Management of Fishing Capacity and Resource Use Conflicts in Southeast Asia

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    Management of Fishing Capacity and ResourceUse Conflicts in Southeast Asia: A Policy Brief

    Mahfuzuddin Ahmed Nerissa D. Salayo

    K. Kuperan Viswanathan Len R. Garces Michael D. Pido

    August 2006

    The

    WorldFish Center (Malaysia)

    In collaboration with:

    Department of Fisheries (Cambodia)

    University of the Philippines in the Visayas (Philippines)

    Southern Marine Fisheries Development Center and

    Coastal Resources Institute (Thailand)

    University of Cape Town (South Africa)

    Ford Foundation (USA)

    Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ-Germany)

    www.worldfishcenter.org

    http://www.worldfishcenter.org/http://www.worldfishcenter.org/
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    Acknowledgements

    The authors acknowledge the collaboration with research partners, including DirectorNao Thuok of the Department of Fisheries, Director Srun Lim Song, Lieng Sopha, Hap

    Navy, Keang Seng and Seng Leang of the Inland Fisheries Development Institute(Cambodia); Chancellor Ida Siason, Alice Joan Ferrer and Harold Monteclaro of theUniversity of the Philippines in the Visayas (Philippines); Director Manoch Roongratri,Pakjuta Khemakorn, Amnaj Siripech and Amnuay Kongprom of the Southern MarineFisheries Development Center, and Ayut Nissapa and Awae Masae of the CoastalResources Institute (Thailand); Maria Hauck of the University of Cape Town (South

    Africa); and Robert Pomeroy, WorldFish Senior Research Fellow, for his comments. TheWorldFish Center appreciates the grants from the Ford Foundation (USA) and DeutscheGesellschaft fr Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ-Germany) with the belief that thebenefits from the outcomes of this Fish Fights over Fish Rights project are worth theinvestment. Furthermore, we thank the numerous researchers, policy-makers andgovernment regulatory personnel who joined in workshop deliberations on the

    management options for resolving conflicts in the fisheries in the region.

    Executive summary

    Most fisheries in the developing countries of Southeast Asia (SEA) are experiencing conflictsarising from excess fishing capacity. An analysis of the issues and a range of

    recommendations for managing fishing capacity are provided in this policy brief. The policyrecommendations suggest four main thematic categories of action plans for fisherystakeholders. These are: (1) uphold institutional partnership and networking in research anddevelopment; (2) build non-fishery human capacity to reduce fishing capacity; (3) promoteand harmonize action plans through good governance; and (4) advocate managementoptions and make politicians aware of the security threats of conflicts arising from excessfishing capacity.

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    Fishing capacity

    Conflicts over resource use in fisheries have been escalating all over the world. This isparticularly true in Southeast Asia (SEA). Its productive fisheries resource systemsprovide the much needed employment and protein requirements of the population.Increasing fishing pressure and over-harvesting of fishery resources, however, have

    resulted in tense competition for resource between small-scale and large-scale fishingoperations, as well as the reduction and/or collapse of important viable fish populations.These, in turn, have led to high levels of conflicts among different users over remainingstocks. The rapid population growth rate in a societal context of reduced income,increased poverty and an overall decline in the standard of living often drive users toemploy more effective, but destructive, fishing technologies.

    This Policy Brief offers a set of management options and policy recommendations formanaging the problem. This is cognizant of the intricately related problems/issues facedby most fisheries in Southeast Asia concerning over-capacity, particularly in the contextof resource use conflicts. This Brief is intended for policy makers and fishery managers

    involved in the small-scale fishery sector.

    Several management measures are needed to effectively address over-capacity, andnot all resource use conflicts are due to over-capacity. The key strategies to exit from thefisheries pertain to effort reduction and sustainable alternative livelihoods. Thecomplementary strategies include improving governance and property rights,participatory management, enhancement of stakeholder awareness and capacitybuilding for non-fishing livelihoods.

    Over-capacity is the situation where the capacity to capture is much more than the targetto be captured (Pascoe and Greboval 2003:4; Pascoe et al. 2003). Over-capacity and

    excess capacity are terms used interchangeably in this policy brief. Overcapacity infisheries has been noted in Bangladesh (Rahman et al., 2003), India (Vivekanandan etal., 2003) and Sri Lanka (Samaranayake 2003). In Indonesias Java Sea, excess effort isestimated at 428 units of 25-gross-tonnage trawlers (Purwanto 2003). In Vietnam, from1987-1999, the three-fold increase in horsepower resulted in only 1.81 times increase inthe total catch (Son, in Silvestre et al. 2003). The serious state of the fishery resourceshighlights the urgent need for the countries in the region to take action, particularly interms of managing excess fishing capacity. In 1995, East Asia contributed about 78 percent to global capacity with its approximate 980,000 decked fishery vessels (PEMSEA2003).

    Causes of excess f ishing capacity

    Over-capacity and resource use conflicts are intricately linked (Figure 1). There aresocietal drivers that bring about over capacity. In turn, over-capacity leads to variousnegative impacts. Among the key impacts are resource use conflicts. There is afeedback loop to indicate that resource use conflicts may also lead to over-capacity. Itmust be noted, however, that over-capacity may still occur even in conditions wherethere is no resource use conflicts.

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    Policies,Institutions

    for

    Governance,PropertyRights

    Populationincrease,Poverty

    Economicincentives,Markets,

    New /

    ImprovedTechnology

    OVER

    CAP

    ACITY

    Over-fishing

    Environmentaldegradation

    Resource useConflicts

    Threats to food,livelihood and humansecurity

    Main DriversKey Problem

    Impacts

    Figure 1. A conceptual framework for contextualizing over-capacity in fisheries inSoutheast Asia with reference to main drivers, and impacts with emphasis on resourceuse conflicts (modified from Kuperan and Garces 2003 and Salayo et al. 2005).

    Case studies from Asia

    Cambodia, the Philippines, and Thailand were chosen for case studies. These three

    countries provide various modes of excess capacity, as well as varying types of resourceuse conflicts in various geographic settings: coastal marine, riverine and freshwaterlakes. The research methods employed included household surveys, focused groupdiscussion (FGD), key informant interview (KII), questionnaire interview, rapid appraisaland stakeholder analysis. The sample size of the respondents also varied among thesites, and most of the data were gathered in 2004.

    Figure 2. Location of eight case study sites in Southeast Asia

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    Box 1Cambodia: Conflicts in Ton Le Sap Lake, Mekong River tributaryand coastal fishing areas of the Gulf of Thailand

    (Source: Seng et al. 2004)

    The case study examined: (1) the allocation of fishing rights to large- and small-scale operators; (2) theimpact on fishing capacity and equity policies to reduce fishing capacity; and (3) the reduction of tensionsbetween poor small-scale operators and larger commercial operators. In Cambodia, many boundaries offishing lots were either neglected or the government was unable to re-demarcate the lots during the war.This resulted in confrontations between lot owners and the residents. Conflicts also arose between andamong other fisher groups.

    A survey was conducted of 270 respondents from Community Fisheries (CF) and Non-Community Fisheries(NCF) in three provinces of Kandal, Pursat and Kampot. Kandal and Pursat provinces represented thefreshwater fishers, while Kampot was chosen to represent coastal (marine) fishers. Aside from keyinformant interviews, the study also conducted 12 FGDs interviews with 18 institutions in the study areas.

    During the projects National Workshop held on 11-12 November 2004, the following conflicts were identifiedand validated:1. conflicts between various types of fishers brought about by competition for access to resources;2. conflicts between fishers and local authority, arising mainly from leasing/selling of fishing grounds;

    3. conflicts between fishers and lot owners due to land conversion for agriculture and water extraction;4. conflicts between provincial fisheries officers and local influential people who allegedly try to protectillegal fishers;

    5. conflicts between community members and community committee members for selling the fishinggrounds, including deep fishing areas;

    6. conflicts between local fishers and outside fishers due to resources use competition and the outsiderswho use illegal fishing gears;

    7. conflicts between local fishers and foreign fishers due to poaching and the foreign fishers using modernfishing gears;

    8. conflicts between fishers and seaweed culturists, because the latter restrict the formers fishing areas;9. conflicts between fishers and fish culturist;10. conflicts between farmers and lotus farmers, whose activities lead to loss of fishing areas due to

    sedimentation;11. institutional conflicts brought about by unclear delineation of responsibilities among the fisheries

    management bodies;

    12. conflicts concerning cutting of flooded forest for different economic activities, such as shrimp farmingand charcoal production, leading to more losses of flooded forest;

    13. environmental conflicts, especially when dam building in one country poses environmental threat inanother country; and

    14. ethnic group conflictsthat are often associated with competition for fishing grounds.

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    Box 2Thailand: Fisheries Conflicts and Excess Fishing Capacity in theGulf of Thailand (Songkhla Province)(Source: Nisappa et al. 2004)

    The case study in Songkhla in southern Thailand focused on conflicts between anchovy fishers and othergear operators (shrimp gill nets, crab gill nets and fish gill nets). Such conflicts have been occurring since1996. The small-scale fishers were mostly from Bo-daeng sub-district and the local anchovy fishers were fromNatub sub-district. Small-scale local fishers claimed that light luring anchovy fishery had caused seriousdestruction to aquatic resources, causing declines in their catches. The effects of these conflicts had grown andbecame a problem at the national level. The problems were taken to the National Committee for FisheriesPolicy for deliberation, which designated the Department of Fisheries as the agency to manage all anchovyfishing activities in Thai waters.

    On 10 February 2000, a multi-stakeholder committee addressed conflicts through a resolution on thedelineation of anchovy fishing zones. The details of the resolution are:

    Zone 1: Areas five nautical miles from the shoreline are designated as fishing area for small-scalefishers. Anchovy fishing using light luring bulbs is prohibited, except in the area of Mae Nam Natub,Jana district up to the marine boundary between Songkhla Province and Pattani Province, where the

    distance shall be three nautical miles from the shoreline. Zone 2: Areas between 5 and 12 nautical miles shall be allowed for fishing activities by anchovy fishers

    using falling nets and lift nets, with boats of less than 14 meters in length.

    Zone 3: Areas between 12 and 15 nautical miles shall be prohibited from anchovy fishing with lightluring bulbs.

    Zone 4: Areas 15 nautical miles outward shall be allowed for fishing activities by anchovy fishers usinglift nets and falling nets, with boats of over 14 meters in length.

    The study employed rapid appraisal techniques for data and information gathering, with qualitative approachfor data analysis. Data were collected using key informants and semi-structured questionnaires. The localkey informants were small-scale fishers, anchovy fishers, anchovy processors, academicians and fisheryscientists, a local leader and an NGO officer. In addition to the above primary survey, data and informationfrom published sources were collected for referencing and joint analysis.

    The study documented that the conflicts have subsided since the enforcement of the zoning regulation, but

    they have not been entirely eliminated. In addition, there are optimistic views that strict zoning - along withenrichment with appropriate artificial reefs placements, and enforcement of closed season and protectedareas - can help sustain the resources. Experiences from a few months of closed fishing season haveshown some satisfactory recovery rates

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    Box 3The Philippines: Fisheries conf licts and fishing capacity in the Visayan Sea(Source: Siason et al. 2004)

    The 1998 Fisheries Code stipulated the limits of municipal waters and the reserved status for use ofmunicipal (or small-scale) fishers. However, this has provided some flexibilities for local government units(LGUs) to allow certain commercial fishers in the 10.1-15 km zone from the shoreline. In turn, ordinanceshave been promulgated by the LGUs to implement the provisions of this Code on access to municipalwaters. The potential conflicts that arise from this zoning regulation include those within municipalities,between municipalities, between municipal and commercial fishing sectors, and between fishers and localgovernment / implementing agencies.

    Three separate case studies in three locations were drawn of the fisheries conflicts arising from zoningregulations to enable better understanding of the dynamics of fishing over-capacity, conflicts and securityissues in the Philippines. A semi-structured questionnaire was used within an interview context to gatherinformation on the variables under study. These were complemented by Key Informant Interviews andFocus Group Discussions. A total of 258 respondents from three coastal municipalities in the Visayan Seawere interviewed, namely: Conception, Iloilo (108); Escalante City, Negros Occidental (90); andDaanbantayan, Cebu (60).

    The study has documented the inter-group and intra-group conflicts reported by the respondents. Amongcommercial fishers, there is competition for the perceived best spot for fishing. When one fisher does notrespect the primacy of whoever arrives first, there is gear entanglement that results in damages. Amongmunicipal fishers, the overcrowding in the same area due to their number and perceived best location alsobrings out gear conflicts.

    The more common conflicts are those between the municipal and commercial fishers. The typicaloccurrence, for example, is the running-over/bumping of municipal fishers smaller crafts by the commercialboats, resulting in net and outrigger entanglements, loss of small fishers gears, damage to stationary gearand fish aggregating devices. In addition, the less visible loss is the decrease in the small fishers catchbecause the commercial fishers insist on operating in the municipal waters using their highly efficient gears.

    Other types of conflicts in the Visayan Sea area include: (1) institutional conflicts (involving Bantay Dagat orlocal sea wardens, local government officials, and middlemen); (2) issues related to the establishment ofmarine protected areas (MPAs); (3) migrant fishers who generally are not aware of the ordinance; (4) areacoverage: fishing activity legal in one municipality but illegal in another neighboring municipality; and (5)piracy (e.g. theft of boat engines and fishing gears).

    The following approaches were suggested for managing conflicts and exit in fisheries in the study area:

    introduction of unified, consistent, and complementary fishery ordinances within the same ecosystem;

    amendment of relevant provisions of the RA 8550 (for example, to include 3.1-20 gross tonnage (GT)boats in the municipal fishing);

    investigation of the production and marketing system to determine the proper GT and type of gears to beused within the municipal waters;

    proper implementation of licensing and registration (to regulate the number of both municipal andcommercial fishing vessels);

    addressing the issues on production in the short run and productivity in the long run; and

    focusing on the optimum utilization of the resource (e.g. eco-tourism, etc.).

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    Strategies for exit from the fisheries

    Exit strategies are the main "management handles to address over-capacity in small-scale fisheries; these must be put in place before instituting other measures. These exitstrategies are broadly classified into regulatory and economic measures. Effort reduction

    and gear/area/temporal restrictions are regulatory in nature. Such measures aresometimes called as sticks. Sustainable alternative livelihoods are primarily economicincentives. Measures like these are also referred to as carrots. The reactions of thecase study respondents to these exit strategies are reflected in Table 2. Overall,measures concerning effort reduction are not acceptable to most fishers. Although mostmeasures within the cluster gear/area/temporal restrictions are acceptable, there iscertain ambivalence towards closed season. Sustainable alternative livelihoods are wellaccepted.

    Table 2. Reactions of respondents to exit strategies based on the case studies in Cambodia,Philippines and Thailand.Exit strategy Cambodia Philippines Thailand

    1. Effort reduction

    Catch limitation Disagreed Disagreed n/a

    Limiting the number of fishers Disagreed Disagreed n/a

    2. Gear / area / temporal restrictions

    Banning the use of certain gears Agreed Agreed Recommended

    Closed season / non-fishing seasons Disagreed Ambivalent n/a

    Establishment of protected areas n/a Agreed Recommended

    3. Sustainable alternative livelihoods Agreed Agreed Recommended

    Notes:1. Agreed means more than 50 per cent of all fisher groups were in favor of the strategy.2. Disagreed means more than 50 per cent of all fisher groups were not in favor of the strategy.3. Ambivalent means the percentages were close between fisher groups who agreed and disagreed.4. n/a means the question was not specifically asked to respondents.5. Recommended means the strategy was identified, but the specific percentage of respondents was

    unknown.

    Source: Seng et al. (2004); Siason et al. (2004); Nissapa et al. (2004).

    The policy goal is to promote sustainability in fisheries by managing excess capacity insuch manner that the conflict concerns are adequately addressed. The appropriatenessand/or suitability of the proposed management measures were evaluated using severalindicators during the regional workshop1. These indicators serve as preliminary andqualitative parameters in the absence of quantitative data sets. An indicator serves as areference point for judging. Seven indicators were used in the analysis (Box 4). Eachindicator was defined, and provided with a specific measure and/or sets of measures.

    In terms of technical adequacy, all the proposed management measures have technicalmerits, i.e. availability of credible technical and scientific bases. The main exception iscatch limitation, due to the limited availability of quantitative and time series information.

    1Regional Consolidation Workshop on Fish Fights over Fish Rights: Managing Conflicts and Exit from Fisheries andSecurity Implications for South and Southeast Asia, International Rice Research Institute Complex, Philippines, 17th

    20th May 2005

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    Generating reliable information for catch limitation is difficult in the tropics, particularly inthe Philippines, because of multi-species marine fisheries. Even in inland fisheries, withfairly limited geographical environment, no effective scheme for limitation of catch hasbeen established yet. Catch limitation may work best in commercial fisheries whoselandings can be monitored.

    Global banning of gears must be put in context. Regulation should consider what gear isbeing used and where. While trawls may be destructive in nearshore waters, these arelegitimate gears in deeper waters. Hence, controlling the use of certain gears may bemore appropriate rather than total banning per se. For net benefit, it will be positive forsome measures and negative for others. It would also be dependent on the social units:for example, establishment of MPA, zoning and sustainable alternative livelihood havepositive net benefits at the household level.

    Box 4 Acceptability indicators for management measure

    1. Technical adequacy relates to the availability of credible technical and scientific bases forthe proposed exit strategy. This is expressed in a five-point Likert scale. A rating of 5 impliesavailability of more credible technical and scientific bases for the proposed exit strategy, whilea rating of 1 implies the reverse.

    2. Net benefit pertains to the ratio of cost over benefit of doing a particular strategy. Its netbenefit is positive if the benefits outweigh the cost. This criterion is often expressed inmonetary term or value. For this exercise, the measure is either positive or negative.

    3. Administ rat ive feasibil ity is measured by the estimated cost of the particular strategy. Assuch, this is expressed in terms of the projected or estimated cost of implementing thestrategy.Scale for administrative feasibility is in terms of net cost: 1 as the least costly and 5as the costliest.

    4. Legality pertains to the existence of a legal pronouncement and/or basis to legitimize the

    implementation of a certain exit strategy. This is simply measured by either a yes or noresponse.

    5. Social acceptability is measured by the perceived and/or actual level of support of the fishergroups for a particular strategy. This is likewise expressed in a five-point Likert scale. Hence,the rate for social acceptability for an intervention is 1 if it is the least acceptable, and 5 if it isthe most acceptable.

    6. Political acceptability is measured by the perceived and/or actual level of support of thelocal government unit for the management measure. Its rating system is similar to socialacceptability.

    7. Equity is measured qualitatively in terms of a relative fairness of a strategy. Hence, a ratingof 1 suggests that the measure is least acceptable, while a value of 5 implies that it is themost acceptable.

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    Policy recommendations

    The major policy recommendations are grouped into four clusters. These are based onthe recommendations derived from the case studies, as well as the suggestions given invarious workshops and consultations. These are generic policy directions that may be

    pursued in the Southeast Asian fisheries.

    Institutional partnership in research and development (R&D)

    Undertake relevant R&D programs.

    Provide scientific/ technical advice and other relevant information.

    Enhance institutional networking.

    Building non-fishery human capacity to reduce fishing capacity

    Build capacity of institutions at all levels of governance.

    Develop coordination and partnerships among stakeholders.

    Facilitate community organizing and development.

    Act as key partner in sustainable resource management. Participate actively in action programs at the local level.

    Secure access to resources for sustainable livelihood.

    Promote and harmonize action plans through good governance

    Formulate and implement a national plan of action for addressing over-capacityand resource use conflicts in fisheries.

    Harmonize the relevant plan of action at the international/regional level.

    Promote collaboration in implementing international / regional action programs.

    Advocate management interventions and politicize security threats

    Promote a conducive policy climate.

    Promote effective natural resource management.

    Support fisheries and resource management.

    The policy recommendations are likewise based on institutional partnership. Hence, theacademe, research institutions, national/local governments, NGOs/peoplesorganizations (POs), international/regional organizations, donors/investors, privatesector and primary stakeholders have crucial roles to play. The recommendations arealso geared toward actions that may be implemented singly or collectively by thevarious partners.

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