South Asian StudiesVolume: VI

:

Waters Managing South Asia's

Volume VI, “Managing South Asia's Waters" of the South Asian Studies series was

prepared by members of one of the 14

research groups established under the

South Asian Policy Analysis (SAPANA)

Network, and assigned to examine the

problems of managing the region's water

resources, including policy approaches,

resource sharing, and water quality

issues. The volume also contains articles

previously published in the South Asian

Journal to supplement this analysis.

© 2006 Free Media Foundation

All rights reserved.

First printing June 2006Editorial collective: Imtiaz Alam (series

editor); Dr Akbar S Zaidi (series

coordinator); Zebunnisa Burki, Waqar

Mustafa, and Maheen Pracha (copy

editors); and Muhammad Adeel

(publication designer).Produced and designed at the Free Media

Foundation and South Asian Free Media

Association (SAFMA), Lahore, PakistanThe findings, interpretations, and

conclusions expressed in this book are

those of the authors and do not necessarily

reflect the views of the South Asian

Journal or the South Asian Policy Analysis

(SAPANA) Network. The South Asian Journal and Free Media

Foundation encourage use of the material

presented herein, with appropriate credit.

South Asian Policy Analysis Network(SAPANA)

9 Lower Ground FloorEden Heights, Jail Road

Lahore, Pakistanwww.southasianmedia.net

ISBN 969-9060-07-7

iii

About SAPANA

ogether with the South Asian Free Media Association

(SAFMA), the South Asian Journal conceived a research

programme in 2005 to develop a “virtual” think-tank Tcomprising an interactive network of scholars from across South

Asia. From this initiative emerged the South Asian Policy Analysis

(SAPANA) Network - an autonomous, independent, and cross-

disciplinary research and analysis platform for initiating informed

policy debates, undertaking fresh research, critically evaluating

existing research and public policy, and proposing alternative policy

measures in South Asia.

As a first step, 14 working groups were set up under SAPANA to

carry out research and propose policy alternatives on issues crucial to

the region. The groups presented more than 80 draft research papers

at a conference organised by the South Asian Journal, titled

“Envisioning South Asia”, which was held in Islamabad (Pakistan) on

29-30 April 2006, and attended by more than 150 eminent scholars

from across the region. After incorporating the feedback generated

by the conference, these papers have been collated for publication as

a 14-volume series titled South Asian Studies. The series is intended

for public perusal, media review, public debate, and the

consideration of policymakers.

When SAPANA was formed, the need for “yet another think-tank”

was questioned, given that there are already numerous institutions

involved in similar work. We, at SAFMA and SAPANA, have found

that most current research in South Asia is either too

departmentalised or too technical for it to be accessible by a non-

academic audience; and that it is greatly influenced by official and

dominant technocratic paradigms.

SAPANA will endeavour to undertake critical, independent,

objective, practical, and pro-people research to pursue an alternative

policy agenda for sustainable development and the empowerment of

people. It will also engage the public and policymakers along with

other major stakeholders in order to sustain informed and

constructive dialogue between the state and civil society. In

collaboration with SAFMA, SAPANA will bring its research-based

findings within the domain of public discourse, rather than leave it to

the mercy of dust or termites.

The next phase will begin with formally establishing a board of

advisors comprising prominent and able academics and researchers

from across South Asia. It is hoped that SAPANA will establish itself

as a leading think-tank in South Asia within the first five years of its

inception. The major tasks that lie ahead are: (i) building a

comprehensive database of scholars and researchers who are either

based in South Asia or based overseas but specialise in the region;

(ii) planning research themes for subsequent years, arranging

workshops on these themes, and publishing the findings that

emerge; and (iii) organising a larger conference every two years to

bring together new themes, new research, and emerging scholars.

Apart from these tasks, SAPANA will design projects and

commission research that is of public and policy interest, and will

liaise with policymakers and governments through the media. As a

“virtual” institution, it will engage scholars and researchers on

specific undertakings, and thus set a new direction for the South Asia

of our hopes.

viv

Preface: Water Issues in South Asia ixImtiaz Alam

Recommendations of SAPANA xiiiResearch Group

Executive Summary xviiDr Zaigham Habib

South Asian Water Concerns 22Ramaswamy R Iyer

A Policy Management Approach to 37Pakistan's Water ResourcesDr Zaigham Habib

Nepal's National Water Plan 62Dr Bishnu Hari Nepal

Water Resources Management 85in BangladeshGiasuddin Ahmed Choudhury

Bangladesh's Water Issues 107Emaduddin Ahmad

Indus Treaty and Baglihar: An Overview 126Ramaswamy R Iyer

Pakistan and the Baglihar Hydro 136Electric Project Shahid Husain

Contents

Arsenic Poisoning and Domestic 151Water Supply in BangladeshDr M Abdul Ghani

Decentralizing South Asia's 161Rural Water SectorDr Satyajit Singh

Water Politics in Pakistan 173Dr Zaigham Habib

India's River Linking Plans 186Syed Shahid Husain

Nepal's Hydel Power for Export 197Dr Upendra Gautam and Ajoy Karki

SAPANA Conference Declaration 209(Islamabad, April 2006)

viivi

ixviii

Acknowledgements

The South Asian Policy Analysis (SAPANA)

Network would like to thank all the contributors to

this volume - their insight into and understanding

of a tumultuous region and the challenges it faces

provides a myriad of insights that could help define

new options for and approaches to tackling South

Asia's most pressing issues. Contributors to the

volume include (in alphabetical order):

Emaduddin Ahmad, Dr Giasuddin Ahmed

Choudhury, and Dr M Abdul Ghani from

Bangladesh; Ramaswamy R Iyer and Dr Satyajit

Singh from India; Dr Upendra Gautam, Ajoy Karki,

and Dr Bishnu Hari Nepal from Nepal; and Dr

Zaigham Habib and Shahid Husain from Pakistan.

SAPANA would also like to acknowledge the

contribution of the series coordinator, Dr Akbar S

Zaidi; the research group coordinator, Dr Zaigham

Habib; and the editorial and design collective at

the South Asian Journal, Lahore - Zebunnisa

Burki, Waqar Mustafa, and Maheen Pracha for

their hard work and editing, and Muhammad

Adeel for designing the volume - without which

this volume could not have been published.

Finally, SAPANA is immensely grateful to the

Royal Netherlands Embassy and Royal Norwegian

Embassy for their generous support, without which

the production of this series would not have been

possible.

Water Issues in South Asia

f there is any single most important issue that mars bilateral

relations among the countries of the subcontinent, it is water.

The issues of cross-border water distribution, utilisation, Imanagement and mega irrigation/hydro-electric power projects

affecting the upper and lower riparian countries are gradually taking

centre-stage in defining interstate relations as both water scarcity

and demand increase and drought and floods make life too often

miserable.

Thanks to its location, size and contiguous borders with other South

Asian countries, it is India, in its capacity as both upper and lower

riparian, that has come into conflict with most of its neighbours,

except Bhutan, on the cross-border water issues. Given an

atmosphere of mistrust, upper riparian India has serious issues to

resolve with lower riparian Pakistan and Bangladesh and, despite

being lower riparian, with the upper riparian Nepal. This, however,

does not mean that India is solely responsible for certain deadlocks,

even though its share of responsibility may be larger than other

countries which have their own physical limitations and political

apprehensions.

As elsewhere in the world, and more particularly in the subcontinent

where population explosion continues and environmental

degradation worsens, water resources, like energy, are going to be

much lower than the increasing demand, even if they are harnessed

to the most optimum. Given the depleting resources of water, the

issues of human security, and water security as its most crucial part,

are going to assume astronomical proportions. The issues of water

Preface

xix

distribution and management are bringing not only countries of the

region, but also states and regions within provinces into conflict

since they are not being settled amicably within a grand framework

of riparian statutes respecting upstream and downstream rights.

What is, however, quite appreciable is that the countries of the

subcontinent have made certain remarkable efforts to resolve their

differences over water distribution through bilateral agreements.

India and Pakistan signed the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) in 1960

allocating three eastern rivers (Ravi, Sutlej and Beas) to India and

three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan. The IWT

has remarkably survived the ups and downs of Indo-Pak relations,

and despite wars the parties have upheld the Treaty. Although

serious differences persist over various projects being undertaken by

India over Jhelum (2 projects) and Chenab (9 projects) rivers, the

IWT provides a legal mechanism to iron out differences and settle

disputes as in the case of Baglihar Project. Similarly, the Ganges

Water-Sharing Treaty (GWST) was signed between India and

Bangladesh in 1996 and resolved the dispute over Farakha Barrage,

although differences continue on Bangladesh's share of water during

the lean period. Nepal and India also signed the Mahakali Treaty in

1996, but despite ratification by the Nepalese parliament, the Treaty

has remained stalled due to the politics of expediency.

Despite these treaties, serious differences over water sharing, water

management and hydropower projects continue to spoil relations

between India, on the one hand, and Pakistan, Bangladesh and

Nepal, on the other. Differences between India and Pakistan

continue to create ill-will between the two on around 11 large

hydroelectric projects India plans to construct, including the

Baglihar Project over which a neutral expert appointed by the World

Bank is about to conclude his arbitration that should be acceptable to

both sides. More than the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir, the

issue of the waters of Jhelum and Chenab has the potential to once

again provoke people in Pakistan against India and push the two

countries to war.

Bangladesh, which shares 54 rivers with India as a lower riparian,

has serious differences with New Delhi that hinder agreement on

eight rivers, besides the continuing complaints by Dhaka over

sharing of water of Ganges. The Indian plan, which is now under

review, to build a big river-linking-project that includes diversion of

water from Ganges and Brahmaputra, has become yet another source

of antagonism between the two countries who have not been able to

sort out their differences over a whole range of issues that continue

to fuel political tension which, in turn, does not allow the resolution

of differences over water.

As an upper riparian, Nepal has a different relationship with India

and faces many problems in constructing its dams due to opposition

by the lower riparian and has serious doubts about the projects

proposed by India. Nepal's mistrust, beside other factors, has been

reinforced by what it perceives to be various unequal treaties --

starting from Sharada Dam construction (1927), 1950 Treaty and

Letters of Exchange of 1950 and 1965, Koshi Agreement (1954),

Gandak Agreement ((1959), Tanakpur Agreement (1991) and the

Mahakali Treaty (1996). Since 400 million people live in the Ganges,

Brahmaputra and Meghna region, India needs Nepal to meet its

energy needs and for management of water.

Besides many issues of water sharing among the countries of

subcontinent, crucial water and energy issues are critically affecting

the food security, environment and agriculture. Above all,

projections of scarcity of water present a doomsday scenario. There

are serious differences over water-sharing within different

states/provinces in India (Ravi-Beas dispute between Punjab and

Haryana and Cauvery dispute among the states of Karnataka, Tamil

Nadu, Kerala and Pondicherry) and Pakistan (water sharing dispute

and construction of dams over Indus between Punjab and Sindh and

also NWFP). Rigorous exploitation of groundwater in India and

Pakistan is rapidly depleting aquifers, which is a cause of great

concern. Contamination of water and presence of arsenic in

groundwater has become a major concern, especially, in Bangladesh

and some parts of India and Pakistan.

Climatic changes that are being forecasted and low-water discharges

need to be addressed collectively. India should, as SAFMA's Delhi

Declaration calls, 'make more efforts to discuss bilaterally with its

neighbours problems relating to river waters. A new regional

understanding of the riparian issues is essential to resolve Indo-

Nepal, Indo-Bangladesh and Indo-Pakistan water issues'. Regional

Riparian Statutes must be obligatory to resolve the bilateral water

xiiixii

disputes. RRR statute model, respecting Helsinki Convention

proposes 8K upstream and downstream rights should guide the

countries of subcontinent to avoid conflict over water and reach a

lasting understanding for the collective good of our peoples. Lastly,

the 'middle-path' adopted by Bhutan should guide the planners for

sustainable development that is environment friendly and is not

carried by supply-side approach of the big dam lobbies.

Volume VI, Managing South Asia's Waters, of South Asian Studies

Series addresses the major water issues of the countries of and the

South Asian region, besides addressing the water security, sharing

and management of waters among the upper and lower riparian. It

includes not only the research papers by the members of the Group

on Water, but also articles by leading experts published earlier in the

South Asian Journal.

Imtiaz Alam

Recommendations of SAPANA Research Group

The SAPANA research group assigned to examine issues of water

resource management in South Asia comprised the following people:

1. Dr Zaigham Habib (group coordinator), Pakistan;2. Giasuddin Ahmed Choudhury, Bangladesh;3. Ramaswamy R Iyer, India;4. Dr Bishnu Hari Nepal, Nepal;5. Dr Satyajit Singh, India.

Increasingly, governments and concerned institutions are realizing

the need to address acute shortage of energy and water, incidence of

drought and floods that often bring miseries to the people and, at

times, states into conflict. The distribution and management of water

resources, though quite a divisive issue among the upper and lower

riparian regions across states, needs to be undertaken amicably

without depriving the lower and upper riparian regions of their due

to avoid a conflict over water issues which must not be politicized.

Bilateral treaties, such as Indus Water Treaty between India and

Pakistan and the Treaty over Ganges between Bangladesh and India

must be respected and upheld in letter and spirit. The Mahakali

Treaty between Nepal and India may be implemented by removing

reservations of either side. The quadrangle of Bangladesh, Bhutan,

India and Nepal may take up an integrated approach to manage

water resources while keeping the interests of upper and lower

riparian, on the one hand, and India and Pakistan must overcome

their differences over Tulbul, Baglihar and Kishanganga projects

xvxiv

within the framework of the IWT, on the other.

There are other major water related problems that need to be

addressed on a priority basis with water cooperation among the

member countries of SAARC to enhance water and food security.

There is a great hydro-power potential in Bhutan and Nepal that can

be utilized by other countries of the region. However, that would

involve the need for a common or bilateral grid, on which all

concerned countries would have to agree.

The group's recommendations are summarised below. 1. The regional water scenario of South Asia is predominated by

increasing gap between increasing water demand and

insufficient supply, high allocation to agriculture and growing

new commercial demands, trans-boundary and regional

conflicts generated from upper versus lower riparian water

needs/interests, increasing interest in hydropower and new

management experiences. Policy challenges are linked to the

socio-economic approaches, selection of technical solutions and

institutional capacity. The following general and specific

recommendations could be made, based on the group

discussion:2. The trans-boundary conflicts are based on concerns of the lower

riparian countries to secure river flows (Pakistan and

Bangladesh versus India) on one hand and development

interests of the upper riparian especially for the hydropower

(Nepal versus India, India vs. Pakistan). The multi-purpose and

multi-country planning for the Himalayan water resources and

the South Asian water basins is the proposed future option.

(proposed NIBB-C Water Ways is an example)3. All South Asian countries are going through the experiences of

decentralization and local management. Different models have

been tried the success so far indicates involvement of local civil

society, political acceptance and local institutional

implementation capacity as the key elements. The national

experiences needs to be impartially evaluated and put in the

proper context. 4. The efficiency and productivity of water use in agriculture must

be enhanced along with sustainable use of water in agriculture.

The physical water stress and growing urban needs of Pakistan

and India suggest a slow transfer of water from the sector.

5. All infrastructure developments should consider long term

conservation of the natural water resources (all water bodies,

including lakes, river sections and groundwater) and

regenerative use of water. The central and top-bottom

engineering approaches are not able to move forward due to

political as well as hydrological reasons, hence, the technical

options must be formulated across the appropriate local

hydrological and political boundaries.6. The human access to water resources, on the one hand, and

increased commercial value of water, on the other, are the

growing challenges for the planning and development. The

secure allocations for the domestic and drinking water, equitable

distribution and fair water pricing in different sectors and

regions are the essential regulatory measures. The public sector

as a service provider has the responsibility to define guidelines.7. The water related sectors have the great opportunity for the

knowledge sharing in the technical and managerial fields.

xviixvi

Executive SummaryDr Zaigham Habib

he Himalayan water resources are shared by India, Pakistan,

Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. South Asia is generally facing

deficit of useable water for the existing and future needs, Tdeterioration of water resources, management inefficiencies,

development concerns and water legislation. The infrastructure

development is considered inevitable in the region for the

hydropower generation and to meet water demands. While facing

problems in the selection of technical solutions, water sharing within

and across the countries and water productivity; all countries are

experimenting management changes to various degrees. Five papers

from the South Asia water group review country specific and trans-

boundary issues, brief highlights from different papers are given

below:

Ramaswamy R. Iyer summarizes water issues of South Asian

countries, trans-boundary water conflicts between India and other

countries while emphasizing alternative approaches. For the water

crises of India, he suggests; “through a combination of two

approaches, namely, on the demand side, the practice of the utmost

economy and efficiency in water-use and of resource-conservation,

and on the supply side, efforts to augment the availability of `usable'

water through extensive recourse to local water-harvesting and

watershed development, it may be possible to avert a crisis, though

the situation will undoubtedly be difficult and will call for careful

management.

The economic and water sector reforms in India are generally

accepted as a public-private partnership. “This is another

prescription of economic `reformers' that seems to be gaining a

measure of acceptance in India. The paucity of financial resources is

pushing the Governments, Central and State, to think in terms of

inviting private sector participation in dam-and-reservoir projects,

which would earlier have been exclusively in the domain of the state.

The new National Water Policy 2002 includes a clause that

specifically provides for this. Turning from projects to services, the

idea of privatizing utilities has been in the air for some time, and now

it seems to be getting extended to water supply in some States.”

Mr Iyer summarizes anti big infrastructure views, also using them in

the context of trans-boundary issues. Anti-dam lobbies argue that

the economic, environmental, social and human consequences of

these projects can not be fully compensated, while the small-scale,

local, people-centred alternatives are available. Similar logic is

mentioned in the context of trans-boundary disputes,” Bhutan is its

deep attachment to its cultural and natural heritage and its

determination to preserve them….. an `alternative' view in Nepal

disfavours large, technology-driven, foreign-funded, export-oriented

projects imposed by the state or foreign investors on the people, and

favours decentralized, relatively small, environmentally benign

projects (whether for irrigation or for hydro-electric power) primarily

for Nepal's own needs rather than for meeting the needs of other

countries.”

Dr. Bishnu Hari Nepal's paper is focused around the theme,” water is

to Nepal what oil has been to the Gulf countries, namely, the source

of revenues and wealth; and that those revenues will come

principally from the export of hydro-electric power to the

neighbouring countries.” While emphasizing the use of advance

technologies he criticizes anti-infrastructure movements. The 'eco-

romanticists', water-mafias and 'dollar farmers' make sometimes

'opposition for opposition's sake' and create havoc to the normal

folks. The paper describes surface and groundwater water resources

of Nepal, current uses, hydroelectric potential, trans-boundary issues

with India and a regional model.

Currently, Nepal is using less than 10% of its rivers inflow of 225

billion cubic meters annually and producing 606 MW

hydroelectricity out of 83,000 MW capacities. While, only 40 per

cent of the households use electricity generated from different

systems and the actual energy needs met from fuel-wood,

agricultural waste and animal-dung is 88.64 per cent of the total

energy consumption. Out of the remaining percentage, the hydro-

xixxviii

electricity contribution is of 1.66 per cent, contribution of renewable

energy resources is 0.52 percent and fossil fuel (petroleum and coal)

comes to be 11.18 per cent.

Nepal's New Water Resources Strategy and National Water Plan for

2002 to 2027 suggest physical developments, joint trans-boundary

projects for hydropower and management reforms in the sanitation

and irrigation sectors. The Farmer Managed Irrigation Systems

(FMIS) already covers 70 per cent of the country's irrigated area,

some systems are being transferred wholly to the Water Users

Association (WUA),while some are jointly managed by the

government and the WUAs. The government has accepted that the

community-managed systems are better than the government-

managed projects.

The scope of joint reservoir and electricity generation projects by

Nepal and India is high, however, as India is the main user of this

electricity, there is conflict of interests on location, ownership, price,

etc. Dr. Nepal proposes a trans-boundary regulatory mechanism

outlined through his SA-RRR-S (South Asian Regional Riparian

Rights Statutes) model. The Model proposes that the countries of

South Asia could take a distance of 8 KM as a distance of mutual

agreement downstream and upstream right of acceptance by

managing the system of the provision of consent from the respective

country for any kind of water and disturbing development activity

within the respective country's territory.

In a very interesting paper Dr. Satyajit Singh reviews water sector

reforms experiences of the South Asia in the context of local

governments, good governance, and communities. He put current

decentralization efforts as the centuries old quest for appropriate

institutions for good governance, formulated by different schools of

thoughts in different social or institutional contexts. The paper

argues that local governments are central to the discussions around

good governance. A shift from communities to local governments

becomes necessary in order to ensure the sustainability of the

community institutions as well as to provide a stable channel for

public fiscal transfers from the centre or the state to the actual

beneficiaries. The local government model provide better defined

structural relations with the central state, while it is accountable at

the local level and is allowed to make choices between public versus

private services. An important assertion is that capacity is an issue at

the central level, which should be able to design institutes at the local

level. “It is an attempt to bring in a convergence between the

institutional and the livelihood paradigm”. While rural communities

in South Asia are directly affected by the swings in the financial and

trade markets, national and state governments are also realizing that

good governance for rural infrastructure and service delivery are best

handled at the local government level.

In this reforms model, the state focuses on policy, strategy and

capacity building of the local government for managing, contracting

and supervising NGOs, private and community groups. The services

are delivered by the public, private, civil society organizations or

their partnerships. The success of decentralization process is linked

with urgent needs, outcomes in the local political economy and the

local capacity. However, many aspects of the implementation process

and achievable impacts of decentralization remain to be understood.

Crafting a balance between local autonomy, state authority and

legitimate national goals is difficult, local governments have neither

the capacity nor the local accountability to act autonomously to

realize the expected benefits of decentralization. decentralization

that works across sectors to provide functional clarity and

operational freedom to local governments. The capacity of

communities and local Governments is essential for success.

India provides examples of different level of decentralization and

success. The sector reforms in Karalla are successful, as they are fully

integrate with decentralization program and the functional local

governments, Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRI), which are largely

respected by the communities. Bangladesh has adopted major

reforms agenda through five year (2005-9) Rural Water Supply

Project. However, delivery mechanism is highly centralized as the

ministry delegates responsibilities to the local public departments

and NGOs. This supply driven approach is not able to response

peoples needs, problems in reporting are mentioned while the

expected results are not achieved. “Unlike in India where the local

government unit actually manages the water projects, the local

government in Bangladesh facilitates and regulates the 'private

sponsors'”.

Giasuddin Choudhury's paper on water management in Bangladesh

xxixx

highlights existing water policy approach of the country and

describes different issues linked to water quality, low productivity

and boundary issues with India. Bangladesh has been closely

working with the international donors during the last twenty years

and has come up with national policy documents, between 1992-99,

in the sectors of environmental, forest, energy, Drinking Water

Supply and Sanitation, fisheries, agricultural, industry and water.

The National Water Management Plan (NWMP) was prepared in

2001 and approved by the National Water Resources Council in

2004.

Bangladesh faces water control and quality problems; groundwater

pollution, floods resulted from high river flows and inadequate

drainage, and increasing demand for winter irrigation. The arsenic

levels are above the safe limit, exposing about 75 million people to

this toxic substance on a daily basis. The water use efficiencies are

low, while water is subsidized along with other inputs. The country

also needs to manage land due to drainage issues and rapid

urbanization. The national water policy of Bangladesh states, “Water

will be considered an economic resource and priced to convey its

scarcity value to all users and provide motivation for its

conservation”.

The trans-boundary conflict with India originates from the fact that,

“Bangladesh has fifty-seven common/ border rivers, out of which

fifty-four rivers are with India. The ever-increasing upstream

withdrawals from these rivers within the Indian territory have

deprived Bangladesh from its traditional uses of the river flows,

especially in the dry seasons and thereby disrupting the livelihoods

of the people depending on these rivers as well as causing serious

environmental degradation to one-third of Bangladesh.” The

diversions from Ganges and water control at Farakka have been a

major concern for Bangladesh, because of its direct impact on

supplies to the irrigated land of Bangladesh. With the help of WB,

Ganges Water Treaty (GWT) was signed between Bangladesh and

India in 1996. However, the Indian River Link (IRL) mega project is

considered to pose great threat to Bangladesh. The paper suggests,

that Bangladesh needs to take an initiative for regional cooperation

with Bhutan, Nepal and India. The Ganges flows can be augmented

by construction a reservoir at the Sunkosh River in Bhutan, similarly,

Sapta Kosi High Dam in Nepal, could bring significant benefits to

Bangladesh.

The paper by Dr. Habib from Pakistan reviews water scenario of

Pakistan, indicating the scope and implications of different measures

available to address the water scarcity and resource conservation in

the country. The country is already utilizing more than 75% of its

rivers inflow of 178 billion cubic meters, more than 100%

groundwater and major part of the rainfall falling in the plains.

Different sectors and areas face qualitative and quantitative water

shortage in terms of water access, allocation and actual availability.

On the supply management side Pakistan is faced with regional

disagreements and technical inabilities for the surface water

development, water productivity and conservation of water quality,

groundwater aquifer and natural aquatic systems. Not only

projected, currently allocated river water is more than actual canal

diversion, making shortage sharing a critical process during the

major part of year. Recycling through groundwater aquifer has

increased the actual water use efficiency in fresh aquifer areas, while

causing groundwater depletion and a need to maintain the

discharge-recharge balance. The drainage projects and water use

practices have failed to arrest water logging in the saline zone. The

low yield and traditional cropping patterns are the major

performance concerns for the agriculture sector. The livelihood

orientation, low investment potential and failure of markets to

stimulate agriculture production are the main causes. Feasible

technical options in the sweet and saline zones are not properly

identified and implemented. The paper suggests sustainable

recharge-discharge balance in the fresh aquifer zone and water

saving at the conveyance level development guidelines.

In the context of institutional reforms, clear and locally accepted

water management model is still far away, existing dichotomies are

obvious from the ongoing disintegrated processes of decentralization

and reforms in the political and resource management sectors. The

institutional changes in the water sector are initiated and directed by

the donor as part of the package (notably World Bank and ADB)

leading to the pilot studies. No efforts are yet carried out for the

evaluation and formulation of these experiments.

2322

South Asian Water ConcernsRamaswamy R. Iyer

his paper aims at presenting a synoptic and objective

overview, in very broad terms, of the principal national

concerns and issues relating to water in South Asian Tcountries. For the purpose of the paper, ‘South Asia’ refers only to

the countries in the subcontinental mainland, i.e., Pakistan, India,

Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. Besides, it is concerned largely with

the northern part of the subcontinent where different countries are

linked together by the Himalayan rivers.

National PerspectivesPakistanThe major part of Pakistan -- leaving aside the inland drainage area

of Balochistan, as also the southern coastal region -- is in the Indus

Basin.

Water Deficit?Most writings on the water resources of Pakistan refer to water

scarcity (present or imminent), but it is not clear how much of the

projected water and food deficit will remain if the ills of poor water

management and inefficiencies in irrigated agriculture (on which

there is general agreement) are remedied.

Water-Logging and SalinityThe allocation of the three western rivers of the Indus system to

Pakistan under the 1960 Indus Water Treaty, and the development of

irrigated agriculture that followed, certainly brought much

prosperity to the country or to some sections of the population, but

an unanticipated outcome was the emergence and spread of the ills

of water-logging and salinity. Out of a total of 18 million hectares

(mha) of irrigated land in Pakistan, about 6.22 mha are said to be

affected by this menace. In response to this the Government of

Pakistan launched different Salinity Control and Reclamation

Projects (SCARP), starting in 1959. These do not seem to have been

very successful. Among the criticisms of the SCARP approach are

design defects, severe environmental impacts, and the creation of

secondary problems that are as bad as the original ones that the plan

had intended to remedy. The impression that one gets is that

Pakistan is still struggling with a gigantic problem to which

satisfactory answers have not yet been found.

Inter-Provincial ConflictsAnother major national concern is the persistence of inter-provincial

conflicts over water distribution. These conflicts have a long history,

going back to the middle of the 19th Century when human

intervention in the natural flow of the river through the construction

of barrages and canals began. The old inter-provincial conflicts and

the attempts to resolve them were followed after Partition (1947) by

the India-Pakistan dispute over the Indus, which was resolved by the

Indus Water Treaty of 1960. The problems of water-sharing among

the provinces in Pakistan continued, and were dealt with by several

committees and commissions. The settlement currently in force is

the Indus Water Accord of 1991. However, there are important

unresolved issues with a crucial bearing on water distribution. Issues

of flood management, not discussed here, also have inter-provincial

angles.

Kalabagh ControversyA new dimension has been added to water-sharing disputes by the

contentious Kalabagh Dam Project. This Project is the centre of a

major controversy in Pakistan. The arguments are familiar. The case

for the project is argued on the basis of a projected water shortage

and the need for and possibility of one more dam on the Indus

system. The opponents of the project argue that water is not available

for the dam, that the project is not needed, and that it will have

serious environmental and human impacts. There is also an inter-

provincial angle: Sindh is afraid that with the Kalabagh dam, more of

the Indus water will be diverted by Punjab, with serious

consequences for it (Sindh); and the North Western Frontier

2524

Province (NWFP), while it might derive some benefits, is seriously

worried about submergence of land, displacement of people, and

water-logging problems.

Two ApproachesAt the heart of the Kalabagh controversy lies the confrontation

between two divergent approaches to water-resource policy,

planning and management, encapsulated by one writer (Bengali,

2003) as the 'techno-centric approach' vis-à-vis the 'socio-centric

approach'. As summed up by him, the former relies wholly on

technical expertise and engineering solutions, whereas the latter

recognises that 'development, management and conservation cannot

be achieved in a vacuum, and social systems and structures and

people's cultures and lifestyles also need to be addressed'.

Other IssuesThere are also serious concerns in Pakistan about the pollution of

rivers, the degradation of coastal zones, the problems of sewage

disposal in urban areas, and so on, but limitations of space prevent

this paper from going into them.

India(The Indian concerns outlined below may find a resonance in the

other countries of the region.)

Water Crisis? An important and widely shared perception in India is that of an

imminent water crisis. The crucial element here is the demand

projection, and that needs to be looked at carefully. In every kind of

water use, major economies are desirable and possible, though

difficult. If these are achieved, the demand picture will not remain

the same. Turning to the supply side, large-dam projects are not the

only answer; there are other possibilities. Local rainwater harvesting

(‘catching the raindrop as it falls’) and watershed development are

also part of the supply-side answers to the demand. Through a

combination of these two approaches, namely, on the demand side,

the practice of the utmost economy and efficiency in water-use and

of resource-conservation, and on the supply side, efforts to augment

the availability of `usable' water through extensive recourse to local

water-harvesting and watershed development, it may be possible to

avert a crisis, though the situation will undoubtedly be difficult and

will call for careful management.

Divergence on Big ProjectsThere is a widespread perception that the growth of population, pace

of urbanisation and economic development will accentuate the

pressure of increasing demand on a finite resource, and that the

answer lies in large supply-side projects and long-distance water

transfers. That is the dominant view in India, but there is a strong

body of opinion that challenges that view.

The Narmada, Tehri Movements The most dramatic confrontation between the two views took place

in the case of the Narmada (Sardar Sarovar) and the Tehri Hydro-

Electric Projects. In both cases, the protest movements and their

leaders (Medha Patkar and Sunderlal Bahuguna) became well-known

nationally and even internationally. In both cases, the battle has been

lost in the Supreme Court, and construction activities -- stalled for a

while -- have been resumed in full force, but the movements cannot

be adjudged to have been failures: they have changed forever the way

people at every level (including the general public, the media, policy-

makers, project-planners and managers) think about such projects.

In that sense, the movements have been enormously influential.

‘Flood Control’ This is a controversial subject, but it is increasingly recognised that

what we must learn to do is not so much to ‘control’ floods as to cope

with them when they occur and minimise damage, partly through

‘flood-plain zoning’ (i.e., regulation of settlement and activity in the

natural flood plains of rivers) and partly through `disaster-

preparedness'. However, the notion of ‘flood control’ continues to

hold some sway over people's minds, and to influence official

thinking.

Inter-State River Water DisputesMost of the major rivers in India flow through more than one

(Indian) state and are therefore ‘inter-state rivers’. The

constitutional/statutory mechanism for the resolution of inter-state

conflicts within India -- over such rivers seemed initially to be

working reasonably well, but it has run into difficulties in recent

years. Two currently outstanding disputes are the Ravi-Beas Dispute

(Punjab and Haryana) and the Cauvery Dispute (Karnataka, Tamil

2726

Nadu, Kerala and Pondicherry). An early and satisfactory resolution

does not seem to be within sight in either case. These unresolved

disputes have implications that go far beyond water: they raise

questions about Indian federalism.

The Groundwater CrisisContinuing reckless exploitation of groundwater, leading to the rapid

depletion of aquifers in many places, portends disaster. The

situation, which has been described as ‘colossal anarchy’ (Shah

2004), needs to be quickly brought under control, but there are

enormous legal, political and practical difficulties here. There may be

need for changes in the law relating to ownership rights over

groundwater, enactment of new state-level laws for regulating the

extraction and use of groundwater, establishment of regulatory

bodies, rationalisation of power tariffs, and so on. However, with

regard to the very large number of private tube-wells in the country

(estimated at 21 million) and the fact that most of these are cases of

‘self-supply’, i.e., outside the purview of supply systems, public or

private, there is some scepticism about the feasibility of `regulation'

and the efficacy of changes in policy or law as remedies for the

depletion and contamination of groundwater aquifers. No clear

solutions to this difficult problem are in sight as yet and the debate

needs to be pursued further.

Water Markets Water markets already exist in India mainly in the context of

extraction of groundwater through tube-wells and bore-wells but also

in relation to surface water in some instances. Many more instances

may emerge. There are many who think that this is the route to

follow for the future; there are others who are deeply uneasy at the

idea of water markets and at the underlying perception of water as a

tradable commodity.

The advocates of water markets (who view water as a commodity)

recommend: ‘Define property rights and allow trading’, but the

citizen's right to water (for drinking, cooking and washing) is a part

of the right to life, and the water rights of a farmer for irrigation or

those of an industry for industrial uses are use-rights; treating either

of them as ‘tradable property rights’ has serious implications that

need to be studied carefully. The supply of water by private tankers in urban areas and the

burgeoning bottled-water trade are also instances of (entirely

avoidable) water markets. If the public system provided an adequate,

reliable and safe supply, the demand for tankers or for bottled water

may go down sharply. Apart from that, these supplies (and the soft

drinks business) have necessarily to draw raw water from

somewhere, and that draft may be an unsustainable or inequitable

one. The instance of the bore-wells of the Coca Cola Company

depriving an entire area in Kerala of its water is well-known. The

case went to the High Court and the judgment has invoked the public

trust doctrine, but the story is as yet unfinished, as the case may still

go to the Supreme Court.

PrivatisationThe paucity of financial resources is pushing the governments,

central and state, to think in terms of inviting private sector

participation in dam and reservoir projects, which would earlier have

been exclusively in the domain of the state. The new Indian National

Water Policy, 2002 includes a clause that specifically provides for

this. There has been much opposition to the idea of `privatisation of

water', whether in relation to projects or in the context of water

services, on several grounds. There was a public outcry against the

leasing of a 20-km stretch of the Shivalik River in Chattisgarh to a

private corporate entity for water supply, and the state tried to cancel

the lease but encountered legal difficulties. This, like the Coca Cola

case mentioned earlier, is an unfinished story.

Pricing of WaterThe twin propositions that water rates should be regarded as `user

charges' and not as a form of taxation, and that the principle behind

`user charges' should be `full cost recovery', are important elements

in current economic thinking. They may be acceptable in the context

of water as an input into economic activity: irrigation, industrial use,

water for hotels. However, these principles cannot apply without

modification to `water for life' (drinking water). This too cannot be

free, but must be priced reasonably, with full economic pricing to the

affluent, penal pricing beyond a certain level of use, some degree of

subsidisation to the less affluent, and perhaps some free supplies to

the very poor. It cannot be said that these issues have been thought

through to clarity and finality in India.

2928

Other IssuesThere are many other issues such as the third tier of local self-

government at the level of villages (panchayats) and cities

(nagarpalikas) introduced by the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the

Constitution. Among the subjects to be devolved to these bodies

(known as panchayati raj institutions or PRIs) is water management

at the local level. The future role of PRIs in relation to water is a

matter of considerable importance.

Another matter which demands urgent attention is the problem of

the pollution and contamination of water sources and systems that

steadily diminishes the quantum available for use.

NepalA large number of rivers and streams flow through Nepal and into

India. The nature of the terrain immediately brings to mind the

possibility of generation of hydro-electric power, and a number of

sites for large projects have been identified. Only a small part of the

power so generated can be used in Nepal; the rest would have to be

exported, primarily to India. India can also use all the waters that

flow from Nepal for irrigation, and would further like to minimise

the damage caused by the floods coming down those rivers from time

to time. These possibilities give rise to the idea of large projects for

building dams and reservoirs in Nepal. (Bangladesh, for its part, has

for long been arguing for seven large projects in Nepal for

augmenting the lean season flows of the Ganges at Farakka, where

the waters are shared between India and Bangladesh.) Against this

background, there is a growing sentiment in Nepal that the country's

water resources represent the route through which its visions of

prosperity can best be realised; that water is to Nepal what oil has

been to the Gulf countries, namely, the source of revenues and

wealth; and that those revenues will come principally from the

export of hydro-electric power to the neighbouring countries, mainly

India.

Several multi-purpose projects (Karnali, Pancheswar, Saptkosi, etc)

have been under discussion between Nepal and India for over three

decades, but little progress has been made on any of them, for

several reasons: the long history of mistrust and suspicion

characterising India-Nepal relations; the growing salience of

environmental concerns, concerns about the displacement of people,

and misgivin about large projects in the seismically active Himalayan

region; and a degree of dissent, even within Nepal, from the view

that the route to prosperity lies in large-scale centralised generation

of hydro-electric power for export.

There is an `alternative' view in Nepal that advocates decentralised,

relatively small, environmentally benign projects (whether for

irrigation or for hydro-electric power) primarily for Nepal's own

needs rather than for meeting the needs of other countries. Export of

electricity is not ruled out, but large generation primarily for export

to a single large buyer (India) under inter-governmental

arrangements is not considered desirable. It is difficult to say how

widespread the `alternative' view is, but that it commands a degree

of influence cannot be denied. Opposition to the Arun III Hydro-

Electric Project did eventually result in the World Bank withdrawing

from the project; this is regarded as a great loss by the water

establishment and other proponents of the mainstream position, but

celebrated as an achievement by critics who argue that the

abandonment of this unviable project made created a number of

smaller, cheaper and quicker alternatives. (For a short while a

leading proponent of this view became a government minister, and

for a brief period the `alternative' view became `mainstream', but

that is no longer the case.)

Turning to another aspect, Nepal -- as a land-locked country --

attaches a great deal of importance to a navigational outlet to the sea

(to a port in India or Bangladesh). At the moment this is not

physically feasible, but creating such a possibility as a part of one of

the projects that are being talked about remains an important

objective of Nepal.

BhutanBhutan, close to Nepal and like it a mountainous country lying on the

southern slopes of the Himalaya between China and India, is flanked

on the western and eastern sides by the Indian states of Sikkim and

Arunachal Pradesh, with Assam as the immediate southern

neighbour. The country is heavily forested and richly endowed with

water resources. The annual availability of water per capita is put at

75000 m3 in the Bhutan Water Policy document, but the

environmental information portal of the World Resources Institute

gives a per capita Internal Renewable Water Resources (IRWR)

3130

figure of 43214 m.3 for the year 2001. It is not clear how those two

figures are related to each other, but it is clear enough from either

figure that the country is exceptionally well-endowed with water,

though even that abundance is expected to come under pressure in

the future because of the growth of population and the processes of

economic development.

The most important point to bear in mind about Bhutan is its deep

attachment to its cultural and natural heritage and its determination

to preserve them. It has adopted what has been described as `the

middle path' to sustainable development. At the same time, the

country is (understandably) not exempt from the aspirations that

other countries entertain for economic development and prosperity.

The contrary pulls of these two strands in Bhutanese thinking are

evident in the Water Policy document. For instance, there are fine

statements of the holistic ecological point of view and indications of

social and human sensitivity; at the same time, the language of

economics, management and the market-place is also found in many

places. It is hoped that the floodtide of `economic development' and

`modernity' will not overwhelm Bhutan and make it

indistinguishable from the rest of the world and subject to the same

ills.

In pursuance of the objective of earning revenues from the country's

hydro-power potential, Bhutan has undertaken certain projects with

Indian assistance. It is not within the scope of this paper to go into

the details of the projects that are in operation; under construction;

and in the visualisation/formulation/planning stages (Chuka, Chuka

II, Tala, Kurichu, Sunkosh, Manas, etc). What needs to be noted is

that Chuka is widely regarded as an example of successful inter-

country cooperation for mutual benefit; and that the inflow of

revenues from the sale of electricity to India has been very large in

relation to the country's GDP and has made the country prosperous

in economic terms, with a per capita income much higher than that

of its neighbours. However, the question whether the transformation

in the economy has been accompanied by ecological and social

changes and whether these warrant any concern, has not been

adequately debated. If further expansions of, and additions to,

hydro-electric capacity take place as planned, would it be possible for

Bhutan to continue to adhere to the middle path? That question is of

course one for the Bhutanese to reflect on.

BangladeshCrisscrossed by rivers and streams, Bangladesh is a water-abundant

country with a per capita water-availability of 8444 m3 in 2002

(World Resources Institute). (Another study Ahmad et al 2001 - puts

the annual per capita water availability at 12162 m3 in 1991, 10305

m3 in 2000, and 7670 m3 in 2025.) As the country acts as a narrow

funnel through which three large river systems (the Ganges,

Brahmaputra and the Meghna) drain into the sea, its major national

problem is the periodical occurrence of disastrous flooding. There

was catastrophic flooding in 1988 and again in 1998. However,

though floods dominate the thinking of Bangladesh, there is also a

perception of a critical shortage of water in the lean season in some

parts of the country.

Most Bangladeshi writings on water tend to make the point that 94%

of the water resources of the country originate beyond its borders,

and that 54 rivers and streams flow into Bangladesh from India. This

consciousness, combined with that of India's size, colours

Bangladeshi thinking and gives it a sense of vulnerability. The water

establishment of Bangladesh is acutely aware that, for water security

as well as for flood-management, the country needs Indian

cooperation.

Against this background, there are four prominent concerns in the

national thinking about water: flood-management; water-sharing

with the upper riparian; internal water-resource management; and

the protection and preservation of the natural environment.

The massive floods of 1988 brought international attention to this

problem, resulting in the Flood Action Plan (FAP) financed by a large

number of donor countries. The FAP was a very large programme

consisting of numerous studies and some pilot projects. However, it

was subjected to severe criticism right from the beginning, and soon

fell into disrepute, largely because it was perceived as a top-down,

non-participative and essentially donor-driven plan.

On water-sharing with upper riparians, treaties or understandings

with India on several rivers are favoured. A Treaty with India on

water-sharing in the Ganges was signed on 12 December, 1996.

3332

Similar understandings are felt to be necessary on at least eight or

nine of the 54 rivers and streams that cross the India-Bangladesh

border. Currently, talks are in progress on water-sharing on the

Teesta. (Another strong Bangladeshi perception is that of the need

for the augmentation of the lean season flows of the Ganges, and the

Government of India is in agreement with that view, but there is a

divergence between the two countries on how the augmentation is to

be brought about).

Turning to internal water-resource management, the work done

under the aegis of the FAP (though there was disenchantment with

that programme) provided useful inputs when, eventually, the

preparation of a new National Water Management Plan and a

National Water Policy was undertaken. (The National Water Policy

was published in 1999, but it still remains largely a declaration of

intent lacking in formal backing and not translated into operational

plans.) In these new initiatives, the old top-down engineering and

structural approaches were moderated by a greater awareness of

non-structural measures; the importance of people's participation in

planning; environmental concerns; and institutional change. At the

same time, the influence of the new processes of `economic reform'

is seen in the references to water as an economic good, the

importance of pricing as an instrument of water management,

private sector participation, and so on. The balancing of these

divergent perceptions seems somewhat uneasy and precarious.

Environmental concerns are now part of the climate of opinion and

have acquired a degree of importance even in the water resources

establishment that was earlier primarily driven by engineering

considerations. The concern is largely focussed on the control of the

incursion of salinity from the sea and on the protection of the

wetlands (the Sunderbans).

In recent years, the presence of arsenic in groundwater has become a

major concern. This problem has been experienced in parts of India

as well, though perhaps not in as acute a form as in Bangladesh.

Different explanations have been given for this phenomenon; expert

opinions seem to vary on this (and therefore on the appropriate

responses), and finality does not seem to have been reached. As

groundwater `development' has been extensive in Bangladesh, this is

a serious national problem.

Another emerging concern relates to the implications for Bangladesh

of the predictions of climate change. This is a subject that is currently

under study in both official and academic circles. As yet, there is

much uncertainty as to what the future holds for the country. As the

studies progress, this is bound to become a central concern.

Convergences and Divergences ConvergencesConcerns about food security and apprehensions of future water-

scarcity are common to all the countries. The response to these

concerns at the administrative, technical and planning levels in

governments is generally characterised by a predilection in favour of

big supply-side interventions, with some variations in the strength of

this way of thinking from country to country. There is also some

advocacy of `alternatives' in all the countries, again with variations

from country to country. The philosophy of `middle path' is

strongest in Bhutan. The `alternative voices' are moderately strong

in Nepal, with a degree of influence on official thinking, but the

mainstream view continues to regard water as Nepal's oil, i.e., as a

potential source of revenue and wealth. In Pakistan and India there

is a strong polarisation between the believers in big, centralised,

technology-driven, supply-side projects as the only answers to future

needs, and those who oppose the approach as unsustainable,

destructive and inequitable, and advocate local, small, community-

led alternatives that are (in their view) environmentally benign and

socially just. The polarisation is particularly marked in India, with an

inadequacy or even absence of constructive civil discourse between

the `dam-builders' and the `environmentalists', either side

describing the other as a `lobby'. In Bangladesh, there are not many

possibilities of big projects, but the official water establishment, as in

India, continues to be dominated by the engineering point of view.

Apart from the already completed Teesta Barrage, the proposed

Ganges Barrage is perhaps the one big project in view, and it is

regarded as very important. Essentially, however, the `big project'

point of view is reflected in the advocacy of several large dams in

Nepal as a means of augmenting the lean season flows of the Ganges.

There is also general agreement at the official levels and among the

intelligentsia (especially the economists) on the `potential' of hydro-

electric power that exists in the river systems of the countries, and, in

particular, in the Himalayan rivers, and the need to exploit as much

3534

of that potential as possible. The critics question such projects on

environmental and other grounds, and contend that the need for

large centralised power-generation can be minimised by a

combination of demand-management, efficiency in energy use,

getting more energy out of capacities already created, extensive local

decentralised generation, and so on. They also have strong doubts

about the wisdom of building large reservoirs in the seismically

active Himalayan region.

Environmental concerns are widely shared, but are not equally

strong or influential in all countries. This is of course a central

concern in Bhutan. There are powerful movements in Pakistan, India

and Nepal, but they are not often very effective, and despite the

existence of Ministries for Environment, the concern cannot be said

to be `mainstream'. At the official level, and among the neo-liberal

economists who are influential in the `economic reform' process,

there is a tendency to juxtapose `development' and `environment'

and to argue that the latter should not be over-emphasised to the

detriment of the former. That (questionable) point of view finds

much implicit (and sometimes explicit) support from the officials of

the World Bank and the ADB.

Floods loom large in the thinking of both India and Bangladesh.

Despite the disenchantment with the FAP, mainstream opinion in

Bangladesh is not wholly negative about embankments. Similarly,

despite the recognition of the weaknesses and failures of

embankments official thinking in India still considers them

necessary. An offshoot of the concern about floods is the Indian

river-linking project.

The use of groundwater is massive in India and quite substantial in

Bangladesh. The mining of groundwater and the rapid depletion of

aquifers in some parts of the country is a major problem in India,

and one which has not been attended to in any significant measure.

In Bangladesh, the main problem is the extensive presence of

arsenic, which is also experienced, though perhaps not to the same

extent, in West Bengal and Bihar in India.

Another emerging concern in all the countries is the problem of

pollution and contamination of water sources and systems.

Potentially, this could be a major source of intra-country and inter-

country friction. However, it cannot be said that there is adequate

awareness of this problem in any of the countries. It follows that

serious action to deal with this threat to resource-availability has not

begun, or even been thought of.

DivergencesDivergences have occurred essentially in relation to water-sharing in

(or projects on) rivers that cross (or flow along) national boundaries.

Some of these have been resolved through treaties. However, some

divergences continue.

The Indus Water Treaty of 1960 between India and Pakistan has

acquired a reputation internationally as a successful instance of

conflict-resolution, but currently there are a few unresolved disputes

under the ambit of the Treaty. In particular, talks about the Baglihar

hydro-electric project have failed, and Pakistan has moved for

arbitration, invoking the arbitration clause of the Treaty for the first

time in its history.

The Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty between India and Bangladesh

(1996), after a shaky start due to low flows in 1997, has been working

reasonably well, and neither country has asked for a review. Whether

it will continue to work well will depend on the state of the political

relationship between the two countries. In other words, here, as in

the case of the Indus Treaty, it is politics and not water that will

determine the future of the Treaty.

Apart from the Ganga (Ganges), there are many other rivers that

cross the India-Bangladesh border, and agreements may be needed

on some of them. However, the current state of India-Bangladesh

relations is perhaps not conducive to the conclusion of further

treaties.

Meanwhile the Government of India's announcement of a major

river-linking project (including possible diversions from the Ganga

and the Brahmaputra) has caused much concern in Bangladesh.

However, with a change of Government in India, that project is

under review.

As far as India-Nepal relations are concerned, a new chapter seemed

to open with the Mahakali Treaty of February 1996, but action under

3736

the Treaty has remained stalled because of certain differences

between the two countries. We need not go into those differences in

detail, but the point is that much time has already been lost without a

resolution of these differences, and nearly nine years after the

signing of the Treaty there is still little progress on its

implementation. It must also be noted that despite the ratification of

the Treaty by the Parliament of Nepal, there is a significant body of

opinion against the Treaty in the country. Further progress on these

matters will have to wait for a degree of internal stability in Nepal.

Ramaswamy R Iyer is an honorary research professor at the

Centre for Policy Research (CPR), New Delhi, India. A Policy Management Approach to

Pakistan's Water ResourcesDr. Zaigham Habib

he international mapping of water resources by the UN and

other leading international research organizations has placed

Pakistan among the world's water-scarce countries (FAO, TIWMI 2004). The existing per capita water availability of 1,100

m3/person fell as low as 900 m3/person during a drought year,

2000-2001. The country's supply of water is consistently decreasing

because of reduced river inflows, groundwater depletion and erratic

rainfall. On the demand and management sides, population growth,

urbanization, increased water losses, and declining water quality has

had a major impact on per capita water availability. Emerging

domestic and industrial requirements are key factors competing for

the use of water, while ecological imbalances, salinization, and

aquifer depletion are typical consequences of the overuse of water

resources. New water quantities and allocations are required for

domestic and industrial uses, and for use in planned agriculture, as

well as to conserve groundwater aquifers, rivers, and lakes, protect

aquatic life in these water bodies, and maintain water quality. Small

users are most gravely affected by canal water scarcity, aquifer

depletion, and land quality deterioration.

New water resource development is critical if we are to increase

availability during water stress periods while minimizing the impact

of water withdrawal from natural streams. The management of water

resources in Pakistan faces challenges in the context of development,

new allocations, environment, and conservation.

3938

Currently, Pakistan utilizes more than 75 percent of its surface water,

100 percent of useable groundwater, and the major part of rainfall in

the plains. River water is central to the rural setup of Pakistan's

economy, employment and social structure. With more than 90

percent of developed resources being utilized, agriculture is

considered a low-performing sector. Extensively developed

agricultural areas are additionally over-drafting groundwater and

face increasing competition from other uses. The actual demand for

water and hydropower has compelled the Government of Pakistan

and water managers to increase the water supply and fully regulate

all water resources. Already, cities are reaching out to more distant

sources of water supply and relocating industries closer to water

sources. It is clear that the future will be heavily concerned with

managing a dwindling resource and mitigating the adverse impacts

of a profligate past.

With the start of the 21st century, there is growing realization of

gross water scarcity, and the need for high water use efficiency.

Water, which was traditionally a technical and administrative

subject, has become an issue of public concern and media coverage.

The current polarization of political and administrative institutions

on matters of water resource development, sharing, and distribution,

has peaked. While there is a clear difference of opinion on

development options, the management vision has become obscured

after ineffective experimentation with participatory and

decentralized management models. Non-agreement on basic water

information is more than a provincial interest, there is a serious lack

of accounting for water availability and demand. Efforts towards “a

management shift” can be seen in new water strategy, policy and

committed priorities, especially at the policymaker and donor levels.

A national water strategy was formulated recently, and the national

water policy is still under discussion. However, the country still has

to screen and select achievable objectives, define an implementation

framework, and set rules and criteria to regulate competing

allocations while conserving the basic resource base.

This paper reviews Pakistan's water scenario by briefly commenting

on the proposed policy and strategy documents in the first section

and presenting an account of water resources, agriculture

assessment, different water demands, and sustainability constraints

in the second section.

Water Policy, Strategy, and InstitutionsThe last two decades have been a globally active period for water

policy and strategy formulations. The issues and conflicts related to

technical and legal management of shared water resources, water

security against increasing depletion and quality deterioration, and

urban versus rural water demands have forced countries and water

managers to take action. Supporting national water policies are

meant to change some of the existing priorities and strategies. In

developing countries, the insistence of donors (especially the World

Bank and Asian Development Bank) has been a major factor pushing

countries towards “new water policy documents”. Experiments so far

have shown that the private sector is not capable of investing in

small, extensively scattered, and low-producing agricultural

economies.

Over the last few years, the Government of Pakistan has developed

and approved a National Water Strategy (2004) and launched a draft

policy document. This policy draft is not very different from other

South Asian countries implementing donor-supported reforms

towards privatization and infrastructure development to increase

water availability, drinking, and domestic supplies. The wording of

the general declaration is global: “that water is essential for life, a

finite resource which must be managed by all stakeholders, valuation

important and agriculture efficiency must increase”.

The water policy of Pakistan (Engineering Council 2005) has

following objectives: (i) provision of drinking supply to all, (ii) food

security, (iii) sanitation, (iv) reuse of water, (v) conserving

environment and ecology, (vi) flood management, (vii) infrastructure

security, and (viii) optimization of water use efficiency. It claims five

guiding principles: (i) equity, (ii) efficiency, (iii) participatory

decision-making, (iv) accountability, and (v) sustainability. Key

water issues and a need for integrated planning are mentioned in the

document. However, the objectives and strategy do not indicate a

focus, envisioned change from the present setup or methods to

achieve these changes.

The water strategy document (National Water Strategy 2004) is

grossly lacking in its presentation of the nature of existing problems

and the pros and cons of different options to solve them. The

conflicts and required compromises at different levels, from

4140

allocation to infrastructure development, remain ambiguous in terms

of their presentation and proposed actions. For example, the total

water requirement of different water use sectors exceeds the total

water available. The strategy is silent on how the sectors will share

the water shortage. What types of rules and implementation

procedures are required to ensure allocations to different sectors?

Another example is environment, which is described as a priority

area. However, discussion on the water needs of environmental

concerns (within and outside rivers, lakes, and aquifers) and any

mechanism to allocate this water is neither envisioned nor proposed.

The importance of water recycling and declining drainage in the

Indus River valleys is ignored. Despite the high percentage of

international consultants in the sector, it lags behind in the

implementation of contemporary sciences.

If the current policy and strategy documents are not to be considered

a “final product”, but part of the transitory process, and if the correct

procedures and directions are selected to plan, test, and refine an

implementation framework, it is possible that a practical water

framework might evolve in a decade or so. The process followed by

the European Union is a good example to understand the complexity

of reaching a clear water vision, priorities, and firm actions. The EU

started evolving its water policy in 1970; it took 18 years for most

countries to reach the required water quality standards (1970-88)

and a further 14 years to compile a comprehensive EU framework

(2002). The framework targets to achieve ecological safety by 2015.

Institutional ApproachesWater Sector OrganizationsSince 1947, there has been a debate on the water sector's

organizational limitations, governance issues, users' interface, and

management gaps. The original water management model is

administrative and colonial. The Public Works Department of India,

responsible for development and operation of water resources, roads,

and railways, was organized as top-bottom hierarchy like all other

departments of the time. The model was close to the British

administrative model in structure, but predominantly colonial in

management and operation (Ali 1995) of the system. The irrigation

network was operated by powerful provincial irrigation departments

having their own legislative, judicial, and administrative powers.

Development decisions were made with the help of special missions

and commissions, which also functioned as arbitrators among the

provinces, in case of disputes. The need for a central planning and management institution arose in

the 1950s. Trans-boundary water sharing, reservoir operations, and

hydropower generation were issues beyond the provincial irrigation

boundaries. The World Bank, a major donor to the Indus works,

proposed a semi-autonomous organization at the central level.

WAPDA (Water and Power Development Authority) was made

custodian of all resources and emerged as the main operator of the

power sector and major developer of large-scale infrastructure for

irrigation and drainage. Meanwhile, need for a basin level planning

on one hand and local decentralized management on the other

continued to be mentioned by the donors. Pakistan, like other South Asian countries, has experimented with

management changes in the water sector since 1980, but without

much success (Bandaragoda 2003, World Bank 2005). A new and

conceptually different institutional approach was introduced about

ten years ago through participatory irrigation management (PIM).

The Government of Pakistan has now adopted the PIM approach as a

condition laid down by its donors. A seminar on “Participatory

Irrigation Management” was sponsored by the Ministry of Water and

Power and the World Bank's Economic Development Institute (EDI)

in October 1994. This was the first introduction to the concept. The

EDI sponsored another workshop in October 1995, during which

representatives from four provinces agreed on a tentative action

plans for institutional change. The diverse opinions and lukewarm

welcome by water managers led to some pilot projects in selected

locations. After pilot experiments at the district level by the

international research organization, IWMI, in Punjab and Sindh, the

authorities themselves selected larger pilot areas comprising whole

canal commands. The Provincial Irrigation and Power Departments

(PID) have been renamed the Provincial Irrigation and Drainage

Authorities (PIDA Act 1997), but new management pattern is still not

emerged.

The latest priority of the water sector is provision of drinking water

and sanitation to rural and urban population. In the rural areas,

district governments headed by the nazims are responsible for

planning, investment, and control of municipal services, including

4342

water supply, sanitation and solid waste disposal. Principally, the

PHED (Public Health and Engineering Department), which had been

responsible for the development and management of rural water

supply, has been decentralized and placed under the respective

District Coordination Officers. The communities wishing to build a

scheme will form Community Based Organisations (CBO) and

contribute a part of the capital. In the urban areas, Water and

Sanitation Agencies (WASAs) and municipal bodies remain

responsible for the management of water supply and sanitation

services. While many of these are run relatively well, most of them

suffer from inadequate funds due to the way they are financed.

Where unable to raise their own money, WASAs must rely on ad hoc

inputs of money from central government reserves which are

infrequent and inadequate. Hence, most urban water systems are in

a poor state of repair and without any real ability to improve the

situation.

Key Legislation Defining Water Rules and InstitutionsThe Canal and Drainage Act of 1873 is a key piece of legislation

providing rules for irrigation water distribution and conflict

resolution at the user level. The act has been supplemented after

1950 in the areas of drainage, groundwater, agriculture research,

ownership of river water resources, and new institutions. The Punjab

Soil Reclamation Act of 1952 governed the preparation of drainage

schemes and other drainage-related works. The Act was later

extended to cover the whole country.

In 1982, Water User Ordinances were promulgated to enable the

formation of Water User Associations (WUAs) to participate in water

management at the watercourse level. The WUAs made a good start

by participating in the improvement of more than 10,000

watercourses. In several cases, WUAs contributed up to 55 percent of

the cost of civil works for improvement of watercourses both in cash,

kind, and in the form of labour, but these generally became dormant

once the improvement works were completed. In order to introduce

institutional reforms in the irrigation and drainage sector, the

provinces enacted new Acts in 1997. These Acts provide the legal

framework for establishment of Provincial Irrigation and Drainage

Authorities (PIDAs), Area Water Boards (AWBs), and Farmers'

Organizations (FOs).A complete and locally accepted water management model is still far

away (Habib 2005), which is evident from the current efforts of the

Government and difficulties faced in the development, management,

and regulation of water resources. The diversity of provincial water

visions is clear from the ongoing processes. The institutional

hesitation in accepting the current draft water policy and “new

modified assertions” in the World Bank's report of 2005 indicate that

substantial adjustments are expected in water resources

management.

Water Resources of PakistanPakistan has achieved extensive development of its water resources,

supported by highly inter-linked rivers, a widespread canal network,

and extraction of groundwater by the majority of individual farmers.

Reasonably reliable river inflow data are available from 1940. The

estimation of useable, recycle-able groundwater resource remains

tricky. A range of values exists, based on assumed seepage losses,

aquifer changes, or well density. A good water balance within a

spatial boundary needs good information on inflow and outflow

across the boundary, infiltration coefficients, and aquifer changes.

Rainfall in the basin is well monitored for the major areas; however,

volumetric estimates of effective rainfall remain controversial. High

variability of rainfall is one of factors causing uncertainty.

RainfallRainfall data since 1960 are available for 35 MET offices, and even

earlier data for a few big cities. The actual rainfall in the basin varies

widely, both spatially and temporally. The average rainfall varies

from 1,400 mm in the north to less than 100 mm in the south.

However, the measuring consistency of these data are difficult to

ensure. Eighty-five percent of the rainfall collected through PAN is

considered effective by WAPDA consultants (WSIP 1990). The

average, minimum, and maximum amounts of rainfall in the basin

after 1960 are shown in Tables 1 and 2 below. Following the

monsoon pattern, rainfall quantities can vary in the range of 30 maf

to 110 maf.

Table 1: Annual average rainfall in different Provinces in mm Data 1960-2002

Period Punjab NWFP Sindh Balochistan Pakistan April-September 254 308 131 72 158 October-March 79 228 16 63 80 July-September 202 279 109 50 118 Average Annual 333 536 147 135 238

4544

Normally, there is no disagreement on the rainfall measured at a

particular location in millimeters. While, computed volumetric

quantities and effective rainfall from the provincial and basin

boundaries vary widely. A detailed discussion on rainfall estimates

and utilization under different hydrological conditions is beyond the

scope of this paper, but references can be made to detailed studies

carried out at different levels (Waijjne 1996, Kijne.J.W. 96, Habib

2004, Chandio 2003, Bhutta 2004).

Based on different analyses, rainfall's quantitative contribution is

summarized as follows. The agricultural land of 18 million ha in the

Indus Basin uses 8 maf to 22 maf rainfall, which is 40 to 20 percent

of the total rainfall in the basin. The groundwater recharge from the

rainfall is estimated in the range of 15 percent (Habib 2004, Chandio

2004), and 5 maf to 14 maf from dry to wet years. The drainage

component of rainfall in the plains is estimated at 6 maf under

average conditions (WAPDA 1989). A range of 4 maf (dry conditions)

to 18 maf (wet conditions) is calculated by a recent study (Study III

2005, Environmental concerns of all provinces). Estimates also show

that more than 65 percent of the rainfall could be utilized in the

basin for vegetation, groundwater recharge and drainage outflow.

The rest goes to unaccounted water bodies recharge (indirectly used)

and non-beneficial evapotranspiration. The beneficial components of

rainfall reduce with the development of urban centers, infrastructure

and reduction in the size of water bodies. The contribution of rainfall

to groundwater aquifers can substantially increase during a wet spell

followed by a dry period and in areas with declining groundwater.

Surface Water ResourcesThe river inflows of the major rivers of the Indus Basin have been

monitored since 1922 (Ravi, Sutlej, Chenab), 1937 (Jhelum), and

1960 (Indus). The measurements after 1978 represent the existing

system with two big reservoirs. The historical trends indicate the

influence of the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960 and physical changes

carried out during 1960-80. There is a declining trend of river

inflows however, the maximum inflows can be double of the

Table 2: Effective Rainfall in the Indus Basin below RIM stations

Average 1960-90

Average 1965-2004

2001-02

1994-95

Rainfall in millimeters (mm)

304

238

153

553

Rainfall million acre feet (MAF)

61.4

49.5

30

110 Source: Pakistan Metereological (MET) Directorate for the

rainfall measured at 26 satations

minimum (Table 3).

Apart from the Indus Basin, there are two smaller river basins in

Balochistan. The Makran Coastal Basin includes the Dasht, Hingol,

and Porali rivers. These rivers flow southwesterly and discharge into

the Arabian Sea. The closed Kharan Basin comprises the Kharan

Desert and Pishin Basin and includes the Pishin, Mashkhel, and

Baddo rivers which discharge into shallow lakes and ponds that dry

out completely in the hot season. The total inflow of the two basins is

less than 4 MAF (5 BCM) annually. These are flash streams and do

not have a perennial supply. About 25 percent of the inflow is used

for flood irrigation.

Surface Water Allocated and Diverted to CanalsThe monitoring and recording of river diversions to canals is carried

out at all head works from the date they commence operation. The

discharge data recorded in the morning is used by the Irrigation

Departments, IRSA (Indus River System Authority) and WAPDA for

official purposes. Generally, diversion data are accepted as accurate,

but the discharge table is rarely updated and the erratic pattern of

water losses in river reaches has raised doubts about the accuracy of

monitoring data. Recently, a telemetric system was installed to

measure river-flows passing through all river structures, but the

calibration and full operation of this system has yet to be established. Out of a 145 maf average inflow for all rivers after 1978 at the RIM

stations, 114.4 maf is allocated for the expected annual canal

diversions to the four provinces (Water Allocation Accord 1991).

Based on the actual data for 1978-82, a 10-daily flow pattern is

suggested for individual or groups of canals. Only 25 percent of the

time, actual diversions follow proposed pattern of the WAA. These

diversions are constrained by river inflows and reservoir storages,

while the capacity of the canals is much greater. Average diversions

from 1978-2004 were 101.6 maf. The peak diversions of 111 maf

Table 3: Rivers Inflow Pattern after 1940 in MAF

Period for Averages Western Rivers Eastern Rivers Indus Rivers

1940 – 1978 139.38 22.54 161.92 1978 – 2004 137.74 7.39 145.1 1999 – 2004 115.39 1.42 116.8

Max year inflow 186.79 32.78 209.5 Min year inflow 99.99 0.90 101.1

4746

occurred in 1996 with a supportive inflow pattern and maximum

storage. After the completion of three on-going canal projects, 3 maf

additional canal supplies are expected.

The average outflow at the last barrage on the Indus, Kotri, is 33.8

maf (1978-2004). Natural uses of this water along the rivers are not

formally accounted for, including diversions to lakes, aquatic and

ecological systems, depending upon river flow and vegetation directly

supported by the rivers. A conservative estimate of these uses is

between 5 to 10 maf (Study III Volume 1). The groundwater excess

pumpage can be up to 15 maf during a dry year (2000-01), which is

not easy to replenish in a wet year (1994-95).

Groundwater Resources The groundwater aquifer in the sweet zone of the Indus Basin is a

reliable and rechargeable secondary source. It has played a major

role in providing extended water access outside the canal irrigated

areas. Fresh shallow groundwater has been used for centuries for

domestic and animal consumption, but the last two decades have

seen the extensive development of shallow tubewells operated by

Table 4: Provincial canal allocation 1991 and average post Tarbela Diversions Allocation WAA Diversions Average 1976-2004 (MAF) Kharif Rabi Annual Kharif Rabi Annual

Punjab 37.07 18.87 55.95 33.49 19.04 52.54 Sindh 33.94 14.82 48.76 28.94 14.22 43.15 NWFP 3.48 2.30 5.78 2.36 1.52 3.87

Balochistan 2.85 1.07 3.92 1.22 0.82 2.02 Sum 77.34 37.06 114.41 66.01

35.6

101.58

Table 5: The maximum and minimum canal diversions between 1978 to 2005 - MAF

Diversions Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan Gross diversions

Maximum 58.20 50.01 6.11 3.17 111.11

Minimum 37.06 31.57 2.91 1.32 77.26

Table 6: Water Balance Summary of the Indus Basin – MAF

Category Average year

1993-94 Wet year 1994-95

Dry Year 2000-01

Total recharge of groundwater aquifer 65.99 72.25 55.1

Total groundwater extraction 67.4 71.13 69.91 Groundwater Balance -1.4 1.1 -14.8

electric, diesel, or mechanical power. The use of groundwater has

become a critical factor in all water use sectors. Shallow aquifers are

tempered in moderate-quality water zones also. Four major

waterlogged areas where deep wells were installed under the Salinity

Control and Reclamation Projects (SCARP) in 1965 are now facing

new threats of irreversible water table depletion.

More than 0.6 million tubewells (NESPAK, World Bank) are

operating in the Indus Basin. The design capacity of deep electric

wells (about 4 percent of the total wells) is 2 to 4 cubic feet per

second (cusec), mostly functioning for city water supply and

industry. Private shallow wells have an average capacity of 1 cusec.

With an average utilization of 8 hours per day and discharge capacity

of 1 cubic feet per second, these wells can pump more than 70 MAF

water. Groundwater pumpage is the most beneficial in non-perennial

canal-irrigated agricultural areas. The areas have higher per hectare

canal supplies in summer, compensating for the winter when

groundwater becomes a primary resource. This water is economically

most beneficial for the farmers and Government because of multi-

cropping and high-value crops.

Groundwater quality has a high dependence on soil type, surface flow

patterns, topography, and irrigation practices. Currently,

groundwater contributes 35 percent of the total water available to

users. The water quality of about 45 percent of the area is marginal to

brackish (World Bank 1997). In the permanent brackish region,

seepage from rivers and canals forms a shallow fresh water layer.

Over-extraction of groundwater and change in water levels can cause

the depletion and rupture of the shallow sweet layer.

Water Demand and Supply GapsIt is normal for projected water demand to be higher than the actual

water supply; the situation becomes serious when supply is less than

the committed allocations and actual demand. Officially, water

shortage is computed against official commitments, while the actual

shortage (from the user's perspective) is the quantity required to

meet existing water needs. With the increase in demand from

different sectors, the targets of the system may become redundant.

Agriculture is the primary water use sector in Pakistan where

demand and use have gone beyond the original planning. Farmers

extract water from aquifers, lakes and ponds, and sometimes directly

4948

from rivers. For water managers, one of the consequences of this

situation can be the gradual irrelevance of monitoring and evaluation

processes. The following sections briefly discuss the current demand-

supply gap with reference to different perspectives.

System Shortages with Respect to CommitmentsTargets set by the Water Allocation Accord of 1991At the basin and provincial levels, WAPDA, IRSA, and the Irrigation

Departments operate to deliver quantitative seasonal allocations

(agreed in the 1991 WAA) to the provinces and operate reservoirs

and link canals to provide the main canals' discharge according to

the 10 daily allocations of the WAA. Below the RIM (rivers inflow

monitoring) stations, average canal diversions are short of about 8

maf annually against an allocation of 111.35 maf. The actual annual

diversions vary from 94 maf to 111 maf with an average of 103.4 maf

(1978-2005). Hence, in a good year, the allocation target is achieved,

while in a worse situation, the target remains short by 22 maf (only

89 maf diversions in 2001). Three non-perennial canal systems

(Katch, Rani and Thal) are under construction, with an allocation of

4 maf. With the completion of these canals, average diversions will

increase, and only during exceptionally low summer flows will these

targets not be achieved. However, average diversions will still remain

within the approved target of 1991.

Targets set at the Design Stage of Canals“Scarcity by design” was the approach adopted in Punjab and

northern India for the development of irrigation. It developed into a

widespread network, low proposed cropping intensities and low

water allowance. The design capacity of the irrigation network was

based on design allocation for summer plus 10 percent to 30 percent

capacity margins. Canal command areas with less reliable flows were

provided with high capacity margins. Because of river flow shortage,

35 percent of the agriculture areas were not entitled to river supplies

in winter, while surplus water could be supplied to these canals on

low priority. The systems in the lower Indus were designed after

1947. Water allowances and canal capacities were kept two to three

times higher than the earlier systems of the Upper Basin.

The water allocations of 1991 acknowledge the fact that available

surface water in summer is less than existing full capacity. About 10

percent more water can be diverted in summer if canals are operated

at the authorized supply. At least another 10 percent can be diverted

by utilizing full canal capacity. The situation in winter is improved, as

25 percent extra water is provided through reservoirs. This situation

clearly shows that temporal water distribution has been improved,

especially in winter, while canals can draw 20 percent more surface

water in summer.

Water Shortage against Actual Agriculture DemandsAll estimates, official and unofficial, indicate shortage and stress with

respect to actual demand. The estimated quantities of present and

future demand vary widely because of different assumptions on

efficiency, recharge, and limitation in accounting for uses. The water

balances carried out in the basin also vary in estimates of rainfall and

groundwater. The National Water Strategy computes existing and future water

requirements to address crop demand while considering population

growth and required agriculture production. For the base scenario of

the year 2000, the estimated 'shortfall' is 12.6 MAF. For the low-

growth scenario, 32 MAF more water will be required in 2010 and 31

MAF in 2025. The Strategy suggests that the canal head

requirements will increase by over 19 MAF by 2010 and remain

around 18 MAF by 2025. This increase will be in the range of

additional requirements. The approach suggests that water equal to

existing shortage should be saved by improving efficiency.

The Framework for Action (FFA) prepared by the Pakistan Water

Partnership (PWP) indicates very high water shortages: 40 MAF in

2010 and 107 MAF in 2015 (Framework for Action 2001). High

estimates are because of 30 percent assumed gross efficiency, low

groundwater potential (15 maf as compared to 45 maf by the national

strategy). The message of this scenario is the extreme possible

situation, if other things remain at their usual level. The water

balances in recent years provide more detailed information. Some

important findings are:

i. At the basin scale, current irrigation shortages are mainly

Table 7: Irrigation Water Shortages in MAF in million acre feet (MAF)

2000/01 2010/11 2024/25

High Demand scenario 12.59 66.64 51.2

Lower demand scenario 12.61 31.93 30.26

5150

outside the canal irrigated areas in summer. Water shortage in

the non-perennial areas during winter is mostly compensated by

groundwater extraction. The saline areas have a high

dependence on river supplies, limited uses of groundwater, and

low final efficiencies.

ii. The areas cropped and partially irrigated outside canals

commands are about 30 percent. The traditional Sailaba

(riverine belt) and Barrani (rain fed) areas are shifting to well

irrigation. Agriculture here depends partly on unauthorized

supplies from water bodies, including rivers. The water needs of

these areas are shown by different studies, especially indicating

provincial water needs; however, they have not been considered

in planning.iii. The existing net water shortage in agriculture is about 10 MAF in

a wet year to 25 MAF in dry year. A wet year may have a gross

excess recharge in the range of 5 MAF and replenish water

bodies. Above-normal summer rains and high river flows are

critical in maintaining sustainable water resources availability. iv. Agriculture water demand is not increasing linearly or as a

function of area because new cropped areas have a bigger share

of the non-irrigated or well-irrigated areas, having a smaller

impact on demand and higher water use efficiency.v. Actual water uses in agriculture will decrease if the present

scenario continues. The surface water availability is already

showing a decreasing trend as the residual flows from the

eastern rivers and existing storage decreases. The shallow

aquifer may drop below the existing pumpage level. Domestic and Industrial SectorsAccording to the National Water Strategy, access to water for

domestic purposes in the urban areas is limited to about 83 percent

Table 8: Estimation of the Crop Water Requirements

of the population. About 57 percent of the people have piped supply

to their homes whereas in other mainly poor areas, people get water

either from community taps, hand pumps, wells or pay a heavy price

to water vendors. The present water use for municipal and industrial

supplies in the urban sector is 4.3 MAF. Most urban water is

supplied through groundwater except for the cities of Karachi and

Hyderabad and part of the supply to Islamabad. Demand is expected

to increase to about 12.1 MAF by the year 2025. The present

domestic water use in rural areas is estimated at 1 MAF. Most rural

water is supplied from groundwater except in saline groundwater

areas where irrigation canals are the main source of domestic water.

Only about 53 percent of the rural population has access to drinking

water from public water supply sources. The remaining population

gets their drinking water supply from streams, canals, ponds or

springs etc. Water consumed by major industries is about 1.2 MAF

(1.45 BCM) per year. Most of the industrial establishments use

groundwater and abstract it at their own expense. It is estimated that

about 0.023 MAF of water is provided to industries through

municipal water supplies.

Environmental NeedsAll Indus Basin rivers are threatened by dryness in their lower

reaches as a result of increased upstream diversions. The gradual

shrinking of rivers reduces the natural recycling process of the flood

plains and water bodies. The rangelands become artificially irrigated,

utilized by the infrastructure, or deserted. The lakes are partially

provided with river supplies through canals. Mostly, these supplies

are at lower priority than irrigation. A serious situation may arise

with the further allocation of river resources without considering

environmental and ecological conditions. As shown in the previous

sections, unallocated uses are also seriously affecting water

availability at spatio-temporal scales. It is further complicated if

international water sharing is involved in ensuring environmental

and drinking water needs. Other than Indus delta, little information is available about river eco-

systems and the impacts of reduced water availability on aquatic life,

water bodies, and morphological changes in the rivers. Recently, a

baseline survey carried out by the Forest Department in Sindh

(Baseline Survey Forest Department 2004) showed more than

41,000 tubewells in the riverine areas. This field situation defies the

5352

forecast as well as riverine area development planning (Vision 2002).

The report also shows an increase in riverine area from 1.1 to 2.04

million ha from 1978 to 2004. The existing water uses of the riverine

area are estimated at more than 2 maf. A recent study by the Federal

Flood Commission Pakistan has suggested flow volume downstream

Kotri as two logical sets, a minimum constant flow of 0.3 MAF each

month and three month average flood of 5 MAF to be achieved over

five years period. This procedure to protect the aquatic life and sea

intrusion is based on assumptions that the lower system will remain

prone to occasional floods.

The dry reaches phenomenon has extended over time span and

across river stretches in the Indus and eastern tributary rivers, Ravi

and Sutlej. The daily river data for a dry year shows nil flows in the

whole year in the tail reaches of the Ravi and Sutlej, and more than

ten months in the tail reach of the Indus. The reduced and nil flows

in the river reaches directly influences aquatic life and natural

vegetation in the riverine (sailaba or kacha) areas. An indirect impact

of these reduced flows is the decrease in groundwater recharge. The

first ever minimum water requirements of the Indus rivers have been

roughly estimated by a preliminary study by the Ministry of Water

and Power (Study III 2005). The study recommends 4 MAF annual

volume as the minimum reach flows; 30 percent of this flow is

expected to be used within river reaches while the rest is conveyed

downstream.

Water Use PerformanceManaging Salinity and Drainage Effluent from Different

Water UsesSalinity and drainage effluent management problems exist side by

side in the saline areas of Pakistan. The constrained drainage intake

potential of rivers and water bodies and high effluent generation

from irrigation in the saline lower Indus are the processes that need

to be managed. The irrigation schemes in the Indus basin were not

supported by a drainage infrastructure and low lying rivers were

supposed to collect all excessive runoff. A part of the summer floods

were stored in flood plains that had a low level of human activity, and

recollected in the rivers when ground water levels dropped,

supporting sub-surface water movement. This process is greatly

disturbed by extensive activity along the rivers, by agriculture,

industry and infrastructure. During early periods, irrigation sector

also practiced control by reducing supplies to the waterlogged areas.

The practice is not expected to be revised because of increased

intensities of high water use crops in saline areas. However, the

drainage situation is different in the sweet and moderately useable

aquifer zones, because of extensive use of groundwater. The SCARP

(Salinity Control and Reclamation Project) schemes implemented

between 1965 and 2004 have been windup in these areas.

The drainage problem in saline zones has yet to be solved. These

areas are now permanently waterlogged because of their flat natural

slopes and very high water tables. An annual drainage effluent

surplus of about 18 MAF is generated in the saline zone (Habib

2004), of which, only a fraction enters the rivers and two outfall

drains, while the rest remains in the high aquifer and evaporates

from the soil surface because of high temperatures and nominal

groundwater contribution. Two big surface drainage projects on the

left bank outfall drain and right bank outfall drains were started as a

part of a major interlinked drainage system, but could not be

finalized as envisaged. According to the National Drainage Program

(NDP); “major issues to be addressed are reducing the drainable

surplus dramatically and permanently at source, and providing the

Indus Basin Irrigation System with a permanent outlet to the sea to

dispose off the drainable surplus”.

The permanently saline areas of Pakistan lie mostly in Sindh and

Balochistan. A detailed salinity survey was carried out by WAPDA

during 1977-79, covering a 16.5 mha gross canal command area in

the Indus Basin (Table 9). The water samples were taken from a

depth of 4 to 5 m. Based on the salinity analysis (Table 9), about 14

percent of the area (2.4 mha) was declared as moderately saline but

useable for agriculture, and 39 percent identified as severely saline

with groundwater not usable for agriculture. In the saline area, 11

percent of the soil profile was saline and 27 percent were saline-sodic

and sodic. The Soil Survey of Pakistan also conducted a detailed

survey of about 6 mha salt-affected soils. The saline and saline-sodic

soils were 11 and 86 percent, respectively. Both these surveys

indicated that saline-sodic soils shared the major proportion of salt-

affected soils. The saline zone was grossly waterlogged.

Irrigation and Agriculture PerformanceThe poor performance of the irrigation network and irrigated

5554

agriculture is widely discussed and criticized. The country has

invested heavily in projects to improve efficiency at the farm and

main network levels through on-farm water management and lining

projects. An analysis of the actual impact of these schemes is out of

scope here, but remains an issue of the national concern. This section

discusses some recent performance estimates to highlight the nature

of performance issues.

Field Efficiency The conveyance efficiency of irrigation systems in Pakistan is

reported to have decreased between 1970 and 1995, as there was an

increase in seepage losses. Basin-level projects, the Revised Action

Plan of 1978, and the Water Sector Investment Planning Study of

1991 reported a 100 percent increase in losses from the irrigation

network as compared to the design estimates. Limited field

measurements based on the monitoring of low-performing system

during the 1980s and 1990s imparted a bias to these “efficiency

projections” (Habib 2004). Lieftlick (1965) and earlier studies measured 20 percent water loss in

the main and secondary canals and another 20 percent loss in the

watercourses of Punjab. The measured losses were even low in Sindh

(LIP 1967) due to high groundwater levels. The accumulated losses

from the main canal to field level were estimated at 36 percent in the

sweet zone and 25 percent in the saline zone, field efficiency was

taken at 70 percent. With these assumptions, 45 to 52 percent of

surface delivery was supposed to reach crops. In 1978, measured

watercourse and main canal losses varied across a huge range. The

average conveyance efficiency from the main canal to the

watercourse tail was estimated at 37 percent, and 40 percent for

sweet and saline areas. This means that, at 70 percent field

efficiency, only 25 to 28 percent of the water diverted to a canal could

Table 9: Irrigated Area Within Different Ranges of Groundwater Salinity in Mha

Fresh Zone

Moderate quality zone

Saline ZoneCanal

Commands

Gross Area

<1500 ppm

1500-3000 ppm

>3000 ppm

Percentage

Punjab

9.84

6.83

1.33

1.67

17 percent

NWFP

0.40

0.35

0.50

-

Sindh

6.24

0.94

0.55

4.74

76 percent

Balochistan

Total

16.5

8.1

2.4

6.4

39 percentSource: Water Sector Investment Planning Study WAPDA (1990)

be used for crops. This low average efficiency is continued to be

reported in development projects and in recent debate on reservoirs.

It is important to mention that primary data collected by research

organizations have shown much lower water losses at the primary

and tertiary levels (IIMI 1993, ISRIP 1994, IWASRI 1994, Wijjen

1995, Wolter 1998, Kuper 1998, Habib 1998). Based on an extensive

review of water loss measurements, Habib 2004 compiled much

higher conveyance efficiencies, showing that more than 40 percent of

the diversions could be used by crops and field vegetation.

Impact of Groundwater Pumpage on Net Water Use

EfficienciesGroundwater pumpage has become an essential practice in areas

with good and moderate quality water. It is increasingly pumped in

the riverine areas of the saline belt. The useable water quality

standards set in 1970 for electrical conductivity (EC), and sodium

absorption ratio (SAR) were revised in 1991 by WAPDA to

accommodate well growth in the areas earlier considered unusable.

The recent drought of 2000-03 has shown groundwater use

surpassing new standards. Poor-quality groundwater is mixed with

canal flows wherever possible and used without mixing when canal

water is not available. High and continuous groundwater extraction has generated a cyclical

recharge-discharge process and enhanced final water use efficiencies.

The impact of groundwater can be understood from its contribution

to actual uses, from irrigation to the domestic sector. About 20

percent of irrigated areas depend solely on groundwater in winter.

About 6 million ha or 60 percent of the canal-irrigated areas in

Punjab receive 50 percent of the supplies at the farm level from

groundwater. One-fourth of canal areas (2 to 3 million ha) use

groundwater during the kharif season up to 40 percent. A recent

analysis based on a complete water balance computes fairly high net

water use efficiency at the secondary and main canal levels. A

comparative study (Molden 2001) from three South Asian districts in

Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka showed the efficiency of using water

beneficially is 90 percent in the Chishtian district of Pakistan as

compared to 85 percent in Hakra, India, and 60 percent in Sri Lanka. The water use quantities created through a groundwater recycling

process introduce a secondary efficiency factor in the system. If 60 to

5756

70 percent of the system losses enter the ground and are pumped

back, the net water use efficiency increases to almost equal that of

primary efficiency. The strongest quality of groundwater for farmers

is its reliable access (Habib 2004): lCash crop areas with low or non-perennial canal supplies have a

high dependence on groundwater to support high cropping

intensities. Extensive perennial cropping and groundwater

mining in the cotton-wheat zone of southern Punjab and the

mixed crop zone of northern Punjab has resulted in a negative

recharge-discharge relationship and gradual depletion of

groundwater. lAreas with high rainfall are becoming intensively well-irrigated.

Recharge from rainfall has apparently enhanced with higher

extraction of groundwater aquifers. A consequence is decreased

drainage contribution from the catchment and decrease in river

gains. lVery high well density in the sweet zone (more than half a

million tubewells) is also linked to the small farm sizes. An

individual ownership of tubewells provides reliable water access. Yield of Major Crops The average yield of all major crops in Pakistan is lower than their

claimed potential (RAP 1978, WSIPS 1991). The national average

yield of the major crops does not indicate a progressive tend. Only

the cotton yield reached the internationally competitive level in 1991,

but the next year, declined to the level it had been in 1985 and

remains there with small fluctuations. Rice yield is generally low in

Pakistan. Wheat and sugarcane have shown an increase, however are

still lower than the potential level. The figure and table show the

yield of major crops in Pakistan after 1970. Agricultural production analyses by different studies identify a

number of yield constraints. Reliable water access has remained an

Pakistan Average Yield Max. Farm level

Crop Avg. 1994-04 Max annual Yield / ha

Kg/ha Kg/ha year Kg/ha

Cotton 576 769 1991

Wheat 2240 2491 2001 7000

Sugarcane 47166 50281 1997

Rice 1901 2050 1999

important factor in agricultural output. The availability of

groundwater has a clear impact on all crops. The gross water use and

crop yields are directly proportional, tubewell owners having a

higher yield, especially in wheat producing areas (Habib 2004,

Zubair, Habib 2001). Tail-end farmers and saline areas have lower

yields (WB 2006), because of the fresh-water shortage.

The relationship between landholding size and the average yield has

shifted with time. During the 1970s, small farms were producing

high gross values (RAP 1978), but during the 1990s (Zubair, Habib

2001) medium farmers were performing best due to the following

factors.

lThese farms can mobilize resources and better invest in

agriculture. lMid-level owners depend on the farm economy and are better

aware of technology improvements. To maximize their income,

these farms try to increase cropping intensities and link it with

the local market.lA high percentage of medium-level farms are managed by the

owners themselves or partly with share croppers. Owner-

cultivated farms have the maximum gross value returns

(Strosser 1997).

With mechanization, large farm can fully utilize their resources,

while, very large farms tend to crop only a part of the land. These

farms have dozens of share croppers and limited investments by

them. A cumulative impact of farm level variations of different inputs

and constraints can influence production to vary in a wide range. The

average production of low quartile is only 10 percent to the 30

Average National Yield of Major Crops

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

1971

-72

1973

-74

1975

-76

1977

-78

1979

-80

1981

-82

1983

-84

1985

-86

1987

-88

1989

-90

1991

-92

1993

-94

1995

-96

1997

-98

1999

-00

2001

-02

2003

-04

wh

eat,

rice

,co

tto

n(l

int)

kg/h

a

30000

35000

40000

45000

50000

55000

Su

gar

can

ein

kg/h

a

Wheat Rice Cotton Sugarcane

Table 10: Average yield of Major Crops

5958

percent of the top quartile for the major crops. The lower investment

potential and cost benefit ratio of Pakistan's agriculture is also linked

with a sharp decrease in subsidies from the Government. The latest

World Bank report (WB 2005) appreciates the agriculture sector of

Pakistan for being able to avoid the “subsidies trap” as a hopeful

factor. However, due to high cost of groundwater pumpage,

pesticides, seeds and fertilizers, inputs are expensive and farmers

tend to use lower quantities of inputs. The low investment potential

is a major factor prohibiting farmers to shift to high quality inputs

and divert from the traditional agriculture.

During the last ten years, wheat, rice and cotton have experienced a

“high production crises”. Apparently farmers cannot increase

national wheat yield to the level of 2.5 tons/ha without a decline of

prices and risk of delayed selling. Not only that, Government is either

failing to manage a good crop or the risk of grain shortage. Pakistan's

access to the wheat market is limited for imports. The local storage of

wheat is also limited, this year local official purchase of wheat was

delayed because storage was already utilized by the imported wheat.

The same happens with cotton. Hence, a good crop can not

guarantee good returns for farmers. The local and international

markets dynamics are mostly not in favor of farmers.

Trans-boundary PerspectivesAt Independence in 1947, the international boundary between India

and West Pakistan cut the irrigation system of the Bari Doab and

Sutlej Valley Project, originally designed as one scheme, into two

parts. The headwork fell to India while the rivers and canals ran

through Pakistan. In 1948, India stopped water supply to the canals

supported by the Ravi River. India's argument was proprietary

ownership of the land and water within its territorial boundaries. A

temporary agreement was reached between the two nations - the

Inter-Dominion Accord of May 4, 1948. This accord required India to

release sufficient waters to the Pakistani regions of the basin in

return for annual payments from the Government of Pakistan.

Pakistan claims historical water rights to all rivers, but supplies from

the eastern rivers, Ravi and Sutlej, can be stopped at any time. The

agricultural areas fed by these two rivers were the most fertile in

West Punjab, comprising one-third of the total irrigated land. In

1951, the World Bank mediated and proposed joint operation of the

basin, which was rejected by both countries.

The negotiations continued for nine years. Finally, the Indus Waters

Treaty was signed between Pakistan and India in 1960. According to

this agreement, the flows of the three western rivers of the Indus

Basin - the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab (except a small quantity used

in Kashmir) - were assigned to Pakistan, whereas the entire flow of

the three eastern rivers Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej were exclusively given

to India. India was also allowed to use the western rivers for

hydropower generation, on the condition that the use remained non-

consumptive and flow quantities entering into Pakistan were not

reduced. The Indus River Commissions were formed in both

countries to supervise and implement the treaty. Pakistan can object

to a project on the western rivers and can request the World Bank to

appoint an independent inquiry commission. Both countries started

developing infrastructure and reservoirs, Pakistan to divert western

river flow to the eastern rivers command area and India to store the

full flows of the Ravi and Sutlej. The reservoirs and link canals built

in Pakistan provided a boost to agriculture by increasing water

reliability and winter supplies to the irrigated areas.

India has built reservoirs, power plants, and infrastructure for new

irrigation and power supply to Rajhastan, Himachal Pradesh,

Punjab, Haryana and Delhi. The development on the eastern front

has required the full exploitation of the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej rivers.

India is now building supply schemes and power stations on the

Chenab, Jhelum and Indus tributaries. Both countries have operated

within the framework of the Treaty for over four decades. However,

India's extensive planning on the upstream catchments of the

western rivers and Pakistan's increasing water stress are likely to

pose serious challenges to the IWT. The Salal and Baglihar Hydro

Electric Project, and Kishan Ganga project have either been

completed or are in progress. Pakistan has raised objections to each

major project. In 1960, the Treaty did not consider and plan beyond

the agriculture water needs of the three eastern rivers (Ravi, Sutlej

and Beas) basins. For irrigation canals, water is transferred from the

Western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) through link canals.

While, no commitments are made for the environmental water

needs, rivers ecology, wetlands and local uses along the rivers. Water

stress on both sides of the border set the perspectives of future

disagreements:

lThe hydropower potential available in the upper catchments of

6160

the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) on the Indian

side and domestic as well as industrial needs may impel India to

use water of these rivers. The technical issue of “changes in river

regime” can emerge in a more complex way, requiring further

arbitration by the World Bank.lThe impact of gradual death of the eastern rivers was apparently

unforeseen. In addition, post-treaty Indus works compensated

for the irrigation diversions from the eastern rivers by

transferring water from the western rivers, but, totally ignoring

the drinking and other needs of the centuries-old populated

catchments, where the groundwater is brackish in huge areas

and rainfall very low. Riparian non-agriculture water needs and

a gross scarcity of fresh water in the southern areas will put high

stress on water management in Pakistan, questioning the logic

of an “administrative treaty”.

Dr Zaigham Habib is a Lahore-based consultant on water issues;

her doctoral thesis focused on the Indus basin irrigation system.

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in Sustainable Irrigated Agriculture: An interpretive precis of the case of

Pakistan. International Irrigation Management Institute, Colombo, Sri

Lanka.lBandaragoda, D. J. (1999). Institutional Change and Shared Management of

Water Resources in Large Canal Systems:lChandio, B. A. 2002, Water a vehicle for food security and development of

Pakistan, world water vision, water for food and rural development PCRWR

contribution to PWP Islamabad. 12 Pages.lFAO, 1998. Crop Evapotranspiration, Guidelines for Computing Crop Water

Requirements. Paper no. 56. FAO Rome.lFAO, 2004, Irrigation in Asia in Figures, Water Report 18, FAO, Rome Italy.lHabib Z., 2004, Scope for Reallocation of River Waters in the Indus Basin,

22nd September 2004, ENGREF Montpellier FrancelHunting Technical Services Ltd and Sir M. MacDonald & Partners

(HTS/MMP). 1965. Lower Indus Report, Physical Resources-Groundwater,

Volume 6, Supplement 6.1.3, 4 & 5. West Pakistan Water and Power

Development Authority.lIndus Waters Treaty. September 1960. Signed by Shri Jawaharlal Nehru,

Prime Minister of India andlMichel Arthur Alloy, The Indus Rivers A study on the effects of Partition,

(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 594.lNational Water Strategy. 2003. Pakistan Water Gateway.

http://www.waterinfo.net.pk/lPNC The Pakistan National Conservation Strategy 1998. Where we are,

where we should be and how to get there. Environment and Urban Affairs

Division GOP and IUCN. Islamabad. lPPSGDP, 2000. Institutional Framework for groundwater management and

regulation in Punjab. Technical report No. 38. Punjab Private sector

Groundwater Development Project Consultants. Lahore. PakistanlPunjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority. 1999. Pilot Farmers

Organizations Rules. Government of Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan.lPWP - Pakistan Water Partnership. 2001.The framework for action (FFA) for

achieving the Pakistan water vision 2025, civil society response to FFA.

PWP. 638 WAPDA House, The Mall Lahore, Pakistan.lReview Division, Water and Power Development Authority, Lahore,

Pakistan.lShams ul Mulk, 1993. Water resources management, Pakistan experience.

First International Conference “Valuing the water”, Washington DC, USA. lSiddiqi M.H. 1994. Pakistan's irrigation system. Selected proceedings of the

second international network meeting on information techniques for

irrigation systems, Lahore, Pakistan.lSindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority 1999. Regulations to provide for the

organisation and functioning of Area Water Boards, Farmers Organisations

and Watercourse Associations in the Province of Sindh. Hyderabad, Sindh.lSir M.MacDonald & Partners and Hunting Technical Services (MMP/HTS)

Ltd, 1984, Left Bank Outfall Drain Stage I Project Preparation, Groundwater

and Tubewell Drainage, Water and Power Development Authority, Pakistan.lThe Canal and Drainage Act 1873 with Additions of Punjab Minor Act 1905,

Sindh Irrigation Act 1879, Soil Reclamation Act (for whole Pakistan) 1952,

Mnasoor Book house Katchry Road LahorelWAPDA - Water and Power Development Authority. 1996. PC-I Form

(Second Revision)-Left Bank Outfall Drain Stage I Umbrella Project

(component projects), Integrated Management Organization (IMO) LBOD

WAPDA, Hyderabad, Pakistan.lWAPDA - Water and Power Development Authority. Water resources

hydropower development Vision 2025. WAPDA House Lahore. 31 p.lWAPDA. 1979. Soil Salinity and Waterlogged Soils. Atlas Master Planning

and Review Division, WAPDA, Lahore.lWater and Power Development Authority (1979). Revised action program for

irrigated agriculture, Vol I. Master Planning andlWater Sector Investment Plan (1990). Water sector investment plan

(19902000). Federal Planning Cell, Lahore, Pakistan.lWorld Bank (1994). Pakistan's Irrigation And Drainage: Issues and Options.

Report No. 11884-Pak. The World Bank, Washington DC. Michel Arthur

Alloy, The Indus Rivers A study on the effects of Partition, (New Haven and

London: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 594.lWorld Bank, 1996, National Drainage Program (NDP) Project, Stall

Appraisal Report (Book 1, Book 2). Agriculture and Natural Resources

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Programme. Rural Development Sector Management Unit, South Asia

Region

6362

Nepal's National Water Plan and

Regional IssuesDr. Bishnu Hari Nepal

emmed between the two largest populations of the world

China and India, Nepal is a tiny country. But it is a world

water power. Nepal has four major river systems, namely: HMahakali, Karnali, Narayani (Gandaki) and Saptakoshi, which

originate from the high Himalayas and cut through the mountain

ranges to form deep river valleys.

Medium-sized rivers like Kankai, Kamala, Bagmati, West Rapti and

Babai originate from the Mahabharata Range. Rivers originating

from Shivalik Range and flowing to the country's south, contain less

water during the dry season, but can create havoc due to floods

during the monsoon. Undoubtedly, the source of the medium- and

small-sized rivers too is the Himalayas but indirect.

Rivers thus form an average annual runoff water of about 225 BCM

(Billion Cubic Meters). This is considerably a large volume of water

flowing every year from the four river systems of Nepal to the Ganges

of India and then to the Bay of Bengal.

Nepal's hydropower generation capacity is 83,000 MW, largest after

Brazil. Out of this huge capacity, it is estimated that some 42,000

MW to 50,000 MW is financially and technically viable. The

Himalayas is the greatest boon to South Asia, in general, and for

Nepal, in particular. Out of 2500km long and 300km wide

Himalayan Range, 800km long area is covered by Nepal. Nepal thus

deserves to be a “water power” of the world because it occupies

nearly one-third length of the total Himalayas. The Himalayas is the

world's fifth largest fresh water treasure with nearly 5000 cubic KMs

ice and snow after Antarctica, the Arctic islands, Greenland and

Alaska.

Out of 194,471 sq. km drainage area, 76 per cent falls in Nepal.

(Nepal: 2004). The Karnali, Sapta Gandaki and Sapta Koshi, all

trans-Himalayan rivers flowing through Nepal, contribute 71 per cent

of the dry season flows and 41 per cent of the annual flows of the

Ganges. So, there are great repercussions of the Nepalese Water

Management Plans and Actions for the Indian River Linking Project,

officially introduced in 2002 by India, and Bangladesh sub-

regionally and matters relating to the integrated statutes for

Pakistan, Bhutan and China as riparian countries in the region as a

whole.

Nepal's Surface Water Resources Capacity KOSHI RIVER BASIN: Nepal's largest river basin is the Koshi River

Basin covering catchment-area of 60,400 sq. km., out of which 46

per cent i.e. 27, 863 sq. km. lies in Nepal. The rest is occupied by

Tibet, China. In Nepal, out of seven; Sunkoshi, Tamakoshi, Arun and

Tamur are the major tributaries of the Saptakoshi River Basin. The

average annual runoff (discharge) of Saptakoshi at Chatara is around

1,409 CM/S (Cubic Meters per Second) i.e. 45 BCM per annum.

NARAYANI RIVER BASIN: The total catchment-area of the Narayai

River Basin is 34,960 sq. km. and nearly 90 per cent of the total

catchment-area falls in the Nepalese territory. Trishuli, Budhi

Gandaki, Marsyangdi, Seti and Kaligandaki are the major tributaries

of the Narayani River Basin. Some 1600 CM/S i.e. nearly 50 BCM

per annum is regarded as the runoff rate of the Narayani River Basin

at Narayanghat, Chitwan.

KARNALI RIVER BASIN: The origin of Karnali River is the south of

Mansarovar and Rokas lakes of Tibet, China. The total catchment-

area of Karnali River at Chisapani is 43,679 sq. km. and 94 per cent

of the total catchment-area falls in Nepal. The major tributaries of

Karnali River Basin are: West Seti, Bheri, Humla Karnali, Mugu

Karnali, Singa Tila, Lohare and Thuli Gad. The average rate of

annual runoff of the Karnali River Basin is 1,397 CM/S i.e. 44 BCM

per annum.

6564

MAHAKALI RIVER BASIN: Earlier, there was a reading that

Mahakali River, on the western border with India, belonged to Nepal

alone. During post-1990 interim government, KP Bhattarai, as an

interim prime minister of Nepal announced that Mahakali was the

common river of Nepal and India. But two Nepalese villages named

Chandani and Dodhara are located across the Mahakali River.

Neglecting this truth, with an understanding for managing the

precious water of the Mahakali River, Nepal and India signed the

popular Mahakali Treaty in 1996.

Due to major differences, the Detailed Project Report (DPR) has not

been finalized yet though it was to be prepared within six months of

the agreement. There are differences over the source of the Mahakali

River and the installations of the Indian army at Kalapani since 1960

when the late King Mahendra sacked the first elected government led

by late B.P. Koirala and dissolved the first democratically elected

parliament of Nepal. Instead, the father of the present king

introduced non-party Panchayat system. Two years later, in 1962, a

major war between India and China broke out. So Mahakali River

Basin serves India's water and security interests.

Therefore, the Mahakali River Basin has remained a very sensitive

zone between Nepal and India. The Tanakpur Agreement of 1991

done by Girija Prasad Koirala, the first and longest ruling Prime

Minister of Nepal during post-1990 governments created great havoc

in the country. Later in 1996, it had to be amended by the popular

Mahakali Treaty.

This Treaty also could not remain exceptional. There is a saying in

Nepali that it also could not remain- paani maathiko obhaano

meaning remaining dry while lying on water! Because of the

Mahakali Treaty of 1996, then largest party in the Parliament- the

CPN-UML was broken. The result was that the best opportunity for

the CPN-UML to form government with absolute majority was lost.

Therefore, the Mahakali River Basin has remained a very sensitive

area not only due to potential water sharing but also because of

politics.

The Government of Nepal says that Api Himal is the origin of the

Mahakali River. The total catchment area of the Mahakali River

Basin is 15,260 sq. km. and 34 per cent of the total catchment area

falls under the Nepalese territory.

MEDIUM RIVER BASINS: Some rivers originate from the

Mahabharat Range of the mountains. They are Kankai, Kamala,

Bagmati, West Rapti and Babai. They are not very forceful during the

dry season. These rivers are also perennial, with groundwater and

springs sustaining the river-flow during the dry period. They are but

mostly primary and rain-fed. The total catchment area of these rivers

is around 17,00 sq. km. and the average combined runoff at various

gauging stations is 461 CM/S i.e. 14.5 BCM per annum.

SOUTHERN OR SHIVALIK RIVER BASINS: The origin of this class

of the rivers is the Shivalik mountain ranges mostly in the southern

part after the Mahabharat Range in Nepal. The rivers during the dry

season are mostly dry but in the monsoon these rivers also swell to a

considerable level and are able to do harm in the riparian belts. The

government of Nepal has numbered them to be 73 in major

categories and they have been divided into 8 groups, each between a

basin covered by large and medium rivers. The total catchment area

is supposed to be 23,150 sq. km. and the combined runoff capacity is

1,682 CM/S, i.e., 53.0 BCM per annum. These rivers are used for

supplementary seasonal irrigation by the small-scale-farmers

extensively under the Small Scale Farmers-Managed Irrigation

Schemes (FMIS).

Groundwater Resources CapacityNepal's southern belt Terai's hydro-geological mapping indicates that

this sector has a tremendous potential of groundwater resources. The

thick sequence of saturated sediments of alluvial and colluvial origin

represents as one of the most productive aquifers in the

subcontinent. It is regarded that the erosion of the Shivalik Hills and

the outwash fans of rivers form the northern-most Bhabar Zone. The

government says the aquifers are unconfined and sediments being of

coarse materials have very high permeability in the range of 100-150

meters per day and thus the Bhabar Zone is considered to be the

main source of recharge for the Terai Groundwater (NWP: 2005).

The NWP further states that the groundwater re-charge at specific

areas is estimated to be as high as 600mm per annum. However, it is

assumed that overall 450mm is recoverable re-charge figure for all of

the Terai region and inner Terai areas such as Chitwan, Dang and

6766

Surkhet are also estimated to hold good groundwater potential. The

government assessment of rechargeable groundwater in the Terai

region is between 5.8 BCM and 11.5 BCM per annum.

Annual withdrawal of groundwater for different purposes in the

Terai region is 1.04 BCM, which is nearly 20 per cent of the

minimum possible re-charge estimate of 5.80 BCM. Contrary to it,

the Kathmandu Valley is already in an alarming situation, because

present estimation of annual abstraction is 23.4 MCM (Million Cubic

Meters), much greater than the maximum recharge estimate of 14.6

MCM (Nepal: 2005). Anyhow, the conclusion of the research based

on the justifications shows that Nepal is a country of waterpower in

the region if managed properly.

Achievements Out of 225 BCM annual availability of its water flow, Nepal is using

only a minimal amount; nearly 15 BCM annually. The rest is wasted.

The world normally cites Nepal as a country of “white gold”, “white

gem”, and “hydro-dollar” out of its 83,000 MW capacity, Nepal is

producing 606 MW hydroelectricity only, nearly 1.6 per cent of the

capacity that too only after the completion of Kali Gandaki-A last

year with the production of 144 MW by the support of the

government of Japan and Asian Development Bank. This is Nepal's

largest single project so far not only in the history of hydropower

projects after failed Arun-3 but also in terms of any development

projects of Nepal.

ON DRINKING WATER: Nepal government claims it is providing

potable pure drinking water to some 71-72 per cent of the people. But

many water experts have reservations. Nepal's southern Terai belt is

inhabited by more than half of the country's population. More than

95 per cent of the people there use groundwater through tube-wells

pumping from 20-100 feet deep. Nearly 800,000 tube-wells are in

the Terai region, out of which only 30,000 tube-wells have been

tested for arsenic. In some 2000 tube-wells arsenic content was

discovered.

The WHO standard for drinkable water is up to 10 micro-gm of

arsenic content per liter. But India and Bangladesh have also

accepted 50 as the upward margin. In Nepal's districts like Nawal

Parasi, Siraha, Kailali and Rautahat nearly 30, 18, 15 and 8 per cent

tube-wells respectively contain arsenic above Nepalese standard of

50 micro gm per liter. (see Nepal: 2005).

Nepal's capital Kathmandu is not an exception in problems regarding

supplying safe and sufficient drinking water to its city dwellers. Out

of Kathmandu's demand of estimated 31-cr-liter per day, so far the

Drinking Water Corporation of Nepal is able to supply estimated 11-

cr-liter only. Hence, Kathmandu badly needs sustainable water

supply plan and projects. There are three major projects where Nepal

has completed certain degree of feasibility studies. They are: Kodku

Khola Drinking Project, Roshi Khola Drinking Water Project and

Melamchi Drinking Water Project. Among the three, the last one is

the biggest.

In 1995, the CPN-UML government, considering the Melamchi

Project very large and difficult to accumulate huge budget

immediately, had given a priority to Kodku Khola Drinking Water

Project, which needed to construct a dam for the storage of water in

two years. As an Ambassador of Nepal to Japan I was involved in

convincing the government of Japan for ODA to implement the

project. The agreement was almost finalized, but the CPN-UML

government collapsed and the new Nepali Congress-RPP

government gave a priority to Melamchi Drinking Water Project

under the multi-national cooperation including Japan. So the

proposed Kodku Khola project remained pending.

Water has always played a crucial role in Nepal's politics. The work

on the Melamchi Drinking Water Project had started when on

February 1, 2005 the king sacked prime minister Sher Bahadur

Deuba government.

Now Deuba and his local development minister Prakash Man Singh

face jail on the charge of malpractices in honoring the construction of

the Melamchi Drinking Water Project. Thus the urban water supply

system is disturbed and is not satisfactory. The latest National Water

Plan states that in the rural areas, the government policy has been to

hand over management of the Department of Water Supply and

Sewerage (DWSS)-built systems to the communities and planning to

rehabilitate and upgrade more than 500 such schemes and hand

them over to the communities for operation and maintenance (O &

M) (NWP: 2005, p.4).

6968

ON IRRIGATION: According to the latest statistics, Nepal has 2.64

million ha of cultivable land and 66 per cent of this land, i.e., 1.76

million ha, is irrigable and around 60 per cent of the irrigable land

has some kind of irrigation facility, and less than one-third has

round-the-year irrigation. Agricultural production in 2003 was 7.2

million tons, just meeting the minimum requirement of the nation's

edible grains. Out of this, only 3.3 million tons were from the

irrigated agriculture (Ibid, p.5).

In 2000 the government stopped giving subsidy on shallow tube-

wells and continued subsidy on deeper tube-wells. The deep tube-

wells irrigating 30-40 hectares of land are found quite useful in

Nepal. Experts joke in Nepal that on the one hand Nepal is striving

hard to provide irrigation facilities to its farmers through traditional

methods but on the other hand India irrigates nearly 1.7 million ha

land from the Sharada Barrage (constructed after Agreement with

Nepal in late 1920s) alone!

Nepal gives a top priority to Pancheswar Multi-purpose Project,

Shikta (Banke), Babai (Bardiya), Kankai Multi-purpose Project,

Bagmati and Kamala irrigation projects. They all serve five sub-

basins of India.

More than 70 per cent of the country's irrigated area falls under

Farmer Managed Irrigation Systems (FMISs) and in the remaining

areas, some systems are being transferred wholly to the Water Users

Association (WUA). Some of them are jointly managed by the

government and the WUAs. The government has accepted that the

community-managed systems are better than the government-

managed projects.

HMG/Nepal seems interested in starting Shikta Irrigation Project in

phases after nearly 25 years. Due to India's direct intervention, Nepal

could not enhance this project. On India's opposition the Asian

Development Bank stopped financing the project. The same

happened to Saudi Fund (NRS 26 cr.) and the European Union (NRs

8.00 billion). But now Nepal may do it alone. The major canal would

be 9km long and 33 km feeder canals would irrigate 34, 270 ha of dry

land in 39 VDCs east of Banke District via Nepalgunj Municipality.

The inflow capacity is estimated to be 24 cubic metre per second and

the dam is expected to be 372 metre over Rapti River with a concrete

bridge over it. The project is estimated to cost nearly NRs 8.00

billion.

ON ENERGY CONSUMPTION PATTERN: Nearly 40 per cent of the

households use electricity generated from different systems including

hydropower. But the energy needs met from fuel-wood, agricultural

waste and animal-dung are 88.64 per cent, from hydro-electricity

1.66 per cent, from renewable energy resources 0.52 percent and

from fossil fuel (petroleum and coal) 11.18 per cent of the energy

consumption.

ON HYDROPWER: Due to lack of funds and firm policy, Nepal has

not been able to benefit from the vast power generation capacity

properly. India, the largest buyer for Nepal, too, should sincerely

realize its need of electricity for rural electrification. One estimate

shows that Indian State of Uttar Pradesh alone needs 20,000 MW of

electricity in the coming decade. Therefore, these two countries need

to assess production, demand and supply properly. Nepal's

production so far is minimal and the country needs more than

$80.00 billion to increase it.

Nepal's private sector or community supply share to the national

hydroelectricity capacity is 17per cent. To attract micro

hydroelectricity production the government has exempted the

production of up to one MW from tax and license. Simply the

producer needs to register the scheme with the district

administration office. This has been very attractive scheme in the

mountainous and rural areas improving the living standard of the

people.

The Integrated Nepal Power System (INPS) manages medium-scale

production and the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) with a capacity

between 606 MW and 619 MW makes power purchase agreements

with the producers. Small-scale private sector will produce nearly 50

MW. It has been proved that domestically planned, managed and

implemented projects are more cost effective than the internationally

developed schemes.

It is estimated that some 20 MW electricity will be produced per

annum by the local Nepalese resources but the demand has already

reached 60-66 MW.

7170

Nepal needs nearly NRs.4.00 billion extra money to maintain the

production of electricity in normal conditions which is difficult to

foot due to the security costs of the armed conflict. Many potential

donors except Japan and a few more have taken their hands off

seeing the king's hunger for absolute power. If the situation persists,

many experts speculate that 'load-shedding' in Nepal would be worse

though the government is planning to allocate 42 percent of its

budget for the electricity (Thapa: 2006).

Private Sector InitiativeIn January 2006, Nepal's first Hydropower Investment Mart (HIM)

was held in Kathmandu at the initiative of private sector involving

Confederation of Nepalese Industries (CNI), Small Hydropower

Promotion Project. (SHPP), German Cooperation Agency-GTZ and

Winrock International. Organizers said the HIM was aimed to bridge

the gap between the prospective private investors and private parties

holding licenses and PPAs for feasible hydropower projects. The

HIM not only encouraged the private sector in Nepal but also from

across South Asia.

The hydropower sector was open to the private sector in Nepal

significantly since 1994. Out of the total hydropower national grid of

Nepal, 148 MW is produced by the private sector. Out of which also,

the exclusive Nepali private sector contribution from their plants is

15 MW only. Some license holders in the country have signed PPAs

worth about 200 MW with NEA. However, their projects have not

gone ahead due to lack of funding. They cite NRs 300.00 billion

liquidity in the country. But if only five per cent of that could be

channeled to hydropower generation, they could produce 30 MW

every year. Investment, technology and bureaucratic hurdles are not

so complicated particularly after 1995 for micro and mini-level

hydropower generation. In the small scale also, for instance, the

Upper Tamakoshi Hydropower Generation Project is one of the most

cost effective projects in Nepal but the 'Dolakha's White Gem' (as it is

popularly known: see Nepal: 2004) waits for its potential investors

impatiently.

After 2001, the NEA is supposed to be in loss by NRs4.00 billion,

whereas, earlier this authority used to earn nearly NRs1.00 billion as

profit per annum. In 2005 alone, the NEA had to bear a loss of nearly

NRs 2.00 billion. It is likely to join two bankrupt but important

corporations namely Royal Nepal Airlines Corporation (RNAC) and

Nepal Oil Corporation (NOC). As per agreement, the NEA needs to

pay the foreign investors some 36.7 per cent of the profit.

The payment to the Khimti, Bhote Koshi and Indrawati Hydropower

generation projects alone was nearly NRs6. 56 billion out of the total

income of NRs12.82 billion. On the other hand, the NEA also pays

interest to the government nearly by 10.5 per cent (Thapa: 2005).

Thus, private sectors are a great hope and challenge to the NEA

concern.

First Positive Understanding with IndiaOn 14 January 2006, in India's capital New Delhi, 'a very positive

understanding' on hydropower trade has been made between Nepal

and India. The talks were held between the officials of NEA and

Ministry of Water Resources and India's the Power Trade

Corporation (PTC) officials. The details of the understanding are very

much welcome!

Nepal lacks nearly 90MW electricity in winter up to 2012 with the

present mechanism. It is estimated that till 2010, India's state of

Uttar Pradesh alone needs nearly 20,000MW electricity for rural

electrification. During winter, Nepal goes for 'load-shedding' due to

shortage of electricity. So, the two countries have come to an

understanding that during winter India sells electricity to Nepal and

during summer, when Nepal has over-supply due to less

consumption, it will sell electricity to India. The signatories have not

fixed the rate of electricity. Electricity is cheaper in India than in

Nepal.

Three complications are seen in this understanding:On the 'rate of the electricity' Nepalese fear being cheated by India. Both India and Nepal need to have a pact that favours both the

countries and so, politics should not hinder it.

India says it will supply Nepal the electricity after the transmission

lines are improved. Let the technology be improved in time in India.

The hope in Nepal is so strong that they believe India would sell

electricity to them even by reducing the supply to Farbesgunj in

India.

7372

Nepal is getting 50MW electricity for its eastern zone from India.

India will supply 50 MW more next year after the improvement of

the infrastructure. Before that in 2006, India can supply 20 MW

more making it 70 MW in total. The understanding shows that up to

150 MW of electricity can be exchanged at the present capacity and

after the improvement of infrastructure. The agreed rate of electricity

is NRs5.57 per unit (Kantipur: 16. 01. 2006, p.1).

Nepal's New Water Resources Strategy and Water PlanHaving initiated in 1995, Nepal brought out its 'Water Resources

Strategy' in 2002. The plan envisages integrating and improving

water laws and regulations and policies like 'Water Supply Sector

Policy 2055', 'Kathmandu Valley Strategy on Water Supply and

Sanitation 2057', 'Irrigation Policy 2053' and Hydropower

Development Policy 2058' etc. Now the water sector aims to help

reduce incidence of poverty, unemployment and underemployment;

to provide people access to safe and adequate drinking water and

sanitation for ensuring health security; to increase agricultural

production and productivity ensuring food security of the nation; to

generate hydropower to satisfy national energy requirements and to

allow for the export of surplus energy; to supply the needs of

industry and other sectors of the economy; to facilitate water

transport, particularly connection to a sea port; to protect the

environment and conserve the bio-diversity of natural habitat and to

prevent and mitigate water-induced disasters (WRS-N: 2002, p. 47.).

Nepal Water Resources Strategy started in 2002 but it took four

years for Nepal to bring out the National Water Plan. The Plan was

brought out in January 2006.

The National Water Plan has been integrated with the National Five

Year Plan System of Nepal. Starting from the 10th Plan as its 'Short

Term Strategy' i.e. from 2002 onwards- it declares 11th & 12th Five

Year Plans as its 'Short Term Plan' and the 13th & 14th Five Year

Plans are supposed to fall under 'Long Term Plan', clearly defining

Nepal's New Water Resources Strategy and National Water Plan to

be of 25 years starting from 2002 and ending in 2027.

The following table shows breakup of the Projected Capital Cost

Proposed in NWP:

The table shows that Nepal gives a priority to hydropower. Out of its

total investment in water resources, 48.6 per cent is in this sector

followed by drinking water and sanitation with 19.3 per cent and

irrigation with 17.0 per cent of the investment planned for the 25

years starting from 2002-2027. The NWP has come out with

significant changes in the 14th Plan for instance on Water

Transportation. The WRS-Nepal: 2002 set down a strategy to invest

16 per cent in water transportation (Summary of WRS-N: 2002,

chart at p. xx) but NWP-Nepal: 2005 is not specific to this sector.

Similarly, while the former indicates 53 per cent, the latter shows

48.6 per cent investment in hydropower.

Nepal's hydropower production targets are not very ambitious but

the national budget allocation is. The targets are: by 2007 up to 700

MW, by 2017, up to 2035 MW and by 2027 up to 4000 MW -- both

by the government and the private initiatives, which meet the

projected domestic demand (NWP-N: p.42). Thus the figures in

NWP also vary because on page 77, the target of 2027 hydropower

production is 3345 MW as not 4000MW. The domestic demand at

that time is estimated to be 2661.4 MW and Nepal through this

scheme will be able to export 683.6 MW electricity.

But the greatest difficulty for Nepal is managing the fund. The table

indicates the capital cost details but actual costs including the O&M

and others are NRs1218.938 billion. By 2027 Nepal needs NRs 511

billion (42 percent) for hydropower generation, NRs267 billion (22

percent) for irrigation and NRs231 billion (19 percent), etc. Nepal's

Table: Summary of Projected Capital Cost Proposed in NWP by Plan Period (NRs in million a 2001 price level)

S.N. Short

Term

Medium Term Long Term

Projects/Programmes

10th

Plan

11 th Plan

12th

Plan

13th

Plan

14th

Plan

NWPTotal

%Share

1.

Drinking Water

and Sanitation

25400

35615

39125

40790

42727 183658 19.3

2.

Irrigation

17623

37441

27075

33469

45504 161111 17.0

3.

Hydropower

28416

87361

101387

114738

130150 462051 48.6

4.

Rural Electrification

11305

10841

10841

18716

18716 70418 7.4

5.

Elec.System.Reinforcement

4253

7763

8100

8438

8775 37328 3.9

6.

Disaster Management

3842

4963

7333

4840

4596 25575 2.7

7.

Environment

467

324

310

302

300 1704 0.2

8.

Fishery & Others

191

375

375

365

365 1670 0.2

9. River Basin Plan. 37 18 18 1 1 76 0.0

10. Institutional 1242 1576 1490 1205 825 6337 0.7

Total Cap. Exp. 92775 186276 196054 222864 251960 949928 100

Cap Exp % of Total 86.8 86.0 81.8 80.5 80.4 82.4 Source: NWP-Nepal, HMG/N, WECS, Singha Durbar, Kathmandu, p. Annex-11, K-1.

7574

current GDP is around US$3.0 billion i.e. nearly NRs210.00 billion.

The conflict has distorted the production process very badly. For

example, so far, Nepal's thought-to-be cheapest, the 'Upper

Tamakoshi Hydropower Project', estimated to produce 309 MW is

disturbed by the Maoists (Kantipur: 19.01.2006). The NEA had

started constructing the link-road, but the Maoists stopped the

construction work. If Nepal could run this project alone and start

producing electricity, it would have been able to end the load-

shedding.

Indo-Nepal Water ConflictsThere are so many examples that in water resources management the

two friendly countries could not satisfy the Nepalese people. Some

typical instances are touched upon below:

Nepal feels badly deceived in the 1927 agreement between the British

India government and the Rana regime in Nepal in exchange for

some saal-trees and 50,000.00 Indian rupees on Sharada Barrage.

The barrage irrigates some 1.7 million ha of land in India now.

Another bitter experience for Nepal was Koshi Agreement of April

25, 1954 which was revised on December 19, 1966. It bears the

technical constraints of the 'sluice gates', silt in the Chatara canal and

change of course of the river etc. leaving little water for Nepal during

the dry season and causing 'inundation' during the lean season. AM

Shrestha writes that the agreement mentions the potential irrigation

benefits for Nepal but keeps the nature and magnitude of similar

gains to India secret. In reality, Nepal irrigates 87,000 ha of its land

but India waters nearly 2.00 million ha i.e. 23 times more than Nepal

(see Shrestha: 1999, p.158). Coincidentally, India is nearly 23 times

bigger than Nepal! The Koshi barrage saves thousands of lives and

property worth hundreds of billion rupees in India by flood control,

says Shrestha.

Another important agreement done by Nepal with India was 'Gandak

Agreement' of December 4, 1959. With a similar technology as of

Koshi Barrage, the dam was constructed in Bhainsalotan providing

for the Narayani to flow to India first and through the dam

constructed half on the border, it could be controlled by India to flow

to the West and East Canals in Nepal. Under the agreement, Nepal

could irrigate nearly 60,000 ha by getting water for the west for

about 16,000 ha and for 44,000 ha of land. But this too could not be

done properly because of Bihar's 94 KM long Don Branch canal.

Shrestha says that in today's calculation, India irrigates some 2.00

million ha of Indian soil, some 33 times more than that of Nepal

benefiting from the project (Ibid, pp.168-169).

With this feeling of being cheated, Nepal waited for nearly three

decades to sign any major agreement with India. It was in 1991 that

Prime Minister of Nepal G.P Koirala signed Tanakpur Agreement.

Shrestha says the agreement was an endorsement of India's

subsequent plan for constructing Tanakpur Dam to supply the

Mahakali river water to a powerhouse through a 566 meter long

canal and then to irrigate half a million ha of land in India. Nepal

also allowed use of 2.9 ha of its territory for the Tanakpur barrage for

7 MW electricity and 4.25CM/S water to irrigate 2,500 ha of

Nepalese land whereas the total hydropower generation was 120 MW

(Ibid, pp.175-176).

But it faced a vehement criticism in Nepal. The Supreme Court ruled

that the agreement required two-third majority of the parliament as

per Article 126 of the Nepalese constitution. B. G. Verghese writes

that the central government of India had to intervene when a hydel-

cum-irrigation project was planned near Tanakpur in Kumaon which

would have diminished flows in the Mahakali for Nepalese uses and

the project was recast to ensure that Nepalese interests were

protected (Verghese: 1999, p.342).

Indian River Linking Project and Detrimental Effects: Nepal faces inundation in its southern belt due to the construction

work by India at the Indo-Nepal border related to its River Linking

Project. India officially declared the project in 2002, though the

country had been working on it by other titles for a long time.According to SB Regmi, the Executive Secretary in the Water and

Energy Commission Sector (WECS), from west to east, Nepal is

flooded at some 19 places endangering world heritage site of Lunbini,

the birthplace of Lord Buddha and the birthplace of mythological

symbol Devi Sita in Janakpur. Unlike Bangladesh, Nepal government

has not spoken a single word against the river linking project.

On the IRLP, the government of Nepal writes, “The high dam

projects identified, which store large volumes of monsoon flood and

7776

generate huge hydroelectric power, will essentially have regional

ramifications. The bone of contention in these projects seems to be

the Indian viewpoint that sees such projects as strictly bilateral

issues and undermines the issue of downstream benefits in terms of

irrigation as well as flood. It is yet to be seen how India intends to

address the issue of cost sharing regarding the proposed 'river-

linking-project', which eventually will involve building storage dams

in Nepal' (NWP: 2005, p.6).

Post-February 1, 2005 move of King Gyanendra, no Indo-Nepal

water talks have been held officially except the preliminary talks on

buying and selling of electricity in the first week of January 2006 in

New Delhi. Third high level technical committee meeting (HLTC) of

27-29 September 2004 the 13th meeting of the bilateral Standing

Committee on Inundation Problem (SCIP) on 30 September 2004 in

Kathmandu and at the secretary level in October in New Delhi had

failed.

The Babai and Shikta Irrigation projects, out of Nepal's six major

irrigation projects, are the vivid examples of Indian interference in

Nepal's internal affairs. Due to India's opposition, as a lower riparian

country, Nepal could not construct these projects by the help of the

foreign support (Nepal: 2004:SAJ-8, p.47). On the similar grounds

of being a lower riparian, India is ignoring the Bangladeshi and

Pakistani demands guided by Farakka Agreement of 1996 and Indus

River Treaty of 1960 respectively. So, regional statutes to regulate

their waters resolving the water conflicts among the countries of the

region are badly and immediately needed.

Sour Experiences of the Immediate PastMahakali Agreement of 1996 is a failed agreement. It failed the

possibility of CPN-UML majority government in Nepal. It failed the

Tanakpur Agreement. It also failed the Arun-3 hydel project directly

or indirectly. Finally, it failed because the Detailed Project Report

could not be prepared in 10 years though it was supposed to be ready

in six months. No better is the Karnali (Chisapani) Multi-purpose

Project supposed to yield 10,800MW with 16.2BCM live storage

capacity planned for export. Due to India's hesitation, Enron was

fully disturbed to work in Chisapani.

India likes to engage every important river basins of Nepal to keep

the resources in its grip to irrigate millions of hectares of its dry

lands and light thousands of villages. India needs a huge amount of

well-managed water and energy but its water policy so far seems not

in its own favour. B. G. Verghese accepts that until the mid-eighties

Indian Planning Commission had never looked at the Himalayan

potential in Nepal and Bhutan in terms of long-tem energy planning

(Verghese: 1999, p.343).

India needs to change its water policy, strategy and plans. It needs to

give its top priority for investment to this sector before it is too late

for the country and the region.

Hope at HandThe rays of hope are not dim. On January 14, 2006 in New Delhi,

Nepal and India for the first time agreed that electricity could be sold

or exchanged in need. Three major case-studies are discussed below:

NIBB-C Water Ways: 21st Century Multi-purpose Project

and the Need for its Joint Pre-feasibility StudyNIBB-C stands for Nepal, India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and China.

These countries benefit from the Eastern Himalayan Waters directly.

These are the waters of hope for South Asia - particularly for the Bay

of Bengal Initiative for MultiSectoral Technical and Economic

Cooperation BIMSTEC region in South Asian perspectives. The

region's leadership has not scarcely exploited the resources. The

superficially perceived national interests of the riparian countries

hinder management and proper utilization of the vast treasure of

nature in the sub-region.

The Ganges, Meghana and Brahmaputra (GMB) region consists of

more than 400 million people, the largest concentration of the poor

in the world. Nearly 45 percent of the population falls below the

poverty line, i.e. earning less than USD1.00 per head per day. South

Asia's global share in business is just 1.3 percent but it is home to

nearly 1/5th of the world's population (Nepal: 2005). The efforts by

the planners, implementers and decision makers of the region to

uplift the living standards of the people have remained remarkable

but not satiable.

NIBB-C Water WaysThe 'NIBB-C Water Ways: 21st Century Multi-Purpose Project'

7978

envisions exploring the possibility of shipping from the Bay of Bengal

to the cities of the riparian countries; e.g., Kosh i-Tappu and upper

parts of Nepal, to the cities like Varanasi, Lucknow and many more

and in the Assam highlands of India and still higher to the Tibetan

highlands of China via Brahmaputra and adjoining cities of

Bangladesh in the Meghana region and similarly to Bhutan. It makes

Nepal, Bhutan and Tibet no more landlocked parts of the globe

geographically. This multifarious economic activity could change the

fate of the region dramatically.

Many multinational companies and shipping corporations are ready

for investment in this ambitious proposal of 21st century. The

governments of riparian countries need to be deeply convinced and

be sincerely ready to adopt it.

Koshi High Dam a 'Litmus Test' for the RegionThis author worked for Arun-3 until it was cancelled. It was very

much a necessary project for Nepal, India and Bangladesh and the

SAARC sub-region. But the water-mafias were able to get it cancelled

after Nepal had spent nearly NRs1.00 billion and one decade of time

on it. The same is going to happen with the Koshi High Dam

construction also. The opposition in Nepal and India to Koshi High Dam construction

has already taken shape. One is genuine in saying that India has

never benefited Nepal in any agreement except for the Mahakali, so

it won't in the Koshi. But in politics, there is no permanent friend or

enemy. So before snapping ties, careful study and negotiation is

necessary. But India has already allocated IRs300.00 million and a

feasibility study has already started. So, politics should not be

allowed to hamper the Koshi High Dam.

The dam opponents say that since the Himalayas falls under seismic-

zone, high dams are not favourable here. But needed is the

application of appropriate technology to combat natural hazards.

This high dam technology should store water even considering the

probability of the NIBB-C WW. If the water storage is not arranged

from the start, flood and silt control and regulated water supply

downstream will not be possible. So, before building the Koshi High

Dam, technical experts, not only from India and Nepal but also even

from Bangladesh and other countries, should be consulted to apply

the latest technology.

Koshi River Basin is the largest River Basin in Nepal and has direct

consequences downstream. Many Nepalese claim even today that

they are yet to be compensated and resettleed for the land acquired

for Koshi and Gandak projects. So Koshi High Dam is a 'Litmus Test'

project.

SA-RRR-S Model: Demand of Time for South AsiaIndia is beset with intra-state water conflicts. Scientists forecast that

India will suffer water crisis more in the coming decades, because of

its population, politics and the geography. Since India is the largest

country in the region after China, such a prediction concerns all the

countries of South Asia having water links with it, through sea with

Pakistan, Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh and through river

with, Nepal, China, Bhutan and again with Pakistan and Bangladesh.

So, it is very important that Indian planners consider this sector very

sensitive and useful for themselves and for the region as a whole. The

situation demands a far-sighted approach from all its neighbors in

water management. Water is not a matter of bilateral concern. Rivers

cross the national boundaries.

The 21st century will not be guided only by politics but by political

economy also. Therefore, South Asia should drive ahead towards

uplifting the living standards of its people reducing cultural and

economic conflicts. It is time for South Asian countries to bind themselves by the

statutes on their water conflicts.

Like the European Union and other institutions in Europe, South

East Asia and other regions, South Asia too can frame a regulatory

mechanism so that the common problems can be resolved. With this

objective, the author during the SAFMA Regional Conference on

Inter-state Conflicts in South Asia in New Delhi, October 9-10, 2004

presented a vision named SA-RRR-S Model for South Asia. It meant

'South Asian Regional Riparian Rights Statutes'.

Under this vision, the countries of South Asia make their regulating

laws on their own. The SA-RRR-S Model proposes that the countries

8180

of South Asia take a distance of 8 KM as a distance of mutual

agreement downstream and upstream right of acceptance for any

kind of water and disturbing development activity within the

country's territory. This would reduce the tension of the selection of

the water management sites between and among countries. This

would reduce the problem of the blockade/release of the flow of

water causing scarcity of water, floods during monsoon and

inundation while blocking the 'sluice gates' as per weather and by

making the canals or dams close to the border lines or so.

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Water Resources Management in

BangladeshGiasuddin Ahmed Choudhury

ater resources management is of prime concern in

sustaining life and livelihood in Bangladesh. The river Wsystems and waterbodies (like hoars, baors and beels)

have shaped the country as well as its culture. Bangladesh has too

much water in the wet season and too little in the dry season. The

seasonal variation of availability of water and the competing

demands for water supply and sanitation, agriculture, industry,

fisheries and wildlife, navigation, hydropower and recreation as well

as environment and the preservation of the waterbodies have made

water management and planning a very challenging task. Moreover,

the recent discovery of arsenic contamination in the shallow aquifer

has set back past successes in bringing safe water supply to the rural

population. Pressures remain on agriculture to intensify production

and maintain self-sufficiency in food grains. Aquatic resources and

natural environment are under severe threat from changes in flood

plain management over the last three decades and, more recently,

from an alarming rise in pollution due mainly to industrial growth

and poor sanitation. The problems compound when the present

population of 135 million is expected to rise to 181 million by 2025

and to 224 million by 2050. Rapid urbanization is expected with 40

percent of people living in towns and major cities by 2025, and 60

percent by 2050. Adequate water supply and sanitation for the

increasing population is a huge task. Policies and Plan for Water Management Bangladesh adopted the National Water Policy in 1999, which

provides a framework for water management. The policy provides

directions on basinwide planning, water rights and allocation, public

and private involvement, public investment, water supply and

8786

sanitation, fisheries navigation, agriculture industry and

environment. The document is intended to guide public and private

actions to ensure optimal development and management of water

that benefits people.

Other related policies are (i) National Environmental Policy (1992),

(ii) National Forest Policy (1994), (iii) National Energy Policy (1996),

(iv) National Policy for Safe Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation

(1998), (v) National Fisheries Policy (1998), (vi) National

Agricultural Policy (1999) and Industrial Policy (1999). Though there

are no major contradictions between them, there are, however, some

gaps in water planning.

Main policy gap is in the land use planning. A principle needs to be

established for guiding the management of the massive urban

expansion expected over the next 25 years. There are also issues of

land tenure reform. Usufruct rights are linked with the willingness

and ability to invest, and the protection of the rights of the landless

and other disadvantaged groups is of paramount importance.

Displacement and resettlement, as a result of natural disasters or

land acquisition, need to be addressed for they affect planning of

water resources.

Based on the policy directions provided by these policy documents,

the National Water Management Plan (NWMP), a framework plan,

was prepared in 2001 and approved by the National Water Resources

Council on March 31, 2004. The plan is presented in three phases: a

short-term (2000-05) firm-plan of on-going and new activities, a

mid-term (2006-10) plan, and a long-term (2011-25) perspective

plan. The plan has 84 different programmes grouped into eight

clusters: Institutional Development (10), Enabling Environment (13),

Main Rivers (12), Towns and Rural Areas, Major Cities (17), Disaster

Management (6), Agriculture and Water Management (8) and

Environment and Aquatic Resources (10).

The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP, 2005) has stressed the

need for implementing the programmes proposed by NWMP to

reduce poverty.

Water Management IssuesFloods and Drainage Problems: Floods are an annual phenomenon

in Bangladesh. The high flows of transboundary rivers, high internal

rainfall, general low-level of the country and inadequate drainage

result in widespread inundation each year. In 1954, 1955, 1974, 1987,

1988, 1998 and 2004, the peak flows of major rivers, spring tides in

the Bay of Bengal, and cyclonic surges transformed the annual

inundations into devastating floods. These floods result in major

damage to life and livelihoods and property, particularly in the

coastal regions. Equally, however, the northeast and northern

transboundary rivers are susceptible to flash flooding from the

adjacent hills in India. In 2004, the flood in the northeast was very

devastating. The southwestern region experienced a devastating

flood in 2000 due to heavy rainfall in the Damodar Valley and

consequent heavy releases from the reservoirs.

Drainage problems themselves arise from drainage impediments and

drainage congestion. Drainage impediments are caused by

insufficient drainage capacity through road embankments, blocked

drainage channels due to siltation, cross-dams or fishing activities

and inadequately sized drainage sluices. Drainage congestion, on the

other hand, occurs due to high outfall water levels that prevent the

drainage flows, irrespective of any other impediments. Both

circumstances are inter-linked, as one can affect the other, and both

are common in Bangladesh.

Annual inundation has both negative and positive impacts. Positive

impacts of floods are increase in soil fertility, enhancements of

capture fisheries and navigation, increased groundwater recharge

and flushing of pollutants. Negative impacts include damage and loss

to property, infrastructure and crops, and sometimes loss of life.

Furthermore, the inundation of hand pumps and latrines increases

the incidences of diseases, while disruption to transport,

communications and economic activities leads to the loss of

employment opportunities. Coastal flooding mainly affects modern

agricultural system because of the salinity of floodwater. Women,

children and the extreme poor are especially vulnerable.

The Bangladesh Water Development Board has provided flood

protection to 66 percent (5.45 million ha) of 8.24 million ha of

cultivable lands in the last half a century. The remaining areas,

especially the urban areas, need to be brought under flood

protection. The drainage congestion in the coastal areas needs to be

8988

addressed immediately. In this connection rationalization of existing

flood control and drainage projects as proposed by NWMP needs to

be taken up.

Drought: Prolonged droughts are not common in Bangladesh.

However, the country experiences dry spells or “crop droughts”.

Much of the western part of the country can be affected by droughts,

with the northwest being most commonly affected. The country has

experienced droughts of major magnitude in 1973, 1978, 1979, 1981,

1982, 1989, 1992, 1994, and 1995. Droughts afflict the country, at

least, as frequently as do major floods and cyclones, averaging about

once in 2.5 years. Although droughts are not always continuous in

any area, consecutive droughts occurred in 1978 and 1979, 1981 and

1982, and 1994 and 1995.

The northwestern region of the country experienced one of the most

severe droughts of the century, which started in October 1994 and

was broken in July 1995 with the onset of monsoon rain. The

continued drought in the northwestern districts of Bangladesh led to

a shortfall of rice production of 3.5 million tons. These districts are

considered to be the granary of Bangladesh and produce surplus rice

- the main staple of the country.

Most of the public irrigation systems were planned for

supplementary irrigation during the monsoon. Droughts connote

enormous suffering for those depending on rainfed-subsisting

farming. To mitigate drought, the drought affected areas need to be

brought under supplementary irrigation systems. Barrages over the

Ganges and the Brahmaputra rivers need to be constructed

immediately. In the meantime, the drought assessment model

developed locally (by CEGIS) need to be implemented for optimum

use of scarce water resources.

Dry Season Reduction of River Flows: Bangladesh is the

traditional water user of the transboundary rivers i.e. the Ganges, the

Brahmaputra, the Meghna Rivers etc, but because of the continuous

upstream withdrawals beyond its territory, the country is facing

water scarcity in the dry season. The country has 7 million ha of

irrigable lands, out of which 4.68 ha are irrigated. There is a need for

development of water resources in order to bring the remaining areas

under the irrigation network and supplement the groundwater water

supply, where ground water levels are receding. At present, the dry

season crop production has exceeded wet season aman production.

Erosion: Riverbank erosion in Bangladesh is a chronic problem

forcing involuntary resettlement of as many as 50,000 people a year.

The studies show that about 3,575 square kilometer area along the

Brahmaputra, the Ganges, the Padma, the Lower Meghna and their

estuaries will be lost due to erosion by the year 2025. On the other

hand, 3,665 square kilometer of land will be gained due to accretion

in the same period. Perusing these data, it may appear that the loss

of land is not very significant. But this has major social, economic

and environmental implications. Riverbank erosion poses a severe

threat to the livelihoods of the people living along the banks of the

major rivers and particularly the poor are the most vulnerable.

Moreover, the people living on the chars are vulnerable and are

forced to move frequently due to river erosion. Though very

expensive, the major cities, towns and important rural areas in more

than 400 places are being protected with bank protection

interventions in different forms. A riverbank erosion-forecasting

tool, developed by CEGIS, enables the country to maximize the

scarce resources to combat river erosion.

Cyclone and Storm Surges: Cyclones affect the coastal districts

of Bangladesh and cause tremendous damages to housing,

agricultural crops, livestock and poultry, food stocks and sources of

drinking water. The coastal areas have experienced more than 70

major cyclones in the last 200 years. The cyclones are accompanied

with storm surges of 3 meter heights above normal times and in

some places it may go up to 6 to 7 meters. Since 1960s, about 123

polders having 5107 kilometer of coastal embankments were

constructed to protect an area of 1.5 million ha of lands from saline

inundation as well as from storm surges.

Arsenic contamination: The latest data indicates that 59 out of

64 districts have tube-wells with arsenic levels above the safe limit,

exposing about 75 million people to this toxic substance daily. The

deteriorating health of arsenicosis patients puts a heavy burden on

their families contributing to economic hardship, social expulsion

and food security. Various agencies are working all over Bangladesh

in testing tube-well water for arsenic. However, the testing methods

have not yet been standardized, field activities are not coordinated,

9190

and valuable information from field investigations is not properly

archived for further use. There is an urgent need to develop an

arsenic database, which should include information on the tube-

wells being affected, the population under threat, the mitigation

measures being undertaken, the method used for testing, the

agencies involved etc. Such a database will contribute immensely to

planning a coordinated arsenic mitigation plan for the country.

Research is urgently needed to improve understanding of the

mechanisms involved and its probable impact on the food chain.

Salinity: The main groundwater salinity problems lie in the coastal

areas of the country and constitute a constraint to its use, although

there is some localized fresh water lenses close to the coast.

Abstractions of groundwater reduce the ability of freshwater to hold

back saline intrusion and this is reportedly a major concern in the

Khulna area and other parts of the southern half of the southwest

region. Fresh groundwater in most coastal areas has to be abstracted

from a depth of over 150 meter and up to 450 meter. Whilst this can

be relatively costly to develop and operate when compared to shallow

aquifers, it has the benefit of being free of arsenic, but it does restrict

the use of this aquifer for irrigation.

The upstream withdrawal of the Ganges waters at Farakka in the dry

season causes the saline water to intrude further inland in the

southwest region, causing industries to close down, reducing crop

yield, degrading the environment and damaging the bio-diversity of

the Sundarbans, which is a World Heritage site.

Declining Seasonal Groundwater Levels: Due to

extraction/exploitation of groundwater through irrigation tube-wells,

seasonal groundwater levels have been declining day by day,

rendering many drinking water hand pump tube-wells inoperable

during the dry season.

Urban Water Supply and Sanitation: The urban population will

increase 2.7 times by 2025. The gross daily water demand in the

major metropolitan cities (Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna and Rajshahi)

will rise from the present 2,460 to 7,970 million liters per day by

2025. There is already a major shortage of required supply of safe

water. Due to over abstraction and loss of recharge areas, the

groundwater table under-lying Dhaka city has declined at an

alarming rate over the last couple of decades. Dhaka has the largest

piped sewerage system in Bangladesh; however, the existing system

serves only 20 per cent of the city. Of this only 3 per cent reaches the

sewage treatment plant at Pagla, the rest leaks into ground or surface

water system, which cause widespread pollution. 40 per cent

households in Dhaka have septic tanks with soak wells. In the future,

with the increase in population density, the quantities will not only

exceed soak well capacity, high land values will discourage the setting

aside of land for such purposes. Therefore, immediate measures to

collect and carry the effluent for treatment and disposal are

necessary.

Water Quality: Water quality in and around the urban areas is fast

deteriorating. Human excretes and industrial wastes are the main

reasons for the deterioration of water quality in the river systems.

The Buriganga in Dhaka, the Karnafuli in Chittagong and the

Bhairab in Khulna are the worst affected. Other rivers are also

showing gradual decline in water quality. The water quality of the

Buriganga River has deteriorated so much that no aquatic life could

survive in it.

Participatory Water Management: The level of participation of

stakeholders in the water management systems is not adequate.

Participatory water management following the “Guidelines for

Participatory Water Management” needs to be institutionalized.

Water Resources Available for Use Bangladesh has abundant water in the monsoon season from June to

October, but there is a shortage of water in the dry season. However,

in the early part of the season and also during the monsoon, the

rainfall can be variable which has necessitated the supplementary

irrigation. Rainfall: Bangladesh has a tropical monsoon climate with four

main seasons: pre-monsoon (March-May); monsoon (June-

September); post-monsoon (October-November); and winter

(December-February). The mean annual rainfall varies from 1400

mm in the extreme northwest to 5,500 mm in the northeastern part

of the country and the mean annual rainfall is 2,400 mm. Some 85 to

90 percent of total annual rainfall occurs between April and

September, with regional variations.

9392

Surface Water: The river systems of Bangladesh are intricate,

crisscrossing the whole country like a web and covering 8 percent of

the country. They are the sources of danger from both flooding and

from erosion, and of sustenance to agriculture, as they contain

sediments. They provide an arterial transportation network for

people, goods and fish migration, and keep salinity intrusion at bay

in the coastal areas. In-country run-off during the dry season is minimal and the main

source of surface water is the transboundary inflows from the

Brahmaputra, the Ganges and the Meghna. They drain an area of

1,750,000 km2, out of which only 8 percent lie within Bangladesh. The river flows have huge seasonal variation, with the combined

flows of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra typically increasing from

less than 10,000 m³/s early in the year to a peak of 80,000 to

140,000 m³/s in late August or early September. During the

monsoon season, 20 percent of the country is inundated each year,

with over 60 percent in a peak flood. These peak floods generally

occur every 10 years that bring severe hardships to those affected. By contrast, the dry season from November to May brings water

shortage. Dry season water deficits occur in different localities and

are marked in the southwest and extreme west where rainfall is the

lowest, and in the eastern hill regions. Surface water is an important

strategic resource for Bangladesh in the dry season. It is the only

resources for some 44 percent of the country (barring some small

pockets of groundwater used for domestic and municipal supplies),

and can be used to augment all areas where deficits arise. Groundwater: Groundwater in appreciable quantities underlies

only in some areas, mostly in the northwest region of the country. In

other areas, small quantities of available groundwater exist,

sufficient only to support a limited amount of domestic and

municipal uses, but are easily overexploited (especially levels are

falling under Dhaka city due to heavy abstractions there). In other

parts of the country, mainly the northeast, southeast, eastern hills

and southern parts of the southwest and south central regions, the

availability of good quality groundwater is very limited.

Projected Future Water Needs Land Use: Future water demands depend on the land use pattern. Bangladesh

has an area of 147,570 km² comprising hills (12 percent), terraces (8

percent) and floodplains (80 percent). Floodplains are categorized

into four types: active river floodplain, meander floodplain,

piedmont, and estuary and tidal floodplains.

Over the next 25 years, the area of rivers is expected to remain

almost constant at 8 percent and water bodies are forecast to rise

from 5 percent to 7 percent of the total area as ponds are increased to

satisfy demand for fish. Forest and mangrove will increase slightly

from 17 to 21 percent, while urban and rural settlements together will

increase from 11 percent to 13 percent. The biggest change affects

agriculture, which is expected to reduce from 56 percent to 48

percent. The absolute decline of agricultural land of 1.64 million ha,

or 20 percent of the existing area, is a cause for considerable

concern. By the year 2025, agricultural land availability per capita is

expected to be 56 percent of the 1996 level. However, over the past

25 years the total crop area has been steady at 13 14 million ha per

annum, land loss being compensated for by increasing cropping

intensities. An increase of 0.33 percent per annum would be needed

to keep up with the overall loss of agricultural land, and up to 2

percent per annum would be needed to sustain per capita production

levels. Monsoon Season Water Demands: In general, water shortages

do not occur during the monsoon season from June to October. In

the early part of this season, rainfall can be variable, which is

significant to those farmers who plant aman at this time of the year.

Some farmers practice supplementary irrigation, although there is

potential to expand this. Many of the public sector's surface water

irrigation schemes were originally designed for both early and late

monsoon crops, rather than the now popular dry season boro crop. Dry Season Water Demands: The dry season from November to

May brings water shortages. NWMP puts the projected water

demands in 2025 at 0,000 million cubic meters. The consumptive

demands for water include evaporation from forests, water bodies,

charlands, urban and rural environments, rain fed and irrigated

agriculture, as well as the needs of water supply and sanitation. In-

9594

stream demands include the overlapping requirements for salinity

and pollution control, navigation and fisheries. The consumptive

demands are estimated to be 44 percent of the total water demand

and in-stream demands to be the balance 56 percent.

Agriculture: Agriculture has the highest overall consumptive

demand in the country. The country is still deficient in food grain

production by 1.5 to 2 million tons. More than 80 percent of

irrigation water is used for rice and the rest for the other crops. Over

the last three decades, much effort has been put into intensification

of agriculture by promotion of dry season cropping through

irrigation. In 2025, the approximate irrigation area will be 8 million

ha, and the dry season water demand will be 50,300 million cubic

meters.

Domestic, Commercial and Industrial Needs: NWMP

estimated the gross domestic, commercial and industrial demands as

998.62 millions of cubic meters per month and the overall net

demand as 430.57 millions of cubic meters per month. Water for

domestic, commercial and industrial needs has been expressed in

terms of both gross and net requirements.

Forest: NWMP estimates that the forest and mangrove will increase

slightly from 19 percent at present to 22 percent covering an area of 2

million ha in 2025. The estimated water requirements for the forests

will be 8,200 million cubic meters. The area excludes the

Sundarbans, for which the water requirement is included under the

salinity control flow.

Fisheries: The area of rivers over the next 50 years is expected to

remain almost constant and water bodies are forecast to rise from 5

percent to 9 percent of total area as ponds are increased to satisfy

demand for fish. Water for fisheries falls into two categories:

demands for flowing water fisheries; and demands for fisheries in

water bodies and ponds. The minimum dry season water

requirements for fisheries in rivers are in the form of pools of water.

An approximation to the gross water demand for fisheries can be

based upon the area of rivers and water bodies, which is 16, 050

million cubic metre.

Navigation: River transport is an important mode of

communication and shipment in Bangladesh, and a network of

routes has been developed by BITWA with specified depths

according to the class of route. Many of these routes are in tidal

areas, and little affected by the freshwater flow in the rivers. The total

flow required for regulating the navigation routes is 340 m3/s. These

minimum flows are needed for operation of locks and fish passes.

Salinity Control: In the southwest region, the reduction of dry

season flows upstream of the Farakka barrage led to an increase in

intrusion of the saline front in the dry season. The flow required in

the Lower Meghna to ensure that the saline front did not penetrate

upstream of Ilshaghat for more than 5 consecutive days has been

estimated as 3,000m³/s. The total minimum water requirements for

salinity control are, therefore, estimated to be 3000m³/s in the

Lower Meghna, of which about 1000m³/s is estimated to pass

through the south central region, 250m³/s through the Gorai for the

southwest, 100m³/s for other outflows in the southwest region and

60m³/s for the south-eastern region

Environment: Some flows are essentially required to ensure the

minimum flows in the river systems. These are needed to provide

dilution of effluents from sewage treatment works, untreated

effluents and for the maintenance of aquatic life. NWMP assessment

has identified 10 pollution “hot-spots” for which it is estimated that a

flow of 200m³/s would be required for all hot spots to help improve

water quality. In addition, the treatment, recycling and inland

disposal need to be geared up for managing non-agricultural

pollutants, as these are the appropriate long-term mechanisms for

protecting the environment.

In-stream needs: NWMP estimates the minimum in-stream needs

to be 30,984 million cubic meters per month, taking into account the

percolation losses, dilution flows and the higher of the computed

navigation flows.

Scenarios of Shortfalls and CrisisWater Balances in 2025: The consumptive demands, at present,

are being met ignoring additional in-stream needs for fisheries and

navigation, except in the Southwest region where, as is commonly

known, shortages exist to meet both the agricultural and salinity

control demands. By 2025, considering the future in-stream needs

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and ultimate agricultural demands, meeting full in-stream needs

(i.e., provision of base flows for fisheries and navigation in most

rivers and streams, as well as provision for salinity control and

dilution of flows at particular environmental hotspots) will not be

possible except in some areas in the south central region in the face

of increased agricultural demands. Under this scenario, there would

be an overall national shortfall for three months (the maximum

monthly shortfall is 3,570 million cubic meter in March, equivalent

to 1,377 m³/s, or about the same as the entire flow of the Ganges in

that month).

No amount of inter-regional transfer would be able to overcome this

situation without a major augmentation of flows entering

Bangladesh. Beyond 2025, as agricultural demand continues to

expand, shortfalls would worsen both in quantity and duration, with

an ultimate maximum monthly shortfall of nearly double the 2025

situation. With more modest fulfilment of in-stream needs by 2025

associated with maintaining year round flows only in the main

navigation and fish migration routes through augmentation or

regulation, the situation appears more manageable as there would be

an overall positive national balance throughout the dry season. With

an overall positive national balance, inter-regional transfers would

enable these lower in-stream needs to be met. Possible impact of arsenic contamination of groundwater on water

balances: The full implications of arsenic contamination of the

groundwater are yet to be determined; one possible scenario is that

the groundwater could be considered to be unsafe for water supplies

and irrigation, the latter if arsenic were shown to be entering the

food chain. The possible extent of the contamination across the

country is still being quantified, but appears to be becoming greater

as the testing continues. Assuming an arbitrary estimate of 75

percent reduction in the groundwater availability as a result of

contamination, even with the lowest estimate of in-stream needs and

ensuring full re-use of percolation losses from irrigation, extensive

shortages can be expected to arise. These would create an overall

national deficit in March of about 2,134 m³/s.

Projected Changes in Climate: The probable effects of global

climate change have been examined in general by the

Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) and are

regularly reviewed. The most recent projections set out the changes

anticipated in Bangladesh, which are:

i) A rise in sea level in the order of 300 mm by the year 2030 and

700 mm by 2075. This suggests a rise of 250 mm by 2025, at the

rate of 10 mm/year.ii) A rise in monsoon season temperature of 0.7°C by 2030 and

1.1°C by 2050. Dry season temperatures would rise by 1.3°C by

2030 and 1.8°C by 2050.iii) An increase in monsoon rainfall of about 10 percent by the year

2030 and 25 percent by 2050. Dry season rainfall is projected to

reduce in the long term.

Climate change will also affect flows in the transboundary rivers.

Temperature changes would affect the timing and rate of snow melt

in the upper Himalayan reaches, which would alter the flow regime

in the rivers, which rise in the Himalayas. Lower dry season rainfall

and increased water demands due to higher temperatures would

increase abstractions from rivers upstream and reduce the flow

reaching Bangladesh.

Restraining Growth of Demand and Possible Measures:

Unquestionably, it is necessary to make adjustment from water

supply management to demand management for the sake of realizing

sustainable water utilization under the pressures of heavy

population, rapid economic development, sharp contradiction

between water supply and demand, serious water pollution and low

efficiency in water utilization etc. The development trend of water

demand management on the dependence of analyzing its current

situation and existing problems is: lStrengthening water resources legislation; lReinforcing water resources management system;lStrengthening water saving;lReinforcing water resources protection;lTaking the water resources appraisal of constructing projects

into effect;lRationalizing water pricing system from the marketing principle;

and studying the assets management on water resources.

Perceived Sector Problems and ChallengesPoverty Reduction: Poverty is endemic in Bangladesh. The trends

in income poverty in Bangladesh show a modest poverty reduction

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rate of around one percentage point a year since the early 1990s from

59 percent to 49.8 percent in 2000. Human-poverty trends have

shown faster improvement than the income poverty trends. The

human poverty index (based on deprivation in health, education and

nutrition) stood at 61 percent in the early 1980s, but declined to 47

percent in the early 1990s and dropped further to 35 percent in the

late nineties (1998/2000). The index of human poverty declined by

2.54 percent per year compared with 1.45 percent in the national

head count ratio for incomepoverty over the last two decades.

Bangladesh formulated the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)

in October 2005. PRSP recognizes the role of the development of

water resources including irrigation development, flood control, and

drainage improvement in increasing agricultural production and

food security. Following the vision of the National Water

Management Plan (NWMP), PRSP sets the following policy

directions:

i) promote rational management and optimal use of the country's

water resources;ii) improve the people's quality of life by ensuring equitable, safe

and reliable access to water for production, health and hygiene;

and ensure availability of clean water in sufficient quantities for

multipurpose use and reservation of the aquatic and water

dependent eco-systems.

Along with facilitating the cultivation of HYV rice and other crops

and increasing the yield levels of boro and aman crops, PRSP

advocates the structural interventions in order to save properties and

lives by controlling river erosion, monsoon flooding and saline water

intrusion; and improving irrigation and drainage congestion and

mitigating drought through re-excavation of khals [watercourses]

and canals. Measures would also be taken to enhance the social

impacts of flood control drainage and irrigation (FCDI) projects

through rationalization of existing projects, and promoting

stakeholder participation and multi-purpose use of flood

embankments. The National Water Policy and the National Water

Management Plan will be periodically reviewed and revised to guide

the management of the country's water resources.

Increasing Agricultural Production: Bangladesh has made an

impressive progress in food production over the last three decades.

Food production has increased from 9 million tons in 1971-72 to

about more than 25 million tons in 2004-05, which is up by 178

percent or about a three-fold increase. However, the country is still

deficient in food grain production by 1.5 to 2 million tons. Increase in agricultural production could be achieved due to rapid

expansion of irrigation, flood control and drainage systems as well as

the adoption of improved seed and fertilizer technology. 60 percent

of the country is now flood protected. During the period 2003-04, it

is estimated that an area of 4.84 million ha was irrigated, out of

which 3.4 million ha was irrigated by groundwater and 1.44 million

ha by surface water. The annual compound growth has been 4.5

percent over the period of three decades. Surface water irrigation has

not, however, grown as fast as ground water and in fact has flattened. In order to achieve the Millenium Development Goals' top agenda of

eradication of poverty and hunger, the shrinking agricultural

resource base needs to be matched with the greater demand for food.

In recent years, both the land and water, particularly surface water,

are continuously shrinking. NWMP has projected that the lands

under agriculture is expected to reduce from 59 percent to 48

percent. The absolute decline of agricultural land of 1.64 million ha,

or 20 percent of the existing area, is a cause for considerable

concern. By the year 2025, agricultural land availability per capita is

expected to be 56 percent of the 1996 level.

The areas irrigated by canal and low-lift pumps have been vastly

outnumbered by use of groundwater using shallow, deep and deep-

set tubewells. There is a limit to which groundwater extraction can

stretch itself without compromising environmental degradation. It is

in this context that the issue of sustainable agricultural development

acquires an added relevance in the light of the MDG. This calls for

greater use of surface water to meet the requirement of increased

food production. Arresting the alarming downward trend in the availability of land

and water resources remains perhaps the most daunting challenge to

achieve the MDG. The irrigation demands are expected to increase

potentially by at least a quarter over the next 25 years, depending

upon the extent to which future agriculture production requirements

are met through yield improvements as opposed to intensification.

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Environmental Degradation: As over one-fifth of Bangladesh is

flooded in the average monsoon and waterbodies cover 9 percent of

its area, the natural environment of the country is dominated by

water. It is, therefore, of great concern to ensure healthy and

sustainable habitats for the many species of flora and fauna, both

aquatic and terrestrial.

Problems of urban and rural water supply and sanitation: Considerable progress has been made in the provision of potable

water supplies in towns and rural areas in the 1990s. However,

arsenic contamination of groundwater has become a serious health

hazard needing the highest priority. Two of the MDGs are directly

related to sanitation. Bangladesh has given priority to sanitation in

order to reduce child mortality, combat diseases, and ensure

environmental sustainability. Also the target of decreasing poverty is

directly related with sanitation. Considering the importance,

Bangladesh has set the target to achieve total sanitation by 2010.

The percentage of hygienic latrines increased from 33 percent in

2003 to 59 percent in 2005. At the same time, the percentage of

unhygienic latrines reduced from 25 percent in 2003 to 21 percent in

2005 and sanitation without latrines from 42 percent in 2003 to 20

percent in 2005. From this scenario, it appears that Bangladesh has

several immediate challenges; such as :lTo develop sanitation and health which needs strong leadership,

political commitment to formulate aerial rules, regulations, laws

and principleslTo convert the sanitation program into a social movement and to

relate it with other cultural and social activities and create social

mobilization for the use of sanitary latrines The current water supply production capacity in Dhaka city is about

900 million litres a day. Low pressure in the distribution system is a

problem in many parts of the city and creates a potential health

hazard resulting from the ingress of groundwater into the mains at

times of zero pressure. Low pressure is often a result of the increased

demands resulting from a vertical expansion of the increasing

population densities. Abstraction exceeds recharge by about 240

million l/day and the groundwater level under Dhaka is dropping by

about 2.6m/year.

Dhaka has the only piped sewerage system in Bangladesh. It serves

about 1.1 million people living in about 20 percent of the city's area.

The sewage treatment plant has a capacity of 120 million l/day, but

in many areas the sewers, which were built to serve much lower

population densities, are overloaded and leaks occur. Many sewers

are totally or partially blocked with sediment and some of the sewage

pumping stations are totally or partially inoperative resulting in a

very small proportion of the water supplied ever reaching the

treatment works. A further 40 percent of households have septic

tanks with soak pits and about 20 percent have pit latrines.

Sanitation in slum areas is practically non-existent. lImplications of Global Climatic Change: Due to Global Climate

Change (GCC) the effects anticipated in Bangladesh are: lA rise in mean sea level in the order of about 250mm by 2025. lAn increase in monsoon rainfall of 10 percent to 15 percent by

the year 2030. lThese two factors will combine to increase flooding, which will

be further worsened if the increased rainfall also occurs in the

catchments of the transboundary rivers.

Water PricingWater pricing is an issue well debated in Bangladesh. Water pricing

ensures the optimum water use. The National Water Policy (1999)

states “Water will be considered an economic resource and priced to

convey its scarcity value to all users and provide motivation for its

conservation. A system of cost recovery, pricing, and economic

incentives/disincentives is necessary to balance demand and supply

of water.” In the case of electrically driven pumps for extraction of

groundwater, the farmers pay their electricity bills at a subsidized

rate. The farmers also bear the cost of fuel for abstracting surface

water by low-lift pumps. In some publicly managed surface water

irrigation projects, the service charges are realized from the

beneficiaries. All the public irrigation projects are yet to come under

the service charge net. This needs strong institutional and political

support. Accepting that water will naturally acquire scarcity value, the

underlying problem is how to ensure equity of access and particularly

that the poor will not bear the burden of increased water costs. It is

relatively easy to make safeguards for domestic water, but ensuring

103102

equity in the competition for water for agriculture while also

increasing the cost of water will be difficult. Industry will also be able

to out-bid agriculture for water provided that its profit per unit of

water used is higher.

Increasing the cost of energy (diesel fuel or electricity) is therefore

the most attractive way of raising the value of water through

increasing the cost of its use. This will affect rich and poor alike

without taking measures to restrict access and usage. There is

considerable potential to increase the energy use efficiency of

existing pumping equipment, which could offset the higher energy

costs and it may be appropriate to specifically target poorer farmers

in the introduction of improved technology since they are the people

least able to afford investments in new equipment.

Water Related Social ConflictsFlood Control Projects: The construction of flood control

embankments in a complex flood plain ecosystem is a source of

conflicts between the different users. Prior to the construction of

flood control projects, the fishermen used to extensively rely on

capture fisheries. In addition to over fishing, the embankments have

caused a marked decline in capture fisheries within the flood control

projects, causing disruption in the fishermen's livelihoods. The

traditional cropping patterns have changed due to the advent of

embankments as the water levels within the FCD projects are

regulated by sluice gates/regulators. This has caused conflicts

between the farmers and fishermen. The farmers want to regulate

the water level as per the crop's requirement, which sometimes goes

against the fishermen's interest.

Land use conflict: The commercial uses of land, especially

government land under lease are the cause of significant conflicts.

With khals once excavated using public or project funds, conflicts

revolve around the use of khal water for irrigating dry season boro

rice or fish culture. These are regarded as income-generating

activities for private gain as opposed to shared benefits for the

community as a whole. Within beels or perennially flooded lands,

conflicts often occur between high and low landholders as to the

optimum level of water to be maintained.

Because of the lucrative possibilities afforded by fish culture within

Bangladesh, cooperative ventures involving the leasing of beels and

haors to traditional fishermen have been launched with donor

support. These are largely successful. When beels are leased out to

local influential people, however, conflicts are more likely to ensue.

These men often re-lease the area to fishing co-operatives who then

must pay a proportion of the catch to the leaseholder, an

arrangement again in which local fishermen suffer.

Furthermore, according to the law, khals remain common property

resources. No one is entitled to construct cross dams or block the

flow of water downstream. Nevertheless, such projects including the

innovative rubber dam schemes are being built. While relatively

successful for the farmers who need water for irrigation, downstream

users are deprived of sweet water flow in the dry season. In areas

prone to salinity, this can be disastrous.

In general, upstream/ downstream conflicts are created when

decisions are taken to obstruct or divert flows on khals for private

purposes. By the same token, where the channel is excavated as part

of a project to open out and sustain the seasonal flow of water as well

as to improve drainage, there are fewer social conflicts since the

benefits of water can be more easily and equitably shared. Transboundary Issues Bangladesh has fifty-seven common/ border rivers, out of which

fifty-four rivers are with India. The ever-increasing upstream

withdrawals from these rivers within the Indian territory have

deprived Bangladesh from its traditional uses of the river flows,

especially in the dry seasons and thereby disrupting the livelihoods

of the people depending on these rivers as well as causing serious

environmental degradation to one-third of Bangladesh. The increase

in salinity in river waters and groundwater has caused thousands of

industries to close down in the southwestern region. Farmers are

forced to abandon agricultural lands due to the increase in soil

salinity and lack of freshwater for irrigation. A large area in the

southwest region is suffering from drinking water crisis. As a result,

the people are migrating to other parts of the country in search of

jobs and better living conditions.

Moreover, the Indian River Link (IRL) mega project, as envisaged,

poses a great threat to the lives and livelihoods of the people of

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Bangladesh. The impact of IRL on Bangladesh would be much more

severe than that being witnessed in the Ganges dependent areas due

to the withdrawals of water upstream of Farakka. Some preliminary

studies indicate that the salinity intrusion might reach as far as 100

km inside the country even in the month of September. Drainage

from waterbodies will be quicker. Due to the reduction in water

availability during the monsoon (especially at the later part), the

advent of dry season would be earlier. The mouths of the major river

distributaries would be silted up causing cut-off of fresh water flow to

different corners of the country. The lowering of water levels in rivers

would cause depletion of aquifers and recharge ground.

Undoubtedly, it goes without saying that the Indian River Link

project would cause major changes to the environment of the entire

country triggering off one of the major socio-economic and

environmental disasters of modem times.

Bangladesh has now an arrangement for sharing the dry season flow

in the Ganges, as set out in the 1996 Ganges Water Treaty (GWT)

between Bangladesh and India. The treaty provides for the sharing of

flows for each 10-day period between 1st January and 31st May:

There are fifty-three other rivers that flow into Bangladesh from

India for which agreements are yet to be reached. After the signing of

the Ganges treaty, the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission set

up a Joint Committee of Experts (JCE) to formulate long-

term/permanent sharing of water sharing of other common rivers in

phases. It was agreed to take up the cases of seven rivers i.e Teesta,

Manu, Khowai, Gumti, Muhuri, Dharla and Dudhkumar in the first

phase with the top priority to the Teesta. An agreement for sharing of

the waters of these and other common rivers need to be worked out

in order to maximize the water utilization of both the countries.

Regional PerspectiveAs a lower riparian state, Bangladesh needs to work with its

neighbours towards an overall basin management, with an early

focus on the different hydrological regions and promoting

information exchange. In the longer-term, there will be increased

competition for water and greater environmental risks. A continuing

dialogue amongst the co-riparian countries and further extensive

studies are needed to develop appropriate long-term strategies in

response to the increasing demands on the overall system.

Since the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the Meghna River basins are

spread over five countries, there is a great potential for regional

cooperation for optimal harnessing of the regional water resources.

Cooperation should form part of a long-term water vision for

Bangladesh. Potentials for such cooperation exist in respect of supply

augmentation, sharing of common or transboundary rivers, and

flood forecasting.

Since the 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty is in place, Bangladesh

needs to take an initiative for regional cooperation towards realizing

the potential of augmenting lean-season flows of the Ganges and

other rivers for the benefit of all the co-riparian. The scope for

augmenting the Ganges flows at Farakka through the construction of

a reservoir on the Sunkosh River in Bhutan is known to be high and

may be examined. Similarly, the proposed Sapta Kosi High Dam on

the Kosi River, a tributary of the Ganges in Nepal, could bring

significant benefits to Bangladesh (as the lower riparian) in terms of

flow augmentation. Bangladesh can collaborate with Nepal and India

in the construction of this dam for mutual benefits.

ConclusionBangladesh has made tremendous achievement in the management

of its water resources spanning a period of half a century. In the past,

the focus was on increasing food production through the

implementation of flood protection, drainage and irrigation projects.

Though the primary objectives of these projects were achieved, other

sectors like fisheries, forestry, navigation and environment were not

paid due attention in this process. This realization led to a holistic

approach in the management of water resources encompassing all

these sectors. NWMP could be cited as an example of integrated

water resources management as a planning document. Another

realization came into focus: the participatory water management

involving stakeholders and local government institutions for the

sustainability of water management systems through proper

operation and maintenance. The extensive and uncontrolled

abstraction of groundwater led to the realization that abstraction of

groundwater needs to be regulated in order to protect the

environment. Another factor is the institutional development of

water sector agencies to make them more service oriented. NWMP

has taken all these concerns during the formulation of the plan.

However, all these achievements will be frustrated if Bangladesh fails

107106

to secure its rightful share from the transboundary rivers. Moreover,

all year round data sharing is needed among the co-riparian

countries for optimization of uses of regional water resources.

ReferenceslNational Water Policy, 1999 GOB, Government of the People's Republic

of Bangladesh lNational Water Management Plan, Volume 1,2,3,4,5; Water Resources

Planning Organization, December 2001lUnlocking the Potential- National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty

Reduction, October 2005, General Economics Division, Planning

Commission, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh

Bangladesh's Water IssuesEmaduddin Ahmad

n the last few decades, water management practices in

Bangladesh were mainly concerned with finding ways to develop

water resources in response to an increasing demand in the Iagricultural sector. This practice brought the country close to food

self-sufficiency in the 1990s. However, focus on water development

is now missing in the country's policies. Many areas in Bangladesh

are now confronted with deteriorating quantity and quality of

existing water resources and economic development is leading to a

negative impact on the life supporting ecosystem. It is envisaged that

rapid growth of population, economic activities and climate change

will further complicate the water development issues in the years to

come.

Water Sector Development in BangladeshlTill the 1950s – Flood Management with small dykes under

individual control, irrigation from river water using manual or

semi-mechanical lift.lWater Sector Master Plan of 1964 -- Concepts of major flood

control, drainage and irrigation projects. This implementation

continued until 1971. The objective was safe paddy cultivation.lIBRD Review 1972 -- Concept of small scale project with

emphasis on irrigation using ground water. Large coverage

could be achieved by private sector initiative. Food grain self

sufficiency was achieved but with adverse impacts such as

lowering of ground water and arsenic pollution.l1983-1989 and 1990-1995 -- Master Plan Organisation (MPO)

and Surface Water Simulation Modelling Programme (SWSMP).

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Flood Action Plan (FAP) considered 26 components after the

floods of 1987 and 1988, initially on the flood, and finally on

round-the-year water management. Regional study on

environmental impacts was introduced. However, due to a lack

of quality control in managing the studies at one times and

results of pilot studies not in, the FAP could not provide definite

and useful output. Simultaneously Flood Forecasting was

introduced using mathematical model to support flood

management. Major and important secondary rivers were

covered. Due to limited upstream information, lead time was

inadequate.lA new National Water Management Plan has been initiated in

2004. The plan is guided by the National Water Policy

introduce in early 1999.l2004 -- The National Water Management Plan (NWMP) was

approved by the Government of Bangladesh.

Achievements and ImpactsSo far 60 per cent of Bangladesh has been brought under flood

control and drainage. Many of the projects are not well maintained

due to lack of funds. No tax rule exists to recover the cost. Adverse

impact of water logging, disallowing available necessary flooding,

closing navigational routes and an overall shortage of fresh water fish

are seen. While the stakeholders are theoretically in favour of flood

management, their participation is still not ensured. Operation of

the structures, maintenance of drainage canal and participation of

decision makers has been missing.

River monitoring is a necessity which requires large sums for hard

material and was neglected until recently. While river monitoring on

a regular basis can reduce the severity of erosion and, thereby, the

costs of initial construction and maintenance, there is no systematic

measure being taken for this.

Policy and Reforms Management actions taken at one location can influence the

geomorphology, water quality and ecosystem of other areas, even far

beyond the project area. Recent approaches to river management are

multi-objective, balancing beneficial uses for agriculture, fisheries,

water supply, navigation with the protection and enhancement of the

riverine and flood plain habitat and water quality. These emerging

concepts make room for the physical processes to drive the ecological

restoration by natural progression, rather than engineering. There is a gradual shift of the government policies of the early 1990s

towards a more comprehensive and holistic approach in water

management from expensive structural measures for flood control

and drainage. There is a new consensus among stakeholders,

professionals and the policy makers on the need for integrated water

resources management, reflected in the Bangladesh Water and Flood

Management Strategy (FPCO, 1996).

The Flood Action Plan culminated in the publication of the

Bangladesh Water and Flood Management Strategy (BWFMS) in

1996. This recognised the limitations of earlier plans, which had

focused too heavily on agricultural development without adequate

consideration of the needs of other sectors. The BWFMS

recommended that the government should formulate a National

Water Policy together with a comprehensive National Water

Management Plan (NWMP).

The government acted promptly to implement these

recommendations. The National Water Policy (NWPo) was prepared

and published in January 1999 following endorsement of the

National Water Resources Council (NWRC). A new National Water

Management Plan (NWMP) was formulated and approved in 2004.

The National Water PolicyThe NWPO provides an overall framework for future management of

the water sector. Directions are provided on such issues as overall

basin-wide planning, water rights and allocation, public and private

involvement, public investment, water supply and sanitation,

fisheries navigation, agriculture industry and environment. The

document is intended to guide both public and private actions to

ensure optimal development and management of water that benefits

both individuals and society at large. Other Related PoliciesIn 1998, the National Policy for Safe Drinking Water Supply and

Sanitation (NPSWSS) was published. The main objective of this

policy is to improve public health and produce a safer environment

by reducing water borne disease and contamination of surface and

groundwater. In this policy the government recognised the

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importance of increasing participation of users including active

support and involvement of other partners, such as NGOs, market-

oriented business organisations and similar private organisations in

water and sanitation development.

The National Agricultural Policy (NAP) was issued in 1999. The

main goal of this policy is to maintain self-sufficiency in food. It also

aims to ensure that agriculture is profitable to farmers by improved

input supply and credit. One important aspect of this policy is that it

sets out clear agenda to promote and develop socially and

environmentally-friendly agriculture.

As early as 1994, the National Forest Policy (NFoP) proposed

approximately 20 per cent afforestation by the year 2015. For the

first time multiple uses of the Sunderbans were recognised including

water, forest and fish. Issues such as global warming, desertification

and control of trade of wild birds and animals were also addressed.

The National Fisheries Policy (NFiP) of 1998 aims to enhance

fisheries production and improve socio-economic conditions for

households where capture fishing is the main activity; to meet the

demand for animal protein; to boost economic growth by export of

fish and fisheries product; and to maintain ecological balance. The

policy highlights the need to conserve fish habitats, to prevent

further drainage of standing water bodies for agricultural

development.

The National Environmental Policy (NEP) of 1992 is broadly similar

to the National Fisheries Policy. This policy also highlights the need

to maintain ecological balance and overall development through

protection and improvement of the environment. It seeks to identify

and regulate activities that pollute and degrade the environment to

ensure environmentally sound development in all sectors. One

important aspect of this policy is proposing to audit existing flood

control and drainage projects on an emergency basis along with steps

to modify these projects as necessary.

Assessment of PoliciesThere are no major contradictions between national policies for

different sectors with respect to water resources development in the

country. However, there are no clear guidelines in the country as to

how the actions required by different policies should be coordinated.

Contradiction also arises due to gaps and interpretation of policy

issues.

A major gap in the NPSWSS is its obscurity in stating the need for

regulating private sector activities to ensure water quality. Neither

the treatment levels nor the industrial effluents are discussed in the

policy. No reference has been made to the interaction of wells for

drinking water and irrigation. The NPSWSS also does not clearly

address the coordination of activities of different agencies in other

sub-sectors. The NAP objective to maintain food self-sufficiency

along with issues related to water requirement and land use to meet

the policy objective need to be adequately addressed.

The NFiP policy aims at expanding the capture fisheries resources

with a target to export surplus. However, this may trigger conflict

with the agricultural sector in the management of water bodies.

Another area of conflict is advocating banning of discharge of

industrial wastes, agro-chemicals and fish-farm chemicals into water

bodies. This may again give rise to conflict with the target of NAP to

maintain food self-sufficiency by expanding HYV crops. There are no

major conflicts between NEP and other policies except for auditing

the FCD projects. The NWPO does not provide any guidelines or

direction in this regards.

Water Development Issues: Today and 2025The population projection for 2025 for medium fertility decline is 181

million, taking 1995 as the base year, according to National Water

Management Plan (NWMP). NWMP also predicts that the urban

population will grow at a rate of 8 per cent per annum, which means

73 million inhabitants in urban areas in 2025 compared to 27 million

in 2000; an increase of 2.7. According to the draft Development

Strategy formulated by the National Water Management Plan Project

(NWMPP), under the medium economic growth scenario the GDP

will rise from 2021 billion in 1999-00 to 7965 billion in 2024-25.

Considering medium economic growth and medium fertility decline,

it has been estimated by the NWMP that an additional demand of 9.5

million tons of food grains will be created in 2025 compared to

2000. Annual fish consumption will increase from 1.68 Mt/a to 4.43

Mt/a in 2025.

113112

Increase in population and economic activities will be the main

driving force in determining the water demand in the coming years.

Some indication of the development scenario could be obtained from

the estimated land distribution in 2025.

Changes in the area of river, forest, urban and rural settlements will

not be appreciable. However, the major concern is the absolute

decline of approximately 1.4 Mha of agricultural land. This is largely

due to the expansion of fish production on agricultural lands. In that

case, the rate of increase of yield should be 2 per cent per annum to

maintain food self-sufficiency. In order to increase production, most

of the irrigable areas will need to be brought under irrigation. A

1997-98 estimate by NMIDP shows that only 2.83 Mha out of a

potential 7.89 Mha is irrigated in the Rabi (winter) season. However,

it must be recognised that getting water to all irrigable lands at an

affordable price will be difficult. The above estimates do not consider

the effect of global warming. It is envisaged that global warming will

have a major impact on crop production due to prolonged dry

season.

Flood Mitigation and ManagementFloodplains of the major rivers and their tributaries and

distributaries cover around 80 per cent of Bangladesh. As a result of

very flat topography 20 per cent of the lands are inundated due to

spilling of the rivers each year during the monsoon period (June-

September). Rainfall of high intensity and long duration in the river

catchments causes drainage congestion within the country due to

inadequate conveyance capacity of the rivers. The situation becomes

severe when peak flow in the rivers synchronises with high rainfall.

The nation experiences around 37 per cent inundation due to floods

every 10 years. In 1988 and 1998 more than 60 per cent land was

inundated.

Classification River Mang rove Forest Urban Rural Other Water Agriculture

1995 (Mha) 4626 4957 21058 8697 6734 3373 7584 82784

2025 (Mha) 4520 5623 24693 12956 8167 4383 10891 68661

During the last 50 years, hundreds of kilometres of embankments

have been constructed by Bangladesh Water Development Board

(BWDB), Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) and

local authorities (zilla parishad/union parishads/pourashavas). As

time progresses and more projects are completed, interdependency

of these kinds of flood mitigation measures with the surrounding

water environment has resulted in a number of adverse impacts.

Some of the adverse impacts include increase in the depth, duration

and extent of inundation in the unprotected areas, increase in

sedimentation rate in the drainage channels, increase in flood levels,

drainage congestion in the protected areas, loss of fish habitats and

breeding grounds. Due to inadequate maintenance of flood

embankment, embankment breaches are common phenomenon.

These embankment breaches are the cause of major flood disaster

particularly in the areas on the right bank of Jamuna River.

Therefore, mitigation measure for one hazard can cause a wide range

of hazards in other areas.

Human Intervention and Associated ImpactsHuman intervention in the flood plains and in the water bodies has

introduced large scale environmental, social and economic impacts.

Conventional methods of engineering practices of analysis and

design had to use simplified approaches without considering

interactive responses from system interventions, which is inevitable

in the complex river and flood plain system in Bangladesh. The

designers had to opt for conservative design parameters to remain on

the safe side, or to omit some very important issues which later

proved to be the main reasons behind unacceptable hazards that

took place within and around project area.

Freshwater Withdrawal and Salinity Intrusion Salinity in the coastal areas, particularly in the south-west region is a

major concern. Salinity intrusion in the south-west has increased due

to low fresh water flow through Gorai during dry season. The main

reason is the withdrawal of water in the upstream resulting in

degradation of the Gorai offtake. This has resulted in major adverse

impacts on the environment and socio-economic condition in the

area. The historic Ganges Water Sharing Treaty (GWT) with India

signed in 1996 makes a certain quantum of flow available to

Bangladesh during the dry season. The main challenge in the future

will be to best utilise this additional flow to restore the Gorai and

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other rivers; arrest environmental degradation by salinity control;

extend irrigation facilities; control of sedimentation. Diversion,

distribution and management of this additional flow will require

major interventions like a barrage on the Ganges, water control

structures and distribution canal in the Ganges Dependent Areas

(GDA). A detailed study on the feasibility of various intervention

options should immediately be undertaken.

Sedimentation of Rivers, Estuaries and CoastsEach year a huge volume of sediment is being conveyed by the major

rivers to the sea. Although it is difficult to quantify the volume of

sediment accurately, estimates by different studies show that the

quantity of sediment ranges somewhere between 0.5 to 2 billion

tonnes per year. It is, however, reasonable to state that sediment load

could be in excess of 1 billion tonnes per year. This is a potential

resource, which needs to be harnessed in the reclamation of land in

the coastal areas. An NWMPP estimate suggests that if 10 per cent of 2the sediment is deposited on 31,000 km land with flooding deeper

than 0.9m with a consolidation of 1.5t/m, then the thickness of the

deposit would average 10mm per year. This is important for

compensation of land subsidence which is typically 2mm per year.

Erosion of River BanksThe seasonal variation of river flows causes variation in sediment

transport and as a result, erosion of river banks occurs. The possible

after effects are migration of bank lines, resulting in a loss of valuable

lands. Previous studies have estimated that by the year 2025 around 23,575 km area in the erodible river valleys of Brahmaputra, Ganges,

Padma, Lower Meghna and estuary will be lost due to erosion. On 2the other hand, 3,665 km land will be gained due to accretion in the

same period. From these figures it may seem that the loss is not very

significant. But this has major social, economic and environmental

implications. Structural measures like river bank protection,

canalisation etc. for mitigation for erosion in the extremely dynamic

river valleys of Jamuna, Padma, Ganges or Lower Meghna would

require huge investment in implementation and more so in

maintenance. Planning of any such mitigation measure requires

prediction of river erosion and the most suitable measure for

mitigation based on their resulting impact upstream and

downstream of the mitigation work. Remote sensing data can be

used for study of pattern of changes to river plan form and bank

lines. Mathematical models could be useful to predict river erosion,

and study of different mitigation options and their impacts.

Prediction of erosion for early warning can also save life and

property.

Cyclone and Storm SurgeBangladesh has over 700 km of coastline, which is exposed to

recurring cyclones from the Bay of Bengal. The coastal areas have

experienced over 42 major cyclones in the last 125 years. These

cyclones cause immense damage to the coastal social and economic

life and to the environment. In 1991, the coastal areas experienced a

storm with a surge height of 4.0-5.0 m, killing 140,000 of the

population and damaging livestock, crops, property and

infrastructure in the area. Since the 1960s a large number of polders

have been constructed in the tidal plains of the south as mitigation

measures against tidal surges and saline water intrusion. A large

number of cyclone shelters have also been constructed to save life in

the event of a storm surge.

One of the major mitigation measures are land-use policies, which

should guide development activities in disaster prone areas. The

land-use policy should be based on analysis of risk due to hazard.

Deterministic models can be used to simulate any events and GIS

could be very a handy tool for risk mapping based on risk analysis on

the basis of an inventory of the property at risk to the hazard, and

estimates of different intensities of hazard events. Probabilistic

models could be used to take into account of the whole range of likely

events by assigning probabilities to each range of events and

estimating the damage that would be expected to occur as a result.

Water StressAgricultural drought is a common phenomenon in many areas of

Bangladesh in post monsoon and dry season. In major cities, scarcity

of water for drinking and sanitation is a major problem. Main causes

of drought are limited rainfall, high temperature associated with low

humidity and withdrawal of water in the upstream. Over withdrawal

of groundwater is causing lowering of groundwater in many areas; as

a result, many Shallow Tubewells (STW) are becoming inoperable.

Moreover, low flow in rivers in the dry period and lowering of

groundwater table is causing environmental problems like salinity

intrusion in surface and groundwater, increase in the concentration

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of pollution in surface water, sedimentation etc. The problem

becomes multifaceted when there is scarcity of ground water during

the monsoon in most years, especially in the flood-controlled area.

This reveals the significance of annual flood plain's inundation for

ground water recharge.

Urban Water Supply and SanitationPollution from human and industrial sources is the main water

quality problem in the river systems near urban areas. Buriganga in

Dhaka and Karnafuli in Chittagong are the worst affected. Other

rivers are also showing gradual decline in water quality. It has been

estimated that urban population will increase by 2.7 times by 2025.

The gross daily water demand in the major metropolitan cities

(Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna and Rajshahi) will rise from the present

2460 Ml/d (million litres per day) to 7970 Ml/d assuming a system

loss of 20 per cent. There is already a major shortage of required

supply of safe water. Due to over abstraction and loss of recharge

areas, the groundwater table in Dhaka has declined at an alarming

rate over the last couple of decades. A 1997 study by Institute of

Water Modelling (IWM) has shown that the maximum drawdown

due to groundwater abstraction was 25m. However, this drawdown

could have been reduced to 15m by conjunctive use of surface and

groundwater. Based on model study, the IWM recommended the use

of surface water during wet season from the rivers surrounding

Dhaka and use of groundwater during dry period. It may be

mentioned here that cost of treatment of surface water will be lower

in wet season because of lower pollution level. Recharge during wet

season will raise the groundwater table, which will reduce the cost of

groundwater abstraction during dry season. Alternative sources like

River Jamna, which is only 80km away with reliable flow needs to be

investigated. Conjunctive use in other major cities and urban areas

should also be studied. Other options relate to more stringent

regulations implemented on the ground relating to protection of the

quality of water and reduction of wastage and unaccounted-for

water. Community participation in the process is vital. Demand

management by imposing tariffs could be useful to discourage

wastage of water. Private sector management of water supply system

could be more efficient in the management of demand and quality

services.

Dhaka has the largest piped sewerage system in Bangladesh;

however, the existing system serves only 20 per cent of the city. Of

this only 3 per cent reaches the DWASA sewage treatment plant at

Pagla, the rest leaks into ground or surface water system, which

cause widespread pollution. 40 per cent households in Dhaka have

septic tanks with soak wells. In the future, with the increase in

population density, the quantities will not only exceed soak well

capacity, but high land values will discourage the setting aside of

land for such purposes. Therefore, immediate measures to collect

and carry the effluent for treatment and disposal are necessary.

Arsenic Contamination of GroundwaterThe issue of arsenic is now the most important environmental

concern of Bangladesh. In recent times arsenic in tube-well waters

has upset the drinking water supply from groundwater. Arsenic has

turned into a national health issue, groundwater users panicking as a

result. Out of 64 districts, arsenic contamination in groundwater has

been detected in 59 districts. The most common mitigation measure

being taken is identifying the tube-wells with arsenic level crossing

allowable limits for drinking water. Various agencies are working all

over Bangladesh in testing tube-well water for arsenic. The testing

methods have not yet been standardised, field activities are not

coordinated, valuable information from field investigations is not

properly archived for further use. There is an urgent need to develop

an arsenic database, which should include information on the tube-

wells being affected, the population under threat, mitigation

measures being undertaken, method used for testing, agencies

involved etc. Such a database will contribute immensely into

planning a coordinated arsenic mitigation plan for the country.

Research is urgently needed to improve understanding of the

mechanisms involved and its probable impact on the food chain.

Institutional DevelopmentThe National Water Policy states that “the governance and

management of the national water resources require a great deal of

coordination of existing institutions and, in some cases, reform and

creation of new community-based institutions. Water resources

management extends across many water-using sectors as well as

political jurisdictions and geographically and hydrologically diverse

areas. Properly functioning institutions are essential for effective

implementation and administration of the country's water and

related environmental resource management policies and directives.”

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It further states “firstly, there should be separation of policy,

planning, and regulatory functions from implementation and

operational functions at each level of government. Secondly, each

institution must be held accountable for financial and operational

performance.”

Regarding community participation and involvement of local

government institutions in water resources management, the policy

states that, “the principle that community resources should be

managed by the community concerned, along with local

government institutions unless a greater national interest prevails,

should guide water resource management. It is recognised that

women have a particular stake in water management because they

are the principal providers and carriers of water, main caretaker of

family's health, and participants in many stages of pre- and post

harvest activities.”

The NWPo clearly states the responsibility of public and private

sectors and need coordination of existing institutions. It is important

to note that the policy has emphasised on participation and

mobilisation of community resources and recognises the importance

of the role of women in water resources management.

In NWPo, the government states its intention to transfer a large part

of all water development schemes to the Zila and Upazila parshads

from the line agencies. These local government institutes are

supposed to secure public participation in all aspect. The government

also declares that restructuring or reform of existing institutions will

be required to implement the policy.

Institutional reforms as declared are never easy to achieve. It may

take several years before such reforms are effectively in place.

However, targets to achieve different institutional reforms have to be

developed and acted upon.

Regional Water IssuesSouth Asian regional water issues can be mainly divided into three

broad categories: i) sharing of river waters ii) cooperative development of water resources, and iii) sharing of data and information on common rivers to facilitate

flood forecasting and water quality control. The sharing of the

riparian river water has been a bone of contention between

India and Bangladesh for the last 35 years.

In 1972, the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission was formed

with the intension to address water related issues concerning the

common river systems between India and Bangladesh. The statute of

the Commission defines its function as follows:

(a) to maintain liaison between the participating countries in order

to ensure the most effective joint efforts in maximising the benefits

from common river systems to both the countries, (b) to formulate

flood control works and to recommend implementation of joint

projects, (c) to formulate detailed proposals on advance flood

warnings, flood forecasting and cyclone warnings, (d) to study

flood control and irrigation projects so that the water resources of

the region can be utilised on an equitable basis for the mutual

benefit of the peoples of the two countries, and (e) to formulate

proposals for carrying out coordinated research on problem of

flood control affecting both the countries. (ii) The Commission shall

also perform such other functions as the two Governments may, by

mutual agreement, direct it to do.

The Commission, over the last 30 years, has only involved itself

effectively (with mixed results) in water sharing issues and sharing of

data on common rivers between India and Bangladesh.

The major dispute between Bangladesh and India is on the sharing of

the Ganges water during lean period. India has constructed a Barrage

on the Ganges at Farraka in West Bengal to divert water through the

Bhagirati-Hoogly system to flush mainly the port of Calcutta.

Bangladesh claims that there is not enough flow in the Ganges that

could be diverted through Bhagirathi-Hoogly to flush Calcutta port

and at the same time maintain the agriculture, ecology and economy

of the areas in the downstream, particularly, the southern part of

Bangladesh.

On 12 December, 1996 Bangladesh and India signed the historic

Ganges water sharing treaty. The 30-year Ganges Water Treaty

concluded 35 years of discussions and negotiations between India

and Bangladesh. The Treaty provides Bangladesh the opportunity to

invest in long-term sustainable projects to develop freshwater

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resources in the Ganges. They must be used to nurture the region

that has suffered so much social and environmental damage in the

past due to low freshwater flow during the dry season as a result of

withdrawal of water in the upstream. One big question about the

Treaty is the guarantee of minimum flow for Bangladesh. This is still

one area of great concern for Bangladesh, which needs to be resolved

in the shortest possible time.

Over the last couple of years a new area of major concern for Bangladesh has emerged. This is in connection with the proposed Indian River Link Project. The main objective of the project is to divert a large volume of water from the so-called water surplus areas to the water deficit areas in India. The Ganges and the Brahmaputra River basins have been identified as marginally surplus and surplus areas, respectively, while most of the western and southern areas have been identified as the water deficit areas. The transfer of water would, therefore, primarily occur from the Ganges and Brahmaputra river basins. Bangladesh has voiced its concern to the Indian side formally. Unfortunately, the response from India has been discouraging to initiate a fruitful dialogue on the issue.

The GBM Basins, covering an area of around 1.75 million sq. km in five countries, have immense potential in developing its water resources in areas like flood management, flow augmentation, hydropower, navigation etc. This is vital for uplifting the economy and living condition of 600 million people living within the GBM region.

Lessons lPast strategies focused on flood prevention with a view to

increasing food production. As a result, other water-using sectors were neglected and a holistic and integrated water management strategy and vision could not be developed.

lStake-holder's participation was completely unknown and absent in the past water development activities, which contributed to the lack of sustainable development in this sector.

lThe reason behind failure of many institutions in the water sector was due to poor operation and maintenance mechanism and capability.

lOver exploitation and unregulated use of groundwater have contributed to adverse environmental impacts including lowering of groundwater table.

lLack of coordination among various agencies in planning and implementation of projects prevented in achieving the desired objectives; rather resulted in some adverse impacts.

Recommendations1. The National Water Management Plan (NWMP) being prepared

should be implemented.

2. In order to meet the national policy to maintain self-sufficiency in food, research in crop diversification and high yielding variety of crops should be given top-most priority.

3. Irrigation facility to maximum irrigable lands should be extended in the next 15 years. Conjunctive use of surface and groundwater, water retention in river valleys and beels, water conservation, rain water harvesting, flow augmentation and diversion and utilisation of major river flows should be investigated.

4. An integrated land and water management policy for Bangladesh formulated by 2007. The policy should:

i) address to the gaps in different sectoral policies ii) provide guidelines for coordination of activities in

different sectors, iii) provide guidelines of land use and management in

Bangladesh, iv) provide principles determining development of urban,

rural and industrial areas, v) provide policy on the preservation of wetlands and bio-

diversity, vi) provide a policy on the mobilisation of private sector

resources, vii) a policy related to access of water to all elements of society,

including the poor and the under-privileged, taking into account the need of women and children.

5. Nationwide environmental assessment for 2005 and prediction for the next 50 years for different development options is required. Mitigation plans for any adverse impacts should be formulated.

6. Water quality in many of the rivers and wetlands in Bangladesh has deteriorated due to lack of awareness among water users, failure to implement regulatory mechanisms to ensure water quality, indiscriminate use of agro-chemicals and untreated disposal of industrial and domestic waste. Immediate steps have to be taken to implement strict measures for waste treatment, monitor use of agro-chemicals and raise awareness about water

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quality.

7. Coordinated efforts to reduce risk of flood in the affected areas by 50 per cent within the next 10 years and by 75 per cent by 2025.

8. Reassessment and audit of all coastal polders and FCDI projects by 2006. Immediate rehabilitation of the projects to meet the need for overall development completed by 2010.

9. Management of water in the monsoon through controlled flooding and drainage where possible.

10. Dredging of offtakes and river beds can be viable solution for restoration of rivers. Appropriate technology for dredging to minimise cost has be studied.

11. Flood forecasting and warning system need to be integrated with the overall mitigation activities for arriving at optimum benefit from the system. Immediate need for institutional strengthening, human resources management and community participation in flood forecasting and warning for better dissemination and utility of forecast. Existing flood Forecasting Model extended further upstream to increase lead-time of forecast in the next 3 years.

12. Computerised Emergency Response System based on wireless and Internet technology instituted in the country by 2007 linking the stakeholders and the central decision making agency.

13. Ganges barrage and associated interventions completed for maximum utilisation of dry season flow of the Ganges in extending irrigation facilities and control salinity intrusion in the Ganges Dependent Areas in the next 5 years.

14. Models for erosion and storm surge prediction developed and applied by 2005.

15. Structural measures for reclamation of coastal lands initiated by 2006.

16. Phase-wise programmes for expansion of access to safe drinking water and sanitation completed within the next 20 years.

17. Hygiene education in 80 per cent of schools by 2010

18. Immediate steps for revival of Buriganga River.

19. Augmentation of water supply for Dhaka needs urgent attention

20. Sanitation problems in particular of urban cities like Dhaka needs to addressed on an urgent basis

21. Standardised testing method for arsenic detection in groundwater, national arsenic database, development of low cost mitigation measures by 2006. Research on probable impact of arsenic contamination on food chain is urgently required.

22. Institutional restructuring and reforms initiated for creating enabling environment for:

i) participation of stakeholders in planning, design, implementation and management of water schemes,

ii) mobilisation of private sector resources, iii) transfer of water sector schemes below 5000 ha to local

government institutions, andiv) enhancing the role of women in water management. Social

and cultural aspects should be given importance in development planning and management of water resources.

23. Campaign to raise awareness among the stakeholders about water planning, management, use and conservation in the next 10 years.

24. Mechanisms for mobilising new financial resources identified and under process of implementation by 2006.

25. Government investment in research in water management issues increased by 2006.

26. Regional cooperation for share of information and data, hydropower, flow augmentation, flood management and flood forecasting by 2010. Basin wide approach is needed for development and management of water resources in the GBM basins for fostering effective regional cooperation.

27. Need of political goodwill to ensure an equitable sharing of the water of the international rivers among the co-riparian as well as to maintain ecological balance and environmental quality.

Department of EnvironmentDepartment of FisheriesDepartment of Public Health EngineeringDhaka Water and Sewerage AuthorityExecutive Committee of the National Economic CouncilExecutive Committee of the National Water Resources CouncilEnvironmental Impact AssessmentFlood Action PlanFlood Control and DrainageFlood Control, Drainage and IrrigationFlood Forecasting and Warning CentreFlood Plan Coordination OrganisationGanges-Brahmaputra-MeghnaGanges Dependent Area Gross Domestic ProductGeographical Information SystemGovernment of (the People's Republic of) BangladeshGorai River Restoration ProjectHigh Yield VarietyInternational Bank for Reconstruction and DevelopmentInternational Union for the Conservation of NatureInstitute of Water ModellingIntegrated Water Resources ManagementJoint Rivers CommissionLocal Government Engineering DepartmentMinistry of AgricultureMinistry of Environment and ForestMinistry of Fisheries and LivestockMinistry of IndustryMinistry of LandMinistry of Local Government, Rural Development and Co-operativesMinistry of Water ResourcesMaster Plan OrganisationNational Fisheries PolicyNational Forestry PolicyNon-Government OrganisationNational Policy for Safe Water Supply and SanitationNational Water Management PlanNational Water Management Plan ProjectNational Water PlanNational Water PolicyNational Water Resources CouncilNational Water Resources DatabaseOperation and MaintenanceOptions for the Ganges Dependent AreaProject-affected PersonPeople's Participation ProcessRoads and Highways DepartmentSurvey of BangladeshSpace Research and Remote Sensing OrganisationSurface Water Simulation Modelling ProgrammeWater Resources Planning OrganisationWater and Sewerage AuthorityWorld Bank

DoEDoFDPHEDWASAECNECECNWRCEIAFAPFCDFCDIFFWCFPCOGBMGDAGDPGISGoBGRRPHYVIBRDIUCNIWMIWRMJRCLGEDMoAMoEFMoFLMoIMoLMoLGRDCMoWRMPONFiPNFoPNGONPSWSSNWMPNWMPPNWPNWPoNWRCNWRDO&MOGDAPAPPPPRHDSOBSPARRSOSWSMPWARPOWASAWB

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28. To facilitate implementation of co-riparian state's interests and obligations, an apex body comprising representatives of all the co-riparian states needs to be set up to evolve a plan for development, conservation, sharing and utilisation of the international water according to the needs of the member states and the principle's of international law.

29. Cooperation and coordinated approach is essential to achieve sustainable development in the water resources sector since water is integration of technical, economical, social, political, institutional and policy factors.

Emaduddin Ahmad is executive director of the Institute of Water Modelling in Bangladesh.

ReferenceslQ. K. Ahmad et al, Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Region: A

Framework for Sustainable Development, (Dhaka: UPL, 2001).lEmaduddin Ahmad et al, Sustainable Development of Water Resources

Towards 2025, BUP, 2002.lBangladesh Water and Flood Management Strategy, MoWR, GOB, 1995.lBangladesh Water Vision 2025, Bangladesh Water Partnership, 2000.lM. C. Chaturvedi, Transboundary River Basin Management and

Sustainable Development-Case Study of Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghana Basin, Proceedings of a seminar on Transboundary River Basin Management and Sustainable Development, UNESCO, 1993.

lA N H A. Hossain, Peoples Initiative for Transboundary River Basin Management, (SAWAF III, Dhaka, 2003).

lHossain, S. M. M. A. Rahman, Integrated Water Resources ndManagement in Bangladesh: Role of SWMC, 2 SWMC Users

Conference, Dhaka, 1999.lMinistry of Water Resources, Govt. of Bangladesh, Overview of Water

Resources Management and Development in Bangladesh, 1997.lNational Water Management Plan, WARPO, 2004.lNational Water Policy, 1998.

Abbreviations

BAMWSPBBSBREBUETBUPBWDBBWFMSDAEDANIDADDSDEMDO

Bangladesh Arsenic Mitigation Water Supply ProjectBangladesh Bureau of StatisticsBrahmaputra Right EmbankmentBangladesh University of Engineering and TechnologyBangladesh Unnayan ParishadBangladesh Water Development BoardBangladesh Water and Flood Management StrategyDepartment of Agricultural ExtensionDanish International Development AgencyDraft Development StrategyDigital Elevation ModelDissolved Oxygen

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Indus Treaty and Baglihar: An OverviewRanaswamy R Iyer

his article focuses on issues and concerns rather than facts

and figures or engineering details regarding the Indus Waters TTreaty and the Baglihar controversy.

The Indus Water Treaty, 1960 is internationally regarded as a

successful instance of conflict resolution between two countries that

have otherwise been locked in conflict. It was also the practice until

recently to express satisfaction at the fact that the arbitration

provisions of the Treaty had not so far been invoked, but that record

seems about to change. On the other hand, there are some who

question the statement that the Treaty is a good example of conflict

resolution; they feel that the surgery that it did on the river-system

was harmful. There is also a body of opinion in both countries that

the division of waters under the Treaty was unfair, but the unfairness

alleged in one country is the exact opposite of that alleged in the

other country. On the outstanding differences under the Treaty

(relating to the Tulbul/Wullar, Baglihar and Kishenganga projects)

there are divergent perceptions in the two countries as to the

question of conformity to the Treaty. Where does the truth lie in

relation to all these differences?

Conflict ResolutionIs the Treaty really a successful example of conflict-resolution? The answer has to be `Yes and No'. The water-sharing under the

Treaty was a simple allocation of three rivers to Pakistan and three to

India, and there was nothing much thereafter to `operate'; there is

no continuous water-sharing on the same river as in the case of the

Ganges (between India and Bangladesh). It is much more difficult to

operate the Ganges Treaty than the Indus Treaty, and high praise of

the Indus Treaty as a successful instance of conflict-resolution is

perhaps somewhat exaggerated. Having said that, one must give due

credit to the fact that the Treaty has managed to survive three wars,

that the Indus Commission has continued to meet even when the

political relationship between the two countries was extremely bad,

and that at the working level the relationship between the officials of

the two countries has been marked by cordiality. At the same time, a

few differences under the Treaty have proved quite intractable, and

that is a poor reflection on the Treaty. On the claims of `successful

conflict-resolution', the picture is, therefore, mixed, with the positive

elements having a slight edge.

Was the `surgery' on the Indus system necessary and good? We must note that the `surgery' on the river-systems (Indus in the

west, GangesBrahmaputraMeghna in the east) was a part of the

surgery on the subcontinent. That surgery is now a fact of history.

However, without entering into a discussion of that division, it must

be noted that in deciding whether the subcontinent should be

divided, little (if any) attention was paid to the fact that major river-

systems were going to be cut across. That did not figure as a factor in

the decision-making but was only considered later as a consequence

of a decision taken on other grounds.

Water Sharing Issues and PartitionWas the Treaty a good answer to the water-sharing problem that

surfaced after the Partition of the subcontinent? It has been argued that dividing the river-system into two segments

was not the best thing to do, and that the better course would have

been for the two countries jointly to manage the entire system in an

integrated and holistic manner. However, given the circumstances of

Partition and the difficult relationship between the two newly formed

countries, it would have been naïve to expect that such a joint

integrated cooperative approach would work. (If a constructive,

integrated approach were possible in relation to the river system,

then why not in relation to the totality of perceptions that led to the

partition of the subcontinent? Obviously this speculation is

pointless). An alternative possibility would have been to agree upon a

sharing of waters between the two countries on each of the six rivers

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constituting the system. That might have been technically feasible

but very difficult to operate. Continuous sharing on each river with

joint monitoring arrangements and so on might have proved

cumbersome, difficult and productive of endless disputes. Instead,

the actual division agreed upon was the allocation of the three

western rivers to Pakistan and the three eastern rivers to India. If the

ideal solution is unavailable, the choice has to fall on the second-best

solution; agreement of any kind is better than discord.

Was the sharing of waters fair? Many in India feel that the allocation of 80 per cent of the waters to

Pakistan and 20 per cent to India was an unfair settlement foolishly

accepted by the Indian negotiators; and many in Pakistan argue that

the territories that went to India under Partition were historically

using less than 10 per cent of the Indus waters, and that the Treaty

was generous to India in giving it 20 per cent of the waters.

Both are fallacious arguments. A share of 20 per cent is not ipso facto

low; on the other hand, the level of historic use (10 per cent or

whatever) does not necessarily determine a country's future needs or

entitlements. A multiplicity of factors and criteria has to be applied,

having regard to all the relevant circumstances; not a priori view on

what is fair is possible. However, it is hardly necessary for us to go

into this question. When prolonged inter-country negotiations by

teams acting under governmental briefings led to a Treaty, and the

Treaty was approved and signed at the highest levels, it must be

presumed that it was the best outcome that could be negotiated

under the given circumstances; either side is then precluded from

saying that it was unfair, unequal, poorly negotiated, etc. If a degree

of dissatisfaction with the Treaty arises in the course of operation of

the Treaty, it would be a matter for inter-state discussions within the

ambit of the Treaty, or a re-negotiation of the Treaty with much

uncertainty as to the outcome. On the whole, it would probably be

best to leave things as they are. The Treaty embodies a negotiated

sharing that doubtless represents what was achievable.

Resolution of DifferencesWhy are certain differences (Tulbul, Baglihar, etc) proving

intractable? Ignoring the complexities involved in these cases and simplifying the

issues, the Pakistani position is that these projects constitute

violations of the Treaty by India which India denies. The Treaty

precludes the building of any storages by India on the rivers allocated

to Pakistan. The crucial question, therefore, is whether the projects

proposed by India involve the creation of storages. That is not as

simple a question as it might seem. The conventional engineering

view is that a diversion barrage or a run-of-the-river hydroelectric

project (unlike a dam and a reservoir) does not create any storage.

However, even run-of-the-river projects involve structures, and any

structure on a river does raise the water-level and create a minimal

storage. The question then becomes one of the level and acceptability

of that storage, and a difference of opinion on this is possible. It is

the Pakistani view that the Indian projects mentioned above involve

storages and are therefore unacceptable; Pakistan is also

apprehensive of the structures in question giving India a measure of

control over rivers allocated to Pakistan, and enabling India either to

reduce water-flows to Pakistan or to release stored waters and cause

floods. The Pakistani objections are thus partly water-related and

partly security-related. The Indian position is that the security fears

are misconceived as India cannot flood Pakistan without flooding

itself first (such an explanation was earlier accepted by Pakistan in

the case of the Salal Project); that its capacity to reduce flows to

Pakistan is very limited; that the Treaty does give India some

minimal rights on the western rivers, which India has not been able

to use partly because no proposal, drawing, design or other technical

detail submitted by it is ever cleared by Pakistan; and that Pakistan is

deliberately unreasonable in its examination of such proposals, the

aim being the obstruction of all efforts by India to use the limited

rights given to it by the Treaty. It is the Indian perception (privately

stated) that the operation of the Indus Treaty has been hamstrung by

total and persistent Pakistani negativism. It is also the Indian

perception that Pakistan's objections to Wullar (Tulbul), Baglihar,

and Kishenganga are essentially political and not technical.

As mentioned above, one such project, namely Salal Hydroelectric

Project, was (after many years of talks) cleared by Pakistan in the

1970s. Subsequently the relations between the two countries

deteriorated and touched rock bottom in the post-Kargil period. It

was unrealistic at that stage to expect the differences relating to

Baglihar, etc, to be resolved. There was even some uncertainty in

2002 about the future of the Treaty itself, but that trouble blew over

and the Treaty continued to function. However, there was a feeling

131130

that once the political relationship between the two countries

improved, agreement would be reached on these outstanding issues.

That expectation has been belied. While the two countries have

begun to talk to each other, and a`peace process' has been put in

motion, the talks over Baglihar have failed and Pakistan has invoked

the arbitration provisions of the Treaty and asked the World Bank to

nominate a neutral expert. It is a bit puzzling that this negative

development that casts a shadow on the `peace process' has been

allowed to occur.

There are two possible explanations to this unfortunate

development. The first is that there is indeed a genuine and sharp

difference between the two countries on the conformity of the

Baglihar Project to the provisions of the Treaty, and perhaps the talks

broke down on that issue. The other possibility is that Pakistan's

objection continues to be political rather than technical, and that

there has been a hardening of the Pakistani position on the talks with

India. If this understanding is correct, the breakdown of the talks on

Baglihar might be the result of a deliberate decision about political

relations, unconnected with the details of the Baglihar case.

Is the invocation of the arbitration provisions a matter for regret?It seems to this writer that there is no need for unhappiness at the

invocation of the arbitration clause. The Treaty provides for

arbitration. That would also be action under the Treaty. If India is

convinced that its position is correct, it should be able to present its

case strongly to the neutral expert, and eventually to the Court of

Arbitration if that contingency arises. However, an agreed settlement

is definitely preferable to arbitration, and India should continue to

try to persuade Pakistan to return to the negotiating table.

Relation with the Kashmir IssueFinally, what is the Jammu & Kashmir dimension of Baglihar,

Wullar, etc? There is a strong sense of grievance in Jammu & Kashmir that the

Treaty has made it very difficult for it (J&K) to derive any benefit by

way of irrigation, hydroelectric power or navigation from the rivers

that flow through it but stand allocated to Pakistan. The Government

of India would like to remove J&K's sense of grievance. However, the

first step here is the communication of the technical details of the

projects concerned to Pakistan. Things get stalled at that stage

because of Pakistan's objections. Speculatively speaking, Pakistan is

perhaps not keen on letting these projects go forward because (a)

they are in what it regards as disputed territory, and (b) the benefits

of the projects would go to J&K under Indian auspices. Hence,

(presumably) the stalemate. Tulbul, Baglihar, etc, might not have

proved so difficult to resolve if they had been located not in J&K but

elsewhere. However, Pakistan did at one stage let Salal proceed

under certain conditions; one had hoped that Baglihar would also be

similarly allowed to proceed. That has not happened. One has to wait

and see what the future holds.

Ramaswamy R Iyer is an honorary research professor at the

Centre for Policy Research (CPR), New Delhi, India.

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Pakistan's and Perspective: the Baglihar Project

Shahid Husain

hile the Baglihar Project may have been at a conceptual stage

for a very long time, it emerged on public consciousness in W1992. However, the issue entered the arena of intense public debate

in the year 2000 and has assumed classical proportions of an Indo-

Pak dispute.

Having accepted the scope of bilateral dialogue, the Government of

Pakistan has finally referred the question to the World Bank for the

appointment of a neutral expert. It notified the World Bank on 15

January, 2005 of its intention. The decision to appoint a neutral

expert had been taken earlier but was deferred on the personal

intervention of the Indian Prime Minister with his Pakistani

counterpart. The neutral expert, when appointed in any of the three

manners defined in the Indus Water Treaty, would help both the

parties reach an agreement but if he fails wholly or partly, the

differences remaining unresolved are designated as ‘Disputes’, which

which would then find their way to the Arbitration Court.

Article IX of Indus Water Treaty 1960 provides for the settlement of

differences and disputes for questions arising between the parties

concerning the existence of any fact which if established, might thconstitute a breach of this Treaty. To the Note Verbale dated 7

August 2003 sent by the Government of India to discuss the issue at

the government level, under Article IV of the Treaty, the Government

of Pakistan put forward the following three conditions:

1. All construction work on the project would be suspended

pending amicable and satisfactory resolution of the issues raised

by Pakistan's Commissioner.th2. On-site inspection by 30 September, 2003 would be provided

to Pakistan's Commissioner and3. Agreement to amicably settle all issues pertaining to the Project

by 31 December, 2003.

The previous round of talks between Indian Water Resources

Secretary V. K. Duggal and his Pakistani counterpart Ashfaq

Mehmood, lasted for four days, and yet did not yield any results.

'Collapse of talks' as observed by Kuldeep Kumar was considered a

setback by observers to the CBMs (Confidence Building Measures).

Pakistan's request to the World Bank has been received by India as a

spanner in the works the reconciliation process. According to one

report, 'Pakistan's reference to the World Bank was premature', as

both sides had achieved some degree of convergence on technical

details during the last round of talks. Indian Foreign Secretary said,

'if carried forward the area of convergence would have increased

further.'

After secretary-level talks between India and Pakistan, a Joint Press thRelease (JPR) was issued on 24 June, 2004. Like all such

diplomatic minutiae this statement, innocuous in content, failed to

address any issues or reveal anything of substance. The joint press

release must have involved intense efforts on the part of the two

foreign office experts. The brief statement is reproduced below:

'Secretary level talks between Indian and Pakistan on the Baglihar

Hydroelectric Project were held at New Delhi on 22.6.2004. Mr

Ashfaq Mahmood Secretary Water and Power led the Pakistan

delegation and Indian delegation was led by Shri VK Duggal,

Secretary, (Water resources). Prior to the meeting the Pakistan

delegation called on Shri Priyaranjan Dasmunsi, Hon. Minister of stWater Resources on 21 June, 2004.

The talks were held in a very cordial and friendly atmosphere and in

the spirit of goodwill and cooperation. The two Secretaries discussed

ways and means to resolve technical concerns relating to the Project

and shared their assessments on this issue. They will now report

back to their respective governments.'(New Delhi June 22, 2004).

139 138

Following a reference to the World Bank, Ministry of External Affairs thof India's (MEA) spokesman, in his statement on 18 January, 2005

said: 'We do not believe that the reference to the World Bank was thjustified.'Irritation was more pronounced, when on 11 January,

2005 the MEA Spokesman said, 'If Pakistan still chooses to go the

World Bank, then we will respond appropriately.'

thOn 16 February, 2005, a month after the reference to the World

Bank by Pakistan, Mr Shyam Saran, the Indian Foreign Secretary,

made the following public statement:

'Our viewpoint is that last round of talks which was held between

India and Pakistan was perhaps the first time that there was a really

very intensive technical discussion. It was our sense, perhaps not

shared by the Pakistani side, that some degree of convergence was

achieved during these discussions. It was our assessment that if these

technical discussions could be carried forward then perhaps the area

of convergence could increase further. Perhaps, it was a sense on the

Pakistani side that we were not going to get anywhere even if there

were further discussions. As you are aware, a reference has been

made by Pakistan to the World Bank. It remains our view that we

should continue bilateral discussions, it remains our view that there

are possibilities for us to be able to find greater convergence to these

discussions.'

The Foreign Secretary seemed to express frustration at the reference

to the World Bank but did not identify the exact areas of

convergence. He acknowledged that this was the first time that

technical discussions had taken place. But water issues cannot be

treated as pure technical matters or divorced from political subtext.

According to Rajeev Sharma, 'Pakistan's objections were not really

technical.' It only wanted to prevent India from doing a major

project in Jammu & Kashmir even if it is permissible under the

Treaty. Pakistan's decision according to him, to bring in neutral

expert, 'will inevitably cast a shadow on the projects in Jammu &

Kashmir.'(The Tribune, NOIDA, Jan 10, 2005). The same newspaper

in its editorial characterised the dispute as 'essentially technical,

rather than political.'Pakistan's decision will prove to be a potential

headache for the Government of India.

As articulated by Professor Pushpesh Pant, such setbacks are normal

in any peace process and should not dishearten any side. In fact it

will convince Pakistani people that their government was not

buckling under Indian pressure, thus arming it with more credibility.

But credibility, without being put to use in resolving the issue to the

mutual benefit of both the parties, is of no use.

Pakistan however offered whatever it could as a lower riparian to

reach a settlement predicated upon suspension of work followed by a

dialogue. But Indian desire to proceed with exploiting hydropower

potential was too overwhelming.

What precisely are Pakistan's objections? They primarily relate to the

design of the plant without questioning India's right under the Treaty

to construct hydroelectric dams and the fear that the dam will cause

a loss of 6,000 to 7,000 cusecs of water every day, equal to a 27 per

cent decrease in the Jhelum River. Other experts say that the

Baghlihar dam will have major security and economic implications

for Pakistan owing to increased Indian control over its share of water

supplies. According to this report the Project will tap around 7000

cusecs of water for irrigation purpose in the short term. This only

confirms Pakistan's apprehensions regarding India's intentions on its rdstorage potential. The electricity would meet 1/3 the total power

requirement of the State.

Due to suspension of supplies for up to 28 consecutive days during

certain months, the project can lead to acute water shortages. Some

apprehensions expressed by Pakistan are:lIndia can use water as a weapon against Pakistan.lThe design of the hydropower project violates the terms of the

1960 Indus Water Treaty.lThe structure will provide India the capability to manipulate the

flow of water to Pakistan's disadvantage.lComplete stoppage for a continuous period of 27/28 days during

December, January and February would adversely affect

agriculture and other requirements at Marala head works.lThe project can also lead to inundation of the area above Marala

head works due to the sudden synchronised releases from Dul-

Hasti, Baghlihar and Salal reservoirs.

India plans to operate the dam at maximum capacity by 2007. (Bilal thHassan, Dawn, 14 February, 2005). It has already constructed the

141140

Wullar and Salal Barrages, on this river and has plans to construct

16/17 dams on river Chenab and 6/7 on River Jhelum. Pakistan has

already, according to the Dawn report, sacrificed 27 MAF to the India

under the Treaty.

The objections officially communicated to India reflecting these

concerns are: i) 'The works themselves appeared to be capable of raising

artificially the water level beyond the full pondage level

specified in the design and would contravene the provisions of

Paragraph 8 (a) of Annex D to the Treaty.ii) 'The pondage in the operating pool being 37.722 million cubic

meter exceeds twice the pondage of water level.iii) 'The site was suitable for an ungated spillway and, therefore, a

gated spillway should not be provided. This was in

contravention of Paragraph 8 (e) of Annex D and iv) 'The intake for the turbine had not been located at the highest

level as required vide Paragraph 8 (f) of Annex D to the

Treaty.’

Reference to the parts of Treaty that Pakistan referred to above find

mention in Annexure D paragraph 8 and the relevant sub paragraphs

8(a), (c), (e) and (f) read as follows:

8. Except as provided in Paragraph 18, the design of any new

Run-of-River Plant (hereinafter in this Part referred to as a

Plant) shall conform to the following criteria; a) 'The works themselves shall not be capable of raising

artificially the water level in the Operating Pool above the Full

Pondage Level specified in the design.b) xxc) 'The maximum Pondage in the Operating Pool shall not exceed

twice the Pondage required for Firm Power.d) xxe) 'If the conditions at the site of a Plant make a gated spillway

necessary, the bottom level of the gates in normal closed

position shall be located at the highest level consistent with

sound and economical design and satisfactory construction

and operation of the works.f) 'The intakes for the turbines shall be located at the highest

level consistent with satisfactory and economical construction

and operation of the Plant as a Run-of-River Plant and with

customary and accepted practice of design for the designated

range of the Plant's operation.’

India, and the State of Jammu and Kashmir are deficit in power and

it seems that the Indian Government has taken a policy decision to

increase the generation. 'Even as the Government of Pakistan is

crying wolf over India's Baglihar, Wullar and Kishanganga

Hydroelectric Power Project, the Indian government is reportedly

planning to construct another three projects. J&K is reported to have

about 15,000 MW of power potential. In the past two decades Indian

Rs.40b have been invested in the power sector in the State’. (Daily

Times, January 17, 2005). There is growing resentment amongst the

people of the State over (the) government's failure to harness the

enormous hydroelectric power potential.

This is why a number of other disputes seem to have emerged in

public view, the Kishenganga hydroelectric project on Neelum River,

which is a tributary to Jhelum, being one of them. The other projects

are: Uri II on the Jhelum River in Baramulla District, the Pakul Dul

and the Burser Dams, both on the Marusundar, a tributary of the

Chenab River in Dhoda district. The Pakuldul and Burser dams are

mega projects with a generating capacity of above 1000 MW each.

According to another report, the Prime Minister's Office has not only

approved more hydel projects but has matched the intention with

money. These projects have been forwarded to the Cabinet for

approval. An allocation of Rs.163 billion by the State of Jammu &

Kashmir and Rs. 240 billion from the Prime Minister's construction

plan have been earmarked. Ministry of Power has reserved about Rs.

120 billion for the three projects.

Chenab is one of the three western rivers allocated to Pakistan under

the Treaty. It is an important water source for the Indus. Both the

countries are planning a dam on the Neelum River, a tributary of

River Jhelum.

Under Indus Water Treaty 1960, Article I the term 'Western Rivers'

means the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab taken together. Article

III provides for unrestricted use by Pakistan of 'all those waters of

the Western Rivers which India is under obligation to let flow under

the provisions' of the following paragraph, which lays down that

India shall not permit any interference with these waters except for

143142

the specified uses like Domestic Use, Non consumptive Use,

Agricultural Use and Generation of hydroelectric power as set out in

Annex D.

Article III (4) reads:'Except as provided in Annexure D&E, India shall not store any

water of, or construct any storage works on, the Western

Rivers.'Annexure D & E to the Treaty provide for exceptions to the

use of Western Rivers by Pakistan.

The Treaty allows India generation of hydroelectric power as one of

the uses. Annexure D applies to unrestricted generation of

hydroelectric power. India is planning many more such projects.

Annexure D to Indus Water Treaty, 1960 applies with respect to the

use by India of the waters of western rivers for the generation of

hydroelectric powers under the provisions of Article III (2) (d) of the

Treaty. The design, construction and operation of the plants shall be

governed by provision of Annexure E (ibid). The design shall

conform to the criteria laid down in para 8, part iii to Annex D and

includes the requirement that the works shall not be capable of

raising artificially the water level in the operating pool above the Full

Pondage Level specified in the design. There shall be no outlets

below Dead Storage Level. Under the Treaty India can make only

‘Non-consumptive uses’, which include any control or use of water

for navigation, floating of timber or other property, flood protection

or flood control, fishing or fish culture, and other like beneficial

purposes so that the water undiminished in volume within the

practical range of measurement remains dormant in or is returned to

the same river or its tributaries. Such use does not include

agricultural use or use in the channels of hydroelectric power.

As soon as it found out Indian 'designs', Pakistan did not hesitate to

ask for more information, and then raised objections as early as

August, 1992. This should be enough to allay any suspicion that

Pakistan's government was found not vigilant. The project is divided into two phases and each phase is designed to

produce 450 MW power. The first phase is likely to be completed

within 2005. However, the MoU for construction of 450 MW thBaglihar Project was signed on 11 March, 1999 with Jaiprakash

Industries Ltd., the biggest Indian hydropower construction

company, and two other companies, Siemens and Hydro Vevey Ltd.

Total cost of the project is Indian Rs.38b (less than a billion dollars)

and the Indian government is providing massive assistance to the

state government in completing the project. The state allocated Rs.

16b; the Indian government promised assistance of Rs. 22b.

The Project envisages the construction of a 308 meters high dam on

River Chenab near the place known as Baglihar (see Map) with

storage of 321,000 Acre Feet of which 291,000 acre ft. is dead

storage capacity. Live storage, also termed as Pondage (Operational

Pool), is 30,400 acre ft. This Pondage is required to supplement the

discharge during low flow period. This is what Pakistan is opposing.

The Treaty has an excellent record of full compliance by both the

parties and has held for the last 45 years and yet we may have

entered a phase where water has acquired a new sense of urgency

about shortages. Population explosion continuing apace in both the

countries, water is going to come under intense pressure. The Treaty

lays down an elaborate dispute resolution mechanism, which has not

been necessary to invoke for the past 45 years. No difference between

the two commissioners has, so far, graduated to a dispute, not even

to the point of difference requiring reference to a neutral expert

before this one.

India insists on bilateral discussion under Article VIII whereas

Pakistan seeks recourse to Article IX. The latter provides for dispute

resolution and involves third party involvement, which India

religiously avoids in settling any dispute with any of her neighbours.

Under the Treaty, it is the Commission that shall first examine any

issues arising. The Commissioners from both sides together form the

Commission. This Commission, if it fails to reach an agreement, a

difference will be deemed to have arisen. It may be noted that

'questions' remain questions so long as they are under discussion in

the Commission. When they defy resolution, they become

differences, which are then to be referred to the neutral expert.

Annex F to the Treaty prescribes the procedure to be followed in that

case. If there is any difference, which in the opinion of either

Commissioner falls within the scope of Article IX read with Annex F

to the Treaty, then at the request of either Commissioner (in this case

145144

Pakistan's) a neutral expert will be appointed in accordance with the

provisions mentioned in Annex F. The two governments may make

appointment jointly, and failing which, by such person as may be

agreed upon between the two governments. In the absence of such

agreement the World Bank will appoint the neutral expert.

Annex G deals with the establishment of a Court of Arbitration. A

Court of Arbitration shall consist of 7 Arbitrators including two

appointed by each party, and three called the umpires, one from each

of the following categories:

1. Persons qualified by status of reputation to be Chairman of the

Court of Arbitration who may, but need not be Engineers or

Lawyers.2. Highly qualified engineers and3. Persons well conversant in international law.

It appears that sooner or later, the World Bank will have to fulfil its

obligations under the Treaty. It cannot escape the responsibility by

claiming that it is not a guarantor. That is precisely what its role was

contemplated by the two parties before agreeing to subscribe to the

Treaty. The appointment of a neutral expert is not going to be easy.

Once the World Bank is referred to, and the two governments fail to

jointly appoint one, the Bank, within one month after the date of

request, shall appoint him. This provision is subject to an important

caveat, which stipulates, 'Every appointment shall be made after

consultation with each of the parties.'

According to reports, Pakistan's Ambassador to the U.S. met the

World Bank President. A leading expert of the World Bank has

predicted a prolonged and complicated legal battle. According to a st threport (31 January, 2005), the World Bank responded on 19

January, 2005 and made it clear that it is just a signatory and not a

guarantor. The WB needs the approval of both countries and as such

the process could be time consuming allowing India sufficient time

to complete the project.

There has been no outcome yet. The World Bank is dragging its feet

and has adopted the role of a conduit of messages between the two

protagonists. The two governments may ultimately agree to finalise

the services of one or more mediators. If and when the neutral expert

agreeable to the two parties is found, the process will begin and in

the meanwhile India will be busy changing realities on the ground.

The provisions contained in paragraphs 3,4, and 5 of Article IX

relating to the 'Dispute' shall not apply to any difference while it is

being dealt with by a neutral expert. In case the neutral expert

determines that in his opinion the difference or a part thereof should

be treated as dispute, then the dispute will be deemed to have arisen,

which will be settled in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of

Article IX.

Mr. T.C.A. Raghavan, Deputy High Commissioner of India, whom

the author met recently, recently stated that the Project is not due for

completion anytime soon and might get completed by Dec 2006.

According to him about 60 per cent work on the Project has been

completed. According to a newspaper report, Senator Khurshid

Ahmad, on the other hand claims, that 85 per cent work on Baglihar

has been completed.

thTrevor D'Souza, in Business and Finance Review, 28 February

2005, claims that 'The percentage of progress at stage I so far is 41

per cent for civil works and 63 per cent for hydro-mechanical works.

Design and engineering 94 per cent, infrastructure works 99 per

cent, river diversion works 88 per cent, dam and intake 17 per cent,

waterways 60 per cent, powerhouse complex 90 per cent and

pothead yard 13 per cent.

The completed structure so far comprises eight bridges, 30 km of

roads, 10 km of tunnels, 300 m vertical shafts and 5 huge caverns

plus camps, storehouses and workshops, offices, laboratory, hospital

and complete facilities for production of aggregates and concrete and

placement.’

When asked why India did not suspend work on the Project as

demanded by Pakistan to provide for further bilateral discussions,

Mr Raghavan referred to the Tulbul Project, which was suspended by

India at the instance of Pakistan, and has remained so since then.

Wullar Barrage Storage Project, which India prefers calling Tulbul

Navigation Project, remains suspended since 1987. According to

India Indian Rs.170 million has already been spent on the project.

India does not want to repeat the mistake. Similarly, India does not

want third party involvement because of sad experience with the

147146

Rann of Kutch and points to India's suspicions of the multilateral

process.

Then there is another twist to the dispute. Kashmir is back again

center stage. According to Dr. Syed Nazir Gilani (South Asia Tribune,

24 January, 2005), taking a position on the Baglihar dispute is full of

risks. Gilani is Chair of International Kashmir Alliance and Advocate

of the Supreme Court. He says that since Pakistan has moved to the

World Bank, 'it is in our prime interest that we become a party

without fail”. According to him the dispute is a blessing in disguise

and has landed Pakistan in the soup by exposing its disregard for the

welfare of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. The dispute has

created an opening for the defence of Kashmir Interests. He holds

that allocation of water under the Treaty was a breach of the

Instrument of Accession of Kashmir with India 1948, which could

not trade off a natural resource without fully assessing 'the

jurisprudence of principality of water, and whether the water being

allocated actually exists or may be taken without detriment to other

users, the water or the environment.’

By concluding the 1960 Indus Water Treaty with India, Pakistan has,

in practice, accepted the sovereignty of India over water resource and

habitat. According to a Kashmiri website (jammu-stkashmir.com/insights) accessed on 31 January, 2005, J&K

rdAssembly passed a Resolution on 3 March 2003 asking New Dehli

to reconsider Indus Water Treaty so as to safeguard the interests of

the State. According to this report, Pakistan's opposition to the

project amounts to playing with aspirations of the Kashmiri people.

It states that average annual flow of water in the Eastern Rivers

allocated to India is around 33 MAF and in the Western Rivers given

to Pakistan 135 MAF.

Pakistan certainly harbours suspicion of India's intentions because of

the design of the Project. The official spokesman for the government

of Pakistan, Mr Masood Khan referred to 'trust deficit'between the

two countries. He went on to say that water is precious and the two

countries need to manage it with prudence.

Even if India does not breach the spirit of the Treaty, there is

obviously no remedy against future intentions of India. A reference

to the World Bank may have satisfied diplomatic ego of Pakistan but

may take long in yielding any returns. In the process it has hurt the

spirit of the reconciliation process. There appears no escape from

confronting each other as well as the thorny issue. One has to

contend with a stream of such project in the pipeline, which India

has suddenly realised offer it the best potential for progress, in

general, and to Indian-administered Kashmir, in particular. The

basic dispute between the two governments arises more out of

mistrust by Pakistan of India's intention, because at some point in

the future, once it acquires the capacity to store water, India can

easily withhold it during shortage and release it during excess, the

precise opposite of what the lower riparian country would want.

India answers to the Pakistani fears by saying that 'the first

installation which would disappear would be the Salal project, which

is down-stream the Baglihar project, and if they were to flood

Pakistan, they would endanger the Salal Project.

The Indian Foreign Secretary, on Pakistani fears that somehow India

would have the 'capability either to flood Pakistan or to deny water to

Pakistan', says: 'The treaty cannot deal with suspicion of this kind; it

cannot deal with intentions of this kind. We are confident that what

we are doing with this project is entirely within the parameters laid

down by the Indus Water Treaty. We respect the Treaty because this

Treaty held for the last forty five years.'He went on to say that: 'We

cannot find a technical fix for suspicion of the kind.'

This issue is an addition to other irritants in the relations between

the two nuclear neighbours. Its early resolution to the satisfaction of

both parties is highly unlikely. The process of appointing a neutral

expert followed by arbitration will be long and tedious.

India seems to be following its decision to proceed apace, and create

a fait accompli like Israeli settlements in the West Bank and other

Palestinian territories. But then India would have to pay a price; it

will undermine the sanctity of an international treaty, which has held

for 45 years. There is nothing to force India to accept the terms of

the Treaty, both in letter and spirit, except the moral force. As the

future unfolds, the waters will be choppy, and the feeling of trust and

good will having been lost, resolution of issues would be less

susceptible to an easy solution.

In the final analysis the dispute will have to be resolved by the two

149148

South Asian nations in the spirit of give and take.

Shahid Husain is a former secretary for water and power with the

Government of Pakistan.

Refernces lIndus Water Treaty, 1960.lOfficial Documents.lJoint Press Release, dated 24.6.2004.lInterviews with Pakistan Commissioner for Indus Waters (4-Lytton

Road, Lahore) and Mr.lT.C.A. Raghavan Indian Deputy High Commissioner, Islamabad.l‘India Planning three more dams in Jammu and Kashmir’, Daily Times,

(Feb 21 2005). th

lDaily Times, Jan 17 2005.lThe Tribune, NOIDA, Jan 10,2005.lBilal Hassan, Dawn, 14th Feb, 2005.lTrevor D'Souza, ‘Baghlihar Dam: Stalemate In Peace Talks’, Business

and Finance Review, 28, Feb 2005. lDr. Syed Nazir Gilani, South Asia Tribune, 24 January, 2005.lJammu Kashmir website (jammu-kashmir.com/insights) accessed on 31

Janusray, 2005.lDelhi Times, Feb 8, 2005.

thlDaily Times, January 17 2005.

Chronology of Events

20.5.1992 The first time India supplies information and Pakistan got to

know about the proposal.

12 .8.1992 Pakistan raised objections.7.5.93 - 28.9.99 Exchange of arguments on the design of the Plant and request

for the Commission's meeting on the issue.6 -11.1.1996 Site inspection No work at site.

th29 - 30.3.2000 First discussion at the 84 meeting of Permanent Indus

Commission.th29.5. - 1.6.2000 85 Meeting of Commission. India promises data. India also

states that no river works have been taken so far. However,

construction on infrastructure continues.29.5 - 1.6.2001 Permanent Indus Commission agrees to consider the matter

under Article IX (1) of the Treaty.(Dispute Resolution).10.01.2001 Pakistan's asks through a letter about status of work in

progress. 15.10.2001 Pakistan writes a letter asking for work to stop and to have a

meeting to resolve the issue.15.1.2002 Pakistan writes a letter asking the construction to stop pending

resolution.6.3.2002 India replies that it is under no obligation to stop work under

the Treaty.April 2002 Pakistan conveys 'questions' relating to the project to India.

th28.5 - 1.6.2002 87 Meeting of the Commission. India seeks Pakistan's reaction

on particulars of change, which they posted to Pakistan.24.5.2002 Particulars of change conveyed by India.13.7.2002 Pakistan writes a letter and maintains objections on the revise

design.31.7.2002 Pakistan writes a letter for meeting to resolve the issue under

Article IX (1).29.8.2002 India gives interim reply that awaiting comments internally.6.9.2002. Pakistan writes a letter and urges an immediate meeting.

th16.9.2002 India writes a letter and repeats its reply dated 29 2002.17.9.2002 Pakistan urges for a meeting and proposes to proceed to the

next step provided in the Treaty, if no positive response.27.9.2002 India writes a letter that it will revert to the subject in coming

weeks but refuses to suspend work.28.9.2002 Pakistan writes a letter and asks for a meeting in October.18.10.2002 Pakistan writes again and urges a meeting in October and asks

to suspend construction.7.11.2002 India writes a letter and expresses its inability to meet in

October.18.11.2002 Pakistan writes to India proposing suspension of work and also

to hold meeting.11.12.2002 India writes a letter and suggests meeting in January 2003.13.12.2002 Pakistan accepts the proposal. 4-6.02.2003 Permanent Indus Commission meets in Islamabad. India

disagrees with the questions formulated by Pakistan. Pakistan

records failure.8.05.2003 Pakistan's Commissioner gives notice for the appointment of a

Neutral Expert.28-30.05.2003 Annual Meeting of the Commission is held. Fails to prepare

'statement of points of difference’.20.6.2003 Pakistan's Commissioner requests the two Governments for the

appointment of a Neutral Expert.4.7.2003 GOP issues Note Verbale to India regarding modalities of

appointing a Neutral Expert.7.7.2003 GOI issues Note Verbale. Suggests bilateral discussion.18.08.2003 Government of Pakistan sends Note Verbale. Asks for:

1. Suspension of work2. Site Visit and3. Time bound resolution

Oct, 2003 Pakistan Commissioner is allowed a Tour of Inspection to the

site. Work was in progress as per design.Nov, 2003 Pakistan communicates its observations based on the site visit

to India.6.11.2003 GOP issues Note Verbale. Reminds India to suspend work and

proceed towards time-bound resolution.18.12.2003 GOI issues a Note Verbale and again asks for a meeting of the

Commission.

151150

27.12.2003 GOP issues Note Verbale. Accepts proposal to have meeting to

discuss & resolve the issue under Article IX (1).13.01.2004 GOI issues Note Verbale. Proposes meeting under Article VIII

(5) and not IX (1).15.01.2004 Pakistan does not accept Article VIII (5), being not relevant

and proposes a meeting under Article IX(1).15.01.2004 Special Meeting of the Commission is held at

Islamabad/Lahore. India refuses discussion under article IX

(1).26-29.05.2004 Annual Meeting of the Commission takes place. India urges

bilateral resolution. Pakistan maintains its demand for

suspension and time-bound resolution.03.06.2004 Pakistan High Commissioner to India raises the issue with

Indian External Affairs Minister. Secretary level talks are

proposed.21-22.06.2004 Secretaries Water (India and Pakistan) meet and agree on

certain modalities including examination by a Technical

Committee.Aug, 2004 Pakistan dispatches data as agreed in the previous meeting.10-9-2004 GOP issues Note Verbale. Reminds India to start process for

time-bound resolution.13.09.2004 India demands Pakistani objections to be substantiated.10.10.2004 Pakistan issues Note Verbale and protests against the Indian

statement that Pakistan had offered to resolve all technical

objections without reference to Article IX of the Treaty.24.11.04.1 The two Prime Ministers meet. Both decide to make another

attempt to resolve the issue bilaterally.st

25.11.2004 Indian Commissioner writes letter and refers to 1 Secretary

level meeting and promises to supply all possible information

by mid December 2004.27.11.2004 GOP issues Note Verbale and proposes to hold the final

thmeeting between Water Secretaries of Pakistan and India on 6

December 2004.01-02.12.2004 GOI issues Note Verbale and suggests a meeting in end

December, 2004 because talks between Secretaries of Water

Resources would be more effective after Pakistan has examined

relevant data provided by India. 11.12.2004 Prime Minister chairs an informal meeting of all relevant

Ministries and issues instructions for holding one last meeting

with India.15.12.2004 GOI supplies requisite data/information through Indian High

Commission, Islamabad. Data is examined by Pakistan.

Objections on the design are maintained after due

substantiation.3-7.1.2005 The Secretaries meet in Delhi but fail to resolve the differences.15.1.2005 Pakistan requests World Bank to appoint a Neutral Expert.24.1.2005 World Bank asks for some documentary evidence.28.1.2005 Pakistan supplies documentary evidence to the World Bank.

Arsenic Poisoning and Water Supply in Bangladesh

Dr M. Abdul Ghani

he river system that flows through Bangladesh is the third

largest source of fresh-water discharge to the world's oceans.

The annual volume of flows passing below the confluence of Tthe Ganges and the Brahmaputra is about 795,000 cubic meters,

which is equivalent to about 5.5 meters of depth over the country. In

addition to that the country receives on an average about 2 meter

rainfall annually. Therefore, hypothetically the country will be under

about 7.5 meter water if there was no flow to the Bay of Bengal. Still

Bangladesh faces shortages of water every year for crop production

and even for home consumption during summer months especially

during February to May. This contrasting situation is mainly due to

regulation of flows of the major rivers outside Bangladesh and

uneven or skewed distribution of rainfall over the year (Table 1)

Table 1: Average Monthly Rainfall Data of Bangladesh for 1986 to 1998 Period (in mm). Year Jan Feb Mar Apri May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Avera

ge

1986

3

1

14

116

146

363 438

315

497

189

131

5

185

1987

1

5

4

148

113

237 779

450

320

93

31

16

183

1988

2

41

58

122

336

551 474

429

236

164

98

2

209

1989

2

13

7

76

203

344

526

134

289

237

0

3

153

1990

0

50

121

133

245

334

586

206

253

238

60

30

1881991

7

19

33

58

274

461

378

341

460

268

3

52

1961992

8

54

4

21

187

264

398

254

274

150

9

3

1361993

22

57

109

124

367

599

464

434

341

148

18

0

2241994

11

27

106

157

183

407

280

309

164

90

8

0

1451995

6

28

23

47

216

416

366

392

238

268

45

0

1701996

10

23

68

118

211

337

583

357

446

27

12

18

1841997

27

19

121

113

223

299

559

3018

277

29

7

22

3931998

28

39

101

150

251

219

697

657

117

161

86

0

209Normal

8

15

42

111

265

506

537

429

304

186

35

9

204

Source: Bangladesh Meteorological Department, 2000.

153152

recent and long term data show similar pattern).

The country depends on intensive withdrawal of groundwater for

irrigation and household purposes during the summer months.

Quality deterioration of groundwater during the recent years due to

arsenic contamination has reduced safe water availability for

drinking and irrigation purposes all over the country. However,

fortunately the quantity of groundwater pumped and used during the

dry months -- November to May -- is fully recharged during the rainy

season -- June to October -- except in Dhaka, where withdrawal rate

is higher than possible recharge rate. Bangladesh receives plenty of

rainwater during the monsoon, which mostly coincides with the

period of the year when it receives huge volume of water from the

catchments outside the country.

Therefore, an unfavourable water environment, due to drought

during February to May and frequent floods during June to October,

is created. During the dry months ground water level goes down at

many places beyond suction limit (>25 feet or about 10 m), arsenic

content in ground water becomes high and crosses safe limit (> 0.05

ppm) for irrigation and domestic consumption and coastal water

(both surface and ground) becomes saline in many places.

Bangladesh, therefore, needs better management of water resources

for crop production and human consumption.

Groundwater is contaminated by natural arsenic in 60 out of 64

districts in Bangladesh. Out of 640 upazillas (sub-districts), 268 are

affected by arsenic contamination (personal communication with a

senior manager of the Department of Public Health Engineering,

DPHE). However, the extent of contamination varied from area to

area and entire area of a district or sub-district is not affected. High

concentration of arsenic is found in water from thousands of wells

across the country and an estimated 30 million out of 130 million

people are at risk (DPHE 2000). However, the extent of

contamination level varies from area to area. The extent of problem

and its impact on health and production are still unknown, but

millions of people are threatened. Information on arsenic

contamination in groundwater does not cover all areas of potential

contamination and is not always reliable or conclusive. However, in

recent years arsenic contamination has become an additional

problem and is becoming a major concern both from human

consumption and irrigation points of views. It is a complex problem

in Bangladesh which needs to be dealt with scientifically. Careful

investigation is also required to find out impact of using arsenic

contaminated water on crop production, its effects in the food chain

as well as arsenic build-up in the soil.

The coastal area of Bangladesh consists of about 2.8 million hectare

(Mha), which is over 20% of the country. Due to suspected salinity

problem, people in this area are forced to use costly tube-wells of

over 300 meter depth for avoiding pumping saline water.

In view of the above situation, Bangladesh should develop strategies

for addressing salinity and arsenic contamination to ensure supply of

clean water for agriculture and household use. Since 25 per cent of

the country is suspected salinity prone and about another 25 per cent

affected by arsenic contamination, Bangladesh cannot afford to leave

almost 50 per cent of the country unattended. The impact of this

situation on human health, production, social and natural

environments needs to be assessed so that professionals can assist in

developing research programmes for mitigating the problems.

Bangladesh has excess water from June to October, which causes

floods carrying debris, dirt and sediments. Therefore, physical

cleanliness is a visible problem in addition to the chemical

contamination of water, which makes it unsuitable for drinking

unless purified. Salinity and arsenic contamination are problems for

coastal and affected areas respectively for agricultural and human

consumption purposes in the dry seasons.

Improvement StrategyWater availability over the year indicates that the country should not

face problem in supplying adequate water for human consumption

and agricultural production. In addition to deep and shallow tube-

wells mainly used for irrigating about 4 million hectares in recent

years, about 8 million hand tube-wells and about 1500 production

wells (deep tube-wells of different capacities used for urban water

supply) are in operation for drinking water supply all over the

country (Personal communication with concerned DPHE high

management 2005).

155154

Water Availability Water for drinking is not scarce in Bangladesh. The document on

national water management plan confirms that the requirements for

domestic and industrial supplies are only to the extent of 0.7 per cent

and is assured while planning agricultural water demand for the

country (MPO 1991). However, its quality is the limiting factor at

places and during a certain period of the year. With possible low cost

treatment/purification, this can be solved specially during the rainy

season (May to October). Water pollution caused by dumping

industrial and other wastes in the low-lying areas, rivers and other

water bodies will improve the situation. Improved management at

local and national level through government and social interventions

can ensure clean water for all. Bangladesh has assessed availability

of groundwater over the Agro-Ecological Regions of the country

(UNDP & FAO 1988). The country can a develop plan for its

sustainable use and quality improvement using this information

(Table 2).

The Department of Public Health Engineering (DPHE) confirmed

that there are 11 Zonal Laboratories in Bangladesh for monitoring

drinking water quality. DPHE is also setting up a donor-funded

central laboratory.

Arsenic ContaminationGroundwater is contaminated by naturally occurring arsenic in 60

out of 64 districts in Bangladesh. Technical options for using

groundwater in the arsenic contaminated area will need to be

developed. This will require analysis of existing water supply

infrastructure and options for alternative supply and treatment of

Table 2: Agro ecological Regime and Surface and Ground Water Availability Situation in Bangladesh Sl.No. Region Water Availability 1.

Old Himalayan Piedmont Plain

Limited surface water

Ample groundwater

2.

Active Tista Floodplain

No dependable surface water

Ample groundwater

3.

Tista Meander Floodplain

Limited surface water

Ample groundwater

4.

Koratoya-Bangali Floodplain

Limited surface water

Ample groundwater except in some locations.

5.

Lower Atrai Basin

Limited surface water

Ample groundwater

6.

Lower Purnabhaba Floodplain

Limited surface water

Uncertain groundwater

7,

Active Brahmaputra and Jamuna Floodplain

Limited surface water

Uncertain groundwater

8.

Young Brahmaputra and Jamuna Floodplain

Ample surface and groundwater

9.

Old Brahmaputra Floodplain

Available surface water (exploited)

Ample groundwater

10.

Active Ganges Floodplain

Limited surface water

Ample groundwater

11.

High Ganges River Floodplain

Limited surface water

Ample groundwater

12.

Low Ganges River Floodplain

Limited surface and groundwater

Groundwater is not available in some places

13.

Ganges Tidal Floodplain

Limited surface water, satisfactory groundwater but with some dead zone

14.

Gopalganj-Khulna Beels

Adequate surface water but saline within 500 meter.

Adequate groundwater but saline near surface and good below 300 meter.

15.

Atrai Beel

Ample surface and groundwater with some limitation of groundwater in certain areas.

16.

Middle Meghani River Floodplain

Ample surface and groundwater

17.

Lower Meghna Floodplain

Ample surface and groundwater

18.

Young Meghana Estuarine Floodplain

Ample surface water but little salinity in dry season.

Groundwater is good below 300 meter.

19.

Old Meghna Estuarine floodplain

Ample surface and groundwater but saline in some

20.

Eastern Surma-Kushiyara Floodplain

Surface and groundwater are available but not enough for the entire area.

21.

Sylhet Basin

Ample surface water

Limited groundwater

22.

Northern and Eastern Piedmont plains

Surface and groundwater are limited

23.

Chittagong Coastal Plain

Limited surface and groundwater

24.

St. Martins Coral Islam

Surface water is saline

No mention about groundwater

25.

Level Barind Tract

Limited surface water

Good groundwater

26.

High Barind Tract

Limited surface water.

Groundwater is poor but need detail investigation

27.

North Eastern Barind Tract

Limited surface water but groundwater is good

28.

Madhupur Tract

Limited surface water but

Ample groundwater

29.

Northern and Eastern Hills

Limited surface water,

Groundwater is also limited, but need detail surveying.

30. Akhaura Terrace Limited surface water

Groundwater is good but need detail survey whether it is enough for the entire area.

Source: Land Resources Appraisal of Bangladesh for Agricultural Development.

Report 2, Agro -Ecological Regions of Bangladesh, UNDP & FAO, Rome, 1988.

157156

water.

Low cost mitigation of arsenic contaminated water is available,

which indicates that through community participation, cost effective

methods of supplying arsenic free water can be made available at less

than Taka 0.1 (0.2 cent) per litre (PROSHIKA 2001). Tube-wells

used for irrigation can also be used for household water supply.

(BMDA 2002).

The relationship between pumping depth and arsenic concentration

of groundwater has been studied for three years, and there is no

correlation between the parameters. At the beginning of the dry

season (December/January) arsenic concentration in the tube-wells

was <0.05 ppm. It gradually increased to >0.05 ppm by the end of

dry season (May/June) but dropped again to <0.05 ppm after the

rainy season. If this trend continues over the years, Bangladesh need

not fear the arsenic havoc claimed by professionals and interest

group (Ghani 2004). However, the study needs three to five more

years for reaching a dependable conclusion.

A major constraint to addressing the arsenic problem in Bangladesh

is insufficient information on the extent, causes and remedial

interventions. Although many research organizations of the country,

government agencies and NGOs are now engaged in data gathering,

information on arsenic contamination in groundwater does not cover

all areas of potential contamination and is not always reliable or

conclusive. The technical options for using groundwater for drinking

in the arsenic areas will need to be developed. This will require

analysis of the water supply infrastructure, options for alternative

supply and treatment of water. Tables 3 and 4 show that preliminary

level of information through limited studies and more detailed

studies are under way. Similar studies should continue in a more

comprehensive way for a longer period for developing data-based

information and mitigation measures.

In the coastal area, where salinity level of the river water becomes a

limiting factor during later part of February to end of May (Table 5 -

cited as an example as many rivers are flowing through the coastal

area), the author and fellow researchers explored the possibility of

storing water in the canals and low lying area when salinity level is

within acceptable level for enhancing ground water recharge,

multiple uses of the stored water including fish farming. Expansion

of the research idea in wider area in the region received enthusiastic

support from the beneficiaries. They agreed to provide 10-15 per cent

of the research cost through cash and kinds, if a pilot study is

undertaken in their area. About six km of canals can be used for

water conservation in a proposed study site and more than 100 ha

area can be irrigated with the stored water during the dry season.

Table 3: Status of Arsenic in Experimental Soil and Water for Different Locations in Bangladesh.

Place No. of Samples Soil As Range (ppm) Water As Range

(ppb) Gopalganj Sadar 132 0.261 to 7.035 150 to 791 Muksudpur 86 0.303 to 8.628 129 to 532 Monirampur

70

0.690 to 4.960

247 to 765

Pirgacha

90

1.200 to 8.100

134 to 667

Rajhat

90

0.200 to 5.500

112 to 490 Chapai Nawabganj

sadar

78

1.980 to 7.480

59 to 796

Charghat

220

0.200 to 40.080

158 to 689 Adopted from Farid A.T.M., et al., 2 002

9

Laksham

0.145

15- 30

10.791 10

Laksham

0.658

15-30

39.107

11

Laksham

0.729

0-15

18,125 12

Laksham

0.037

15-30

16.971

13

Laksham

0.261

O- 15

28.009 14

Laksham

0.261

15-30

42.608

15

Laksham

0.397

15-30

22.763

16

Laksham

0.341

15-30

12.529

17

Chandina

0.380

0-15

19.270

18

Chandina

0.160

0-15

19.270

19

Sonargaon

0.682

15-30

38.930

20

Sonargaon

0.860

0 to 15

22.866

21

Sonargaon

0.860

0 to 15

14.829

22

Sonargaon

0.860

15 to 30

14.000

23

Sonargaon

0.860

15 to 30

13.671

24

Bancharampur

0.092

0 15

17.147

25

Bancharampur

0.115

0 to 15

11.318

26

Netrokona

0.077

0-to 15

81.248

27 Netrokona 0.064 15 to 300 26.559Adopted from Huq, S. M. I., Rahman, A., and Sultana, N., 2002.

Table 4. : Arsenic in water and corresponding As in Soil of Different locations in Bangladesh.

Serial No. Location Water As (mg/kg) Soil depth, cm Soil As (mg/kg)1 Sharsha 0.041 0-15 13.670 2 Sirajdikhan 0.544 15-30 10.655 3 Alamdanga 0.021 0-15 16.647 4 Alamdanga 0.021 15-30 11.820 5

Alamdanga

0.191

0-15

11.918

6

Alamdanga

0.058

0-15

10.675

7

Meherpur

0.163

0 15

33.912

8 Meherpur 0.016 15- 30 28.220

159158

Fish farming in the canal and domestic water supply with water

purification will be additional benefits. The author believes that out

put of the research findings can be expanded in the remaining part of

2.8 million hectare of coastal area in Bangladesh. Similarly,

rainwater conservation and its planned use can minimise the

problem of clean water availability especially during dry months if

properly planned and implemented. This can also be used even for

the coastal and arsenic affected areas.

Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) has created facilities

for irrigation, drainage and flood control for over 5 million hectares

(BWDB 2004). BWDB has also created irrigation and drainage

canals and borrow pits for water conservation. Similarly, adequate

water can be stored in the small rivers through water control

structures from end of the monsoon till up to beginning of the

following monsoon. This will provide additional water bodies for

year-round use and help in continued recharge to the groundwater

and improved water environment. Water conservation during the

monsoon in the upper region through active participation of the

neighbours will further assist Bangladesh in solving water availability

problem during the dry months and will also assist in establishing

friendly relations with its neighbours.

Comprehensive studies should be undertaken at upazila or sub-

districts levels involving stakeholders, government and non-

government organisations (NGOs) working with agriculture, soil and

water based development programs. This will assist in developing

and implementing upazila level crop production and drinking water

supply plans. Experiments on on-farm water management will be

complemented with crop demonstration programs over the country

for comprehensive use of water for agricultural development and

drinking water supply. Water saved in one sector can complement

water supply to other sector. Appropriate management and low-cost

water purification and treatment will ensure good quality drinking

water supply for Bangladesh.

ConclusionSafe water for Bangladesh can be ensured through improved

planning and management. However, this will require water

purification, treatment and selection of pumping depth from region

to region. Government policies should ensure regulation of city, town

and industrial waste disposal so that water bodies are not polluted.

Improved management and conjunctive use of water resources are

major needs for Bangladesh. Rain water conservation and its

planned use during less or no rainfall period can minimise the

problem of clean water availability.

Dr M Abdul Ghani is national coordinator of the International Rice

Research Institute in Bangladesh.

References lWeather Data Report, Bangladesh Meteorological Department, (BMD,

Sher-e-Bangla Nagar, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2000) lPersonal Communication, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee

(BRAC), (BRAC Center, Dhaka, Bangladesh)lAnnual Report for 2002- 03 and Project Brief of BWDB Projects,

(Bangladesh Water Development Board, BWDB 2004 and 2005). lPersonal Communication, Barind Multipurpose Development Authority

(BMDA), 2002. lCEGIS, Unpublished Data 2002, Bangladesh. lBGS Technical Report, Department of Public Health Engineering,

DPHE (2000). WC/00/19 Volume 1. (Kakrail, Dhaka, Bangladesh).lFarid et. Al., A study of Arsenic Contaminated Irrigation Water and its

carried Over effect on Vegetable. Proceedings of the International

symposium on Fate of Arsenic in the Environment. Bangladesh

University of Engineering and Technology (BUET) and United Nations

University ( BUET, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2003).lM. A. Ghani, Arsenic Research in Bangladesh Agriculture: An

Overview. Proceedings of the workshop on "Arsenic in the Food Chain:

Assessment of Water-Soil-Crop Systems" held in Dhaka on July 22,

2004. Publication number 147 (Bangladesh Rice Research Institute,

Gazipur).lS. M. I. Huq, A. Rahman and N. Sultana, Extent and Severity of

Arsenic Contamination in Soils of Bangladesh. Proceedings of the

Table 5: Salinity Level in dS/m in Kazibacha River, Batiaghata, Khulna.

Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec1990 - - - - 12.5 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.31991

1.0

3.9

13.8

17.3

19.3

1.3

1.2

0.7

0.3

0.3

0.5 2.4

1992

1.7

6.5 11.3

21.3

20.0

13.9

1.2

0.7

0.3

0.3

0.5 2.4

1993

5.5

11.2 14.5

18.0

15.5

2.0

0.3

0.2

0.2

0.4

0.3 0.3

1994

0.8

5.7 10.0

15.2

14.7

12.5

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3 0.4

1995

3.2

8.4

14.9

19.9

21.2

2.9

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.3

0.4 0.4

1996

1.6

8.9

-

15.8

15.2

14.6

0.3

0.3

0.4

0.4

0.6 1.01997

2.7

10.5

11.4

13.4

17.4

11.0

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.4 0.91998

1.9

2.3

11.1

12.5

14.3

6.9

0.2

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3 0.41999

1.7

2.6

9.4

16.3

13.7

1.1

0.6

0.2

0.3

0.2

0.3 0.32000

0.7

1.1

1.8

9.7

1.3

0.4

0.2

0.3

0.3

0.2

0.4 0.52001 0.7 5.9 11.7 19.6 9.1 0.6 - 0.14 0.33 0.30 0.36 0.5

Adopted from CEGIS, 2002.

161160

International symposium on Fate of Arsenic in the Environment.

Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET) and

United Nations University, ( BUET, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2003) lMaster Plan Organization (MPO), National Water Plan Project Phase II.

Ministry of Water Resources, Bangladesh Secretariat, Dhaka, 1991).lPROSHIKA Initiatives on Arsenic Mitigation in Bangladesh, Progress

Report, PROSHIKA - A Center for Human Resources Development.,

Dhaka 1216, Bangladesh.lUNDP and FAO, Land Resources Appraisal of Bangladesh for

Agricultural Development, Report - 2, Agro-ecological Regions of

Bangladesh, FAO, Rome, 1988.

Decentralizing South Asia's Rural Water Sector

Dr Satyajit Singh

arl Wittfogel is thesis of Oriental Despotism emphasized that

it was the distribution of water which laid the foundation of

society, state and empire (Wittfogel, 1957). The Wittfogelian Kthesis argued for an all powerful, centralized and despotic state that

should control all water resources. In contrast, Clifford Geertz, based

on a historical and sociological study of a subak, or irrigation society,

in the Indonesian island of Bali points out that peasants and

communities played a central role in the control and regulation of

water (Geertz, 1980). As Geertz puts it, 'Theories of hydraulic

despotism to the contrary notwithstanding, water control in Bali is

an overwhelming local and intensely democratic matter'. It is argued

in this paper that an understanding of this debate on a centralized

versus decentralized state for water management is central to the

understanding of water and its related conflicts in South Asia. This

paper will highlight the centralizing versus decentralizing debate in

the context of the rural drinking water sector in South Asia and draw

lessons for the wider water sector.

In South Asia we have had a few large irrigation projects in the forms

of lakes and canals built by empires. The classic examples are the

Lake Sudarshana constructed by Chandragupta Maurya and the

Grand Anicut by the Cholas and numerous canals off rivers that were

supported by the State. At the same time, groundwater irrigation

through the charsa and the araghat or small bunds on rivers and

streams (also supported by the State at least from the time of the

Mauryan empire documented in the Arthsashtra) met the bulk of

irrigation requirement in South Asia. Indeed, this decentralized

production of water led to the consolidation of petty peasant

production in agriculture as medieval historians like Irfan Habib

have pointed out (Habib, 1963). The existing social relations to water

were to change under the British colonial rule. Under the

management of military civil engineers, water was seen as an empire

builder and Lt. Gen Sir Arthur Cotton visualized a web of canals

linking the rivers in India and China. Water was not only an

instrument for empire building but also a revenue generator. The

early returns from water led Cotton to make the statement, “Water in

India is more valuable than gold of Australia.” Post-colonial South

Asia continued with the colonial quest of taming the waters in a

centralizing manner with disastrous social, ecological and economic

implications (Singh, 1997).

Present-day South Asia has seriously begun the quest of

decentralizing and democratizing governance. Institutional designs

for the production, control and regulation of water at the local

government level are being attempted in earnest. This paper points

to some - issues and concerns related to the decentralized

management of drinking water in rural South Asia that has

implications for decentralizing the water sector as a whole. Similar

attempts at decentralization are also being made for watershed

management. While farmers associations are also being established

for the efficient distribution of canal water, reforms in the irrigation

sector as a whole are not yet on the table in South Asia. Here policy

makers, academics and critics are working for spaces within the

centralized structure rather than calling for an overhaul of the

system.

State and Provision of Service DeliveryDrinking water and sanitation services to rural areas have

traditionally been delivered by state agencies funded through fiscal

transfers from the center. It is a public sector model of delivery

where the incentives are so structured that the public agency is

responsive to central bureaucracy rather than beneficiaries. In South

Asia they are structured to disburse capital funds rather than focus

on sustainability, outputs and outcomes of the investment. This is a

supply driven mechanism where technology is chosen on the basis of

incentives to the professional managers rather than the people. The

existing perverse incentives have led to an over-emphasis on the

technological super-structure rather than the economic and social

sub-structure through which people relate to water. In contrast, civil

society initiatives have focused on issues of appropriate technology;

equitable distribution of developmental benefits and prioritized

targeting of the poor; greater gender equality; and sustainable use of

resources. People's participation is seen as key for better

developmental outcomes.

Recent studies have also pointed out that many of these public

investments are also inefficient. In South Asia unaccounted-for water

ranges from 40 to 60 percent. Cost recovery from water is grossly

inadequate. While the proponents of the public sector justify its

existence in the name of the poor, the public distribution system for

drinking water has not reached full coverage. This actually means

that the poorest are actually not provided public water and are left to

depend on water vendors who could charge according to recent

studies anywhere between 20 to 60 times more than the public utility

price. The poor are already paying the cost of public sector

inefficiency. In the name of public goods, while about 10 percent of

the total plan funds since independence have been spent on

irrigation, hydraulic property rights are linked to property rights in

land. Given the skewed distribution of land in South Asia, it is not

wrong to say that public investment in irrigation has benefited the

affluent in the countryside rather than being used for poverty

reduction. It is time to question the outcome of our public sector

investment in the effort to design pro-poor institutions and

safeguards. Democratic and devolutionary decentralization that puts

the responsibility of distribution and development of public goods

and distribution of subsidy at the local level may be the starting point

for addressing pressing concerns of poverty and what water can do to

help alleviate it.

A worldwide emphasis on reforms is a political reaction to the

failures of centralized models of administration and economic

management, whether Leninist or Keynesian. Today the centralized

state is being dismantled because the economic gurus have found a

competitive market to be more efficient and responsive to the

citizens than a monopolist state where accountability is to the centre.

This theory states that the market creates efficiencies due to the

existence of bargaining in economic transactions and the existence of

institutions that define the procedures under which this bargaining

163162

takes place and the mandates of those involved. Under a

monopolistic state, organizations face informational constraints,

there are huge transaction costs, contracts do not provide for all the

contingencies or specifically define the outputs and outcomes of

public investment. In short, institutional weaknesses, graft and rents,

inappropriate incentive systems and lack of enforcement lead of

chronic failures in centralizing states. Economies that are in

transition form socialism or developing economies to a market

economy, face the added problem of working in an institutional

vacuum created over the control of rents in a situation where the

older elite has not yet been replaced with a new governing

configuration. In fact, the nature of the new governing structure is

'under construction' for the market and the state have to define their

'equilibrium' positions in the new order. A recent economic theory

argues that Paroto-optimal allocation through the price mechanism

can be achieved for private goods only. For public goods such as

health and education, market allocation leads to undersupply.

However, before we celebrate the inefficiencies of the market in the

supply of public goods we need to heed carefully to the institutional

paradigm that call for the demise of the monopolistic state and the

need to establish institutional and organizational bargaining for

greater efficiencies. The institutions regulate the exercise of

authority, establish incentive systems and reduce transactional

constraints. Douglas North calls institutions the rules of the game,

according to which individuals and organizations function. They

constrain and facilitate behavior and together with endowments and

technology, define the set of economic opportunities in a society.

Institutions define norms of behavior, provide transparent

information, define commitment mechanisms, and establish an

effective monitoring and evaluation system (North, 1986).

The state thus redefines itself to focus on policy, leaving the process

of implementation or service delivery to a plethora of institutions

characterized as public, private, civil society or partnerships between

these organizations. The issue is not one of state versus market, or

state versus civil society, rather one of institutional design that

separates the functions of policy, implementation and regulation.

Currently, these roles are all combined in one, making the

government the judge, the jury and the executioner. Yet, the state

cannot be wished away as government regulation in some form is

required due to the public good nature of water. The state needs to

ensure sustainability of the water resource over time and provide

standards for water quality. An important function of the state is the

provision of public goods to the poor to help them with asset

creation. The state needs to devise safety nets and instruments of

managing the shocks to the economy that enhance the vulnerability

of the poor (drought, floods, natural calamities, etc), devise

mechanisms for redistribution and also methods that enable voice

and choice in the determination and distribution of public goods.

There is thus a need to evolve models of state ownership and control

without necessarily being part of the delivery process.

Decentralization is one such option.

Decentralization, driven by political, economic and technical factors

has led to the emergence of multi-tiered governments in one form or

another across the world. Of the 75 developing and transition

economies, with a population of over 5 million, 63 are devolving

political, administrative or fiscal authority at the local governments.

In some countries, administrative de-concentration is the path while

in others it is full political and fiscal decentralization. There is a

potential that the attempts to address the rural drinking water

scarcity may require some form of decentralization of powers -

partial or otherwise - in South Asia. In today's world more often than

not, several tiers of government are often involved in the delivery

and financing of public goods. There is a need to clearly define the

institutions, role of different tiers of governments within a country in

the management, financing and delivery of these public goods.

Decentralizing the Rural Water Supply in South AsiaIn the mid-nineties a $80m community driven project, popularly

known as the Swajal project, was designed in Uttar Pradesh in India.

This was a follow-up on the institutional design of the JAKPAS

project in Nepal designed in the early nineties. Under these projects,

for the first time the communities had a say in every aspect of project

design and implementation, including the choice of technology and

community contracting. The earlier NGO, bilateral and multi-lateral

projects encouraged participation for O&M while hardware was

designed and constructed by the state water boards, e.g. World Bank

and DFID Maharashtra, World Bank Karnataka, Danida Karnataka,

Dutch AP, Gujarat and Kerala projects. The JACPAS project in Nepal

and the Swajal project in UP demonstrated to the world that

165164

community-driven development for rural infrastructure could be cost

effective and sustainable. The per capita cost of these projects ranged

between 40 to 60 percent of the UP Jal Nigam rates. Similarly in

Ollavanna panchayat in Kerala, the cost of local government projects

was about 18 percent of the Kerala Water Authority projects.

Community management characterized the institutional design of

this scheme. The management of the project was situated outside the

government, as the Project Management Unit (PMU) was an

autonomous body registered under the Societies Act. The PMU and

the communities in the form of the village water and sanitation

committees (VWSCs) sought the help of NGOs for both hardware

and software support. The VWSC was a stakeholder group, bypassing

the political institution of the Gram Panchayat. This was a very

efficient, executive led, fast delivery vehicle for the supply of rural

water.

However, there are a few issues associated with this institutional

design marked by a flow of funds to community and user groups by-

passing of state as well as local governments. The first relates to

economies of scale. Drinking water technologies that require

economies of scale beyond the boundaries of user groups or village

committees and which are economically efficient and affordable are

not addressed by the project. As a result, most rural communities are

left with small gravity systems or tube wells rather than piped water

systems that may be recommended for areas with water quality

problems. Excessive decentralization can be as problematic as over-

centralization. It is important to draw up a right balance of the roles

and responsibilities of the different tiers of the government as per the

local needs. Second, in order to effectively deal with issues of equity,

sustainability and reducing the vulnerability of the poor due to

uncertainties, a local fiscal base is required. In other words, there is a

need to develop the local government's fiscal foundations rather than

by-pass an underdeveloped local government. Finally, there is the

issue of scaling up the best practices of decentralized management.

The local government structure provides a constitutional and

institutional base to scale up what are identified as local,

decentralized and community initiatives in resource and water

management. The rational option seems to be an alignment with the

local government system in a way that local government and

community interface is strengthened. This has to be along with the

need to develop local capacity and innovative mechanisms to

contract in state level training institutions, NGOs, professionals and

the private sector for support to implement the water and sanitation

services.

Policy Reforms in Rural Water Supply in IndiaThe 73rd Constitutional Amendment is changing the institutional

landscape in rural India. The Government of India is committed to

rural decentralization. The constitutional amendment has mandated

a minimum level of rural decentralization across all states. The States

have modified their Acts to conform to the 73rd Amendment and

have set up State Finance Commissions to recommend resource

allocation to the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs). Political

decentralization in most states has taken place and has been highly

successful. However, with regard to devolution at the state level there

is a hesitant beginning in spite of the possible positive outcomes.

With the Constitutional Amendment, local governments have been

given functional responsibilities for water supply and sanitation. In

many ways these are natural functions for rural local governments as

these are critical to their everyday needs. The general disillusionment

with the centralized delivery of these services has resulted in growing

expectations for better services from the local governments.

The national and state governments face the challenge of providing

the poor with efficient services and substantially increased access to

sufficient quantity and quality of water and sanitation services. In

spite of significant public investment to the tune of Rs 37,000 crores

(about $ 9 billion) since independence till the Ninth Five Year Plan,

it is estimated that nearly fifty percent of the country's rural

population does not have access to safe and sustainable water supply

and the sanitation coverage for rural India is estimated to be only

about twenty percent. Lack of sufficient safe drinking water and

sanitation facilities significantly worsens the conditions of the rural

poor.

The Rural Water Supply and Sanitation (RWSS) sector in India is

undergoing a gradual but dramatic transformation. A centralized

state-run supply-driven organization staffed by hydraulic engineers

has till recently been considered as the most efficient form of

institution to be entrusted with the responsibility of safe and

sustainable supply of drinking water in rural India. It is increasingly

167166

The nature and scale of the reform process is unprecedented and

therefore requires focused intervention to catalyze the capacity fund

to make the reforms more effective. An increase in the access of the

poor to safe and sustainable water and sanitation services would

assist in better health that will positively impact economic gains from

the livelihood of the poor.

The Government of India (GOI) guidelines on sector reforms mark a

shift in the institutions primarily responsible for the delivery of water

supply and sanitation services. The reforms are clearly aimed at

developing alternatives to the water boards or the public health and

engineering departments. However, the GOI has provided a flexible

institutional design for state governments to adopt in line with state

policies. After one year we see three generic models developing

amongst the 26 states that would be discussed later. At the state

level, the GOI guidelines call for the creation of a State Water and

Sanitation Mission (SWSM) or an equivalent institution to facilitate

the reform process, provide policy guidelines salient to the state,

coordinate with other line departments, ensure uniform policies

across pilot districts and ensure proper monitoring and evaluation. Diagram 1: Institutional Reforms in the Water Sector in South Asia Existing Arrangement:

Supply Driven Reform Design: Demand Driven

Under the reform programme, the GOI instead of funding the state

water boards, directly funds a District Water and Sanitation Mission

(DWSM) or an equivalent institution like the District Panchayat for

project preparation, design and implementation. The DWSM is

State

Communities

Water Boards Local Governments

being recognized that this model of service delivery has failed to live

up to its expected outcomes of quality service delivery, financial and

ecological sustainability.

The Government of India has introduced a national policy that

promotes the financing and management of rural drinking water and

sanitation services at a decentralized level through local governments

and communities. The programme advocates for an increased role of

communities in the planning and management of their own facilities.

It envisages a shift in the role of government from provider to

facilitator and promotes participatory management and increased

cost recovery from users (at least 10 percent capital cost and 100

percent operation and maintenance contribution) as being critical in

order to ensure good quality, sustainable services. Under this

programme, the fiscal transfer from the national government is

directly to a dedicated district unit that in turn acts as a facilitator of

this programme with the involvement of local government and

community groups.

These principles were first articulated in the GOI Eighth Five Year

Plan, and are being implemented under the GOI Accelerated Rural

Water Supply Programme (ARWSP) in the Ninth Five Year Plan. 20

per cent of the ARWSP funds have been earmarked to implement

sector reforms on the basis of a demand responsive approach across

63 pilot districts in 26 states. Till August 2001, more than Rs 1,820

crores had been sanctioned to implement sector reforms in the 63

districts. Based on the wide success and acceptance of this

programme, the Government of India now wishes to allocate its

entire ARWSP budget on the basis of these demand-driven principles

from April 2006. State governments are being asked to restructure

the PHEDs and enter into a memorandum of understanding with the

central government to move from a supply driven to a demand

driven paradigm. Failure to do so would result in a denial of the

central funds that form the core of the state government's resources

for drinking water.

As institutional change of this magnitude has to be supplemented

with adequate capacity, a significant proportion of the national funds

are earmarked for capacity building of the local government and

communities. This is a unique scheme, perhaps the only one in the

world, to pilot a reform process in rural water supply and sanitation.

169168

Reforming the Rural Water Supply in Bangladesh:

s per the Gram Sarkar Bill of 2003, the local governments

work as agencies of the central government with little or no

autonomy. Their responsibilities are restricted to conducting Asurveys, maintaining birth and death and marriage statistics,

supervise management of primary schools, create awareness for

better health care, maintain law and order, ensure participation in

government development programmes, etc. The local government

structure has helped the administration reach the grassroots and

built mechanisms for participatory decentralized administration.

However, it is still a long way away from the stage of devolution of

the rural local governments. While the draft Upzila/Thana Parishad

and the Zila Parishad bill discusses autonomy by suggesting the

devolution of 26 subjects currently with the central government to

the local governments, there is as yet no firm support for these bills

by the ruling party in the country. A weak administrative structure

and lack of financial and human resource base would inevitably

result in questionable outputs from the local governments. At best,

the Bangladesh model of local governments can be described as a

deconcentrated model that combines in itself democratic

representation. It represents a centralized administrative system

with the Union Parishad having little resources itself and little say in

the manner in which the centre decides to allocate resources. While

the Union Parishad is directly elected, it is dominated by

administrative officials whose accountability lies elsewhere as well as

by members of the parliament. Given the lack of accountability it has

been characterized as a hub of patronage, clientialism and

corruption. The Government of Bangladesh has recently embarked upon major

reforms through its five year (2005-9) Rural Water Supply Project.

responsible for managing central funds, communicate the key

features of the programme to the entire district, form Village Water

171170

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Water Politics in PakistanDr Zaigham Habib

he political formulation of water-related socio-economic

interests and the civil society debate on water issues have

remained limited in Pakistan. The political parties have not Tgone much beyond the regional water demands they had promised to

provide to their constituencies. The development of water storage is

a hot issue, but the existing extreme positions are taken superficially,

without any real vision and understanding of future implications.

The media have recently started playing an active role in the

projection of water related issues. For the common public, facts

about water remain controversial and all domestic water issues are

explained in the context of provincial antagonism. Water-related

policies, economically important and socially relevant, are mostly

undertaken by the public sector in Pakistan. However, techno-

political controversies may become complicated requiring intensive

political process to resolve them.

Background of Water PoliticsLarge-scale development and management of water resources of the

subcontinent were introduced under a centralised policy of the

British colonialists. The objective was to exploit maximum

agricultural potential. The regional and local administrations played

a key role in the identification of feasible water projects. The

management of developed water resources was handed over to the

provincial departments. The state, as the owner (usually termed as

custodian), promised water access to everyone. The constitutions of

all South Asian countries have similar clauses ensuring 'public

access' to water. However, in Pakistan, as in South Asia, the state

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175174

mainly develops water resources for agriculture. The physical

integration of the river systems and scattered population in Pakistan,

and North India, made the development of water resources a matter

of competition among various regions. This competition is mostly

reflected by the conflicting demands of the provincial/state

governments.

thThe last two decades of the 20 Century have highlighted the global

and local water scarcity, conservation threats, crisis of water

management and ownership issues. 'New water policies and

paradigms' are debated (Annexure 1) and sometimes changed to suit

competing interests of various stakeholders. However, changes

introduced in the developing countries, with the help of donors and

multilateral funding agencies, have not produced expected results

(WB 2003). The factors behind a need for change in water

management are:

lsteady decrease in per capita water availability; lfinancial inefficiency of agriculture, especially services; lincreasing need and demand for drinking water and sanitation;lcompetitive water-related business (agriculture, industry); and

interest of donors.

With the whole water infrastructure of Pakistan developed with the

help of foreign and international experts (British engineers before

1947, many international consortium after 1950, different

management approaches have been tried as well. The basin level

water resources management (main theme behind Water and Power

Development Authority [WAPDA]), participatory management

(change of the provincial irrigation departments into irrigation

authorities in all provinces 1997) and the National Water Strategy

(2002) are a few examples.

However, not much is changed for the development and

management objectives and procedures. Sp far no proper political

dialogue on water management issues in Pakistan has taken place.

Inability of the present system to move forward indicates the need to

understand what is wrong with it, what the long-term solutions are

and how constructive political choices can be made.

Existing Procedure Generally, three sets are followed to implement and improve water

resources development and utilisation:

1. Technical solutions are formulated and proposed by different

public sector institutions and donors considering multi-

disciplinary factors and constraints; 2. Solutions are formally approved by the administrations and

legislation at the national and/or at the provincial levels on the

basis of priorities and compromises; and 3. Decisions are administratively implemented.

It can be seen that none of the above mentioned processes is

independent, linear and convergent. Political and economic interests

may influence the selection of technical options as well as

institutional priorities. Institutional interests may lead to limited

vision of management and development options; a dominant

institution can over-shadow the less developed and less influential

institutions. In case of political disagreement, the process can be

complicated, formulation of issues exaggerated and political

representation biased towards the vested interests and vocal groups.

The technical aspects of water resource management are generally

not understood by the politicians nor are they communicated to the

common public. In case of diverse opinions, step 2 becomes difficult

and selection of appropriate solutions a major techno-political task.

The dominant mode of thinking prevails and the probability of

making wrong decisions remains high. There could be intensive

negotiations and a deadlock in case of disagreement and unnecessary

uniformity in case of agreement.

Water Issues The provincially disputed issues - debated by the media and

politicians are:

1. provincial river water sharing from the gross pool and during

water shortage periods, 2. development of a new reservoir, 3. protection of the Indus delta, and4. potential for water saving and increased efficiency Emerging

issues at the national scale but less debated are:i) shortage of water required for agriculture;ii) groundwater depletion in intensively cropped areas and

urban centers;iii) drinking water supply and water quality hazards, andiv) pollution of the water bodies: river, lakes and groundwater.

On the first set, technical and institutional opinions are different, not

177176

only between Punjab and Sindh, but also across the country. There

are different opinions among the media and public groups. No

technical solution seems possible because all given solutions are

controversial and the justifications diverse. The river water transfer

approach adopted in the Indus Basin, estimation of total water

availability and mode of water use are strongly linked with these

issues. The second set of issues is less debated, but more basic and

critical in nature. These are the real challenges faced by the water

shortage and non-optimum performance of the water systems. In

fact, these shortages are to be addressed with a long term planning,

integrated and priority based choices, to avoid adverse future

impacts.

River Water Transfer and ImplicationsThe water transfer from a bigger to a smaller river had been adopted

as early as 1905, to support agriculture on physically suitable and

populated areas of the Basin. The river commands of the Eastern

tributaries benefited the most from this approach. Sindh objected to

each upstream project as the lower riparian of the Indus river,

especially those which would reduce winter flows in the lower Indus.

Historically, regional conflicts of interests were represented by the

institutions, and addressed by the technical and judicial committees

formed by the central governments. The five committees formed

during 1916, 1925, 1932, 1939, 1945 suggested technical solutions.

Principally, all mainstream and local political institutions supported

the development of irrigation schemes while defending their existing

uses and water access. The tedious negotiations between the

Bahawalpur State and the British Government show the conflict of

regional and central interests. With the development of Sukkur

Barrage scheme in 1932, irrigation rights were provided to the vast

area of Lower Indus, to be developed over a long period of time.

In 1947, the water sharing issue acquired a new intensity, with the

division of the basin between the two countries, cutting the upstream

reaches of the tributary rivers of the Indus. The whole country

became lower riparian. Pakistan, being at the neck of the rivers, had

limited choices, especially from the Eastern Rivers. The Radcliff line

dividing the two nations was drawn so hastily that 'there was not

sufficient time to divide the Indus waters or the assets’. After 13

years of negotiations and international mediation the Indus Water

Treaty was signed between Pakistan and India on September 19,

1960. The Treaty is an internationally appreciated and well-quoted

example of successful trans-boundary agreements on river water

sharing. However, it was signed after a high-level political agreement

between the two countries, only 'After long, intensive, and difficult

discussions'. The World Bank and the Consortium of donors had to

persuade the president and prime ministers of Pakistan and India.

Kirmani and Rangeley conclude that 'they differed too sharply in

their views to pursue joint planning.' The Treaty brought major changes in river water availability and

sharing.

lA shift from the Basin to the Dominion level water development

planning. lAnnual average of 29 million acre feet (MAF) water from three

Eastern Rivers was allowed to be fully used by the India. A

number of dams, barrages, and link canals have been built to

distribute water from the eastern Indus tributaries to the Indian

Punjab and neighbouring states. lThe construction of replacement works included inter-river link

canals to transfer water from the Western Rivers and a reservoir

(Mangla on Jhelum) to store water for the Rabi (winter crop)

irrigation. Pakistan started another reservoir to transfer water

from the summer flood flows to winter. On an average 10 MAF

water is transferred (from the Indus and Jhelum rivers) to the

Eastern Rivers systems, which is bound to increase as supplies

from India are becoming nil after 1995. lBetween 1947 and 1978, Pakistan extended canal systems to

divert 70 per cent more canal water and irrigate 29 per cent

more area.

Provincial Water Accord With the development of reservoirs, winter water availability

increased and provinces started to count their volumetric share from

the gross storage. Practically a mix of design authorised discharge

and seasonal volume sharing evolved new regulation of the network.

The Water Allocation Accord (1991) was another success in the

regional water sharing. Each province is provided a volumetric share

and 10-daily reference allocation to share the daily flows. However,

the developments of 1960-78 could not continue satisfying the water

demand of the increasing population and agriculture and differences

on the interpretation of WAA increased.

Further storage of summer water was once more rejected by the

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Sindh. The four year drought made the situation worse, strongly

indicating the need for sustainable water supply to highly arid areas.

The current debate on further water development is extremely

important as the water left in the basin is at a minimum level while

agriculture and drinking water shortage is maximum.

Existing Water Scarcity Agricultural sector use has reached 70 per cent of the river inflow,

more than 95 per cent of the developed water and more than 90 per

cent of the groundwater pumped. During a dry year, the percentage

of river water used goes to 90 per cent (PWP 2000). No government

or political institution can deny that the whole riverine belt (called

Saila area in the upper and Kacho area in the lower basin) has

become heavily well irrigated and cropped. Officially five million acre

riverine cultivation is reported in the country (WAPDA 2000). The

water used by riverine agriculture is around 20 MAF (Habib 2004).

Like other developing countries, Pakistan has the land potential to

expand agriculture, while existing agriculture has become highly

groundwater dependent. Every farmer will prefer to have and use

more canal water; this is partly due to irrigation practices and

groundwater quality.

The existing canal system can divert 20-30 per cent more water.

Because of economic pressures and modernisation, the cropping

intensities are increasing with future demand further increasing. The

basic question is: Do we have sustainable water availability to expand

agriculture? A big technical failure of the public sector institutes is to

realise this basic water shortage and communicate it to the users.

The political handling is even worse; all political institutions (within

the government or outside) advocate or promise extension of

agriculture. Notwithstanding the political value of such slogans, it is

a dangerous path of thinking and planning.

The groundwater table is depleting around the urban centers and

intensively irrigated areas, because of higher extraction than

recharge to the aquifer. It is being evaluated since 15 years (a nation

wide NESPAK study was carried out in 1991). The control of

groundwater pumpage is a difficult problem to be addressed, because

it has become a major source of supply for the domestic and

industrial uses, livelihood agriculture and riverine areas.

Unfortunately, technical and institutional failure of the public sector

to protect the regenerative nature of alluvial water supply system is

the least understood issue. Rather, there is continuous advocacy for

the canal lining (projected by the media and politicians as capable of

saving water equivalent to few surface reservoirs). It is not only 40

maf pumpage (WAPDA vision 2001), its leaching character is

ignored. A very basic contribution of the shallow drinkable

groundwater is the dependence of more than 70 per cent population

on it. The physical works are always the choice of the engineering

institutes. A lack of understanding of the environment friendly

regenerative water and land systems of the basin can cause

permanent damage to the system. It will further accelerate

groundwater depletion and quality deterioration. Drainage and effluent management systems are other areas of

technical and administrative failure. The drainage projects proved

short-lived despite maximum investment across the country, (SCARP

Projects, LBOD). Most of the vertical drainage is replaced by the

irrigation tube-wells; surface drains have no effluent and could not

be maintained. About 80 per cent of the total area is waterlogged in

the saline zone. The mega LBOD drain has a major problem of direct

seawater back-flows and has to share fresh river water below Kotri.

Another technical and institutional failure is to control the water loss

to the saline aquifer. The much advocated lining projects are hardly

implemented in the saline Lower Indus (Sindh). It is unfortunate

that the technical organisations cannot put together the failure of

watercourse lining in the high water use saline areas and push it

forward for political reasons. A common explanation is that the

system has deteriorated so much in Sindh that watercourses cannot

be lined.

In reality, a new water use system has evolved in Sindh, canals and

watercourses are governed by new regime, tail-ends of the channels

have gone lower than the ground level and water is pumped for

irrigation. The vested interests of the large land holdings are

understandable, but the bigger political issue is the high vulnerability

of this system. In case of shortage, some areas quickly lose access to

water, a higher probability for the small land holdings, and a general

drinking water shortage for the millions of people relying on the river

water. The low performance of water conveyance and distribution

systems in Sindh is linked to the low performance of the irrigation

department and vested interests of the big land holding.

181180

There should be no doubt about emerging drinking water problems

in Pakistan. All big cities are facing shortage of potable drinkable

water. The drinkable water supply to big cities -- Karachi, Islamabad

and Quetta -- has forced an increasing percentage to shift to bottled

water. The access of millions of rural users to safe drinking water is

considered critical. It has increased the common public's

vulnerability to scarcity of water.

New Surface StoragePakistan has a shortage of water in all areas, with higher

vulnerability in the saline and more arid areas. The agriculture of the

lower Indus mostly depends on the surface storage, which is

depleting. The question arises as to why there is a big resistance to

the new storage in Sindh. To some extent it is mistrust, but there is a

more sound background to this opposition, which needs to be

understood and addressed. The lower Indus has been the major

recipient of Indus waters before the irrigation development and has

always claimed its riparian right on its water. It is now a shareholder

in the developed water used for irrigation, vulnerable to drinking

water shortage, sea intrusion and having a greater percentage of the

unaccounted water uses. Water experts from Sindh have the dual

task of protecting bigger gross share and securing a sustainable water

supply. The water shortage is more dangerous because the majority

of the population uses canal water for domestic purposes as well.

At the national scale river-regulation cannot be allowed to move

backwards, which is happening with the depletion of existing surface

storage. The gross available river inflow is expected to decrease in the

future with water management schemes on Chenab, Jhelum and

Kabul rivers in the upstream countries. The climate change can have

longer dry spells. These challenges have forced the president of

Pakistan to campaign for water storage development. However, due

to shortcomings of the water management institutes and

apprehensions of the provinces, the techno-political process remains

weak. Some of the factors not properly understood/conveyed are:

lThere is a growing need to manage water demands, as the water

available for development is limited. The claims to develop

many reservoirs are misleading.lThe water needs outside agriculture are critical and are bound to

increase because these uses are informal and highly stressed.

There must be an allocation for all uses to secure them.

lThe reservoir site has a critical link with the gross and minimum

availability of water. This point is understood by the technical

institutions (WAPDA) but not conveyed to the politicians and

common people.lAll provinces of Pakistan have adopted a water use system based

on river regulation. Each province is to protect its systems

depending upon natural inflows or flood pattern (highly

unreliable with decreasing probability at the current level) with

the help of an efficient use of regulated flows. Intensive

negotiations at Indus River System Authority (IRSA) are proof

of that.

Institutional and Political Failure The issue of below Kotri is the most serious example of the failure of

technical and management system of the public sector institutions. It

is a much debated and politically controversial issue, but the national

and provincial water management organisations have not addressed

it. With any new development of water infrastructure, the annual

gross quantity passing below Kotri (limited to couple of weeks) has

been decreasing. There is an inevitable increase in water uses

upstream and a part of flows are shared with the drainage system

(LBOD). It is amazing that the basin famous for the engineering

interventions could not move for a solution here. There is also a lack

of discussion on the solutions suggested by the Sindhi engineers

(Panhwar 2002). Political sensitivity of the issue is the obstacle to

technical debate. However, it will be highly unfortunate to postpone

solutions for the below Kotri management and to continue focusing

on the water demand. Some recommendations made in the past

show that the scope of this debate should be widened. Another

barrage below Kotri could ensure and control the supply

downstream, the sea intrusion through the groundwater table is

caused by the depletion of sweet water layer, which is also linked

with the irrigation and drainage practices. Human efforts and

modern science need to be applied to preserve the Indus delta.

Water Policy and PoliticsThe practiced and legally accepted relation between water and its

users is a key factor in shaping the communal and institutional water

interests. A major policy challenge is to protect the future water

security. This can be achieved only by ensuring livelihood-oriented

water availability for future generations and by conserving and

improving existing water resources of the country. As is obvious, it is

183182

a complicated political and institutional task. Since the country is

trying to do business as well, we cannot avoid political influence of

the donors, vested local interests and decay of water management

institutions (WAPDA) in their desired functions. The political

dialogue is still weak and superficial in the country. Politicians and

major political parties continue promising water without prior

thinking. The water issues of Pakistan and selective political

sensitivity show the need to go down to the community and users

levels and make an inventory of the challenges faced by them, then

up-scale their issues to the national level with a futuristic vision. No

correct political process and vision on water policy issues could be

suddenly evolved but more aware techno-political debate is towards

filling the gaps. Three water policy approaches globally discussed are

given in the annexure-1.

The water management institutes have played a strong role in the

national and provincial water politics as well as authoritative control

on water resources development. Both roles have declined with the

evolution of new historical realities. It is important to realise that

water politics cannot be contained within the old boundaries and the

new water policy should go for strategic changes.

Dr Zaigham Habib is a Lahore-based consultant on water issues;

her doctoral thesis focused on the Indus basin irrigation system.

References lZ. Habib, Scope for Reallocation of River Waters in the Indus Basin,

ndENGREF Montpellier France, 22 September 2004.lP. H. Gleick, ‘The Changing Water Paradigm – A look at the Twenty-first

Century Water resources Development’, Water International, Vol. 25,

no.1, (International Water Resources Association, 2000). pp. 127-138lWSIPS -- Water Sector Investment Planning Study, Vol. I - IV,

(Islamabad: Federal Planning Cell, WAPDA, 1990).lDavid Aubin and Frédéric Varone (AURAP - UCL) March 29, 2002

European Water Policy. lWAPDA 2001, Water Resources Hydropower Dev Vision 2025. lMichel Arthur Alloy, The Indus Rivers -- A study on the effects of

Partition, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967), pp.

594.lLisa Widawsky, The Integral Role Of International Actors In Solving

Riparian Disputes: A Case Study On The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960.lM. H. Panhwar, Water Requirements of Riverine Areas of Sindh, (Sindh

Education Trust Hyderabad, 2002).lThomas, 48. 90 Kirmani and Rangeley, 4.lAyoob, 57. 91 Gulhati, 97.

lHussein A. Amery and Aaron T. Wolf, (Austin: University of Texas

Press, 2000), p. 210.

Annexure 1

1. Privatisation approach of the major donors as formulated by

the ' freedom from debt Coalition (7/17/2003)

lThe dominant water policy promotes and ' imposes' :lLiberalisation, deregulation and privatisation of water services to meet

the loan conditions established by the World Bank and the IMF, which

require that a country liberalise, deregulate and privatise a sector for

which it is seeking loans.lPrioritisation of private investment. The priority has been once again '

consecrated' by the ' Camdessus' report in ' Financing Water for All' ,

that was presented in Kyoto. Based on the final declaration of the

Monterrey Summit on the financing of development in the world, and

the Camdessus report, it is only the private sector that can assure the '

efficacious' financing of the hundreds of billions of dollars of

supplements (an hugely exaggerated amount), which according to the

World Bank would be required to reduce by half the number of people

with access to drinking water and hygiene from now to 2015

2. Towards demand managementAn international paradigm shift towards demand-based management has

been summarised by Gleick (1999, 2000) ' the dynamic process of managing

freshwater resources is changing again. There are many components to this

change: a shift away from sole, or even primary, reliance on finding new

sources of supply to address perceived new demands; a growing emphasis on

incorporating ecological values into water policy; a reemphasis on meeting

basic human needs for water services and a conscious breaking of the ties

between economic growth and water use' .

3. New Socialistic Approach:

freedom from debt Coalition (7/17/2003)

An alternative global and local

water policy '

As a point of departure, we propose the right to life for everyone by 2020.The objective is to guarantee the right of access to water for all the 8 billion

people who will live in the world by 2020, for all living species, and for all

future generations, while equally guaranteeing the sustainability of

ecosystems.

In this spirit, we affirm the ' sacred' value of water at the symbolic level.

Water is the expression of life, human dignity and nature, and of human

cultures and history.

Basic Principles

185184

a) The access to water in necessary quantity (40 liters per day for domestic

use) and quality for an acceptable quality of life, should be

acknowledged as a constitutional, universal and indivisible human and

social right.In this regard, we salute with satisfaction, the ' General comments' of

the United Nations Human and Social Rights Committee, which

considered access to water as a human right.b) Water should be treated as a common good belonging to all human

beings and living species of the plant. The ecosystems should be

considered as a common good.Water is a good only available in limited quantity at local and global

levels. No level of profit justifies the unlimited consumption of this

good. The current excessive waste of water constitutes a crime against

necessities of life. That is why ownership, governance and political

control of water (specifically the management of water services) should

remain in public hands and within public authority.c) It is the task of public authorities to ensure and promote the use of

water resources with regards to human rights, to take into consideration

future generations and to safeguard and value ecosystems in an

integrated fashion.d) The public sector (from communities to the state, from continental

unions to the global community) must assure the necessary financing

and investment to realise the right of access to drinking water and

sustainable use of water resources.e) The most appropriate instrument for this purpose is the establishment

of a progressive fiscal system with a redistributive nature at all levels,

from local to global, based on multiplicity and modularity of public

provision of financial resources for territorial investment needs. For this

purpose, it is imperative that the role and function of multilateral

financing agencies such as the World Bank, the IMF, BERD, BEI, IBD,

ABD etc. be revisited without further delay, and that new national or

international cooperative financing institutions based on public-public

partnerships are defined.f) Citizens have to participate in a representative and direct manner in the

definition and realisation of the water policy, from the local level to the

global level.g) Democracy has to be at the center of ' coexistence' , even at the global

level. It's hard to accept that globalisation can really be ' global' , if it

only occurs at the level of trade, finance, production, consumption,

lifestyles and cultural flux, while democracies are still based on nation-

states or continental-state in nature, such as is the case of the United

States, China, Russia, India, Brazil and Indonesia. The concept of '

global governance' put in fashion by policymakers in the ' north' is a

great mystification.h) Democracy necessitates the promotion of a new democratic,

participatory and solidarity-based public sector, and the establishment

of participatory mechanisms which include citizens and local

communities, workers, local institutions and valuing diversity in all its

different forms, which represents the richness of the democratic

experience in different continents and countries.

India's River Linking Plans Syed Shahid Husain

he Indian government got judicial sanction from its Supreme

Court in October, 2002 to be able to implement its scheme on Tlinking major Indian rivers to 'overcome drought and floods'.

The BJP government followed this up with pronouncements

supportive of the scheme. The proposal was not received without

dismay in the neighbouring countries, particularly Bangladesh,

which organised a series of conferences to highlight the folly inherent

in the scheme. The most recent of these conferences was a three-day

international conference on Regional Cooperation on Trans-

boundary Rivers in Dhaka (December, 2004) with a call to India to

dispel mistrust and concerns over its river linking project and to

follow a 'no harm policy' towards its neighbours. This is a phrase

used in the Treaty between India and Bangladesh on Farakka.

According to reports, the Indian Ambassador to Bangladesh assured

the Bangladeshis that India would undertake a detailed consultative

process with all concerned. She asserted that the project was still at a

conceptual stage. This does not mean that the proposal has been

shelved; hence, the continued concern for Bangladesh. This

conference was a follow up, close on the heels of the August

conference in 2004. Aware of the threat posed by this gigantic

project and the challenges faced by the region on account of

population growth, food scarcity, the Third South Asia Water Forum

(SAWAF-III) was held in Dhaka in July, 2004.

The Bangladesh People's Initiative against River Linking (BPIRL) in

collaboration with the South Asian Solidarity for Rivers and Peoples

(SARP) organised the South Asian consultation on River Linking

Project (21-22 August 2004), so as to focus on the implications of the

proposal on linking the two large rivers in the subcontinent.

Concerned citizens from India, Pakistan and Nepal joined their

Bangladeshi counterparts to voice their concern at the Indian

proposal of changing the geomorphology of the subcontinent.

Brahmaputra and Jamna Basins account for 65 per cent of surface

water in Bangladesh. In all, 80 per cent of the surface water in

Bangladesh comes through these two rivers (Brahmaputra and

Jamna) originating in Himalayas and passing through Nepal, Bhutan

and India. Bangladesh inter alia decided to endorse the principle of

'more crop for each drop' of water as an alternative to this mega

project, so as to increase water efficiency, to decrease non-structural

options, to evolve cost effective technologies including rain water

harvesting as well as re-cycling of effluent and for action to use water

as a source of peace and prosperity rather than a source of discord.

stThe 21 century is marked with a growing need for global

cooperation, in general, and regional cooperation, in particular.

What could be more important for global understanding than on

water, which is getting scarcer by the day and will get more so in the

future? Days of profligacy are long gone and the mounting pressure

of population has forced the issue of this precious commodity to the

fore not only in this region but also in other parts of the world.

The controversy is not confined to Bangladesh and India. The

Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin (GMB) represents a far bigger

region comprising Bhutan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal and some parts

of Tibet. According to a recent report, India has nearly exhausted

underground water reservoirs by pumping water for irrigation to

achieve a mirage of food self-sufficiency. The proposed project is

thought to be the only solution to overcome the problem.

The project consists of thirty river links, 14 on the

Himalayan Rivers and 16 on the peninsular south. The project

involves storage of flood and monsoon water. The important links

India has

proposed to transfer water from the Brahmaputra through a gigantic

324-km long link canal, which will run from Assam across northern

Bangladesh to just above Farraka. The second part of the proposal

envisages three large dams, which are potential hydropower-cum-

flood control sites.

187186

are four, including Brahmaputra with Ganges, Subamarekaha and

Mahanadi with Brahmaputra so as to irrigate Assam, West Bengal,

Bihar, Jharkhand and Orissa.

The proposal for interlinking of rivers is not new. Sir Arthur Cotton

first mooted it in the 19th century primarily for promoting inland

navigation. Dr K. L. Rao later revived the idea in 1972. After that the

focus shifted from navigation to the issue of water scarcity in the

south. In 1977 Captain Dastur, a pilot by profession, proposed

construction of two canals named Garland Canal -- because it

envisaged 4,200 km Himalayan Canal and the twice as long Southern

Garland Canal, which were to be connected through pipelines

passing through Patna and Delhi.

Much before the Supreme Court decision in 2002, National Water

Development Agency (NWDA) was established in 1980, to carry out

two separate studies, viz. Himalayan and Peninsula rivers. NWDA

has to survey and investigate possible storage size and

interconnecting links. There are two action plans. Under action

plan-I, the schedule for implementation is 10 years from the start. It

is stipulated that work will start in 2007 and complete in 2016.

Under action plan-II, two committees have been set up to go into the

financial aspects of the project. Both the committees are to work

concurrently. The NWDA has conducted feasibility studies jointly

with the Ministry of Water Resources on six of the thirty possible

river links in the last few decades. It is reported to have completed

water balance studies of 137 basins/sub-basins and prepared pre-

feasibility studies of 30 links.

A task force has also been set up by the Government of India on

December 13, 2002, with Suresh Prabhu as the Chairperson with the

following terms:

1. To provide guidance on norms of up-raising of individual

projects in respect of economic liability, socio-economic impacts,

environmental impacts and preparation of re-settlement plans;2. Devise suitable mechanisms for brining about a speedy

consensus among the stats;3. Privatise different projects' components for preparation of

detailed project reports and implementation;4. Propose suitable organisational structures for implementing the

projects;5. Consider various funding, modalities; and6. Consider international dimensions that may be involved in some

components of the project.

A full-fledged cost benefit analysis will follow the feasibility studies

and detailed project reports. It is, however, claimed that phenomenal

economic and socio cultural benefits will accrue, like:

1. Agricultural production will increase by 100 per cent in the next

five years;2. 35 million hectares will be added to the command area to the

current 90 million hectares; 3. Loss of crops worth Rs.250b will be saved by preventing drought

and floods;4. Savings in foreign exchange of Rs.30b per annum will accrue

because of cost effective alternative navigation and reduced

import of oil;5. The country will further be bound together.6. Employment to one million people will be provided in next 10

years; and7. Additional water line defence will be provided along the western

and north-western borders.

There are sceptics who doubt the viability of the scheme or even the

seriousness on the part of India. They suspect that it was an election

stunt and will not go beyond the laying of foundation stone. With the

new government in place one has not heard of it so loudly. 24 years

after the project emerged on the public scene, it is nowhere near

completion. But there are those who are afraid of India's

seriousness. Once the government conducts studies, like it did on the

Kalabagh Dam in Pakistan, without involving the stakeholders in a

discussion, then a vested interest is created in going ahead with its

execution. Narmada is another example of the same approach.

Consequently, the dam is still incomplete.

The question remains whether there is enough water to sustain the

idea. Except for the Brahmaputra basin in the northeast, there is no

surplus water anywhere. The scheme is predicated on the

assumption that there is surplus water in the rivers that could be

diverted to the deficit rivers. Dr Ainun Nishat, Country

representative of IUCN in Bangladesh, in his brilliant exposition at

189188

the August Conference in 2004, brought out -- with the help of data -

- that dry deltas in Bangladesh bring forth (very poignantly) an

affirmation of the claim by the critics of the proposal that not much

water is left to flow into the sea. Those who are building a super-

structure over a pipe dream either do not understand or have a

sinister agenda hidden from public view.

The receding snow lines of the Himalayas are another development

which cannot be overlooked. The glacier mass showed a negative

trend since the middle of the last century, signalling a sharp

reduction in flow into the rivers in the next 30 years. Himalayan

glaciers could disappear by the year 2035 according to some

researchers. There is no scientific database on climate pattern and

discharge pattern in the Himalayas. Pakistan is facing its gravest

crisis with its existing dams almost empty and its present and future

crops in jeopardy. In-depth studies of glacier hydrology is in order.

The claim that water flows into the sea is no longer true. India has

highly uneven water availability. In Pakistan and India diversions on

the mighty Indus and its tributaries have reduced water outflows into

the sea by 80 per cent; destroying deltaic mangroves that once

stretched over 250,000 hectares and were spawning grounds for

coastal fisheries. In Philippines, rights to environment have been

included as fundamental rights.

Engineering a geo-morphologic feature changes both the object and

the process and thus triggers a chain of developments that persist

long after the intervention is over. The system takes its own time to

settle into a new equilibrium. This on a generational time scale is

much longer than the executive decisions. The natural level of all

water on earth being the sea, the river -- unlike a canal -- augments

its flow along its path. Such a project will invite the Law of

Unintended Consequences. Moreover the project will involve

submergence of forestland, habitations and wild life. How good is the

prevailing use of irrigation water? 70 per cent of river water is wasted

before its delivery into the fields. High intensity use for sugar cane

and rice further compounds the problem. The region faces floods and

droughts at the same time.

Obtaining the consent of the states within the Union of India will

prove an almost insurmountable hurdle. The states have full

authority over water and yet the Centre can intervene by taking steps

to interfere with their plans for use of the water. Ironically the states

where the rivers are located are the most undeveloped parts of the

country. East Punjab followed Kerala in opposing the project. Punjab

and Haryana are still fighting over the Sutlej water. The annual

discharge of the system is 1350 billion cubic meters with a total

drainage area of 1.75 million sq. kms Brahmaputara contributes 700

BCM, Ganges 500 and Meghna 150.

Tamil Nadu supports the project completely, whereas Andhra

Pradesh supports it conditionally. Tamil Nadu has already completed

the Mekkara Dam, which is to be used in the proposed link even

though Kerala is opposed to the project. Kerala Legislative Assembly

has passed a unanimous resolution against the link on August 6,

2003. Gujarat has objections because Daman Ganga-Pinjal River

Linking Project, one of the 30 interstate projects, located in Gujarat

will be adversely affected. There are two out of thirty proposals that

fall in Gujarat.

West Bengal is worried. It is demanding adequate funds from the

centre to combat post Farakka problem causing floods and erosion.

Assam is opposed to the project and is of the view that while

remaining within the constitution, the Centre must evolve a

consensus of the states. A board or an ordinary bill in parliament

cannot supersede the constitutional provisions. One opinion suggests

that Bihar should not oppose linking of Brahmaputra because there

is sufficient water to meet the needs of the south. However, Nepal

will have to be excluded from the plans. Bihar, after spending over

Rs.19b on flood control in the flood prone area, is worse off with

floods affecting almost three times the area (from 2.5m hectares to

6.9m). Bihar also fears that India will reap benefits at its cost.

Bringing the countries of the region, particularly Bangladesh, on

board may be far more difficult for India, especially after the India-

Bangladesh Treaty of December 1996 on the sharing of the Ganges

waters. Farakka Barrage, completed in 1975, has been a significant

source of friction between India and Bangladesh, much before the

latter's creation. The Barrage allows India to divert the Ganges water

into Hoogly River through a feeder canal. A decline of 51 per cent

flow of water is claimed to have been experienced by Bangladesh

191190

after Farakka. Under an ad-hoc arrangement reached in 1983,

pending scientific studies, 39 per cent of the dry season flow was to

be allocated to India, 36 per cent to Bangladesh and the remaining to

continue to be unallocated.

The 1996 Treaty protects the flows at Farakka and any storage

upstream of Farakka will be in breach of that Treaty. Ganges and

Brahmapatra are international waters and their historic use cannot

be overlooked. Para 3 of the Preamble of the Treaty requires the two

countries to make optimum utilisation of the water resources of their

region for the mutual benefits of the people of the two countries.

Article IX of the Treaty enshrines the principle -- 'Guided by the

principles of equity, fairness and no harm to either party both the

Governments agreed to conclude water sharing Treaties/Agreements

with regard to other common rivers'.

According to Bangladesh, its share in Farakka is fixed at 35,000

cusecs, if availability of water is 75,000 cusecs. In case water exceeds,

India will get 40,000 cusecs and Bangladesh the balance. The water

sharing arrangement was to be reviewed by the two governments at

five years interval or earlier, but so far no such review has taken

place. Bangladesh took up the issue of the interlinking project at the

Joint River Commission. According to Mr. Hafiz Uddin Ahmad,

Bangladesh Minister for Water Resources, India was reluctant even

to discuss it, calling it outside the scope of the Joint River

Commission (JRC). Bangladesh persisted and the discussion

continued for 13 hours, but at the end of the day it was not even

minuted. The marathon discussion was dismissed in a single line

signifying, nothing. However, there may be some meeting of minds

with the new government in place in New Delhi.

There are alternatives available to the proposed millennium folly

such as decentralised water harvesting, non-conventional energy

sources and conservation strategies. A former Indian Prime Minister,

while addressing state irrigation ministers in 1986, had this to say:

'Since 1951, 246 big surface irrigation project(s) have been initiated.

Only 66 out of these have been completed. 181 are still under

construction. For 16 years, we have poured out money. The people

have got nothing back, no irrigation, no water, no increase in

production, no help in their daily life'. The river linking project is in

fact a river privatisation project. Projects that have already been

planned or executed are being shown as new projects under the

scheme. India seems to be re-making its geography so that water

flows where it previously never did.

There is need for a regional treaty that forces each country to honour

its ecological obligations towards the great oceans. The combined

population of the region is about 600 million. If India thinks that it

can exploit its upper riparian position and its size, China, which has

reportedly drawn its own plans to divert rivers originating in Tibet --

including Brahmaputra, may follow suit. While India plans to

complete the project by the year 2013, China plans to do so by 2009.

An estimated 90 per cent of the Tibetan rivers flow downstream to

India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. Both India and Bangladesh

are at the mercy of China which could for its own interest withhold

water for irrigation and power during dry season and release water

during the flood season. Bangladesh experts brought the issue to the

attention of Indian journalists.

All the rivers flow into the Bay of Bengal. All these countries have

abiding interest in the sustainability of the system in order to ensure

livelihood of people, who depend on agriculture as well as to protect

ecology, environment and wild life for present or future collaboration

necessary to evolve common goal of survival. Ganges is reported to

be the most polluted river. The effort is not going to be easy but each

country has to be prepared to make sacrifices and suffer the

perceived loss involved in an agreement. Equity and understanding

of the other's point of view are crucial to any settlement, tentative or

permanent.

Another option is that a public interest petition is filed by any

concerned citizen of India requesting review of Supreme Court order,

which may possibly review its own order suo moto in the region's

interest. There are other hurdles that India must cross before

establishing feasibility such as:

1. External financing in view of huge external debt may not be

forthcoming. The private sector sees a distinct road for itself in

the proposed mega project after having experienced the

privatisation of Sheonath River in Chattisgarh.

193192

2. As per the Constitution, water is a state subject, but no project

can be undertaken without following the planning process,

which means every proposal must go before the central

government.

3. Whether or not there will be a political will to interlink rivers is

an open question. A proposal was made to constitute a

commission on the lines of the Finance Commission to examine

the project.

There is also the role of international law and treaties. United

Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of

International Watercourses, although not ratified, could provide a

basis to proceed. The Convention was adopted by the General

Assembly of the United Nations in 1997. Watercourse has been

defined as a system of surface waters and ground waters forming a

unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus. The

Convention was based on the principles and recommendations

adopted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and

Development of 1992 in the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21. It

expressed the conviction that a framework Convention will ensure

the utilisation, development, conservation, management and

protection of international watercourses and the promotion of the

optimal and sustainable utilisation thereof for present and future

generations.

Nothing in the Convention shall affect the rights or obligation of the

Watercourse state arising from agreements in force on the date on

which that State became a party to the Convention.

There are 37 Articles to the Convention. The Articles in the

Convention relate to subjects like watercourse agreements, equitable

and reasonable utilisation participation, factors relevant to equitable

and reasonable utilisation, obligation not to cause significant harm,

general obligation to cooperate and settlement of disputes, etc. The thConvention shall enter into force following ratification of 35

Instrument. So far the Convention has attracted perhaps no more

than 16 signatures and 11 ratifications. 103 nations including

Bangladesh had voted in favour. Surprisingly India and Pakistan

were on the same side and were amongst 27 nations that had

abstained from voting.

Times have changed; the demand for water is growing. Dams and

megaprojects are known to disrupt the existing pattern of water use.

Where people depend on fish, flood plains or deltas for their

livelihood, big dams can wreak great havoc. Watershed eco-systems

suffer and fragmentation of aquatic and terrestrial eco systems cause

growing threat to the ecological integrity is one of the many factors

impacting on the change in climate.

The growing rate of extraction of fresh water has put enormous

pressure on aquifers. Sedimentation causes the dams to lose storage

capacity at an estimated rate of 05-1 per cent per annum. In the next

25 to 50 years, 25 per cent of the existing storage will have been lost

mostly in the developing countries. In three Asian countries -- China,

India and Pakistan -- the water table is sinking at the alarming rate

of 1 to 2 metres a year. Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt and Israel are the

most water stressed countries. Pakistan is close to Germany in being

less stressed.

Today most of the countries are focusing their attention on

management of existing water resources including the dams. The

effort involves rehabilitation, renovation and optimisation. Demand

side management and improvement of efficiency of the existing

supply are receiving greater attention.

There are bound to be difficulties for the countries of the region

along the way. However, inaction is not an option. If the waters in

the basin are sufficient to justify an equitable and just sharing of

waters and the social, economic, political and environmental impact

of such structural intervention on common river systems is

manageable, then the project cannot be dismissed as being

unfeasible. It will require cooler heads in the spirit of give and take

for the stakeholders in all the countries of the region to grapple with

hard choices. The outcome may yet produce a win-win situation for

everybody. The growing population of all the countries of the region,

which they have failed to control, imposes an obligation on their

leaders to do something substantial to avert the looming disaster of

famine and poverty.

Forming a common front against India as being the largest country

195194

in the region will be a self-defeating strategy. After all Pakistan did

the unthinkable of bartering away three of its six rivers for the sake

of peace and amity in the largest part of the subcontinent. The

important thing to note is that the intervention of the World Bank

proved crucial to the culmination of the effort in the signing of the

Treaty.

(Syed Shahid Husain has served as Secretary, Water and Power in

the Government of Pakistan and as Chief Secretary, Balochistan.

Mr. Husain may be contacted at sshusain@hotmail.com)

ReferenceslIndus Water Treaty 1960.lProfessor Hap Dunning , 'Water Law', in Water Resource Management,

fourth edition. l'Riparian Rights Case Summaries', Environment Probe. lIslam M. Faisal, 'Managing International Rivers in the Ganges-

Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM)'.lJayanta Bandyopadhyay and Shama Perveen on Doubts over the

scientific validity of the justifications for the proposed inter linking of

rivers in India. lMostafa Kamal Majumdar, 'River Linking and the Environment'.lDr. Sudhirendar Sharma, 'Interlinking Rivers , Whose Concern is it

Anyway?'. lDr. Asif Nazrul, The RLP and International Law lDr. Uma Shankari, Interlinking Rivers, Contradictions and

Confrontations, A Report on the electronic debate (riverlink@

yahoogroups.com)

197196

Nepal's Hydel Power for Export Dr Upendra Gautam and Ajoy Karki

epal is ideal for the development of hydro-power due to its

vast water resources and steep topography. Furthermore, Nthe only significant source of energy in Nepal, apart from

bio-mass (which is a traditional source comprising firewood, animal

dung and agricultural residue), is hydro-power. The present techno-

economically feasible hydro-power potential (given the state of

infrastructure and price of fossil fuel) in the country is estimated to

be around 43,000 MW.

However, to date, the Integrated Nepal Power System (INPS) has a

total installed capacity of about 610 MW, of which about 550 MW is

hydro-power based. Of the hydro-power plants, only 92 MW

(cascaded between Kulekhani I of 60 MW and Kulekhani II of 32

MW) is from seasonal storage and the rest is from run-of-river

schemes (some have daily pondage). Thus, so far, less than 2 per

cent of the techno-economically feasible hydro-power plants have

been developed in the country.

The annual electrical energy available for use within the country in

the fiscal year 2003-2004 was 2381 GWh (92% of which was from

hydro sources) -- an increase of about 5.3 per cent compared to the

previous fiscal year. The state-owned utility, Nepal Electricity

Authority (NEA), has estimated the total number of grid connected

consumers to have reached 1,060,700 by the end of 2004. Of these,

the domestic consumers were expected to be around 1,018,000.

Thus, in 2004 among the country's population with access to the

electricity grid (23 per cent), the average national consumption per

connection was 187 kWh/month. In the domestic consumer

category, the consumption per household was about 56 kWh/month.

Assuming average household family size to be between four to five

members, the electricity consumption per capita would be around 11

KWh/month to 14 KWh/month. These figures indicate that on one

hand only limited population has access to grid electricity in Nepal,

and even among those who are grid connected the consumption is

nominal. It should be noted that electricity consumption in

developed countries such as Canada and Sweden had reached 4500

kWh/annum per capita (i.e., 375 KWh/month per capita) in 1998.

Based on a load forecast study undertaken by NEA, the expected

peak load in the Integrated National Power System (INPS) by the

year 2020 is estimated at 1820 MW with the corresponding annual

energy availability at 8300 GWh. Thus, even if Nepal is able to meet

the projected demand for electricity in 2020 (and reach an installed

capacity of 1820 MW), only about 4.2 per cent of the techno-

economically feasible hydro-power potential of the country will have

been developed. These projections clearly indicate that within the

distant future, Nepal's hydro-power potential will far exceed the

growth in demand for electricity within the country. It is against this

backdrop that this paper discusses the possibilities of how Nepal's

hydro-power potential can be used to meet regional energy demand

creating a win-win situation.

The relevance of the regional context is obvious when one looks at

the map entitled: "Earth at night, lights of the world" produced by

the National Geographic Society in November 2004. Darkness

carpeting South Asia and western part of China adequately reflects

the need of a substantive inter-Himalayan regional energy drive to

take this part of the world from darkness to light.

Hydro-power Development PlanThe only significant hydro-power plant currently under construction

is the 70 MW Middle Marsyngdi Project located in Lamjung District,

Western Region of the country. Due to various delays, this hydro-

power project is now expected to be commissioned in 2007. At

present, the Nepali private sector is mainly involved in developing

small hydro-power projects that are limited to 5 MW installed

capacity. This year (2005), the 2.5 MW Sun Koshi and the 500 KW

Rairang hydro-power plant have been commissioned and the 1.5 MW

199198

Chakhu is also expected to come on line within a month. Although,

the Nepalese private sector hydro-power developers have acquired a

number of licenses and have also entered into power purchase

agreements (PPA) with NEA, at present not one has entered the

construction phase.

After having successfully implemented the 60 MW Khimti and 36

MW Bhote Koshi projects in the early 2000, the multi-national

companies too do not seem to have immediate plans to develop more

hydro-power plants in the country. Thus, in the next four-five years

the installed capacity in the INPS is likely to be limited to 700 MW.

Snowy Mountain Engineering Consultancy (SMEC) had acquired the

license to develop the 750 MW West Seti Hydropower Project in the

mid 1990s. SMEC plans to develop this project for export of

hydroelectricity to India. Under the terms of the licence, Nepal will

be entitled to receive 10 per cent of the generation capacity free of

cost from the project. Thus, with the completion of West Seti

(planned for 2012/13), the INPS will have an equivalent 75 MW of

additional installed capacity. SMEC has successfully concluded the

PPA with India.

The tentative list of hydro-power projects that NEA has identified for

development in the near future are presented in Table 1. These

projects were initially planned to be commissioned by 2015.

However, since only the feasibility studies have been completed for

most of these projects and furthermore, none have reached the

construction stage and the 2015 commissioning target now appears

to be over optimistic basically due to large number of power plants

and limitation of funds.

It should be noted that if all of the hydro-power plants listed in Table

1 were to be developed, the installed capacity within the INPS would

reach around 1850 MW which would be sufficient to meet the

predicted system demand till the year 2020.

ChallengesOne of the main challenges in the hydro-power sector in Nepal is the

excessively high consumer end tariff. The present domestic

(household) tariff in Nepal and that of Delhi, India, are compared in

Table 2.

The current exchange rate between Indian Rupee-IRs. and Nepali

Rupee-NRs. is one IRe. is equal to 1.60 NRs. As can be seen from

Table 2 the electricity tariff (on per kWh basis) in Nepal is around

90-250 per cent higher than that of Delhi, India, although the Indian

electricity tariff is subsidised (i.e., cost of supply in Delhi is 20 per

cent higher than the consumer end tariff). However, even when the

subsidy is accounted for, the Indian domestic tariff is still

significantly lower than that of Nepal.

S.N. Hydropower Project Installed Capacity

(MW)

Average Annual Energy (GWh)

Remarks

1. Kabeli A 30 164 Feasibility study completed2. Chameliya

30

196

Feasibility study completed3. Lower Modi

19

123

Feasibility study completed4. Upper Modi-A

42

285

Feasibility study completed5. Rahughat

27

165

Feasibility study completed6. Upper Marsyngdi A

50

340

Feasibility study completed7. Budhi Ganga

20

106

Feasibility study completed8. Hewa Khola

10

67

Feasibility study completed9. Likhu-4

44

270

Feasibility study completed10. Khimti-2

27

157

Pre-feasibility study completed

11. Upper Seti

122

592

Storage type, Feasibility study completed

12. Madi Ishaneswar 86 355 Storage type, Feasibility study completed

13. Upper Tamakoshi 250 1568 Feasibility study- Phase 1 completed

14. Tamur -Mewa

101

489

Feasibility study completed

15. Dudh Koshi -1

300

1702

Feasibility study completed

Table 1: Hydropower projects identified for development in the near future

Source: Nepal Electricity Authority, Corporate Development Plan FY 2003/04 - 2007/08.

Table 2: Domestic electricity tariff in Nepal and Delhi, India Tariff, NRs./kWh (IRs./kWh)

Monthly Energy

Consumption (kWh) Nepal

Delhi, India

Remarks

0-20

4.00 2.10 (1.31)

21-100

7.30

2.10 (1.31)

101 -200

7.30

2.53 (1.58)

201 250

7.30

5.04 (3.15)

251-400 9.90 5.04 (3.15)Over 400 9.90 6.05 (3.78)

Nepal : Min. monthly charge varies from NRs. 80, 299, 664 and 1394 based on 5A, 15A, 30 A, and 60 A meters installed.

Delhi, India : Min. monthly charge varies from NRs. 80 to 160 for 1 kW and 2 kW loads and NRs. 96 per additional kW load thereafter.

201200

The main reason for such high tariff in Nepal is because of high per

unit (kW) cost of hydro-power plants that are developed in the

country (i.e., high cost of supply), especially the larger ones with

public funding. This high cost of supply of electricity is mainly due to

the need for importing construction materials (e.g., steel) and

equipment, the inability of the local contractors to take up significant

construction work volume and the inability to mobilise local finances

and thus the reliance on hard currency loans. Furthermore, large

hydro-power plants in Nepal are implemented under bilateral or

multilateral donor aid with the preconditions (tied aid) that the

generating equipment, accessories and the main contractor be from

the donor countries. On the other hand, India is able to produce

most of the required construction materials and equipment for

hydro-power development within the country along with the

capability to mobilise significant local finances.

Another reason for high tariff is due to ‘cost-plus pricing’ approach

used to fix the tariff in the Nepalese hydro-power sector. In this

approach the generator fixes the price of electricity based on its

average cost of generation plus a certain net profit margin. Although

from the developer's point of view, cost-plus pricing is good as it

guarantees a minimum profit, it does not encourage reduction in

generation cost and thus the tariff. Some would even argue that

under the cost-plus pricing mechanism, power generation with high

costs generates higher profit and vice versa, as profit margin is

estimated as a certain percentage of the total costs.

It is also interesting to note that small hydro-power plants developed

by the Nepalese Independent Power Producers (IPP) are within the

range of US$1500/kW installed capacity, whereas the larger projects

developed by the public sector easily exceed US$2500/kW. Based on

the principles of economy of scale one would expect larger project to

be more cost effective on a per unit basis. The reason for small

hydro-power plants being more cost effective is mainly due to use of

local finances and local contractors in larger proportion along with a

higher ability to manage risks internally.

‘If one further transparently analyzes the strategic implications of the

‘high cost’ of hydropower pricing in Nepal, no developer other than

India would have an interest in harnessing Nepal's water for energy

as it is only India which can reap all other geo-political and economic

benefits (flood and drought mitigations, maintenance of ecological

balance, industrial development, and redistribution of benefits in the

poverty-centered and politically - sensitive heart-land of densely-

populated northern states of India, namely, the Uttar Pradesh, Bihar

and West Bengal) out of the ”high cost” hydropower development.’

(U. Gautam and A. Karki, Editors Note, Hydropower Pricing in

Nepal, Developing a Perspective (2004)

The challenge for Nepal remains to produce and market hydro-power

at a reasonably affordable price if hydro-power generation and

utilisation is to be linked to distributive justice, industrial

development, and as a common means of modernising the lives of

the Nepali people.

The ‘pricing’ indicates the inherent institutional attitude of the

official power sector. Recently India and China agreed to continue to

cooperate in exchanging flood-season hydrological data of the trans-

border rivers. Furthermore, in response to concerns expressed by the

Indian side, China agreed to take measures for controlled release of

accumulated water of the landslide dam on the river Parechu, as

soon as conditions permit. Both the sides noted with satisfaction that

an agreement concerning the provision of hydrological data on

Sutlej/Langqen Zangbo was concluded and that the two sides had

also agreed to continue bilateral discussions to finalise at an early

date similar arrangements for the Parlung Zangbo and Lohit/Zayu

Qu Rivers. While encouraging developments have taken place, that

too of an inter-Himalayan regional significance, in the water

resources management, the same was not true when it came to

water-energy security and conservation. The joint India-China

statement as published by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs

stated: ‘The two sides agreed to cooperate in the field of energy

security and conservation, including, among others, encouraging

relevant departments and units of the two countries to engage in the

survey and exploration of petroleum and natural gas resources in

third countries.’

But the two sides do not specifically offer cooperation in water

energy, a proven resource that is not only renewable, clean, and

environmentally friendly but is integral to water, a natural

endowment in the inter-Himalayan region.

203202

China and India, with higher rates of pollution due to the excessive

use of fossil fuels, require a regime of more environment-friendly

energy under the Kyoto Protocol. As the sustainability of increasing

China-India trade depends on progressive use of environment-

friendly energy in the coming time, Nepal can offer comparative

advantage to both neighbors through regional cooperation and

management of its water resources.

The Way ForwardThe first two priorities for hydro-power in Nepal are: to ensure that

the consumer end tariff is affordable, and to continue to increase

supply of electricity to the general population. These require the

country to come out of the ‘cost plus pricing”’mindset and to develop

a mechanism which rewards efficiency. One option would be to

initiate competitive bidding for electric power (kW) and energy

(kWh) where the authorised agency would request developers to

quote the price they are willing to sell the electricity generated from

their proposed hydro-power plants. The authorised agency will then

have the option of buying electricity on a least cost basis to meet the

growth in demand.

A second option that can be considered to ensure competition in the

electricity sector in the country is to create an environment where

multiple generators and distributors of electricity can operate in a

free market instead of having a monopolistic and dominant player.

Although the private sector has been investing in the generation

sector (24 per cent of the INPS installed capacity is contributed by

the private sector), the distribution sector is still entirely owned by

NEA. Thus, all IPPs need to sign PPA with NEA in order to sell

electricity into the national grid. With multiple generators and

distributors, the prices could be brought down, as the monopolistic

barrier would be broken. With such an arrangement and free

market, Nepal could move closer to establishing a spot market in

electricity similar to the one set up by India recently. His Majesty's

Government of Nepal is currently preparing to divide NEA into

generation, transmission and distribution entities. As a result of this

and providing a greater room to the private sector, one can expect a

competitive electricity market with the end result being affordable

end tariff for the consumer.

Given the high price of electricity from generation cost to consumer

end tariff, the electricity market has been operating on a suppressed

demand. The projections that have been made by NEA of a system

demand of 1820 MW in the country by the year 2020 also reflect

such suppressed demand and not the actual or potential demand. If

the price of electricity is based on its ‘real market value’ and

extensive transmission and distribution networks are established

allowing the general population and industries access to virtually

unlimited electrical energy, the aggregate demand would be much

higher. However, even with such growth that caters to the

development driven demand, it is unlikely for the country to have the

capacity to fully utilise the 43,000 MW of techno-economic potential

hydroelectricity even in the distant future. Priority needs to be given

to domestic consumption of electricity, as this would ensure that the

secondary benefits (industrial output, employment, etc. resulting

form forward and backward linkages in the economy) remain within

the country, due to the sheer hydro-power potential. An enormous

possibility still exists for Nepal to develop this resource base as an

exportable commodity. Apart from being a constant source of

revenue for the country, this can also contribute towards regional

energy security.

There is a growing deficit in the supply of electrical energy in India

and more specifically in its northern states. Against the target of

adding 6,000 MW annually, India has been able to meet it only

halfway and consequently, the demand-supply gap has been

increasing annually. With the growing Indian economy, this deficit is

likely to increase. Nepal can contribute in bridging this gap in the

Indian electricity supply by developing its hydro-power potential

further. With the planned implementation of the 750 MW West Seti,

to a certain extent, export of electricity from Nepal to India is about

to start.

China's annual energy need has been increasing rapidly to meet its

development pace. According to China Daily of 28 January, 2005,

‘…car ownership and fuel consumption are growing inexorably and

today China is the second largest importer of oil in the world’. It is

interesting to note that prior to 1993, China was an exporter of oil.

To curb the use of fossil fuel, China has also launched grain-fed

vehicles programs, i.e., vehicles are driven by gasohol, which

comprises 10 per cent ethanol. Corn, wheat and sugar cane serve as

raw materials for ethanol and it is claimed that with gasohol, vehicle

205204

carbon monoxide emissions can be reduced by as much as 40 per

cent.

It should be noted that only domestic production and huge imports

of oil and innovations such as the use of gasohol would not be

sufficient to meet China's growing demand for energy. Thus, along

with developing huge hydro-power project such as the 18,200 MW

Three Gorges which when fully commissioned will produce 84,000

GWh/annum (enough to provide 11% of China's soaring electricity

demand), China plans to build nuclear reactors at a rate of nearly two

a year between now and 2020 (International Herald Tribune, 17

January 2005).

Due to high volume of fossil fuel consumed, projections are that

China will be among the leading countries in terms of carbon

emissions. Similarly, India's electricity generation is also

significantly thermal power plant based and coal, which is the

primary fossil fuel used by Indian thermal plants, produces more

carbon than most other fossil fuels. The scientific community is of

the opinion that high carbon emissions (greenhouse gas emissions)

leads to global warming resulting in climate change. In fact, this is

the basis for the Kyoto Protocol, which has been ratified this year

with Russia signing the ‘Protocol’.

The Kyoto Protocol is the outcome of the meeting of more than 160

nations in Kyoto in 1997 when an agreement was reached among the

developed nations to limit their greenhouse gas emissions, relative to

the levels emitted in 1990. Now that the Protocol has entered into

force, the emissions target by the developed countries would have to

be achieved on average over the commitment period (2008 to 2012).

The Kyoto Protocol has established the Clean Development

Mechanism (CDM), which enables Annex I countries (developed

countries and economies in transition) of the United Nations

Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) meet their

greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction targets at lower cost through

projects in developing countries. Thus, carbon has now become a

tradable commodity with an associated value. One tonne of carbon

dioxide (CO2) reduced through a CDM project, when certified by a

designated operational entity is known as a Certified Emission

Reduction (CER) and can be traded like any other commodity.

Apart from standard climate change implications due to carbon

emissions such as changes in rainfall pattern and frequent

occurrences of extreme hydrological events (droughts and floods)

affecting agricultural sector and livelihood, other common areas of

concern between Nepal, China and India are:

lMelting of the Himalayan snow in Nepal and China resulting in

Glacial Lake Outburst Floods (GLOF).lReduction in river discharges in Nepal and India affecting mostly

hydropower generation in Nepal and supply of irrigation water

in India. Studies now indicate that over the past 10 years, the

average discharge in the Mahakali River has been gradually

decreasing.

In the context of climate change, Kyoto Protocol and CDM, there

exists a viable cooperation possibility in water-energy sector among

the three nations, namely Nepal, China and India. By supplying

electricity to its northern and southern neighbors, Nepal can produce

other multi dimensional effects. That are as follows:

lThe trade in energy will help China and India reduce their oil

imports.lThe sharing of CDM benefits the countries along with a

reduction in pollution level, due to the reduction in carbon

emissions in China and India after a decrease in their reliance on

thermal as a result of hydro-electricity supplied by Nepal.lThe market opportunity for both China and India to supply

construction materials and equipment to Nepal for the

development of hydro-power plants. For example, construction

materials such as steel are imported from India and some small

hydro-power plants have recently installed Chinese generating

equipment.

However, for such a win-win situation, it is essential for the three

countries to have the political will at the highest level. First, Nepal

needs to take measures to ensure that it is able to supply electricity at

a competitive market price and treat water-energy from a business

perspective. This may also require allowing multinational

investment, including from China and India, in Nepal's hydro-power

sector. China and India need to diversify sources of energy to ensure

energy security. Furthermore, India needs to duly recognize the

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benefits (mainly irrigation benefits) that will accrue from regulated

flows of water from Nepal if it agrees on a mutually beneficial

sharing mechanism.

Another pre-requisite for such a win-win situation is to encourage

people to people interaction leading to private sector investment

across the borders. Since both China and India have been supplying

construction materials and equipment to hydro-power projects in

Nepal, such an interaction is already happening. Thus, this will not

be an entirely new field for cooperation; only a multilateral

cooperative framework with a vision legitimately based on a mutually

agreed international protocol.

Such cross country energy trade did not take place earlier due to the

constrained political environment because of putting both energy

security and national security under the same framework, and in

some ways, mutually exclusive. With the Kyoto Protocol coming into

force, such constrained perspective will become irrelevant.. Issues

considered political will be driven primarily by market and

environmental/ecological factors.

In the words of Stanley A. Weiss, Chairman of the Washington-based

Business Executives for National Security, ‘India must be more

sensitive to the legitimate water worries of its smaller neighbors.

What's good for New Delhi must also be good for the region,

economically and ecologically. For example, as part of their new

‘strategic partnership’ and plans for joint energy ventures, China and

India should stop treating Nepal and Bhutan as buffer zones and

instead see them as future hydro-based economic zone’.

Equitable Water Energy Order Water energy offers an equitable alternative to the countries of the

inter-Himalayan region as water has an integrated upstream and

downstream spread and connectivity. The spread and connectivity

have received critical significance in the face of on-going climate

change. It is therefore a high imperative to go for an inter-Himalayan

regional commission that works for establishment and promotion of

equitable water energy order on an inter-regional basis. Conflict

cannot be an option in such a cooperative framework. To quote

Henry A. Kissinger, ‘India finds no inconsistency between its

improving relations with the United States and proclaiming a

strategic partnership with China, and China, in its own interest, is

seeking cooperation with the United States for many reasons’. In

such a scenario, regional cooperation should become possible and

essential. What the countries of the inter-Himalayan region

including China, India, Nepal and others, need is an enforceable

cooperative framework for an equitable water energy order,

regardless of the internal situation of any country.

Dr Upendra Gautam is an institutional development specialist from

Nepal.Ajoy Karki is editor of the quarterly publication, Biogas, based in

Nepal.

Referencesl 'FY 2002-03 -- A Year in Review', Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA),

August 2004.lUpendra Gautam and Ajoy Karki, Hydropower Pricing in Nepal,

Developing a Perspective, Jalsrot Vikas Sanstha (JVS), Anmanager,

Kathmandu, Nepal, 2004 lA. Karki and B. Shrestha, ‘Micro-hydropower in Nepal: Access to

Electricity for Isolated Rural Population in the Hills and Mountains’,

International Energy Journal, Special Issue, vol. 3, No.2, December

2002.lWebsite: www.worldenergy.org

lWebsite: http://cdm.unfccc.int/

lWebsite: www.ipcc.ch

lWebsite: www.prototypecarbonfund.org

lStanley A. Weiss, ‘The Untapped Might of Himalayas,’ The Kathmandu

Post, May 12, 2005.lThe Joint Statement of the Republic of India and the People's Republic

of China published after Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s state visit to

India, the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 11, 2005, New Delhi. lUpendra Gautam, ‘China-India accords and Nepal,’ The Kathmandu

Post, April 23, 2005.lIAHR Newsletter, vol. 22, 2005 (Supplement to JHR - Vol. 43 - No. 1)lThomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat, A Brief History of the Twenty-

first Century, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).lHenry A. Kissinger, ‘Conflict is not an option,’ International Herald

Tribune, June 9, 2005.

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SAPANA Conference Declaration

eading experts, academics, and scholars from the member

countries of SAARC, representing different disciplines and

sectors, having met at the South Asian Journal conference L“Envisioning South Asia”, facilitated by SAFMA, on 29-30 April

2006 in Islamabad, Pakistan, have deliberated upon and initiated a

process of evolving a holistic and integrated South Asian vision by

and for South Asians and a strategic understanding on meeting the

challenges of the 21st century and globalisation and ushering in a

new era of fraternal, equitable, and collective partnership:

1. South Asia is at a historic moment of unprecedented potential

for transforming its economic and social conditions and,

together with China, emerging as two large economies in the

next two decades, playing a key role not only in the global

economy, but also in the development of human civilisation in

the 21st century. Yet the world cannot be sustained by economic

growth alone. Human life is threatened with environmental

crises, conflicts, endemic poverty, natural calamities and an

arms race. 2. Our societies have a rich cultural tradition of unity in diversity,

creative growth through human solidarity and harmony with

nature. In bringing these aspects of their culture in facing

contemporary challenges, the people of this region could bring

new consciousness and institutions to the global market

mechanism that can take the world on to a new trajectory of

cooperative, sustainable development and human security.

Global cooperation in environmental protection, poverty

reduction and defusing the flash points of social conflict and an

end to violence, terrorism and repression will become the

essential underpinning of sustainable development and human

security in this century. Thus it is not the military muscle of a

state/region that will be the emblem of status, but its

contribution to meeting the challenge of peace, overcoming

global poverty, protecting the planet from environmental

disaster and contributing to humanizing the world and

advancement of its people.3. The global environment provides a historically unprecedented

scale of capital flows, trade opportunities, information and

technologies, which, if utilized, can dramatically transform the

material and social conditions of life of the peoples of South

Asia. A vision is efficacious to the extent that it can be

concretized. This requires bringing to bear the new

consciousness of South Asian cooperative and equitable

partnership to undertake specific policy actions. Apart from

implementing the decision at the Islamabad SAARC Summit to

establish a South Asian Free Trade Area, SAARC Social Charter,

ISACPA Report on Poverty Alleviation, three broad areas for

deepening economic cooperation can be identified for the

purposes of specific policy action: (1) energy cooperation and

water management and conservation within South Asia; (2)

Increased investment for accelerating economic growth,

especially in physical and social infrastructures; (3)

Restructuring growth for faster poverty eradication and human

resource development. 4. With the most contiguous region of the world, a common history

to share and similarities of cultures, South Asia has less baggage

to shed than Europe or the Far East. It is now booming with the

ideas of regional cooperation that take a wholist approach

towards the collective good of the region as they increasingly

find state-centric and security-centred approaches inconsistent

with the interests of our 1.4 billion people and the imperatives of

our times. 5. India and Pakistan are at a crucial moment in history when

economic cooperation between the two is necessary for

sustaining their respective economic growth rates. a) India will

require rapidly rising imports of oil and gas from the Middle

East and Central Asia to fuel its economic growth. Pakistan is

the natural conduit through which these oil and gas supplies can

be transported into India and the rest of South Asia. b) India's

211210

growth in the past has been based essentially on the home

market. In the future, sustaining growth will requite export

markets in Pakistan and other South Asian countries. c)

Similarly, the sustainability of Pakistan's GDP growth requires a

large increase in investment, particularly in infrastructure, and

the Indian private sector, along with direct foreign investment,

can fill this gap for Pakistan. d) The oil and gas pipeline from

Iran through Pakistan to India alone can generate over $700

million a year and with similar lines from Central Asia,

Afghanistan through Pakistan another $500 million. This could

add 1.5 percentage points to Pakistan's GDP growth. e) The gains

from trade between India and Pakistan will be greater for

Pakistan than India, and can accelerate GDP growth in both

countries. Thus opening up trade and investment is vital for

growth sustainability in South Asia.6. Energy and Water are two vital resource inputs into economic

growth. South Asia requires integrated gas and electricity grids

for the welfare of each South Asian country. Similarly, South

Asian regional agreements among upper and lower riparian

states on the model of the Indus Basin Treaty need to be made

between Nepal, India, Bangladesh. Similar protocols need to be

developed for upper and lower riparian districts/ provinces

within each country. These are necessary to avid inter and

intrastate tensions in the future.7. Governments in South Asia need to realize that in the next two

decades, South Asia will become the second largest economy in

the world after China. This means that the centre of gravity will

shift for the first time in 300 years, to this part of the world from

the West. This presents a new challenge to South Asian citizens

to develop new paradigms of economic policy, governance and

international relations. a) At the level of economic policy we

need to restructure our GDP growth so as to achieve growth with

equity which requires making the poor not into victims but the

subjects of the growth process, from being marginal to becoming

the mainstream of economic growth. b) At the level of

governance we need to give up the 18th century notion that

economic gains must be translated into increased military

power. In an inter-dependent world the emblem of the status of

a country will be based not on its ability to destruct but its ability

to save the planet from ecological disaster and to build a more

humane world. c) At the level of international relations we need

to replace the competitive and hegemonic model of interstate

relations with a cooperative model. We can start with South

Asian cooperation to demonstrate to the world that the

maximization of national welfare lies not in conflict but

cooperation, not through aggression but through human

solidarity.8. The remarkable concurrence of views expressed by the experts at

South Asian Journal's conference reflect the immense urge of

our peoples to outgrow the past and take a leap into a future that

is free from want and conflict. Certain stages of history can be

skipped, so can various evolutionary stages through which, for

example, the European Union had to pass in the 20th century.

The intrastate conflicts and interstate disputes must move from

management to resolution in a result-oriented process that must

at the same time allow, rather than hinder, regional cooperation

to address the demands of our peoples. The lines of conflicts

must change into the bridges of friendship and the fenced-

borders must gradually soften before the urge of South Asians to

become a fraternal and indivisible community of people with

nation states, while keeping their sovereign equality, joining

hands in submitting before the will of their real sovereigns - the

people. 9. With a step-by-step approach, and simultaneously, all sided

measures can be taken through an integrated and well calibrated

sequencing and realistic stages, towards South Asian Free Trade

Area, South Asian Union, (tourism/environment/water/energy/

communication /information/economic), South Asian Tariffs

and Customs Union, South Asian Monetary Union, South Asian

Bank and Development Fund, South Asian Cooperative Security

and South Asian Parliament. However, to take a leap forward,

there will have to be no hegemony, or ganging up by the small

against the big. A new paradigm of equitable, if not equal,

partnership must evolve to reshape our all-sided relations. 10. Welcoming the current peace process between India and

Pakistan with its two-fold objectives: the exploration of all

options for a final settlement of the J&K question in an

atmosphere free of violence, terrorism and normalization of

bilateral relations while implementing their joint statements of

January 6, 2004, September 24, 2004 and April 18, 2005 in

their letter and spirit. Appreciating the efforts by India and

Pakistan to undertake nuclear and conventional military

213212

confidence-building measures, we urge them to put in place a

comprehensive regime of CBMs that will ensure a nuclear-

tension free subcontinent. We endorse the demands of India and

Pakistan for negotiations with the other nuclear weapons powers

to promote global non-proliferation and effective nuclear

disarmament. Appeal to all countries in the region to put in

place comprehensive sustainable dialogue mechanisms for

resolving all bilateral disputes. While India and Pakistan today

have a composite dialogue in place which needs to be given

further impetus and momentum, similar exercises are needed,

for example between India and Bangladesh.11. Concerned about various intrastate conflicts, such as in Sri

Lanka, Nepal and elsewhere, we call upon the concerned parties

to hold fire, take necessary confidence building measures and

allow peace process to address their relevant genuine concerns

and propose alternative solutions on which the parties could

mutually agree to resolve their disputes. 12. Welcoming the victory of democratic struggle in Nepal, a

broader consensus on convening a Constituent Assembly,

without any conditions, the urge of all segments of civil society

to find an amicable peaceful solution to the causes that gave

birth to the Maoist upsurge and to set a democratic path of free

and fair elections, we hope that the people of Nepal will realize

the dream of a republic and set a laudable example for those

other peoples who are still struggling to achieve their democratic

aspirations against the remnants of authoritarianism and

extremism. 13. Facing the challenges of globalization and taking a collective

stand in the ongoing trade negotiations on WTO, South Asia

should set its own house in order to pursue its collective goal of

creating an even playing filed both within the region and in the

world.

In view of the above, the individual working groups set up under

SAPANA put forward recommendations in the following areas:

South Asian Free Trade Area The agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) requires

effective implementation, expanding the space for trade and, more

importantly, economic collaboration, investment and development.

If South Asia's economies are to be integrated, it presupposes

development of transnational communication networks and physical

infrastructure and monetary cooperation involving greater

coordination among the governments and the central banks. Despite

limited complementarities in trade-able items, due to similar

comparative advantages, expansion of trade warrants vertical and

horizontal integration of industries and investment in joint ventures

by public and private sectors. However, trade and investment will

not move ahead unless tariffs are lowered, the negative list kept to

the minimum, para- and non-tariff barriers removed and standards

harmonized.

Streamlining borders transactions through trade facilitation at sub-

regional junctions, special attention needs to be focused on

promoting border trade. Increase in efficiency within the sub-region

often spills over into trade outside the region as well, because

improving customs or improving efficiency of ports helps both

intraregional trade and international trade.

The Group on Tariff and Macroeconomic Harmonisation

recommends:14. The average rate of tariffs has gone down in all the South Asian

countries, but some of them impose para-tariffs, including

regulatory duties, anti-dumping duties, and specific duties and

non-tariff barriers. Transparency in the tariffs structure needs to

be ensured. While the average duties are not all that high there is

a need to remove tariff peaks. Further reduction in duties should

ensure that the industries where the country has dynamic

comparative advantage are not closed down. The group also

recommends trade facilitation because various procedural

requirements discourages growth of trade;15. Containing fiscal deficit policy should be pursued by making

judicious choices between growth and stability;16. The prudential regulations for the banks should be effectively

implemented and it needs to be ensured that the efficiency gains

result in higher deposit rates and/or lower rates on the

advances. The pursuit of prudential regulations should not be

applied on the small and micro enterprises who cannot meet the

collateral requirements; 17. South Asian countries may continue to have floating exchange

rates and the central banks may only intervene to keep the

currency near the equilibrium value;

215214

18. The South Asian countries may further deregulate the economy

and may continue privatization policies as long as the private

sector monopolies are properly regulated; 19. Whereas South Asian countries are struggling to promote trade

within the region, the ultimate objective should be the economic

union and common currency. Whereas political agreement

would be necessary to make SAFTA effective, formulate the

custom union and economic union, various steps will have to be

taken before economic union is formed. The countries will have

to coordinate the exchange rate, fiscal and monetary policies;20. The coordination of policies would imply that the countries are

willing to increase interdependencies and the commitment of

the union to help the country suffering from any problem and a

South Asian Fund may be created for this purpose. Various

studies need to be conducted to examine the problems by way of

policy coordination and the lack of economic policy options

when the economic union is formed; and21. The group also feels that the South Asian countries have

achieved growth rates exceeding 8 per cent in recent years and

they expect the growth rate to continue. However, the

investment rates and other prerequisite to the high growth rates

are missing and they must try to overcome the stumbling blocs

to growth.

InvestmentsIntra-regional investment plays an important role in transferring

surplus capital from capital endowed countries of a region to capital

deficit ones and along with it technical, managerial and marketing

skills. It also plays a vital role in industrial restructuring within the

region and helps in moderating trade imbalances among the member

countries.

In view of the crucial role of investments, it is desirable that member

countries of SAARC evolve a common investment policy so that

instead of competing with each other in terms of offering fiscal

incentives, they facilitate freer flow of capital among them that

extend beyond their respective countries. The elements of such an

investment policy include capital flows to mitigate the trade deficit

and capital scarcity, avoidance of double taxation, protection of

investment and conditions governing the management of foreign

exchange, differentiating between the requirement s of least and

non-least developing countries.

The 13th SAARC Summit held in December 2005 adopted three

treaties for promoting investment facilitation. These are related to

customs cooperation, limited double tax agreement and setting up of

an Arbitration Council. The scope of these agreements needs to be

extended so that the goal of a SAARC investment area is realized.

South Asian Customs, Tariffs, and Monetary UnionIntra-regional trade and Investment will, subsequently and

gradually, translate into a South Asian Customs and Tariffs Union

which may lead to a common exchange rate policy that will,

eventually, necessitate the creation of a South Asian Monetary Union

underwritten by macro-economic management and harmonization of

trade, fiscal and monetary policies at the regional level.

No less important is the cooperation in the transport and

communication sectors envisaging an integrated transport

infrastructure that allows uninterrupted travel across and beyond

our region and communication highways, facilitating free movement

of people, goods and unhindered flow of information across the

region and beyond, connecting South Asia with Central, South

Western and South East Asia. Not only do rail and road links

between Pakistan, India, Nepal and Bangladesh need to be

rehabilitated, a system of connectivity will have to be constructed

especially for the railways and the truckers will have to be issued

special permits.

Nevertheless, the Indian and Pakistani governments must agree to

transit of trade between Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, India and

Central Asia. For promotion of trade the countries will have to

facilitate cross border movement of people and goods. Visa and

custom facilities will have to be simplified, and for special categories

of people and goods waived, across the board.

The Group on Custom Laws and Issues recommends: 1. Trade is growing in the region the mindset of protectionism is

changing. Trade barriers still exist, with high tariff barriers and a

large number of non tariff barriers. The economies are booming

and clearly need to be integrated.2. Customs laws need simplification and harmonization;3. Dry ports need to be set up and transit rights be given freely;

217216

4. Valuation procedures need to be harmonized;5. Warehousing infrastructure, charges and fees needs

improvement;6. Common formats need to be developed for declaration forms;7. These forms be made available in electronic form, and available

in all major languages in the region;8. Information and data be exchanged freely;9. Countries to do away with secretive sensitive lists;10. A common software be used that would simplify declaration and

valuation;11. Mutual recognition of certification;12. Common standards and testing procedures to be followed;13. Capacity building and technology transfer be speeded up;14. Pakistan to take a lead in trade facilitation efforts, Sri Lanka to

lead the efforts towards breaking down non tariff barriers;15. Allow and encourage trade in services by recognizing University

and college degrees across the region.

Water Sharing and ManagementIncreasingly, the governments and concerned institutions are

realizing the need to address acute shortage of energy and water,

incidence of drought and floods that often bring miseries to the

people and, at times, states into conflict. The distribution and

management of water resources, though quite a divisive issue among

the upper and lower riparian regions across states, needs to be

undertaken amicably without depriving the lower and upper riparian

regions of their due to avoid a conflict over water issues which must

not be politicized.

Bilateral treaties, such as Indus Water Treaty between India and

Pakistan and the Treaty over Ganges between Bangladesh and India

must be respected and upheld in letter and spirit. The Mahakali

Treaty between Nepal and India may be implemented by removing

reservations of either side. The quadrangle of Bangladesh, Bhutan,

India and Nepal may take up an integrated approach to manage

water resources while keeping the interests of upper and lower

riparian, on the one hand, and India and Pakistan must overcome

their differences over Tulbul, Baglihar and Kishanganga projects

within the framework of the IWT, on the other.

There are other major water related problems that need to be

addressed on a priority basis with water cooperation among the

member countries of SAARC to enhance water and food security.

There is a great hydro-power potential in Bhutan and Nepal that can

be utilized by other countries of the region. However, that would

involve the need for a common or bilateral grid, on which all

concerned countries would have to agree.

Recommendations of the Water Group1. The regional water scenario of South Asia is predominated by

increasing gap between increasing water demand and

insufficient supply, high allocation to agriculture and growing

new commercial demands, trans-boundary and regional

conflicts generated from upper versus lower riparian water

needs/interests, increasing interest in hydropower and new

management experiences. Policy challenges are linked to the

socio-economic approaches, selection of technical solutions and

institutional capacity. The following general and specific

recommendations could be made, based on the group

discussion:2. The trans-boundary conflicts are based on concerns of the lower

riparian countries to secure river flows (Pakistan and

Bangladesh versus India) on one hand and development

interests of the upper riparian especially for the hydropower

(Nepal versus India, India vs. Pakistan). The multi-purpose and

multi-country planning for the Himalayan water resources and

the South Asian water basins is the proposed future option.

(proposed NIBB-C Water Ways is an example)3. All South Asian countries are going through the experiences of

decentralization and local management. Different models have

been tried the success so far indicates involvement of local civil

society, political acceptance and local institutional

implementation capacity as the key elements. The national

experiences needs to be impartially evaluated and put in the

proper context. 4. The efficiency and productivity of water use in agriculture must

be enhanced along with sustainable use of water in agriculture.

The physical water stress and growing urban needs of Pakistan

and India suggest a slow transfer of water from the sector. 5. All infrastructure developments should consider long term

conservation of the natural water resources (all water bodies,

including lakes, river sections and groundwater) and

regenerative use of water. The central and top-bottom

219218

engineering approaches are not able to move forward due to

political as well as hydrological reasons, hence, the technical

options must be formulated across the appropriate local

hydrological and political boundaries.6. The human access to water resources, on the one hand, and

increased commercial value of water, on the other, are the

growing challenges for the planning and development. The

secure allocations for the domestic and drinking water, equitable

distribution and fair water pricing in different sectors and

regions are the essential regulatory measures. The public sector

as a service provider has the responsibility to define guidelines.7. The water related sectors have the great opportunity for the

knowledge sharing in the technical and managerial fields.

South Asian Energy GridSimilarly, the energy cooperation should evolve into a South Asian

Energy Grid with integrated electricity and gas systems. As India and

Pakistan now agree, and they must move forward, the gas and oil

pipelines can run from Central Asia, Gulf, Iran and Myanmar

through Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh to whole of South

Asia and beyond. In this context of developing energy markets,

power trading in the region calls for establishment of high voltage

interconnections between the national grids of the countries. India,

Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh should cooperate in transportation

of gas and jointly developing, trading and sharing of energy.

The Energy Group recommends: 1. South Asia is home to 22% of the world's population and

occupies only 4% of the world land mass. All the countries in the

region are developing economies and heavily dependent on

energy imports despite being bestowed by nature with large

energy resources including hydro, solar, wind and, to some

extent, natural gas resources. However, they have not been able

to exploit their energy resources to meet the demand. Energy

imports constitute 27% to 87% of their commercial energy

needs. Price fluctuations in the international oil market have

been adversely impacting the economies of the region. Projected

energy consumption to sustain the current economic growth

levels would call for a more than 300% increase in their energy

consumption by 2020. Energy security, therefore, assumes

greater significance for the socio-economic development of

South Asia. The major causes of concern from the regional

energy security perspective are:(i) Short-term supply risks due to threat of war and military action

that may impact Middle East or Iran, the primary source of

commercial energy supply to South Asia;(ii) Difficulty to pay for oil imports, when the prices shoot up

sharply;(iii) Prospect of obtaining to long term gas and oil supply contracts at

affordable prices, which can also ensure greater price stability;(iv) Availability of electricity to all households within a reasonable

time span to enhance the socio-economics development and

improve quality of life.2. The following steps need to be taken urgently to address the

above concern:3. Expedite development of indigenous energy resources including

hydropower while taking into account issues of resettlement and

socio economic crisis. Non-conventional energy resources, such

as, the wind and solar energy resources, such as, the wind and

solar energy to meet the long term energy demand;4. Establishment of a South Asian regional power grid to facilitate

exchanges and trading of power to meet the electricity demand

in the region;5. Development of a South Asia Gas Grid with pipelines from Iran.

Turkmenistan, to facilitate natural gas surplus countries in the

neighborhood of South Asia to facilitate natural gas imports into

the region and its distribution among the countries of South

Asia;6. Establish South Asia Energy Research Programs for

development of new technologies that would facilitate

harnessing the benefits of solar and other energy resources on a

more sustainable basis;7. Establish regional energy cooperation on a long-term basis;8. Undertake evaluation to examine the appropriateness and

impact of power sector reform initiatives undertaken by the

countries in South Asia to identify the need for any course

correction or policy change.

South Asian Development Bank Given a low rate of investment to GDP ratio, South Asia must create

attractive environment for investment in high value-added

manufacturing lines and trans-regional projects. Enhanced

investment flows, both from within and outside the region, would

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culminate in production facilities located across the region through

integrated production systems. Shares of both national and regional

companies would be quoted on our stock exchanges as capital moves

without hindrance across national boundaries to underwrite

investment in joint ventures and projects in any part of our region

through a South Asian Development Bank.

Addressing LDCs' ConcernsHowever, economic cooperation and trade would not produce

tangible results unless the concerns of Least Developed Countries

(LDCs) are genuinely addressed, the negative-list is minimized,

tariffs are substantially brought down and non-tariff and para-tariff

barriers lifted, the economies are gradually opened up with a

recourse to investment-trade linkage that takes care of trade deficits

between partners through investment flows and capital account,

vertical and horizontal integration of industries that benefits from

relative advantages and economies of scale. The time frame

envisaged in the agreement on SAFTA must be strictly adhered to.

South Asian Cooperative SecurityWe resolve to get out of the straitjacket of enmity, overcome

obsession with over-demanding militaristic security paradigms and

look beyond the traditional notions of security and focus on an

integrated South Asian Cooperative Security that recognizes

interdependence and mutuality of interests. The states ought to act

in their enlightened self-interest to resolve their conflicts and

differences through peaceful means and to the mutual benefit of our

peoples. The choice is often, erroneously, posed between regional

cooperation and conflict resolution. We urge all our states to

simultaneously move forward to address long-standing political

disputes through peaceful means. The main obstacle to regional

cooperation and economic integration remains political and

strategic. Therefore, we vow to be courageous, flexible and consistent

to help resolve interstate and intrastate conflicts and dismantle

political barriers to regional economic takeoff.

Countering the widespread threat of terrorism, the SAARC countries

must implement the current protocol for cooperation against

terrorism and bring it in line with the international norms. The

regional efforts against terrorism must also include measures to

combat the spread of small arms and light weapons, narcotics

trafficking, smuggling, organized crimes and criminal mafias. This

will require exchanges and interaction between the national

intelligence and security agencies with their counterparts across the

border and greater interaction between the armed forces and

military establishments in the region.

The conference strongly emphasizes the principle that there can be

no intervention in the internal affairs of any nation in the

subcontinent. Yet, given the implications of internal conflicts for

regional security as a whole, the SAARC must pay greater attention

to the relationship between internal and regional security. It calls on

both parties to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka to take immediate

steps towards a revival of the stalled peace process and creation of an

interim administration in the Tamil-dominated regions while

securing integrity of the country and the rights of minorities there.

Without prejudice to the current positions of the SAARC

governments on amending the SAARC charter, the conference calls

upon the SAARC to initiate a study on mechanisms for cooperative

security in the region.

Advancing the SAARC charter, the conference welcomes the

decision, in principle, of the Islamabad SAARC summit to establish

procedures for cooperation with other countries and organizations.

Given the increasing interdependence among regions, cooperation

with neighboring countries, such as China, Afghanistan and

Myanmar and Central Asia, and other regional organizations, it is an

essential future activity for SAARC.

The Group on Nuclear Stabilization recommendsThe existence of nuclear weapons in South Asia remains an issue of

major concern for the peoples and region's security analysts. Given

Indo-Pak history of constant tensions and intermittent crises, we are

concerned about the likelihood of a crisis spiralling out of control

and eventually leading to a nuclear conflict. While we find the South

Asian nuclear regime to be relatively stable in peace time, there is

indeed nuclear instability induced into the nuclear equation in time

of crises. This is borne out of an analysis of the 1999 and 2002 crises

between India and Pakistan. Moreover, since one of the adversaries,

Pakistan, inherently links nuclear escalation to conventional

asymmetry, the growing asymmetry in conventional arms between

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Pakistan and India could also lead to a lowering of the nuclear

thresholds in terms of South Asian crises. Finally, while the mutual

ambiguity of the nuclear regime in South Asia contributes to stability

on some counts, it does not allow the adversaries to make informed

decisions in times of crises and can thus lead to instability.

Given the above, the recommendations of the group

include:1. Recognizing that much of the tensions are a result of outstanding

disputes, we recommend that Pakistan and India must continue

dialogue on these issues and continue on the overall drive

towards CBMs through the existing normalization process. With

regard to nuclear weapons, Pakistan and India should mutually

initiate a global drive towards disarmament. The starting point

should be a declaration that transforms South Asia into a nuclear

weapons free zone. More specifically, the two sides could focus

on the following:2. Declaring a bilateral ban on nuclear testing through an

agreement;3. Ceasing the production of all fissile material (agreement);4. Signing a non-deployment agreement, agreeing that weapon

systems will not be mated or deployed (agreement);5. Signing an agreement no to pre-empt nuclear installations of the

adversary;6. Establishing of NRRCs but with a legally binding agreement that

such channels will remain open during crises;7. Enhancing command and control structures to eliminate the

likelihood of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear conflict.

The Group on Conflict Resolution Mechanism Proposes: Conflicts in South Asia are passing through a critical phase of

transformation which requires a proper understanding,

interpretation and information about issues which cause conflicts.

For a long period of time, South Asia has perceived conflicts through

a zero-sum perspective but the process of gradual conflict

transformation is taking place in the region which may help the

formulation of conflict resolution mechanism.

Recommendations:1. Need for proper conceptualization and understanding of

conflicts and their interpretations in a rational manner.

Therefore, it is recommended to establish conflict resolution

centers and institutes at the governmental and non-

governmental levels so as to unleash the process of meaningful

research in the field of conflict resolution. It is also

recommended to design academic curricula on conflict

resolution so as to create a better awareness among the people of

South Asia about the need for a conflict resolution process. Both

print and electronic media of South Asia can play a plausible role

for creating proper conditions for conflict resolution process; 2. Involvement of stake holders and allow them the space to craft

out alternative conflict resolution mechanism. Stakeholders

must have political will for conflict resolution and women should

be made an integral part of this mechanism. The composite

dialogue going on between India and Pakistan should also focus

on the practicable conflict resolution strategy as far as

contentious issues are concerned;3. State structures and their proponents should also be influenced

because states are often the creators, promoters and sustainers

of conflict;4. There should be SAARC conventions on minority and water

rights' charters and the existing human rights' charter of SAARC

needs to be strengthened and properly implemented.

South Asian Human Security Beyond cooperative security, South Asian nations must ultimately

move towards South Asian Human Security by placing people -- their

wellbeing and rights to peaceful life and development -- at the centre

of security concerns, rather than intensifying the arms race. To

include the excluded, governments of South Asia should take

concrete steps to implement the SAARC Social Charter and give

priority to poverty eradication by implementing ISACPA Report on

Poverty Alleviation and meeting the Millennium Development Goals.

This can be done by increased investment, enhanced economic

growth and development, which do not necessarily translate into

poverty alleviation unless structured to address the root-causes of

poverty and give priority to human resource development,

employment generation and empowerment of the dispossessed,

women and the poor, in particular.

South Asian Parliament The South Asian region emerged out of decolonization as a result of

the drawing of political boundaries with sovereignty attributes

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forming new states. The political boundaries have further been

reinforced through divergent strategies of state and nation building,

reinterpretations of history and religion, and due to the Cold-War

strategic divides. In the context of these reinforced boundaries and

divisions, it may sound imprudent and even unrealistic to talk of

political integration in the region. However, over the past decades,

the imperatives of globalization, end of the cold war and rising

popular aspirations in each of the South Asian states have brought

about qualitative changes in the regional perceptions. Processes like

SAARC have created institutions and generated impulses under

which people are visualizing the prospects of establishing a South

Asian community. Regional integration should and will take place

within the framework of community building, not by conceiving or

attempting erosion of state sovereignties or identities. The examples

of SAFMA's initiative towards South Asian parliament and the

collective and individual attempts in India and Pakistan to re-write

history text books are indicative of growing popular pressure in

favour of community building.

The SAPANA Group decided to mobilise country-based but

comparative studies, that address the question of state building

strategies, nationalism, status of minorities within and otherwise in

the context of human rights and democratic polices. Studies will also

take note of the professional engagements like that of Chamber of

Commerce and industries, media, lawyers, academics, doctors and

human rights activists across the board initiated and

institutionalised within or outside the SAARC framework. The basic

strategy to be adopted towards community building through

integration will be to encourage institution building and

engagements. Patterns of sub-regional cooperation amongst the

parts of the states and societies in South Asian, linkages among

parliamentarian, political parties, scholars and analysts, as well as

transport and communication networks across the borders driven by

popular pressures present concrete examples of such strategy. The

conclusions of the studies will then be put in a perspective to map

out the properties of community building through integration. The Group on South Asian Political Integration

recommends:The participants overwhelmingly endorsed the view to initiate a

process of moving towards the creation of an institutional interactive

mechanism for parliamentarians of South Asia keeping in mind the

concept of a South Asian Parliament. A full fledged SAP may take a

decade or two, but it is time to initiate moves in that direction. To

begin with, the conference proposes: a) Creation of an Intra-

Parliamentary Union in South Asia; b) SAARC may in principle agree

to create a South Asian Parliament and appoint a group of experts,

responsible before the SAARC Speakers Forum, to prepare a

comprehensive report and a timeframe to establish it in stages and

through an evolutionary process; c) The SAARC Speakers Forum

should be activated and; d) To begin with, SAP may be set up as a

deliberative and consultative body, not as a legislative body, so as to

create regional opinion on and build regional pressures on the issues

pending for implementation at the SAARC level. This deliberative

body may work within the SAARC agenda. By ultimately creating a

South Asian Parliament, the evolution of a regional South Asian

identity, without in any sense compromising on or conflicting with

respective national identities and sovereignty of nation-states of the

region.

The Group on Rewriting History recommends: There is very little shared knowledge of how history is researched,

written and taught in each of the countries of South Asia.

Furthermore, there is inadequate recognition or appreciation of the

shared past of this region. Despite this lack of knowledge about the

past, references to and the use of history as a resource in a variety of

political debates has only increased, particularly for the promotion of

communalism, fundamentalism, casteism, regional and linguistic

chauvinism. This makes it more difficult to produce trans-national

historical perspectives.The close link between the state and historical research and textbook

production has had ambiguous and conflicting consequences for

developing a sense of the past. Historical research and analysis is still

dependent on Western categories and tools of analysis. There is need

to develop more indigenous categories.

Recommendations:1. The efforts at working out a common history of South Asia are

viable. Even though there may be fundamental differences in

perspective, it is possible to identify and work on common

themes. Rather than focusing on national histories, themes that

are shared by all the countries of South Asian countries should

be identified and worked upon.

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2. Furthermore, a perspective on history that emphasizes the

people, and neither fights shy of acknowledging historical

injustices of caste, region, religion, gender, (to take some

examples) nor glorifies them is an urgent imperative. 3. We believe that such histories can help evolve a broader

framework through stronger institutional linkages between

groups of professional historians in South Asia. Such an

engagement with the past will make a richer, fuller sense of the

past possible, and have a great impact on society and the polity

today and in the future.

The Group on Religious Extremism and Minorities

recommends:Both minority persecution and ghettoisation have to be countered.

There is still a major deficit in terms of information and

understanding about events across the region even among those

actively engaged with various human rights causes.

Recommendations: 1. A standing body charged with responsibility to study and

compose the institutional frameworks that seek to empower

minorities across the region. Where institutional support is

absent it should be highlighted.2. The political position, strategies and rhetoric employed by the

participants in the political process be monitored in order to

identify issues that may impact minorities. 3. Intellectual tendencies and debates within discourses generated

by the minorities about their situation those that promote

minority empowerment be highlighted.

South Asian Human Rights CodeIt is imperative for the South Asian countries to agree to and set up

institutions under the Paris Principles and purposefully set about

creating the required mechanisms to implement all internationally

recognized fundamental human, civil and democratic rights. The

Proposed Draft on Human Rights Code for South Asia presented

before the South Asian Parliament's Conference, convened by

SAFMA, will be circulated among the human rights bodies of the

region and Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and other human

rights bodies in the region will be requested to develop broader

understanding among the major stakeholders to develop a regional

framework at the level of SAARC and its member countries.

People to People ContactThe prevailing barriers to cross-border movements make neither

commercial nor logistical sense and originate in the pathologies of

interstate, as well as domestic, politics. There is an urgent need to

allow greater interaction among the policy-makers,

parliamentarians, businessmen, media practitioners, professionals,

youth and the leaders of civil society. To enable it to happen, it is

necessary that India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, who have the most

restrictive visa regimes, drastically revise their visa policy and

remove impediments to free movement of people. All-country visas

may be granted at separate South Asian counters on arrival at the

airports and on all border-crossings.

South Asian Information Society To overcome information deficit in the region, it is essential that all

restrictions on access to and free flow of information are removed

forthwith and media persons and products are allowed free

movement across frontiers. In this regard, SAFMA's Protocols on

'Free Movement of Media Persons and Media Products' and

'Freedom of Information' must be adopted by the national

legislatures/governments and the SAARC. To ensure the citizens'

right to know, we support SAFMA's Protocol on Freedom of

Information. The media, on their part, should rise above national

divides, avoid demonization and give special attention to the

coverage of the countries of South Asia that remain under-reported.

Given the rising numbers of South Asian Cyber citizenry, there is an

urgent need to upgrade, integrate and facilitate cyber connectivity

and accessibility.

Culture and TourismThe scope of collaboration in the sphere of culture, tourism, sports,

education, health, research, human resource development and

environment is infinite. At the level of SAARC, measures should be

taken to promote cultural exchanges, tourism, health and education

services and research in all fields.

Promotion of HumanitiesPrivate initiatives and those of universities should be encouraged by

the authorities to introduce country studies, invite faculties from the

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neighbourhood, exchange students, promote humanities and

physical sciences through South Asian congresses and undertake a

non-discriminatory portrayal of history. Visa restrictions and tedious

process for academics, experts and scholars must be dispensed with.

Women's ConcernsAcknowledging the inadequate attention to and focus on redressing

the marginalization and invisibility of women at all levels of national

and regional policy-making; and the disproportionately high burden

of poverty that women face in South Asia; SAPANA resolves to work

towards gender equality and gender justice in all aspects of our work

in the process as well as the substance; and exhort all the South

Asian governments to acknowledge and rectify the glaring gender

inequalities especially the feminization of poverty.

South Asian Policy Analysis (SAPANA) NetworkThe participants of South Asian Journal conference have agreed to

form South Asian Policy Analysis (SAPANA) Network that will

pursue virtual research and develop networking among various

independent research groups and scholars across the region to

promote free and pro-people thinking and a course of development

that addresses the concerns of the people, in a wholist and

sustainable framework.

The objective and purpose of SAPANA will be to redress the

shortcomings found in existing Think Tanks and research

organisations. Firstly, it is proposed that the main purpose and

objective of SAPANA will be to liaise with policy makers and with

governments in separate countries and in South Asia as a whole. The

research undertaken by SAPANA, while following all the principles of

objectivity and rigour, will serve as a platform for policy dialogue and

intervention.

SAPANA has a great advantage over all existing think tanks and

similar institutions, in that it is part of the Free Media Foundation

and will work closely with the South Asian Free Media Association

(SAFMA). This proximity will allow SAPANA's research output to be

available in the public arena through the media. This ability to

disseminate extensively will be one of the major advantages SAPANA

will have over other institutions.

SAPANA will focus on multidimensional and multi-thematic

interventions rather than specialise in one particular area. Because of

the already existing network of the Free Media Foundation and

SAFMA, SAPANA is being perceived as a sort of a 'virtual' institution.

Unlike most research organisations and think tanks, for the first few

years, it will not employ scholars and academics, but will out-source

research. Because of its 'virtual' nature, not constrained by the

abilities of an in-house research staff, SAPANA will have access to

the best scholars working on South Asia who will be hired on short

term contracts for specific purposes. Moreover, SAPANA will also be

able to design research themes of a more topical and immediate

nature requesting scholars to respond quickly. Its flexibility will be

one of its strengths. The participants appreciated South Asian

Journal and SAFMA for taking this timely initiative. The participants

of the First SAPANA Conference agreed to meet again within two

years to pursue their objectives and shared goals.

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