A s i a P a p e r V o l u m e 6 I s s u e 3 2 4 M a y 2 0 1 2 I S S N 2 0 3 4 5 3 6 4

J o n a t h a n H o l s l a g

The Asia Papers are the flagship publication series of the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies. They aim at a wide audience of experts, students, journalists, and policy makers. All papers

undergo a double peer review. They can be accessed via the institute’s website.

Series editor: Jonathan Holslag. Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies

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Making Waves

China and Maritime Security in Asia

Abstract. The best way to avoid an armed conflict with another great power is to make any conflict scenario as lethal, costly, prolonged, and unpredictable as possible. That is the essence of deterrence: building up military capabilities to the degree that the price of war nullifies the prizes of aggression. To be effective, however, deterrence must coincide with reassurance. That is at least the commonly held view among today’s realists. The most optimist strands of realism even assume that such deft deterrence could create the necessary stability for closer cooperation in other areas and facilitate the emergence of a security regime This paper tests how much these ideas hold true in case of the evolving tensions between China and the other Asian powers over the Western Pacific since 2009. It finds that China’s alleged assertiveness in this area was indeed met by balancing through deterrence, and that China on its turn counterbalanced by shoring up its military capabilities. The reassurance part, though, has been remarkably absent. There is no evidence whatsoever that a security regime is in the making and China seems to keep all options open for defending its claims. Moreover, it is not unlikely that security in the Western Pacific could take a turn for the worse.

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Making Waves

China and Maritime Security in Asia

Jonathan Holslag1

MORE THAN EVER, the maritime fringes of East Asia are turning into a play

tub for great powers. Stretching from the Indonesian Archipelago to the Kuril Islands, and from Guam to the Chinese shores, these waters matter a great deal to any protagonist that seeks to preserve its economic lifelines, territorial integrity, military manoeuvrability, and, not the least, political status. The very geography of this Asian Mediterranean elicits wrangling for influence. In recent years, we have witnessed bolder balancing against China’s alleged assertiveness, with the latter showing no inclination to back down. Officials and experts insisted, though, that this does not need to cause violence. Even if balancing takes the form of military deterrence, none of the protagonists is in for a fight, so that they all invest in reassurance and try to prevent tensions from affecting cooperation in other fields. Defensive realism is key. It holds that states pursue security rather than aggrandizement, and that if China shores up its naval prowess, other protagonists can close the ranks and show their resolve collectively. Thanks to this counterweight, stability can be maintained and, on its turn, raise momentum for an Asian security regime. That is at least the optimistic notion. This paper argues that a transition from conflict to coexistence and from coexistence to regime building should not be expected. It challenges that bolder balancing has prompted China to pay more attention to reassurance and that smart deterrence is bringing Asia closer to lasting stability or peace. Moreover, too much confidence in defensive realism is perilous, as it overlooks several factors that could lug Asia into much fiercer power plays. The Asian powers have all stressed that they will not put their domestic development at risk by pursuing adventurous schemes of expansionism. Conquest no longer pays off. But even when strategic restraint and the respect for sovereignty form the cornerstones of Asian diplomacy, there are a lot of places where territorial sovereignty is simply not settled. Status quo here stands for legal limbos and invites different interpretations, political tussle, and military browbeating. In such context, different parties seek to deter each other from

Jonathan Holslag (jholslag@vub.ac.be) is research fellow at the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (BICCS). The author is grateful to Robert D. Kaplan, Andrew Nathan, Liselotte Odgaard, and Xie Tao for going through earlier drafts of this paper.

Making Waves 3

Hotspots and emerging military partnerships in the Western Pacific. Military partnerships and agreements concluded between 2009 and 2011.

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changing the status quo unilaterally, but simultaneously explore new avenues for avoiding skirmishes. Deterrence, so it is seen, has become a matter of demonstrating military resolve when it must and signalling prudence whenever it can. Such prudence is articulated in different ways and all of them have been extensively debated. In the first place, deterrence can be complemented with reassurance. Contemporary security dilemmas, Thomas Christensen posits, require sophisticated coercive diplomacy: “Reassurances must be built into deterrent threats so that the target will not fear being deprived of its core values if it complies with the deterring state’s demands.”1 This interpretation bridges the traditional gap between deterrence – which assumes that reassurance or appeasement prompts opponents to become more demanding – and spiral models – which expect the showcasing of force to engender only more belligerent responses. Second, deterrence can be accompanied by policies of escalation management and confidence building. Third, deterrence can be offset by promoting functional cooperation in other areas. Commercial ties in particular raise the threshold for going offensive. Lastly, there is dialogue. This can involve technical discussions on possible settlements or policy gatherings in which both sides explain their security aspirations. Furthermore, pundits can be called in for helping to unravel complicated disputes into smaller components that could be tackled more easily. There are diverging appreciations of such deft deterrence. Optimists contend that it creates the stability and predictability that is needed to foster cooperation and to get the parties involved around the table. On the one hand, effective mutual deterrence makes violence irrelevant. On the other hand, the broader cooperation becomes, the more there is a chance that the value attached to contentious issues decreases, and leaders gradually build up the political will to discuss binding rules and even reach a final settlement. “States can find a way to signal their true benign intentions and work out their differences,” Tang Shiping contends in a treatise that describes defensive realism as one step in an evolution towards more liberalist diplomatic standards.2 Others have gone less far and described deft deterrence as a way to manage conflict, not to solve it. States continue to modernise their military capabilities and to introduce new ways of showing resolve, but this perpetuating pattern of balancing and counterbalancing will lead to stability and predictability – in spite of the fuse staying in the powder keg. This is also where more sceptical interpretations come in. Even most defensive realists reckon that smart deterrence would become difficult if the balance of power alters drastically and prospects of deterring the rising power would be modest. At that moment, the security dilemma would just be too pressing and invite belligerent behaviour or even preventive strikes. Offensive realists go further and claim that restraint cannot be but a temporary phenomenon: not in anticipation of liberal standards, but on the way to expansionism. When they have the means to do so, all powers will pursue aggrandizement or, at the least, act forcefully in defending what they consider legitimate interests. Power breeds arrogance.

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The power plays between China and the other pretenders in the Asian Mediterranean constitute thus a test case for assessing whether the more ingenious variants of deterrence can indeed prevent military tensions from turning violent. Obviously, the handling of this strategic conundrum will largely shape the Asian security landscape and affect global stability. This paper contributes several insights to the debate. The first part deconstructs the tensions over the Asian Mediterranean into three interconnected dilemmas – a territorial, a security, and a domestic political one. The following two sections give an account of the tensions between China and the other powers. They demonstrate that China’s growing influence in its maritime periphery has been met with balancing and more muscular deterrence. China on its turn answered with counterbalancing, but its efforts to reassure remained very modest. Instead of soothing fears and working towards a regime that limits military muscle flexing, it rather sought to give its deterrence a civilian guise, to distract attention to economic cooperation, and to divide the balancers – a strategy that obviously has not much chance of easing tensions. The subsequent part elucidates why the three dilemmas will become more pressing and could still cause armed showdowns. A strategic and political gridlock The enmity between China and the other powers in East Asia’s maritime margins unfolds over three layers. All three of them are important to consider in assessing how recent tensions affect regional stability. In the first place, there exists a daunting territorial gridlock involving Taiwan and the China Seas. Whether it relates to secession in case of Taiwan or littoral countries appropriating disputed islands; both events would be regarded as an attack on China’s territorial integrity and a declaration of war. Compared to China’s territorial dispute over the continental border with India, these maritime conflicts are much more precarious. In case of the Sino-Indian border, which remains disputed after decades of negotiations, the status quo is pretty straightforward. China controls one section, India the other, and between war on the one hand and some diplomatic pestering on the other, both sides have not much options to change reality on the ground. This is different in regard to the territorial disputes in China’s maritime frontier. Taiwan and Beijing understand very well the meaning of the status quo, but they have much more scope for adjusting the situation – being it only, for example, by changing political preferences in Taiwan or Taipei’s expanding ties with different parts of the world. Legally, nothing changes, but reality adjusts constantly. The same goes for the East and South China Sea. The status quo in this case entails that different countries stick to different claims, yet, at the same time have plenty of ways to build up their presence in contested waters – economically, militarily, and even by promoting maritime research and tourism. The legal impasse coexists thus

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with fluctuations of influence and that makes the situation more prone to incidents.

This territorial dilemma on its turn is part of both a regional security dilemma and domestic political predicaments. The security dilemma entails that whoever controls the East Asian seas wields tremendous influence over trade, resources, and the destiny of the Pacific Ocean – America’s traditional buffer against turmoil in Eurasia and the quiet flank of countries like Japan, Indonesia, and Australia. But it would

also have at its disposal a launch pad for naval coercion against any littoral state that looms as a potential challenge. This would certainly be the case if China were to combine such maritime supremacy with its overwhelming geopolitical weight onshore and, hence, inevitably vest its hegemony from the Bering Strait to Australia and from the Mariana Trench to the Gulf of Bengal and the Caspian Sea. But this is not how China sees it. China considers itself a very defensive player that merely seeks to protect its legitimate territorial claims and, this is key, to deter the United States from coming to the rescue of its neighbours in case of a showdown. Rather than that the People’s Republic is to be feared for hegemonic designs, it is the United States, so the reasoning goes, that attempts to keep Asia under the thumbs and arrogantly throws its massive power projection capacity around. This also explains why Chinese officials and experts consider Washington as the agitator of many maritime disputes and maintain that it is the United States that needs to be deterred in the first place. These strategic calculations have to be put into the perspective of political considerations at home. As much as loaded territorial disputes have proved useful for political elites to play up nationalism and to present themselves in a rather easy way as guardians of the national interest, they also became hostages of public expectations they or their predecessors created. After all, most Asian leaders seek to avoid the heavy cost of armed conflict and to advance regional cooperation in pursuit of economic growth. In this regard one could see them as security-seeking actors in two ways: in their foreign policy by trying to avoid armed conflict and in their domestic policy by advancing national unity through development. Whether one considers this a matter of politicians trying to get it both ways by combining nationalism with risk aversion or of unsettled business from a previous era reducing their scope; the conundrum makes that they have to walk a tightrope between the preoccupation with security and sovereignty on the one hand, and eagerness to avoid any incident that could perturb their access to the global markets. It is the pull of these two concerns that determines how capitals rate the importance of reassurance and deterrence – but ultimately their moves will be determined by one thing: the gravitation of political survival.

“Whoever controls the East Asian seas wields tremendous influence

over trade, resources, and the destiny of the Pacific

Ocean.”

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Balancing against assertive China

As the first decade of the new century wound to an end, a wave of agitation rippled through the Western Pacific. Many countries lamented that China’s diplomatic and military attitude had become much more assertive, if not arrogant. Whereas, the true bearing of China’s alleged assertiveness is still a matter of discussion, the truth is that that those other states became firmer in their efforts to balance against the People’s Republic and to deter pugnacious propensity.

Australia

India

Japan

Philippines

Vietnam

US

Singapore

RO

K

Malaysia

Indonesia

Welcome US role in maritime security X X X X X X X X

Military cooperation Asian powers X X X X X X X X

Need to modernize own military X X X X X X X X

Chinese navy challenges maritime security X X X X X X X

Maritime disputes to be multilateralized X X X X X X X X X X

Concern about China in maritime disputes X X X X X X X X X X

Concern about regional arms race X X X X

Concern about US presence X X

Sources 11 13 12, 13

8,9,12,14

8 16, 17

6,7,9, 15

10,11

3,4,5

1,2

Table 1. Attitudes towards maritime security in Eastern Asia expressed in public statements at head of state or minister level. Sources: specified in the references list. See note 3. A first way to respond to China’s assertiveness was to let senior officials vent anger in public statements. Public remarks are both a means to exert pressure and an indication of how far governments want to go in chiding China. Let us first look at individual countries. Departing from on-record official interventions, table one summarizes the main countries’ attitudes towards maritime security in the Western Pacific. All ten countries have expressed their concern about maritime disputes involving China as well as their preference for addressing these disputes in a multilateral context. The main difference, however, laid in their willingness to label China’s naval modernization explicitly as a challenge or threat. South Korea, Malaysia, and Indonesia refrained from such statements and also showed themselves more concerned about regional arms races. The latter two even uttered their reservations about America’s more robust military presence in the East Asian waters. A clear indication of the tendency towards balancing is that most countries have signalled their positive appreciation of a growing military presence and involvement of the United States in the area, the need for more military

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cooperation amongst them, and the importance to modernize their own armed forces in response to maritime conflicts. A second indicator is how much countries have been willing to make critical joint statements about China’s impact on regional maritime security. If anything, such statements have a powerful bearing and are much disliked in Beijing. From this perspective, the balancing tendencies of Australia, India, Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and the United States are confirmed, as those countries made collective statements – against South Korea, Malaysia, and Indonesia more reticent attitude. The most compelling parameter of balancing is how much other countries ramped up their military capabilities in function of conflict scenarios with China and deployed them to theatres where Chinese military presence is feared. In that regard, the United States has answered most decisively by launching its AirSea Battle Concept, which recycles the lessons of fighting Germany in the earlier half of last century into today’s context of a rising China.4 The Concept’s aim is to deter any aggression as effectively as possible and to squash eventual efforts to close off the Western Pacific whenever deterrence is to fail. Many relocations and replacements in the Pacific Command had been under way well before 2009 – such as the rotational deployment of bombers, the expansion of the Seventh Fleet, and the development of new intelligence and command centres at Hawaii. Some American officials even reckon that China’s so-called assertiveness might partially have been a reaction to this evolution. Still, the Pentagon has indicated that it will continue to prioritize the Pacific in the allocation of new aircraft and vessels, thereby allaying concerns that America was neglecting its alliances and security partnerships.5 The return of China at the top of Washington’s security agenda has also made Congress show restraint in cutting weapon programmes critical to keep China in check. Whereas the 2012 National Defence Authorization Act required additional information on the future unmanned carrier-based strike system and

the new generation strategic missile submarines, it also stressed the need to uphold American primacy in the Pacific, to respond to Chinese area denial strategies, and to invest in strategic deterrence.6 As one defence official stated, “China gave that extra push that we needed to convince lawmakers of the importance of modernizing our conventional and nuclear deterrence capability.”7 It is true that many uncertainties remain over America’s financial wherewithal to replace several ageing military systems, but deterrence against China will certainly prevail in the Pentagon’s hard budgetary choices.

Of all East Asian countries, Japan, another country affected by budgetary constraints, made the most significant steps in enhancing its military deterrence against China. The 2010 Japanese Defence Programme Guidelines put heavy emphasis on disputes in which territorial quarrels could intermingle with economic interests and prioritized capabilities to respond to attacks on remote islands.8 While it was not the first time that this contingency was put forward, it

“It is true that many uncertainties remain over

America’s financial wherewithal to replace several ageing military

systems, but deterrence against China will certainly

prevail in the Pentagon’s hard budgetary choices.”

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now came at the top of anticipated scenarios.9 Effective naval deterrence came up as the main concern, with the Defence Ministry announcing the construction of a new generation of submarines, the modernization of its destroyers and the commissioning of a new generation by 2018, the acquisition of new patrol aircraft, the improvement of detection systems for stealth aircraft, the modernization and replacement of its air fighters, and the deployment of troops “to fill the defence void in the Sakishima Islands”.10 At the end of 2009, the Diet finally greenlighted the construction of a new generation of large helicopter carriers, the 22DDH, which would become vital in anti-submarine warfare and feature significant force projection capacity if it were to be fit F-35B fighters. Japan was followed by Vietnam, which ordered six Kilo class submarines and added another four corvettes to its order list. Vietnam’s naval modernization is explained most explicitly as an effort to deter China.11 The Philippines too stated the need for better capabilities in response to China’s naval modernization, among others in the 2020 Strategic Sail Plan, but a lack of resources thwarted plans even more as in case of Vietnam.12 Other countries were less outspoken. South Korea continued expanding its KDX-III destroyer fleet, but this vessel is designed as much in function of the North Korean missile threat as of maritime disputes that could involve China among others.13 Indonesia and Malaysia ordered more conventional submarines, small surface combatants, and patrol aircraft, but these moves cannot be pinned down on a strategy to deter China.14 Indonesia even purchased Chinese anti-ship missiles. Countries also clenched a fist by staging bolder military exercises. Vietnam, for example, went all-out in flexing its overstrained military muscle. In 2011, it conducted its first publicized live-fire exercise offshore and launched vast air defence manoeuvres.15 Japan increased the frequency and scope of its air defence, de-mining, and anti-submarine exercises around the East China Sea. In August 2010, the Japanese Self-Defence Forces for the first time simulated the recapturing of a remote island. Furthermore, countries also set the scene for new joint war games. The 2010 program of the Japanese Ministry of Defence foresaw in more joint exercises and training with the United States in the South Western Region.16 Japan also held its first air exercises with Australia in the Aomori Prefecture and agreed with India to organize their first air and naval exercises in 2012.17 Since 2009, the Malabar Exercises – consisting of the American, Indian, Japanese, Australian, and Singaporean navies – have been staged around Okinawa, instead of in the Indian Ocean, and also more intensively simulated anti-submarine warfare. In December 2010, over 60 warships and 400 aircraft from Japan and the United States participated in military drills, which became the largest exercise since the formation of the alliance and were for the first time attended by South Korean observers.18 In July 2011, the United States, Japan, and Australia staged their first naval exercise off Brunei in the South China Sea.19 Most emblematic were the first naval simulations between the United States and Vietnam in 2010 and 2011.20

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Partners Start Content

Vietnam-US September 2011 MoU on defence cooperation, including dialogue, sea security, search and rescue, etc.

Vietnam-Japan October 2011 Defence protocol on military cooperation and disaster relief

Vietnam-Australia October 2010 MoU on military cooperation covering strategic dialogue, training, etc.

Vietnam-India November 2009 MoU on military cooperation covering i.a. security dialogue and exchanges

Vietnam-ROK October 13 MoU on military cooperation covering i.a. regional security dialogue

Vietnam-Singapore September 2009 Defence cooperation agreement

Vietnam-New Zealand November 2010 Statement on defence cooperation

Vietnam-Philippines October 2011 MoU between navy and coastguard on i.a. strategic dialogue, equipment, and information sharing. Vietnam-Indonesia September 2011 MoU with Indonesia to stage joint patrols in the South China Sea

Vietnam-Malaysia May 2010 MoU on defence cooperation including training and information exchange

Japan-Australia May 2010 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement

Japan-India November 2009 Agreement on Maritime Security Dialogue

Japan-Philippines October 2011 Naval cooperation agreement covering joint i.a. training and dialogue.

Japan-ROK January 2011 Preliminary agreement on DPRK and mutual supply support for regional contingencies.

ROK-Australia December 2011 Agreement on expanding military exercises, intelligence gathering, and equipment.

ROK-Indonesia July 2011 Agreement on defence cooperation and equipment

ROK-Philippines November 2011 Statement on defence cooperation and equipment

Philippines-New Zealand

August 2011 Agreement on security dialogue and statement on South China Sea

Malaysia-India October 2010 MoU on military exchanges, training, and equipment

Table 2. Closing the ranks. Military agreements signed between the Western Pacific countries in 2009, 2010, and 2011. Since 2009, the web of military partnerships around China has tightened. On the one hand, Washington paid more attention to its security alliances, which came after a period of concerns about America’s commitment to these partnerships. Although statements of the 2010 and 2011 Security Consultative Committee between Japan and the United States did contain a lot of new “strategic objectives”, the 2011 document confirmed Taiwan as a common concern and both sides

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continued to step up operational synergies in the field of missile defence, early warning, areal deterrence, and anti-submarine warfare.21 Highly symbolic was the decision to rotate ships, aircraft, and troops through facilities in Australia, which would lead to a quasi-permanent presence of 2,500 American soldiers. The Pentagon announced that it would station a littoral combat ship in Singapore and long-range P-8A anti-submarine warfare intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft in Thailand, both meant to patrol the South China Sea. In January 2011, the United States promised the Philippines to help boost its maritime capacity, which was followed by an 11-day joint naval exercise and the delivery of two large patrol ships.22 With Vietnam, a new important country joined Washington’s network of partnerships. Cooperation also accelerated among the Asian countries. At least 19 new defence agreements were signed since 2009, as showed in table two. Vietnam became the spider in a whole new web of partnerships. Hanoi clearly felt some urgency, as it negotiated ten new military cooperation schemes, followed by Japan and South Korea, which signed five such documents each. Most of these new plans were centred on maritime security and several were accompanied by statements of concern about the tensions in the South China Sea. Some, such as those involving Vietnam and the one between Japan and South Korea, were path breaking, although it has to be said that this agreement was mostly related to North Korea and that all other documents involving South Korea were mostly related to cooperation between defence industries and trade in defence systems. Highlighting this evolution even more is the fact that Indonesia was the only country that concluded a defence agreement with China during this period.23 Chinese military officials made a joint statement with counterparts from South Korea and New Zealand, but these did not provide in any specific measures. Balancing against China’s growing maritime power has thus certainly taken an important leap. As regards official statements of concern and new defence agreements, we can see a strong degree of overlap. Those countries that were most critical and expressed this criticism in different joint statements – Vietnam, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, India, and the United States – also became active in exploring new defence synergies, with Vietnam standing in the vanguard. Of all East Asian countries, Vietnam and Japan were also the ones that most visibly boosted their military capabilities in function of tensions with China. Indonesia, South Korea, and Malaysia, were not willing to balance so visibly. China responds

Chinese scholars and officials recognized that the period between 2009 and 2011 has severely tested their country’s Asia policy. Most of them did not see reasons to be overly alarmed about the deteriorating relations with neighbouring countries and the growing tendency to counterbalance. Nervousness in the region

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demonstrated that the balance of power was shifting, but not yet to the degree that China was singled out as the new hegemon. Overall, they maintained that economic interests and the prospect of stronger regional organizations could still withhold Asian countries from becoming belligerent. Yet, what most pundits and officials shared, was disquiet about the role of the United States. Overall, it was the interplay of a superpower loath to see its privileges constrained with neighbouring countries fearful of being dominated by China, which most of them believed to be the main cause of the new tendency towards balancing. The tide of disquiet has sparked a vivid debate in China on how to respond. That debate, however, has not evolved towards consensus, but rather crystallized around five possible approaches, which are not mutually exclusive but do have different priorities. A first school claims that China should not exaggerate tensions, show restraint in throwing its economic and military weight around, and make more concessions to its neighbours.24 Zhang Guoqing of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), for example, argued that China should not let its rise be taken into hostage by maritime disputes. “Our economic dependence on the South China Sea is not large and the presence of resources very small Sea, so we do not need to exaggerate the importance of the South China Sea.”25 Echoing this observation, Li Xiangyiang, one of China’s foremost experts on Asian affairs, suggested that China needed to learn from Germany’s role in the European integration process, make important compromises on its ambitions, strike a consensus with the other Asian powers, and then use its large domestic market to advance regional integration.26 A second school emphasizes the need for more cultural diplomacy to ease distrust. This is for example the main advise in a new book of Peking University’s Wang Yizhou. “We often ignore the feelings of others,” he found, “culture moisten things silently.” Wang believes that China had to contributed to an alternative for Western Civilization which he saw promoting a violent and rebellious attitude and to humiliate Asia’s ancient culture.27 Yan Xuetong, a Tsinghua scholar known for his usually hawkish views, argued that China can only break through American primacy in Asia and weaken its network of allies and military partners by

showcasing humane authority or benevolent rule (王道, wangdao – a term usually used to contrast with hegemony). The battle for Asia is a battle for harts and minds, he insisted, and therefore China needed to create a desirable model at home that inspires people abroad.28 Cultural and normative power have clearly been picked up as important themes for the leadership, as the sixth plenary session of the seventeenth Central Committee revealed a new guideline to promote the nation’s cultural and soft power. A third strand maintained that China has to bide its time until it has more influence and that influence has to be developed by taking a more active stance toward regional security, to promote cooperation and to weaken resistance.29 Cao

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Xiaoyang of CASS wrote, for example, that in spite of its aggressive attitude, the United States still needs China, and that this creates the opportunity to pragmatically exploit these dependencies as long as China maintains its self-control.30 Fudan University’s Wu Xinbo asserted that China’s needed to communicate better about its strategic intentions and promote regional cooperation on non-traditional security challenges.31 Most of these views are not very new and the main critique from other colleagues is, hence, that interdependencies and regional security dialogues have just not been effective enough in upholding Chinese interests and influence.

A fourth group favours conditional peaceful rise (和平崛起是有条件, heping jueqi shi tiaojian), which implies that China’s benign attitude depends on how much the other powers respect its key and core interests. At a press briefing in September 2011, Wang Yajun of the Central Foreign Affairs Office stated: "Even though we have pledged ourselves to a path of peaceful development, we will not do so at the expense of our national interests.”32 Along the same lines, Chen Xiangyang of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Studies (CICIR) wrote that: “There is a potential misunderstanding that peaceful development is unconditional and absolute… Yet peaceful development is not pursued in a vacuum and is certainly not unconditional… The key premise is that the outside world respects our core interests. Peaceful development can only persist if it is echoed by the international community.” Qu Xing, President of the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) claimed that peace and development on the one hand and the defence of sovereignty and interests on the other were interlinked.33 Qiao Liang, a popular and hawkish PLA strategist, pointed out that loving peace is not the same as weakness and that China should prevent other powers from using the peaceful development doctrine to force it in a position of subservience – “by keeping is sword sharp”.34 The latter might still be far away from Zhongnanhai or Waijiaobu talk, but it finds a soundboard in the community of netizens and nationalist newspapers. The fifth school champions a much tougher line and mostly finds that China should stop trying to be liked at all cost. The point of departure of this group can be summarized with the traditional proverb that “flies only circle around eggs that have cracks”, in other words it is China’s rather undetermined attitude that elicits bullying and humiliation. Zhang Jie, a department head at CASS, stated for instance that China cannot neglect its interests for the sake of piece and that nation’s naval going-out (zou chuqu) is inevitable, and that it should pursue a mixture of dialogue, effective economic diplomacy, and confident counterbalancing so as to uphold its key interests.35 Yin Yinan of the National Defence University in this regard found that there is a lot of talk about peaceful rise, but that Asian countries do not want to see China’s rise anyhow. China cannot blindly rely on commerce to ease tensions, he writes, hinting that that it would be

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most important to try to avoid that maritime incidents strengthen the esteem of other powers and to play on the divisions amongst them.36 As opinions straddle between standing strong and compromising, China’s response has combined balancing with reassurance. In the first place, it reaffirmed its interests, including those related to Taiwan, its territorial claims, and the interpretation of convention on the law of the sea (UNCLOS). While the usual technical discussions among Chinese pundits about how Taiwan could be integrated into the People’s Republic and how far China’s exclusive economic zone should stretch continued, experts directed most of their anger to Washington’s interpretation of the law of the sea. In an important essay, published by Xinhua, Zhang Haiwen made a forceful case against the American navy’s posturing under the banner of freedom of navigation. “In the logic of containing China, the US has launched a wide range of military reconnaissance and surveillance operations, focusing on areas that are militarily sensitive to China,” he wrote, “while UNCLOS is clear about a coastal state’s jurisdiction in regard to marine scientific research in the exclusive economic zone, military research activities are not part of it and

therefore require prior approval (事先征得, shixian zhengde).”37 Zhang, a prominent maritime strategist, continued that American attempts to abuse the convention’s stipulations on the freedom of navigation to justify military activities are illegal, asserting that even if Article 88 does not clarify what exactly the right of non-coastal states to peacefully use high seas means, Washington has no right to unilaterally impose its interpretation and that its notion of freedom of navigation is at loggerheads with the majority of developing countries’ preference to disqualify military presence from peaceful use. In the legal battle over the Asian seas, America became thus the main focus, reflecting once again China’s suspicion that Washington was masterminding a sort of new containment. In the second place, it continued to invest in its capacity to defend those interests and to deter alleged aggression. It did not refrain from showcasing major progresses in its military modernization, like the revelation of its J-20 – which is supposed to become China’s next generation stealth fighter, the launch of the Shi Lang aircraft carrier – accompanied by statements that more such platforms are to be expected, trials with a new missile-defence system, and the much-publicized tests of a new submarine-launched anti-ship missile. Other systems did not make the front page, but were equally contributing to the improvement of China’s conventional deterrence. Since late 2010, the navy started, for example, with the construction of two new T-072 landing platform docks, six new T-052C destroyers, ten T-054A frigates, a new submarine support ship, and probably also launched the first hull of an entire new generation of T-056 corvettes. In the third place, China showed that it would not back down. As much Hu Jintao’s call for preparing for struggle at a meeting between the Central Military Commission and the Navy in 2011 was part of the traditional nationalist repertoire;

Making Waves 15

the Chinese armed forces certainly acted along these lines by upholding their tradition of staging several large-scale manoeuvres in the China Seas.38 In the last years, the Chinese navy usually held three large blue water drills, and this pattern was not changed, being it that they became more intensive. In June 2011, 11 ships of the Eastern Fleet sailed through the Miyako Strait on the way to the Pacific where they exercised near to the contentious Japanese Okinotorishima atoll. Almost the same training scenario had unfolded in 2010, but now the flotilla was bigger and featured unmanned areal vehicles.39 In the same month, the navy embarked on different exercises in the South China Sea, including one in the Gulf of Tonkin. These drills were centred on anti-submarine warfare and island defence capabilities. CCTV television broadcasted Chinese patrol boats firing at an uninhabited island and fighter jets providing areal support. Almost simultaneously, two navy ships offloaded construction materials on Palawan, an island claimed by Manila to be part of its exclusive economic zone.40 Despite protests from Manila, at least one other Chinese patrol around Palawan was reported. In November, a flotilla steamed yet another time through the Miyako Strait. Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan all reported that China had stepped up the number of patrols by military ships and planes, allegations that Beijing routinely derided as groundless. China also confirmed its resolve by expanding its capacity to police the East and South China Sea. “While the Navy remains our ultimate deterrent,” a Chinese professor at the China National Defence University stated, “the government seeks to have more manoeuvrability to enforce its legal territorial claims by developing a whole range of maritime surveillance, coast guard, surveillance boats and fishery patrol units.”41 Indeed, Beijing announced in June 2011, that it was set to increase its maritime surveillance force to 530 patrol boats and 16 aircraft. In line of previous years, 2011 continued to bring about a large number of incidents with these “civilian actors” in disputed waters. Tensions ran particularly high after vessels cut a submerged cable towed by a Vietnamese surveillence ship, a showdown with a Philippine oil exploration in the vicinity of Reed Bank, both in May and June, the capturing of a Vietnamese fishing boat in July 5, and the ancouncement in August that China would expand the number of geological surveys around the Senkaku Islands.42 Two large patrol ships, the Haixun-31 and the Haijian 50, made their maiden voyage to the Senkaku and Spratly Islands.43 Beijing also confirmed its maritime aspirations by approving oil drilling in the Chungxiao /Shirabaka Gas field in the East China Sea. With the commissioning of the HYSY 981 deep-water drilling rig, the largest of its kind, China also reaffirmed its ambitions to tap into the oil resources of the South China Sea. Important is thus to stress that China’s deterrence in maritime disputes consists of both military and civilian capabilities. At the same time, China sought to reassure it neighbours. These moves remained modest, though, compared to the efforts to counterbalance. Defence Minister Liang

Asia Paper 6,3 16

Guanglie called on the Philippines and Indonesia to discuss the South China Sea dispute, but no agreement was reached on new security exchanges. State Councillor Dai Bingguo called on Hanoi to chair an annual meeting on bilateral cooperation, where both sides suggested setting up a defence hotline. Yet, it was not the first time that such link was put in place. China carried out its

regular exercises with Vietnam, but no new military synergies were explored with other countries around the China Seas. The only bilateral breakthrough, in spite of its content remaining vague, was the agreement with Japan to set up a maritime crisis management mechanism. Nor did China made significant progress in its talks with the ASEAN countries. While Beijing lauded the agreement on the implementation of the Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea, signed in July 2011, as a major breakthrough, the document remained non-binding and hardly foresaw in specific measures. The agreement, which was in the offing for nine years, also became only possible after the ASEAN countries acceded to Chinese pressure to relinquish internal consultations ahead of their talks with Beijing. If anything, China tried to wheedle its neighbours by promising more economic gestures. Vis-à-vis Japan, for instance, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi vowed to lower barriers for agricultural goods. The ASEAN countries were approached with a US$ 50 million maritime cooperation fund. Furthermore, China continued to offset the tense relations with Vietnam and the Philippines by pushing for closer military ties with one the one hand Indonesia and Malaysia, two more cautious maritime claimants, and on the other continental neighbours like Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. Rocky waters ahead The security outlook in the Western Pacific is getting rockier. Tensions that have built up since China became singled out as an assertive power are the result of a complex security dilemma. At the baseline, the countries in the region still consider the others’ changing capabilities and resoluteness to defend key interests as a challenge to their own security. Security, as we have seen, usually means that another country cannot change the status quo of disputed maritime areas unilaterally or use its military power to extract other concessions. One additional complexity of the maritime security dilemmas in Asia is, however, that the overlapping claims render it virtually impossible to make the distinction between offensive and defensive intentions. Even though China believes the protection of its claims to be a reasonable and just choice, others consider such plans greedy and aggressive. Furthermore, the very nature of disputed maritime areas, allows a state to maintain the legal limbo while it tries to change reality on the spot and, hence, from the viewpoint of the other pursues tacit expansionism. Another complexity is that although most political leaders find development a safer way to security and status than territorial adventurism; they still complement this risk averse attitude

“ If anything, China tried to wheedle its

neighbours by promising more

economic gestures.”

Making Waves 17

with nationalism. It is this nationalism that prompts them to stand strong whenever the national interest and prestige is in danger. Deft deterrence, the combination of deterrence and reassurance, could be seen as the logical result of these strategic ambivalences and diverging aspirations of Asian political elites. Since 2009, however, we have witnessed more balancing and counterbalancing than before, and certainly more deterrence than reassurance. All over China’s maritime periphery, countries have stated their concerns much more bluntly, re-enforced the web of military partnerships around the People’s Republic, and strengthened their military capabilities in areas where they felt threatened China’s growing maritime presence. Most important in this respect has been China’s response. If anything, the debates among experts about how to handle the more suspicious mood in Asia have moved into all different directions and do thus not provide a lot of guidance in clarifying that matter. Pundits and officials generally stressed that China can still not afford being taken hostage by armed rivalry over the Western Pacific – including Taiwan and the China Seas – but the chorus of hardliners favouring a tougher response has certainly not quieted. Judging China’s posturing in 2011, one can clearly see that it has not backtracked and even continued to expand and diversify its deterrence capacity. Moreover, compared to the investments in deterrence, the efforts to reassure the neighbourhood in bilateral and multilateral settings have been very limited. Instead, Beijing appeared to prefer soft-soaping the other countries by offering more economic cooperation and to capitalize on the divisions amongst them. There is thus certainly no evidence that deft deterrence has laid the groundwork for a security regime. The optimistic suppositions of some defensive realists have thus not materialized. There is no reason for being optimistic about the future either. Let us take another look at the main layers of conflict in the Western Pacific. As regards the territorial stalemate, no legal settlement is in the making, but reality remains bound to change. The Taiwanese society is increasingly divided about closer relations with the Mainland. Leave alone a reunification. China will continue to increase its presence in disputed waters. The United States and China will remain at loggerheads over the freedom of navigation of military vessels in its claimed exclusive economic zone and both sides will step up their capabilities to dissuade unwanted behaviour. Fishing, energy exploitation, and shipping activities will further expand in the China Seas and this will undoubtedly be followed by a splurge of patrols by coastguards, maritime security agencies, and several other constabularies. The navy will, of course, do its bit. As a result, the security dilemma between China and its neighbours will become more pressing. America’s military presence cannot but embolden Beijing to invest more in new defence systems and to show its resolve farther into the Pacific. In a context like this, a new security regime will prove more than ever a pipe dream. That leaves us the third layer: the calculations of political elites. At the moment of writing this paper, there

Asia Paper 6,3 18

was no doubt that they still valued the ability to promote domestic unity and growth through largely stable international relations above the control over a swath of sea and islets. But with economic progress becoming more uncertain and China entering into an awkward period of adjustment, which several experts reckon to take at least a decade, nationalism and populism could once again become a more attractive option for leaders to secure their political survival. So it goes that balancing and counterbalancing in the Western Pacific will inevitably persist and that states continue strengthening their deterrence. Equally predictable is that most of the security dilemmas in the region will revolve around territorial disputes. The main factor that will shape scenarios of conflict is the return of negative nationalism. This entails on the one hand that political elites become less convinced that positive agendas of trade and cooperation are instrumental in building up their prestige at home and that they attach more value to their reputation as forceful actors in an unfriendly neighbourhood. This is not to say that they suddenly become revisionist, but that they will show less restraint in changing the reality underneath the legal status quo, developing new military systems, and to retaliate against alleged acts of aggression. What could this mean? Most obvious is a traditional scenario of states trailing into the rear of economic pioneers, meaning that private initiative ultimately morphs into national interest. A nationalist revival will give more leeway to those domestic interest groups that want to exploit the richness of the East Asian waters and make it more difficult for political leaders to keep economic adventurism in check, whether this concerns oil companies eager to drill the deep seas, fishermen roaming uncharted waters in search of pricy blue fin tuna, or other mavericks. That, of course, increases the risk of countermoves and incidents, which for the same reason, need to be sanctioned forcefully through political means. Tensions could thus escalate because nationalism mandates economic adventurism and economic adventurism will be followed by military interventionism. A second scenario would be that of nationalist drama politics centring on symbolically laden unilateral moves: Taiwan reconsidering its rapprochement, unilateral decrees on maritime demarcation, fortification activities on disputed islets, the denial of access to warships under the pretext of maritime law, etc. As much as nationalism can lay at the origin of such moves, it would also make governments more ferocious in handling escalation. Again, in both scenarios, assertive policies could perfectly be explained as being defensive and an understandable response in the interest of national security. The main change, however, will be the price that leaders are willing to pay to pay for such moves. Another possibility is the blown-out-of-proportion incident. The China Seas are getting ever more crowded. With expanding fleets of merchant ships, trawlers, surveying vessels, and different sorts of patrol boats, the risk of incidents clearly

Making Waves 19

gets larger. Whereas most countries have set up basic protocols for handling events with military ships, those regulations remain widely absent for civilian ships. The best example was the arrest of a Chinese skipper by the Japanese coast guard in September 2010. A trivial incident suddenly made big waves and even led mild-mannered Premier Wen Jiabao to threaten with repercussions if the captain was not released. More patrol boats were sent to the Senkaku Islands. The positive side of this incident was that those boats were part of the Ministry of Agriculture’s fishery patrol fleet, not of the navy, which shows the ability to delay escalation of such events into armed conflict. The downside was that tensions only eased after Japan gave in and that the discourses of Chinese leaders were very hostile. Political manoeuvrability remains thus key, but the incident also demonstrated the crucial importance of escalation management. The big players might have at their disposal a whole series of civilian options to show their resolve. Smaller countries usually do not have that flexibility. We have, for example, witnessed the Philippines sending out its air force to confront Chinese patrol boats and Vietnam its navy after another encounter around the Spratlies. Here we witness thus a situation in which a combination political sabre rattling and the lack of tools to show resolve in a proportionate way could let tensions get out of control more easily. “It is those tiny islands that is going to give us big trouble,” a Singaporean naval officer confided in the sidelines of the Shangri La Security Dialogue, “realities are changing much faster than that our politicians, diplomats, and lawyers can handle them.”44 That observation summarizes the conundrum over the Western Pacific very astutely, for it will stay the main incubator of rivalry among the Asian great powers. It incorporates all the dilemmas that the emerging maritime European powers battled over in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, with the main difference being that the Western Pacific has all these sources of tension in one large tract of sea, straits, and islands. There is no narrow Gibraltar Strait that checks the spillover of tensions from the thronged China Seas into the wide Pacific Ocean – and vice versa. What makes this area so cumbersome, this paper argued, is also that it combines three different layers of instability: territorial disputes, military security dilemmas, and a domestic tilt towards nationalism. Furthermore, the territorial void renders it impossible to distinguish defensive and offensive intentions. We have also witnessed how maritime disputes allow countries to change the actual influence over contested areas more easily, in contrast to the maintenance of the legal status quo. The more the China Seas get crowded, the more there will be frictions between the legal stalemates and reality. Most of all, the case of the Western Pacific shows how careful one should be about the effectiveness of deterrence, even if that is veiled in policies of reassurance.

Asia Paper 6,3 20

Notes and references

1 Christensen, Thomas, 2002. The Contemporary Security Dilemma- Deterring a

Taiwan Conflict. The Washington Quarterly, 25, 4, pp. 7-21.

2 Tang, Shiping, 2008. From Offensive to Defensive Realism. Rajaratnam School of

International Studies Paper Series, n°3, p. 29.

Sources of table 1: Khalik, Abdul and Rendi Witular, 2011. US, China compete to

woo RI over S. China Sea. The Jakarta Post, 23 July 2010; 2. Faruq, Anwar 2011.

Southeast Asia Caught Between US and China. Jakarta Globe, 17 November 2011;

3. Kate Ten, Dandiel 2011. China Reassures Its Neighbors After Clashes in South

China Sea. Jakarta Globe, 5 June 2011; 4. IISS, 2011. Procedings of the Opening

Keynote Address of Malaysian Premier Najib Razak. London and Singapore: IISS.

3 June 2011; 5. Weihua, Chen 2010. Malaysia's PM welcomes improved relations

with China. China Daily, 30 September 2010; 6. Why US must be a part of the

Asian story, interview with Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. Straits Times, 24

September 2010; 7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, 2011; Comments on

Visit of Chinese Maritime Surveillance Vessel Haixun 31 to Singapore. Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, 20 June 2011. Retreived at:

http://app.mfa.gov.sg/pr/read_content.asp?View,15638; AFP, 2011. Vietnam

backs Philippine sea peace zone plan. AFP, 26 October 2011; AFP, 2011. Southeast

Asia caught between US and China. AFP, 17 November 2011; Yonhap, 2011. S.

Korea to keep neutral stance on South China Sea dispute. Yonhap, 19 July 2011;

IISS, 2011. Proceedings of the Third Plenary Session with statements by ROK

Defence Minister Kim Kwan-jin and Australian Defence Minister Stephen Smith.

London and Singapore: IISS. 4 June 2011; Noda, Yoshihiko and Benigno Aquino,

2011. Japan-Philippines Joint Statement on the Comprehensive Promotion of the

Strategic Partnership, Tokyo, 27 September 2011; Smith, Stephen, 2011. India,

Australia call for 'freedom of navigation' on high seas. Times of India, 8 December

2011; Oredain, Simone, 2011. Philippines Says Freedom of Navigation in South

China Sea Under Threat. Voice of America, 23 July 2011; AFP, 2011. Singapore

urges China to come clean in island dispute, 19 June 2011; Clinton, Hillary, 2011.

Press Statement on the South China Sea. Department of State, 22 July 2011.

Retrieved at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/07/168989.htm; Clinton,

Hillary, 2011. Remarks With Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario After

Making Waves 21

Their Meeting. Department of State, 23 July 2011. Retrieved at:

http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/06/166868.htm

4 Carreno, Jose, Culora, Thomas, and Caldorisi, George, 2010. What’s New About

the AirSea Battle Concept. Procedings, 136, 8, pp. 1-29; Ministry of Defence of the

USA, 2011. Background Briefing on Air-Sea Battle by Defense Officials from the

Pentagon. Ministry of Defence, 9 November 2011. See:

http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4923

(Accessed 23 January 2012).

5 Scott, David 2011. Presentation to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Washington,

6 April 2011; Willard, Robert 2011. Presentation to the Senate Armed Services

Committee. Washington, 12 April 2011.

6 Congress of the United States, 2011. 2012 National Defence Authorization Act. On

China and PACOM: sections 346, 1232; on strategic deterrence: section 134 and 242,

on Future Unmanned Carrier-based Strike System section 213.

7 Conversation with US DoD official, Singapore, 29 May 2011.

8 Katsumata, Hidemichi, 2010. SDF Exercises to Recapture Nansei Island, Yomiuri

Shimbun, 20 August 2010.

9 Ministry of Defence of Japan 2011. Summary of the National Defence Program

Guidelines. Tokyo: Ministry of Defence. 17 December 2010, p. 5.

10 Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2010. Defence Programs and Budget of Japan. Tokyo:

Ministry of Defence, p. 2-7.

11 The Vietnamese Kilo’s solely serve the objective of deterring China. Their

effectiviness remains to be seen, but the intention is clear. Interview with

Vietnamese Navy Officer, Hanoi, 3 June 2011.

12 Malaysia is expected to have a fleet of six submarines, meaning four additional

vessels on top of its current two troubled Scorpène subs. Indonesia is expected to

have five to six submarines delivered around 2016. The Philippines launched a

study on the purchase of submarines. Contrariliy to Vietnam, though, it is difficult

to find evidence or statements by officials that link those purchases up to China.

Most officials justify the purchases in a sense of “we need them because everyone

has them”. On the purchase: Evangelista, Katherine, 2011. Philippines Eye

Submarines to Boost Navy. Inquirer, 17 May 2011; AFP, 2012. South Korea Exports

Submarines to Indonesia. AFP, 21 December 2011.

Asia Paper 6,3 22

13 For an update of the KDX–III programme, see Defence Industry Daily:

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/drs-wins-multiplexing-contract-for-

korean-aegis-destroyers-0431/ (accessed 23 January 2012).

14 Malaysia is expected to have a fleet of six submarines, meaning four additional

vessels on top of its current two troubled Scorpène subs. Indonesia is expected to

have five to six submarines delivered around 2016. The Philippines launched a

study on the purchase of submarines. Contrariliy to Vietnam, though, it is difficult

to find evidence or statements by officials that link those purchases up to China.

Most officials justify the purchases in a sense of “we need them because everyone

has them”. On the purchase: Evangelista, Katherine, 2011. Philippines Eye

Submarines to Boost Navy. Inquirer, 17 May 2011; AFP, 2012. South Korea Exports

Submarines to Indonesia. AFP, 21 December 2011.

15 AFP 2011. Vietnam Holds Live-Fire Drill amid China Tensions. AFP, 12 June 211.

16 Ministry of Defence of Japan, 2010. Defence Programs and Budget of Japan. Tokyo:

Ministry of Defence, p. 4.

17 Prasad, K.V., 2011. India, Japan to Step up Defence Cooperation. The Hindu, 3

November 2011.

18 AFP, 2010. Japan, US Launch Biggest ever Joint Military Exercise. AFP, 3

December 2010.

19 AFP, 2011. US, Japan, Australia Plan South China Sea Drill. AFP, 8 July 2011.

20 AFP, 2011. US, Vietnam Start First Military Relationship. AFP, 1 August 2011.

21 Those Joint Statements traditionally focus on the trouble with American bases

and remain rather abstract on operational priorities. Cfr. the Security Consultative

Committee Joint Statements, 1 May 2007, 28 May 2010, and 21 June 2011. Retrieved

at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/index.html

22 AFP, 2011. US Pledges Help For Philippine Navy, AFP, 27 January 2011.

23 Indonesia: 22 March 2011, MoU signed on military sales, transfer of technology,

and training. South Korea: 17 July 2011, Joint statement in which defence ministries

vowed to set up a high-level military strategic dialogue and to enhance exchanges

in the areas of training and education. New Zealand: September 2011, Guo

Boxiong and Richard Rhys Jones, Chief of New Zealand’s military made a

statement that high level visits and personal exchanges could be considered, but

did not go any further. Sources: Indonesia, China to Strengthen Defense

Cooperation. The Jakarta Post, 23 March 2011; China, ROK to Cement Military Ties.

Making Waves 23

Xinhua, 15 July 2011; China, New Zealand Agree to Strengthen Military Ties.

Xinhua, 6 September 2011.

24 中共智囊郑必坚再论中国和平崛起, Zhonhong zhinang Zheng Bijian zailun:

Zhongguo heping jueqi, [CPC Think-Tank, Zheng Bijian: China must firmly

uphold peaceful rise]. Xinhua, 16 May 2011.

25 南海成遏制中国道具, Nanhai cheng ezhi Zhongguo daju, [Becoming bold in the

South China Sea to Contain China]. People’s Daily, 23 June 2011.

26 李向:中国要和平崛起可选择区域经济合作战略 Li Xiangyang; Zhongguo yao

heping jueqi ke xuanze quyu jingji hezuo zhanlue, [Li Xiangyang: China’s Peaceful

Rise Needs a New Regional Cooperation Strategy], People’s Daily, 31 May 2011.

27 中国需要创造性介入外交 Zhongguo xuyao chuangzaoxing [China Needs a

Creative Foreign Policy], Beijing Morning Post, 16 November 2011.

28 Yan Xuetong 2011. 才能打败美国, Zhongguo ruhe caineng dabai Meiguo [How

China can Beat the United States], Renmin Ribao, 20 November 2011

29 Men, Honghua, 2011. 罗马英国美国三大帝国霸权的战略比较? Luoma, Yingguo,

Meigguo san da diguo baquan de zhanlue bijiao, A Comparison of the Hegemonic

Strategies of the Three Empires Rome, Britain, and the United States. Quishi, 21

September 2011.

Yan, Zheng, 2011.奥巴马政府东亚政策评析, Aobama zhengfu dongya zhengce ping

xi, Analysis of the Obama Administration’s Policy Towards East Asia], 当代世界,

Dangdai Sjijie [Contemporary World], January 2010, pp. 49-52.

30 Cao, Xiaoyang, 2011. 国重返亚洲：特点、影响及中国的战略应对, Guo chongfan

Yazhou: Tedian yinxiang ji Zhongguo de zhanlue yingdu [US to Return to Asia:

Features, Impact, and China’s Strategic Response]

31 Wu, Xinbo, 2011. 吴心伯塑造亚洲安全，中国应更积极, Wu Xinbo: Suzao Yazhou

anquan Zhongguo Ying geng jiji [China Should be More Active in Shaping Asian

Security]. Global Times, 6 September 2011.

32 AFP, 2011. China Seeks To Dispel Military Build-Up Fears. AFP, 7 September

2011.

33 曲星：和平发展不意味着容忍别人来侵犯核心利益: Qu Xing: Heping fazhan bu

yiweizhe rongren bieren lai qifan hexin liyi, [Qu Xing: Peaceful Development does

not Mean that we Will Tolerate Violations of our Core Interests]. Renmin Ribao, 23

September 2011

Asia Paper 6,3 24

34 Qiao, Liang, 2011. 战争主动权并非由挑衅者决定 中国有选择和回旋余地,

Zhangzheng zhuding quan bingfei tiaoxin zhe jueding Zhongguo you xuanze he

huixuanyudi, [War Provocations Do not Leave China much Choice to Choose its

Response]. Jiefang Ribao, 29 August 2011.

35 “Zhongguo jin kao yasuo ziji de liyi kongjian lai hanqu heping de fangshi yi bu

kechixu.” Zhang, Jie, 2011. 边安全形势与中国对策, Zhoubian anquan xinshi yi

Zhongguo duice [China’s Peripheral Security Situation and Policy Options], in

Zhang, Jie and Yang Danzhi eds. 中国周边安全形势评估, Zhongguo zhoubian anquan

xingshi pinggu [Assessment of China’s Peripheral Security Situation]. Hong Kong:

Social Science Publishing.

36 面对围堵中国对周边环境长期经营不够, Yin Yinan: Miandui weidu Zhongguo

dui zhoubian hanjing chanqi jingying buguo, [Jin Yinan: To tackle containment

of China, engagement is no longer enough]. China 21st Century Herald, 5

November 2011.

37 Zhang, Haiwen 2010. 维护的是航行自由还是其海上霸权, Meiguo Yao weihu de

shi hangxing ziyouhaishi qi haishang baquan? [Is the US set to Maintain Freedom

of Navigation or its Maritime Hegemony?]. Xinhua, 10 November 2010.

38 http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/title/2011-12/07/content_4733898.htm

39 Beijing does not recognize it as an islet, so that Japan cannot claim an exclusive

economic zone around it. AFP, 2011. China says navy drills not linked to sea

disputes. AFP, 30 June 2011.

40 Pasaylo, Jun, 2011. Chinese Surveillance Ships Roam Philippine Waters.

Philippine Star. 10 June 2011.

41 Interview, Beijing, 13 April 2011.

42 AFP, 2011. China navy boards Vietnam boat in sea spat. AFP, 15 July 2011.

43 The Haixun-31 of the Chinese Maritime Safety Administration left in June and

the Haijian 50 of the China Marine Surveillance in December.

44 Conversation with Singaporean officer, Singapore, 1 June 2011.