Managing Transatlantic Divergence: Lessons from Africa

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Managing Transatlantic Divergence: Lessons from AfricaHerman CohenPublished online: 30 Nov 2010.

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Postwar ColonialismThe United States and the European powers

have been interacting intensively in and aboutAfrica since the end of World War II. U.S.–European relationships concerning Africa havesometimes been marked by irritation and evensevere disagreement, but issues involving “West-ern security interests” have almost always beenresolved through dialogue, joint analysis, coop-eration, and occasional joint military action.

The Winding Downof Colonialism

The United States came out of World War IIwith strong anticolonial instincts. Washingtontook very seriously the commitment of the war-time Atlantic Charter (of Roosevelt andChurchill) to the “self-determination of peoples.”The United States was largely responsible forthose elements of the UN Charter, such as theFourth Committee of the General Assembly andthe Trusteeship Council, that exerted pressureon the colonial powers to bring their colonies toself-government and independence. The intellec-tual leaders of this trend in U.S. foreign policyduring 1944–1952 were John Foster Dulles, whowas to become secretary of state underEisenhower, and Eleanor Roosevelt, a perennialDemocratic party member of the U.S.delegation to the UN General Assembly.

Needless to say, the European colonial pow-ers were not particularly happy with the U.S.

posture on self-determination. They felt they werebeing pushed too hard and too fast. Memorandaof conversation between European foreign min-isters and U.S. secretaries of state between 1945and 1955 are full of warnings that a too-rapid endof colonial rule in Africa could open the door tocommunist takeovers. This was a period whenfear of Soviet military action was at its highestwithin the Western alliance. In addition, each ofthe European colonial powers had domestic con-stituencies to worry about. This was especiallytrue for France in Algeria, for the United King-dom (U.K.) in Rhodesia, for Portugal in Angolaand Mozambique, and for Belgium in the Congo.All of these colonies had substantial Europeanpopulations that saw themselves more as perma-nent residents in Africa than as transients. TheseEuropean populations had significant politicalinfluence back home.

The U.S.–European basic disagreement overthe colonialism problem in Africa was essentiallyone of analysis. The U.S. view was that the tideof African nationalism was too strong to allowfor a slow process leading to self-determinationand independence, desirable as such a proceduremight have been. The best way to prevent com-munist takeovers in Africa—especially inresource-rich countries like the Belgian Congo,Angola, and Rhodesia—was to recognize Africannationalism and encourage it as a counterweightto communist imperialism. The American viewwas that Africans would not be willing to acceptSoviet colonialism after having fought so hard toget rid of European colonialism. The Europeansdisagreed. They argued that the colonial peopleswere ill-prepared for independence and that trib-

Managing Transatlantic Divergence:Lessons from AfricaHerman J. Cohen

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396 Herman J. Cohen


alism, severe poverty, and white racism could beexploited by the Soviets once the colonial powerswere out. The Europeans believed the U.S. viewwas naïve.

Against this background of clashing analyses,events unfolded in a way that caused frequentirritations in the transatlantic relationship. U.S.rhetoric on ending colonialism emboldened theAfrican nationalists, who might otherwise havebeen willing to be more patient. The Europeansfound themselves increasingly having to deal withcivil unrest in their colonies. They perceived aself-fulfilling prophecy. The greater the U.S. an-ticolonial rhetoric, the more civil unrest there wasand the more pressure was exerted to move theself-determination process more quickly. Whilethis was unfolding, the United States was gain-ing popularity in Africa, while the Europeanswere required to be increasingly coercive in main-taining order.

The Cold War Trumps IdealismAt the end of the day, what was significant

from the transatlantic relationship for Africaduring the period 1945 to 1960 was that, despitethe irritations, the clash of analyses, and the ac-tual perceived harm, the two sides never lost sightof their larger joint security considerations: (a)Western European recovery, reconstruction, andrearmament; (b) containment of the Soviet blocworldwide; and (c) enhancement of the alliance’smilitary capacity.

This joint vision manifested itself in a num-ber of ways in Africa.

• The United States allowed MarshallPlan resources to be diverted to Af-rica in order to stimulate revenue-producing activities that benefitedthe Europeans in the short run andnot necessarily the Africans in thelong run.

• Early NATO planning included

fallback positions in Africa in theevent of an initially successful So-viet land invasion of Western Eu-rope. A NATO-qualified airbasewas constructed in the BelgianCongo as part of this planning ef-fort.

• The U.S. government (under theKennedy administration) had tochoose between an estrangementwith Portugal over the latter’s re-fusal to contemplate self-determina-tion for Angola and Mozambiqueand ignoring the colonial problemin favor of keeping the Azores airbase in the eastern Atlantic. TheUnited States chose to back awayfrom pressuring the totalitarianPortuguese regime on its colonies,much to the consternation of theindependent African countries aswell as the political left in bothWestern Europe and the UnitedStates.

• NATO planned to use military force,if necessary, to prevent a Soviettakeover of the newly independentDemocratic Republic of the Congo(Belgian) during the second halfof 1960. A NATO committee onthe Congo was established to coor-dinate planning and analysis. A U.S.National Security Council deci-sion was taken (under theEisenhower administration) to pre-vent a Soviet takeover of the Congo,including the use of military meansif necessary.

• The United States and the Europe-ans decided that significant eco-nomic development efforts wererequired in Africa to counter thesiren call of the Soviet model, and

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they proceeded to implement re-source transfers on a large scale.

The African Independence Eraand the Cold War

During the great wave of African indepen-dence between 1956 and 1964, the Soviet mili-tary threat became less intense globally. InAfrica, therefore, the transatlantic relationshipbecame less concerned with Western security in-terests. This was especially true during theperiod 1965–1975. As the newly independent Af-rican countries consolidated their sovereignty,both the Americans and the Europeans couldclaim that their separate analyses about the im-pact of accelerated transitions to self-determi-nation were valid. The Americans were correctin predicting that African nationalism was thebest defense against communist inroads. Onthe other hand, the Europeans were correct inpredicting growing political instability and ex-panding internal insecurity as the result of “pre-mature” independence. This left the African dooropen to Soviet nonmilitary inroads in a numberof African countries, including Mali, Guinea,Ghana, and Tanzania.

Soviet Political WarfareThe Soviets were particularly successful in

exercising substantial influence in the so-calledAfrican liberation movements that sought topressure recalcitrant colonial powers or white mi-nority regimes to move their African territoriestoward independence or majority rule by wagingguerrilla and psychological warfare. These wereespecially important in Southwest Africa(Namibia), Mozambique, Angola, and Rhodesia.The Soviets provided training, money, and armsto these organizations. In Africa as a whole, theSoviet bloc made a substantial effort to winfriends through educational and cultural activi-

ties. Patrice Lumumba University was estab-lished in Moscow for African students. Thousandsof Africans went there every year to learn Rus-sian and to be trained in a great variety of pro-fessions. Other countries in the Soviet bloc didthe same.

Within the Atlantic alliance, postcolonial Af-rica policy continued to yield a certain amount offriction between the United States and Europe,mainly in the competition for resources. TheFrench were particularly adept at underminingefforts by the American private sector to estab-lish footholds in French-speaking countries. TheUnited Kingdom exercised so-called common-wealth preferences to edge out American inter-ests in their former colonies. These practices didnot cause too much heartburn within the Ameri-can administration because the economic stakeswere too small (except for oil) but above all be-cause the Americans adopted a policy of recog-nizing the primacy of the “metropole” powers inAfrica. The Americans conceded European domi-nation in Africa in return for Europe taking pri-mary responsibility for defending Western secu-rity interests in that continent.

Between 1960 and 1975, the Soviet bloc threatin Africa was essentially political. Moscow soughtto rally African support for its foreign policies byjoining the “African liberation” bandwagon. Dur-ing this period, the Soviets had some success instimulating African support for some of their in-ternational objectives, including anti-Zionism,anti–Vietnam War, the recognition of CommunistChina, and support for various “peace” movementsaimed at undermining the NATO alliance. Never-theless, American and European policies towardAfrica, although essentially uncoordinated, werelargely successful in preventing the Soviets fromco-opting even a single African government intothe bloc. Neither could the Soviets boast of a singleAfrican government that supported Soviet strate-gic interests. The Soviets were unsuccessful intheir efforts to obtain military basing concessionsin Africa, with the single important exception of anaval facility in the Somali port of Berbera acrossthe Gulf of Aden from Yemen.

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398 Herman J. Cohen


The Congo Crisis: The Alliance’sFirst Out-of-Area Test

The main security challenge to Western in-terests in Africa between 1960 and 1975 was inthe ex-Belgian Congo, where premature indepen-dence in 1960 resulted in total chaos in a terri-tory equal in size to the United States east of theMississippi River. As indicated, the Soviet threatto exploit this chaos led to the initiation of NATOplanning for possible military action to prevent aSoviet takeover. But the main action to keep theCongo from falling apart took place within theUnited Nations, where the Atlantic partnersworked together to bring about the UN’s firstpeacekeeping operation directed from its NewYork headquarters. Not only did the UN opera-tion manage to prevent the Congo’s collapse, butit also undermined Soviet efforts to control powerthrough selected Congolese surrogates. In thiscrisis, U.S.–European coordination was total andeffective. Because they were outmaneuvered bythe Atlantic alliance in the Congo and in theUN Security Council, the Soviets were subse-quently reluctant to agree to further UN peace-keeping operations. Cyprus was the most notableexception.

The Congo crisis of 1960 constituted an im-portant policy threshold for the Atlantic alliance.A NATO intervention to restore order and imple-ment a transition could have been possible. Butthe Western powers opted instead for a UN Secu-rity Council intervention. This was a wise deci-sion because the Soviets would have successfullyexploited a NATO intervention as a neocolonialact. The decision to go to the United Nations ef-fectively neutralized both the Soviets and certainpolitical factions in Belgium who were pushingfor a return of Belgian forces and influence. Theoperation was successful in maintaining the ter-ritorial integrity and political independence ofthat vast country. The action also enhanced alli-ance cohesion because the decision was takencollectively in a coordinated fashion. The Belgianswere disappointed because a NATO intervention

probably would have resulted in a Congolese re-gime friendly to Brussels’ business interests. TheUN restored order in the Congo but opened thepostcolonial space between Belgium and itsformer colony to the detriment of overall Belgianeconomic interests. Thus the narrow interests ofalliance member Belgium had to be sacrificed tothe greater good of preventing Soviet inroads intocentral Africa.

After 15 years of independence, the Africanssaw that only the Western powers could deliversubstantive development assistance, private in-vestment, and quality technical support. Sovietbloc education was considered inferior, and theSoviets were capable of providing only militaryequipment and training. The Soviets had no sig-nificant capability in the area of developmentcooperation. As of 1975, Moscow was unable topoint to any significant strategic successes in Af-rica, despite its heavy resource investments. Forits part, the Atlantic alliance could be proud ofits ability to block significant inroads from itscold-war adversaries, although Africa’s lack ofprogress in economic development had to behighly disappointing to the West, whose resourceinvestments in Africa were considerably higherthan those of the Soviet bloc.

1974–1980:The End of Détente and theRevival of the Cold War in Africa

Exit Portugal, Enter Cuba

During the period 1974–1975, there were sev-eral “regime change” developments in Africa thatwere equal in significance to the Congo crisis of1960 for Western security interests.

First, the fascist/corporatist regime in Portu-gal collapsed through a coup orchestrated byyoung military officers. This led to immediate andtotally unprepared independence for Portugal’sfive colonies in Africa: Angola, Mozambique, Sao

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Tome, Cape Verde, and Guinea-Bissau. In all ofthese newly sovereign countries, former guerrillaorganizations came to power as Marxist partiesclosely tied to the Soviet bloc. This was not sur-prising, as the Soviets were the main source ofarms and financing for these groups during thelong struggle against Portuguese colonialism. Thethreats to Western security interests arising fromthe collapse of Portuguese colonialism were three-fold.

1. Angola was becoming a major oilproducer with enormous potential.

2. Both Angola and Mozambique hadborders with the Republic of SouthAfrica, which the West accepted asa modernizing bastion against com-munist expansion, despite the politi-cal immorality of white minorityrule under the apartheid system.

3. Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau hadclose access to the South Atlantic airsurveillance areas overlooking U.S.nuclear submarine zones of opera-tion.

The perceived security threat to Western in-terests posed by the emergence of pro-SovietMarxist regimes in the former Portuguese Afri-can colonies was significantly enhanced by thearrival in Angola of a Cuban expeditionary forcesummoned by the Marxist regime to help staveoff an armed challenge by a rival Angolan guer-rilla group (UNITA) sponsored by the Republicof South Africa. The anxiety level, not to speak ofthe political embarrassment, of Washington’sRepublican administration (under Gerald Ford)was quite high as a result of the Cuban caper.

Second, a military coup in Ethiopia in 1974overthrew Emperor Haile Sellasie, one of theWest’s oldest and staunchest supporters in Africa.The Ethiopian army participated in the UN “po-lice action” in Korea during 1950–1953, and theUnited States enjoyed the use of an importantmilitary/diplomatic communications station in

Asmara. The United States also was a major sup-plier of military assistance to Ethiopia, which wasconsidered a reliable pro-Western partner in Af-rica. The loss of the emperor and his regime wasbad enough. But the new regime’s decision to turnto the Soviets for military assistance effectivelybrought the Soviet military to the shores of theRed Sea, the back door to the Persian Gulf.

The Soviets saw this change in Ethiopia as agolden opportunity to consolidate their positionin the Horn. They were operating a naval facilityin Somalia. They attempted to forge a Marxistalliance between Somalia and the new regime inEthiopia, but this failed because of the traditionalanimosity between the two neighbors. Forced tochoose between two friends, the Soviets opted forthe much larger and more powerful Ethiopia anddropped out of Somalia. The upheaval and tem-porary instability in Ethiopia caused by the mili-tary coup allowed the Somali government toinitiate military action in southeastern Ethiopiadesigned to recuperate territories inhabited bySomali ethnic groups. When Somalia gained theupper hand militarily, the new Ethiopian regimeappealed for Soviet assistance. This was forth-coming in the form of a second Cuban–Africanexpeditionary force that did an excellent job ofhelping to repel the Somali invaders.

Thus within the space of 24 months, theWest’s security position in Africa went from rela-tively benign to somewhat threatened. The firstcasualty of the Soviet/Cuban interventions inAngola and Ethiopia was the policy of détente:President Gerald Ford announced the death ofthe policy that had been adopted with enthusi-asm by his predecessor, Richard Nixon.

Europe Yawned Whilethe United States Panicked

How did the Western alliance react to thesenew security developments in Africa in 1974–1975? As they did in the preindependence periodin the late 1950s, the United States and the Eu-ropeans differed in their analyses of threats to

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400 Herman J. Cohen


Western security interests. It is interesting tonote, moreover, that the two positions had beencompletely reversed over a period of 15 years.

The Europeans saw developments in Ethio-pia and the former Portuguese colonies as a nor-mal progression of African nationalism andthought that the West could and should work withthe new regimes in the interests of increasingeconomic growth and reducing poverty. The poli-cies of the reactionary/mercantilist Portuguesecolonial regime had effectively guaranteed non-development, whereas in Ethiopia a feudal eco-nomic system maintained 50 million peasants inabject poverty. The Europeans tended to viewCuban troops and Soviet influence as relativelyunimportant and believed that nationalism inthese countries would effectively keep Soviet in-fluence at bay.

The Americans, on the other hand, saw theworldwide grasping reach of the Brezhnev Doc-trine and thought that Soviet initiatives in Af-rica should not go unanswered. It was difficult,therefore, to develop an alliance strategy for thisnew security environment in Africa. The Ameri-can government moved quickly to replace theSoviets in Somalia by developing with theMogadishu regime a closer diplomatic relation-ship, including arms transfers and intelligenceexchanges. In this initiative Washington had thesupport and counsel of the Italian government,in view of Rome’s former colonial presence inSomalia. In addition, Secretary of State HenryKissinger attempted to initiate clandestine politi-cal–military operations against the Angolanregime but was thwarted by the Democratic ma-jority in Congress, which was still traumatizedby Vietnam. Western security interests in Angolawere therefore left in the hands of the Republicof South Africa, a government that was increas-ingly becoming a pariah because of its harsh rac-ist policies toward the black majority.

In contrast to the close transatlantic coordi-nation over the Congo crisis of 1960, the UnitedStates and Europe went their separate ways indealing with the enhanced Soviet–Cuban militarypresence in Africa beginning in 1974. The Euro-

peans had full diplomatic relations with Angolaand Ethiopia, including significant economic as-sistance. The Americans had no diplomatic rela-tions with Angola and only a minimal presencein Ethiopia. Only in Mozambique, where therewere Soviet military advisers but neither Sovietnor Cuban troops, did the United States and theEuropeans have a common policy of giving fullsupport to the new regime with the objectiveof preventing major instability along theMozambique–South African border.

Ad Hoc U.S.–European SecurityCooperation in Africa

Although the United States and Europe tookseparate approaches to the Soviet/Cuban militarypresence in Angola and Ethiopia, there contin-ued to be transatlantic consultations and occa-sional cooperation in African security situationsin which analyses coincided.

In 1978, insurgents based in Marxist Angolaattacked the pro-Western Mobutu regime inneighboring Zaire (Congo-K). These insurgentshad received Cuban training and arms, therebyfulfilling the American prophecy that the Soviet/Cuban action in Angola was far from benign. Af-ter the overthrow of the Ethiopian emperor,Mobutu became the West’s best friend in Africa.As in 1960, the West could not countenance thefall of the resource-rich Zaire to Soviet surrogates.Because Mobutu’s army was incapable of han-dling the insurgents from Angola, his survival wasclearly in question. Rapid consultations betweenthe Americans and the European allies resultedin a decision to fly to Zaire in American aircraftFrench paratroops based in Corsica to repel theinvaders. The French also recruited Moroccan,Senegalese, and Ivory Coast troops, all of whomwere transported in American aircraft to join theoperation. The operation was successful. Al-though American assets came from the U.S.–Eu-ropean command, NATO had no involvementin the operation.

Between 1978 and 1980, the Soviets engaged

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in a major diplomatic effort to obtain air opera-tional rights in Guinea-Conakry (formerlyFrench) and Guinea-Bissau (formerly Portu-guese). The Soviets had a double objective. First,they needed a base for the air surveillance ofWestern nuclear submarines operating in theSouth Atlantic. The closest they could come un-til that point was Angola, but that was too faraway to allow their aircraft loitering time overthe objective. Second, the Soviets needed a moreconvenient transit point for their supply flightsfrom the Soviet Union to Cuba. To address thisissue, the Americans, the French, and the Portu-guese coordinated a diplomatic/economic effort topersuade the two African regimes to avoid jeop-ardizing their “nonaligned” status. This effortsucceeded.

Between 1975 and 1980, the United Kingdomand the United States worked closely together tobring about a transition in Rhodesia from whiteminority rule to black majority rule. The UnitedKingdom was blockading Rhodesia’s main portof entry in Beira, Mozambique, thereby forcingthe white regime to rely totally on supplies fromthe Republic of South Africa. In 1975, Secretaryof State Kissinger began a diplomatic offensivein South Africa that persuaded the apartheid re-gime to force the white Rhodesians to negotiate.In effect, Kissinger promised the South Africansthat the United States would resist growing do-mestic pressure to apply economic sanctionsagainst them in return for their delivering Rho-desia to majority rule. This was an example ofeffective diplomatic/military cooperation for con-flict resolution in Africa between the United King-dom and the United States. Rhodesia became theindependent Zimbabwe in 1980 as a result.

After 1975, the Soviets became interested inbecoming an Indian Ocean naval power. Theyestablished bases in Aden and the EthiopianDhalak Islands in the Red Sea, thereby endan-gering the Bab El Mandeb choke point betweenthe Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. The main West-ern counter to this Soviet presence in the IndianOcean was the French naval base in the Republicof Djibouti. The United States and France coop-

erated closely in running air surveillance missionsfrom Djibouti to keep track of the Soviet navalpresence.

1980–1993:The U.S.-DominatedSearch for Stability in Africa

Peacemaking in Southern Africa

As Africa entered the 1980s, the biggest issuewas the future of white minority rule in apart-heid South Africa. Up to that point, the Sovietscould lay claim to being the European power mostclosely identified with the liberation struggle.Although the Soviets had a good image (in Afri-can eyes), they lacked the capacity to bring aboutsolutions. All they could do was supply arms,money, and indoctrination to guerrilla groups.

In the United States, the Republican admin-istration (under Ronald Reagan) embarked on aneight-year marathon quadripartite negotiationthat delivered peace to southern Africa, includ-ing the independence of the former GermanSouthwest Africa (Namibia), the departure ofCuban troops from all of Africa, and the arrivalof black majority rule in South Africa between1989 and 1994. This was a remarkable tour deforce that defied all predictions. What was strik-ing, however, was the absence from this processof the Europeans, except for a supporting role bythe U.K. embassies in Luanda and Pretoria.

Postcold-War Conflict Resolutionin Africa

With the end of the cold war in 1989, theUnited States turned its attention to conflict reso-lution in African countries suffering from long-term civil war: Ethiopia, Sudan, Angola, andMozambique. In each case, selected Europeanpartners played important roles, augmented by

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402 Herman J. Cohen


ad hoc mechanisms that came into play. In Angola,Portugal took the lead, while the United Statesand the Soviet Union provided both backup andbackbone. In Mozambique, Italy took the lead,the United States played a major role during ne-gotiations, and European Community embassiesin Maputo played the leading role during theimplementation process. The special UN repre-sentative (Aldo Ajelo of Italy) successfully coor-dinated the implementation of the peace processin Mozambique, but the help of the Western em-bassies was crucial. In Ethiopia, the United Statesworked alone, while the Soviets hovered helpfullyin the background. In Sudan, the U.S. partnerwas the United Nations.

1994 and BeyondAfter 1993 and the Somalia tragedy, both the

United States and the Europeans lost their en-thusiasm for conflict management in Africa, andthe major responsibility drifted toward the UnitedNations and African subregional organizationssuch as the Economic Community of West Afri-can States (ECOWAS), the IntergovernmentalAlliance for Development (IGAD), and the South-ern African Development Community (SADC).Needless to say, this unstructured approach, with-out the “adult supervision” of the industrial de-mocracies, failed to prevent some major humantragedies in Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, andthe Democratic Republic of the Congo. AfterSeptember 11, 2001, it became evident that con-flicted states, failed states, and collapsed statesin Africa could no longer be considered problemsinternal to Africa and therefore less of a priorityfor the West. The financing of terrorism throughthe illegal trade in diamonds, timber, and otherminerals, as well as money laundering and drugtrafficking in Africa, means that African insta-bility continues to have global implications. Inparticularly egregious cases and in certain placeswhere specific interests have been at risk sincethe end of the cold war, European governmentshave intervened directly in Africa with military

force. The most notable examples are the deploy-ment of British forces to Sierra Leone in 1999and French forces to Côte d’Ivoire in 2002. Thead hoc nature of those interventions significantlyafter the fact suggests that the development ofstructured approaches by the Western democra-cies toward emerging hot spots would probablybe more effective.

Lessons Learned and Recommendations

1. Develop strategies within the clubfirst. The industrialized democra-cies should consult initially aboutinternational and regional securityproblems worldwide away from non-members of the club. U.S.–Euro-pean Union consultations about thevarious geographic regions as cur-rently structured are useful, butthey do not allow for the hard analy-sis and debate needed to developworking strategies to deal withchronic and potentially dangerousinstability as well as potential directthreats to Western interests. TheNATO Committee on the Congo in1960 and the U.S.–EU WorkingGroup of Ambassadors in Maputo in1992–1994 were successful, albeitfleeting, examples of how structuredcooperation within the club of West-ern democracies can bring substan-tial added value to the managementof instability. In the Congo crisis of1960, NATO decided that externalintervention in the Congo was nec-essary but concluded that the bestapproach was through the UnitedNations, effectively generating aunited Western position within theSecurity Council. There is no rea-son why this coordinated approachcannot be used for security prob-lems worldwide.

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2. There is a need for intensive ex-changes of analyses. Apart from theU.S.–U.K. special intelligence rela-tionship, there appear to be onlylimited exchanges of analyseswithin the club of Western democ-racies. The U.S.–European Com-mand in Stuttgart is developing anexpanding circle of intelligence andanalysis sharing with NATO allies.It probably would be feasible to raisethis to the political level within theNATO structure. Expanded ex-changes do not guarantee analyti-cal agreement—on the contrary. Butthe development of strategies, in-cluding the assignment of responsi-bilities, begins with analysis. TheUnited States and the allies learnedthis during the intensive period ofconflict resolution between 1981and 1993.

3. The club of Western democraciesneeds a clubhouse. NATO is theonly structure in which the West-ern democracies can discuss theworld’s security problems in pri-vate. During the period of intensiveconflict resolution activities inAfrica by the United States andselected European partners (1981–1993), negotiators and mediatorsshuttled through Brussels to briefthe NATO Council on a regularbasis. Lively and useful debateswere stimulated. But those debateshad no status. It was a good exampleof “the dog barks, but the caravanmoves on.” It might be time toassign NATO a crisis managementand prevention vocation without,of course, detracting from thekey roles played by the UN Secu-rity Council and regional players.Consultations among the democra-

cies in crisis management awayfrom the gaze of club’s nonmemberscannot fail to add value to the pro-cess even where there is disagree-ment among analyses.

4. There should always be room for adhoc coalitions. In 1991, the transi-tion in Zaire from a one-party stateto a multiparty democracy was injeopardy. External intervention ap-peared necessary to revive the pro-cess. The United States, France, andBelgium formed a troika to fulfillthis requirement. If there had beenan umbrella structure at the time(i.e., NATO), the process probablywould have been the same.

5. In emerging democracies, the devel-opment of professional, competent,and well-financed security forces isa paramount necessity for stability.The Western democracies are cur-rently addressing this issue on ahaphazard basis and on the cheap.This requirement could be the firstorder of business for a concertedWestern approach to crisis manage-ment. Mediated peace arrange-ments are generally short-livedunless attention has been focusedon this important element.

6. The European Commission may nothave guns, but it has money. It hasthe important capability to injectmoney quickly into a crisis situationor to stop the flow of money alreadyagreed to. The EU Commission (DGVIII) has the power to make rapidfinancial decisions in crisis situa-tions such as financing the demobi-lization of fighters or purchasingequipment for elections. On the co-ercive side, the EU Commission was

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404 Herman J. Cohen


instrumental in 1991 in organizingan aid boycott of Kenya to force theone-party regime to adopt multi-party democracy. The EU Commis-sion should therefore be a partnerin any structured procedure forcrisis management by the Westerndemocracies.

The key conclusion of this article is that thereis no longer any such phenomenon as a purelylocal security crisis. All local instability and vio-lent conflict have the potential to go global, aswe have seen in Al Qaeda’s exploitation of anar-chy in Sierra Leone to launder money throughthe illegal diamond trade as well as its ability toinfiltrate into Kenya to attack U.S. and Israeliinterests. So far the Western democracies havetreated most of these crises on an ad hoc basis,

with little prior comparative analysis. The timehas come for a more structured approach withinthe club of Western democracies. A structuredapproach based on comparative analysis will notalways result in agreement on the nature of aproblem or on the appropriate solution. But themere fact that frank exchanges have taken placewithin the confines of the club of industrial de-mocracies cannot fail to have an amelioratingimpact on eventual disagreements.

About the Author

Professor Herman J. Cohen, a professoriallecturer at the Nitze School of Advanced Inter-national Studies, John Hopkins University, is aformer assistant secretary of state for Africanaffairs.

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Documents

Managing Transatlantic Divergence: Lessons from Africa