Malate Hotel vs. Manila Mayor

7/27/2019 Malate Hotel vs. Manila Mayor

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC.,HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees,vs.THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.

Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an actionfor prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of thedue process clause. The lower court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional,and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such

judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustainan attack against its validity.

The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 bythe petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its

members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president andgeneral manager of the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the Cityof Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power andduty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders forthe faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was allegedthat the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protectionof the interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels,characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and cityauthorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than2,500 person and representing an investment of more than P3 million." 1 (par. 2). Itwas then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manilaenacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor

Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par.3).

After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail.There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of theCity of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in therevised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made tomotels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for


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being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would imposeP6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second classmotels; that the provision in the same section which would require the owner,manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodginghouse to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting anyroom or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribedform in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein thesurname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, theoccupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number ofcompanions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would bespecified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passportnumber, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form haspersonally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner,manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms andrecords kept and bound together, it also being provided that the premises andfacilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspectioneither by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized

representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not onlyfor being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefiniteand uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and theguaranty against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged ordinanceclassifying motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certainminimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a diningroom or, restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due process clause forbeing arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies to theportion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room; thatthe provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern orcommon inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it

unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of suchestablishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours,runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for itsunreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penaltyprovided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent convictionwould, cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effectcausing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is onceagain a transgression of the due process clause.

There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgmentdeclaring the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on

July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor torefrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.

In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personalcircumstances regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners arelicensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila, of theprovisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether onstatutory or constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state


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a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to aproper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the policepower and that only the guests or customers not before the court could complain ofthe alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against selfincrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex

parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and thedismissal of the petition.

Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulationof facts dated September 28, 1964, which reads:

1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel OperatorsAssociation, Inc. and Hotel del Mar Inc. are duly organized andexisting under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the Cityof Manila, while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and generalmanager of Hotel del Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is aresident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;

2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent CityMayor and chief executive of the City of Manila charged with thegeneral power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manilaand to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution andenforcement of such ordinances;

3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business ofoperating hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;

4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila

enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963,by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of Manila,in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor, amendingsections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of theordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three newsections. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the respondentMayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement datedFebruary 15, 1963 (Annex B);

5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor HerminioAstorga was submitted with the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is attached hereto as

Annex C;

6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income ofP101,904.05 from license fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels(including herein petitioners) operating in the City of Manila. 1wph1.t

Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, whereinstress was laid on the presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the


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burden of showing its lack of conformity to the Constitution resting on the party whoassails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable Americanauthorities. Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by point the argumentsadvanced by petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, onFebruary 4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail whatwas set forth in the petition, with citations of what they considered to be applicable

American authorities and praying for a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance"null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminaryinjunction issued.

After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitionersassociation, and referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party,the lower court observed: "The only remaining issue here being purely a question oflaw, the parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter,to submit the case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then thatwithout any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision passed upon the allegedinfirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is

undoubtedly right and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authorityof the City of Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "thechallenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and,therefore, null and void." It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued againstrespondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance inquestion." Hence this appeal.

As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard forconstitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished thelower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Itsdecision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been theaccepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantiveaspects.

Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidenceto offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute orordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption isall in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected representatives of the peoplecannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, befamiliar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts andcircumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The locallegislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that theregulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should

not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personalor property rights under the guise of police regulation.2

It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, thenecessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance isvoid on its face which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere betterexpressed than in the leading case ofO'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire InsuranceCo.,3 where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and


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succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with asubject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it voidon the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable andhence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of factmay condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption ofconstitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record foroverthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case,the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, thepresumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance setaside.

Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatallydefective as being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. Themantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not coverpetitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specificallyaimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity restingpurely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise

would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has beenproperly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable ofpowers,4 extending as it does "to all the great public needs."5 It would be, toparaphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if itcould be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promotepublic health, public morals, public safety and the genera welfare. 6 Negatively put,police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it toprohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.7

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted tominimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of theCouncilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks ofthe alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manilatraceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessaryatmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "idealhaven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes tocheck the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments byrequiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for thepurpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several otheramendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes theregistration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed feeswas intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purposeother than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city

government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far fromsustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.

It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of itsapproval, ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as avagrant;8 provide a license tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation ofpublic dance halls;9 prohibiting gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 andmonte;12prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal


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holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines;14 and prohibiting any personfrom keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place whereopium is smoked or otherwise used,15 all of which are intended to protect publicmorals.

On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily restthe exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is thepower to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process,equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the exerciseof such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any personis subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be consideredas either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or aviolation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by thecourts.

We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection

is raised to the question of due process.16

There is no controlling and precisedefinition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which the governmentalaction should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in eachappropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which mustexist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challengedordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legalinfirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out andunfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, toparaphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheeroppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack ofreasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It isthe embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to those strivingsfor justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light ofreason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions oflegal and political thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixedcontent unrelated to time, place and circumstances,"19 decisions based on such aclause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of oursociety."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically inslavery to form or phrases.21

It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely tomeet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion

an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. It would seem that what should bedeemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of the power togovern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of publicmorals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the needfor a remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of the challengedordinance. A strong case must be found in the records, and, as has been set forth,none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint ofnullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend


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any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of OrdinanceNo. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such features as the increased feesfor motels and hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, incertain particulars, its alleged vagueness.

Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for bythe challenged ordinance for hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200%for the latter, first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee andsecond-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far backas 1922 that municipal license fees could be classified into those imposed forregulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only.22 As was explainedmore in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupationsare also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be impliedfrom the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees themunicipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of casesthan in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that

municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courtshave, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability ofimposing restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination ofthe amount of this kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature ofprivilege taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in of licenses forthe sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been declaredunreasonable.23

Moreover in the equally leading case ofLutz v. Araneta24 this Court affirmed thedoctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may bemade to implement the state's police power. Only the other day, this Court hadoccasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy

Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range ofsubjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public purposes, just anduniform.25

As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City ofManila in imposing licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that"much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," herethe license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as apolice power measure.26 The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close withthis pertinent citation from another decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of

the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them oftheir lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls inthe public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated orcold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under certainconditions is permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in thecommunity may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode ofearning a living cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in acase, persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and


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interest be affected by the exercise of the police power embark in these occupationssubject to the disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of thatpower."27

Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challengedordinance makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorizedrepresentative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, tolease or rent room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a provisothat in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion. Again,such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of dueprocess. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb theopportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and,according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitraryor oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the undeniableexistence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction.Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct amountsto curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute.

Thus: "One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty isplainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of theindividual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the generalwell-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounceunbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonablerestraint by general law for the common good x x x The liberty of the citizen may berestrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, orotherwise within the proper scope of the police power."28

A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at thebottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the generalwelfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business andoccupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints andburdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state xx x To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual aresubordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty shouldnot be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy.Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individualwill fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty andauthority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may beestablished the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happinessfor all.29

It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because ofundue deprivation of freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains itsvirtuality as a living principle. The policy oflaissez faire has to some extent givenway to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even incontractual relations affected with public interest.31 What may be stressed sufficientlyis that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard forthe validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the


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liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope ofregulatory measure is wider.32 How justify then the allegation of a denial of dueprocess?

Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process groundby invoking the principles of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recitalin the petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance isthat the provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain.Petitioners, however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name,relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite anduncertain in view of the necessity for determining whether the companion orcompanions referred to are those arriving with the customer or guest at the time ofthe registry or entering the room With him at about the same time or coming at anyindefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as towhether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretionof its owners or operators; another proviso which from their standpoint would requirea guess as to whether the "full rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease

thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do theseallegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness oruncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From Connally v. GeneralConstruction Co.33 toAdderley v. Florida,34 the principle has been consistently upheldthat what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment eitherforbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of common intelligence mustnecessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the situationbefore us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to allthe generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is nocanon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what theyobviously mean."35

That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for thearguments pressed with such vigor and determination, the attack against the validityof the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respectfor constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered toby this Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.

Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issuedlifted forthwith. With costs.

Documents

Malate Hotel vs. Manila Mayor