Mandler_1992_How to Build a Baby_ II. Conceptual Primitives

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Psychological Review

1992, Vol. 99, No. 4,

587-604

Copyright

1992

by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

0033-295X/92/S3.00

How to

Build

a

Baby:

II.

Conceptual Primitives

Jean

M .

Mandler

Department of Cognitive Science

University of California, San Diego

and

Medical Research Council Cognitive Development Unit

London, England

A mechanism

of perceptual

analysis

by

which infants derive meaning

from

perceptual activity

is

described. Infants

use

this mechanism

to

redescribe

perceptual

information into image-schematic

format.

Image-schemas create conceptual structure from the spatial structure of

objects

and

their

movements, resulting in notions such as

animacy, inanimacy,

agency, and containment. These

earliest

meanings

are

nonpropositional, analogical

representations grounded in the perceptual

world

of the

infant.

In

contrast with most

perceptual processing,

which

is not

analyzed

in

this

fashion,

redescription into

image-schematic format simplifies

perceptual

information and makes

it potentially accessible for purposes of concept formation and thought. In

addition

to enabling

preverbal thought, image-schemas provide

a

foundation

for

language acquisition

by

creating

an

interface between the continuous processes of perception and the discrete nature of language.

When

you

keep putting

questions to

Nature

and

Nature keeps

saying no,

it is not unreasonable to suppose

that somewhere

among the things you believe there is something that isn't true.

(Fodor, 1981,

p.

316)

One of the

least understood developments

in infancy is how

children

become able

to

think, that

is, to go

beyond perceptual

categorization to form

concepts.

As

Quinn

and Eimas

(1986)

expressed this mystery:

The categories of infants . . . are sensory in nature, whereas the

categories and concepts of adults are

often

far

removed from

the

world of sensory data.. . . Nor can it be readily envisioned how

the

attributes

of

adult

concepts can be constructed from the

attri-

butes innately available to infants.

Nevertheless,

a commonly, if

often tacitly, held view is that the

nontransducible

attributes of

adult

concepts

are somehow derived from the sensory primitives

available to infants. Adequate (that is, testable) descriptions

of

the

developmental

process

remain

to be offered, however, (p.

356)

My ultimate goal is to develop such a theory and

to

show how

the attributes of adult concepts can be derived from the primi-

tives of infants. I

believe this

ca n

only

be

done, however,

by

abandoning a crucial assumption in Quinn and Eimas's

(1986)

formulation:

that

infants

only engage in sensory (or perceptual)

categorization. In a

previous article

(J. M.

Mandler, 1988),

I

reviewed

some

of the

evidence

for

nonsensory conceptual activ-

ity in

infancy

and

outlined

a

mechanism

of

perceptual analysis

by which

such conceptual processing might

be

achieved.

T he

goal of the

present article

is to

specify this mechanism

in

more

detail and to explore the nature of the

format

in which the

resulting

notions

are

represented.

I

propose that perceptual

Preparation of this article was supported in part by National Science

Foundation Research Grant BNS89-19035. Thanks to Nancy Johnson,

Melissa Bowerman, Annette

Karmiloff-Smith, and

John Morton

for

helpful and

insightful comments

on

earlier drafts. Some

of the

ideas

in

this article

appear

in germinal form in J. M. Mandler

(1991).

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Jean

M. Mandler, Department

of

Cognitive Science, University

of

Califor-

nia,

San

Diego,

La Jolla,

California 92093-0515.

analysis results in redescriptions of spatial structure in the

form

of

image-schemas. These redescriptions constitute

the

mean-

ings that

infants use to

create concepts

of

objects, such

as

ani-

mate

and

inanimate things,

and

relational concepts, such

as

containment and support. I

further

propose that image-sche-

mas provide a level of representation intermediate between

perception an d language that facilitates the process of language

acquisition.

Concepts such

as

animacy

or

containment

are

complex

and

unlike

sensory attributes,

yet

they appear early

in infancy. At

the

same time,

it is not

necessary that they

be

innately given

in

order

to

account

for

their early appearance.

As will be

seen,

many

of the ideas I propose in this article are not couched in the

traditional

framework

of concept formation and are somewhat

speculative in nature. However, as Fodor

(1981)

pointed out,

theories of concept attainment have been limited to a small

range of

theoretical options. Perhaps

it is

time

to try a new

approach.

The view

that

only

sensory attributes

are

innately

given and

are used in conjunction with experience to derive the nonsen-

sory concepts of adults has been the dominant view of concep-

tual development since the time of the British empiricists. In

more recent

form ulations

of this view, the term perceptual is apt

to be

substituted

for sensory, but the

general approach

is the

same.

Fo r

example, during

the

second half

of the first

year

of

life,

infants are

said

to

begin

to form

so-called basic-level catego-

ries,

such as faces,

dogs,

or

cars, that enable them

to

recognize

new

instances

(e.g., Cohen &

Younger, 1983;

Strauss,

1979).

The

ability to create such equivalence classes is thought to rest on

responsivity to the correlated

features

that make up the objects

(e.g.,

Rosch

&

Mervis, 1975).

It is

assumed that

for infants

these

features are perceptual, however, leaving still unsolved the ques-

tion of how nonperceptual understanding of objects develops.

These early categories are called perceptual because they

need

not have conceptual content (or in another terminology,

these categories

are not yet

representational).

Voung infants,

like lower organisms, industrial vision machines, and various

connectionist programs, can form perceptual prototypes by

587



588

JEAN M. M A N D L E R

learning to abstract the central tendencies of perceptual pat-

terns. Forming discriminable categories, however, does not

imply that the organism or machine has thereby formed any

theory of what the objects being categorized

are

or can use this

information for purposes of thought. Thus, the infant (or ma-

chine or program) that ca n differentiate between male and fe-

male

faces

(Pagan &

Singer, 1979)

or can

discriminate trucks

from horses

(Oakes,

M adole, & Cohen, 1991) could be doing so

on a purely perceptual basis and is not thereby displaying con-

ceptual knowledge about people or animals (J. M. Mandler,

1988;

Nelson, 1985).

To

have

a

concept

of

animal

or

vehicle

means to

have

at least some rud imentary notion of what k ind of

thing an animal or vehicle is.

1

There is ample evidence that

even 3-year-old children have such concepts (e.g., W ellman &

Gelman, 1988).

How

does

the

infant advance

to

this

ne w

kind

of unders tanding?

Piaget's Theory of Concep t Form ation

The

most widely accepted answer

to the

question

of how

concepts are first acquired is based on Piaget's

(1952)

theory of

sensorimotor

developm ent. In his theory, much of the first year

and a

half

of

life

is

taken

u p

w ith developing perceptual (sen-

sorim otor) categories of objects, such

as

those d escribed earlier.

Piaget recognized that these categories need not be conceptual

in natu re; indeed, he posited that they are not conceptual, con-

sisting instead

of

sets

of

perceptual-motor schemas that enable

infants to recognize a variety of objects (and events) and to act

appropriately

in

their presence.

He saw no

evidence that

in-

fants, during

this period,

have any conceptual representations

that would enable thought about objects. In Piaget's analysis,

concepts develop when sensorimotor schemas become inter-

iorized, speeded up, and freed from ongoing perception and

action. This transform ation, which depends heavily

on

learning

about objects through physical interactions w ith them , is said to

occur at the transition

from

the sensorimotor to the preopera-

tional period at about 1.5 years of age.

Piaget's (1952) theory of a sensorimo tor stage in infancy has

been widely accepted and seems to have escaped m uch of the

critical response that h as been directed tow ard other aspects of

his theory. Nevertheless, his view of infant cognition faces a

number of

theoretical

and

empirical difficulties (e.g.,

J. M.

Mand ler, 1988; Sugarm an, 1 98 7). On the theoretical side, it

does not provide a satisfactory description of ho w sensorimotor

schemas are transformed into concepts. Piaget's theory states

only

that over the course of the sensorimotor period,

action-

schemas gradually become speeded up and

freed

from

their

sensorimotor limitations. The main avenue for this develop-

ment

is said to be imitation. Infants gradually become able to

imitate more

and

more complex activities that eventually

be-

come interiorized in the form of images. How images are actu-

ally created

by

this process

is not

discussed,

but in Piaget's

view

images constitute the first nonsensorimotor, conceptual form

of representation. Imagery allows infants to re-present objects

and

events

to

them selves,

and so it

provides

the

foundation

for

the beginning of thought. However, the claim of a p urely sen-

sorimotor form

of

representation

for the first

year

and a

half

of

life

depends on the assumption that there is no imagery du ring

this period.

If

im agery could occur

in

younger infants, there

would

be

nothing

in

principle

to

p revent them from engaging

in conceptual thought. In fact, there is no evidence that imag-

ery is such a late-developing process. In addition, the theory

leaves unsettled

how

images come

to

have m ore than percep-

tual

content. H ow does forming a n image of an object concep-

tualize it? Thus, this

view

of concept

formation

begs the very

question that

w as

posed.

There

are

also empirical

difficulties

with

Piaget's

(1952)

theory.

C urren t evidence suggests that

infants do not

require

such

an

extended period

of

experience

to

learn

the

most basic

characteristics of objects. At least from 3 months of age they

live

in a

stable perceptual world , consisting

of

objects that

a re

seen as coherent, bounded things, separate

from

the back-

ground and behaving in predictable ways (Spelke, 1985 ). By 4

to 5 months they understand that objects are both solid and

permanent

(Baillargeon, in press), and they have begun to

dif-

ferentiate

causal from noncausal object m otion (Leslie, 198 2).

Some of this under standing may be sensorimotor in character

and not require conceptual activity of the typ e

defined

earlier.

Therefore,

Piaget's theory could probably be adapted to fit this

evidence,

although

it

does create

a

puzzle

as to why

conceptual

activity

should

be

delayed

so

long.

More serious,

however,

is recent evidence that conceptual

representation is no t long delayed, that concepts are developing

concurrently

with the development of sensorimotor schemas.

For examp le, one of the c riteria that Piaget (1952) used to dem-

onstrate conceptual activity was recall of absent objects or

events. Recall requires

the

infant

to

re-present

information no t

given

b y current sensorimotor activity. Piaget thought such re-

call

did not

occur until about

the

middle

of the

second year.

However, recall has been demonstrated in the laboratory as

early as 8 months of age (Baillargeon, De V os, & Graber, 198 9).

Recall

of

past events over 24-hr delays

has

been shown

at 9

months

(Meltzoff,

1988) , and two studies

have

provided evi-

dence that events taking place before 10 to 11 months of age can

be recalled up to

1.5

years later (McDonough & Mandler,

1990;

Myers, Clifton , & Clarkson, 1987 ). Such findings

indicate

that

a long-lasting declarative mem ory system is in place by about 8

months

of

age;

i ts

onset

may be

even earlier

but the

relevant

research has not yet

been conducted.

In addition, work on the acquisition of sign language has

provided evidence for the beginning of symbolic

functioning

as

early as 6 to 7 months of age

(e.g.,

Bonvillian, Orlansky, & No-

vack, 1983; Meier & Newport, 1990; see J. M. Mandler, 1988,

for

a disc ussion of the sym bolic character of these early signs).

There has been som e controversy over the linguistic status of

these early signs (e.g., Bates, O'Connell, & Shore, 1987; Petitto,

1987),

but the

relevant point here

is

that children

of

this

age are

capable of using a gesture (probably associatively learned) to

refer

to or express a m eaning. Along with recall, this hallmark

of

conceptual thought appears before infants have become

skilled in manipulating objects or have begun to locomote

through the environment. Thus, several lines of evidence ind i-

cate the presence of conceptual thought during the time when

1

This

view

of concepts as ideas about kinds emphasizes

their

theoret-

ical nature

(Carey, 1985; Keil,

1989;

Medin

Wattemaaker, 1987), as

opposed to a view of concepts as distributions of

features or properties.



CONCEPTUAL

PRIMITIVES

589

Piaget posited it to be absent.

Evidently,

a great deal

of

conceptu-

alization about objects and events in the world comes from

observation rather than from physical interaction with objects.

2

Nevertheless,

it

must

be

determined

how

observation of objects

forms

the basis from which more abstract conceptual knowl-

edge about those objects is derived.

Concept

Formation by Perceptual Analysis

I have proposed that

perceptual analysis

is the mechanism by

which concepts are first formed (J. M. Mandler, 1988). Percep-

tual analysis is a process in which a

given

perceptual array is

attentively analyzed, and a new kind of information is

ab-

stracted. The information is new in the sense that a piece of

perceptual information is

receded

into a nonperceptual form

that represents a meaning. Sometimes perceptual analysis in-

volves comparing one object with another, leading to concep-

tualizing

them as the same (or different) kind of thing, but

often it

merely

involves noticing some aspect of a stimulus that

has not been noticed before. The process is different from the

usual

perceptual processing, which occurs automatically and is

typically

not under the attentive control of the perceiver. Most

of

the

perceptual information normally encoded

is

neither

consciously noticed

nor

accessible

at a

later time for purposes

of

thought. Perceptual analysis, on the other hand, involves the

active receding of a subset of incoming perceptual information

into meanings that

form

the basis of accessible concepts.

Perceptual analysis is a simple version of what Karmiloff-

Smith (1986,1991) calls

redescription

of procedural informa-

tion. She has concentrated on how elaborate systems of proce-

dural information, such as the pronominal system in language,

become redescribed, eventually achieving

a form

that is accessi-

ble to consciousness. Perceptual analysis is a simpler kind of

redescription, one that is

often

concurrent with perception it-

self;

that is, redescription does not

have

to take place

off-line

on

long

established representations, as suggested by the data with

which Karmiloff-Smith has worked, but can also take place

on-line

with the registration of perceptual information. In both

cases, however, information is being receded into a different

format,

and in the

process some

of the

original information

is

lost. What people consciously attend to and store in a

form

that

they can potentially think about involves a reduction and rede-

scription of the huge amount of information provided by their

sensory receptors.

A

great deal

of the

perceptual information

that people process is stored in procedural (implicit) form, as

illustrated by the fact that they readily learn complex percep-

tual categories such

as

faces,

but

cannot state what

the informa-

tion is that they use; that is, the information is not explicit (J. M.

Mandler, 1988). Forming an explicit knowledge system re-

quires a different format—what one might call a vocabulary of

meanings. The process of redescribing perceptual information

forms such a vocabulary. This vocabulary is both simpler than

the original information and, at least to some extent, is optional

as to whether or when it is formed. It is simpler because it

contains less information than is processed by the perceptual

system

and is

more coarsely grained.

For

example, representing

a zebra as striped (either by language or by a sketch) is a coarse

summary description of a

specific

complex grating. It is op-

tional in the sense that it need not occur

when

perceptual pro-

cessing goes on. It is the

optionality

of what one attends to that

accounts for much of the variability in conceptual

develop-

ment,

as

opposed

to the

nonoptional, automatic processing

of

perceptual information that takes place most

of the

time.

Although perceptual analysis is not necessary for much of

one's traffic with the environment, adults seem to do a good

deal of it, or more precisely, engage in a process that is similar.

For example, someone may consciously

notice

that an acquain-

tance has started wearing glasses, a fact that may have been

missed for several weeks in spite of looking at this person every

day. A few years ago, during a boring seminar, I discovered that

most people's ears are at the same level as their eyes, which is

something

I

must have processed perceptually since infancy

but that I had not analyzed and made part of my concept of a

face

in the

past.

The results of such analysis can be expressed in

verbal

or in

imaginal

form and are

then available

for

purposes

of

recall, planning, making choices, and so on. It is important

to

note, however, that

these

examples

from

adult experience

take place in a processing system that already has a large con-

ceptual vocabulary that can be used to add new

facts

to its

accessible knowledge

store.

In that sense, they are somewhat

misleading vis-a-vis

the

more basic process

of

perceptual analy-

sis that

infants

must carry out.

Infants

have to create the mean-

ings from which

the

conceptual base

is

formed

in the first

place. These meanings are unlikely themselves to be

consciously

accessible, but must be redescribed once again into

imagery

or words. This issue is discussed further in the section

on image-schemas.

In principle, perceptual analysis could begin quite early in

life even though it might initially be rather primitive in

form.

That is, I assume that the capacity to engage in perceptual analy-

sis is innate. However, it also seems

likely

that such analysis

requires the development of at least some stable perceptual

(sensorimotor) schemas. As mentioned earlier, research (e.g.,

Baillargeon, in press; Kellman, Gleitman, & Spelke, 1987;

Spelke, 1985) suggests that stable schemas of three-dimen-

sional objects, seen as coherent, solid, and separate from the

background, are formed by 3 to 4 months of age. It is about the

same time that the first indications of perceptual analysis

ap-

pear (J. M. Mandler, 1988). The measures are necessarily indi-

rect,

but are

implicated

in

many accounts

of

behavior after

the

first few months of life. For example, Werner and Kaplan

(1963) described the development of a contemplative attitude

between

3 and 5 months; Fox, Kagan, and Weiskopf

(1979)

and

Janowsky (1985)

reported an increase in vicarious trial and

error

(VTE)

behavior, or active comparison of stimuli, between

4

and 8 months; Ruff (1986) described the examining schema

as

already well developed

by 7

months,

the

earliest

age she

studied. Perceptual analysis

can

also

be inferred from

Piaget's

(195 1) account of early imitation in which he described his

2

It is

sometimes claimed that Piaget means

action in a

more

abstract

sense,

for example, as

eye-movements

or

even

as anything

that trans-

forms

reality (Sinclair, 1971, p .

134).

Even if the

latter

abstract

defini-

tion

can be meaningfully included under the

rubric

of

action,

Piaget is

quite

clear that

the roots of

conceptualization

lie in

infants'

physical

interaction

with objects (Piaget, 1951, 1952). In any

case, this

more

typical usage

of the term action has

been

the predominant under-

standing of

Piaget's

theory among developmental psychologists.



590

JEAN M.

MANDL E R

children

as

young

as 3 to 4

months

as

displaying intense con-

centration on the models he provided.

3

A

Vocabulary

for

Preverbal

Concepts

In an

earlier article

(J. M.

Mandler, 1988)

I

em phasized

the

process

of

perceptual analysis,

but had

little

to say

about

the

format

of the resulting representations. If perceptual analysis

results in concept forma tion, there mu st be some vocabulary, or

set of elementary meanings, from which the concepts are com-

posed. Whatever m eanings infants derive from perceptual anal-

ysis, they seem likely to be rather global in character.

Even

for

adults, conscious conceptualizations about objects and events

tend to be crude and contain vastly less information than the

perceptual knowledge used for recognition. Infants' concepts

are apt to be

cruder

still and may not

even

be

couched

in

prepo-

sitional form as many adult concepts appear to be.

The problem of

specifying

a conceptual vocabulary is not

one that can be avoided, regardless of the natu re of one's theory

of

conceptual development. However, with

the

exception

of

Leslie (1988), who discussed the primitives involved in the first

causal concepts, about the only researchers work ing on the

problem are those in the area of language acquisition who talk

about preverbal conceptualizations or semantic primitives. It

has long been assumed that the notions of objecthood, agency,

actionality,

and

location

expressed in the earliest

speech

are

drawn

from nonlinguistic representations (e.g., Bloom, 1970;

Bowerman,

1973; Brown, 1973;

see

also Sinclair,

1971).

How-

ever,

the precise nature of these preverbal representations has

not yet been addressed. One of the rare discussions of what

these representations might be like is found in Slobin (1985),

who

suggested that youn g language learners

not

only have con-

cepts of objects and actions but also make use of sets of more

abstract relational notions. H e discussed these notions in term s

of prototypical scenes that highlight various com ponents and

the paths

that

they take.

4

If

language acquisition depends in part on preverbal con-

cepts, they must already

be

present

by 10

months w hen children

begin

to acquire their first spoken words and use them for

communication.

The

work

on

sign language

in 6 - to

7-month-

old deaf infants suggests that the relevant conceptualizing pro-

cess begins even earlier. Wh at

is

needed

is to find ways of

char-

acterizing the representation of these p reverbal concepts. It is

not sufficient to

say,

as has

traditionally been done within

the

Piagetian

framework,

that

a

concept

is

formed

by

transforming

a

sensorimotor schema; the form at in which the concept is rep-

resented m ust be specified as well. The initial conceptual repre-

sentation seems likely

to be

perceptually based

but not in the

format

that is used by the procedural workings of the

percep-

tual systems.

For example, consider possible sources for a primitive con-

cept of anima te thin g or animal. There is an excellent source in

perception to deliver some of the information needed for this

basic notion, namely,

the

perceptual categorization

of

motion.

Adults

easily differentiate animate from inanimate (or me-

chanical) m otion (Stewart, 1984). The data have not yet been

collected to determine whether infants do so as well, but it is

known that infants differentiate caused from noncaused mo-

tion

(Leslie,

1982,1988). In

addition, infants

are

high ly respon-

sive

to motion; not

only

do they look longer at moving stimuli

than

at

motionless stimuli,

bu t

various perceptual achieve-

ments

are first

attained when moving stimuli

are

used

(e.g.,

object p arsing: Spelke,

1985;

face recognition: M. H. Johnson &

Morton,

1991). Of

particular relevance,

infants

perceptually

differentiate the motion of people

from

similar but biologically

incorrect motion

as early as 3

months

of age

(Bertenthal,

in

press). This work suggested that it is

likely

that

infants

can

make

the m ore general categorization of anim ate versus inan i-

mate (mechanical) motion. I make the assumption that they

can

and

that

the

perceptual categorization

of

motion

is one

source for dividing the w orld into classes of things that mov e in

different

ways.

More

is

needed, however.

To form a

concept

of

animal,

as

opposed

to a

perceptual category of

a

p articular type

of

motion, the

infant

needs to notice and conceptualize some-

thing like the following: Those things that move in one way

start

up on

their

ow n

(see Gelm an, 1990; Premack, 1990)

and

sometimes respond to the infant from a distanc e, whereas those

things that move in another w ay do not start up on the ir own

and nev er respond to the infant from a distance. (There m ay be

other important bases. I have tried to use a minimum set that

would be

sufficient

to

u nderstand som ething about what kind

of thing an animal is above and beyond what it looks like.)

Such simple meanings are sufficient to constitute an early

concept of animal, a concept that is present in some form be-

fore the end of the first year of

life.

Several experiments have

shown

that infants respond to animals in a way that canno t be

accounted

for on the

basis

of

perceptual categorization alone.

For

example, Golinkoff

and

Halperin (1983) found that

an

8-month-old produced a un ique emotional response to both

real and toy animals that varied widely in shape, features, and

texture. In my laboratory we have found that

9-month-olds

dis-

habituate to a vehicle after seeing various models of animals

(and

vice versa) even when

the

individual animals vary greatly

in

their perceptual appearance (Mc Donough & Mandler,

1991). (Ongo ing work indicates this is true of 7-month-olds as

well). F urthermore, 9-m onth-olds also dishabituate to m odels

of birds after seeing airplanes (and vice versa), even though, in

this case, the shapes of the airplanes and birds are similar

(McDonough

& Mandler, 1991). It is usually assumed that simi-

lar

shapes and

features

form the basis of

early

perceptu al catego-

rization (e.g., Cohen

& Younger,

1983).

If

true, then perceptual

categorization

is

insufficient

to

account

for

these kinds

of re-

sponses; some conceptual basis is required. (This issue is dis-

cussed

further in the

last section

of this

article.)

To

further this account,

it is

necessary

not

only

to

specify

the

meanings involved in an early concept of animal (such as

m oves on its own and responds to other objects ) but also to

specify

the

format

in which they are represented. Whatever

their exact nature, these meanings are unlikely to consist of

sensory descriptions, as the British empiricists would have had

it. Brown and square are not the sorts

of

attributes that lead

to

understanding what

an

animal

is. Nor are the

features talked

3

These

measures

are

discussed

in

more detail

in J. M. Mandler

(1988).

4

Slobin based some of his notions on the work of Talmy (e.g., 1983),

who was

also

one of the

root sources

for

some

of the

ideas

in

this article.



CONCEPTUAL

PRIMITIVES

591

about

in the

classical theory

of concepts

(see

E. E.

Smith

&

Medin, 1981), such as has wings or four legs, likely to lead

to conceptual understanding either, for the same reason that

feature theories

have

failed

as an approach to understanding

semantic development (Armstrong,

Gleitman, &

Gleitman,

1983; Medin & Ortony, 1989; Palermo, 1986). It seems likely

that early conceptual understanding will be of a global (i.e.,

shallowly analyzed) character, with analysis of features

( brown, has wings, etc.) a later intellectual achievement

(J.

M. Mandler,

Bauer,

& McDonough,

1991; Nelson, 1974;

L. B. Smith, 1989a). Thus, an approach is needed that does not

require detailed

featural

analysis but at the same time allows

the formation of some global conceptions about what is being

perceived.

Image-Schemas

as

Conceptual Primitives

The

approach

to preverbal

conceptual representation that

I

take here

is

derived from

the

work

by

cognitive linguists

on

image-schemas (M. Johnson, 1987;

Lakoff,

1987;

Langacker,

1987;

Talmy,

1983,1985).

Although

not

developmental psychol-

ogists, these researchers have been led by their linguistic con-

cerns to seek the underlying basis of the concepts expressed in

language. It is claimed that one of the foundations of the con-

ceptualizing capacity is the image-schema, in which spatial

structure is mapped into conceptual structure. Image-schemas

are notions such as PATH, UP-DOWN, CONTAINMENT, FORCE,

PART-WHOLE,

and

LINK, notions that

are

thought

to be

derived

from perceptual structure. For example, the image-schema

PATH is the simplest conceptualization of any object

following

any trajectory through space, without regard to the characteris-

tics

of the

object

or the

details

of the

trajectory itself. According

to Lakoff and to

Johnson, image-schemas

lie at the

core

of

people's understanding, even

as

adults,

of a

wide variety

of

objects

and events and of the metaphorical extensions of these

concepts

to

more abstract realms. They form,

in

effect,

a set of

primitive meanings. (Primitive in this sense means founda-

tional; it does not mean that image-schemas are atomic, uni-

tary,

or without structure.)

A

good deal has been written about image-schemas, al-

though,

with the

exception

of

formal

linguistic treatments (e.g.,

Langacker, 1987),

most discussions have been relatively infor-

mal and

have

been directed primarily to showing how image-

schemas

function

within semantic theory. My focus here is

somewhat

different

because I am interested in the origins of

such meanings

and the

larger role they

play in

psychological

functioning.

Therefore,

after providing a definition of image-

schemas, I

will

discuss various aspects that

have

not been

stressed by

cognitive linguists, including

the

role

that

image-

schemas play

in

preverbal concept formation.

Even

though image-schemas are derived from perceptual

and (perhaps to a lesser extent) motor processes, they are not

themselves sensorimotor processes.

I

characterize them

as

con-

densed

redescriptions

of

such processes. Perceptual analysis

involves a

redescription

of

spatial structure

and of the

structure

of motion that is abstracted primarily from vision, touch, and

one's

own movements. In this view, perceptual analysis

involves

receding

perceptual inputs into schematic conceptualizations

of space. Hence, image-schemas can be denned as dynamic

analog representations of spatial relations and movements in

space. They

are

analog

in

that they

are

spatially structured repre-

sentations. They are dynamic in that they can represent continu-

ous change in location, such as an object moving along a path.

Their

continuous,

as opposed to discrete,

nature

means

that

they

are not

prepositional

in character, although due to the

simplicity of the information they represent, it should be a rela-

tively simple task to redescribe them into

prepositional

form.

They are abstracted

from

the same type of information used to

perceive,

but they eliminate most

details

of the spatial array

that are processed during ordinary perception. At the same

time they are redescriptions because they use a different

vocab-

ulary

(described

in the next

section).

These new representa-

tions are the primitive meaning elements used to form

accessi-

ble concepts.

5

To illustrate, the perception of movement trajectories

through space is receded into the image-schema PATH. The in-

fant sees many objects moving in many different

ways,

but each

can be

redescribed

in

less detailed

form as

following

a

path

through

space.

In

many cases,

the

infant sees

the

object begin-

ning

to

move

and

also coming

to

rest,

and

these

aspects

of the

event can be represented in image-schematic

form

as well. Be-

cause image-schemas are analog in nature, they have

parts.

One

can focus on the path

itself,

its beginning, or its ending. In this

sense, image-schemas embed. BEGINNING-OF-PATH can be em-

bedded in PATH; each can be considered an image-schema in its

own

right. Similarly, perception of contingent motion is re-

coded into the notion of coupled paths or LINK (discussed

later).

I

propose that image-schemas such

as

PATH (with

the

focus

on BEGINNING-OF-PATH) and LINK

constitute

the

mean-

ings involved

when a

concept such

as

animacy

is

formed. Thus,

a first concept of animals might be that they are objects that

follow

certain kinds of paths, that begin motion in a particular

kind of way, and whose movement is often coupled in a specific

fashion

to the movement of other objects. Notice that several

image-schemas have been combined to form the

concept

of

animal. That is, the concept of animal is complex, involving

more than one meaning.

This article describes

a

format

to

represent

the

meanings that

make up

several such concepts.

To

carry

out

thought with

these

concepts requires relating

one to

another. Whether thinking

in

this sense requires

a prepositional form of

representation

or can

be

carried out by constructing a mental model of an image-

schematic nature

(e.g.,

along

the

lines

of

Fauconnier's, 1985,

mental

spaces) is an open question and one that is beyond the

5

It

will

be noted

that

I am emphasizing

spatial

rather than tem poral

analysis.

I a m assuming

that

temp oral concepts are at

least

partly de-

rived from spatial ones. Many linguists

have

noted that in

all languages

studied, most

if not all

temporal

terms

have

a

spatial

sense as their

primary meaning (e.g., Clark, 1973;

Fillmore,

1982; Traugott, 1978).

Even

though movement

trajectories have

both spatial and temporal

extent, it seems easier to analyze movement through space than

move-

ment through

time;

for

example,

a nonverbal analysis of a

change

in

location

can be

expressed

by

pointing

or

moving

the hand, an

option

not available for a change in tim e. Of

course,

even very young infants

us e temporal parameters in their processing but that

does

not mean

they

conceptualize them. I suggest

that temporal concepts

are in the

first instance

represented

as

analogical extensions

of

spatial schemas.



59 2

JEAN M . H A N D LER

scope

o f

this article. Ho wever,

it is

worth noting that both La-

koff (1987) and M. Johnson (1987) have argued that the struc-

ture of

image-schemas gives rise

to

various entailments, sug-

gesting that at

least

some inferences do not require a preposi-

tional form of representation. That is, the dynamic and

relational nature

of

image-schem as provides

a

kind

of

syntax,

although no t couched in predicate-argument structures that

specify truth

conditions.

If

this view

is

correct

it

suggests

that

an

infant equipped with image-schemas could begin

to

think

about the world without a propositionally based language of

thought.

An

alternative architecture to a built-in prepositional lan-

guage, such as described by Fodor (1975), is one in which the

infant

has the

ability

to

simplify perceptual input, including

objects participating in events, thu s creating analog sketches of

what

it perceives. The resulting image-schemas provide the ear-

liest m eaning s available

to the

infant

for

purposes

of

preverbal

thought (leaving open the issue of how they are conc atenated)

and

form

the

basis

on

which natural language rests.

6

T his for-

mulation does not imply that image-schemas are themselves

accessible to consc iousness; no langu age of thoug ht is directly

accessible. Image-schem as represent

th e

meanings

from

which

accessible concepts

are

formed. (See

G.

Mandler,

1985, for a

discussion

of the processes

involved

in

conscious construc-

tions.) Hence, this architecture agrees with

Karmiloff-Smith's

(1986)

proposal that more than one level of redescription is

required before conscious access can be achieved. In the pres-

ent

case, the levels consist of

inaccessible

perceptual process-

ing,

redescription into image-schematic m eanings, followed by

further redescription into conscious imagery or language.

An ap pealing aspect

of an

image-schema architecture

is

that

it provides a natural grounding for symbolic representation.

One problem that rarely appears in discussions of the language

of thought

is how

contentless symbols

are

chosen

to

represent

its meanings (see Harnad, 1990). Unless a symbol has been

innately assigned to a meaning, such as animacy, it is difficult

to

understand

how it

becomes assigned.

An

image-schema

avoids

this problem because its meaning resides in its own

structure;

it

does

not

requ ire other symbols

or

another system

to

interpret

it.

Furthermore, this architecture avoids positing

an

enormou s list of innate m eanings. Form ing an image-schema

requires

only an innate mechanism of analysis, no t innately

known content. New content can be added to the system

when-

ever perceptual analysis takes place on aspects of the input not

previously

analyzed.

The issue of why particular image-schemas are derived from

perceptual

structure rather than others

has

rarely been dis-

cussed

by

c ognitive

linguists, and it

certainly

has not

been

re-

solved. Why,

from

observing an object in motion, should its

path b e abstracted rather than some other aspect of the input?

One possibility is that our perceptual input systems are pre-

wired

or

weighted

to form

schematic summaries

of

certain

types of perceptual information rather than others. On this

account one could say that the

infant

has an innate predisposi-

tion to

form image-schemas

of a

certain type. However,

it is

equally plausible that certain types of redescription are simply

the

outcome

of the way an

infant's immature input systems

process the spatial structure that exists in the world. O n this

accoun t , one would

no t

need

to

bias

or

preset

the

system that

processes spatial information. As a hypothetical example, a

newborn

m ight not perceive m uch m ore in a rapid perceptual

encounter than a blurry object moving along a path. If so, a

mapping of Euclidean structure into topological structure

might be a

predictable type

of

schem atization

for a

processor

that is not yet skilled at analyzin g the fine details of shape or

angular

distance. This result would happen even thoug h

it was

not

preset

to

abstract topological,

rather

than

Euclidean, infor-

mation. Altho ugh the resolution of this issue will ultim ately be

of great imp ortance, it seems prem ature to try to do more than

speculate about it at this time. First, i t needs to be determined

whether a theory of early concept formation in terms of image-

schemas is

feasible

and

p roductive.

M. Johnson (1987) and

Lakoff(1987)

stressed that image-

schemas

are not the

same

as

real images

(what

they called

rich images). Image-schemas are more abstract

than

images;

they

consist of dynam ic spatial p atterns that u nderlie the spa-

tial relations

and

movements found

in

actual concrete images.

It should be noted, however, that real images are typically not as

rich as Johnson and Lakoff implied. Furthermore, they are not

mental pictures

if a

mental picture means

a

copy

of

what

has

been perceived. V isual ima gery is constructed

from

what a per-

son knows; images are not uninterpreted copies of reality but

rather

are constructed from the

underlying

concepts the

person

has already formed (Cham bers & Reisberg, 1992; Intons-Peter-

son &

Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1989; Intraub

&

Richardson, 1989;

Piaget & Inhelder,

1971).

If concepts were represented largely in

propositional form, then one would need a complex theory

such

as

that proposed

by

K osslyn (1980)

to

show

how

analog

images could be constructed from discrete information. How-

ever, if

concepts, perhaps especially preverbal concepts,

are

couched in image-schematic form, then the

process

of

forming

images should be considerably sim plified. The im age-schema

itself

structures

an

image space

in

which specific objects

and

m ore detailed p aths and spatial relationships c an be filled in. It

is these concrete, or rich, images that appear in awareness, not

the im age-schemas themselves. That is,

when

one consciously

thinks about what an animal is, the meanings from which this

concept

is

composed com e

to

mind

as

specific images, words,

or

both. Image-schemas, therefore,

are a

crucial

part of our

m ental architecture. T hey are not

only

used to c reate m eanings

but also to help

form

the

specific

images that instantiate them

and to understand the words that refer to them. In sum m ary,

then, perceptual analysis operates on perceptual information,

leading to image-schemas,

which

in turn form th e foundation

of the

conceptual system,

a

system that

is

accessible

first via

imagery and

later

via

language

as well.

In the following sections, I will characterize several image-

schemas used

to

create concepts that appear

to be

early develop-

mental achievements: animacy, inanimacy , causality, agency,

containment, and support. To the extent that the relevant

image-schemas involve simp lifying and redescribing percep-

6

This theory

of the

basis

o f

thought

is

more

or

less

the

opposite

o f

that

proposed by Piaget (1951). Piaget claimed that imitation of the

actions of others produc es imagery, which then enables thought. My

position

is

that image-schemas provide

the

meanings that enable

in-

fants

to im itate actions in the first place.



CONCEPTUAL

PRIMITIVES

593

tual input, they seem compatible with what is known about

infant capabilities. As discussed earlier, perceptual

schemas

are

formed during the first few months of

life

and are therefore

available

to be

operated

upon.

There

is no a

priori reason

why

redescribing

these

perceptual schemas into image-schematic

form should require another year of sensorimotor learning.

However, the time of

onset

of these

concepts

is not crucial for

the arguments I make. The issue is not the exact age at which

conceptualizations of the world begin to be constructed but

whether, in principle, an image-schema formulation can ac-

count for the preverbal conceptualization

that

occurs.

The

Concept ofAnimacy

It seems that people judge motion to be animate on the basis

of perceptual characteristics of

which they

are not

aware. Some

of

the

bases that adults use, primarily involving violations

of

Newton's laws

of

motion,

have

been described

by

Stewart

(1984).

Judging motion

to be

animate

is

similar

to

judging that

a

face

is male or female—people easily make

this

categoriza-

tion but

have

little idea about the kinds of information they use

(J.

M.

Mandler, 1988).

So, if

someone

is

asked

how

they know

that a briefly viewed moving object is an animal, they might

say,

It moved like an animal, or It

started

up on its own.

What

is meant by such statements?

There are two broad types of onset of motion, self-instigated

motion (called self-motion here) and caused motion (see Pre-

mack, 1990). From an early age infants are sensitive to the dif-

ference between something starting to move on its own and

something being pushed or otherwise made to move (Leslie,

1988;

see the discussion later on causality). In its simplest form,

self-motion means that

an

object

is not

moving,

and

then, with-

out any forces acting on it, it

starts

to move. If one were asked to

express

this notion without using words,

the

best

one

might

be

able to do is to put one's hand at rest and then move it. Thus, an

image-schema SELF-MOTION

might be graphically expressed as

in Graphic

1:

a vector extending

from

a point A where A repre-

sents an entity at the beginning of its

path.

(This and the follow-

ing diagrams are obviously not meant to be literal interpreta-

tions of image-schemas; they are merely attempts to illustrate

nonverbal notions.)

SELF-MOTION

AO > (1)

This is basically the notion of a trajector (M. Johnson, 1987;

Langacker, 1987; Lindner, 1981). Self-motion is the start of an

independent trajectory; that

is, no

other object

or

trajectory

is

involved.

By

itself

an

object starting

to

move without another

visible

trajector acting

on it is not a

guarantee

of

animacy.

A

windup

toy

with

a delay

mechanism might appear

to start itself,

or an unfelt

tremor might cause

a

precariously balanced object

to fall

from

a surface. Although any such occurrence could

cause a

mistaken judgment

of

animacy, perhaps especially

by

an infant,

the

concept

of

animacy involves more than

one

meaning, not self-motion alone. As just

discussed,

moving

ob-

jects can be perceptually categorized into two kinds, and the

motion of a mechanical toy or a falling object does not fit into

the appropriate class on grounds other than the onset of its

motion, namely,

the

type

of

trajectory

it

follows.

I

address this

issue further in the following paragraphs.

My claim

is

that Graphic

1 is the

most primitive characteriza-

tion of what moves by itself means. It is a schematic represen-

tation

abstracted from

a class of varied and complex move-

ments. The schematization could be achieved merely by analyz-

ing observed movement in the environment. It might also be

abstracted from

felt

movement

of the

self

and

thei|efore have

a

kinesthetic base. Nevertheless,

the

same representation should

result: a kind of spatial representation of movement in space.

This representation

can be

redescribed once again into lan-

guage, of course, but the basic meaning is not prepositional in

form.

I assume that

in

addition

to

self-motion, infants represent

something about

the

form

of the

trajectories that self-moving

things

follow. I also assume that whatever analysis infants carry

out is rather simple. Perceptual discrimination of biological

motion (Bertenthal, in press), like perceptual categorization of

faces as

male

or female, is

something one's perceptual recogni-

tion system easily does, but this information is represented at

best crudely and

often

inaccurately. Biological motion is ex-

tremely

complex; even theoretical psychologists

are not yet

cer-

tain which parameters are crucial to judgments of animacy

(Stewart, 1984; Wilson, 1986). Similarly

for

faces:

Our

percep-

tual mechanisms use complex information about the texture

and

proportions

of the face

to distinguish male from

female

(Bruce

et al, 1991), but that information is not

part

of our

concept

of what a male or

female

looks like. We do not seem to

have a sufficiently large image-schema vocabulary to accom-

plish detailed analyses of such complex phenomena and must

rely

instead

on

simpler conceptualizations

to

think about them.

I assume that perceptual analysis

of

biological motion results

in little more than the notion that it does not

follow

a straight

line. Adults think of biological motion as having certain rhyth-

mic but unpredictable characteristics, whereas mechanical mo-

tion is thought of as undeviating unless it is deflected in some

way.

Therefore, an image-schema of

ANIMATE MOTION

may be

represented simply

by an

irregular path,

as

illustrated

in

Graphic

2.

ANIMATE-MOTION ̂_̂ ->-

2)

Although crude, this image-schema of an animate trajectory is

sufficient

for its

purpose.

In

order

to

understand

what

animals

are,

it is not

necessary

to

analyze

in

detail

the

movements that

set up the perceptual category in the first place. Nevertheless,

because

of the

concentrated attention that infants give

to

mov-

ing objects, I assume that some analysis of animate trajectories

takes place along with the analysis of the beginning of their

paths. An example would be noticing that dogs bob up and

down as

well

as follow irregular paths when they move. In this

regard,

we

have observed

an

illuminating

bit of

behavior

by

some of the 1- to 2-year-old children who have taken

part

in our

studies of early concepts (e.g., J. M. Mandler, Bauer, & McDon-

ough, 1991).

In a

typical experiment,

the

children play

with

little models

of a

variety

of

animals

and

vehicles,

and we

record

the

sequences

in

which

the

children interact

with

them. Occa-

sionally a

child will respond

to the

animals

by

making them

hop along the table and to respond to the vehicles by making

them scoot along

in a

straight line. Making

a fish or a

turtle

hop

is

a

graphic example

of a

representation

of

animate movement



5 9 4

J E A N M . M A N D L E R

t h a t

i s f a i t h f u l t o t h e a n a l y s i s i n

G r a p h i c

2 , n o m a t t e r h o w

i n a c c u r a t e

i t i s i n

d e t a i l .

T h e i m a g e s c h e m a s f o r S E L F - M O T I O N a n d A N I M A T E

M O T I O N

c a n b e c o m b i n e d ; t h a t i s , a n i m a g e - s c h e m a e m b e d d i n g

G r a p h i c

1 a n d G r a p h i c 2

r e p r e s e n t s

a n o b j e c t s t a r t i n g u p o n i t s

o w n a n d t h e n m o v i n g o n a n a n i m a t e

p a t h .

I n G r a p h i c 1 t h e

f o c u s

i s o n t h e

o n s e t

o f t h e

m o t i o n ( t h e s t r a i g h t l i n e

i n t h e

d i a g r a m i s m e r e l y a d e f a u l t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f o r a p a t h ) , w h e r e a s

i n

G r a p h i c 2 t h e f o c u s i s o n t h e p a t h i t s e l f . C o m b i n i n g t h e t w o

g i v e s a n i m a g e - s c h e m a

t h a t

m i g h t b e c a l l e d S E L F - M O V I N G A N I -

M A T E , a s

i l l u s t r a t e d

i n

G r a p h i c

3 .

S E L F - M O V I N G A N I M A T E

3

G r a p h i c

3

i l l u s t r a t e s

t h e

n o n u n i t a r y

a n d

r e l a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r

o f

m o s t i m a g e - s c h e m a s .

I t h a s t w o p a r t s

( B E G I N N I N G - O F - P A T H

a n d P A T H ) a n d a s i m p l e k i n d o f s y n t a x i n t h e s e n s e t h a t o n e c a n

m o v e f r o m o n e

p a r t

t o t h e o t h e r .

I n a d d i t i o n t o s e l f - m o t i o n a n d a n i m a t e m o t i o n , a t h i r d n o -

t i o n t h a t I

p r o p o s e

t h a t c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e c o n c e p t o f a n i m a c y i s

c o n t i n g e n c y o f m o t i o n b e t w e e n o b j e c t s , e s p e c i a l l y c o n t i n g e n c y

t h a t

a c t s a t a

d i s t a n c e r a t h e r t h a n t h r o u g h d i r e c t p h y s i c a l c o n -

t a c t .

T h e m o t o r l i m i t a t i o n s o f y o u n g i n f a n t s s e v e r e l y r e s t r i c t

t h e i r m a n i p u l a t i o n o f o b j e c t s ( a l t h o u g h t h e y h a v e a m p l e o p p o r -

t u n i t y t o w a t c h o t h e r s d o s o ) . H o w e v e r , t h e y a r e s u r r o u n d e d b y

p e o p l e w h o i n t e r a c t c o n t i n g e n t l y a m o n g t h e m s e l v e s a n d w h o

r e s p o n d f r o m

a

d i s t a n c e

t o t h e

i n f a n t ' s a c t i o n s

a n d

v o c a l i z a -

t i o n s

i n a w a y

t h a t i n a n i m a t e

o b j e c t s d o n o t . T h e s e m i n a l e x p e r i -

m e n t a l w o r k o n t h i s t o p i c w a s t h a t o f W a t s o n ( 1 9 7 2 ) . H e

s h o w e d t h a t

a t 2

m o n t h s

o f a g e

i n f a n t s l e a r n e d

t o

m a k e

a m o -

b i l e h a n g i n g a b o v e t h e i r c r i b t u r n w h e n

t h e

m o v e m e n t

w a s

c o n t i n g e n t

o n

t h e i r p r e s s i n g t h e i r h e a d s

o n a

p i l l o w . W h e n

t h e

m o b i l e d i d n o t t u r n o r t u r n e d n o n c o n t i n g e n t l y v i s - a - v i s t h e

p i l l o w a c t i o n , h e a d p r e s s e s d i d n o t i n c r e a s e . T h e m o s t i n t e r e s t -

i n g

r e s p o n s e

o f t h e

c o n t i n g e n t g r o u p

w a s

t h a t

b y t h e 3 r d t o 4 t h

d a y

o f e x p o s u r e t o t h e c o n t i n g e n t m o b i l e , t h e i n f a n t s b e g a n t o

s m i l e

a n d c o o a t i t .

W a t s o n h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t

t h e

m o b i l e b e g a n

f u n c t i o n i n g

a s a

s o c i a l s t i m u l u s

a n d

t h a t

t h e

i n i t i a l b a s i s

o f a

s o c i a l s t i m u l u s i s l i m i t e d t o s o m e s e t o f c o n t i n g e n c y e x p e r i -

e n c e s .

I t i s n o t

c l e a r

h o w o n e

w o u l d d i f f e r e n t i a t e b e t w e e n

a

c o n c e p t o f a s o c i a l s t i m u l u s a n d a n a n i m a t e s t i m u l u s i n

i n f a n c y ;

p e r h a p s a s o c i a l s t i m u l u s i s o n e t h a t r e a c t s c o n t i n g e n t l y t o o n e ' s

o w n

m o v e m e n t s , a s

o p p o s e d

t o r e a c t i n g c o n t i n g e n t l y t o t h e

m o v e m e n t o f o t h e r o b j e c t s . I n e i t h e r c a s e , o n e s h o u l d e x p e c t t o

s e e

i n f a n t s r e a c t i n g

t o

c o n t i n g e n t t o y s

o r

m o b i le s

a s i f

t h e y w e r e

a n i m a t e .

T h e h y p o t h e s i s i s s u p p o r t e d i n r e s e a r c h b y F r y e , R a w l i n g ,

M o o r e , a n d M y e r s ( 1 9 8 3 ) .

T h e s e

i n v e s t i g a t o r s u s e d s i g n a l d e -

t e c t i o n a n a l y s e s o f v i d e o t a p e s o f i n f a n t s r e s p o n d i n g e i t h e r t o

t h e i r

m o t h e r s o r t o a

t o y ;

i n a d d i t i o n , t h e m o t h e r s a n d t o y

i n t e r a c t e d w i t h t h e i n f a n t s i n e i t h e r a c o n t i n g e n t o r n o n c o n t i n -

g e n t f a s h i o n . O b s e r v e r s

h a d t o d i s c r i m i n a t e

a m o n g

t h e t a p e s ,

o n w h i c h o n l y t h e i n f a n t s c o u l d b e s e e n .

T h r e e - m o n t h - o l d s

w e r e j u d g e d t o b e h a v e s i m i l a r l y w h e n e i t h e r t h e i r

m o t h e r s

o r a

t o y r e a c te d c o n t i n g e n t l y t o t h e m

( i . e . ,

t h e o b s e r v e r s

c o u l d

n o t

t e l l t h e s e t a p e s a p a r t ) a n d t o b e h a v e

d i f f e r e n t l y

i n t h o s e s i t u a -

t i o n s

i n

w h i c h th e r e

w a s n o

c o n t i n g e n t

i n t e r a c t i o n .

T e n - m o n t h -

o l d i n f a n t s , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w e r e j u d g e d

a l s o

t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e

c o n t i n g e n t m o t h e r s f r o m c o n t i n g e n t t o y s , s u g g e s t i n g t h a t b y

t h i s a g e i n f a n t s h a v e d e v e l o p e d a m o r e d e t a i l e d c o n c e p t i o n o f

p e r s o n s o r a n i m a t e t h i n g s .

P o u l i n - D u b o i s

a n d

S h u l t z

( 1 9 8 8 )

s u g g e s t e d t h a t i n f a n t s

o n l y

l e a r n a b o u t

t h e

n o t i o n

o f

i n d e p e n d e n t a g e n c y

i n t h e

l a s t

q u a r t e r

o f t h e f i r s t

y e a r ; t h e y f o u n d t h a t 8 - m o n t h - o l d s h a b i t -

u a t e d m o r e t o t h e s i g h t o f a c h a i r a c t i n g a s a n i n d e p e n d e n t a g e n t

t h a n t o a p e r s o n a c t i n g a s a n i n d e p e n d e n t a g e n t . A l t h o u g h i t i s

n o t c l e a r e x a c t l y h o w t o i n t e r p r e t t h i s r e s u l t , i t s e e m s r e a s o n a b l e

t o s u p p o s e t h a t i f c o n t i n g e n t m o t i o n a n d s e l f - m o t i o n d e f i n e

a n i m a c y

f o r

i n f a n t s

i n t h e f i r s t

m o n t h s

o f

l i f e , t h e n

t h e

m i s -

t a k e s t h a t y o u n g

i n f a n t s

m a k e m a y n o t b e b e c a u s e t h e y d o n o t

h a v e a

c o n c e p t

o f

a n i m a c y

b u t

b e c a u s e

i t i s t o o

b r o a d . I n f a n t s

w h o s m i l e a n d c o o a t a m o b i l e t h a t i s c o n t i n g e n t o n t h e i r b e h a v -

i o r o r i n f a n t s

w h o s e i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h

a n

a n i m a t e d

t o y

c a n n o t

b e

d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h t h e i r m o t h e r ,

m a y b e

r e v e a l i n g t h a t t h e y t h i n k t h o s e t h i n g s a r e a n i m a t e , a n d s o t h e y

r e a c t a c c o r d i n g l y .

H o w m i g h t t h e n o t i o n o f c o n t i n g e n c y b e c o n c e p t u a l i z e d b y a

y o u n g i n f a n t ? T h i s i s a d i f f i c u l t q u e s t i o n b e c a u s e t h e e x t e n t t o

w h i c h i n f a n t s i n t e r p r e t c o n t i n g e n c y a s i n v o l v i n g a c a u s a l r e l a -

t i o n i s n o t k n o w n . I t s e e m s p l a u s i b l e t h a t i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c et h e y d o n o t a n d t h a t t h e i n i t i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f c o n t i n g e n c y i s

a

s i m p l e r n o t i o n .

A

s i m p l e d e r i v a t i o n

o f a

n o t i o n

o f

c o n t i n g e n c y

i s p o s s i b l e f r o m a r e d e s c r i p t i o n o f s p a t i a l s t r u c t u r e i n t e r m s o f

t h e L I N K i m a g e - s c h e m a . L a k o f f ( 1 9 8 7 ) d i s c u s s e d t h i s s c h e m a

o n l y

b r i e f l y ,

n o t i n g t h a t i t s s t r u c t u r e c o n s i s t s o f t w o e n t i t i e s a n d

a l i n k c o n n e c t i n g t h e m . T o m y k n o w l e d g e , t h e r e h a s n o t b e e n

m u c h a n a l y s i s o f t h i s k i n d o f i m a g e - s c h e m a , b u t t h e r e a p p e a r s

t o b e a f a m i l y o f L I N K s c h e m a s w i t h r e l a t e d m e a n i n g s , m u c h a s

B r u g m a n

( 1 9 8 8 )

a n d

L a k o f f ( 1 9 8 7 ) u s e d

a f a m i l y o f

s c h e m a s

t o

r e p r e s e n t

t h e

v a r i o u s m e a n i n g s

o f t h e

t e r m o v e r .

T h e

s i m p l e s t

v e r s i o n o f t h e

L I N K i m a g e - s c h e m a

i s

i l l u s t r a t e d

i n

G r a p h i c

4 .

O t h e r v e r s i o n s o f L I N K s c h e m a s a r e l i s t e d b e l o w i t .

L I N K

B

O N E - W A Y

L I N K

A O O B

T W O - W A Y L I N K A O O B

L I N K E D

P A T H S

A

5 C ) B

( 4 )

( 4 a )

( 4 b )

( 4 c )

I n

G r a p h i c 4 t h e l i n k ( w h i c h i s n o t t h e s a m e a s a p a t h ) m e a n s

t h a t t w o e n t i t i e s o r e v e n t s , A a n d B , a r e c o n s t r a i n e d b y , o r d e -

p e n d e n t o n , o n e a n o t h e r e v e n t h o u g h t h e y a r e n o t i n d i r e c t

c o n t a c t .

L i n k s c a n o c c u r a c r o s s b o t h s p a t i a l a n d

t e m p o r a l

g a p s

a n d c a n b e o n e - w a y o r m u t u a l . F o r e x a m p l e , t o e x p r e s s t h e

c o n t i n g e n c y i n t h e W a t s o n

( 1 9 7 2 )

e x p e r i m e n t

d e s c r i b e d

e a r l i e r

i n w h i c h t h e i n f a n t A a c t s a n d t h e m o b i l e B t u r n s , o n e m i g h t

u s e a

L I N K

s c h e m a i n

w h i c h

t h e

c o n t i n g e n c y

i s

o n e - w a y ,

a s i n

G r a p h i c 4 a . ( T h e a r r o w i s m e a n t t o r e p r e s e n t t h e d i r e c t i o n o f

t h e c o n t i n g e n c y )

T h i s

k i n d o f c o n t i n g e n c y s e e m s l i k e l y t o r e -

q u i r e a n u m b e r o f r e p e t i t i o n s b e f o r e a n e x p e c t a t i o n i s s e t u p , a s

o c c u r r e d

i n t h e W a t s o n e x p e r i m e n t . P r e s u m a b l y , t h e r e f o r e ,

a n a l y s i s

o f t h e

c o n t i n g e n c y w o u l d

n o t h a p p e n o n t h e f i r s t

o c c a -

s i o n . R e p e t i t i o n

m a y a l s o b e

r e q u i r e d

f o r G r a p h i c 4 b , w h i c h

r e p r e s e n t s

t h e b a c k - a n d - f o r t h i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n a n i n f a n t

a n d i t s

m o t h e r d e s c r i b e d i n t h e

F r y e

e t a l .

( 1 9 8 3 )

e x p e r i m e n t .

I n a d d i t i o n ,

t h e r e a r e l i n k e d

p a t h s ,

i n w h i c h t w o o b j e c t s m o v e



CONCEPTUAL PRIMITIV ES

595

in tandem as linked trajectories, shown in Graphic 4c; if A

moves, then B moves too. It may be

possible

to analyze this

kind of contingency on the first exposure to it. Notice that in all

these cases m otion is involved, not in the link but by the entities

themselves; that is, the entities are

parts

of events.

Responsivity to co ntingency is one of the m ost basic predis-

positions of

infants

(or, for that matter, o f organisms in gen-

eral). For example, conditioning would not be

possible

without

it. Whether active analysis, or awareness, of contingency is re-

quired for conditioning to occ ur is a disputed issue and would

take us too fa r

afield

to discu ss here, but

responsivity

to contin-

gency, even

in

neonates,

is not in

dou bt (Rovee-Collier, 198 7).

One of the first kinds of contingency to be learned is that in-

volved in S-S conditioning, that is, a contingency occurring

between two entities (or events) in the environment, rather

than

a

contingency occ urring between

an

entity (or event)

and

the

neonate's

own

responses (see SamerofT

& Cavanaugh,

1979). Therefore, it should be possible to analyze contingent

motion

on the

basis

of the

structure

of

environmental events

alone. The evidence to date is m ostly about c ontingencies be-

tween

self

and the environment; for example, Greco, Hayne,

and Rovee-Collier (1990) suggested that 3-month-olds use mo-

tion

th at is contingent on their responses to categorize d issimi-

lar app earing objects. However, analysis

of

objects' m ovements

vis-a-vis one's

own

responses, though useful,

may not be re-

quired

for analysis

of

contingent motion

to

take place. Whether

very young infants actually engage

in

perceptual analysis

o f

such environmental contingencies

is

another issue.

My

point

here

is only that it is possible to associate contingent motion

with

a

particular category

of

mov ing objects without having

to

observe

their responsivity

to self.

Such

a

situation would allow

infants

to

conceptualize birds

or

animals

in a zoo as

animate

things without

having

to interact with them in a personal way.

The contingency of animate movement not only involves

such factors as one

animate

following

another,

as

described

by

LINKED P A T H S but also involves avoiding barrie rs and making

sudden

shifts

in acceleration. Stewart (1984) showed that adults

are sensitive to all of these aspects of animate movement, but

even thou gh they appear to be p erceptually salient, it is not yet

known whether infants are responsive to them or not. N or has

anyone c onsidered

how

factors such

as

barrier avoidance might

be

represented

in

image-schema form.

M.

Johnson

(1987) de-

scribed several FORCE schemas, such

as

blockage

and

diversion,

that

may be

useful

in

describing barrier avoidance,

bu t

they

need to be differentiated into animate and inanimate trajecto-

ries. One

m ight represent animate

and

inanimate

differences in

response to blockage as a trajectory that shifts direction

before

contacting

a barrier versus one that ru ns into a barrier and then

either

stops

or

bounces

off from

it.

I

have

outlined here some simple kinds of percep tual analysis

that

give

conceptual m eaning

to a

category

of

moving things.

The claim

is

that infants generalize across

the

particulars

of

perception to a representation that encom passes some abstract

characteristics the experiences have in common. Things that

move

in one w ay can be concep tualized as starting up on their

ow n

and interacting with other entities in a contingent way

without

having to m ake contact with them. Such things can be

contrasted w ith another c ategory of

moving

things that not only

move differently, but do not start up on their own and do not

interact contingently with other entities

from

a

distance.

These

analyses can be characterized as redescriptions of varied and

exceedingly complex perceptions into a few different kinds of

trajectories. Some

of the

trajectories imp ly self-motion; others

imply

contingent response to objects taking part in events in

the environment. Such redescription could in principle be

carried

out

from

a

very young

age by

analysis

of

spatial struc -

ture into image-schematic form. It would provide the begin-

nings of a concept (or theory) of what an animate thing is ,

above

and

beyond what

it

looks like.

So far I have concentrated on the conceptualization of ani-

mate things, saying little about the c ontrasting class of inani-

mates.

Even

thou gh anim ates are the class of things that seem

to attract infants' interest and attention the most,

infants

do

attend with interest to all moving things, many of which are

inanimate. Therefore, I assume that c onceptualization of inani-

macy

takes place concurrently with the formation of notions

about anim acy; that is, there is no reason to assume that inani-

mates

a re

merely

a

default class.

A

likely starting point

is the

fact that inanim ates involve caused m otion rather than self-mo-

tion. How might caused motion be represented?

T h e C o n c e p ts

of

Causa l i t y and

Inanimacy

The

difference between self-motion

and

caused motion

is

that

in the

latter case

the

beginning-o f-path involves another

trajector. A

hand picks

up an

object, whose trajectory then

begins,

or a

ball rolls into another, starting

the

second

o ne on its

course. A n image-schema of C A U S E D MOTION could be graphi-

cally represented as in Graphic 5: a vector toward an object A,

with

another vector leaving the p oint. The two trajectories are

not independent; the first one ends (or shifts direction) at the

point and time at which A begins its motion. The illustration

here, as in Graphic 1, is meant to emphasize the onset of mo-

tion. The trajectories are drawn as straight lines, again as a

default

case (although they are app ropriate for m any kinds of

caused motion). In the case of the hand, the trajectories are

more complex; this issue is discussed in the following para-

graphs.

CAUSED MOTION

5)

Just as

for

animate motion, p erceptu al analysis of the paths of

objects

caused to move, such as a launched b all or a car, results

in a representation of inanimate (or mechanical) motion. The

simplest

way to

express this notion

is by a

straight line

as in

Graphic 6.

INANIMATE MOTION

(6)

Again,

combining

the

beginning-of-path with

the

path itself

forms an image-schema that might be called CAUSED-TO-MOVE

I N A N I M A T E

as in Graphic 7. (The only difference between

Graphics 7 and 5 is that the beginning-of-path and the path

itself have been g iven equal emp hasis in Graphic 7.)

A

CAUSED-TO-MOVE INANIMATE

K)

(7)

Leslie

(1982,

1988)

has

provided data

on the

perception

of



596

J EA N M .

M A N D L E R

causality in infancy, with findings similar to those

found

by

Michotte

(1963)

fo r

adults.

Leslie speculated that a concept of

causality is derived

from

this kind of perception. He found that

infants as you ng as 4 months distinguish between the c ausal

movement involved in one ball launching another and very

similar events

in

whic h there

is a

small spatial

or

temporal

g ap

between

the two movements. In launching, the end-of-path of

the first trajectory is the beginning-of-path of trajector A, as

illustrated in Graphic 7. In the n oncausal case there is no con-

nection between

the end o f one

trajectory

and the

beginning

of

the next, as illustrated in Graphic 8.

7

A

It

is probably no accident that L eslie used films of balls being

launched that look similar

to the

sketch shown

in

Graphic

7

and contrasted them with films that looked m uch like Graphic

8.

Launching is a paradigm case of causal motion, and the

image-schema underlying it may be used as the foundation of

causal understanding of all sorts. It also represents the para-

digm case of the motion of inanimate objects. Inanimate ob-

jects are objects that typic ally do not m ove at all, but when they

do they are caused to move. The cause of motion can itself be

either animate or inanimate. In Graphic 7, A represents an

inanimate object; not only is it caused to move, but it follows an

inanimate trajectory. In Graphic 8, A also moves in an inani-

mate fashion, but creates an anomalous impression because it

starts up on its own.

If

spatial analysis results

in an

early representation

of

causal-

ity, it would suggest that physical causality might be repre-

sented before psychological c ausality. This progression w ould

be the opposite of that usually assumed in development. Ac-

cording to Piaget

(1954),

psychological causation, or the aware-

ness

of one's own intention or

efforts

to make something hap-

pen, is the basis on which the later understanding of physical

causality rests.

The

spatialization

of

causal understanding

is

said

to

begin only after infants experience many occasions

of

drawing

objects to themselves or pus hing them away. However,

both Leslie's (1982, 1984) data

and an

approach

to

concept

formation

in term s of redescription of spatial structure suggest

that the ontogenetic ordering may be the other way aroun d. The

experience

of

intention

or

volition

may not be

required

to

form

an initial conception

of

causality. Indeed, internal states

are

notoriously difficult to conceptualize, and children may re-

quire a good deal of experience before they begin to do so. W e

have

no evidence for any analysis of internal states by 4-month-

old infants. In contrast, som e analysis of the spatial struc ture of

moving objects has apparently begun by this

age.

8

T he

C o n c e pt of

Agency

Leslie (19 82) provided other data on causal perception that

are

relevant to the issue of how a concept of agency can be

represented.

He

showed that both

4- and

7-month-olds were

surprised when

a

hand appeared

to

move

an

object without

touching

it.

That

is, the

image-schema

of C A U S E D MOTION was

violated because

the first

trajector

did not

reach

the

point

where the

second trajector began

its

path. Thus,

an

object

started

up on its own but d id not

move

in the way

that animate

objects usually

do;

rather,

it

moved

in an

inanimate fashion

as

in Grap hic 6. Such a display creates an anomaly, similar to that

illustrated in Graphic 8. Related data (Leslie, 1984) indicated

that infants have also learned something about animates as

agents

at an

earlier

age

than Poulin-Dubois

and

Shultz

(1988)

suggested. In this experiment, 7-month-olds dishabituated

when

a hand appeared to pick u p an object without contacting

it, but they did

no t

react

differentially

to blocks o f wood that

picked up objects with or w ithout contact. The infants may

have

found

the

sight

of a

block

of

wood picking

up an

object

difficult

to

interpret whether

it

contacted

the

object

or not and

so did not

differentiate between

the

two. (Even 3-month-olds

have already learned some of the characteristic behavior o f

hands. Needham

and

Baillargeon,

1991, found

that 3-month-

olds were surp rised

when a

hand pushed

a n

object off

a surface

and the object did not fall; a similar display in which the object

wa s grasped by a hand, did not surprise them.)

Leslie's (1984) data suggest that perceptual analysis of causal

and

noncausal motion

is

involved

not

only

in the

formation

of

concepts of animacy and inanimacy but also in the develop-

men t of the concept of an agent. Anim ate objects not only move

themselves but cause o ther thi ngs to move; it is the latter char-

acteristic, of course, that turns animates into agents. I offer a

representation

of an

image-schema

of

A G E N C Y

in

Graphic

9.

AGENCY is represented as an animate object, A,

that

moves

itself and also causes another object, B, to move. This image-

schema is hardly more complex than the image-schema of

C A U S E D - T O - M O V E

IN A N IM A T E

(Graphic

7) . T he

only

difference

is

that

tw o

objects

are

represented,

and the

object

A

that c auses

B to

move follows

an

animate path.

A B

AGENCY <y -̂_̂ XD >

(9)

One of the

most frequent

sights in

early infancy

is

that

of

people manipulating objects. These are typically objects that

rarely move at all under other circumstances. The trajectories

taken by manipulated objects in these cases are those of the

agent that

is

holding them. This complicates

the

analysis that

must

b e

carried

out but

perhaps

not so

greatly

as to be

necessar-

ily a late development. Inanimate objects are those that often

do not move at all, but when they do the beginning-of-path is

caused m otion, not self-motion. The pa ths they follow are inan-

imate paths, unless the cause of motion is an agent picking

them

up. In

that case, their paths

are

contingent

on the

path

of

the agent. If the paths part company (i.e., the agent lets the

object go), the path of the manip ulated object reverts to that of

inanimate motion.

7

Note that the

separation between

the two trajectories in

Graphic

8

can represent either a spatial or a temporal gap; that is, a spatial or a

temporal

separation results in the assessment that A begins on its own.

Using a temporal gap to judge

that

an independent

trajectory

has be-

gun

is an example of using temporal information without necessarily

conceptualizing

it as such.

8

If

this argument

is

correct,

it provides an ontological

basis

for our

pervasive tendency to conceptualize the mental world by analogy to

the physical world, rather than the other way

around.

Extensive

analy-

ses of

this

tendency have been provided by cognitive linguists

such

as

M . Johnson (1987), Sweetser (1990), andTalmy (1988).




597

I

have discussed several kinds of spatial movement that

might be important in early concepts about objects, but there

are certainly a num ber of others. For example, W agner, Winner,

Cicchetti, and Gardner (1981) found that 9- to 13-month olds

were able

to

make

a metaphorical

match between

certain

auditory

and

visual patterns.

Specifically, the

infants were more

ap t

to

look

at a

broken line

or a

jagged circle when listening

to a

pulsing

tone

and to

look

at a

continuous line

or a

smooth circle

when

listening to a continuous tone. Similarly they looked

more at an upw ard pointing arrow (which m ay tend to make

the eyes move upwards) when listening to an ascending tone

and to a downw ard arrow whe n listening to a descending tone.

This finding is of particular interest because it

appears

to be

the same phenomenon described by M. Johnson (1 987 ) and

Lakoff (1987)

as the way in

which adults project image-sche-

m as from

one

domain

to

another, fo r example, conceptualizing

quantity

in terms of

verticality

(m ore is up, less is down) .

The

Wagner

et

al. (1981) data

are

also interesting because

of

their potential application

to the

debate over

the

basis

of

cross-

modal matching

in

infancy.

For

instance, when listening

to a

single

sound track while being presented with

two

different

films, 4-month-old infants are more ap t to look at the film that

matches

the

sound track (e.g., Spelke, 1976). Kellman (1988)

suggested that the auditory and visual transducers output the

same pattern of information in an am odal form, which could

account for the m atching behavior. Spelke (1988), on the other

hand, suggested that a more thoughtful central

process

is

required. Although Spelke did not describe this process in

terms of image-schemas, her suggestion could be so inter-

preted. In

such

an account, the m atching behavior would not be

due

to the transducers resulting in the same amodal output;

rather,

the infant

would

be

described

as

creating

the

same

image-schema to represent the two outputs.

The Concep t s of Containment and Support

The last concept I will discuss is containment, along with a

cluster of related notions: going in or out, opening and closing,

and support. Containment in particular is an important notion

to consider because of its potential relevance to p reverbal think -

ing. The data that are available suggest it is an early c onceptual

development. Some concept of containment seems to

be

respon-

sible for the

better performance 9-month-old infants show

on

object-hiding

tasks when the occluder consists of an upright

container, rather than an inverted container or a screen (Free-

man,

Lloyd, & Sinha, 1980; Lloyd, Sinha, & Freeman, 1981).

These authors suggested that

infants

already have

a

concept

of

containers as places where things disappear and reappear.

More direct work on

containment

has been

conducted

by

Kol-

stad

(1991), wh o

showed that 5.5-month-old infants

are

sur-

prised

when

containers without bottoms app ear to hold things.

This finding suggests that the notions of containm ent and sup-

port may be closely related

from

an early age.

According

to Lakoff (1987), the CONTAINMENT schema has

three struc tural elements: interior, bou ndary, and exterior. Such

a notion seems likely to arise from two sources: first, percep-

tual analysis of the

differentiation

of figure from ground, that

is, seeing objects as bounded and having an inside th at is sepa-

rate

from

the

ou tside (Spelke, 1988 ), and second, from percep-

tual analysis of objects going into and out

of

containers. The list

of containm ent relations that babies experience is long. Babies

eat

and

drin k, spit things out, w atch their bodies being clothed

and

unclothed,

are

taken

in and out of rooms, and so on. Al-

though

M.

Johnson (1987) emphasized bodily experience

as

the basis of the understand ing of containment, it is not obvious

that bod ily experience

per se is

required

for

perceptual analysis

to take place.

Infants have

many opp ortunities to analyze sim-

ple, easily visible containers, such as bottles, cups, and dishes,

and the acts of containment that m ake things disappear into

and reapp ear out of them . Indeed, I would expect it to be easier

to analyze the sight of milk going into and out of a cup than

milk going into or out of one's mouth. Nevertheless, however

the analysis of co ntainme nt gets

started,

one wou ld expect the

notion of food as something that is taken into the m outh to be

an early conceptualization.

In

the same way as discussed for LINK, there appears to be a

cluster of related image-schemas used to form the concept of a

container.

One expresses the meaning of

CONTAINMENT

itself.

Thus, Graphic 10 represents the meaning of one thing being

inside another, by showing an object, A, in an at least partially

enclosed space.

CONTAINMENT

(A)

(10)

Related

image-schemas

express the meaning of going in or go-

ing out in which a trajector goes from outside a container to the

inside, as in

Graphic lOa,

or

vice versa,

as in

Graphic lOb.

GOING

IN

GOING OUT

6

6

(10a)

(10b)

As Kolstad's

(1991)

data suggest still another aspect that

seems to be involved in an early concept

of

a container is that of

support: true containers not only envelop things but support

them as well. I

have

already mentioned work by Needham and

Baillargeon (1991) showing that infants as young as 3 months

are surprised

when

sup port relations between objects are vio-

lated. A primitive image-schema of

SUPPORT

might require

only a representation of contact between two objects in the

vertical dimension. An image-schema of SUPPORT is repre-

sented in Graphic 1 1 in the form of an object, A , above and in

contact with

a

surface.

SUPPORT A (11)

Baillargeon,

Needham,

and DeVos

(1991) docum ented

some of

the

changes that occ ur

in

understanding support over

a

period

of

a few

months.

A t 3

m onths infants expect objects

to be

sup-

ported if they are in full contact with a surface, and otherwise

they expect objects

to

fall.

B y 5

m onths they expect

an

object

to

be

supp orted

if any

part

of the

object rests

on the

surface.

By 6

months they have begun to differentiate between partial but

inadequate support (15% overlap between

the

object

and the

supporting surface) and adequate support (70% overlap).

These data suggest that

the

earliest notion

of

support does

no t

include

considerations

of

gravity

or

weight distribution,

but at

least som e aspects of these characteristics are learned within a

few

months.

Still another exam ple of early understanding related to c on-



5 9 8

J E A N

M

M A N D L E R

t a i n m e n t i s t h a t o f o p e n i n g a n d c l o s i n g . P i a g e t ( 1 9 5 1 ) d o c u -

m e n t e d i n d e t a i l t h e a c t i o n s h i s 9 - t o 1 2 - m o n t h - o l d i n f a n t s p e r -

f o r m e d w h i l e t h e y w e r e l e a r n i n g t o i m i t a t e a c t s t h a t t h e y c o u l d

n o t s e e t h e m s e l v e s p e r f o r m , s u c h a s b l i n k i n g . H e n o t i c e d t h a t

b e f o r e t h e y a c c o m p l i s h e d

t h e c o r r e c t a c t i o n

t h e y s o m e t i m e s

o p e n e d a n d c l o s e d t h e i r m o u t h s , o p e n e d a n d c l o s e d t h e i r

h a n d s ,

o r

c o v e r e d

a n d

u n c o v e r e d t h e i r e y e s w i t h

a p i l l o w . H i s

a c c o u n t t e s t i f i e s b o t h t o t h e p e r c e p t u a l a n a l y s i s i n w h i c h t h e

i n f a n t s w e r e e n g a g i n g

a n d

t h e i r a n a l o g i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g

o f

t h e

s t r u c t u r e

o f t h e

b e h a v i o r t h e y w e r e t r y i n g

t o

r e p r o d u c e .

S u c h

u n d e r s t a n d i n g s e e m s a c l e a r c a s e o f a n i m a g e - s c h e m a o f

t h e s p a t i a l m o v e m e n t i n v o l v e d w h e n a n y t h i n g o p e n s o r c l o s e s ,

r e g a r d l e s s

o f t h e

p a r t i c u l a r s

o f t h e

t h i n g i t s e l f .

T h e

i m a g e -

s c h e m a i s n o t e a s i l y r e p r e s e n t a b l e i n a s t a t i c s k e t c h , b u t i t i n -

v o l v e s

a n o p e r a t i o n o n t h e b o u n d a r y o f a c o n t a i n e r , s u c h t h a t

s o m e t h i n g c a n m o v e i n o r o u t o f i t , a s i n G r a p h i c s l O a a n d

1

O b .

L a k o f f ( 1 9 8 7 ) p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e C O N T A I N M E N T i m a g e -

s c h e m a

f o r m s

a

g e s t a l t - l i k e

w h o l e t h a t h a s m e a n i n g b y v i r t u e o f

t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s a m o n g t h e p a r t s . I n d o e s n o t h a v e m e a n i n g

w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r i n g o u t a n d a b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n t h e m .

L a k o f f

w e n t o n t o

s u g g e s t t h a t

t h e

C O N T A I N M E N T

s c h e m a

f o r m s

t h e

b a s i s

f o r t h e l a t e r m e a n i n g f u l n e s s o f c e r t a i n l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s ,

s u c h

a s P o r n o t P ( i n o r n o t i n ) , a n d f o r t h e

B o o l e a n l o g i c

o f

c l a s s e s ( i f a l l A s a r e B s a n d x i s a n A , t h e n x i s a B d e r i v i n g

f r o m i f A i s i n

c o n t a i n e r

B a n d

j c

i s i n A ,

t h e n

j c i s i n

B ) .

H e

c l a i m e d t h a t o u r i n t u i t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e m e a n i n g o f a s e t

( e v e n

t h o u g h i t i s d e f i n e d f o r m a l l y i n s e t - t h e o r e t i c a l m o d e l s o f

l o g i c ) i s d u e t o t h e C O N T A I N M E N T s c h e m a . I n t h i s v i e w , m e a n -

i n g p o s t u l a t e s a r e m e a n i n g f u l b e c a u s e t h e y a r e p r e p o s i t i o n a l

t r a n s l a t i o n s o f t h e s c h e m a s t h a t s t r u c t u r e o u r n o n v e r b a l

t h o u g h t .

L a k o f f s

( 1 9 8 7 ) c l a i m a b o u t

t h e

b a s i s

o f o u r

i n t u i t i v e u n d e r -

s t a n d i n g o f l o g i c i s a t t r a c t i v e i n s o f a r a s i t s u g g e s t s h o w r e p r e -

s e n t i n g e a r l y c o n c e p t s

i n

i m a g e - s c h e m a t i c t e r m s

c a n

p r o v i d e

a

g r o u n d i n g i n p r e v e r b a l t h o u g h t f o r

a s p e c t s

o f l a t e r l a n g u a g el e a r n i n g a n d r e a s o n i n g . A s B r a i n e a n d R u m a i n

( 1 9 8 3 )

p o i n t e d

o u t , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o i m a g i n e h o w c h i l d r e n c o u l d u n d e r s t a n d

s e n t e n c e s c o n t a i n i n g l o g i c a l c o n n e c t i v e s s u c h a s o r i f t h e y d i d

n o t a l r e a d y h a v e w h a t B r a i n e a n d R u m a i n c a l l e d i n f e r e n c e s c h e -

m a s .

A l t h o u g h B r a i n e

a n d

R u m a i n

d i d n o t

s u g g e s t t h a t s u c h

s c h e m a s a r e w i t h i n t h e c o m p e t e n c e o f i n f a n t s , i t b e c o m e s e a s -

i e r t o s e e w h e r e t h e y m i g h t c o m e

f r o m

i f t h e y c o n s i s t o f u n d e r -

s t a n d i n g t h e m e a n i n g o f s i m p l e n o t i o n s l i k e C O N T A I N M E N T .

T h e

i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t s o m e t h i n g i s e i t h e r i n o r o u t o f a c o n t a i n e r

a n d i s n o t b o t h i n a n d o u t a t t h e s a m e t i m e i s s p a t i a l l y e v i d e n t

f r o m e x a m i n i n g a c o n t a i n e r a n d c a n b e p r o j e c t e d b y m e a n s o f

t h e

C O N T A I N M E N T i m a g e - s c h e m a

t o

o t h e r o r

a n d

n o t r e l a t io n s .

A

s i m i l a r k i n d o f a n a l y s i s o f i f - t h e n m a y b e d e r i v e d

f r o m

t h e

L I N K

s c h e m a s i n

G r a p h i c s

4 a a n d 4 b . S u c h i m a g e - s c h e m a i m -

p l i c a t i o n s

a r e

n o n p r o p o s i t i o n a l ; t h e y

d o n o t

c o n s i s t

o f

s t r i n g s

o f d i s c r e te s y m b o l s , y e t t h e y a l l o w t h e m e a n i n g o f c e r t a i n i n f e r -

e n c e s t o b e u n d e r s t o o d . B e c a u s e t h e s e k i n d s

o f

a n a l o g

r e p r e s e n -

t a t i o n s h a v e

a

r e l a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e ,

o n e

m i g h t

s a y

t h a t t h e y c o n -

t a i n w i t h i n t h e m s e l v e s t h e b a s i s o f w h a t w i l l

b e c o m e

i n l a n -

g u a g e

( o r l o g i c )

a

p r e d i c a t e - a r g u m e n t s t r u c t u r e .

I m a g e - S c h e m a s a n d L a n g u a g e A c q u i s i t i o n

B o w e r m a n

( 1 9 8 7 ) n o t e d t h a t t h e r e a r e t w o i m p o r t a n t

a s p e c t s

o f t h e

r o l e

o f

m e a n i n g

i n

l e a r n i n g

t o

t a l k t h a t m u s t

b e

s o l v e d

b e f o r e o n e c a n c l a i m t o h a v e a n a d e q u a t e m o d e l o f l a n g u a g e

a c q u i s i t i o n . T h e f i r s t i s a p l a u s i b l e t h e o r y o f w h e r e c h i l d r e n ' s

m e a n i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s c o m e f r o m , a n d t h e s e c o n d i s h o w

t h e y

a r e u s e d t o

f a c i l i t a t e

l a n g u a g e l e a r n i n g . ( B o w e r m a n a l s o

n o t e d t h a t w e h a v e n o t m a d e m u c h p r o g r e s s o n e i t h e r p r o b l e m . )

T h e p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n s o f t h i s a r t i c l e a d d r e s s e d t h e f i r s t o f t h e s e

i s s u e s , b y s h o w i n g h o w p r e v e r b a l m e a n i n g s m i g h t b e f o r m e d

a n d

d o i n g

s o i n a

l a n g u a g e - i n d e p e n d e n t

w a y .

T h a t

i s , t h e

m o t i -

v a t i o n f o r t h e

c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n

o f t h e

i m a g e - s c h e m a s

I

h a v e

d e s c r i b e d

w a s n o t t o

e x p l a i n l a n g u a g e l e a r n i n g

b u t t o

a c c o u n t

f o r t h e k i n d o f c o n c e p t u a l a c t i v i t y t h a t o c c u r s i n p r e v e r b a l c h i l -

d r e n . I n t h i s s e c t i o n , h o w e v e r , I

w i l l

d i s c u s s s o m e o f t h e

w a y s

i n

w h i c h i m a g e - s c h e m a s s h o u l d b e u s e f u l i n l a n g u a g e a c q u i s i t i o n .

I m a g e - s c h e m a s ,

w h i c h

a r e b a s e d o n a r e d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e

s p a t i a l s t r u c t u r e i n f a n t s e x p e r i e n c e e v e r y d a y , w o u l d s e e m t o b e

p a r t i c u l a r l y

u s e f u l

i n t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f v a r i o u s r e l a t i o n a l c a t e -

g o r i e s i n l a n g u a g e . O n t h e b a s i s o f l i n g u i s t i c a n a l y s e s , c o g n i t i v e

l i n g u i s t s h a v e p r o p o s e d i m a g e - s c h e m a s a n d m e n t a l s p a c e s a s

t h e r o o t s o f o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d u s e o f m o d a l s ( S w e e t s e r ,

1 9 9 0 ;

T a l m y ,

1 9 8 8 ) , p r e p o s i t i o n s ( B r u g m a n , 1 9 8 8 ;

T a l m y ,

1 9 8 3 ) ,

v e r b p a r t i c l e s ( L i n d n e r ,

1 9 8 1 ) ,

t e n s e a n d a s p e c t ( L a n -g a c k e r ,

1 9 8 7 ) ,

a n d p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s ( F a u c o n n i e r ,

1 9 8 5 ) .

S o m e

o f t h e s e c a t e g o r i e s h a v e s e e m e d m o r e p r o b l e m a t i c a l f o r y o u n g

l a n g u a g e

l e a r n e r s t h a n l e a r n i n g t h e n a m e s f o r t h i n g s .

E v e n

t o

l e a r n n a m e s , i t h a s b e e n t h o u g h t n e c e s s a r y t o p r o p o s e t h a t

c h i l d r e n

h a v e

a b i a s t o a s s u m e t h a t l a b e l s r e f e r t o w h o l e o b j e c t s

r a t h e r t h a n t o o b j e c t p a r t s ( M a r k m a n , 1 9 8 9 ; Q u i n e , 1 9 6 0 ) . A

s i m i l a r k i n d o f b i a s m a y o p e r a t e w i t h r e s p e c t t o v a r i o u s r e l a -

t i o n a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s .

B r o w n

( 1 9 7 3 ) a n d o t h e r s s h o w e d t h a t a n u m b e r o f r e l a t i o n a l

m o r p h e m e s , s u c h a s t h e p r e p o s i t i o n s

i n

a n d

o n ,

a r e e a r l y a c q u i -

s i t i o n s .

T h e

m e a n i n g

o f

t h e s e r e l a t i o n a l t e r m s

i s

g i v e n

b y t h e

r e l e v a n t i m a g e - s c h e m a s , j u s t a s t h e o b j e c t s t h a t e n t e r i n t o t h e

r e l a t i o n s a r e g i v e n b y t h e p e r c e p t u a l p a r s e r . I t i s t r u e t h a t o b -

j e c t s c a n b e i d e n t i f i e d o s t e n s i v e l y i n a w a y t h a t r e l a t i o n s c a n -n o t . H o w e v e r , b e c a u s e o f i m a g e - s c h e m a t i c a n a l y s e s t h a t

h a v e

a l r e a d y b e e n c a r r i e d o u t , i t s h o u l d n o t b e

d i f f i c u l t

f o r t h e c h i l d

t o l e a r n t h a t i n e x p r e s s e s a c o n t a i n m e n t r e l a t i o n o r o n a s u p p o r t

r e l a t i o n . T a k e

f o r

e x a m p l e

a

2 0 - m o n t h - o l d c h i l d h e a r i n g

t h e

p h r a s e t h e s p o o n i n t h e c u p O n t h e b a s i s o f t h e d a t a a n d

i m a g e - s c h e m a a n a l y s i s o f c o n t a i n m e n t d i s c u s s e d i n t h e l a s t

s e c t i o n , i t c a n b e a s s u m e d t h a t t h e c h i l d w i l l a l r e a d y h a v e h a d

m o r e t h a n a y e a r ' s e x p e r i e n c e i n a n a l y z i n g o n e t h i n g a s b e i n g i n

a n o t h e r .

A

s i n g l e i m a g e - s c h e m a

c a n b e

u s e d

t o

j o i n

t h e t w o

o b j e c t s i n a

f a m i l i a r

r e l a t i o n . H e n c e , e v e n t h o u g h i n c a n n o t b e

p o i n t e d t o , i t c a n n e v e r t h e l e s s b e a d d e d t o t h e s e m a n t i c s y s t e m .

S u p p o r t f o r t h i s v i e w c a n b e

f o u n d

i n t h e f a c t t h a t

i n

a n d

o n

a r e

t h e e a r l i e s t l o c a t i v e t e r m s t o b e a c q u i r e d i n a l l t h e r e l e v a n t

l a n g u a g e s t h a t h a v e b e e n s t u d i e d

( J o h n s t o n ,

1 9 8 8 ) a n d a r e a c -

q u i r e d ( a t l e a s t i n

E n g l i s h )

i n v i r t u a l l y e r r o r l e s s f a s h i o n ( C l a r k ,

1 9 7 7 ) .

T h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n i n a n d o n i s n o t a p e r c e p t u a l o n e .

T h e

p e r c e p t u a l s y s t e m m a k e s m a n y

f i n e

g r a d a t i o n s w h e r e l a n -

g u a g e s t e n d

t o

m a k e

c a t e g o r i c a l

d i s t i n c t i o n s . L i n g u i s t i c d i s -

t i n c t i o n s a r e o f t e n b i n a r y o p p o s i t i o n s , a n d w h e n f u r t h e r s u b d i -

v i s i o n s

a r e

m a d e t h e y t e n d

t o b e f e w i n

n u m b e r . L a n g u a g e s

v a r y

a s t o w h e r e t h e y m a k e t h e s e c u t s , a n d

t h e s e

t h e c h i l d m u s t

l e a r n

f r o m

l i s t e n i n g

t o t h e

l a n g u a g e .

B u t t h e

h y p o t h e s i s

I a m

o p e r a t i n g u n d e r

i s

t h a t h o w e v e r

t h e

c u t s

a r e

m a d e , t h e y

w i l l b e



C O N C E P T U A L P R I M I T I V E S

5 9 9

i n t e r p r e t e d w i t h i n

t h e

f r a m e w o r k

o f t h e

u n d e r l y i n g m e a n i n g s

r e p r e s e n t e d

b y

n o n v e r b a l i m a g e - s c h e m a s . T h a t

i s ,

s o m e

o f t h e

w o r k r e q u i r e d t o m a p s p a t i a l k n o w l e d g e o n t o l a n g u a g e h a s a l -

r e a d y b e e n a c c o m p l i s h e d b y t h e t i m e l a n g u a g e a c q u i s i t i o n b e -

g i n s . C h i l d r e n

d o n o t

h a v e

t o c o n s i d e r c o u n t l e s s

v a r i a t i o n s

i n

m e a n i n g s u g g e s t e d b y t h e

i n f i n i t e

v a r i e t y o f p e r c e p t u a l d i s -

p l a y s

w i t h w h i c h t h e y a r e c o n f r o n t e d ; m e a n i n g f u l p a r t i t i o n s

h a v e

a l r e a d y t a k e n p l a c e . S o m e

o f t h e

i m a g e - s c h e m a s

I

h a v e

b e e n d e s c r i b i n g p r o v i d e r o u g h l y b i n a r y

d i s t i n c t i o n s ,

a s i n t h e

c a s e o f s e l f - v e r s u s c a u s e d m o t io n , a n d t h e r e f o r e t a i l o r - m a d e t o

b e p r o p o s i t i o n a l i z e d . O t h e r s a r e n o t b i n a r y o p p o s i t i o n s b u t

r e p r e s e n t f u n d a m e n t a l c o n c e p t s i n h u m a n t h i n k i n g , s u c h a s

c o n t a i n m e n t a n d

s u p p o r t .

W h a t r e m a i n s f o r c h i l d r e n t o d o i s t o

d i s c o v e r h o w t h e i r l a n g u a g e e x p r e s s e s t h e s e

p a r t i t i o n s .

T o t a k e a n e x a m p l e f r o m B o w e r m a n ( 1 9 8 9 ) , l a n g u a g e s v a r y

a s

t o h o w t h e y t r e a t c o n t a i n m e n t a n d s u p p o r t r e l a t i o n s . E n g l i s h

s p e a k e r s m a k e

a n

a l l - p u r p o s e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n i n

a n d

o n .

T h e s e m a p e a s i l y o n t o t h e C O N T A I N M E N T a n d

S U P P O R T

i m a g e -

s c h e m a s d e s c r i b e d

i n t h e

p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n . A c c o r d i n g

t o

B o w -

e r m a n , S p a n i s h s p e a k e r s t y p i c a l l y

u s e

e n

f o r

b o t h

t h e

E n g l i s h

m e a n i n g s . T h i s c u t m a y e m p h a s i z e t h e n o t i o n o f s u p p o r t o v e rt h e n o t i o n o f c o n t a i n m e n t , b u t i n a n y c a s e t h e l a c k

o f

a d i s t i n c -

t i o n h e r e s h o u l d n o t c a u s e y o u n g l a n g u a g e l e a r n e r s a n y p a r t i c u -

l a r

d i f f i c u l t y .

D u t c h , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , d i v i d e s o n i n t o t w o

k i n d s o f s u p p o r t r e l a t i o n s . O p i s u s e d t o e x p r e s s h o r i z o n t a l

s u p p o r t , a s c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y t h e i m a g e - s c h e m a d e s c r i b e d i n

t h e p r e v i o u s s e c t io n , a s w e l l a s t o e x p r e s s c e r t a i n k i n d s o f n o n -

h o r i z o n t a l s u p p o r t ,

a s i n a

p o s t e r g l u e d

t o a

w a l l . A a n , a n o t h e r

t e r m

f o r o n , i s

u s e d

t o

e x p r e s s

a

v a r i e t y

o f

o t h e r s u p p o r t r e l a -

t i o n s i n w h i c h o n l y p a r t o f a n o b j e c t i s a t t a c h e d t o a s u p p o r t i n g

s u r f a c e ,

a s i n a

p i c t u r e h a n g i n g

o n a

w a l l .

I

w o u l d p r e d i c t t h a t

t h i s

f i n e r d i s t i n c t i o n , d e p e n d i n g a s i t d o e s o n s o m e u n d e r -

s t a n d i n g

o f g r a v i t y ,

m i g h t c a u s e p r o d u c t i o n

e r r o r s .

( S u c h e r r o r s

n e e d n o t o c c u r i n t h e e a r l i e s t u s a g e

o f

a t e r m . T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t

c h i l d r e n

l e a r n c o m m o n l y u s e d ,

f i x e d

p h r a s e s

f o r

m a n y s i t u a -

t i o n s , c o n f u s i o n a m o n g t h e v a r i o u s u s e s o f

o n

m i g h t n o t b e

e v i d e n t u n t i l t h e c h i l d a t te m p t s t o d e s c r i b e a n e w s i t u a t i o n . )

I n

t h e s e t h r e e l a n g u a g e s

( a s

w e l l

a s

m a n y o t h e r s ) c o n t a i n -

m e n t a n d s u p p o r t r e l a t i o n s a r e e x p r e s s e d b y p r e p o s i t i o n s t h a t

a r e u s e d q u i t e g e n e r a l l y w i t h m a n y d i f f e r e n t v e r b s s o t h a t c h i l -

d r e n h e a r t h e m

i n a

g r e a t m a n y s i t u a t i o n s .

I n

a d d i t i o n , u s i n g

t h e p r e p o s i t i o n s a l o n e ( a s c h i l d r e n d o i n t h e o n e - w o r d s t a g e o f

l a n g u a g e

p r o d u c t i o n )

i s o f t e n

s u f f i c i e n t

t o

c o n v e y

t h e

a p p r o -

p r i a t e m e a n i n g . T h e r e a r e l a n g u a g e s , h o w e v e r , t h a t h a v e n o

a l l - p u r p o s e m o r p h e m e s e q u i v a l e n t

t o

E n g l i s h i n

o r

o n

b u t e x -

p r e s s s p a t i a l m e a n i n g s p r i m a r i l y

b y

m e a n s

o f a

v a r i e t y

o f d i f -

f e r e n t v e r b s o f m o t i o n ( a n d s o m e t i m e s b y n o u n s s u c h a s

t o p

s u r f a c e

o r

i n t e r i o r .

K o r e a n

i s o n e o f

t h e s e l a n g u a g e s ,

a n d a s

C h o i

a n d

B o w e r m a n

( 1 9 9 2 )

d o c u m e n t e d , i t p r e s e n t s a

s o m e -

w h a t d i f f e r e n t t a s k f o r t h e y o u n g l a n g u a g e l e a r n e r . I n K o r e a n

t h e r e

a r e

v e r b s t h a t m e a n r o u g h l y t o p u t i n t o a

c o n t a i n e r o r

t o

p u t o n a s u r f a c e ,

b u t

a l s o

a

v e r b t h a t m e a n s r o u g h l y o f i t t i g h t l y

t o g e t h e r t h a t c u t s a c r o s s t h e E n g l i s h u s a g e s o f i n a n d o n . M y

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h i s th r e e - w a y s p l i t i s t h a t t h e l a n g u a g e p r o -

v i d e s a

d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h i n g s g o i n g

i n o r

t h i n g s g o i n g

o n ,

b u t s u p e r s e d e s t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i n t h e c a s e i n w h i c h t h e t h i n g

g o i n g i n o r o n r e s u l t s i n a t i g h t f i t ( a s i n a c a s s e t t e t a p e g o i n g

i n t o i t s c a s e , o r a l i d b e i n g s n a p p e d o n t o a c o n t a i n e r ) . C h o i a n d

B o w e r m a n n o t e d t h a t t h e s e

d i s t i n c t i o n s

d o n o t g i v e K o r e a n

c h i l d r e n

a n y d i f f i c u l t y , i n t h e

s e n s e t h a t

t h e

w o r d

f o r

f i t t i g h t l y

t o g e t h e r

i s o n e o f t h e f i r s t w o r d s t h e y l e a r n .

B o w e r m a n

( 1 9 8 9 )

a n d

C h o i

a n d

B o w e r m a n ( 1 9 9 2 ) s u g -

g e s t e d t h a t t h i s k i n d o f e x a m p l e c a s t s d o u b t o n

i n

a n d

o n

a s

p r i v i l e g e d s p a t i a l p r i m i t i v e s t h a t c a n b e m a p p e d d i r e c t l y o n t o

l a n g u a g e . T h e y s u g g e s t e d i n s t e a d t h a t c h i l d r e n m u s t b e s e n s i -

t i v e

t o t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e i r i n p u t l a n g u a g e

f r o m

t h e b e g i n n i n g .

A t

t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e y

n o t e d

t h a t h o w c h i l d r e n f i g u r e o u t l a n -

g u a g e - s p e c i f i c s p a t i a l c a t e g o r i e s r e m a i n s

a

p u z z l e . A l t h o u g h

I

a g r e e t h a t t h e i r

d a t a

p r o v i d e s t r o n g e v i d e n c e

t h a t

y o u n g c h i l -

d r e n a r e s e n s i t i v e t o t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e i r l a n g u a g e f r o m a n

e a r l y a g e ,

t h e

m a p p i n g

i s

o n l y

a

p u z z l e

i f o n e

a s s u m e s t h a t i n

a n d

o n

a r e t h e

o n l y k i n d s

o f

s p a t i a l a n a l y s e s o f c o n t a i n m e n t

a n d

s u p p o r t t h a t h a v e b e e n c a r r i e d o u t .

I t m a y w e l l b e t h a t

i n

a n d

o n

a p p e a r a s e a r l y a s t h e y d o i n

E n g l i s h b e c a u s e o f t h e i r s t a t u s a s s e p a r a t e m o r p h e m e s , t h e i r

f r e q u e n t u s a g e ,

a n d

t h e i r r e l a t i v e l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d m a p p i n g

o n t o t w o s im p l e i m a g e - s c h e m a s . K o r e a n c h i l d r e n i n t h e o n e -

w o r d

s t a g e c a n n o t

g e t b y

w i t h i n

a n d

o n b e c a u s e t h e s e a l l - p u r -

p o s e m o r p h e m e s d o n o t e x i s t i n t h e i r l a n g u a g e . B e c a u s e c h i l -

d r e n

a d d o n l y a f e w

w o r d s

a t a

t i m e

i n t h e

e a r l y m o n t h s

o f

l a n g u a g e p r o d u c t i o n , K o r e a n c h i l d r e n e x p r e s s o n l y s o m e

o f

t h e

m a n y u s a g e s t h a t E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g c h i l d r e n m a n a g e w i t h t h e i r

m o r e g e n e r a l

i n

a n d

o n .

O n e o f th e w o r d s t h e y d o u s e m e a n s

t o

f i t t o g e t h e r t i g h t l y . S u c h a c o n c e p t d o e s n o t a p p e a r i n E n g l i s h

s a m p l e s o f e a r l y s p e e c h , b e c a u s e t h e r e i s n o s in g l e m o r p h e m e i n

t h e l a n g u a g e

t o

e x p r e s s

i t .

H o w e v e r , t h i s d o e s

n o t

m e a n t h a t

E n g l i s h

c h i l d r e n d o n o t h a v e s u c h a c o n c e p t u n t i l a l a t e r s t a g e

w h e n

t h e y b e g i n

t o

c o m b i n e s e v e r a l m o r p h e m e s t o g e t h e r .

I

s u g g e s t t h a t t h i s i s a n e a s y w o r d f o r K o r e a n c h i l d r e n t o l e a r n

b e c a u s e i t s m e a n i n g r e f l e c t s t h e k i n d s o f s p a t i a l a n a l y s e s t h a t

p r e v e r b a l i n f a n t s e v e r y w h e r e

a r e

c a r r y i n g o u t . T o f i t t i g h t l y

( o r

f o r t h a t m a t t e r , t o f i t l o o s e l y d o e s n o t s e e m a n u n d u l y d i f f i c u l t

n o t i o n

f o r

i n f a n t s

w h o a r e

e n g a g e d

i n

a n a l y z i n g m a n y k i n d s

o f

c o n t a i n m e n t a n d

s u p p o r t

r e l a t i o n s .

U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e r e i s n o t y e t a r i c h e n o u g h d a t a b a s e t o p r o -

v i d e a

d e f i n i t i v e

a n s w e r t o t h e c o n c e p t u a l d i s t i n c t i o n s c h i l d r e n

h a v e m a s t e r e d

b e f o r e

l a n g u a g e b e g i n s . T h e

w o r k

o f B a i l l a r g e o n

a n d h e r c o l l e a g u e s , d i s c u s s e d e a r l i e r , i n d i c a t e s t h a t a g o o d d e a l

o f a n a l y s i s

o f

s u p p o r t r e l a t i o n s

h a s

a l r e a d y t a k e n p l a c e

b y 6

m o n t h s . A f u r t h e r y e a r w i l l e l a p s e b e f o r e p a r t i c l e s e x p r e s s i n g

s u p p o r t e n t e r t h e c h i l d ' s v o c a b u l a r y , d u r i n g w h i c h t i m e a g r e a t

m a n y m o r e d i s t i n c t i o n s

a r e

l i k e l y

t o

h a v e b e e n c o n c e p t u a l i z e d .

H o w e v e r , i t i s n o t y e t k n o w n w h e t h e r v a r i o u s k i n d s o f h o r i z o n -

t a l s u p p o r t a r e u n d e r s t o o d

b e f o r e

v e r t i c a l s u p p o r t o r t h e a g e a t

w h i c h i n f a n t s l e a r n a b o u t t h e k i n d s o f a t t a c h m e n t n e c e s s a r y f o r

t h e

v e r t i c a l s u p p o r t i n d i c a t e d

b y t h e

w o r d

a a n . B e f o r e

i t i s

p o s s i b l e

t o

m a k e

d e t a i l e d p r e d i c t i o n s

a b o u t

t h e

c o u r s e

o f

m a s -

t e r i n g D u t c h v e r s u s E n g l i s h i n t h i s r e g a r d , t h e n , m u c h m o r e

d a t a

a r e

n e e d e d

o n

i n f a n t s ' p r e v e r b a l c o n c e p t s . S i m i l a r c o m -

m e n t s c a n b e m a d e a b o u t t h e c o n c e p t o f t i g h t - f i t t i n g n e s s i n

K o r e a n . B e c a u s e m o s t o f th e e x i s t i n g r e s e a r c h h a s b e e n c o n -

d u c t e d

b y

s p e a k e r s

o f

l a n g u a g e s t h a t

d o n o t h a v e a

s i n g l e m o r -

p h e m e e x p r e s s i n g t i g h t - f i t t i n g n e s s , t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h i s c o n -

c e p t i n

i n f a n c y

h a s n o t e v e n b e g u n t o b e i n v e s t i g a t e d . U n t i l

s u c h r e s e a r c h i s c a r r i e d o u t i t w i l l n o t b e

p o s s i b l e

t o d e t e r m i n e

w h e t h e r

a

g i v e n l a n g u a g e m e r e l y t e l l s

t h e

c h i l d

h o w t o

c a t e g o -

r i z e a s e t o f m e a n i n g s t h e c h i l d h a s a l r e a d y a n a l y z e d o r w h e t h e r



600

JEAN M. MA N D LER

the language tells the child it is time to carry out new

percep-

tual analyses.

Containment and supp ort may be more complex than would

at first appear, but they are spatial relations and therefore

clearly re quire spatial analysis. How ever, there are other linguis-

tic categories that are less obviously spatial in character and

even

more complex, yet in spite of this, they are early linguistic

achievements. One example is linguistic transitivity

(how

sub-

jects and objects are marked in transitive clauses, such as Mary

throws

the

ball,

versus intransitive clauses, such

as John

runs) .

As

Slobin (1985) discussed,

linguistic

transitivity

is

among

the

first notions marked by grammatical morphem es in the acqui-

sition of language. Although it is an abstract lingu istic notion, it

nevertheless

depends

on

concepts

of

animacy, inanimacy ,

agency, and cau sality, and I have argued that these concepts also

result from spatial analysis. Because the relevant image-sche-

mas occur preverbally, linguistic transitivity should not p resent

the

young language learner with undue

difficulty. One

might

even argue that language

ought

to make some distinctions be-

tween these notions i f their presence in the infan t's representa-

tional

system

is as

prominent

as I

have

suggested.

At the

same

time,

to the extent that a particu lar language goes beyond pre-

verbal image-schemas one can predict particular kinds of

diffi-

culties

in

early ac quisition.

Slobin (1985)

gave

a

detailed example

o f

this kind

of

diffi-

culty

in the case of transitivity. He pointed out that whether

expressed in the child's native language by accusative

inflec-

tions, direct object markers,

or

ergative inflections, m arkin g

of

transitive phrases is underextended in early child language.

9

The marking occurs at first only when the child is talking about

an an ima te agent physically acting on an inanimate object; only

later

is it extended to less prototyp ical cases of

transitivity.

Slo-

bin referred to this underextension as children first using the

relevant

morphemes

to

talk about

a manipulative

activity

scene.

This scene requires

the

child

to

represent

a

cluster

of

notions,

such as the concepts representing the objects involved, concepts

of phy sical agency involving the hands, and concepts of change

of state or location. Althou gh Slobin suggested that there is no

basis for proposing any particular analysis of this complex o f

notions, they fit remarkably well with the image-schemas that

were described earlier.

Thus, one of the earliest grammaticized relational notions

can be characterized as a linguistic redescription of the image-

schemas I have described for representing an animate acting

causally

on an inanimate. It is particularly interesting that at

first only

inanim ate patients

(such as

ball)

are

given accusative

marking,

even when the native language uses distinct accusa-

tive forms for

animate

and

inanimate objects. Slobin (1985)

reported that children

are

slow

to

learn this accusative subdis-

tinction.

I

would suggest that

the difficulty is due in

part

to the

initial

conception of what an inanimate is: It is something acted

upon and that does not act by itself. So the child may first

interpret

the

accusative marker

as a

marker

for

inanimacy,

rather than as a marker for a patient. This is a case in which

syntactic bootstrapping (Gleitman, 1990; Landau & Gleitman,

1985)

seems to be required if the child is to realize that it is not

just inanimates that are marked in the abstract role of patient.

These underextension errors are relatively minor, but indi-

cate tha t a gramm atical notion c om bining several image-sche-

mas in a

complex

w ay may

require some

trial an d

error before

the particular set the language expresses is

fully

mastered.

There are other cases in which a grammatical distinction

matches early image-schemas more exactly. An example is the

distinction

in

K orean betw een intransitive verbs involving self-

motion and transitive verbs involving caused

motion

(Choi &

Bowerman,

1992).

English

does

not

mark these distinctions;

for

example,

English

uses

th e

same verb

to say

either that

the

door opened

o r

that M ary opened

the

door. Korean, however,

uses quite different verb forms for these tw o cases. Choi and

Bowerman reported that

this

distinction is respected by

chil-

dren as soon as they begin to use such w ords; the c hildren they

studied

never made

a

cross-category confusion between these

two types of verbs. Thus, learning this gramm atical distinction

in

Korean appears

to be

comparable

to the

ac quisition

of

in

and

on in English; a straightforward match between the underlying

image-schemas and the linguistic distinctions makes learning

rapid

and

easy.

Another example of a spatial analysis unde rlying a seemingly

nonspatial concept is that of possession. A number o f writers

have

noted this

affinity

(e.g., B rown, 1973; Lyons, 1968). Slobin

(1985) defined possession as a locative state in which an ani-

mate being enjoys a particu lar socially sanctioned relationship

to an object. He pointed ou t that young children m ay not yet

understand

the

social aspects

of

this concept

and

attend pri-

marily to its locative aspects. In support of this view, he cited

Mills

(1985),

wh o

found

that Germ an c hildren sometimes con-

flate locative and

possessive functors.

For

example, locative

functors such as

to

are sometimes used to mark possession, as in

the

case

of

using zu

to) to

express both

going

to

and belongs

to .

Slobin's analysis suggests that this conflation (or

better,

under-

extension

of the adult use of the term) comes about because an

image-schema o f a trajector has not yet been projected into the

social realm. T he earliest m eanin g being expressed by a child

using the locative term to may

well

be spatial destination, repre-

sented

a s END-OF-PATH. In the

same

w ay

that

focus on

BEGIN-

NINO-OF-PATH em phasizes

the

animate

or

inanimate character

of a

moving object, focus

on END-OF-PATH

em phasizes

its

desti-

nation: In the simplest sense, th e place where an object comes

to

rest

is

where

it

belongs.

A too

comp lex notion

of

possessive-

ness is probably ascribed to y oung children who pepper their

conversations

with

my book, my c hocolate, my watch, re-

gardless of whose book, chocolate, or watch is under discus-

sion. In observing a 2-year-old child exhau stively us e this con-

struction, it seemed to me that nothing like possession in the

adult sense was being claimed; rather, a request for a movement

of

the item to the child as destination was being expressed.

Indeed, at the time of these observations the child had yet to

learn the construction

Ben's

book , which might indicate a no-

tion of possession closer to the full adult sense (Deutsch &

Budwig, 1983).

Slobin

(1985)

discussed the acquisition of a large num ber of

nonreferential grammatical morphemes. A t first glance, man y

of them, such as distinguishing between transitive and intransi-

9

In

inflectional accusative languages,

a

marker

is pu t on the

direct

object in a transitive clause, whereas in ergative languages, transitivity

is marked on the subject noun (the agent).




601

tive activities

or use of the

progressive aspect

of

verbs,

not

only

seem

impossibly abstract for the

very

young child to master,

but

also

slightly

odd.

10

Of what value to communication or

understanding is it to make

these

distinctions? Indeed, some

languages do without them. They may occur in most languages

partly because of analyses that have been carried out by prever-

bal organisms. In any case, when the notions that underlie these

linguistic devices are analyzed in image-schematic terms, some

of

the linguistic problems facing the child seem more tractable.

This is a serendipitous result of an analysis that was originally

motivated by quite

a

different problem, namely, how to account

for the appearance in infancy of concepts such as animacy and

causality.

Perception an d Concept ion

Revisited

My analysis of redescription of spatial structure into an

image-schematic form

of

representation

can

also account

for

why it is often difficult to tell whether perceptual or conceptual

categorization

is

occurring

in infancy. The

relationship

be-

tween perception

and

conception

has

long

been

an

arena

of

argument among psychologists. I have

tried

to make a firm

dividing line between the two in order to highlight

differences

that are often ignored or glossed over. However, if the earliest

conceptual

functioning consists of a

redescription

of

percep-

tual structure, there may be no hard and fast line. The reason

why there

have

been so many arguments over whether it is possi-

ble to separate percepts and concepts is that there are great

similarities between the two, even though they are considered

to

involve

different kinds of processing. For example,

when

we

showed

in my laboratory that

infants

respond to a global cate-

gory

of

animals

(J. M.

Mandler, Bauer,

&

McDonough, 1991;

McDonough

&

Mandler, 1991), some

of our

colleagues tried

to

convince

us that this was merely a perceptual

category—that

all

animals look more alike than

they

look like plants or artifacts.

So what

we

were calling

the

concept

of

animal

was really

just

an

extended child-basic category whose acquisition could be ex-

plained by perceptual factors alone. However, the perceptual

characteristics of animals are too varied to make such a charac-

terization useful. To be sure, at a high level of description there

are some perceptual commonalities across animals; for exam-

p l e

it can be observed that animals all move by themselves,

even though they move

in

physically different ways.

Self-mo-

tion, however, is not the same type of description as the parame-

ters that describe movement; on the contrary, it is the concept

of self-movement that relates

different

perceptual descriptions

of the motion. The high-level

parameters

of

motion that

are

common

to the hopping of a kangaroo and the gliding of a

shark

are as yet

only

partially known. The perceptual system

may

make use of such parameters to form a broad perceptual

category of

biological motion,

but the

conceptual system con-

structs a simpler notion to express this commonality.

In

our

studies (J.

M.

Mandler

&

Bauer, 1988;

J. M.

Mandler,

Bauer, & McDonough, 1991; McDonough & Mandler, 1991) of

the

development

of the

concept

of

animals

we have

typically

used small plastic models of animals and other objects. In one

of

our tasks, we put a number of varied animals and vehicles in

front

of the

children

and

observe

the way the children

interact

with

them. If a child touches the animals in sequence more

often

than would occur by chance, we say that the child has a

category

or concept of animals, in the sense that the animals are

seen to be related to each other. However, because the models

do not move one might ask, if movement is the

basis

for the

concept of animals why does the child respond systematically

in

the absence of the cue to the conceptual meaning? Having a

concept

of

what

an

animal is

is not the

same thing

as identifying

one. There are undoubtedly a number of perceptual

bases

used

to

recognize something

as an

animal.

For

example, things that

move themselves have appendages of various sorts that are in-

volved

in the

movement (legs, wings,

or fins).

These shape

characteristics can serve to identify something as an animal in

the absence of movement. Thus, shape is a good identifier of a

categorical

exemplar, even though shape only specifies what

the

exemplar looks like, not what it is. Most important, the shapes

of various appendages do not themselves look alike. They are

alike only because they all signify self-motion. If the basis for

sequential touching of animals were merely the physical appear-

ance of appendages, it would be difficult to understand why

winged creatures are associated with legged and finny ones, but

not with winged airplanes (McDonough & Mandler, 1991).

There is a limit to the usefulness of characterizing knowledge

as perception. It is true that to the extent that concepts are

derived

from percepts, there must often

be

perceptual bases

for

conceptual

decisions.

The

same image-schema

can be used to

give a

brief structural description

of a

percept

or to give a

brief

description of the meaning of a simple concept. Thus, the

image-schema

of

SELF-MOVING

ANIMATE shown in Graphic 3

can be used to describe in part what a fish looks like as it begins

to swim away or what a cat standing on a mat looks like as it

walks off

the

mat.

The

details

of the

paths vary,

but

Graphic

3

describes their commonality. At the same time, Graphic 3 de-

scribes the conceptual meaning of what has happened in the

two

situations.

In

spite

of its

perceptual roots, however,

what I

have

been calling the concept of animal brings together a num-

ber

of diverse perceptual analyses into a more

abstract

charac-

terization of what an animal is, that is, what Wellman and Gel-

man (1988) called the nonobvious

aspects

of something seen. It

is these nonobvious characteristics that 3-year-olds use concep-

tually

to differentiate pictures of statues from pictures of ani-

mals they have never seen before (Massey & Gelman, 1988).

They say such things about a new animal as, It can go by itself

because it has

feet, even when

no feet are visible in the pic-

ture.

11

Such inferential ability

(in

this case,

the use of

inheri-

tance properties) is the hallmark of concepts and cannot be

characterized as perceptual knowledge. The claim that I have

made here is

that

2- to 3-year-olds can only make such infer-

ences because they have previously

formed

concepts through

10

Focus

on an object's

path, rather than

its beginning or e n d empha-

sizes the ongoing trajectory

itself.

An im age-schema of T R A V E R S A L - O F -

P A T H could provide the basis for the early understandingof the progres-

sive aspect of

verbs.

The claim that the

animal

has

feet

is a conceptual

justification.

Th e actual basis of recognition of the animals versus the statues may be

their different textures. Massey and

Gelman

(1988) reported children

saying such things

as,

The statue

can't go by itself

because

it is

shiny

Smith (1989b)

made a

similar

point about the importance

of texture

in

object

recognition.



60 2

J EA N M .

HANDLER

the redescription of perceptual

information

into image-sche-

matic

form.

The image-schemas allow them to represent the

idea

of

animacy, which

in turn allows the

inference

of unseen

appendages.

It is

also

what allows infants to categorize

winged

and

legged

creatures together.

In

conclusion, I

have

proposed that human

infants

represent

information

from

an

early

age at more than one level of descrip-

tion. The first level is the result of a perceptual system

that

parses and

categorizes

objects and object movement (events). I

assume

that

this

level

of

representation

is roughly

similar

to

that

found

in

many

animal species. In

addition,

human infants

have

the capacity to

analyze objects

and

events into

another

form of

representation that,

while

still

somewhat

perception-

like in character,

contains

only fragments of the information

originally

processed. The

information

in this

next

level of repre-

sentation

is spatial and is represented in analog form by means

of

image-schemas.

These

image-schemas,

such as SELF-MOTION

and CONTAINMENT, form the

earliest

meanings

that

the

mind

represents. The capacity to engage in this kind of perceptual

analysis

allows

new concepts to be

formed

that are not merely

combinations of earlier image-schemas; in this sense, it is a

productive system. This

level of representation allows the

organ-

ism

to

form

a conceptual system that is

potentially

accessible;

that is, it contains the

information

that is used to

form

images,

to recall, and eventually to plan. A similar

level

of representa-

tion apparently exists in

primates

as well (Premack, 1983) and

perhaps

in other mammals too

(although

the

format would

presumably vary

as a

function

of the particulars of the sensory

systems involved). Humans, of course, add still another level of

representation, namely, language. Whatever the exact

nature

of

the step required to go

from

image-schemas to language, it may

not be a

large one,

at any rate not as large as would be required

to

move

directly

from a

conceptless organism to a speaking

one.

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Revision

received November

19,1991

Accepted December 4,1991 •

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Mandler_1992_How to Build a Baby_ II. Conceptual Primitives