Management for Safety and Safety

Culture in State Corporation for Atomic

Energy «Rosatom»

Technical Meeting to Review and Revise IAEA Safety Guides and Related Reports

on Leadership, Management for Safety and Safety Culture to be held on 10-12 July

2017, Vienna, Austria.

Expert of Enterprise of the Service of the Inspector General

of the State Atomic Energy Corporation «Rosatom»

Fedor Aparkin

Power nuclear reactors Nuclear reactors of

ship installations

Research nuclear installations

Which is objects cover the management for the safety and

the safety culture SC «Rosatom» ?

2

Nuclear Installations

Nuclear Fuel

Cycle

SC "Rosatom" today is more than 350 organizations and

enterprises, employing more than 250 thousand employees

2

The group of processes of the management for the safety

and the safety culture of State Corporation «Rosatom»

Management of regulatory and

methodological documentation of

management for safety

Radiation

safety

Special

safety

Nuclear

safety

Labor

protection

Technical

safety

Fire

safety

Environmen

tally safety

Safety of

special

transportations

Federal

Executive

Authorities

Regulatory

Bodies

Department of

Technical

Regulation

Implementation

Internal

technical control

Implementation

of state policy in

the field of

safety

Safe

implementation

of all groups of

processes of

SC Rosatom

General

Inspectorate

of SC

Rosatom

Special

Transportation

Organization

Strategy for development and implementation of Concept

Management for Safety and Safety Culture in State Corporation

«Rosatom»

Development of Concept Management for Safety and Safety Culture in State

Corporation «Rosatom»

Development of a process model for the implementation of Concept Management

for Safety and Safety Culture in State Corporation «Rosatom»

Development of methodological documents on management for safety and safety

culture

Development of training materials on management for safety and safety culture

Organization of training of Top - managers and personnel of nuclear power facilities

for methodical approaches in the implementation of Concept Management for Safety

and Safety Culture in State Corporation «Rosatom»

Implementation of pilot management projects for safety and safety culture at 2-3

facilities of State Corporation «Rosatom»

Development of the Strategy for a wide-scale implementation of Concept

Management for Safety and Safety Culture in State Corporation «Rosatom»

Organize an industry forum to discuss the dynamics and exchange of experience in

the implementation of management processes model for safety and safety culture in

the State Corporation «Rosatom»

4

IAEA Safety Standards: Safety Fundamentals

10 Fundamental Safety Principles – long term stability:

» Responsibility for Safety

» Role of Government

» Leadership and Management for Safety

» Justification of Facilities and Activities

» Optimization of Protection

» Limitation of Risks to Individuals

» Protection of present and Future Generations

» Prevention of Accidents

» Emergency Preparedness and Response

» Protective action to reduce existing or unregulated

Radiation Risks

5

SF-1: Fundamental Safety Principles

Principle 3 - Leadership and management for safety

Safety has to be achieved and maintained by means of an effective management system.

This system has to integrate all elements of the management system

The management system also has to ensure the promotion of a strong safety culture,

Recognition of interactions of individuals with technology and with organizations

6

Integrated Management System

A single coherent management system in which all the components, parts of an organization are integrated to enable the organization’s objectives to be achieved

−All management areas: safety, quality, environment, health, security, economical

−Objectives, goals, strategies

−Personnel, resources e.g. equipment, safety culture, policies, processes

−One set of organizational processes (and their description) that address the totality of the objectives/requirements of the organization

7

What does integration do?

Enables the organization to achieve its mission and objectives

Defines all the processes and interfaces of the organization

Integrates all activities, objectives and processes into a unique system

Provides clear accountabilities and responsibilities

Enables processes, people and resources to be aligned

Enables consistency

Provides management with a tool to assist in their oversight role

Helps identify what needs improvement

8

9

IAEA Safety Standards. General Safety

Requirements No. GSR, Part-2

«Leadership and Management for Safety»

Requirement 12: Fostering a culture for safety

Individuals in the organization, from senior managers

downwards, shall foster a strong safety culture. The

management system and leadership for safety shall be

such as to foster and sustain a strong safety culture.

The main components of the safety culture (INSAG-4)

system(INSAG-4)

Development of the regulatory framework for a safety culture for facilities using nuclear energy in the Russian Federation

11

The term and requirements are included in the General Safety Provisions

- Nuclear Power Plants

- Research Reactors

- Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities

- Radiation Sources

Methodology for assessing the level of safety culture

at enterprises of the nuclear fuel cycle is published

Recommendations on the formation and maintenance of a

safety culture at nuclear power plants is published

www.secnrs.ru

Basic principles of a safety culture of

State Corporation «Rosatom»

Safety culture is primarily the behavior of personnel at a nuclear facility

and a hazardous enterprise

Leaders of all levels establish and demonstrate the priority of safety in

making regulatory decisions

Striving for constant learning, improvement, self-assessment at all levels of

a nuclear enterprises.

A systematic and integrated approach to addressing safety issues

Stimulating and maintaining constructive open interaction on safety issues

www.secnrs.ru

Lessons learned from the accident at the

Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant

( the IAEA Director General Report)

Nuclear organizations need to critically review their approaches

to emergency drills and exercises to ensure that they take due

account of harsh complex conditions and unexpected situations.

A systemic approach to safety needs to be taken in event and

accident analysis, considering all stakeholders and their

interactions over time.

Licensees, regulators and governments need to conduct a

transparent and informed dialogue with the public on an ongoing

basis.

www.secnrs.ru

Lessons learned from the accident at the

Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant

( the IAEA Director General Report)

The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP was a surprise outside the

boundaries of the basic assumption of the key stakeholders, meaning

the stakeholders had not been able to imagine that such an accident

could occur. From this, the lesson learned for the international nuclear

community is that the possibility of the unexpected needs to be

integrated into the existing worldwide approach to nuclear safety.

The results of research on complex sociotechnical systems for safety

need to be taken into account.

Individuals and organizations need to consciously and continuously

question their own basic assumption and their implications on actions

that impact nuclear safety

Organizational levels of the management for the safety

and the safety culture

23

1 lev. • The management for the safety and the safety culture at

the state level.

2 lev.

• The management for the safety and the safety culture at the sectoral level - at the level of the State Atomic Energy Corporation "Rosatom"

3 lev.

• The management for the safety and the safety culture at the level of the operating organization, for example, at the level of JSC "Concern Rosenergoatom"

4 lev.

• The management for the safety and the safety culture at the level of an object using atomic energy, for example, at the level of nuclear power plants

The management for the safety and the safety culture

at the state level - Regulation and Control

16

Не

Performance

International

Agreements (Conventions)

Federal Laws

Regulatory Bodies

and Supervisory

State policy of

ensuring safety

System of norms and

rules of regulatory

bodies and standards of

the Corporation

Fundamentals of state policy in the field of nuclear and radiation safety of the

Russian Federation for the period up to 2025.

Approved by the President of the Russian Federation on March 1, 2012.

Annual reports of the State Corporation Rosatom on the security status of the OIAA

to the President of the Russian Federation; On the implementation of the Action Plan

for lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant.

"Convention on Nuclear Safety", Vienna, 17.06.1994;

Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and on the Safety of

Radioactive Waste Management ", 29.09.1997;

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Vienna, 26.10.1979,

Amendment of 08.07.2005. And other international Conventions and Agreements.

From 11/21/1995 № 170-ФЗ "On the use of atomic energy";

From 01.12.2007 No. 317-FZ "On the State Atomic Energy Corporation" Rosatom ";

The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation of 05.06.1996 with amend. As of 30.12.2015.

The Civil Code of the Russian Federation (part two) of 26.01.1996, ed. As of May 23, 2016.

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 683 "On the National Security Strategy of

the Russian Federation" dated December 31, 2015, in accordance with federal laws No. 390-FZ of

28.12.2010 "On Security" and dated 28.06.2014 No. 172-FZ "On Strategic Planning" and Other

laws.

Federal Service for Environmental, Technological and Nuclear Supervision -

Federal Norms and Regulations

Atomic Energy Management Authority - State Atomic Energy Corporation

Rosatom - safety and security standards.

Federal rules and regulations: ( NP-001-15; НП-022-2000; НП-029-01; NP-033-01; NP-

038-11 ... ...

The system of standards of Rosatom State Corporation with security requirements

The management for the safety and the safety culture

at the sectoral level - at the level of the State Corporation

«Rosatom»

25

Не

Policy of State

Corporation

«Rosatom»

Organizational

Structure

System of work

with the personnel

Sectoral safety

programs and

standards system

Internal Safety

Control System

Innovative projects are implemented through sectoral and federal target

programs on the basis of a developed and constantly improved

regulatory framework. Sectoral projects on Safety Culture.

Statement on the policy of the State Atomic Energy

Corporation "Rosatom" in the field of ensuring the

safety of nuclear facilities.

The Nuclear Energy Complex of Rosatom State Nuclear

Energy Corporation has integrated divisions: mining,

fuel, machine-building, electric power, science and

innovation and "sales and trading" …

There are higher education institutions, centers for additional education, advanced

training and retraining, training centers for nuclear power plants, the Academy of

State Corporation Rosatom, the TsIPK Rosatom. Personnel motivation systems were

implemented with application of key performance indicators (KPIs) at all levels of

management and criteria of the Rosatom production system (SDP).

The State Corporation "Rosatom" has specialized control services.

Quarterly, the head of the State Corporation «Rosatom» holds meetings

to review the state of safety in the Corporation.

-сквозные отраслевые КПЭ

(каскадирование по отрасли) 18

Strategic and functional objectives implemented by the Corporation in the

field of safety and the system for assessing their achievement through

Key Performance Indicators

Absence of violations on the INES scale in

accordance with accepted levels

Nuclear and Radiation Safety

Ensuring the Safe Use of Atomic Energy

level 2 and more

More 50 мЗв per year

-сквозные функциональные КПЭ

(декомпозирование по отрасли)

- персонализированные КПЭ по функции ОТ

при сооружении объектов

from 70% tо 10%

LTIFR (coefficient of incidence of accidents

with disability)

Reduction of incidents from a height

Reduction of severe and fatal injuries in

contractors

≤ 0,4

from 50% tо 0%

Avoid accidents

Labor protection and industrial safety

Absence of violations, accompanied by

exposure of personnel beyond specified limits

Elimination of accidents at hazardous production

facilities

Sectoral key performance indicators (KPI), areas and outline of their establishment

The introduction of the system of sectoral KPIs into the activities of Rosatom State Nuclear Energy

Corporation has significantly increased the level of motivation and responsibility of its employees in

achieving their safety goals.

Functional goals and objectives

The annual number of violations in the operation of power

units of nuclear power plants, which were in industrial

operation in the period from 2000 to 2016.

19

4 2 1 3 2 2 1 3 2

69

62

38

47

43

28

42

47

38

29

37

42 39

42

38 34

46

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Чи

сло

нар

уше

ни

й в

раб

оте

АЭ

С

Уровень 1 по INES Общее число нарушений

Specific (for one power unit for 7000 hours of operation) the

number of reactor shutdowns from the critical state at nuclear

power plants in Russia in comparison with international experience.

20

0.5 0.46

0.37 0.38

0.2

0.39

0.29 0.32

0.39

0.53

0.61

0.21

0.28 0.26

0.15

0.32

0.9

0.7 0.7

0.6 0.6

0.5

0.6

0.5

0.4 0.5

0.56 0.46

0.49 0.5 0.51

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

АС России АС мира

21

0.43 0.28 0.24 0.2 0.19

1.92 1.72

1.37 1.44

4.15

3.82

3.15

2.05

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

The LTIFR index of Rosatom State Corporation is presented in comparison

with LTIFR of other well-known foreign companies - Korean KEPCO and

French AREVA

CONCLUSION

The facts discussed in the presentation make it possible to talk about the

established system for managing for safety and safety culture of the nuclear

industry, its development and the convergence of positions and views

through active international cooperation supported by the IAEA.

The above examples of the positive dynamics of safety indicators in the

Russian nuclear industry are due to the ever deeper penetration and rooting

of the principles of a managing for safety and safety culture along the entire

spectrum of the life cycle stages of nuclear power facilities

Effective leadership and management for safety is established and sustained

in organizations SC Rosatom concerned with, and facilities and activities that

give rise to, radiation risks.

A single coherent management system SC Rosatom in which all the

components, parts of an organization are integrated to enable the

organization’s safety objectives is achieved.

22

THANK YOU FOR ATTENTION!

Proposal of systematic approach for Guideline

Requirements 6,7,12 «Leadership and

Management for Safety», No. GSR Part 2

Technical Meeting to Review and Revise IAEA Safety Guides and Related Reports

on Leadership, Management for Safety and Safety Culture to be held on 10-12 July

2017, Vienna, Austria.

Expert of Enterprise of the Service of the Inspector General

of the State Atomic Energy Corporation «Rosatom»

Fedor Aparkin

Systemic Approach – The Interaction between individuals, technology and the organization – ITO for Integration of Management System and Safety Culture (Req. 6,7,12 GSR Part 2)

3.14. “An important factor in a management system is the recognition of the entire range of interactions of individuals at all levels with technology and with organizations. To prevent human and organizational failures, human factors have to be taken into account and good performance and good practices have to be supported.”

Source: IAEA Safety Standards: SF-1 25

IAEA

THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI ACCIDENT. REPORT BY THE IAEA

DIRECTOR GENERAL. HUMAN AND ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS

Observation:

While the stakeholders involved in the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi

NPP were aware of the possibility of the single safety issues related to the

accident in advance, they were not able to anticipate, prevent or

successfully mitigate the outcome of the complex and dynamic

combination of these issues within the sociotechnical system.

Lesson Learned:

• To proactively deal with the complexity of nuclear operations, the

results of research on complex sociotechnical systems for safety need

to be taken into account by all stakeholders involved.

• A systemic approach to safety needs to be taken in event and accident

analysis, considering all stakeholders and their interactions over time.

IAEA

IAEA

IAEA

IAEA

IAEA

Examples of Organizational Factors

Organizational Factors (OF):

• Vision and objectives

• Strategies

• Business Models

• Integrated Management System

• Continuous improvements

• Decision making process

• Knowledge management

• Priorities

• Communication

• Contracting

• Work environment

• Culture

• etc

IAEA

Examples of Technical Factors

Technical Factors (TF):

• Design

• Existing technology

• Hard ware/Soft ware

• PSA/DSA

• Technical Specifications

• I/C

• Quality of material

• Equipment

• etc

IAEA

Examples of Human Factors

Human Factors (HF):

• Human capabilities

• Human constraints

• Perceived work environment

• Motivation

• Individuals understanding

• Emotions

• etc

Complexity and Systemic Challenges in relation to Safety

Organizational Factors (OF): • Alignment of vision and objectives • Clear and appropriate strategies • Current Integrated Management

System • Continuous improvements • Priorities • Transfer of knowledge • Openness of communication • Contractor management • Systematic and continuous

improvements of safety culture • etc

Technical Factors (TF): • Existing technology • Advanced technology • Automation • Analogue/digital • Modifications • etc

Human Factors (HF): • Job readiness • Cooperation and teamwork • Learning and reflection • Stress and fatigue • Motivation • Individuals understanding • Trust • Self-management • etc

IAEA

IAEA

IAEA

IAEA

Proposal for Guideline Requirements 6,12,13,14

«Leadership and Management for Safety», No. GSR

Part 2

1. Management for safety=integration strong safety culture to

management system nuclear organization.

2. If you implement HOT Systematic Approach for

assessment of management system nuclear organization

you can stregths links of HOT safety system nuclear

organization. (with risk assessment links).

3.For measurement of effectivenes of management for safety

should be use KOI (Key Performance Indicators).

4. For assessment of safety culture of management system

nuclear organization should be use self-assessment and

independent assessment safety culture methodology.