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LEGAL ETHICS: DISBARMENT

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 7158, March 09, 015

 !OLANDA A. ANDRES, MINETTE A.MERCADO, AND ELITO ".

ANDRES , Complainants, v. ATT!.SALIMATHAR V. NAMBI, Respondent .

Based on the foregoing, we have no basis tohold respondent administratively liable forgross ignorance of the law. However, we notethat respondent had consistently andobstinately disregarded the Court’s and IBP’sorders. It is on record that respondent totallyignored the Court’s June , !""#$esolution%& directing him to 'le his

Comment. He also failed to attend themandatory conference before the IBP’sCommission on Bar (iscipline despitenotice.%) *either did he 'le his PositionPaper. +s a former abor +rbiter, respondentshould -now that orders of the court are notmere re/uests but directives which shouldhave been complied with promptly andcompletely.0!" He disregarded the oath hetoo- when he was accepted to the legalprofession 1to obey the laws and the legalorders of the duly constituted legal

authorities.’ 2 2 2 His conduct wasunbecoming of a lawyer who is called uponto obey court orders and processes and ise2pected to stand foremost in complyingwith court directives as an o3cer of thecourt.0!% 4ection !, $ule %5& of the $ules of Court provides64ec. !. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; groundstherefor . 7 + member of the bar may bedisbarred or suspended from his o3ce asattorney by the 4upreme Court for any

deceit, malpractice, or other grossmisconduct in such o3ce, grossly immoralconduct, or by reason of his conviction of acrime involving moral turpitude, or for anyviolation of the oath which he is re/uired tota-e before admission to practice, or fora #$%%&'% ($)o*+($+c+ o& a- %a#&'%or(+r o& a )'+r$or co'r/, or for corruptlyor willfully appearing as an attorney for aparty to a case without authority so to do.

 8he practice of soliciting cases at law for thepurpose of gain, either personally or through

paid agents or bro-ers, constitutesmalpractice. 9:mphasis supplied;

Considering that this appears to berespondent’s 'rst infraction, we 'nd it properto impose on him the penalty of reprimandwith warning that commission of the same orsimilar infraction will be dealt with moreseverely.

HEREORE, theCourt RE"RIMANDS respondent +tty4alimathar

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warranted when a lawyer abandons his

lawful wife and maintains an illicit

relationship with another woman who has

borne him a

child.5&chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

+tty. Catindig’s subse/uent marriage during

the subsistence of his previous one de'nitely

manifests a deliberate disregard of the

sanctity of marriage and the marital vows

protected by the Constitution and a3rmed

by our laws. By his own admission, +tty.

Catindig made a moc-ery out of the

institution of marriage, ta-ing advantage of 

his legal s-ills in the process. He e2hibited a

deplorable lac- of that degree of morality

re/uired of him as a member of the bar,

which thus warrant the penalty of 

disbarment.

 8he Court is not unmindful of the rule that

the power to disbar must be e2ercised with

great caution, and only in a clear case of 

misconduct that seriously a>ects the

standing and character of the lawyer as an

o3cer of the Court and as a member of the

bar. here a lesser penalty, such as

temporary suspension, could accomplish the

end desired, disbarment should never bedecreed. *evertheless, in this case, the

seriousness of the o>ense compels the Court

to wield its power to disbar, as it appears to

be the most appropriate penalty.

+tty. Catindig’s claim that (r. Pere@’s

allegations against him are not credible since

they are uncorroborated and not supported

by a3davits contrary to 4ection %, $ule %5)

B of the $ules of Court, deserves scant

consideration. air and the purported

love letter to +tty. Baydo that was signed by

+tty. Catindig

 8he Court has consistently held that in

suspension or disbarment proceedings

against lawyers, the lawyer en=oys the

presumption of innocence, and the burden of

proof rests upon the complainant to prove

the allegations in his complaint. 8heevidence re/uired in suspension or

disbarment proceedings is preponderance of

evidence.5)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

 8he presentation of the anonymous letter

that was received by (r. Pere@ only proves

that the latter indeed received a letter

informing her of the alleged relations

between the respondents it does not prove

the veracity of the allegations therein4imilarly, the supposed love letter, if at all

only proves that +tty. Catindig wrote +tty

Baydo a letter professing his love for her. It

does not prove that +tty. Baydo is indeed in a

relationship with +tty. Catindig

HEREORE, in consideration of theforegoing dis/uisitions, the Court resolves

to ADO"T the recommendations of theCommission on Bar (iscipline of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines. +tty. 8ristan

+. Catindig is found G;ILT!  of grossimmorality and of violating the awyer’s

?ath and $ule %."%, Canon and $ule ."5

of the Code of Professional $esponsibility and

is hereby DISBARRED from the practice oflaw.

et a copy of this (ecision be entered into

the records of +tty. 8ristan +. Catindig in the

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?3ce of the Bar Con'dant and his name

is ORDERED STRICEN from the $oll of +ttorneys. i-ewise, copies of this (ecision

shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of 

the Philippines and circulated by the Court

+dministrator to all appellate and trial courts.

 8he charge of gross immorality against +tty.

Karen :. Baydo is hereby DISMISSED forlac- of evidence.

 8his (ecision ta-es e>ect immediately.

LABOR LA: ILLEGAL DISMISSAL

G.R. No. 11

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*onetheless, the Court agrees with the C+’s

dismissal of the award of moral and

e2emplary damages for lac- of merit. 8here

is no satisfactory proof that the concerned

o3cers of HPC acted in bad faith or with

malice in terminating Farrales.

*otwithstanding the +’s assertion to this

e>ect, Farrales’ bare allegations of bad faith

deserve no credence, and neither is the mere

fact that he was illegally dismissed su3cient

to prove bad faith on the part of HPC’s

o3cers.5& But concerning the award of 

attorney’s fees, Farrales was dismissed for a

Limsy charge, and he was compelled to

litigate to secure what is due him which HPC

un=usti'ably withheld.

HEREORE, premises considered, thepetition for review is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

%elas#o, "r., (Chairperson), $eralta, %illarama,

 "r., and "ardelea, ""., concur.

LABOR LA: ILLEGAL DISMISSAL

G.R. No. 19088, March 13, 015

ONORE V. MONTERO, EDGARDO N.ESTRA=ERO, RENING ". "ADRE, GABRIELA. MADERA, HERMINIO T. TACLA,NELSON C. VILORIA, DEMETRIO >."A?ARILLO, ALREDO R. AGANON,RE!NALDO AVILA, ALBERT T. R;I4,NESTOR !. !AGO, HART! M. T;"ASI,AG;STIN R. AVILA, ?R. OR MARCOS R.AVILA, BONIACIO B. GAANO, ?OSELITO

D. C;ENTA, ?ONAS ". ESTILONG,DOMINADOR C. CANARIA, GENARO C.RONDARIS, HERARDO M. D;LA!,RANLIN A. RAVINA, ?R., AND R;BENC. CABELLO, $etitioners, v. TIMESTRANS"ORTATION CO., INC., ANDSANTIAGO RONDARIS, MENCOR"TRANS"ORT S!STEMS, INC., VIRGINIA R.MENDO4A AND RE!NALDOMENDO4A, Respondents

 8he petitioners contend that the period when

they 'led a labor case on Day %, %))& but

withdrawn on Darch !!, %))) should be

e2cluded from the computation of the four

year prescriptive period for illegal dismissa

cases. However, the Court had already ruled

that the prescriptive period continues even

after the withdrawal of the case as though no

action has been 'led at all. 8he applicability

of +rticle %%EE5of the Civil Code in labor

cases was upheld in the case

of &nter#ontinental Broad#asting Corporation

v. $anganiban5& where the Court held that

although the commencement of a civi

action stops the running of the statute of

prescription or limitations, its dismissal or

voluntary abandonment by plainti> leavesthe parties in e2actly the same position as

though no action had been commenced at

all.05)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In li-e manner, while the 'ling of the

complaint for illegal dismissal before the +

interrupted the running of the prescriptive

period, its voluntary withdrawal left the

petitioners in e2actly the same position as

though no complaint had been 'led at all 8he withdrawal of their complaint e>ectively

erased the tolling of the reglementary

period.

+ prudent review of the antecedents of the

claim reveals that it has in fact prescribed

due to the petitioners’ withdrawal of their

labor case doc-eted as *$C $+BI"%

%""." Hence, while the 'ling of the said

case could have interrupted the running of

the fouryear prescriptive period, the

voluntary withdrawal of the petitioners

e>ectively cancelled the tolling of the

prescriptive period within which to 'le their

illegal dismissal case, leaving them in e2actly

the same position as though no labor case

had been 'led at all. 8he running of the four

year prescriptive period not having been

interrupted by the 'ling of *$C $+BI"%

%"", the petitioners’ cause of action had

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already prescribed in four years after their

cessation of employment on ?ctober !#,

%)) and *ovember !, %)). Conse/uently,

when the petitioners 'led their complaint for

illegal dismissal, separation pay, retirement

bene'ts, and damages in !""!, their claim,

clearly, had already been barred by

prescription.%chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

4adly, the petitioners have no one but

themselves to blame for their own

predicament. By their own allegations in

their respective complaints, they have barred

their remedy and e2tinguished their right of 

action. +lthough the Constitution is

committed to the policy of social =ustice and

the protection of the wor-ing class, it does

not necessary follow that every labor dispute

will be automatically decided in favor of labor. 8he management also has its own

rights. ?ut of concern for the less privileged

in life, this Court, has more often than not

inclined, to uphold the cause of the wor-er in

his conLict with the employer. 4uch leaning,

however, does not blind the Court to the rule

that =ustice is in every case for the

deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the

established facts and applicable law and

doctrine.!

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

HEREORE, the (ecision dated +ugust!&, !"") and $esolution dated (ecember %%,

!"") of the Court of +ppeals in C+.$. 4P

*o. %"#!#" are AIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

%elas#o, "r., (Chairperson), Del

Castillo,' %illarama, "r., and "ardelea, "".,

concur

LEGAL ETHICS: DISBARMENT

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 759@, March 11, 015

ALVIN S. ELICIANO, Complainant , v. ATT!CARMELITA BA;TISTALO4ADA, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

4u3ce it to say that practice of lawembraces Many activity, in or out of courtwhich re/uires the application of law, legaprocedure, -nowledge, training ande2perience.M It includes MNperformingO actswhich are characteristics of the NlegalOprofessionM or MNrendering any -ind ofOservice NwhichO re/uires the use in anydegree of legal -nowledge ors-ill.0%chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the instant case, +tty. o@adas guilt isundisputed. Based on the records, there is nodoubt that +tty. o@adas actuations, that is,in appearing and signing as counsel for andin behalf of her husband, conducting oro>ering stipulationQadmission of factsconducting direct and crosse2amination, alconstitute practice of law. Furthermore, the'ndings of the IBP would disclose that suchactuations of +tty. o@ada of activelyengaging in the practice of law in JuneJuly!"" were done within the period of her two9!;year suspension considering that she wassuspended from the practice of law by thisCourt in Day , !""#. It would then appearthat, at the very least, +tty. o@ada cannotpractice law from !""# to !""&. 8hus, it isclear that when +tty. o@ada appeared forand in behalf of her husband in Civil Case *o.%"%

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forget that she is 'rst and foremost, ano3cer of the court who is bound to obey thelawful order of the Court.

Ander 4ection !, $ule %5& of the $evised$ules of Court, as amended, willfuldisobedience to any lawful order of asuperior court is a ground for disbarment orsuspension from the practice of  law6chan$oblesvirtualawlibrary

4:C. !. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; groundstherefor . + member of the bar may bedisbarred or suspended from his o3ce asattorney by the 4upreme Court for anydeceit, malpractice, or other grossmisconduct in such o3ce, grossly immoralconduct, or by reason of his conviction of acrime involving moral turpitude, or for anyviolation of the oath which he is re/uired tota-e before admission to practice, or for awillful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a

 party to a case without authority to doso. 8he practice of soliciting cases at law forthe purpose of gain, either personally orthrough paid agents or bro-ers, constitutesmalpractice.%E

+tty. o@ada would have deserved a harsher

penalty, but this Court recogni@es the fact

that it is part of the Filipino culture that amidan adversity, families will always loo- out

and e2tend a helping hand to a family

member, more so, in this case, to a spouse.

 8hus, considering that +tty. o@adas

actuation was prompted by her a>ection to

her husband and that in essence, she was

not representing a client but rather a spouse,

we deem it proper to mitigate the

severeness of her penalty.

Following the recent case of %i#tor C. !ingan

v. tty. Romeo Calubauib and "immy $.

Baliga,%# citingMolina v. tty. Magat ,% where

this Court suspended further respondents

from the practice of law for si2 9#; months for

practicing their profession despite this

courts previous order of suspension, we,

thus, impose the same penalty on +tty.

o@ada for representing her husband as

counsel despite lac- of authority to practice

law.

(isbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that

aims to purge the law profession of unworthy

members of the bar. It is intended to

preserve the nobility and honor of the legal

profession. hile the 4upreme Court has the

plenary power to discipline erring lawyers

through this -ind of proceedings, it does so

in the most vigilant manner so as not to

frustrate its preservative principle. 8he

Court, in the e2ercise of its sound =udicia

discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe

punishment if, through it, the end desire of

reforming the errant lawyer is

possible.%&chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

HEREORE, premises considered, +ttyCarmelita 4. Bautistao@ada is

found G;ILT!  of violating 4ection !,%) $ule%5& of the $ules of Court, and is

hereby S;S"ENDED for a period of si2 9#;months from the practice of law, with

a ARNING that a repetition of the same orsimilar o>ense will warrant a more severe

penalty.

et copies of this (ecision be furnished allcourts, the ?3ce of the Bar Con'dant and

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their

information and guidance. 8he ?3ce of the

Bar Con'dant is DIRECTED to append acopy of this (ecision to respondent’s record

as member of the Bar

+tty. o@ada is DIRECTED to inform theCourt of the date of her receipt of this

(ecision, so that we can determine the

rec-oning point when her suspension shal

ta-e e>ect

 8his (ecision is immediately e2ecutory

SO ORDERED

%elas#o, "r., (Chairperson), %illarama, "r.,

Reyes, and "ardelea, ""., concur

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COMMERCIAL LA: VESSEL CIVIL LA:RES I"SA LO>;IT;R

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 195331, March 11, 015

;NNON ONER O THE VESSEL MVCHINA ?O!, SAMS;N SHI""ING LTD., ANDINTERASIA MARINE TRANS"ORT,INC., $etitioners, v. ASIAN TERMINALS,INC., Respondent .

R'%$ o& /h+ Co'r/

*he Court agrees +ith the C that the petitioners are liable to *& for the damagesustained by the latters unloader. -o+ever,the Court nds the petitioners liability to bebased on uasi/deli#t and not on a #ontra#t of #arriage. *he Court li0e+ise deems it 

 proper to modify the rate of interests on theamount of damages imposed by the C uponthe petitioners.

 8he Court notes that the shipowner andshipowner’s agent, 4amsun, are all =uridical

entities not registered and not doingbusiness in the Philippines. It was thecharterer’s agent, Inter+sia, a dulyregistered domestic corporation, which had'led the instant petition for itself and onbehalf of the shipowner and 4amsun.!E In thecourse of the proceedings too, none of theparties had raised issues anent the validity of the service of summons and the courts’ac/uisition of =urisdiction over the persons of the petitioners.

 8he petitioners present two issues for theCourt’s resolution, to wit6 9a; the applicabilityof the doctrine of res ipsa louitur  in the caseat bar and 9b; who participated and shouldthus assume liability for the loading of thesoybean meal cargo.

In its (ecision dated January 5", !""), the$8C declared that while +8I indeed sustaineddamages to its unloader, liability thereforcannot, however, be established with

certainty.

In the assailed decision, the C+, on the otherhand, discussed in detail why and how thethree re/uisites to the application of thedoctrine of res ipsa louitur  are found to beattendant in the case at bar. 1irst , the comingling of the two foreign metal ob=ectswith the soybean meal cargo and theconse/uent damage to +8I’s unloader is anaccident which ordinarily does not occur inthe absence of someone’snegligence. Se#ond, the foreign metaob=ects were found in the vessel’s Hold *o. !,which is within the e2clusive control of thepetitioners. *hird, records do not show that+8I’s negligence had in any way contributedto the damage caused to its unloader

 8he Court agrees with the C+ anent +8I’sentitlement to the payment of damages fromthe petitioners and the applicability of thedoctrine of res ipsa louitur . However, theCourt 'nds as misplaced the C+’s applicationof the laws on maritime commerce andcontracts of carriage for reasons discussedbelow.

Th+r+ $) o co/rac/ o& carr$a+*+/#++ /h+ +/$/$o+r) a( ATI

 8here is no contract of carriage between +8Ion one hand, and the shipowner, 4amsunContiSuincyBunge ..C., and Inter+sia, onthe other. It li-ewise bears stressing that thesub=ect of the complaint, from which theinstant petition arose, is not the damagecaused to the cargo, but to the e/uipment ofan arrastre operator. Further, +8I’scontractual relation is not with thepetitioners, but with the consignee and withthe Philippine Ports +uthority 9PP+;

In Delgado Brothers, &n#. v. -ome &nsuran#e

Company and Court of ppeals,

!#

 the Courtdiscusses the functions of an arrastreoperator, vi 6chan$oblesvirtualawlibrary

Ander this provision, petitioner’s functions asarrastre operator are 9%; to receive, handle,care for, and deliver all merchandiseimported and e2ported, upon or passing overovernmentowned wharves and piers in thePort of Danila, 9!; as well as to record orchee- all merchandise which may bedelivered to said port at shipside, and in

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generalN,O 95; to furnish light and waterservices and other incidental services inorder to underta-e its arrastre service. *otethat there is nothing in those functions whichrelate to the trade and business of navigation 2 2 2, nor to the use or operationof vessels 2 2 2. Both as to the nature of thefunctions and the place of their performance9upon wharves and piersshipside;, +/$/$o+r) )+r6$c+) ar+c%+ar%- o/ ar$/$+. +s we held inthe Ma#ondray  case, /h+- ar+ o ($+r+/&ro /ho)+ o& a (+o)$/ar- or#ar+ho')+a. ranting, arguendo, thatpetitioner’s arrastre service depends on,assists, or furthers maritime transportation 22 2, it may be deemed merely in#identalto itsaforementioned functions as arrastreoperator and does not, thereby, ma-epetitioner’s arrastre service maritime incharacter.! 9Citations omitted, italics in theoriginal, emphasis and underscoring ours;8he functions of an arrastre operatorinvolve the handling of cargo deposited onthe wharf or between the establishment of the consignee or shipper and the ship’stac-le. Being the custodian of the goodsdischarged from a vessel, an arrastreoperator’s duty is to ta-e good care of thegoods and to turn them over to the partyentitled to theirpossession.0!&chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

8he legal relationship between an arrastreoperator and a consignee is a-in to thatbetween a warehouseman and a depositor.+s to both the nature of the functions andthe place of their performance, an arrastreoperator’s services are clearly not maritimein character.0!)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In &nsuran#e Company of 2orth meri#a v. sian *erminals, &n#.,5" the Court e2plainedthat the liabilities of the arrastre operator for

losses and damages are set forth in thecontract for cargo handling services it hade2ecuted with the PP+. Corollarily then, therights of an arrastre operator to be paid fordamages it sustains from handling cargoesdo not li-ewise spring from contracts of carriage.

However, in the instant petition, thecontending parties ma-e no references at allto any provisions in the contract for cargohandling services +8I had e2ecuted with the

PP+.

Ar/$c%+ 173 o& /h+ N+# C$6$% Co(+ a(/h+ (oc/r$+ o& res ipsa loquitur  a%-

*otwithstanding the above, the petitionerscannot evade liability for the damage causedto +8I’s unloader in view of +rticle !%# ofthe *ew Civil Code, which pertinentlyprovides asfollows6chan$oblesvirtualawlibrary

+rt. !%#. hoever by act or omissioncauses damage to another, there being faultor negligence, is obliged to pay for thedamage done. 4uch fault or negligence, ifthere is no pree2isting contractual relationbetween the parties, is called a /uasidelictand is governed by the provisions of thisChapter.cralawredIn *aylor v. Manila 3le#tri# Railroad and !ightCo.,5% the Court e2plained that to establish aplainti>’s right to recovery for /uasidelicts,three elements must e2ist, to wit6 9a;damages to the plainti> 9b; negligence byact or omission of which defendantpersonally, or some person for whose acts itmust respond, was guilty and 9c; theconnection of cause and e>ect between thenegligence and thedamage.5!chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

*egligence, on the other hand, is de'ned asthe failure to observe that degree of care,precaution and vigilance that thecircumstances =ustly demand, wherebyanother su>ersin=ury.55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the case under consideration, the partiesdo not dispute the facts of damage upon+8I’s unloader, and of such damage beingthe conse/uence of someone’s negligenceHowever, the petitioners deny liability

claiming that it was not established withreasonable certainty whose negligence hadcaused the comingling of the metal barswith the soybean meal cargo. 8he Court, onthis matter, agrees with the C+’s dis/uisitionthat the petitioners should be held =ointlyand severally liable to +8I. +8I cannot befaulted for its lac- of direct access toevidence determinative as to who among theshipowner, 4amsun, ContiSuincyBunge andInter+sia should assume liability. 8he C+ hade2haustively discussed why the doctrine

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of res ipsa louitur  applies. 8he metal barswhich caused damage to +8I’s unloader wasfound comingled with the cargo inside Hold*o. ! of the ship, which was then within thee2clusive control of the petitioners. 8hus, thepresumption that it was the petitioners’collective negligence, which caused thedamage, stands. 8his is, however, withoutpre=udice to the petitioners’ rights to see-reimbursements among themselves from theparty whose negligence primarily caused thedamage.

A o($ca/$o o& /h+ $/+r+)/) $o)+(o /h+ (aa+) a#ar(+( $) $ or(+r.

+nent the interests imposed by the C+ uponthe damages to be paid to +8I, modi'cationof the same is in order.

In 2a#ar v. 4allery 1rames,5 the Courtdeclared6chan$oblesvirtualawlibrary

To r+ca$/'%a/+ a( &or &'/'r+ '$(ac+,/h+ '$(+%$+) %a$( (o# $ /h+ ca)+o& Eastern Shipping ines ar+accor($%- o($+( /o +*o(- BS"MBC$rc'%ar No. 799, a) &o%%o#):

I. hen an obligation, regardless of itssource, i.e., law, contracts, /uasicontracts,delicts or /uasidelicts is breached, thecontravenor can be held liable for damages.

 8he provisions under 8itle T

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ascertained, until full satisfaction thereof.

HEREORE, the (ecision dated *ovember%", !"%" of the Court of +ppeals in C+.$.

C< *o. )5%# is AIRMED #$/hMODIICATION. 8he petitioners, An-nown?wner of the

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views regarding the election and other

related issues may choose not to, for fear of 

reprisal or sanction by the C?D::C. (irect

resort to this court is allowed to avoid such

proscribed conditions. $ule #E is also the

procedural platform for raising grave abuse

of discretion.

 Judicial power includes the duty of the courtsof =ustice to settle actual controversies

involving rights which are legally

demandable and enforceable, and to

determine whether ornot there has been a

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac-

or e2cess of =urisdiction on the part of any

branch or instrumentality of the

overnment.E#9:mphasis supplied;

 8he more relevant provision for =urisdiction in

this case is +rticle

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direct e2ercise of the sovereignty. 8he

principle of e2haustion of administrative

remedies yields in order to protect this

fundamental right.

prior e2haustion of administrative remedies

may be dispensed with and =udicial action

may be validly resorted to immediately6 9a;

when there is a violation of due process 9b;when the issue involved is purely a legal

/uestion 9c; when the administrative action

is patently illegal amounting to lac- or

e2cess of =urisdiction 9d; when there is

estoppel on the part ofthe administrative

agency concerned 9e; when there is

irreparable in=ury 9f; when the respondent is

a department secretary whose acts as

analter ego of the President bear the implied

and assumed approval of the latter 9g; whento re/uire e2haustion of administrative

remedies would be unreasonable 9h; when it

would amount to a nulli'cation of a claim 9i;

when the sub=ect matter is a private land in

land case proceedings 9=; whenthe rule does

not provide a plain, speedy and ade/uate

remedy or 9-; when there are circumstances

indicating the urgency of =udicial

intervention.M

 emon test in that case, such that aregulation is constitutional when6 9%; it has a

secular legislative purpose 9!; it neither

advances nor inhibits religion and 95; it does

not foster an e2cessive entanglement with

religion

+ FI*+ *?8:

e maintain sympathies for the C?D::C inattempting to do what it thought was its duty

in this case. However, it was misdirected.

C?D::C’s general role includes a mandate

to ensure e/ual opportunities and reduce

spending among candidates and their

registered political parties. It is not to

regulate or limit the speech of the electorate

as it strives to participate inthe electora

e2ercise.

 8he tarpaulin in /uestion may be viewed as

producing a caricature of those who are

running for public o3ce.8heir message may

be construed generali@ations of very

comple2 individuals and partylist

organi@ations.

 8hey are classi'ed into blac- and white6 as

belonging to M8eam PatayM or M8eam Buhay.M

But this caricature, though not agreeable tosome, is still protected speech.

 8hat petitioners chose to categori@e them as

purveyors of death or of life on the basis of a

single issue W and a comple2 piece of

legislation at that W can easily be

interpreted as anattempt to stereo type the

candidates and partylist organi@ations. *ot

all may agree to the way their thoughts were

e2pressed, as in fact there are other Catholic

dioceses that chose not to follow the

e2ample of petitioners.

4ome may have thought that there should be

more room to consider being more broad

minded and non=udgmental. 4ome may

have e2pected that the authors would give

more space to practice forgiveness and

humility.

But, the Bill of $ights enumerated in ourConstitution is an enumeration of our

fundamental liberties. It is not a detailed

code that prescribes good conduct. It

provides space for all to be guided by their

conscience, not only in the act that they do

to others but also in =udgment of the acts of

others.

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Freedom for the thought we can disagree

with can be wielded not only by those in the

minority. 8his can often be e2pressed by

dominant institutions, even religious ones.

 8hat they made their point dramatically and

in a large way does not necessarily mean

that their statements are true, or that they

have basis, or that they have been

e2pressed in good taste.

:mbedded in the tarpaulin, however, are

opinions e2pressed by petitioners. It is a

specie of e2pression protected by our

fundamental law. It is an e2pression

designed to invite attention, cause debate,

and hopefully, persuade. It may be

motivated by the interpretation of petitioners

of their ecclesiastical duty, but their

parishioner’s actions will have very realsecular conse/uences. Certainly, provocative

messages do matter for the elections.

hat is involved in this case is the most

sacred of speech forms6 e2pression by the

electorate that tends to rouse the public to

debate contemporary issues. 8his is not

speechby candidates or political parties to

entice votes. It is a portion of the electorate

telling candidates the conditions for theirelection. It is the substantive content of the

right to su>rage.

 8his. is a form of speech hopeful of a /uality

of democracy that we should all deserve. It is

protected as a fundamental and primordial

right by our Constitution. 8he e2pression in

the medium chosen by petitioners deserves

our protection.

H:$:F?$:, the instant petition is$+*8:(. 8he temporary restraining order

previously issued is hereby made permanent.

 8he act of the C?D::C in issuing the

assailed notice dated February !!, !"%5 and

letter dated February !, !"%5 is declared

unconstitutional.

4? ?$(:$:(.

MARVIC M.V.. LEONEN+ssociate Justice

4C’s JA$I4(IC8I?*, C:$8I?$+$I, HI:$+$CHR

?F C?A$84, P?I8IC+ SA:48I?*, (?C8$I*:

?F :TH+A48I?* ?F +(DI*I48$+8I

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Danila in view of private respondent former

President Joseph :=ercito :strada’s 9former

President :strada; dis/uali'cation to run for

and hold public o3ce.

 8he dis/uali'cation of former President

:strada under 4ection " of the C in

relation to 4ection %! of the ?:C was

removed by his acceptance of the absolute

pardon granted to him.

4ection " of the C identi'es who are

dis/uali'ed from running for any elective

local position. $isosense involving moral turpitude or for ano>ense punishable by one 9%; year or more

of imprisonment, within two 9!; years after

serving sentenceN.O 9:mphasis supplied.;

i-ewise, 4ection %! of the ?:C provides for

similar prohibitions, but it provides for an

e2ception, to wit6

4ection %!. (is/uali'cations. 7 2 2 2 unless

he has been given plenary pardon or granted

amnesty. 9:mphasis supplied.;

+s earlier stated, $isosense involving mora

turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any

public o3ce, whether local or nationa

position.

 8a-e notice that the applicability of 4ection

%! of the ?:C to candidates running for loca

elective positions is not unprecedented. In

 Jalos=os, Jr. v. Commission on :lections,5 the

Court ac-nowledged the aforementioned

provision as one of the legal remedies that

may be availed of to dis/ualify a candidate in

a local election 'led any day after the last

day for 'ling of certi'cates of candidacy, but

not later than the date of proclamation.5& 8he

pertinent ruling in the Jalos=os case is /uoted

as follows6

hat is indisputably clear is that false

material representation of Jalos=os is a

ground for a petition under 4ection &

However, since the false materia

representation arises from a crime penali@ed

by prision mayor, a petition under 4ection %!

ofthe ?mnibus :lection Code or 4ection " of

the ocal overnment Code can also be

properly 'led. 8he petitioner has a choicewhether to anchor his petition on 4ection %!

or 4ection & of the ?mnibus :lection Code

or on 4ection " of the ocal overnment

Code. 8he law e2pressly provides multiple

remedies and the choice of which remedy to

adopt belongs to petitioner.5) 9:mphasis

supplied.;

 8he third preambular clause of the pardon

did not operate to ma-e the pardon

conditional.

Contrary to $isos

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rights to su>rage and to see- public elective

o3ce have been restored.

 8his is especially true as the pardon itself 

does not e2plicitly impose a condition or

limitation, considering the un/uali'ed use of 

the term Mcivil and political rightsMas being

restored. Jurisprudence educates that a

preamble is not an essential part of an act as

it is an introductory or preparatory clause

that e2plains the reasons for the enactment,

usually introduced by the word

Mwhereas.M" hereas clauses do not form

part of a statute because, strictly spea-ing,

they are not part of the operative language

of the statute.% In this case, the whereas

clause at issue is not an integral part of the

decree of the pardon, and therefore, does

not by itself alone operate to ma-e thepardon conditional or to ma-e its e>ectivity

contingent upon the ful'lment of the

aforementioned commitment nor to limit the

scope of the pardon.

?n this matter, the Court /uotes with

approval a relevant e2cerpt of C?D::C

Commissioner Daria racia Padaca’s

separate concurring opinion in the assailed

+pril %, !"%5 $esolution of the C?D::C in4P+ *o. %5!%% 9(C;, which captured the

essence of the legal e>ect of preambular

paragraphsQwhereas clauses, vi@6

 8he present dispute does not raise anything

which the !" January !"%" $esolution did not

conclude upon. Here, Petitioner $isosect on the absolute nature of the

pardon e2tended by former President +rroyo

to herein $espondent. 8his ruling is

consistent with the traditional and customary

usage of preambular paragraphs. In the case

of :chegaray v. 4ecretary of Justice, the

4upreme Court ruled on the legal e>ect of

preambular paragraphs or whereas clauses

on statutes. 8he Court stated, vi@.6

Besides, a preamble is really not an integra

part of a law. It is merely an introduction to

show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the

origin of rights and obligations. here the

meaning of a statute is clear and

unambiguous, the preamble can neither

e2pand nor restrict its operation much less

prevail over its te2t.

If former President +rroyo intended for the

pardon to be conditional on $espondent’s

promise never to see- a public o3ce again,

the former ought to have e2plicitly stated thesame in the te2t of the pardon itself. 4ince

former President +rroyo did not ma-e this an

integral part of the decree of pardon, the

Commission is constrained to rule that the

5rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted

as a condition to the pardon e2tended to

former President :strada.! 9:mphasis

supplied.;

+bsent any contrary evidence, former

President +rroyo’s silence on former

President :strada’s decision torun for

President in the Day !"%" elections against,

among others, the candidate of the politica

party of former President +rroyo, after the

latter’s receipt and acceptance of the pardon

spea-s volume of her intention to restore

him to his rights to su>rage and to hold

public o3ce.

here the scope and import of the e2ecutiveclemency e2tended by the President is in

issue, the Court must turn to the only

evidence available to it, and that is the

pardon itself. From a detailed review ofthe

four corners of said document, nothing

therein gives an iota of intimation that the

third hereas Clause is actually a limitation

proviso, stipulation or condition on the grant

of the pardon, such that the breach of the

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mentioned commitment not to see- public

o3ce will result ina revocation or

cancellation of said pardon. 8o the Court,

what it is simply is a statement of fact or the

prevailing situation at the time the e2ecutive

clemency was granted. It was not used as a

condition to the e3cacy orto delimit the

scope of the pardon.

:ven if the Court were to subscribe to the

view that the third hereas Clausewas one

of the reasons to grant the pardon, the

pardon itself does not provide for the

attendant conse/uence of the breach

thereof. 8his Court will be hard put to discern

the resultant e>ect of an eventual

infringement. Just li-e it will be hard put to

determine which civil or political rights were

restored if the Court were to ta-e the roadsuggested by $isosrage

and to hold public o3ce. 8he afore/uoted

te2t ofthe e2ecutive clemency granted does

not provide the Court with any guide asto

how and where to draw the line between the

included and e2cluded political rights.

 Justice eonen emphasi@es the point that the

ultimate issue for resolution is not whether

the pardon is contingent on the condition

that former President :strada will not see-

 =another elective public o3ce, but it actually

concerns the coverage of the pardon 7

whether the pardon granted to former

President :strada was so e2pansive as to

have restored all his political rights, inclusive

of the rights of su>rage and to hold public

o3ce. Justice eonen is of the view that thepardon in /uestion is not absolute nor

plenary in scope despite the statement that

former President :strada is Mhereby restored

to his civil and political rights,M that is, the

foregoing statement restored to former

President :strada all his civil and political

rights e2cept the rights denied to him by the

unremitted penalty of perpetual absolute

dis/uali'cation made up of, among others,

the rights of su>rage and to hold public

o3ce. He adds that had the President chosen

to be so e2pansive as to include the rights of

su>rage and to hold public o3ce, she should

have been more clear on her intentions.

However, the statement MNhOe is hereby

restored to his civil and political rights,M to

the mind of the Court, iscrystal clear 7 the

pardon granted to former President :strada

was absolute, meaning, it was not only

unconditional, it was unrestricted in scope

complete and plenary in character, as the

term Mpolitical rightsMadverted to has a

settled meaning in law and =urisprudence.

ith due respect, I disagree too with Justice

eonen that the omission of the /ualifying

word MfullM can be construed as e2cluding therestoration of the rights of su>rage and to

hold public o3ce. 8here appears to be no

distinction as to the coverage of the term

Mfull political rightsM and the term Mpolitica

rightsM used alone without any /uali'cation

How to ascribe to the latter term the

meaning that it is MpartialM and not MfullM

de'es one’s understanding. Dore so, it wil

be e2tremely di3cult to identify which of the

political rights are restored by the pardonwhen the te2t of the latter is silent on this

matter. :2ceptions to the grant of pardon

cannot be presumed from the absence of the

/ualifying word MfullM when the pardon

restored the Mpolitical rightsM of forme

President :strada without any e2clusion or

reservation.

 8herefore, there can be no other conclusion

but to say that the pardon granted to former

President :strada was absolute in theabsence of a clear, une/uivocal and concrete

factual basis upon which to anchor or

support the Presidential intent to grant a

limited pardon.

 8o reiterate, insofar as its coverageis

concerned, the te2t of the pardon can

withstand close scrutiny even under the

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provisions of +rticles 5# and % of the

$evised Penal Code.

 8he C?D::C did not commit grave abuse of 

discretion amounting to lac- or e2cess of 

 =urisdiction in issuing the assailed

$esolutions.

In light of the foregoing, contrary to the

assertions of $isos