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2/24/2015 EX-99.5 https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/823094/000119312515055994/d875183dex995.htm 1/5 EX-99.5 3 d875183dex995.htm EX-99.5 Exhibit 5 February 20, 2015 Domenico De Sole Lead Independent Director Sotheby’s 1334 York Avenue New York, New York 10021 Domenico, I am writing in response to Sotheby’s announcement on February 13 th that “there will be no return of capital to shareholders at this time”. 1 In the 18 months since Marcato’s initial investment in Sotheby’s, we have outlined numerous opportunities both publicly and privately for Sotheby’s to use its capital more intelligently to create shareholder value. Despite our dialogue with you and other members of the board, a substantial portion of Sotheby’s invested capital continues to earn a poor return or worse yet, earns no return at all. This willful neglect on the part of both management and the Finance Committee of the board must end urgently. Shareholders deserve leadership that combines sound business strategy with skilled financial management. For the duration of Marcato’s investment, we have enjoyed neither. We feel a responsibility to other shareholders to express our deep concern with the governance and executive judgment on matters of capital allocation and hold this board and management accountable. We submit that any new CEO’s first order of business may need to include the recruitment of a new CFO who will serve the interests of shareholders rather than defend misguided policies of the past. By way of background, sellside analysts covering Sotheby’s value the company by applying a P/E multiple to their estimate of earnings per share. This methodology produces a result that ignores any part of Sotheby’s business that has value but does not contribute to its earnings; the most obvious example of which is the company’s unusually large cash balance, but the same can be said for art and jewelry inventory, excess equity in the loan portfolio, and real estate assets. None of this significant value is being accounted for in Sotheby’s current market value. Today, we present a specific and straightforward roadmap that we believe can immediately release $12.33 per share (28% of current market value) without materially affecting the company’s continued earnings power. With this increased flexibility, we recommend the immediate repurchase of $500 million of Sotheby’s shares. 1 Exhibit to Sotheby’s Form 8K filed February 13, 2015

Marcato's February 20th Letter to Sotheby's Board

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Marcato renews its call for Sotheby's to issue a special dividend and details how it sees the company coming up with $500m in capital.

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  • 2/24/2015 EX-99.5

    https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/823094/000119312515055994/d875183dex995.htm 1/5

    EX-99.5 3 d875183dex995.htm EX-99.5Exhibit5

    February20,2015

    DomenicoDeSoleLeadIndependentDirectorSothebys1334YorkAvenueNewYork,NewYork10021

    Domenico,

    IamwritinginresponsetoSothebysannouncementonFebruary13ththattherewillbenoreturnofcapitaltoshareholdersatthistime.1

    Inthe18monthssinceMarcatosinitialinvestmentinSothebys,wehaveoutlinednumerousopportunitiesbothpubliclyandprivatelyforSothebystouseitscapitalmoreintelligentlytocreateshareholdervalue.Despiteourdialoguewithyouandothermembersoftheboard,asubstantialportionofSothebysinvestedcapitalcontinuestoearnapoorreturnorworseyet,earnsnoreturnatall.ThiswillfulneglectonthepartofbothmanagementandtheFinanceCommitteeoftheboardmustendurgently.Shareholdersdeserveleadershipthatcombinessoundbusinessstrategywithskilledfinancialmanagement.ForthedurationofMarcatosinvestment,wehaveenjoyedneither.Wefeelaresponsibilitytoothershareholderstoexpressourdeepconcernwiththegovernanceandexecutivejudgmentonmattersofcapitalallocationandholdthisboardandmanagementaccountable.WesubmitthatanynewCEOsfirstorderofbusinessmayneedtoincludetherecruitmentofanewCFOwhowillservetheinterestsofshareholdersratherthandefendmisguidedpoliciesofthepast.

    Bywayofbackground,sellsideanalystscoveringSothebysvaluethecompanybyapplyingaP/Emultipletotheirestimateofearningspershare.ThismethodologyproducesaresultthatignoresanypartofSothebysbusinessthathasvaluebutdoesnotcontributetoitsearningsthemostobviousexampleofwhichisthecompanysunusuallylargecashbalance,butthesamecanbesaidforartandjewelryinventory,excessequityintheloanportfolio,andrealestateassets.NoneofthissignificantvalueisbeingaccountedforinSothebyscurrentmarketvalue.

    Today,wepresentaspecificandstraightforwardroadmapthatwebelievecanimmediatelyrelease$12.33pershare(28%ofcurrentmarketvalue)withoutmateriallyaffectingthecompanyscontinuedearningspower.Withthisincreasedflexibility,werecommendtheimmediaterepurchaseof$500millionofSothebysshares. 1 ExhibittoSothebysForm8KfiledFebruary13,2015

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    Howdidwegethere?

    AsimpleGooglesearchforDelawareChanceryCourtMemorandumOpinionSothebysproducesacourtdocumentthatoffersrareinsightintotherationalebehindSothebyscurrentcapitalallocationstrategy.Theemailexcerptsinthecourtopinionexposethatcapitalallocationdecisionsinthepasthadnotbeengovernedbythoughtfulconsiderationforliquidityneeds,returnthresholds,andcostsofcapitalbutratherbytacticalconsiderationstoforestallalongoverdueproxycontest.

    Amongnumerousotherexamples,thepassagebelowbetweenCEOBillRuprechtandRobertTaubman,amemberoftheFinanceCommittee,wasparticularlydisappointing:

    Wearegoingtobethetargetofaproxyfightwithactivistshareholders.Themotivationforthatfightisonlyperipherallyaboutreturningcapital.ItisaboutbeingonSothebysBoard.MickMcGuireneedsthatasvalidation,andLoebwantsthatforego

    Myreviewofthesituationhoweveristhis:ifwemakeagesture,thatwecanafford,ofacoupleofhundredmillionreturnedquicklytoshareholders,wegainenormoustacticalleverageintheprocessofpersuadingthe85%ofshareholderswhowerenotactivists,thatweareresponsiblestewardsfortheirinvestment

    Sothisisaboutpower,andpoliticalgamesmanshipwithshareholders,notaboutcapitalstructure[emphasisadded]

    Ifyoudoamodestbuyback,andstillfeellikeyouaregoingtoloseaproxycontest,thenyouwouldofferactivistsoneortwoseatsandstillbeincontrol.2

    Atthetimeofthiscorrespondence,SothebyscurrentCFO,PatrickMcClymont,wasemployedbyGoldmanSachsandservingasmanagementsfinancialadvisor.InanemailexchangewithBillRuprecht,PatrickMcClymontagreedwithBillsargumentthatthedecisiontomakeaprudentdistributionnowallowsusthegreatestcontroloverboardcompositionandcollegialitygoingforward.Tobunkerinensuresboarddisruptionnextspring.Thisisntandneverwasaboutcapitalmarkets[forMcGuireandLoeb].ItsaboutgettingintoaleadershippositiononSothebysboard.[emphasisadded]

    Asyourecall,thisreasoningprovedtobewrongasIwasofferedaboardseatandIdeclinedbecauseIwouldonlyserveontheconditionthatSothebyscommittocertaincapitalallocationtargetsaconditionthecompanyresisted.

    Againstthisbackdrop,shouldshareholdersbesurprisedthataCFOwhowasoriginallyhiredastheCEOsactivistdefensebankerwouldbereluctanttoupdateacapitalallocationstrategythatwasconceivedwithulteriormotives?Shouldshareholdersbesurprisedthatpromisestoreturncapitalhavegoneunfulfilledaftertheillconceivedplanfailedtoaccomplishitsgoalofpreventingaproxychallenge?ShouldshareholdersbesurprisedthataboardandmanagementwithverylittleoftheirownmoneyinvestedinSothebysstockareunconcernedwiththeopportunitycostoflazycapitalallocationpolicies? 2 Source:http://courts.delaware.gov/opinions/download.aspx?ID=205180

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    Whatshouldwedonow?

    Theexerciseisasimpleone:

    1) Answerthequestion:Howmuchcapitalflexibilitydoesthecompanyrequireinordertopursueitsbusinessstrategyandbeconfidentthatitcanwithstandanunexpecteddownturninitsbusiness?

    2) CalculatesourcesofcapitalthatSothebyshasatitsdisposal.

    3) If#2isgreaterthan#1,thecompanyisovercapitalized.Thecostofthisovercapitalizationcanbemeasuredbycomparingthecompanyscostofcapitaltothereturnbeingearnedontheseassets.

    Managementhasprovidedaframeworkto#1inapresentationdatedJanuary29,2014whereSothebysdetailedtheresultsofitscapitalallocationandfinancialpolicyreview3(thispresentationmysteriouslycannolongerbefoundonSothebyswebsite).

    Theanswerto#1is$495millionwhichisbrokendownasfollows:

    $300millioninstandbyliquidityincasethecompanyexperiencesaworstcasescenarioofhavingtofundauctionguarantees.Thecompanydefinedworstcasescenarioas50%ofoutstandingguarantees(netofanypurchasecommitments)andanoveralllimitof$600millioninguarantees(net).(Intruth,theJanuarypresentationdetailedaliquidityreserveof$150millionagainstanetguaranteelimitof$300million,butmanagementveryquicklyblewthroughitsownselfimposedlimitjustafewmonthslaterandrevisedtheirmaxguaranteetargetto$600million,butthelackofdisciplinearoundtargetsisthetopicofadifferentconversation.)

    $100millionofavailablecapitaltofunddealsthatoffercertainbuyersextendedpaymenttermsonpurchases.This

    representsloansthatareoutsidetheactivitiesofSothebysFinancialsServices(SFS)queryastowhyextendedpaymenttermsarenotfundedoutofSFS?

    $90millionasacushiontoworkingcapitalinthescenariowhereasuddenandseveredownturnreducescashflowfasterthanthecompanycanresetitscostbase.

    $5millioninworkingcapitalforSFS.

    Toreiterate,inJanuary2014,aspartofanefforttoundermineaproxycontestthroughagesturewecanafford,managementsframeworkimplies$495millionofworstcasescenarioliquidityrequirements.Itisdifficulttoimaginewhymanagementwouldhaveanyreasontounderestimatethisnumber,butquiteeasytoimaginewhytheymighthavewantedtooverestimatethenumberforpurposesofjustifyingasmallergesture. 3 ExhibittoSothebysForm8KfiledJanuary29,2014

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    CalculatingthesourcesofcapitalatSothebysdisposalisalsonotdifficult.However,wedobelievethattherearestepsthatSothebyscanandshouldtaketoincreasethetotalliquidityavailabletothecompany.Wedetailthisbelow:

    CurrentReadyLiquidity:

    $484millioninCashat9/30(definedascashonhand,plus$450millionreceivablefrombuyersless$386millionduetoconsignors)

    $192+millionofestimatedFreeCashFlowgeneratedinQ420144

    $300millionrevolvingcreditfacilitythatiscurrentlyundrawn

    Subtotal:$976million

    Wecontinuetorecommendthatthecompanytakethefollowingeasystepstocreateadditionalsourcesofliquidity:

    AppraiseLondonrealestateassetsanduseasasourceoffundingthrougheither:1)mortgagefinancingor2)adding

    appraisedrealestatevaluetothecollateralbasketofthecreditfacility.$162.5million.Usingestimateof$250millionappraisalvalueand65%advancerate.

    Employconservativeleverageagainstauctionsegmentthroughfixedratetermfinancing.Managementrecommends3.5x4.0xAdjustedDebt/throughthecycleEBITDA,inclusiveofmortgagerelateddebt,andhasbeenunwillingtodisclosetheirdefinitionofthroughthecycleEBITDA.Wewouldadvocatefor2xDebt/throughthecycleEBITDA,butweexcludemortgagedebtfromthiscalculation.Wecomputethetrailing7yearaverageauctionsegmentEBITDAtobe$206millionimplyingincrementalborrowingcapacityof$112million.

    IncreaseSFSloantovaluetostatedtargetlevelof85%ofoutstandingloanbalances.$54million.

    AppraiseNewYorkrealestateandcontributeresidualequityvalueofNewYorkpropertytothecollateralbasketofthecreditfacility.$41million.Usingestimateof$400millionappraisalvalue,65%advancerateoftotalpropertyvalueless$219millionmortgageloan.ThecompanyhastheabilitytoprepaythemortgageonJuly1andthisisanopportunetimetoimprovethetermsofthemortgage.

    Subtotal:$370million

    #2:Totalsourcesofcapital:$1,346million

    #2minus#1=$851millionofexcesscapital!

    CalculatingtheCost:

    $851millionofexcesscapitalrepresents$12.33pershare,or28%ofthecurrentstockprice.Webelievethecompanycanimmediatelyreleasethisexcesscapitalwithoutmateriallychangingtheearningspowerofthebusiness. 4 AssumesQ22014adjustedcashflowfromoperations(excludingchangesinaccountsreceivable,duetoconsignors,and

    unusualinventoryinvestment)lesscapitalexpenditures

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    ThisdegreeoffinancialmismanagementisunacceptableparticularlygiventhepersistenceofexcesscapitaloverthetenureofMarcatosinvestment.Theboardandmanagementmusttakethenecessarystepstocurethisdynamic.Werecommendtheimmediaterepurchaseof$500millionofSothebysshares.Thisamountrepresentsthecurrentcashandrevolvercapacitylesstheentirereserveforworstcasescenarioliquidityrequirements.SharerepurchasesaremuchmoretaxefficientthanaspecialdividendandwebelievethatSothebyssharesareacompellinglongterminvestment.Theremainingexcesscapitalcanbeaccessedinshortorderandredeployedintoactivitiesthatclearthecompanys15%ROIChurdleorcanbereturnedtoshareholdersthroughadditionalsharerepurchases.Futurefreecashflowgeneratedbythebusinesswillalsobeavailabletofundgrowthinvestments.

    Weexpectthatwiththisanalysis,theFinanceCommitteeoftheboardwillbeequippedtofulfillitsdutyasfiduciariestoshareholders.Whilethesenumbersappearlarge,theirmagnitudeonlyservestohighlightthederelictionofresponsibilityofSothebysboardandmanagement.AsoneofSothebyslargestshareholders,wealsolookforwardtoathoroughdiscussionwithitsnewCEOregardingtheimportanceofintelligentcapitalallocationincreatingvalueforshareholders.

    Sincerely,

    MickMcGuire

    cc:JohnAngeloFinanceCommitteeJessicaBibliowiczKevinConroyTheDukeofDevonshireDanielLoebDanielMeyerOlivierRezaFinanceCommitteeMarshaSimmsRobertTaubmanFinanceCommitteeDianaTaylorFinanceCommitteeDennisWeiblingFinanceCommittee,ChairmanHarryWilsonFinanceCommittee

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