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Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda • Game Theory – Chapter 9 – “Strategery” – strategic interdependence – Cartels: Cooperation and Cheating – Auctions – Fun and Games – Sequential interactions – Holland Sweetener versus Monsanto, p. 245

Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

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Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda. Game Theory – Chapter 9 “Strategery” – strategic interdependence Cartels: Cooperation and Cheating Auctions Fun and Games Sequential interactions Holland Sweetener versus Monsanto, p. 245. Basic Ideas of Game Theory. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

• Game Theory – Chapter 9– “Strategery” – strategic interdependence– Cartels: Cooperation and Cheating– Auctions– Fun and Games– Sequential interactions– Holland Sweetener versus Monsanto, p. 245

Page 2: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Basic Ideas of Game Theory

• Game theory is the general theory of strategic behavior.· Generally depicted in mathematical form.

· Plays an important role in modern economics.

Optimal decision making whenall decision agents are presumed rationaleach attempts to anticipate actions of rivals

Page 3: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Rules, Strategies, Payoffs, and Equilibrium

Economic situations are treated as games.The rules of the game state who can do what,

and when they can do it.A player's strategy is a plan for actions in each possible situation in the game.

A player's payoff is the amount that the player wins or loses in a particular situation in a game.A players has a dominant strategy if that

player's best strategy does not depend on what other players do.

Page 4: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Nash Equilibrium

• Occurs when each player's strategy is optimal, given the strategies of the other players.A player's best response (or best strategy) is the strategy that maximizes that player's payoff, given the strategies of other players.A Nash equilibrium is a situation in which each player makes his or her best response.

Page 5: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Prisoner’s DilemmaFamous example of game theory.

• Strategies must be undertaken without the full knowledge of what other players will do.•Players adopt dominant strategies, but they don't necessarily lead to the best outcome.

Page 6: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Bonnie’s Decision Tree

Page 7: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Problems Facing Cartels• Members must be convinced to come to

coincidental interests.• Production levels, or quotas, must be agreed upon.• Profits must be divided to the cartel members’

satisfaction.• Members who may cheat must be controlled.

•A cartel is a group of firms (members of the cartel) that try to collude to act like a monopoly and share the monopoly profit.

Page 8: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Market Demand and Industry Costs with Ten Firms

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Page 9: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Market Demand and Industry Costs with Ten Firms

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Page 10: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Market Demand and Industry Costs with Ten Firms

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MC

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$12

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Page 11: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Market Demand and Industry Costs with Ten Firms

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MC

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$12

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Competitive output and price

Page 12: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Market Demand and Industry Costs with Ten Firms

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MC AC

MC

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$18

$12

120 200

Competitive output and price

Page 13: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Market Demand and Industry Costs with Ten Firms

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MC AC

MC

AC

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$18

$12

120 200

Cartel output and price Competitive output and price

Page 14: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Firm A’s Output in the Cartel

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Page 15: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Firm A’s Output in the Cartel

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$12

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Page 16: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Firm A’s Output in the Cartel

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PMC

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$12

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Competitive quantity and price

Page 17: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Firm A’s Output in the Cartel

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PMC

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12

$18

$12

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Competitive quantity and price

Page 18: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Firm A’s Output in the Cartel

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AC

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$18

$12

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Firm A’s output and price with cartel agreement

Competitive quantity and price

Page 19: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Firm A’s Output in the Cartel

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PMC

AC

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$18

$12

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Firm A’s output and price with cartel agreement

Competitive quantity and price

Page 20: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Firm A’s Output in the Cartel

Q

PMC

AC

12

$18

$12

20 24

Firm A’s output and price with cartel agreement

Firm A’s output and price if it cheats on the cartel agreement

Competitive quantity and price

Page 21: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Firm A’s Output in the Cartel

Q

PMC

AC

12

$18

$12

20 24

Firm A’s output and price with cartel agreement

Firm A’s output and price if it cheats on the cartel agreement

Competitive quantity and price

Page 22: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Firm A’s Output in the Cartel

Q

PMC

AC

12

$18

$12

20 24

Firm A’s output and price with cartel agreement

Firm A’s output and price if it cheats on the cartel agreement

Extra profits earned by cheating on cartel agreement

Page 23: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Cheating on a Cartel

General Electric

Cheat on Cartel (Charge Low Price)

Don’t Cheat (Charge Monopoly Price)

Westing- house

Cheat on

Cartel

$3 million each

Westinghouse earns $8 million

G.E. earns $2 million

Don’t Cheat

Westinghouse earns $2 million

G.E. earns $8 million

$6 million each

• Cartel members' possible strategies range from abiding by their agreement to cheating. Cartel members can charge the monopoly price or a lower price.Cheating firms can increase profits.The best strategy is charging the low price.

Page 24: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Restraint of Trade and the Antitrust Laws• Antitrust laws make it illegal to restrain trade or

attempt to monopolize a market.– Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 – Clayton Act of 1914

• Executives face jail time for fixing prices or agreeing to limit competition.

Page 25: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Auctions• Oral versus sealed bid

• First Price Auction – highest bidder pays his bid and receives object

• Second Price Auction– highest bidder pays the 2nd highest bid and receive

object• First and second price Auction

– First and second bidders pay, high bid wins object

Page 26: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Rock, Paper, Scissors• What are the elements of a

game?• What are elements of the rock

paper scissors game?• What is the Nash equilibrium

strategies in this game?

Page 27: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Normal form of Rock Paper ScissorsKnowing this, we can see without the complex math that to be indifferent to all 3 options both players should play Rock, Paper and Scissors in 1/3 of their games.

Rock, Paper, Scissors

Page 28: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Seinfeld plays Kramer’s Rock, Paper, Scissors• Payoffs:

– Scissors cut paper (Scissors wins)– Rock smashes scissors (Rock wins)– But, rock flies straight through paper (Rock wins)– Both players play the same object results in a tie

• What are elements of Kramer’s rock paper scissors game?

• What is the Nash equilibrium strategies in this game?

• What does the rock paper scissors game teach us about baseball? Pitching? Hitting? Sitting “dead red?”

Page 29: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

• Auditing and malfeasance• Employees determine whether and when to “Enron”

by cooking the books or “Rigas,” the corporation and take a ”five-finger discount?”

• Auditors determine what receives higher or lower levels of scrutiny.

• Why is nobody steals and nobody audits not a Nash equilibrium?

• What are the key features of a Nash equilibrium in the auditing game?

The Auditing Game is like Rock, Paper, Scissors

Page 30: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

An Advertising Game

Marlboro’ s Decision

Advertise

Advertise

Marlboro gets $3billion profit

Camel gets $3billion profit

Camel gets $5billion profit

Marlboro gets $2billion profit

Camel gets $2billion profit

Marlboro gets $5billion profit

Camel gets $4billion profit

Marlboro gets $4billion profit

Don’t Advertise

Don’tAdvertise

Camel’sDecision

Does this game explain why Phillip Morris was so happy for the federal government to restrict tobacco advertising?

Page 31: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

A Common-Resource Game

Exxon’s Decision

Drill TwoWells

Drill Two Wells

Exxon gets $4million profit

Texaco gets $4million profit

Texaco gets $6million profit

Exxon gets $3million profit

Texaco gets $3million profit

Exxon gets $6million profit

Texaco gets $5million profit

Exxon gets $5million profit

Drill One Well

Drill OneWell

Texaco’sDecision

Page 32: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Why People Sometimes Can Cooperate

• Firms that care about future profits will cooperate in repeated games rather than cheating in a single game to achieve a one-time gain.

• Will ECON 600 students successfully form a cartel against Professor Spry? Will they all agree to turn in poor final exams, so that he will have to give everyone a large curve?– FYI, there is a reason past cartels to turn in

blank exams have failed.

Page 33: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Sequential interactions• Boeing & Airbus communications

technology choice– Boeing chooses first

• Analyze with backward induction– Boeing must take Airbus’s best response

into account in making its choice– Boeing has first mover advantage

• Credible commitment by second mover can alter first mover choice

Page 34: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Extensive formsequential game

Page 35: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

  Holland Sweetener versus Monsanto, p. 245 • Construct the strategic-form payoff matrix or this strategic

pricing problem. Find the Nash equilibrium.• Now assume that the interaction is sequential where Holland

Sweetner chooses to enter and if so they face the pricing problem in the second stage. Should Holland Sweetner enter?

• Why do you think Holland Sweetner entered? Were they just dumb or were there other potential considerations?

• Prior to Holland Sweetner’s entry into the US market, Pepsi and Coke began deemphasizing the NutraSweet label on their cans and bottles. Why do you think they did this?

• Explain how Monsanto had a “first-mover’s advantage.”• Pepsi and Coke were the big winners in this case. Explain why.

Page 36: Managerial Economics: Today’s Agenda

Looking Forward

• Assignment 3 due Oct. 28, Nov. 1 or 2

• Readings:– Managerial Economics Chapters 10

and 18 (pages 503-513)• eBay.com, p. 275.