Transport Policy 24 (2012) 83–90

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

Transport Policy

0967-07

http://d

n Corr

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journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/tranpol

Making better choices: a systematic comparison of adversarial andcollaborative approaches to the transport policy process

Christiane Baumann n, Stuart White

Institute for Sustainable Futures; University of Technology, Sydney, 235 Jones St, Ultimo NSW 2007, Australia

a r t i c l e i n f o

Available online 23 August 2012

Keywords:

Sustainable urban transport

Policy change

Stakeholder conflict

Asymmetry of influence

Collaborative stakeholder dialogue

Learning

0X/$ - see front matter & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. A

x.doi.org/10.1016/j.tranpol.2012.06.012

esponding author.

ail address: christiane.baumann@isf.uts.edu.a

a b s t r a c t

This paper investigates the practical and theoretical advantages of collaborative stakeholder (CSD)

dialogue over adversarial processes in facilitating better transport policy choices.

CSD is an emergent governance procedure that is increasingly advocated by practitioners and

researchers as a practical means of counterbalancing the asymmetry of interests in public policy

making. In CSD, participants that represent the full diversity of interdependent organised interests in

the issue at stake engage in collaborative dialogue to find a consensus on the way forward.

In order to improve the process and application of CSD in transport it is important to systematically

compare this procedure to the conventional adversarial style of stakeholder interaction in the transport

policy process. To do so this paper builds on a governance framework that allows the comparison of the

collaborative and adversarial pathways with regards to their potential to facilitate better transport

policy choices.

The paper concludes by proposing CSD as a tool to de-politicise stakeholder discussions and so

enable a shift away from the traditionally narrow priority of transport policy making to facilitate

economic growth to a broader focus that better integrates environmental, social and economic

considerations. It also concludes that CSD is most appropriate in problem situations with high levels

of conflict between competing stakeholder groups that all have influence.

& 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Urban transport and sustainable development — a wickedproblem

Research and practice have produced valuable information ontransport infrastructure elements or programs that can contributeto more sustainable urban transport systems, for example,enhanced active and public transport networks or financialdisincentives to individual car use (see Schiller et al., 2010 for agood overview). However, efforts by governments to implementthese policies are often blocked by the activities of interest groupsthat perceive these initiatives as incompatible with their ownobjectives. For example, the expansion of urban cycleway net-works is regularly contested by industry and motorist associa-tions because building cycleways often requires a rededication ofroad or parking space in areas that already have capacityproblems. Environmental and community groups and cyclistassociations, on the other hand, argue that active transportoptions should be chosen because of their health and environ-mental benefits, that they contribute to social equity and thatreduced motorised traffic in urban areas improves liveability.

ll rights reserved.

u (C. Baumann).

Although none of these groups has a formal say in the processesof policy development, decision making and implementation,they have the power to create barriers to the policy process inthat they can influence the public acceptance of policy proposals,for example, through media campaigns or public protests. Pro-blems like these, for which there are no solutions that completelysatisfy all parties, are often referred to as wicked problems (Ritteland Webber, 1973).

The activities of interest groups are an integral part of pluralistsocieties, and typically some groups or coalitions of groups havemore resources than others to influence policy development —

experience in mobilising public support for their causes, or moretime, know-how, money and access to people in power. Intransport there are typically two main stakeholder coalitions:those that prioritise values such as material growth and indivi-dual freedom often support motorised road transport (MRT);those that prioritise values such as environmental health andsocial equity support active and public transport (APT) solutions.In the past, MRT interest groups had more influence on policymaking than APT interest groups (Hamer, 1987; Vigar, 2002).A persistent asymmetry of influence, however, is problematicwhen trying to achieve sustainable outcomes in wicked problems.This is because policy solutions to wicked problems can not onlydetermine the distribution of benefits but always involve

C. Baumann, S. White / Transport Policy 24 (2012) 83–9084

tradeoffs and implicit decisions on the distribution of negativeimpacts across groups of society or on the environment (Voßet al., 2006).

To deal with this asymmetry it is increasingly advocated bypractitioners and researchers to better engage the public in policydevelopment (Banister, 2008; Schiller et al., 2010). Today manycities use procedures for lay citizen participation (Booth andRichardson, 2001; Gastil and Levine, 2005). While these makeessential contributions to the quality and legitmacy of policysolutions citizen engagement alone cannot deal with the asym-metry of interest group influence on policy development. Thispaper therefore investigates a complementary pathway that hasthe potential to counterbalance the asymmetry of influence inthe urban transport policy process — collaborative stakeholderdialogue (CSD) (see Innes and Booher, 2010 for a introduction).

In CSD, participants that represent the full diversity of inter-dependent organised interests in the issue at stake engage incollaborative dialogue to find a consensus on the way forward.The approach originated in the 1980s in the context of emergingresearch on alternative dispute resolution (Bingham, 1986; Fisherand Ury, 1991). It has been mostly used in the in the United Stateswith regards to local water planning (see Innes and Booher, 2010for an overview of case studies), but there is also a successful casestudy in transport in Munich, Germany (Baumann and White,Forthcoming-a).

In order to improve the process and application of CSD inurban transport, it is important to systematically compare thisemergent governance process to the conventional adversarialstyle of stakeholder interaction that has usually been used inthe transport policy process. It is also important to demonstratethe practical and theoretical advantages of CSD over adversarialprocesses in facilitating better choices in the transport policyprocess. The aim of this paper is to fill these gaps.

The paper starts by introducing adversarial and collaborativeapproaches to stakeholder interaction as two pathways to achiev-ing change in the urban transport policy process. We thenestablish a governance framework that enables a comparison ofthe two approaches with regards to their potential to contributeto better transport policy choices. We conclude by proposing CSDas a tool to de-politicise stakeholder discussions and so counter-balance asymmetries of influence in the urban transport policyprocess.

2. Two pathways to policy change

In this section we argue that both adversarial and collaborativeapproaches have the potential to shift the balance of dominantvalues and interests influencing policy development, but that themechanisms for this shift are fundamentally different. Table 1provides a synthesis of these two pathways to policy change. Inaddition it sets up the distinction between CSD and negotiation ascollaborative techniques: while CSD can facilitate stakeholder

Table 1Characteristic differences in the mechanisms and outcomes of policy change based on

Source: Baumann, 2012, Chapter 4.

Style of stakeholder interaction Mech

Collaborative style ofdebate (CSD)

Collaborative dialogue among interdependent

stakeholders in institutionalised setting

Shift

collab

Collaboration withinadversarialframework

Negotiation and bargaining in institutionalised

setting

Ident

comp

Adversarial style ofdebate

Adversarial tactics and strategies in the public

arena without direct stakeholder interaction

Shift

policy

learning based on mutual understanding negotiation is basedwithin an adversarial framework and only facilitates learningabout other groups’ ‘willingness to pay’. In the remainder of thepaper we mean CSD when we discuss collaborative approaches.

We acknowledge that in a real-world policy setting thesedistinctions are not as clear cut. However, setting up a dichotomyis analytically useful to highlight and contrast the characteristicsof CSD and adversarial stakeholder interaction.

2.1. Adversarial style of stakeholder interaction

In adversarial settings interest groups take advantage ofopportunities to bring to bear their resources on specific policyinitiatives they oppose or want to promote. It is adversarialbecause groups typically aim to discredit the positions of theirpolitical opponents, and so increase their own influence on policydevelopment and decision making. The related activities are oftenreferred to as lobbying, which can build on direct and indirectapproaches (Thomas, 2004). Interest groups using a directapproach try to gain access to decision makers, build relationshipsand influence them to become conducive to their cause on a longterm basis, for example, by providing technical or politicalinformation. Indirect approaches aim to influence public accep-tance of policy proposals through media campaigns, public pro-test or the release of scientific or authoritative information thatsupports or weakens a particular policy proposal. Hall succinctlydescribes this mechanism:

Organized interests, political parties, and policy experts do notsimply ‘exert power’; they acquire power in part by trying toinfluence the political discourse of their day. To the degreethey are able to do so, they may have a major impact on policywithout necessarily acquiring the formal trappings of influ-ence (Hall, 1993, p. 290).

Policy change in an adversarial setting is often described as apower struggle that consists of three phases (Baumgartner andJones, 2009; 1999; Dudley and Richardson, 1996; Hall, 1993;Kingdon, 2002): first, conflicts arise because the solutions pro-posed by the dominant policy community are unable to deal witha new problem situation. This results in an increasing number ofproblems or anomalies. Secondly, shortcomings of a policy com-munity to deal with the increasing anomalies attract publicattention, and so increase the resources opposing groups canuse to promote or block policy change. If these strategies aresuccessful, existing power monopolies are broken up and newinfluence coalitions form. In the third phase, any new allianceneeds to secure their long-term influence by institutionalisingtheir value and interest priorities, for example, in policies,indicators or decision making tools. Crucial for a successfulinstitutionalisation are first successes of the new alliance in termsof policy outcomes.

Bratzel (1999) illustrates these three phases of adversarialpolicy change in five empirical case studies that investigate the

collaborative and adversarial styles of stakeholder interaction.

anism of change Level of stakeholder learning

in stakeholder perceptions through

orative learning process - consensus

Learning about the values

behind other groups’ interests

ification of lowest common denominator –

romise

Learning about other groups’

‘willingness to pay’

in the amounts of influence that groups have on

making based on power struggles

Unchanged

C. Baumann, S. White / Transport Policy 24 (2012) 83–90 85

patterns and degrees of the ‘greening’ of urban transport policiesin Europe in the 1970s.

2.2. Collaborative style of stakeholder interaction (CSD)

An alternative mechanism for policy change is a collectivelearning process of transport stakeholders based on collaborativestakeholder dialogue (CSD). Innes and Booher (2010, p. 35) describethree conditions that need to be present for CSD to produce sociallyvaluable outcomes: stakeholders need to represent the full diversityof interests in a problem situation; they need to recognise that theycannot meet their interests independently because their objectivesand those of their adversaries are interdependent; and they need toengage in a face-to-face authentic dialogue according to Habermas’sbasic speech conditions.

In the collaborative process stakeholders learn about thepositions of their adversaries with regards to a shared problemsituation, so as to find ways to better accommodate their owninterests within the bigger picture:

When parties learn about the specific, detailed concerns of theother parties, they find out that some of those concerns are mucheasier to satisfy than others. They learn, crucially, that what’simportant to another party may be far less important for them –and vice versa. With that understood, they discover that they canmake offers that cost themselves little even as they benefit otherssignificantly. They can then devise options that create mutualgains: not equally devastating compromises, but packages of‘trades’ that actually satisfy the concerns and interests the partiesbring to the table (Forester, 1999, p, 490).

In this process, the resources stakeholders can bring to bearare mainly limited to the strength of their argument and theirability to co-create innovative solutions with the representativesof all relevant interests.

The quality of learning in a consensus-building process can beillustrated using the tools of Critical Systems Heuristics (CSH)(Ulrich, 2005, p. 6). Ulrich argues that every claim to knowledgeis inevitably selective based on the boundary judgements, factsand values an individual applies — an eternal triangle (see Fig. 1).Boundary judgements ‘determine which empirical observationsand value considerations count as relevant and which others areleft out or considered less important’ (Ulrich, 2005, p. 2). Hesuggests that we consider each aspect of the triangle in the lightof the other two corners.

If stakeholders expand the boundaries of their referencesystems as a result of the CSD, new facts and values becomerelevant to their problem assessment and decision making.

Fig. 1. The ‘eternal triangle’ of boundary judgments, facts and values (Ulrich, 2005).

This transformative type of learning has also been described byVickers:

[Debate] serves not so much to produce a series of possiblenew solutions as to alter what those concerned regard as therelevant facts and the way in which these are classified andvalued (Vickers, 2010, p. 18).

We suggest that a joint learning process takes place if CSDparticipants develop a shared understanding of each others’boundary judgements, facts and values, and, based on that,negotiate a common ground and co-create knowledge so thatparticipants’ individual triangles are altered. By contrast, in aprocess of negotiation participants emerge with their perceptivetriangles unchanged.

2.2.1. A case study in CSD

Baumann and White (Forthcoming-a) investigated this colla-borative style of stakeholder interaction in a case study inMunich, Germany — the Inzell-Initative.1 The authors collecteddata in semi-structured interviews with 13 stakeholders frominside and outside of government in Munich, ranging from bicycleuser groups, public servants and politicians through to themotorist association and the local car manufacturer, BMW. Theinterview accounts were supplemented with archival data. Theoriginal aim of the research was to explore successful advocacystrategies of public and active transport advocates in Munich,assuming an adversarial model similar to Bratzel (1999). How-ever, the researchers were impressed with the way the differentinterview participants highlighted the role of a CSD known as theInzell-Initiative in fundamentally changing the ways stakeholdersinteracted and developed proposals for transport development.

The Inzell-Initiative is a professionally facilitated dialogueamong transport stakeholders in Munich that sits outside theformal administrative and political processes. It was initiated bythe Mayor of Munich and the CEO of BMW in 1995 after years ofintense stakeholder conflict that had largely blocked progress intransport development. Its aim was to ‘solve traffic problemstogether’ by focusing on areas of agreements rather dissent,sending out the message:

We basically agree on 90 per cent and should not block these90 per cent only because we fight over 10 per cent (MunichInterviewee #12, City of Munich).

This CSD identified and consolidated the common ground amongparties who had previously seen themselves as having fundamentallyincompatible or contradictory positions, and created a more stablepolitical climate in which they were able to proceed. Although it isnot possible to draw direct causal links between positive policyoutcomes in Munich and the Inzell-Initiative, the interview partici-pants highlighted how the effects of the stakeholder collaborationenabled developments that would not have been possible before1995. For example, one participant realised in reflection that all thepositive developments he described during the interview were ‘insome way related to Inzell’ (Munich Interviewee #11, MotoristAssociation). Below we document three types of developments thatwere repeatedly mentioned by interview participants as direct orindirect products of the Inzell-Initiative:

�

Transport development: The most significant policy output ofthe Inzell-Initiative was an inner-city wide parking spacemanagement system that had previously been stronglyopposed by business and motorist groups. Since its implemen-tation incoming traffic into via the Old City Ring Road

1 http://www.inzell-initiative.de/_engl.Version/index_eng.htm.

TabPre

Sou

P

P

C. Baumann, S. White / Transport Policy 24 (2012) 83–9086

(Altstadtring) decreased by almost 50 per cent, incoming trafficvia the Middle Ring Road (Mittlerer Ring) by more than 20 percent (Zorn, 2011, p. 9). This development is remarkable in thatit is contrary to all traffic forecasts and despite growingresident and employment numbers (Munich Interviewee#13, City of Munich). At the same time the city has seen anincrease in cycling of 40 per cent between 2002 and 2008, with14 per cent of daily trips made by bicycle in 2008 (City ofMunich, 2010).

� Institutional change: The deliberations in the Inzell-Initiative

facilitated a shift in thinking within the traditional transportplanning institutions which enabled the introduction of moreprogressive ideas. The most significant institutional change thatwas largely attributed to the Inzell-Initiative was that Munich, asfirst city in Europe, established a mobility management depart-ment with a substantial budget in an institution that waspreviously known as ‘the advocates of motorists’ (Munich Inter-viewee # 12, City of Munich). The main aim of mobility manage-ment is to influence travel demand by informing citizens of theirmobility options across all modes before they start their actualtravel activities (Schreiner, 2007). Mobility management projectsinvolve consulting new Munich citizens on their public andactive transport and car share options as well as providingeducation programs for school children and senior citizens.

� Stakeholder transformation: The collaborative dialogue in the

Inzell-Initiative established a climate that allowed stakeholdergroups to learn from each other, and thereby enhance mutualunderstanding for each other’s positions. A major shift inMunich’s transport policy was described as a move away fromthe approach of imposing policies that created restrictions toprivate car use towards supply- and service-oriented strategiesthat create attractive incentives and alternatives for travelbehaviour change (Munich Interviewee #12, City of Munich).As a result of this ‘paradigm shift’ (Munich Interviewee #13, City

le 2conditions and process criteria for successful consensus building in a collaborative

rce: Baumann and White, forthcoming-a, based on Forester, 1999 (a); Innes and Bo

Success factor Rationale

reconditions/incentives

Problem-

related

(1) Hurting stalemate and lack of

alternative avenues (b, c, d)

A deadlock in

the status qu

advancing the

(2) Perceived interconnectedness of

actors (a, b)

‘Once parties

worry them,

effectively’ (d

Process-

related

(3) Perceived influence (b, d) Participants h

outcomes.

(4) High level leadership and

commitment (b, c, d)

Commitment

enough to att

(5) Previous positive experience with

collaboration (a, d)

Participants a

them as ‘almo

rocesscriteria

Legitimacy

and fairness

(6) Composition of actors (b, c, d) Forum repres

(7) ‘Neutral’ leadership and

facilitation and distributed funding (c)

The chair and

come from m

(8) Self-organising, adaptive process

rules and norms (b, c, d)

Participants s

should own t

Learning and

consensus

(9) Nature of the problem: empirical

issues (b, c, d)

Purpose and t

normative iss

level of confli

(10) Ongoing interaction (b, c, d) A minimum o

building’ (b)).

(11) Authentic dialogue (b, c, d) Participants c

approximates

(12) Building trust and relationships

(b, c, d)

Social capital

(13) Fostering creative thinking (b) Encourages ch

(14) Confidentiality (d) Closed-shop s

(15) Documented shared principles

(b, d)

Commonly de

of Munich), MRT stakeholders became more open to sustainabletransport solutions:

There is now a different spirit, for example, BMW hasaccepted that something has to change in the city if peoplewant to continue driving at all. They now support publictransport enhancement and parking space and mobilitymanagement, but they would not support radical interven-tions. In exchange the City is also open to cooperating withBMW (Munich Interviewee #8, City of Munich).

When I look at statements of BMW colleagues today ascompared to 20 years ago there has been a major develop-ment. It has been a learning process for both sides (MunichInterviewee #5, Green Party).

In that sense the Inzell-Initiative improves the substantivequality and acceptance of transport policy outcomes in an indirectway by fundamentally transforming the way stakeholders interact,develop objectives and co-create knowledge and policy alternatives.

The Inzell-Initiative still exists today, with general meetingsevery one to two years, and more regular meetings in multi-institutional working groups that deal with pressing sharedproblems. Innes and Booher (2010) document and analyse morecase studies in CSD in other fields of public policy making.

Table 2 illustrates the preconditions and process criteria forCSD based on the Munich case study and other research oncollaborative stakeholder processes.

3. Using a governance framework to compare adversarialand collaborative approaches

There is a tension between the potential of adversarial politicsto create fundamental change within a short period of time and

stakeholder dialogue

oher, 2010 (b); Sabatier and Weible, 2007 (c); and Baumann, 2012, Chapter 6 (d).

which none of the stakeholders is able to emerge victorious and all parties find

o unacceptable. None of the participating groups sees alternative means of

ir interests.

begin to recognize that they both have complex histories and real problems that

then and only then can they begin to work together to solve their problems

).

ave the impression that investing their resources will be rewarded with policy

of organisers and participants at a senior level so that forum is prestigious

ract all relevant stakeholders.

re impressed by previous positive experiences with collaborations; perceive

st magical’ (c).

ents the diversity of interdependent interests in a problem situation.

the facilitator for the negotiations should be ‘respected neutrals’. Funding should

embers of different coalitions to increase the legitimacy of the process.

hould be able to decide on ground rules, objectives and discussion themes; they

he process.

ask of the process are real, practical, and shared by the group; ‘primarily

uesy are not ripe for negotiation’ (c). The issues at stake are at an intermediary

ct.

f six meetings over a year, and continuity in participation (‘turnover kills trust-

an challenge any assumptions, deliberation not directed by external control,

Habermas’ ideal speech conditions.

as basis for finding agreement and cross-fertilising knowledge and ideas.

allenges to accepted knowledge and fosters creative thinking.

ituation for the stakeholder discussions to create an atmosphere for learning.

veloped and agreed on principles for policy development or negotiating text.

C. Baumann, S. White / Transport Policy 24 (2012) 83–90 87

apparent downsides in terms of dealing with wicked problemsthat involve a wide spectrum of stakeholder interests. Collabora-tive procedures on the other hand can produce more widelyaccepted results but are inherently a status quo process. Thissection assesses the potential of CSD relative to adversarialprocedures to facilitate better transport policy choices, based ona public governance framework.

3.1. A governance rather than a planning framework

The OECD EST (Environmentally Sustainable Transport) projectproposes a set of guidelines to assist governments in the devel-opment of appropriate strategies to achieve more sustainabletransport outcomes (Wiederkehr et al., 2004). These guidelinesprovide valuable insights from a planning perspective on how todevelop high-quality policy solutions based on a long-term vision.However, they do not take into account the context of conflictingstakeholder interests and asymmetric influence that can createimplementation barriers. In order to be able to compare andcontrast collaborative and adversarial styles of stakeholder inter-action within this political context we propose a framework thatassesses public policy making from a governance rather than froma planning perspective. Such a framework includes policy qualityas key element, but also considers aspects of public acceptanceand social cohesion that are relevant to the successful and durableimplementation of these policies. This section introduces theelements of the governance framework in detail (see Table 3 foran overview).

Most frameworks that investigate the different outcomedimensions of public policy making in pluralist societies agreeon the basic need for governance systems to contribute toeffectiveness, efficiency, legitimacy and social cohesion (see Renn,2008 for an overview of the literature). Efficiency refers to ‘thedegree to which scarce resources are utilized for reaching theintended goal’ (Renn, 2008, p. 286). In transport this is particu-larly relevant to the policy process and the durability of itsdecisions in relation to the time and money used to come to thatdecision. Durability means that all stakeholders accept a policydecision on a long-term basis, so that its effects can unfold in theintended way. The need to achieve efficiency also affects thequality of actual policy outcomes with regards to the investedresources; however in our framework we discuss this require-ment with the need for policy effectiveness (see Table 3).

Effectiveness is ‘the need of societies to have a certain degree ofconfidence that human activities and actions will actually result inthe consequences that the actors intended when performing theseactions’ (Renn, 2008, p. 286). The transport policy process needs toensure that it produces interventions that positively contribute to all

Table 3Governance criteria for efficiency, effectiveness, legitimacy and social cohesion i

transport system.

Source: Baumann, 2012, Chapter 7 based on Renn, 2008.

Policy process and its stakeholders

Efficiency Process is efficient in terms of resources invested to reach agr

and in terms of the durability of the implemented agreement

Effectiveness

Social

cohesion

(1) to inform and educate the public, (2) to incorporate public

preferences and assumptions into decision making, (3) to foste

trust in institutions, and (4) to reduce conflict among stakehol

Legitimacy Outcomes of legal process are widely accepted or not contested

groups in society

areas related to urban sustainability (society, economy, environ-ment, urban form) or at least, that these interventions are notdetrimental to them — a normative ideal that is sometimes referredto as a ‘virtuous cycle’.

Social cohesion refers to ‘the need for social integration andcollective identity despite plural values and lifestyles’ (Renn,2008, p. 286). In the case of transport this has implications forboth the physical transport system and society. However, weintegrate the need for transport infrastructures to allow allsectors of the community to participate in social life with theneed for policy effectiveness (see Table 3). The criterion of socialcohesion thus primarily refers to society. In that regard, Beierle(1999, p. 81) suggests a number of social goals, that is, goals that‘transcend the immediate interests of parties involved in adecision’. Four of these goals are relevant for the transport policyprocess: (1) to inform and educate the public, (2) to incorporatepublic values, preferences and assumptions into decision making,(3) to foster trust in institutions, and (4) to reduce conflict amongstakeholders (Beierle, 1999, pp. 82–87).

Legitimacy, according to Renn (2008), has two components:first, the normative objective right of a governing body to makedecisions that are legally binding. The second legitimacy compo-nent is of a subjective nature: ‘the factual acceptance of this rightby those who might be affected by the decision’ (Renn, 2008,p. 286). The legitimacy or acceptance of transport policy decisionstherefore strongly depends on how the impacts of the decisionsare perceived by different groups in society, and how muchinterest and resources these groups have to challenge thesedecisions.

3.2. Comparing the potential of adversarial and collaborative

approaches to facilitate better transport policy choices

This section assesses adversarial and collaborative approachesto stakeholder interaction using the previously establishedgovernance framework (see Table 4 for a synthesis). The assess-ment is based on findings from our empirical case study and thetheory introduced in Section 2. Importantly, we add an additionaldimension to the assessment: the relative level of influence thatstakeholder coalitions have in the process. This is relevantbecause, as Sidaway (2005, p. 198) argues, in order to make anassessment on the likely outcome of a policy dispute the debateneeds to be considered within the context of the distribution ofpower in a particular policy arena. To account for this we refer topower parity if neither MRT nor APT stakeholder coalitions areable to meet their interests independently, and to power parity ifone coalition has significantly more resources to influence policydevelopment than others.

n the context of the transport policy process and its impacts on the physical

Physical transport system (¼materialisation of thedecisions made in the policy process)

eement Resulting infrastructure is efficient in terms of resources

invested to achieve sustainability impacts

Resulting infrastructure achieves sustainability impacts

(‘virtuous cycle’)

values,

r

ders

Resulting infrastructure contributes to social inclusion

by affected

Table 4Comparative assessment of collaborative and adversarial approaches to the policy process in the light of the sustainable transport governance framework.

Source: Baumann, 2012, Chapter 7.

Adversarial policy process (power shift) Collaborative policy process (idea shift)

Process efficiency –power parity

Policy process can be inefficient and create stalemate. Collaborative process more efficient than adversarial in case

of conflict or stalemate.

Process efficiency –power disparity

Process is efficient. However decisions resulting from uneven

power balances are likely to be contested at later stages.

Not applicable (because there is no incentive for influential

stakeholders to engage in collaboration).

Effectiveness ofresulting policies –power parity

Solutions likely to be more balanced as groups in power

need to incorporate preferences of other groups.

Collaborative process facilitates broader perspective among stakeholders and

can generate solutions that integrate various value and knowledge systems.

Effectiveness ofresulting policies –power disparity

Dominant groups can put forward quite radical policies.

However, solutions only represent interests of one group;

caveat that outcomes are not balanced in all directions of

sustainability.

Not applicable (because there is no incentive for influential

stakeholders to engage in collaboration).

Social cohesion –power parity/disparity

Adversarial process is not focused on cooperation. There are

always stakeholders who are unhappy with solution.

CSD process can reduce conflict by ‘pacifying’ stakeholders.

Legitimacy – powerparity/disparity

The process is legal; however the outcomes of the

process might be contested given that they only

represent interests of some stakeholder groups.

CSD is legal but might be contested on several grounds. Ultimately CSD can

legitimise itself only through successes.Outcomes of a CSD are typically

expected to have high acceptance rates as they are inclusive of all major

interests.

C. Baumann, S. White / Transport Policy 24 (2012) 83–9088

3.2.1. Process efficiency

In an adversarial setting, the process of decision making andimplementation can be very efficient if one stakeholder coalitionhas considerably more resources to influence the policy processthan others — in other words, if there is a significant powerdisparity so that decision makers can implement policies withouthaving to invest time and money to address the demands ofopposing groups. Decisions resulting from such a constellationare, however, likely to be overturned if the power balance shifts.By contrast, in cases of power parity, that is, when differentstakeholder coalitions have similar levels of influence, the processof planning, decision making and implementation can be pro-tracted and a resource-intensive stalemate may result (Sidaway,2005, p. 199). For example, in Munich, before the Inzell-Initiative

was in place the government wanted to implement policies tolimit private motor vehicle use in the inner city area. However, acoalition of organisations blocked these efforts and insteadadvocated the construction of a major road tunnel project. Theyear-long conflict came to a head in a public referendum thatforced the City to build the tunnels (Hajer and Kesselring, 1999).

In comparison, when stakeholders realise their interconnect-edness in the problem situation and that none of the competinggroups is able to deal with problems alone, a collaborative processcan help overcome stalemate and reduce the friction that occurswhen people are locked into their political positions. In that sensethe increased transaction costs of conflict or stalemate — espe-cially financial costs and time requirements — act as an incentivefor stakeholder collaboration. Still the CSD in Munich wascriticised by some interviewees as too resource-consuming withregards to the actual policy outputs it produced (Munich Inter-viewee # 7). On the other hand we suggest that it is difficult toassess tangible policy outcomes against the intangible benefitssuch as trust and learning that improve the outcomes of thepolicy process in a more indirect way.

Importantly, a CSD is unlikely to succeed in cases of powerdisparity as there is no incentive for influential stakeholders toengage in collaboration if they can achieve their objectivesthrough direct lobbying efforts.

3.2.2. Effectiveness of the resulting policies

If a stakeholder coalition in an adversarial setting has stronginfluence on policy making relative to others it can promote quiteradical policies. This does not, however, guarantee quality in

terms of sustainable development. If solutions are put forwardby one group only, there is a risk that outcomes are not balancedwith regards to environmental, social and economic considera-tions. By contrast if power relations in an adversarial setting aremore equal, solutions are more likely to be a combination of thepreferences of the different groups. In summary adversarialpolitics is fluid and uncertain, which can be a great creative andgenerative strength that allows the possibility of far reachingchange within a short timeframe.

In comparison a collaborative process can go beyond trade-offsbetween stakeholder preferences and facilitate shared learningthat integrates the value and knowledge systems of thoseinvolved — in other words, their perceptive triangles of facts,values and boundary judgements are altered. Through thatprocess, CSD allows participants to find ways to accommodatetheir interests in a more sensible way, that is, to meet theirinterests without unnecessarily preventing other groups fromhaving their needs met, so that solutions become more widelyaccepted. In the Munich case this had the result that everystakeholder group, independently of their value priorities, feltthey had achieved more during the 15 years the CSD was in placethan they had with the adversarial model that was in place before(Baumann and White, Forthcoming-a).

Finally, the policies suggested by a CSD are less susceptible topolitical short-termism than solutions that emerge from anadversarial process. This is because CSD creates a space outsidethe public sphere where the thinking of participants is lessconstrained by political strategies and allegiances and can there-fore focus on long-term solutions. As one participant in Munichstated:

There are always areas where stakeholders lie a little bit apartfrom each other, but we have found a very large core ofconsensus y in that we can work together on solutions thatactually endure (Munich Interviewee #2, BMW).

Taking debates out of the political context can also help tobreak up dominant discourses or storylines and the relatedinstitutional structures that justify policy development (Lowet al., 2003). This ‘de-politicised’ nature of discussions in a CSDis typically also more evidence-based. CSD can so produce morecreative and integrative solutions than could be proposed by onestakeholder group alone. Nevertheless, CSD is by definition a

C. Baumann, S. White / Transport Policy 24 (2012) 83–90 89

status quo process whose outcomes are pre-set by the range ofstakeholders and the definition of the problems to be solved.

3.2.3. Social cohesion

Adversarial politics embraces and expresses power conflict byoffering the possibility of counter publics that are not included inthe formal policy making process. In doing so an adversarialprocess can contribute to the social goals 1 and 2 outlined inTable 3: to inform and educate the public, and to incorporatepublic values, preferences and assumptions into decision making.Yet interest groups often strategically expand conflict to win overgroups of the public so as to increase their political influence.Mouffe (2005) argues that today political conflicts are increas-ingly ‘played out in the moral register’, that is, not in terms of aleft/right divide but in terms of good and evil. For example, in theclimate change debate, rather than relying on evidence-basedarguments some groups use campaigns that are designed to inciteemotions in order to discredit the policy proposals of theiropponents (see also Forester, 1999). As a result there are alwaysstakeholder groups that are disadvantaged or unhappy with thedecision because they did not have sufficient resources promotetheir own value priorities. This can be detrimental to Goals 3 and4 in Table 3: to foster trust in institutions, and to reduce conflictamong stakeholders.

A collaborative process by contrast manages conflict by estab-lishing a working relationship between stakeholders who hadpreviously seen themselves as having largely incompatible views.This collaboration typically enhances social capital among parti-cipating stakeholders in the form of trust and relationships (Goal4). Based on this argument we suggest that by ‘pacifying’ orappeasing stakeholders, CSD can also appease the public. If a CSDcan help to enhance relationships between interest organisationsso that they do not see the need anymore to pitch their case in themoral register, it can contribute to a better informed public(Goal 1), incorporation of public values into decision making(Goal 2) and more trust in institutions (Goal 3).

To clarify, we are not suggesting that the interest groupsinvolved in transport development decision making can ever befree of conflict or that values and interests can be assimilated.Rather, we suggest that the process of appeasement that can beachieved through CSD consists of subduing the conflict to a levelthat allows for all arguments and scientific, practice- and com-munity-based evidence that is relevant to a problem situation tobe heard, disputed and considered. Innes and Booher (2010,p. 113) argue that establishing a CSD does not keep interestgroups from being adversaries; rather, they learn to live in twoworlds — they collaboratively harvest the low-hanging fruitinside the CSD and try to maximise their influence through ‘thepower of the better argument’ (Habermas, 1984). But at the sametime they keep promoting or defending their values and interestsin the public sphere, however, with more respect and empathythan they would otherwise have for their adversaries and theirpositions. Importantly, they emphasise the value of agonism, thatis, the continuing tension of among stakeholder perspectives in acollaborative process as essential source of creativity (Innes andBooher, 2010, p. 104) Similarly, Bachtiger (2010, p. 13) stressesthe importance of ‘agonistic inquiry’ in facilitating a critical andrigid investigation of stakeholder ideas and viewpoints stake-holder as a basis for meaningful preference transformation — herefers to it as ‘a strong medicine for avoiding easy and falseconsensus’.

3.2.4. Legitimacy

The outcomes of an adversarial policy process might becontested on the grounds that it only represents the interests of

some groups in society. For example, in 2010 in Germany theterm Wutbuerger or ‘angry citizen’ emerged to account for theongoing public protest against a large rail infrastructure project indowntown Stuttgart (GfdS, 2010). The protests involved pre-viously politically inactive citizens from various demographicsand parties challenging an arbitrary government decision on a keyinfrastructure project.

By contrast, the outcomes of a CSD are likely to be more widelyaccepted as they are inclusive of all major interests. The process,however, might still be contested by groups in society on thegrounds that the lay public is excluded from the forum. Wetherefore suggest that CSD has to gain subjective legitimacythrough the successes it produces. In Munich, for example, amedia search for material published at the time of the imple-mentation of the Inzell-Initiative did not reveal a single criticalarticle — a phenomenon that one interviewee attributed to thefact that it is ‘boring’ for the media if there is no conflict to reporton (Munich Interviewee # 2, BMW). In that sense the mereabsence of public protest is interpreted as an indicator of theacceptance or legitimacy of a process. We recognise, however,that the level of public protest cannot be used as the onlyindicator to measure legitimacy, as there are also ‘weak’ intereststhat might not have the resources to voice their protests (VonWinter and Willems, 2000). Ideally these interests should berepresented in the CSD, or the CSD process should be integratedwith citizen engagement procedures (Baumann, 2012, Chapter 8).

As a final note on legitimacy we suggest that the level ofacceptance of CSD might depend on where the process is locatedin the formal structures of the policy process, that is, how muchformal influence is granted to interest organisations. The Munichprocess, for example, has no formal decision making capacity butplanners and elected decision makers are part of the delibera-tions. If formal decision making capacity was granted to CSDparticipants public acceptance of the process could be signifi-cantly lower.

4. Discussion and conclusion

The comparative discussion demonstrates that collaborativestakeholder dialogue (CSD) is a powerful governance tool tobetter balance competing and conflicting interests in the urbantransport policy process and so achieve a better integration ofenvironmental, social and economic considerations in policydevelopment. The discussion also shows that CSD is most appro-priate in problem situations resembling a stalemate, that is,situations with high levels of conflict between competing inter-ests that all have influence. This is the case for many wickedtransport policy issues today.

A situation where none of the stakeholder groups is able tomeet their interests independently is an essential precondition forinitiating CSD because, for example, a local government that hasthe political power to implement their preferred policies is likelyto do so without considering the interests of those who opposethem. Similarly, lobby groups who feel their interests have beentaken into account in the policy development of the currentgovernment are not likely to be interested in changing thatgovernment’s approach. NGOs that have been successful inblocking government initiatives with adversarial tactics mightnot want to engage in collaboration with their adversaries. Rather,a fundamental change in the style of stakeholder interaction, as isthe case with initiating a CSD, requires that potential participantssee a benefit in their participation that is worth investingresources and moving away from extreme positions. Sidaway(2005, p. 200) argues that ‘only when the politics of power have

C. Baumann, S. White / Transport Policy 24 (2012) 83–9090

been exhausted can the politics of co-operation become a viablepossibility’.

In the case of Munich, for example, organising a CSD was, fromthe perspective of the Mayor, an ‘an instrument to create majoritiesfor the necessary’ (Baumann and White, Forthcoming-a), based onthe insight that what he considered ‘the necessary’ could notbe implemented in the adversarial political reality at that time.The Inzell-Initiative effectively resolved this stalemate and createdoutcomes that every interview participant felt accommodated theirneeds better than the outcomes of the adversarial processes whichexisted before 1995. This ongoing satisfaction with their level ofinfluence created longstanding support for the forum.

From a sustainability perspective a collaborative approach thatproduces a stable and balanced policy development on a long-term basis appears superior to an adversarial process that onlyrepresents the values and interests some groups of society and sooscillates between more radical but short-lived solutions. Wetherefore propose CSD as a more appropriate approach to dealwith wicked problems in transport development and to facilitatebetter transport policy choices.

Acknowledgements

We acknowledge Dr Betsi Beem, Dr James Goodman and twoanonymous reviewers for their valuable suggestions on earlierversions of this paper. We thank the Munich interview partici-pants for generously supporting this research. We thank JohnRevington for editorial advice.

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