (e.g.) P 1 assign an entity that determines another

entity belonging to the range of P 2. For example, conceptual roles are not

truth conditions, nor do they determine truth conditions. Suppose the inde-

pendence condition is not met: suppose, for example, that P 1 determines

the assignment to e of a value V that is in the range of P 2.4 Then, either

V = P 2(e) or V = P 2(e). In the first case, P 2 is, in a sense, redundant: P 1suffices to assign both semantic values to e. So this is not really a solution

to the Articulation Problem, for it is rather a reduction of the second theory

to the first. However, the idea was that the first theory did not suffice, for

it could not deal with some phenomena that were, in turn, accounted for

by the second theory. If on the other hand we are in the second case, i.e.,

V = P 2(e), then e is being regarded as ambiguous: it is assigned two

distinct sets of entities of the same kind at the same time (for example,

two (sets of) truth conditions). This may or may not be acceptable in itself

(perhaps e is ambiguous), but anyway corresponds to a different solution

to the Articulation Problem.

The third solution simply consists in treating the phenomena as am-

biguous. In such an account, only one property P is involved, except that

P is not a function (equivalently, it is a function that assigns pairs of values

(of the same kind) to the same entity). For example, when we say that the

word ‘bank’ is ambiguous – for it means both ‘financial institution’ and

‘bordering elevation’ – we are neither saying that there are two semantic

properties of ‘bank’, each relevant to some of its contexts of occurrenceand not to the others, nor that ‘bank’ has a complex meaning, one aspect

of which has to do with finance while the other is connected with rivers;

we are saying that the word, as a lexical item considered in isolation, has




two meanings, i.e., that the meaning-function assigns to ‘bank’ two entities

of the same kind.

expression (in every context)

P

−→ {sense1, sense2}

Similarly, when we say that the sentence ‘Every boy loves a girl’ is se-

mantically ambiguous we are saying that it has two logical forms. There

may be contexts of use such that one rather than the other form is strongly

preferred (i.e., any interpreter in her right mind would read it one way

rather than the other), but the sentence in itself has both. Similarly with de

dicto-de re ambiguities (‘The Pope is necessarily a Catholic’) and every

other bona fide ambiguity.

Clearly, there is nothing inherently wrong with the third solution: it

makes perfect sense to regard certain words and sentences as ambiguous,

and a theory that makes them ambiguous is a perfectly decent theory.

Fodor’s objection against two-factor semantics was perceived as poten-tially devastating because it was aimed at two-factor theories of thoughts,

not of language: we have no intuitions about a thought or a content being

ambiguous. “What on Earth would the content of such a thought be? What

sentence would one use to express it? And, worst of all, would it be true

or would it be false?” (Fodor 1987, 82). Had (two-factor) theories of lan-

guage been at issue, Fodor’s objection would have had a different import:

he could have claimed that it was highly counterintuitive for a theory to

make so many sentences ambiguous by assigning them two distinct and

possibly incompatible truth conditions, but he could not have claimed that

it just made no sense to do so.5 Of course, attributing ambiguity is all right

only if the phenomena we are dealing with (say, linguistic expressions) are

ambiguous; in other words, ambiguity should not just be an artefact of the

theory. The phenomena that the theory declares to be ambiguous should

exhibit the patterns of behaviour that are typical of ambiguous phenomena:

they should pass certain tests; perhaps they should come to be perceived

as ambiguous by the informed observer.

3. CHALMERS’S THEORY

A new semantic framework, two-dimensional semantics, has been in the

field for a few years. It comes in several varieties (for a survey, see

Chalmers, 2002c), though the most thoroughly worked out is undoubtedlythe work of David Chalmers.6 Chalmers is both a Fregean and a Kripkean:

he believes that the spirit, if not the letter, of Frege’s view’ on the notion of

sense can be vindicated (2002a, 6) and that ’a broadly Fregean account of



328 DIEGO MARCONI

meaning is tenable’ (2002a, 35); but he also believes that ‘senses should be

supplemented by a further semantic value, a subjunctive intension’ (2002a,

35) which is meant to capture the Kripkean intuitions concerning coun-

terfactual evaluation. Thus, Chalmers’s is a ‘dualist’ semantic framework that aims at accounting for both the Fregean and the Kripkean intuitions

by exploiting notions from both the Fregean and the Kripkean family. As

such, Chalmers’s theory must face the articulation problem. In this paper,

I will try to answer the question whether the theory is a viable solution to

the problem. I will argue that, in spite of Chalmers’s theoretical brilliance,

technical ability, and generally sound intuitions, the solution he offers is

ultimately unsatisfactory.

Chalmers’s version of two-dimensional semantics was introduced for

the first time in his book The Conscious Mind (Chalmers 1996, 56–65),

where it was intended to ground the crucial inference from ‘World W is

conceivable’ to ‘World W is possible’. In later writings, Chalmers has

radically qualified both the 1996 formulation of the theory and its effective-ness in licensing the inference. I will not elaborate on this, since it is not

my purpose to assess the theory’s effectiveness in grounding Chalmers’s

views on consciousness. I want to examine the theory for its own sake,

as a semantic theory purporting to account for our semantic intuitions,

both Fregean and Kripkean. My presentation of the theory will be based

on Chalmers’s recent work, particularly on 2002c, 2002b, and 2002a; I

will disregard the formulations of (1996) unless they are in substantial

agreement with more recent versions of the theory.7

According to the theory, every linguistic expression has two intensions,

that can be seen as ‘capturing two dimensions of meaning’ (2002c, 4): an

epistemic intension and a subjunctive intension.8

Subjunctive intensionsare familiar objects: they are just the usual functions from possible worlds

to (appropriate) extensions. For example, the subjunctive intension of ‘Wa-

ter is H2O’9 is the constant function that assigns truth to every world;

the subjunctive intension of ‘Water is XYZ’ is the constant function that

assigns falsity to every world; and the subjunctive intension of ‘The king

of France is a liar’ is the function that assigns truth or falsity to a world de-

pending on whether whoever is the unique king of France in that world (if

there is one) is or is not a liar. Correspondingly, the subjunctive intension

of ‘water’ is the function that assigns to each world W the substance that

is water in the actual world (supposedly, H2O), if W has that substance;

and the subjunctive intension of ‘the king of France’ assigns to each world

W the individual who is the king of France in W, if there is one, and someconventional entity or nothing at all otherwise.




Subjunctive intensions determine an expression’s extension in worlds

‘considered as counterfactual’, Chalmers says (2002b, 3, 9; 2002c, 5).

Consequently, they are involved in the semantic evaluation of statements

of such forms as ‘It might have been that S’, or ‘If it had been that S, itwould have been that T’ (2002c, 39). The connection is not entirely clear

(nor is Chalmers explicit about it). The underlying idea seems to be that, by

uttering a statement in the subjunctive mode, we are taking the standpoint

of the actual world: from that standpoint we assert something concerning

worlds that are counterfactual with respect to our standpoint. For example,

in saying ‘Water might have been more nutritious than it is’ we are saying

that there is a counterfactual world where water – actual water, H2O – is

more nutritious than it happens to be; we are not saying that there is a world

where the oceans, lakes and rivers are filled with a different, more nutri-

tious substance. Thus what we mean by ‘water’ in such contexts depends

on what the word picks out in the actual world: an expression’s subjunctive

intension is what the expression means in such contexts. Chalmers saysthat “In considering a world as counterfactual, empirical facts about the

actual world make a difference to how we describe it; in considering a

world as actual, they do not” (2002b 10). For example, in the evaluation

of ’Water might have been more nutritious than it is’ it makes a difference

that, as a matter of empirical fact, water is H2O.10

Epistemic intensions are less familiar and harder to define. Intuitively,

an expression’s epistemic intension determines its extension in a world

considered as actual (1996, 57; 2002b, 8, 2002c, 5, 24). For example,

suppose we are in a world where seas, lakes and rivers are filled with

XYZ: then ‘water’ designates XYZ. Or again, suppose we are in a world

where the star that is brightest in the evening is the planet Mars: if such isthe case, then ‘Hesperus’ turns out to refer to Mars (1996, 65; equivalent

examples in 2002c, 5, 2002a, 8). The immediate Kripkean objection that

there are no such worlds (e.g., because water, being H 2O, has that nature

in all possible worlds) is taken care of by Chalmers by insisting that the

objection depends on a posteriori knowledge: a priori, nothing rules out

the possibility that the watery stuff in seas and lakes is XYZ. For all we

know a priori, water might be XYZ (1996, 61; 2002a, 8–9; 2002c,18).

Epistemic intensions are said to ‘back a priori truth’ (1996, 62), and

also to ‘govern the cognitive and rational relations among thoughts’ (1996,

65; cf. 2002b, 2). They back a priori truth in that ‘If one thought implies

another thought a priori, the epistemic intension associated with the first

entails the epistemic intension associated with the second’ [and, presum-ably, vice-versa] (2002b, 15). They govern cognitive, or rational, relations

in that an expression’s (or a thought’s) cognitive content is supposed to



330 DIEGO MARCONI

be captured by its epistemic intension: for example, the relations between

beliefs, desires and behaviour depend on the involved thoughts’ epistemic

intensions, not on their subjunctive intensions:

Belief states can produce very similar behaviour for apparently systematic reasons, even

when the beliefs have very different subjunctive content: witness the behaviour that my

twin and I produce when we think about twin water and water respectively, or the similarity

between the actions of two people who think I am hungry. A whole dimension of the

explanation of behaviour is hard for subjunctive content to explain. (2002b, 34).

In short, the notion of epistemic intension is meant as an explicatum of the

dimension of meaning on which ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ (or ‘water’

and ‘H2O’) differ, ‘corresponding to the difference in their cognitive and

rational roles’ (2002c, 4).

Formally, a sentence’s epistemic intension is a function from scenarios

to truth values (2002c, 20). For example, ‘Water is XYZ’ is true at a

scenario V if V is an XYZ-scenario. Intuitively, scenarios are maximalepistemic possibilities (2002b, 3, 2002c, 19). An epistemic possibility is

a way the world might turn out to be, for all we know a priori (2002c,

18); it is said to be maximal if it is maximally specific. Chalmers goes

to some length to make these notions precise. He defines two ways in

which scenarios might be understood: as centered possible worlds (i.e.,

possible worlds marked with a ‘center’, which represents the perspective of

the speaker within the world (2002b, 5, 2002c, 5)), or as purely epistemic

entities that are themselves understood as linguistic constructions, i.e., as

equivalence classes of complete sentences in an idealized, purely qualitat-

ive language. A sentence S of L is complete if it is epistemically possible

and there is no D such that both S&D and S&∼D are epistemically pos-

sible (i.e., S does not ‘leave any possibility open’). In the centered-worlds

interpretation, an XYZ-scenario is a world centered on a subject surroun-

ded by XYZ (see 2002b, 5–6). In the purely epistemic interpretation, it

is a complete sentence that entails some qualitative description somehow

amounting to ‘Oceans, lakes etc. contain XYZ’. These alternatives need

not concern us here, nor do the details of the construction.11

Under no interpretation do scenarios really remove the inherent vague-

ness of the idea of epistemic possibility. A statement (or, for that matter,

a thought) is said to be epistemically possible when its negation is not

epistemically necessary (2002c, 21); and it is epistemically necessary

’when in some sense, it rationally must be true’ (ib.). Both notions ap-

pear to presuppose some boundary between knowledge of language andfactual knowledge, if not a full-fledged analytic-synthetic distinction.12

For example, ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ is said to be epistemically

necessary, and ‘Hesperus has never been visible in the evening sky’ to be




epistemically impossible (2002c, 21). So, a statement seems to be epistem-

ically necessary if it expresses minimal semantic competence, whereas

it is epistemically possible if it does not contradict minimal semantic

competence.

13

However, semantic competence is notoriously hard to de-limit. We are told that ‘Water is H2O’ is not epistemically necessary, while

‘Water is watery stuff’ is (1996, 62). We are likewise told that ‘In any

given world, the epistemic intension of water picks out a substance with

certain superficial characteristics (e.g., a clear drinkable liquid)’ (2002b,

3; cf. 2002c, 6); thus ‘Water is a liquid’ and ‘Water is drinkable’ should

be epistemically necessary. These examples suggest an interpretation of

epistemic necessity (and of aprioricity) in terms of Quine’s ‘humble’ ana-

lyticity (Quine, 1973, 78–80): anybody who acquires the word ‘Hesperus’

also comes to believe that Hesperus is visible in the evening sky; similarly,

anybody who acquires the word ‘water’ comes to believe that water is a

drinkable liquid. This would identify epistemic necessity with constitutiv-

ity of semantic competence (Marconi 1997, 30–31). However, these arefuzzy notions: what about ‘Oceans are mostly water’, or ‘Rain is water’,

or ‘Water is used to cook food’? These are truths that a child of four might

ignore; still, few would say that the child doesn’t know the meaning of

‘water’. So the notion of epistemic necessity is vague.

In addition to epistemic and subjunctive intensions, Chalmers also

defines two-dimensional intensions (2002b, 11, 2002c, 6–7, 38, 2002a, 23).

An expression’s two-dimensional intension is intended to ‘capture how its

subjunctive intension will vary, depending on which epistemic possibility

turns out to be actual’ (2002a, 23). Formally, in one formulation (2002c,

38), it is defined as a function from scenarios to subjunctive intensions, or

equivalently as a mapping from (scenario, world) pairs to extensions. Tofigure out the value of the two-dimensional intension of a sentence S at

scenario V for a world W, Chalmers suggests that we ask the question: ‘If

V is actual, then if W had obtained, would it have been the case that S?’

(2002b, 11; cf. 2002a, 23); or in terms of canonical descriptions, ‘If D1

[= the canonical description of V] is the case, then if D2 [= the canonical

description of W] had been the case, would S have been the case?’ (2002c,

38). For example, take an XYZ-scenario VXYZ, and a possible world W in

which the oceans and seas are filled with H2O: the sentence ‘Water is H2O’

is false at (VXYZ, W) for any W, for suppose VXYZ is actual: then ‘water’

designates XYZ; therefore water is XYZ in all possible worlds including

W; consequently, it is not the case that water is H 2O in W (given that VXYZ

is actual). By a parallel argument, ‘Water is XYZ’ is true at (VXYZ, W) forany W. By contrast, at any pair (VH2O, W) ‘Water is H2O’ is true.14



332 DIEGO MARCONI

Why would one need such a theory, assigning to each expression

both a subjunctive and an epistemic intension (or, synthetically, a two-

dimensional intension)? Chalmers’s answer is simple and straightforward:

we need it because meaning, or content is indeed twofold. We cannot getby with just subjunctive content, as people have frequently assumed in

recent years (2002b, 14): subjunctive content does not account for the

cognitive difference between ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ and ‘Hesperus is

Hesperus’, for the difference between believing that Superman is across

the road and believing that Clark Kent is across the road, for Pierre’s

predicament with Londres and London; and it fares very poorly in the

explanation of behaviour (2002b, 15–17). To take care of all such cases we

need epistemic intension. In general, to account for all relevant phenomena

we must assume that a thought (or a sentence) has both an epistemic and a

subjunctive intension.

Chalmers insists that the two intensions are differentially relevant to

different phenomena: for example, epistemic intension must be invokedto explain the informativeness of a thought such as Hesperus is Phos-

phorus or the compatibility of Pierre’s two beliefs (2002b, 15), whereas

subjunctive intension is needed to correctly determine the truth conditions

of counterfactual conditionals (2002b, 10); he also hints at the role of sub-

junctive content in understanding the success ‘of communication and of

collective action’ (2002b, 22). This, however, does not tell us whether both

intensions are also differentially relevant to the interpretation of different

linguistic expressions. For example, is ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ only to be

interpreted epistemically, or is it to be interpreted both ways? Or perhaps

it is to be interpreted epistemically in some cases (e.g., in certain syntactic

contexts) and subjunctively in others? Is a one-one correspondence presup-posed between sentences, or sentences-in-a-context, and the phenomena

that either intension is intended to explain? After all, a semantic theory is,

first and foremost, a device for the interpretation of language; so we need

to be told how the theory is to be put to use in the interpretation of real life

sentences.

Chalmers repeatedly and emphatically rejects the question of which is

the content of a thought, or of a linguistic expression (2002b, 14, 2002a,

24, 2002c, 39); the idea is that every expression has both kinds of content,

the epistemic and the subjunctive. This seems to entail that any sentence

has both an epistemic and a subjunctive reading: are such readings always

alive, so to speak, or are they differentially alive? Depending on what?

There is little doubt that such questions are crucial to the theory’s viabilityas a semantic theory. As we shall shortly see, Chalmers does have answers




to such questions, though they are neither perfectly consistent nor entirely

convincing.

4. FACING THE ARTICULATION PROBLEM

Sometimes, Chalmers appears to suggest that each intension is relevant to

a definite class of syntactic contexts: i.e., a sentence is to be semantically

evaluated (‘read’) epistemically, or subjunctively, or two-dimensionally

depending on its syntactic form.

A sentence is in no sense ambiguous for having both epistemic intensions and subjunctive

intensions; rather, it has a complex semantic value. Different aspects of this semantic value

will be relevant to the evaluation of the sentence in different contexts. In epistemic contexts

(‘it is a priori that S’; ‘it might turn out that S’; ‘if S, then T’), the epistemic intension will

be most relevant. In subjunctive contexts (‘it might have been that S’; ’if it had been that S,

it would have been that T’), the subjunctive intension will be most relevant. In combinedepistemic-subjunctive contexts, the two-dimensional intension will be most relevant.15

There is no need to settle the question of which of these, if any, is the meaning or content

of an expression. (2002c, 39; see also 2002a, 21–23)

Considered as a solution to the Articulation Problem, this is essentially

the first solution: there are three semantic properties, mapping different

domains (sets of contexts) to different entities. Property 1 assigns epi-

stemic intensions to (expressions in) epistemic contexts, property 2 assigns

subjunctive intensions to subjunctive contexts, and property 3 assigns two-

dimensional intensions to combined contexts. The domains are disjoint by

definition: if a context is both epistemic and subjunctive, it is a combined

context.The problem with two-dimensional semantics as a solution of this kind

is twofold: on the one hand, it is not clear that Chalmers’s taxonomy of

contexts is exhaustive; on the other hand, it is doubtful that there is a

perfect, one-one correspondence between syntactic structures and intended

readings, i.e., that (e.g.) all and only syntactically subjunctive contexts are

to be read subjunctively and only subjunctively (i.e., not epistemically).

Let us start with the first difficulty. What about (1)?

Water is XYZ(1)

This is not classified as either an epistemic or a subjunctive context, and it

is certainly not ‘combined’. So, which intension is relevant in the case of (1)? If we want to account for both the Fregean and the Kripkean intuitions

(as Chalmers’s theory would like to), we should not choose, but rather

assign it both intensions: for the Kripkean would regard (1) as necessarily



334 DIEGO MARCONI

false, as it turns out to be if it is evaluated on the basis of its subjunctive in-

tension, whereas the Fregean would regard it as only contingently false (so

she must have the epistemic intension in mind).16 Chalmers’s taxonomy is

silent about (1), et pour cause: either choice would be hard to justify for atheory that will not forsake either the Kripkean or the Fregean intuitions.

Moreover, even in the case of contexts that are explicitly included in

Chalmers’s taxonomy the proposed treatment is unconvincing from the

standpoint of the intuitions that motivate the theory. Take

If water were XYZ, it would have been discovered long ago.(2)

(2), being a counterfactual conditional, is a subjunctive context and ought

to be assigned a subjunctive intension. Now, (2), read subjunctively, is

trivially true, for its antecedent is false at all possible worlds. In this

respect, (2) is on a par with (2):

If water were XYZ, it would never be discovered(2)

This may be all right with some people’s intuitions. However, part of the

point of Chalmers’s theory seemed to consist in vindicating the intuitions

of other people, who feel that (2), if true, is not trivially true (i.e., it is not

true just because water can’t be XYZ); people who feel that, e.g., there

could be arguments for or against (2) or (2 ). Such people are sensitive to

Chalmers’s ‘cognitive’ or ‘rational’ role of the antecedent in both (2) and

(2), which is meant to be captured by the sentence’s epistemic intension.

To do justice to such intuitions, (2) and (2 ) should be read epistemically,

not subjunctively.

So, aside from the difficulty highlighted by (1), the ‘deep’ reason why

Chalmers’s solution cannot be of Type 1 is that the intuitions the theory

is supposed to vindicate do not neatly correspond to linguistic contexts:

e.g., syntactically subjunctive contexts do not invariably elicit Kripkean

intuitions. Contexts cannot be nicely split into epistemic (requiring an

epistemic reading), subjunctive (requiring a subjunctive reading), and

combined (requiring a two-dimensional reading) without begging the issue

against the very intuitions that Chalmers’s theory is intended to vindicate.

Perhaps Chalmers himself is not entirely at ease with his own charac-

terization of two-dimensional semantics as a type-1 solution, for he does

not consistently stick to it throughout his papers. Sometimes, he seems to

be leaning towards a type-2 solution,17 particularly when he insists that,

independently of context, one complex semantic value is assigned to eachlinguistic expression:

If one’s conception of a proposition is a set of possible worlds (or something similar, such

as a structure of intensions), then one could say that S expresses two propositions, an




epistemic proposition and a subjunctive proposition. But if one’s conception of a propos-

ition is more generally of what remains semantically of S once the arbitrary clothing of a

given language is stripped away, then one could say that S expresses a complex proposition

with a two-dimensional structure. One should not run these two conceptions together: for

example, the fact that an utterance of S expresses two propositions in the first sense in noway entails that the utterance is ambiguous, since ambiguity would involve expressing two

propositions in the second sense. (2002a, 25)

Here, Chalmers is stressing that an expression’s semantic value is the com-

plex entity consisting of both the epistemic and the subjunctive intension

(‘S expresses a complex proposition with a two-dimensional structure’).

This is why no ambiguity is involved: if two values were assigned, one

might suspect ambiguity, but this is not the way it works. However, charges

of ambiguity are not so easily rejected. It will not do to say that, although

the word ‘bank’ expresses two notions (the notion of bordering elevation

and the notion of financial institution), it is not really ambiguous for it

really expresses the complex notion {bordering elevation, financial insti-tution} (whereas ambiguity would involve expressing two such complex

notions). Or again, it will not be acceptable to say that the sentence

Every boy loves a girl(3)

is not ambiguous by virtue of having two readings or logical forms,

(∀x)(x is a boy ⊃ (∃y)(y is a girl & x loves y))(3)

(∃y)(y is a girl & (∀x)(x is a boy ⊃ x loves y)),(3)

for it really has one complex logical form, namely {(3), (3)} (it would

be ambiguous if it had two such complex logical forms). The ambiguity

is not avoided simply by regarding two properties, P 1 and P 2, as making

up one semantic value. What matters is the properties’ role in semantic

evaluation: if an expression is to be evaluated on the basis of both P 1 and

P 2, and both properties have the same range, then the expression is being

regarded as semantically ambiguous even if P 1 and P 2 are conceived as

‘parts’ or ‘aspects’ of one semantic whole (remember Fodor’s criticism of

two-factor theories).

Similarly, whether a theory is a type-2 or a type-3 solution to the Ar-

ticulation Problem does not depend on whether different assignments of

semantic values are declared to be packed into a single ‘complex’ assign-ment: it depends – as we saw – on whether the acknowledged semantic

properties are independent. Are the two ‘dimensions’ of meaning that two-

dimensional semantics acknowledges independent semantic properties? Or



336 DIEGO MARCONI

in other words, are epistemic intensions and subjunctive intensions entities

of a different kind?

The answer seems to hinge on how epistemic intensions are defined. For

subjunctive intensions are functions from possible worlds to the appropri-ate extensions, whereas epistemic intensions are functions from scenarios

to extensions; and scenarios may or may not be (centered) possible worlds.

If scenarios are defined as possible worlds, then the conclusion that both

intensions are entities of the same kind can hardly be escaped. If, however,

they are identified with purely epistemic possibilities one is free to main-

tain that the two intensions are not entities of the same kind. Under this

interpretation, Chalmers’s solution to the Articulation Problem would turn

out to be a type-2 solution, a form of two-factor semantics.

However, we saw (p. 326) that type-2 solutions to the Articulation Prob-

lem stand or fall with the actual independence of the semantic factors they

identify. A viable type-2 theory must be such that the factors do not assign

entities of the same kind (otherwise, the theory turns into a type-3 solution,i.e., an ambiguity-ascribing solution).

Now, in the case of Chalmers’s theory we have the following problem.

Take the sentence

Water is necessarily H2O.(4)

Read subjunctively, (4) is true, for the subjunctive intension of ‘Water is

H2O’ is true at all worlds. What about the epistemic reading? No doubt,

there are scenarios at which ‘Water is H2O’ comes out false; therefore, if

we take the epistemic truth conditions of (4) to be such that (4) is true

(at any scenario) just in case ‘Water is H2O’ is verified by every scenario,

then (4) is bound to be false. One may say that, given that scenarios are

intended to be epistemic possibilities, assigning epistemic truth conditions

this way amounts to interpreting the adverb ‘necessarily’ in (4) in terms

of aprioricity (truth in every scenario is just a priori truth).18 However,

the point is that, within the context of a type-2 solution, (4) must have an

epistemic reading alongside a subjunctive one. It is not surprising that the

most natural way of reading (4) epistemically entails that ‘necessarily’ is

read epistemically as well. Notice, however, that ‘water’ is also assigned its

epistemic intension: for otherwise there would not be scenarios at which

‘Water is H2O’ is false. Thus, that (4) comes out false on the epistemic

reading does not just follow from the epistemic interpretation of necessity.

So, if (4) is allowed to receive both readings it will receive conflictingtruth values. To avoid this conclusion, we must force either reading, e.g.,

the subjunctive reading, as Chalmers would have it (2002a, 22). However,

how can this move be justified, if not from the perspective of a type-1




solution?19 But we already saw that Chalmers’s theory cannot be a type-

1 solution to the Articulation Problem; not without betraying its original

inspiration.

So, if every sentence is assigned both an epistemic and a subjunctiveintension in all contexts, some sentences will turn out to receive incompat-

ible truth values. The two intensions, though not of the same kind (at least

under the ‘epistemic possibility’ interpretation of scenarios), determine

incompatible truth values for many sentences. In a way, this is as it should

be: epistemic and subjunctive intensions are meant to yield different truth

conditions for the same sentence:

We can say that . . . S has epistemic truth-conditions (showing how S’s truth depends on

how the world turns out), and subjunctive truth-conditions (showing how S’s truth varies

in counterfactual possibilities) (2002a, 51, cf. 1996, 63).

However, this is enough to rule out Chalmers’s theory as a type-2 solution

to the Articulation Problem, for in type-2 solutions the assigned semantic

values must not interfere with each other.

5. TW O-DIMENSIONAL INTENSION

Let us take stock. We saw that Chalmers’s solution cannot be of type 1,

in spite of his occasional insistence to that effect. It could be regarded as

of type 2, for, strictly, epistemic intensions and subjunctive intensions are

not entities of the same kind; however, if it is so regarded – so that both

the epistemic and the subjunctive intension play a role in the evaluation of

every expression – then conflicting assignments are determined whenever

modal expressions are involved, as in (4). It remains that the theory is

a type-3 solution, i.e., that it solves the Articulation Problem by mak-

ing language systematically ambiguous. Before exploring this possibility,

however, let us pause to wonder whether another option might be open to

us (and to Chalmers): maybe the complex semantic value we need is not

just the pairing of the epistemic and the subjunctive intension (as we have

assumed), but rather their combination into the entity that is called a ‘two-

dimensional intension’.20 Perhaps Chalmers’s theory is a type-2 solution

after all, except that the complex semantic value that is assigned is just

two-dimensional intension. This would contradict Chalmers’s explicit pro-

nouncements to the effect that two-dimensional intension is not relevantto the semantic evaluation of every expression: ‘its full structure will be

relevant only in rare cases’ (2002a, 23), whereas ‘most of the time we need

only appeal to a thought’s epistemic and subjunctive intensions’ (2002b,



338 DIEGO MARCONI

11; the remark can safely be extended to language). Still, let us try, contra

Chalmers.

Let us start with the problematic (1):

Water is XYZ.(1)

The two-dimensional intension of (1) is a function that assigns to a

scenario V a function that assigns to a possible world W the value True

if whatever is water in V is XYZ in W, and the value False if whatever

is water in V is not XYZ in W. Therefore, in an XYZ-scenario (i.e., in

a scenario where the oceans, lakes etc. are replete with XYZ) the two-

dimensional intension of (1) assigns T to all worlds, for water, being XYZ

in V, is XYZ in every W; whereas in a non-XYZ-scenario (e.g., in an H2O-

scenario) it assigns F to all worlds, for water, not being XYZ in V, is not

XYZ in any W. In other words, in any scenario (1) is either necessarily

true or necessarily false. This appears to fit the intuitions that the theory is

trying to preserve: ‘Water is XYZ’ might be true (in that case, it would be

necessarily true); though as a matter of fact it is false, indeed, necessarily

false. The possibility that (1) be true is captured by the a-priori consistency

of an XYZ-scenario, whereas its de facto necessary falsity is captured by

ours being a non-XYZ-scenario, so that (1) is necessarily false, things

being as they are. This is as it should be.

Or is it? Is the Fregean happy with an evaluation on which water might

be necessarily XYZ? This is not what she had in mind: what she had

in mind was that (1), though false, might be true, i.e., that water might

be XYZ (though it isn’t). As we saw, this is captured by the epistemic

reading: there is a scenario that verifies (1). On the contrary, the intuition

is not captured by the two-dimensional reading, which has no room forthe simple possibility of (1). This is due to the fact that, as Chalmers

says, two-dimensional intension ’captures how its subjunctive intension

will vary, depending on which epistemic possibility turns out to be actual’

(2002a, 23). To each epistemic possibility, two-dimensional intension as-

signs a subjunctive intension which, for sentences like (1), is bound to be

either a necessary truth or a necessary falsity. Consequently, evaluation by

two-dimensional intension fits the intuition that a sentence like (1) might

be necessarily true as well as necessarily false. This is not the Fregean

intuition.

Let us now look at the equally problematic (2):

If water were XYZ, it would have been discovered long ago.(2)

In a non-XYZ-scenario, the two-dimensional intension of (2) determines

a function that assigns T to every world W, i.e., the conditional is trivially




true in all worlds W, independently of whether the nature of water was long

manifest in W. In fact, given a non-XYZ-scenario water is not XYZ in any

W, so the antecedent of (2) is false in every W and the whole conditional

is true everywhere. By contrast, in an XYZ-scenario the two-dimensionalintension of (2) determines a function that assigns T or F to a world W,

depending on whether it was long ago discovered in W that water is XYZ.

For XYZ-worlds, this is obvious. For non-XYZ-worlds (e.g., for worlds

where the oceans, lakes etc. are filled with H2O), one may wonder how

it could have been discovered that water (that is, V XYZ-water) is XYZ;

nevertheless, there is no inconsistency in supposing that it might have. So,

(2) is necessarily – and trivially – true given a non-XYZ-scenario, whereas

it is true of false, depending on W-local discoveries, in worlds relative to an

XYZ-scenario; i.e., it is contingent in an XYZ-scenario. This corresponds

to the following picture: As it turns out (a posteriori), (2) is necessarily and

trivially true (for water cant’ be XYZ); however, for all we know a priori

it might be true, or again it might be false.Such a picture does not seem to fit our intuitions of what (2) means. To

people who don’t take (2) to be trivially true for ‘Kripkean’ reasons, (2)

does not say: Suppose we are in an XYZ-world; then it could (or, it might )

have been discovered long ago that water is XYZ. It says that, in such an

eventuality, it would have been discovered long ago. It is not surprising

that two-dimensional intension does no better than subjunctive intension

with (2) (or other similar counterfactual conditionals): the apparatus of

two-dimensional semantics is simply not fit for dealing with non-trivial

readings of counterfactuals. Indeed, by insisting that subjunctive condi-

tionals like (2) are to be read subjunctively (2002c, 39) Chalmers is just

biting the bullet: we saw that (2), read subjunctively, is bound to be trivial.Two-dimensional semantics inherits from the Kripkean treatment of nat-

ural identities the inability to deal with non-trivial readings of conditionals

like (2); in no way can it do justice to ‘Fregean’ intuitions about their truth

conditions. Even two-dimensional intension doesn’t really help.

6. IS AMBIGUITY THE ANSWER?

If evaluation by two-dimensional intension does not manage to make

Chalmers’s theory into a type-2 solution to the Articulation Problem, it

remains that the solution is of type 3. This would amount to taking both

intensions as entities of essentially the same kind, as Chalmers himself didin the past and still does occasionally.21

In one of his papers, Chalmers says that the notion of necessity should

be recognized as ambiguous: there is an epistemic variety of necessity and



340 DIEGO MARCONI

a ‘subjunctive’, or metaphysical variety, ‘with two corresponding means

of evaluation in possible worlds’ (2002d, 4). If the notion of necessity is

ambiguous, then it is natural to assume that the notion of possibility is

likewise ambiguous, for otherwise the two notions would not be fully inter-definable. But if the notions are ambiguous, then the words ‘possible’ and

‘necessary’ must also be ambiguous, as such words are taken to express

the notions of possibility and necessity, respectively. So ’It is possible that

S’ and ‘It is necessary that S’ are both ambiguous. Therefore, ‘It might

be that S’ is also ambiguous, for it is (usually taken to be) synonymous

with ‘It is possible that S’. It is then natural to conclude that ‘It might have

been that S’ and ’It might not have been that S’ are both ambiguous: it

would be surprising if the ambiguity of ’might’ did not carry over to the

latter contexts. This conclusion appears to conflict with Chalmers’s claim

that ‘It might have been that S’ is to be read subjunctively; however, we

saw that such a claim does not quite agree with the intuitions that underlie

the theory (this is one reason why Chalmers’s solution of the ArticulationProblem cannot be considered to be of type 1).

Now, it seems that if the modal notions and the modal idioms are am-

biguous, then many other expressions are bound to be ambiguous as well.

Consider the statement

Cats are Martian robots(5)

and suppose we want to say that it is possible in one sense of ‘possible’,

though not in the other (or equivalently, consider the statement ‘Cats might

be Martian robots’ and suppose we want to say that it is true in one sense

of ‘might’ but false in the other). (5) is possible in one sense, for we can

imagine – a priori – a world or scenario in which the furry, self-moving,

meowing objects we call ‘cats’ are Martian artefacts; it is not possible in

the other sense, for, things being as they are (i.e., cats being animals with a

certain DNA), there is no possible world in which something would have

a different nature and still be a cat .

Now suppose that the word ‘cat’ is not ambiguous in any way: it has one

and only one intension, which is a function that assigns to every possible

world the species ‘cat’ (or the individuals in that world that have the same

nature as actual cats). If so, then there is no world where ‘cat’ picks out a

Martian robot and not an animal: so there is no room for (5) to be possible

in the former, ‘epistemic’ sense. If on the other hand we take the intension

of ‘cat’ to be a function that assigns to each possible world the furry, self-moving, meowing beings of that world, then (5) is possible in the epistemic

sense, and there is no way we could justifiedly declare it to be impossible.

In other words, the ambiguity of the modal notions and idioms carries with




it the ambiguity of many other expressions, including natural-kind words

and proper names.

As we noticed, there is nothing inherently wrong in regarding natural

language (or fragments of it) as systematically ambiguous. It may be thatevery sentence has both an epistemic and a subjunctive reading, differing in

their inferential potential. However, the alleged ambiguity must stand up to

test. For example, genuine ambiguities are such that one can imagine (and

occasionally find) a language in which the ambiguity does not materialize.

As Saul Kripke says,

We . . . have two methodological considerations that can be used to test any alleged ambigu-

ity. ‘Bank’ is ambiguous; we would expect the ambiguity to be disambiguated by separate

and unrelated words in some other languages. Why should the two separate senses be

reproduced in languages unrelated to English? First, then, we can consult our linguistic

intuitions, independently of any empirical investigation. Would we be surprised to find

languages that used two separate words for the two alleged senses of the given word? If

so, then, to that extent our linguistic intuitions are really intuitions of a unitary concept,rather than of a word that expresses two distinct and unrelated senses. Second, we can ask

empirically whether languages are in fact found that contain distinct words expressing the

allegedly distinct senses. If no such language is found, once again this is evidence that a

unitary account of the word or phrase in question should be sought (Kripke 1979, 19).

I propose to subject Chalmers’s theory (interpreted as a type-3 theory) to

a slightly modified version of Kripke’s test: let us see if we can imagine a

language in which the alleged ambiguity would be disambiguated.

Consider proper names. We know that every proper name has both

an epistemic and a subjunctive intension: for example, the subjunctive

intension of a standard token of ‘Hesperus’ is the constant function that

assigns the planet Venus to each world (as ’Hesperus’ refers to Venus in the

actual world), while its epistemic intension is the function that assigns toeach scenario (roughly) the evening star of that scenario, if there is one.22

Actually, that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘the evening star’ have the same epistemic

intension is not to be taken for granted:

For many or most terms, there may be no description (and certainly no short description)

with the same epistemic intension as the term.[. . . ] In these cases, the best one can hope

for is a description whose epistemic intension approximates that of the original term: as

with ‘justified true belief’ for ‘knowledge’, or ‘the clear drinkable liquid in the oceans and

lakes’ for water, and so on. These descriptions may give one a rough and ready sense of

how a term’s epistemic intension functions, but they do no more than that (2002a, 22).

To bypass this sort of difficulties, let us stipulate that the description ‘the

Hesperizer’ has the same epistemic intension as ‘Hesperus’ – an intensionthat is roughly approximated by the intension of ‘the evening star’. We

shall then say that the epistemic intension of ‘Hesperus’ is the function

that assigns to each world the Hesperizer of that world (if there is one).



342 DIEGO MARCONI

We are now treating a proper name’s double intension as involving

ambiguity. Consequently, all sentences in which a proper name occurs are

likewise ambiguous. For example, the sentence

Napoleon had dark hair(6)

is ambiguous: it expresses two different propositions, it has two distinct

sets of truth conditions, etc. Could there be a language in which either

proposition would be expressed by a different sentence, so that no ambi-

guity would occur? Let us try the following, that I’ll call ‘Disenglish’ for

‘disambiguated English’. In Disenglish, the proper name ‘Napoleon’ has

no epistemic intension: its one and only intension is the constant function

that assigns Napoleon to every possible world. Or in other words, ‘Na-

poleon’ is just a rigid designator: whatever descriptive material may be

associated with the word ‘Napoleon’ is not supposed to play any semantic

role whatever: emphatically, it does not determine the truth conditionsof sentences in which the word ‘Napoleon’ occurs. On the other hand,

Disenglish has another expression, ‘the Napoleonizer’, whose (one and

only) intension is exactly the epistemic intension that the English name

‘Napoleon’ is supposed to have. Thus the sentence of Disenglish

Napoleon had dark hair(6)

only expresses one proposition, i.e., the subjunctive proposition expressed

by (6). The epistemic proposition expressed by (6) is expressed in Diseng-

lish by (6):

The Napoleonizer had dark hair(6)

Let us now consider the sentence of Disenglish ‘Napoleon had dark hair’,

i.e., (6). Suppose that a Disenglish-speaking child hears the sentence for

the first time and asks the quite legitimate question ‘Who is Napoleon?’, or

‘Whom are you talking about?’. It is plausible to suppose that his parents

will answer the question by some linguistic characterization that fits Na-

poleon as closely as their education and patience allows them to provide.

Thus the child will associate to the sound ‘Napoleon’ a certain amount of

descriptive material. However, his parents, as competent speakers of Dis-

english, will tell him not to pay any special attention to such an association:

the word ‘Napoleon’ – the parents will say – refers to Napoleon, not to theentity that fits such and such a description. For that entity, Disenglish has

another expression, namely ‘the Napoleonizer’. The child may feel quite

confused. However, his Kripkean parents will have no difficulty in helping




him sort out his confusion: they will tell him that, though Napoleon did

as a matter of fact Napoleonize, he might not have Napoleonized (while

still being Napoleon); that it is conceivable that the historians discover that

Napoleon did not Napoleonize after all, whereas they could never discoverthat Napoleon was not Napoleon; and the like. In short, they will be able to

motivate the existence in Disenglish of two expressions with quite distinct

meanings, ‘Napoleon’ and ‘the Napoleonizer’.

So, the child’s confusion is not the point. The point is, rather, this: as

Disenglish speakers learn proper names, in many cases, by associating

descriptions with them, just like we do in English, couldn’t the epistemic

reading arise even with Disenglish sentences such as (6)? For there is little

doubt that it is the steady association of descriptive notions with proper

names that motivates the epistemic reading of English sentences in the

first place. Thus the ambiguity will arise in Disenglish exactly as it does in

English, and for the same reasons.

Against this argument, however, it could be objected that, as we under-stand the distinction between a description that determines an expression’s

truth conditions, on the one hand, and a mere reference-fixing descrip-

tion on the other hand, there is no reason why we should not attribute

the same understanding to speakers of Disenglish.23 Consequently, even

though speakers of Disenglish may learn proper names and natural kind

words by associating them with certain descriptions, there is no reason

why they should not be constantly aware that such descriptions do not give

the meaning of the names and words they are associated with. Thus, a

competent speaker of Disenglish will never assent to (7):

Water is H2O, but water might not have been H2O;(7)

he will say that watery stuff might not have been H2O, but water – never.

But on the other hand – it could be replied – if the ambiguity does (sup-

posedly) arise in English in spite of both our awareness of the descriptions’

double role and the presence of such expressions as ‘the watery stuff’, why

shouldn’t it arise in Disenglish as well? It seems that either there really is

no such ambiguity in English (against the hypothesis), or if there is, the

norms of Disenglish will not keep it from showing up there as well. Which

is exactly the conclusion I think should be drawn from the experiment.

Thus, we have not been entirely successful in imagining a language that

would not carry the alleged ambiguity. The invited conclusion is that thereis no epistemic/subjunctive ambiguity (or, it is not the kind of ambiguity

that is sensitive to Kripke’s test). Then Chalmers’s theory is not a type-3

solution to the Articulation Problem either.



344 DIEGO MARCONI

7. CONCLUSION

We saw that Chalmers’s theory cannot be classified as a type-1 solution

to the Articulation Problem, for the contention that the several intensions

(epistemic, subjunctive, two-dimensional) apply to expressions in system-

atically different contexts cannot really be sustained: if the intuitions on

which the theory is based are to be vindicated, there have to be contexts

in which an expression can be read both epistemically and subjunctively.

On the other hand, the theory is not really a type-2 solution either, for the

several factors of the alleged complex intension that every expression is

assigned do interfere (at least in certain cases) in semantic evaluation. So

the theory is not a ‘two-factor’ theory, or anyway not a tenable two-factor

theory. Moreover, the theory is not easily regarded as a type-3 solution,

i.e., as a theory that treats every linguistic expression as ambiguous, or at

any rate, the kind of ambiguity that would turn out to be involved does not

behave like standard semantic ambiguity.So it seems that the theory is not a viable solution to the Articulation

Problem. However, our discussion of the last case (type 3) can perhaps

throw some light on what the theory is really about (and on its considerable

merits, if seen from the right viewpoint).

The basic intuition is that many sentences, such as

Cats might be Martian robots

Cats could not be Martian robots

Water is necessarily H2O

It is possible that water is XYZ

admit of a double reading. The two readings cannot be made to correspond

to different syntactic structures (this is why the theory is not a type-1 solu-

tion), and they represent different evaluations, issuing in different truth

values (therefore the theory is not a type-2 solution, a ‘two-factor’ the-

ory). A formal apparatus can be developed systematically to yield the two

readings: such an apparatus would borrow heavily from Frege to derive

one reading and from Kripke to derive the other. However, the interesting

point is not so much the formal apparatus as the double reading itself. For

if the two readings are really there, and they materialize wherever certain

expressions occur (proper names, natural-kind names, the modal idioms)

so that they reappear in any language that has such expressions, then the

issue between the Fregean theories and the Kripkean theories is, in a sense,settled: either family of theories is simply an attempt at privileging one

reading over the other: an attempt that is bound to fail. There may be con-

texts for which one reading is strongly favoured (Chalmers’s theory may




be seen as an attempt at exploiting this difference among contexts), but no

context where one reading is definitely ruled out. There are people who

think that ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ and ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ are both a

priori true (see Chalmers, 2002c, 70), and there are people who think that‘Water might not have been H2O’ is all right as it stands (including Kripke

himself, before tutoring his own intuitions). This appears to indicate that

both the Kripkean and the Fregean intuitions are extremely resilient: there

is little hope that the Fregean will succeed in re-educating the Kripkean, or

vice versa. We must learn to live with both accounts.

In a way, this is exactly what Chalmers is suggesting. However, the

form of his proposal is, I believe, misleading to say the least. To say that

many expressions admit of a double reading is not to say that every expres-

sion has a ‘complex’ semantic value, nor is it to say that expressions have

different semantic values in different contexts (we saw that both claims can

be found in Chalmers). Both formulations betray a yearning for a unified

semantic theory that would generate both readings in a clean, consistentfashion. There cannot be any such theory, any more than there could be

one for, say, the de dicto/de re double reading: there cannot be a theory

that definitely and uniquely assigns the de re reading to certain contexts

and the de dicto reading to other contexts, or a theory that assigns one

complex {de dicto, de re} reading to every expression independently of

context.24

What kind of ambiguity is involved in the double reading? For we saw

that it is not an ambiguity of the usual kind, i.e., a straightforward semantic

ambiguity: if it were, there could be a disambiguating language. To this

question I do not have a definite answer. It may be that Chalmers is on the

right track when he suggests that the basic ambiguity concerns the modalnotions, possibility and necessity (this would explain why the ambiguity

will not go away even in a language that disambiguates the modal idioms:

for possibility and necessity would still be involved in the evaluation of

non-modal expressions). Or, it may be that the epistemic reading is best

interpreted as metasemantic rather than semantic, as Robert Stalnaker has

suggested (2001). This, too, would explain why the ambiguity will not go

away: for the epistemic reading would then express the possibility that a

word (such as ‘Hesperus’ or ‘water’) has a different semantic value than

it does have, and this possibility will concern any language that has (the

equivalents of) such words. In either case, there would be no room for a

unified theory of meaning accounting for both readings at the same time.



346 DIEGO MARCONI

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am indebted to discussions with Paolo Casalegno, Manuel Garcia

Carpintero, Chris Gauker, Carlo Penco, Alfredo Paternoster, and AlbertoVoltolini. I also greatly benefited from an extended exchange with David

Chalmers.

NOTES

1 It would perhaps be more appropriate to label the paradigm ‘Millian’; it may be doubted

that Saul Kripke himself is an unqualified Millian. However, David Chalmers refers to

Kripke’s arguments and the intuitions they rely upon as having a prima facie bearing

against the Fregean paradigm (see Chalmers 2002a). My label reflects this opposition.2 For simplicity’s sake, we shall suppose that all theories presuppose the same syntactic

analysis of the languages they apply to.

3 Two semantic values are of the same type if they belong to the same ontological domain:e.g., if they are functions from the same domain to the same range.4 More precisely, we are supposing that f 1,j (e) = V entails that e is (also) assigned a

value V ’ in the range of the f 2’s.5 In fact, in Fodor and Lepore (1992) the same objection is aimed at two-factor theories

of language: “What prevents there being and expression that has an inferential role appro-

priate to the content 4 is a prime but the truth conditions appropriate to the content water

is wet ? (We assume that no adequate semantics could allow such an expression. What

on earth would it mean?)” (1992, 170). Fodor and Lepore do not consider the ambiguity

option. Clearly, it was far from the intentions of the two-factor theoreticians whose views

they are criticizing.6 The earliest formulation of the two-dimensional picture is usually considered to be

found in Stalnaker (1978). Among the early versions, Tichy (1983) is in some respects

closest to Chalmers’s proposal. Chalmers critically discusses Tichy’s views in 2002c.7 Readers who are interested in the discussion leading to the recent formulations of

Chalmers’s theory are invited to consult Chalmers (2002c), and the unabridged version

of the present paper at http://www.lett.unipmn.it/docenti/marconid/personale.htm.8 In the theory’s first version (1996), they had been called ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’. In

2002c, Chalmers uses ‘1-intension’ and ‘2-intension’ as generic names or labels for the

pre-theoretical entities that supposedly fit the two sets of intuitions to be captured by a

two-dimensional semantic theory (see 2002c, 6).9 In Chalmers’s presentation, the bearers of semantic properties are sentence tokens, for

two reasons. First, Chalmers wants to compare his epistemic intensions with contextual

intensions, which are obviously attributed to tokens. Secondly, Chalmers admits that an ex-

pression’s epistemic intension may vary across its uses (although there may be expressions

whose epistemic intension is constant across all its tokens) (2002a, 32). I will disregard the

matter, as it does not seem to make a difference for the purposes of this paper.10 However, with non-rigid expressions it doesn’t necessarily work that way. Take the

statement ‘The prime minister of Italy might have been taller than he is’. By that state-

ment, we are not necessarily saying that Mr. Berlusconi – who, as a matter of fact, is the

prime minister- might have been taller; we might as well be saying that a different and




taller man (for example, Mr. Rutelli) might have been prime minister (As is well known,

the ambiguity was first pointed out by Bertrand Russell in (1905); see e.g., Lycan 2000,

44–45). But if Chalmers’s remark applied in this case, only the first reading would be

admissible. Actually, the real point seems to be essentialism: counterfactual water must be

H2O, whereas the counterfactual prime minister need not be Berlusconi. What ‘makes adifference’ for subjunctive intension are not just the empirical facts about the actual world,

but those facts together with the nature of the expression that is being evaluated.11 Epistemic intensions for subsentential expressions are defined in slightly different ways

depending on how scenarios are understood. If they are understood epistemically, i.e., if

they are equivalence classes of epistemically complete sentences in an idealized language

(2002c, 25), we proceed as follows. Let D be a canonical description of a scenario V.

Two singular terms T1 and T2 are equivalent under V if D implies ‘T1 = T2’. Then an

individual in V is defined as an equivalence class of singular terms (e.g., Phosphorus is

|Phosphorus|D ). The epistemic intension of a general term such as ‘water’ will pick out a

class C ‘in’ V such that x is in C iff D implies ‘T is water’ for some T that refers to x (i.e.,

for some T in the equivalence-class that coincides with x).12 Frank Jackson, also a proponent of two-dimensional semantics, does endorse some form

of analytic-synthetic distinction (1998, 45–46). It doesn’t seem to me that Chalmers isequally explicit on the matter.13 Chalmers himself points out the connection between competence with an expression

and the ability to know its extension ‘given sufficient information about the world’, which

is what knowledge of the epistemic intension is about (2002a, 7).14 In 2002c, Chalmers also introduces a slightly different definition of two-

dimensional intension, which, however, appears to run into some problems (for

a discussion, see the Appendix in the unabridged version of this paper at

http://www.lett.unipmn.it/docenti/marconid/personale.htm.). Here I will be relying upon

the definition given above.15 An example of a combined context is ‘If water is XYZ, then water could not be H 2O’

(2002a, 23).16 I will separately deal with the suggestion that (1) may be assigned a two-dimensional

intension (see Section 5).17 Chalmers himself says that “there is no question that [he] intended a type-2 interpret-

ation”, and that “[he has] no sympathy with type-1 or type-3 interpretations” (personal

communication).18 “If you think that the sentence [‘Water is necessarily H 2O’] has an epistemic reading

on which it is false, then I am happy to play along, but I note that here any ambiguity will

then be entirely due to an ambiguity in ‘necessarily’ (which can express either epistemic

or subjunctive necessity), and will have nothing to do with conflicting 2D semantic values

per se” (D. Chalmers, personal communication).19 In fact, Chalmers’s move to that effect is within a generally type-1 setting: see 2002a,

43–46.20 This has been suggested in discussion by several people, among whom Martine Nida-

Rümelin and Wlodek Rabinowicz.21 “There are two sets of truth conditions associated with any statement” (1996, 63);

“These two sets of truth conditions yield two propositions associated with any statement”(ib.); etc. For more recent formulations: “There is a robust and natural notion of narrow

content such that narrow content has truth conditions of its own” (2002b, 2); “. . . ‘water

is H2O’. In a centered world considered as actual, this is true roughly when the clear,



348 DIEGO MARCONI

drinkable liquid around the center of that world has a certain pattern of chemical structure.

In a world considered as counterfactual, it is true when H2O is H2O’ (2002c, 6); ’“ ‘water

is XYZ’ is true at the XYZ-world considered as actual, but false at the XYZ-world con-

sidered as counterfactual” (2002c, 24). All these formulations appear to presuppose that

both intensions are functions from possible worlds to extensions.22 From now on I will make no distinction between scenarios and centered possible worlds.

The ‘centered’ feature will be irrelevant to the examples I will be dealing with.23 This objection was raised by Paolo Casalegno in discussion.24 This could be done, of course, but only trivially, as one could define a ‘(unique) complex

logical form’ for sentences such as ‘Every boy loves a girl’ (see above, p. 15).

REFERENCES

Block, N.: 1986, ‘An Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology’, Midwest Studies in

Philosophy 10, 615–678.

Chalmers, D.: 1996, The Conscious Mind , Oxford University Press, Oxford.Chalmers, D.: 2002a, ‘On Sense and Intension’,

http://www.u.arizona.edu/ ∼chalmers/mmm-papers.html; now in J. Tomberlin (ed.),

Philosophical Perspectives 16: Language and Mind , Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 135–182.

Chalmers, D. 2002b, ‘The Components of Content’,

http://www.u.arizona.edu/ ∼chalmers/mmm-papers.html; a revised version in D.

Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford

University Press, Oxford.

Chalmers, D.: 2002c, ‘The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics’,

http//www.u.Arizona.edu/ ∼chalmers/mmm-papers.html.

Chalmers, D.: 2002d, ‘The Tyranny of the Subjunctive’,

http://www.u.arizona.edu/ ∼chalmers/mmm-papers.html.

Evans, G.: 1982, The Varieties of Reference, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Field, H.: 1977, ‘Logic, Meaning, and Conceptual Role’, Journal of Philosophy 74, 379–

409.Fodor, J.: 1987, Psychosemantics, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

Fodor, J. and E. Lepore: 1992, Holism, Blackwell, Oxford.

Frege, G.: 1892, ‘Ueber Sinn und Bedeutung’. Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosoph-

ische Kritik 100, 25–50. English transl. In P. Geach and M. Black (eds.), Translations

from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, Blackwell, Oxford.

Jackson, F.: 1998, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis,

Clarenden Press, Oxford.

Kripke, S.: 1979, ‘Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference’, in P. A. French, T. E.

Uehling and H. K. Wettstein (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of

Language, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

Loar, B.: 1981. Mind and Meaning, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Lycan, W.: 2000, Philosophy of Language, Routledge, London.

Marconi, D.: 1997, Lexical Competence, MIT Press, Cambridge MA.McGinn, C.: 1982, ‘The Structure of Content’, in A. Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object ,

Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Quine, W. V. O.: 1952, ‘Notes on Existence and Necessity’, in L. Linsky (ed.), Semantics

and the Philosophy of Language, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, IL.




Quine, W. V. O.: 1973, The Roots of Reference, Open Court, La Salle, IL.

Russell, B.: 1905, ‘On Denoting’, Mind 14, 479-493.

Salmon, N.: 1986, Frege’s Puzzle, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

Stalnaker, R.: 1978, ‘Assertion’, in P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics: Pragmatics, Vol.

9, Academic Press, New York, pp. 315-322.Stalnaker, R.: 2001, ‘On Considering a Possible World as Actual’, Proceedings of the

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 141-156.

Tichy, P.: 1983, ‘Kripke on Necessity a Posteriori’, Philosophical Studies 43, 225-241.

Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici

Via G. Ferraris 116

I-13100 Vercelli

Italy

E-mail: [email protected]



Documents

Marconi, D. Two-Dimensional Semantics and the Articulation Problem