Malabanan vs Republic of the Phils. G.R. No. 179987 April 29, 2009

7/27/2019 Malabanan vs Republic of the Phils. G.R. No. 179987 April 29, 2009

1/48

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 179987. April 29, 2009.]

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, Jp:

One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that from Indonesia to

Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not titled and registered. This is a generalized

phenomenon in the so-called Third World. And it has many consequences. STHDAc

xxx xxx xxx

The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's in Indonesia to

Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these people and have not been able to do so

effectively? One reason is that none of the state systems in Asia or Latin America can gather

proof of informal titles. In Peru, the informals have means of proving property ownership to

each other which are not the same means developed by the Spanish legal system. The

informals have their own papers, their own forms of agreements, and their own systems of

registration, all of which are very clearly stated in the maps which they use for their own

informal business transactions.

If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you walk by field

after field in each field a different dog is going to bark at you. Even dogs know what

private property is all about. The only one who does not know it is the government. The

issue is that there exists a "common law" and an "informal law" which the Latin American

formal legal system does not know how to recognize.

Hernando De Soto 1

This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of persons and entities otherthan the Philippine government. The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by

the Court en banc in order to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original

registration proceedings under Sections 14 (1) and 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree. In

doing so, the Court confronts not only the relevant provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil

Code, but also the reality on the ground. The countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as

the problem of informal settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately been treated with benign

neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in addressing the

phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is primarily to decide cases before us in accord with the

http://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/pr

8 8/28/2013


2/48

Constitution and the legal principles that have developed our public land law, though our social

obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the endemic problems.

I.

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of

land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre, 2 situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang

Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased theproperty from Eduardo Velazco, 3 and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,

notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30)

years. HaSEcA

The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of

Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the State. 4 Apart from presenting documentary

evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco

testified that the property was originally belonged * to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his

great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban the fourth being Aristedes's grandfather. Upon Lino's death, his four sons inherited the property

and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban's wife, Magdalena, had become the

administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the

death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties,

including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property

that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. 5

Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Aristedes Velazco. He further

manifested that he "also [knew] the property and I affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr.

Velazco." 6 The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert theapplication.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001,

issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment

and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was "verified to be

within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under

Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982." 7

On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the dispositive portion of

which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places

under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property

Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and

containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square

Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case,

in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal

age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite. HcDaAI


8 8/28/2013


3/48

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration

shall forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to

prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that

the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the

length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 8 reversing the RTC and dismissing

the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section 14 (1) of the Property

Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and

disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of

possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified

that the property was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos'

possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession.

This interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree wasbased on the Court's ruling in Republic v. Herbieto. 9

Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals; 10 hence, it was his heirs

who appealed the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in

Republic v. Naguit,11 which was handed down just four months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners

suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since

the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the registration of the property had no

jurisdiction in the first place since the requisite notice of hearing was published only after the hearing

had already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the

property in question is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possessionprior to the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in reckoning the

period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree.

The petition was referred to the Court en banc, 12 and on 11 November 2008, the case was heard on

oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues for the oral arguments, to wit: HICEca

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered

under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property

Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12,

1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of theapplicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of

ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land

classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to

acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or


8 8/28/2013


4/48

because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the

Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive

prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section

14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both? 13

Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.

With respect to Section 14 (1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in Naguitis the

correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is

submitted, should be considered obiter dictum, since the land registration proceedings therein was

void ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further point out

that in Republic v. Bibonia, 14 promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied Naguitand adopted

the same observation that the preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14 (1) was patently

absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for Section 14 (1) to apply, the land should have

been classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart fromHerbieto, the OSG also

cites the subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v. Republic,15Fieldman Agricultural Trading v.Republic 16 and Republic v. Imperial Credit Corporation, 17 as well as the earlier case ofDirector of

Lands v. Court of Appeals. 18ACTEHI

With respect to Section 14 (2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious

possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the

land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14 (2). According to them, it

would not matter whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural

land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property had already been

"converted" into private property through prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners citeextensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties. 19

The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14 (2) are more extensive. The OSG

notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State

refers to "patrimonial property", while Section 14 (2) speaks of "private lands". It observes that the

Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14 (2) as a ground for application for

registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the period of possession under Section

48 (b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG

further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said

period should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable.

Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular factual circumstances

surrounding the subject property and the ownership thereof.

II.

First, we discuss Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full understanding of the

provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land Act. HSEIAT


8 8/28/2013


5/48

A.

Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its enactment, governed

the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The President is authorized, from

time to time, to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or

mineral lands. 20 Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified

according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar

productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations fortown sites and for public and quasi-public uses. 21

May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and disposable lands

of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for

agricultural purposes may be disposed of "by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles" through

"judicial legalization". 22 Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073,

supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisites stated therein:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public

domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have notbeen perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where

the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title

therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,

continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable

lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June

12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of

title except when prevented by war orforce majeure. These shall be conclusively presumedto have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to

a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. DEHcTI

Section 48 (b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the law was amended

by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term

"agricultural lands" was changed to "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain". The OSG

submits that this amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered. 23 This is not

actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, "agricultural lands" are a mere subset of

"lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition." Evidently, alienable and disposable

lands of the public domain are a larger class than only "agricultural lands".

Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for "thirty (30) years

immediately preceding the filing of the application" to possession "since June 12, 1945 or earlier".

The Court in Naguitexplained:

When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed

necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain

commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942,

which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30)


8 8/28/2013


6/48

years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by

P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. . . .

It bears further observation that Section 48 (b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as Section

14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws relative to the

registration of property, including lands of the public domain. It is Section 14 (1) that operationalizes

the registration of such lands of the public domain. The provision reads:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First

Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their

duly authorized representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of

alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim

of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. SDTIaE

Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14 (1)

therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or theirpredecessors-in-interest who "have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and

occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of

ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier." That circumstance may have led to the impression that

one or the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been

repealed or mooted. That is not the case.

The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property

Registration Decree warrant comparison:

Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the Philippines,occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest

therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of

First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and

the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The following persons

may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,

whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

xxx xxx xxx

It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed

by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to presume the

pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to

assert that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has

primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and

notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a


8 8/28/2013


7/48

bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect or complete his title by

applying with the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the

corresponding certificate of title. DCSETa

Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the Public Land Act,

which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by

confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the notion that both provisions declare that

it is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the possessorwho has been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14 (a) of the

Property Registration Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under Section 48 (b) of the

Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial

confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.

There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48 (b). Section 47 of the Public Land

Act limits the period within which one may exercise the right to seek registration under Section 48.

The provision has been amended several times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It

currently reads thus:

Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not

to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter:

Provided, That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does not exceed

twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated by the

President in accordance with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands

comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as

prohibiting any said persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period

fixed by the President. 24

Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted under Section 48 (b)

may be availed of only until 31 December 2020.

B.

Despite the clear text of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and Section 14 (a) of the

Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to

seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the

applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of ownership

since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the property must have been declared

also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSG's approach, all lands certified as alienable and

disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14 (1) of the Property

Registration Decree or Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an

implication was discussed in Naguit. EcTDCI

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land

should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by

the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945", as used in the provision, qualifies


8 8/28/2013


8/48

its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership". Generally speaking, qualifying

words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated,

and not those distantly or remotely located. 25Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi

impediatur sentencia.

Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner's position.

Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG's view, that all lands

of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged

possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually

inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to

reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the

situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines

was not yet even considered an independent state.

Accordingly, the Court in Naguitexplained:

[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property

sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application forregistration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet

deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that

the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve

its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good

faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it

is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its

exclusive prerogative over the property. EIcSTD

The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14 (1) is that which was adopted in

Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits theapplication of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually

declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to

establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership

long before that date.

Moreover, the Naguitinterpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to

avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be feasible underHerbieto.

This balancing fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and

reach of Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree.

Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter

dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due to lack of

the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn

Herbieto, as it suffices that the Court's acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used

therein concerning Section 14 (1) is indeed obiter.

It may be noted that in the subsequent case ofBuenaventura, 26 the Court, citing Herbieto, again

stated that "[a]ny period of possession prior to the date when the [s]ubject [property was] classified

as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the


8 8/28/2013


9/48

period of possession. . ." That statement, in the context of Section 14 (1), is certainly erroneous.

Nonetheless, the passage as cited in Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The

application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14 (2). The evidence submitted by

petitioners therein did not establish any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby

precluding the application of Section 14 (1). It is not even apparent from the decision whether

petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original registration following Section 14 (1), their

position being that they had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for

over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945. aCHDST

Thus, neitherHerbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any precedental value

with respect to Section 14 (1). On the other hand, the ratio ofNaguitis embedded in Section 14 (1),

since it precisely involved situation wherein the applicant had been in exclusive possession under a

bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Court's interpretation of Section 14 (1)

therein was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which between NaguitorHerbieto

provides the final word of the Court on Section 14 (1) is now settled in favor ofNaguit.

We noted in Naguitthat it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals 27 since in the

latter, the application for registration had been filed before the land was declared alienable ordisposable. The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet two

years afterBracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling

in Republic v. Ceniza, 28 which involved a claim of possession that extended back to 1927 over a

public domain land that was declared alienable and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell,

quoted extensively from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration in

Ceniza should have failed. Not so.

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant

must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential

proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureauof Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.

In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November 25, 1994, issued

by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots

involved were "found to be within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land

Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980". This is

sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of private respondents'

application. Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of

contradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also was the observation ofthe Court of Appeals stating that:

[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the

application of appellees on the ground that the property still forms part of the public

domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in question are forestal land. . . . IDASHa

Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public land for the

period required by law would entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did

not err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section


8 8/28/2013


10/48

48(b) of the Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of

proving the alienability of the land subject of their application.

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to prove their

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land even before the

year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Although

there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one of them. 29

Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored Bracewell, sanction

the registration under Section 48 (b) of public domain lands declared alienable or disposable

thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the

application for registration was filed nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared alienable

or disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9) years before the land was

declared alienable or disposable. That crucial difference was also stressed in Naguitto

contradistinguish it fromBracewell, a difference which the dissent seeks to belittle.

III.

We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14 (2). The provision

reads:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First



xxx xxx xxx

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the

provisions of existing laws.

The Court in Naguitoffered the following discussion concerning Section 14 (2), which we did even

then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we nonetheless refer to it as material for

further discussion, thus:

Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073

preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession

over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the

Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of "those whohave acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing

laws." DEcSaI

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. [ 30] There

is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be

converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at

least thirty (30) years. [31] With such conversion, such property may now fall within the

contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by

those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the


48 8/28/2013


11/48

alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession

being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register

the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

Naguitdid not involve the application of Section 14 (2), unlike in this case where petitioners have

based their registration bid primarily on that provision, and where the evidence definitively

establishes their claim of possession only as far back as 1948. It is in this case that we can properly

appreciate the nuances of the provision.

A.

The obiterin Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible basis for

application for original registration under Section 14 (2). Specifically, it is Article 1113 which

provides legal foundation for the application. It reads:

All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless

otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in

character shall not be the object of prescription.

It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character,

they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the public domain lands

that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The

Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands. caTESD

There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the acquisition of real property

through prescription. Ownership of real property may be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten

(10) years, 32 or through extraordinary prescription of thirty (30) years. 33 Ordinary acquisitive

prescription requires possession in good faith, 34 as well as just title. 35

When Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that persons "who have

acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws", it

unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is

the only existing law that specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands,

including patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical question that needs

affirmation is whether Section 14 (2) does encompass original registration proceedings over

patrimonial property of the State, which a private person has acquired through prescription.

TheNaguit obiterhad adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence holding that properties

classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open,continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. 36 Yet if we ascertain the source of

the "thirty-year" period, additional complexities relating to Section 14 (2) and to how exactly it

operates would emerge. Forthere are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year rule.

The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section 48 (b) of the Public

Land Act by granting the right to seek original registration of alienable public lands through

possession in the concept of an owner for at least thirty years.


48 8/28/2013


12/48

The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or

claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been

perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the

land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title

therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: TDCaSE

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the

public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years

immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except

when prevented by war orforce majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have

performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a

certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied) 37

This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the date 12 June

1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless, applications for registration filed prior to

1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.

The second source is Section 14 (2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as it applies the rules

on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that

there are two kinds of prescription under the Civil Code ordinary acquisitive prescription and

extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1137, is completed "through

uninterrupted adverse possession. . . for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith".

Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became unavailable

after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the law on prescription

under the Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14 (2). However, there is a material differencebetween how the thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the

Civil Code.

Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to or call into

application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a requisite thirty-year

possession period immediately preceding the application for confirmation of title, without any

qualification as to whether the property should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and

continue as such, throughout the entire thirty (30) years. There is neither statutory nor jurisprudential

basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated such a requirement, 38 similar to our earlier finding

with respect to the present language of Section 48 (b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of

reference.

Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as basis for original

registration became Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree, which entitled those "who

have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws" to

apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-year period is derived from the rule on extraordinary

prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Section 14 (2) puts into

operation the entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with


48 8/28/2013


13/48

respect to Section 14 (1).

B.

Unlike Section 14 (1), Section 14 (2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription under existing

laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of prescription, as set forth in the

Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section 14 (2). There is no similar demand on our part in the case

of Section 14 (1).DSHTaC

The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: "[p]roperty of the State or any

of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription". The

identification what consists of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we

quote in full:

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges

constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some

public service or for the development of the national wealth.

Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding

article, is patrimonial property.

It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to the State,

cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of man. 39 Lands of the

public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion

and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President or any duly

authorized government officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the public domain. Would

such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property of

the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable and

disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things

within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides

that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription. IEcDCa

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no

longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the

State". It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into

patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear

that those property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for

some public service or for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For

as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it

remains property of the public dominion if when * it is "intended for some public service or for the


48 8/28/2013


14/48

development of the national wealth".

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion

property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or

that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the

property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion,

pursuant to Article 420 (2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when

such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longerintended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of

acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly

enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly

authorized by law.

It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree

limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands already declared alienable

and disposable to the detriment of the bona fidepossessors or occupants claiming title to the lands.

Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all

lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to beused only by the Government.

Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to apply the Constitution

and the laws in accordance with their language and intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is

the province of the legislative branch. Congress can very well be entreated to amend Section 14 (2)

of the Property Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the

requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. aATEDS

The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual example. Republic Act

No. 7227, entitled "An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of Military Reservations Into OtherProductive Uses, etc.", is more commonly known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes

the sale of certain military reservations and portions of military camps in Metro Manila, including

Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of effecting the sale of the military camps, the

law mandates the President to transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion Development

Authority (BCDA) 40 which in turn is authorized to own, hold and/or administer them. 41 The

President is authorized to sell portions of the military camps, in whole or in part. 42 Accordingly, the

BCDA law itself declares that the military lands subject thereof are "alienable and disposable

pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulations governing sales of government

properties." 43

From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have become alienable and

disposable. However, said lands did not become patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly

makes the reservation that these lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the

former American bases at Clark and Subic. 44 Such purpose can be tied to either "public service" or

"the development of national wealth" under Article 420 (2). Thus, at that time, the lands remained

property of the public dominion under Article 420 (2), notwithstanding their status as alienable and

disposable. It is upon their sale as authorized under the BCDA law to a private person or entity that

such lands become private property and cease to be property of the public dominion.


48 8/28/2013


15/48

C.

Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a duly enacted

law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for public service or for the

development of the national wealth, would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such

public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the

possessors? We rule in the negative.

The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of possession before

the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of completing the

prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be

the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under

Section 14 (2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no

way that possession during the time that the land was still classified as public dominion property can

be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration. EHTSCD

Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14 (1) and Section 14 (2)? There is

no inconsistency. Section 14 (1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section14 (2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14 (1) is

extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while

registration under Section 14 (2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree

and the Civil Code.

In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under Section 48 (b) of the

Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period available through

Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The

period under the former speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while the period under

the latter concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary prescription. Registration underSection 48 (b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years

of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under Section 14 (2)

of the Property Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil

Code.

It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not apply as well to

Section 14 (1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it ultimately is just one of

numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferior to other statutes such as the Property Registration

Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil Code

when it enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14 (2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate the

registration allowed under that provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with respect

to Section 14 (1).

IV.

One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing how our land

registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which, under the Civil Code, is one of

the modes for acquiring ownership over property.


48 8/28/2013


16/48

The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by private

persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which states that "[a]ll things

which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription", and that [p]roperty of the

State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription".

There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired under the Civil

Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117, requires possession in

good faith and with just title; and, under Article 1134, is completed through possession of ten (10)years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial property of

the State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to impose such a

rule. At the same time, there are indispensable requisites good faith and just title. The

ascertainment of good faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article

1127 of the Civil Code, 45 provisions that more or less speak for themselves.

On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under Article 1129, there is

just title for the purposes of prescription "when the adverse claimant came into possession of the

property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real

rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right". Dr. Tolentino explains: ITCcAD

Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership, and which would

have actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect is

the one cured by prescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation, succession,

and dacion in payment. 46

The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the applicability of ordinary

acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major premise for the argument is that "the

State, as the owner and grantor, could not transmit ownership to the possessor before the completion

of the required period of possession". 47 It is evident that the OSG erred when it assumed that thegrantor referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the one from whom the person

invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title, whether by sale, exchange, donation,

succession or any other mode of the acquisition of ownership or other real rights. SIEHcA

Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary prescription, the

period of possession preceding the classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be

counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But after the property has been become

patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite

period has been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the patrimonial property is ipso jureconverted into private land; and (2) the person in possession for the periods prescribed under the

Civil Code acquires ownership of the property by operation of the Civil Code.

It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the converted patrimonial

property, the ideal next step is the registration of the property under the Torrens system. It should be

remembered that registration of property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a

mode of confirmation of ownership. 48


48 8/28/2013


17/48

Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in

1977, it is apparent that the registration system then did not fully accommodate the acquisition of

ownership of patrimonial property under the Civil Code. What the system accommodated was the

confirmation of imperfect title brought about by the completion of a period of possession ordained

under the Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945

following P.D. No. 1073).

The Land Registration Act 49 was noticeably silent on the requisites for alienable public landsacquired through ordinary prescription under the Civil Code, though it arguably did not preclude

such registration. 50 Still, the gap was lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself,

establishes ownership over the patrimonial property of persons who have completed the prescriptive

periods ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the adoption of the Property Registration

Decree in 1977, with Section 14 (2) thereof expressly authorizing original registration in favor of

persons who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of

existing laws, that is, the Civil Code as of now. AcDaEH

V.

We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:

(1) In connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48 (b) of the

Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those who by themselves or through their

predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and

occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of

acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to,

such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48 (b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does notrequire that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the

entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial

confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and

disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land

Act. 51

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act is further

confirmed by Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under theCivil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property.

However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that

these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the

property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of

national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become

patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin

to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires


48 8/28/2013


18/48

ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is

entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14 (2) of the Property

Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be

acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive

prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through

possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Underextraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person's uninterrupted adverse

possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of

good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

B.

We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired

ownership over the subject property under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act. There is nosubstantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have

been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date

back their possession, according to their own evidence the Tax Declarations they presented in

particular is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14

(1) of the Property Registration Decree. EaCDAT

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14 (2) as basis for registration. While the subject

property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no

longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably

with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable anddisposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion

under Article 420 (2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

VI.

A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines established in this

decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of today's ruling cannot be discounted. For,

every untitled property that is occupied in the country will be affected by this ruling. The social

implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be abdicating its social responsibility

to the Filipino people if we simply levied the law without comment.

The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a phenomenon tied to

long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common among the so-called "Third World"

countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the disconnect between a legal system and the reality on

the ground. The law so far has been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of

these public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have proven unattractive due to

limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of said properties. 52 Judicial

confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive means to

regularize the informal settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, yet even that


48 8/28/2013


19/48

system, as revealed in this decision, has considerable limits.

There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively held residential

lands on which they have lived and raised their families. Many more have tilled and made productive

idle lands of the State with their hands. They have been regarded for generation by their families and

their communities as common law owners. There is much to be said about the virtues of according

them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the Court to translate into positive law, as the law

itself considered such lands as property of the public dominion. It could only be up to Congress to setforth a new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the settlement of such lands

which in legal theory are lands of the public domain before the problem becomes insoluble. This

could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation

of imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for the conversion of public

dominion property into patrimonial.

One's sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not only of that

individual, but also to the person's family. Once that sense of security is deprived, life and livelihood

are put on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring welcome closure to the long pestering

problem. caHIAS

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February

2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Peralta and

Bersamin, JJ., concur.

Puno, C.J., joins J. Nazario.

Quisumbing, J., is on official business.

Corona, J., joins the dissent of Mr. Justice Brion.

Chico-Nazario, J., Pls. see Concurring & Dissenting Opinion.

Leonardo-de Castro, J., joins the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Nazario.

Brion, J., dissents see Opinion.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the majority opinion in dismissing the application for registration of a piece of land

originally filed by the late Mario Malabanan (Malabanan), petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. The

land subject of the instant Petition, being alienable and disposable land of the public domain, may

not be acquired by prescription under the provisions of the Civil Code, nor registered pursuant to


48 8/28/2013


20/48

Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree. CTIEac

At the outset, it must be made clear that the Property Registration Decree governs registration of land

under the Torrens system. It can only identify which titles, already existing or vested, may be

registered under the Torrens system; but it cannot be the source of any title to land. It merely

confirms, but does not confer ownership. 1

Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree allows "those who have acquired ownership of

private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws", to apply for registration of their

title to the lands.

Petitioners do not fall under such provision, taking into account that the land they are seeking to

register is alienable and disposable land of the public domain, a fact which would have several

substantial implications.

First, Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree clearly and explicitly refers to "private

lands", without mention at all of public lands. There is no other way to understand the plain languageof Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree except that the land was already private when

the applicant for registration acquired ownership thereof by prescription. The prescription therein

was not the means by which the public land was converted to private land; rather, it was the way the

applicant acquired title to what is already private land, from another person previously holding title

to the same. 2 The provision in question is very clear and unambiguous. Well-settled is the rule that

when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or

construction, but only for application. 3

With the understanding that Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree applies only to what

are already private lands, then, there is no question that the same can be acquired by prescriptionunder the provisions of the Civil Code, because, precisely, it is the Civil Code which governs rights

to private lands. ECcTaS

Second, Section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as

amended, reads:

Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as

follows:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;

(3) By lease; and

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent). (Emphasis ours.)


48 8/28/2013


21/48

The afore-quoted provision recognizes that agricultural public lands may be disposed of by the State,

and at the same time, mandates that the latter can only do so by the modes identified in the same

provision. Thus, the intent of the legislature to make exclusive the enumeration of the modes by

which agricultural public land may be disposed of by the State in Section 11 of the Public Land Act,

as amended, is not only readily apparent, but explicit. And, undeniably, the enumeration of the

modes for acquiring agricultural public land in the said provision does not include prescription, in the

concepts described and periods prescribed by the Civil Code.

Neither the Civil Code nor the Property Registration Decree can overcome the express restriction

placed by the Public Land Act, as amended, on the modes by which the State may dispose of

agricultural public land.

The Public Land Act, as amended, is a special law specifically applying to lands of the public

domain, except timber and mineral lands. The Public Land Act, as amended, being a special law,

necessarily prevails over the Civil Code, a general law. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that

"where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor

specially should prevail." Generalia specialibus non derogant.4

As for the Property Registration Decree, it must be stressed that the same cannot confer title to land

and can only confirm title that already exists or has vested. As has already been previously discussed

herein, title to agricultural public land vests or is acquired only by any of the modes enumerated in

Section 11 of the Public Land Act, as amended. TcADCI

And, third, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act was amended several times, changing the period of

possession required for acquiring an imperfect title to agricultural public land:

Under the public land act, judicial confirmation of imperfect title required possession en

concepto de dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894. Under C.A. No. 141,this requirement was retained. However, on June 22, 1957, Republic Act No. 1942 was

enacted amending C.A. No. 141. This later enactment required adverse possession fora

period of only thirty (30) years. On January 25, 1977, the President enacted P.D. No. 1073,

further amending C.A. No. 141, extending the period for filing applications for judicial

confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to December 31, 1987. Under this decree, "the

provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are

hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and

disposable land of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and

notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-

in-interest under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945." 5(Emphasis ours.)

Prior to Presidential Decree No. 1073, imperfect title to agricultural land of the public domain could

be acquired by adverse possession of 30 years. Presidential Decree No. 1073, issued on 25 January

1977, amended Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by requiring possession and occupation of

alienable and disposable land of the public domain since 12 June 1945 or earlier for an imperfect

title. Hence, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1073, the requisite period of possession for

acquiring imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the public domain is no longer

determined according to a fixed term (i.e., 30 years); instead, it shall be reckoned from a fixed date


48 8/28/2013


22/48

(i.e., 12 June 1945 or earlier) from which the possession should have commenced.

If the Court allows the acquisition of alienable and disposable land of the public domain by

prescription under the Civil Code, and registration of title to land thus acquired under Section 14 (2)

of the Property Registration Decree, it would be sanctioning what is effectively a circumvention of

the amendment introduced by Presidential Decree No. 1073 to Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act.

Acquisition of alienable and disposable land of the public domain by possession would again be

made to depend on a fixed term (i.e.,10 years for ordinary prescription and 30 years for extraordinaryprescription), rather than being reckoned from the fixed date presently stipulated by Section 48 (b) of

the Public Land Act, as amended. DCcIaE

There being no basis for petitioners' application for registration of the public agricultural land in

question, accordingly, the same must be dismissed.

I, however, must express my dissent to the discussion in the majority opinion concerning the

contradictory pronouncements of the Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals 6 and Republic v.

Herbieto, 7 on imperfect titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, acquired in

accordance with Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and registered pursuant toSection 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.

According to Naguit,a person seeking judicial confirmation of an imperfect title under Section 48 (b)

of the Public Land Act, as amended, need only prove that he and his predecessors-in-interest have

been in possession and occupation of the subject land since 12 June 1945 or earlier, and that the

subject land is alienable and disposable at the time of filing of the application for judicial

confirmation and/or registration of title. On the other hand, it was held in Herbieto that such a person

must establish that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the

subject land since 12 June 1945 or earlier, and that the subject land was likewise already declared

alienable and disposable since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The majority opinion upholds the ruling inNaguit, and declares the pronouncements on the matter inHerbieto as mere obiter dictum.

As the ponente ofHerbieto, I take exception to the dismissive treatment of my elucidation in said

case on the acquisition of imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the public domain, as

mere obiter dictum.

An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law

which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it. It is a remark made, or opinion expressed,

by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, "by the way", that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not

directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determinationof the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as

precedent. 8

To recall, the Republic of the Philippines opposed in Herbieto the registration of certain parcels of

land of the public domain in the names of Jeremias and David Herbieto, based on two grounds, one

substantive and the other procedural, i.e., (1) the applicants for registration failed to prove that they

possessed the subject parcels of land for the period required by law; and (2) the application for

registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the application consisted of two parcels of


48 8/28/2013


23/48

land individually and separately owned by two applicants.

The Court, in Herbieto, addressed the procedural issue first, and held that the alleged infirmity in the

application constituted a misjoinder of causes of action which did not warrant a dismissal of the case,

only the severance of the misjoined causes of action so that they could be heard by the court

separately. The Court though took note of the belated publication of the notice of hearing on the

application for registration of Jeremias and David Herbieto, the hearing was already held before the

notice of the same was published. Such error was not only procedural, but jurisdictional, and wasfatal to the application for registration of Jeremias and David Herbieto.

The Court then proceeded to a determination of the substantive issue inHerbieto, particularly,

whether Jeremias and David Herbieto possessed the parcels of land they wish to register in their

names for the period required by law. The Court ruled in the negative. Section 48 (b) of the Public

Land Act, as amended, on judicial confirmation of imperfect title, requires possession of alienable

and disposable land of the public domain since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Given that the land sought to

be registered was declared alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, and the period ofpossession prior to such declaration should not be counted in favor of the applicants for registration,

then Jeremias and David Herbieto could not be deemed to have possessed the parcels of land in

question for the requisite period as to acquire imperfect title to the same.

The discussion in Herbieto on the acquisition of an imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of

the public domain, which could be the subject of judicial confirmation, was not unnecessary to the

decision of said case. It was not a mere remark made or opinion expressed upon a cause, "by the

way", or only incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon a question before the Court; or upon

a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause; or introduced by way of

illustration, or analogy or argument, as to constitute obiter dictum. ECaHSI

It must be emphasized that the acquisition of an imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the

public domain under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, was directly raised as an

issue in the Petition in Herbieto and discussed extensively by the parties in their pleadings. That the

application of Jeremias and David Herbieto could already be dismissed on the ground of lack of

proper publication of the notice of hearing thereof, did not necessarily preclude the Court from

resolving the other issues squarely raised in the Petition before it. Thus, the Court dismissed the

application for registration of Jeremias and David Herbieto on two grounds: (1) the lack of

jurisdiction of the land registration court over the application, in light of the absence of proper

publication of the notice of hearing; and (2) the evident lack of merit of the application given that the

applicants failed to comply with the requirements for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title under

Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. This is only in keeping with the duty of the Court

to expeditiously and completely resolve the cases before it and, once and for all, settle the dispute

and issues between the parties. Without expressly discussing and categorically ruling on the second

ground, Jeremias and David Herbieto could have easily believed that they could re-file their

respective applications for registration, just taking care to comply with the publication-of-notice

requirement.


48 8/28/2013


24/48

Of particular relevance herein is the following discourse in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals 9 on what

constitutes, or more appropriately, what does not constitute obiter dictum:

It has been held that an adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case

cannot be considered as obiter dictum, and this rule applies to all pertinent questions,

although only incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the regular course

of the consideration of the case, and led up to the final conclusion, and to any statement as to

matter on which the decision is predicated. Accordingly, a point expressly decided does notlose its value as a precedent because the disposition of the case is, or might have been, made

on some other ground, or even though, by reason of other points in the case, the result

reached might have been the same if the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise

than it did. A decision which the case could have turned on is not regarded as obiter dictum

merely because, owing to the disposal of the contention, it was necessary to consider another

question, nor can an additional reason in a decision, brought forward after the case has been

disposed of on one ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case presents two (2) or

more points, any one of which is sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court

actually decides all such points, the case as an authoritative precedent as to every point

decided, and none of such points can be regarded as having the status of a dictum, and one

point should not be denied authority merely because another point was more dwelt on and

more fully argued and considered, nor does a decision on one proposition make statements

of the court regarding other propositions dicta. IcHTCS

An adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be considered a dictum;

and this rule applies as to all pertinent questions, although only incidentally involved, which are

presented and decided in the regular course of the consideration of the case, and lead up to the final

conclusion, and to any statement in the opinion as to a matter on which the decision is predicated.

Accordingly, a point expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent because the disposition

of the case is or might have been made on some other ground, or even though, by reason of other

points in the case, the result reached might have been the same if the court had held, on the particular

point, otherwise than it did. 10

I submit that Herbieto only applied the clear provisions of the law and established jurisprudence on

the matter, and is binding as a precedent.

Section 14 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, explicitly requires for the acquisition of an

imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the public domain, possession by a Filipino citizen

of the said parcel of land since 12 June 1945 or earlier, to wit:

Section. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of thepublic domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have

not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province

where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of

title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable


48 8/28/2013


25/48

and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of

ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the

applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force

majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions

essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the

provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis ours.) SCIcTD

Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, by substantially reiterating Section 48 (b) of thePublic Land Act, as amended, recognizes the imperfect title thus acquired and allows the registration

of the same, viz.:

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First



(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable

and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership

since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (Emphasis ours.)

Meanwhile, jurisprudence has long settled that possession of the land by the applicant for registration

prior to the reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable cannot be credited to the

applicant's favor. 11

Given the foregoing, judicial confirmation and registration of an imperfect title, under Section 48 (b)

of the Public Land Act, as amended, and Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree,

respectively, should only be granted when: (1) a Filipino citizen, by himself or through his

predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and

occupation of agricultural land of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition ofownership, since 12 June 1945, or earlier; and (2) the land in question, necessarily, was already

declared alienable and disposable also by 12 June 1945 or earlier.

There can be no other interpretation of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and

Section 14 (1) of the Property Registrat

Documents

Malabanan vs Republic of the Phils. G.R. No. 179987 April 29, 2009