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Republic of the PhilippinesCourt of Appeals
Manila
FOURTH DIVISION
MAKATI INSURANCECORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
- versus -
SINCERE MARITIMECORPORATION, CARGILL NORTHASIA LTD., and MARITIME PHILS.PORT SERVICES, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.x-------------------------------------------------xSINCERE MARITIMECORPORATION, CARGILL NORTHASIA LTD., and MARITIME PHILS.PORT SERVICES, INC., Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants,
- versus -
MARIA CRISTINA CHEMICALINDUSTRIES, INC., Third-Party Defendant-Appellee.
CA-G.R. CV No. 63146
Members:
VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS, D.,ChairDE LOS SANTOS, E. R., and BRION, A.D., JJ.
Promulgated:____________
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
CA-G.R. CV No. 63146Decision
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
Before us are separate appeals that are both grounded on the
damages the vessel MV Sincere No. 5 (vessel) and the private
wharf of the Maria Cristina Chemical Industries Inc. (MCCI)
suffered while the vessel was docked at the MCCI private wharf to
discharge a cargo of salt for the consignee Mabuhay Vinyl
Corporation (Mabuhay).
Makati Insurance Corporation (Makati Insurance) is the
insurer of MCCI who paid for the damages MCCI incurred in the MV
Sincere No. 5 incident. It filed the complaint, Civil Case No. 93-
64936,1 for a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 40, in the exercise of its right of subrogation under
Article 2207 of the Civil Code. RTC Judge Felipe G. Pacquing
dismissed the complaint on the ground that the damage to MCCIs
wharf was caused by force majeure.2 MCCI brought this judgment of
dismissal to us on appeal.
1 Record, at pp.1-4.2 Id., at pp. 365-368.
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CA-G.R. CV No. 63146Decision
With leave of court, the defendants filed a third-party
complaint3 against MCCI on the ground that the structure and
maintenance of the MCCI wharf contributed to the damage that the
vessel suffered. The lower court dismissed the complaint in its
orders dated February 10, 1995,4 April 25, 19955 and October 23, 19956
on the ground that the third-party complaint fails to state a cause of
action. The third-party plaintiffs likewise brought the dismissal of
their third-party complaint to us on appeal.
BACKGROUND
Makati Insurances complaint recites that
3. On or about February 26, 1992, the vessel MV SincereNo. 5 berthed and secured herself at the private wharf of MariaCristina Chemical Industries, Inc., at Iligan City to discharge hercargo of industrial salt in favor of Mabuhal Vinyl Corporation wholeased said wharf from its owner for the purpose of receiving thesaid shipment.
4. Discharging of the cargo having been suspended due tothe presence of Northeasterly winds, the master of the MK/VSincere No. 5 was requested by the pier owner to pull out thevessel from the pier to prevent damage to the pier, which requestsaid master refused to heed;
5. As a result, the vessel continuously bumped the piersfender clusters, thus, causing extensive damage thereto, as well as
3 Id., at pp. 125-130.4 Record, at p. 1855 Id., at p. 216.6 Id., at p. 224.
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CA-G.R. CV No. 63146Decision
to the piers deck and the mooring ballard, rendering the wharfunusable;
6. The aforesaid pier facilities together with other relatedmachineries and equipment of Maria Cristina Chemicals Industries,Inc. was insured by the latter with plaintiff under and by virtue ofPolicy No. SPF-0858;
7. The aforementioned damages to the pier facilities werebrought about by the fault or negligence of the defendants; sheerlack of prudence, lack of foresight, and lack of skill of the vesselsmaster who did not act swiftly to avert the damages as aforesaid orat least to minimize the same;
The defendants Sincere Maritime Corporation and Maritime
Philippine Ports Services, Inc. admitted in their Answer7 that the
vessel was docked at the MCCI pier but otherwise denied the
negligence imputed against the vessels master, citing as defenses the
fact that there was force majeure and the negligence of the
managers/operators of the pier.
Subsequently, Cargill North Asia Ltd., the charterer of MV
Sincere No. 5, was impleaded as a party defendant through an
amended complaint.8 The defendants, for their part, sought leave
and was allowed by the lower court to file a third-party complaint
against Maria Cristina Chemical Industries, Inc.9 The third-party
complaint states that:
7 Record, at pp.19-23.8 Id., at pp. 67-71.9 Id., at pp. 125-130.
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CA-G.R. CV No. 63146Decision
3. On February 25, 1992, M/V Sincere No. 5, owned by SincereMaritime and under charter by CARGILL and represented in thePhilippines by MARITIME PHIL., arrived at the Iligan roadstead,Philippines, to discharge her cargo of industrial salt of theconsignee, Mabuhay Vinyl Corporation, but which temporarily lied(sic) idle while awaiting berthing instruction from said consignee ofthe shipment;
4. However, on or about the morning of February 26, 1992, thelocal harbor pilot boarded M/V SINCERE NO. 5 for docking; andshe was safely secured along side (sic) a private wharf or pier ofMARIA CRISTINA and started discharging her said shipment forthe consignee;
5. While discharging its said shipment that same day, anortheasterly wind occurred and prevailed in the sorrounding (sic)areas, which temporarily stopped the ongoing discharging ofshipment, as M/V SINCERE NO. 5 begun (sic) to have a strongcontact and crushed to the fenders cluster piles of the wharf/pier;
6. With the contacts between M/V SINCERE NO. 5 and the onlyfour (4) fender-cluster piles, which were inadequate and defective,the latter easily gave way with one cluster uprooted, causingdamages to M/V SINCERE NO. 5 and the wharf/pier;
7. In fine, the damages incurred by M/V SINCERE NO. 5 andallegedly by the wharf/pier were caused by a force-majeure, thenortheasterly wind, and the inadequate and defective wharf/pier asa result of the lack of proper maintenance by and/or malfeasanceand /or negligence of its owner/operator, MARIA CRISTINA,considering the undeniable fact that the same wharf/pier used to beconstantly hit by other ships/vessels before M/V SINCE NO. 5came to dock thereat;
x x x
9. Third-party Defendant, MARIA CRISTINA, is liable alone tocompensate and/or pay for whatever loss and/or claim of Plaintiffunder the insurance Policy No. SPF-0858, since the damages on thewharf/pier in question were caused by the inadequate and defectivewharf/pier itself, more specifically its delapidated/defective (sic)
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CA-G.R. CV No. 63146Decision
fender-cluster piles, due to lack of proper maintainance (sic) byand/or malfeasance and/or negligence of MARIA CRISTINA, asstated in paragraphs 5,6 and 7 hereof:
It was this third-party complaint that the lower court dismissed for
lack of cause of action.
At the trial, the plaintiff-appellant presented two witnesses.
Efren C. Cabungan10 testified that MCCI is insured by their company
and identified the MCCIs insurance policy.11 Upon receipt of
MMCIs claim, they immediately assigned the claim to one of their
adjusters, the Toplis and Harding company, who was tasked to
proceed to the cite (sic), inspect the damage sustained by the vessel and to
submit a formal report. . .12 Toplis submitted a preliminary report
identified and marked as Exhibit B13 and a subsequent evaluation
report14 marked as Exhibit C. The witness confirmed that the
plaintiff paid MCCIs insurance claim and identified the subrogation
receipt (Exh. D)15 and Exhibit E, a Sworn Statement on Proof of
Loss. On the whole, his testimony went towards proving the right of
the plaintiff to be subrogated to the right of MMCI to claim damages
against the defendants.
10 TSN, January 8, 1998.11 Exhibit A - Property Floater Policy dated August 26, 1993; A-1 Premium Inventory No.A-16238; Record, at p. 323.12 TSN, January 8, 1998, at p. 6.13 Id., at p. 9; Exh. B, Record at pp. 324-326.14 Id., at pp. 9-10; Exh. C, Record at pp. 327-331.15 Id., at p. 15; Exh. D, Record, at p. 332.
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Valentino Aboy, the second witness for the plaintiff, is a civil
engineer and adjuster. He was presented to testify on the adjustment
and investigation made in this pier incident. . . to explain to the court how
the amount or the value of the losses has been arrived at. . . identify some
documents in support to (sic) his recommendation made as to how much
was the actual losses suffered by the pier facilities.16 Mr. Aboy
confirmed that he is an adjuster and the Vice President of his
company. His company was instructed or commissioned by the MCCI
to adjust the claims filed by the insured, the Maria Cristina Chemical
Industries for the damages sustained by their pier facilities as a result of the
incident.17 He narrated that his people went to the loss site to gather
information surrounding the circumstances of the incident as well as
to inspect the damages that resulted from the incident.18 He himself
did not go to the MCCI pier.19 The data and documents were
analyzed by his staff and submitted to him. He identified the same
Exhibits B and C that the previous witness identified.
The defendants uniformly objected to the admission of these
exhibits for lack of proper identification. They likewise presented
two witnesses in their defense. Their first witness was Alfredo Saso,
General Manager of Survey Specialist, who acted as surveyor and
16 TSN, Feb. 27, 1998, at p. 4.17 TSN, Feb. 27, 1998, at pp. 5-6.18 Id., at p. 22.19 Id., at. pp. 22-23.
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CA-G.R. CV No. 63146Decision
who testified20 on the inspection made on the site and on his survey
reports (Exhibits 1 and 2 with sub-markings)21. In the course of
his testimony, he identified the following:
a. Exhibit 322 Marine Note of Protest by Capt. Lui Jen-Yu
dated Feb. 26, 1992, subsequently offered to prove that the master of
the vessel made a protest;
b. Exhibit 423 Letter dated Feb. 25, 1992, addressed by
Mabuhay Vinyl Corporation to Capt. Lui Jen-Yu;
c. Exhibit 524 Letter of Mabuhay to Capt. Lui Jen-Yu dated
Feb. 27, 1992, advising the Captain to undock the vessel so that
unloading can be undertaken at the Iligan pier;
d. Exhibit 5-A25 Masters remarks on the Mabuhay letter;
and
e. Exhibits 6 and 7 with submarkings26 refer to the layout
of the MCCI pier and the photographs of the damaged pier and
vessel.
The second defense witness was Diomedes Rabadam, a claims
processor, who testified27 on the Vessels Damage Report, marked
20 TSN, Oct. 20, 199821 Plaintiffs Evidence Folder: Exh. 1, pp.1-2; Exh. 2, pp. 3-9.22 Id., at p. 1023 Id., at p. 1124 Plaintiffs Evidence Folder, at p. 1225 Ibid.26 Id., at pp. 13-1427 TSN, Nov. 17, 1998
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CA-G.R. CV No. 63146Decision
and offered as Exhibit 9. 28 He likewise identified as part of Exhibit
9 the Statement of the Master of the Vessel consisting of his
insights and comments on the February 26, 1992 incident. The cited
Statement was separately marked as Exhibit 8.29
The plaintiff objected to all the defendants exhibits but
particularly to the survey reports for violation of the opinion rule
and to the Marine Protest by the Master of the vessel (Exh. 3), the
Masters remarks on the Mabuhay letter (Exhibit 5-A), and the
Statement of the Master of the Vessel (Exhibit 8) for being hearsay.
In its decision, the lower court identified the outstanding
issues (as identified by the parties in their pre-trial briefs) as follows:
1. Was there damage in the pier facilities?
2. Was there proper subrogation?
3. Are defendants liable for damages?
4. Will the counterclaim be granted?
After summarily disposing of the two initial issues, the lower
court, proceeded to rule on the third issue as follows:
Are the defendants liable? While there was propersubrogation, the defendants claim that the damage of the insuredproperty was caused by force-majeur is valid.
28 Plaintiffs Evidence Folder, at. p. 6029 Id., at pp. 43-59
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CA-G.R. CV No. 63146Decision
The last paragraph of exhibit B-1 reads as follows:
However, at about 1:30 p.m., discharging operationswas stopped due to the presence of strongnortheasterly winds which also enduced (sic) longswells to occur. This condition prevailed until 6:45p.m. and caused the vessel to continuously bumped(sic) the piers fender clusters. (Emphasis provided)
Exhibit 2, under the heading VESSEL POUNDING ONMCCI PIER gave the following account:
Accordingly, at 1330 hours of the above date,discharging of cargo from the aforementioned vesselwas temporarily stopped due to alleged strongNortheasterly wind (25-30 knots) and long swell thatprevailed in the area. As a consequence, the vesselsstarboard section made of (sic) contact and crushed to(sic) the fender cluster piles, as well as to (sic) theMCCI pier. Due to the incessant contact between thevessel and the four (4) fender cluster piles at that time,the latter, which were installed in line with the mainpier and (two clusters for each side), gave way withone cluster uprooted, causing the vessels starboardsection, which was in line of the overhand section ofthe concrete pier in way of Hold No. 3, to crushagainst it. As a result, the vessels starboard sectionand the MCCIs concrete pier sustained damage.(Emphasis supplied)
From the above exhibits, it is clear that the proximate causeof the damage of the insured property of MCCI is due to the strongnortheasterly winds of about 25 to 30 knots which enduced (sic)long swells and caused SINCERE No. 5 to bump and damage thepier of MCCI. This is considered force-majeur to which thedefendants should not be held liable for the damage done.
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CA-G.R. CV No. 63146Decision
Apparently for the same reason, the lower court dismissed the
counterclaim as well.
I. APPEAL FROM THE DECISION DATED JANUARY 4, 1999:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
In its appeal, Makati Insurance assigns the following errors:
1. THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THEDAMAGE OF THE INSURED PROPERTY WASFORCE MAJEURE;
2. THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED INRULING THAT THE DEFENDANTS SHOULD NOTBE HELD LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGE DONE;
3. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSINGTHE COMPLAINT.
THE COURTS RULING
We see no merit in the appeal.
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CA-G.R. CV No. 63146Decision
We went out of our way to extensively quote portions of the
complaint in order to clarify at the outset what the case is all about
and what requires to be proven to support or defeat the complaint.
The complaint is for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code
and is anchored on the existence of damages and negligence. Thus,
the complaint alleges that The abovementioned damages to the pier
facilities were brought about by the fault or negligence of the defendants,
sheer lack of prudence, lack of foresight, and lack of skill of the vessels
master who did not act swiftly to avert the damages as aforesaid or at least,
to minimize the same.30
In a civil litigation (as in the present case), it is the plaintiff who
has the burden of proving the cause of action embodied in the
complaint. It is basic law that a plaintiff must prove the existence of
its legal right, the correlative legal duty on the part of the defendant
to respect the plaintiffs legal right, and an act or omission of the
defendant in violation of plaintiffs right.31 Under Article 2176
involved in the present case, the cause of action centers on the act or
omission on the part of the vessel, attended by fault or negligence,
causing damage to the MCCI wharf.
30 Complaint, Record, p. 331 Mathay v. Consolidated Bank, 58 SCRA 559; Dulay v. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 221.
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CA-G.R. CV No. 63146Decision
We extensively reviewed the evidence adduced by the plaintiff-
appellant to prove the elements that would entitle it to recover from
the defendants. Thus, for purposes of this Decision, we even
outlined the evidence, both testimonial and documentary, that the
plaintiff-appellants witnesses presented. Unlike the lower court
who dismissed the complaint in recognition of the defense of force
majeure, we conclude after our evaluation that the plaintiff-appellant
miserably failed to prove the allegations of its complaint.
Incidentally, we are keenly aware that the plaintiff-appellants failure
to prove the allegations of the complaint is not an error specifically
assigned in the present appeal. A review or assessment of this aspect
of the case is necessary, however, even before the defense of force
majeure the focal point of the present appeal can be considered.
Thus, it is an issue which we can legitimately tackle and rule upon in
this appeal because it is an issue upon which the determination of the
assigned error depends.32
The plaintiff-appellant presented only two witnesses, one of
whom, Efren Cabungan, testified solely on MCCIs insurance claim
and the documentary support to entitle the plaintiff to exercise the
right of subrogation. Thus, he said nothing that would support the
Article 2176 aspect of the complaint.
32 Law Firm of Abrenica, et. al. vs. CA, et. al., G.R. No. 143706, April 5, 2002.
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The second witness was Valentino Aboy, an adjuster, who
frankly admitted the role of his company and his own role in the
whole affair. They were there to adjust the claim. In one case,33 the
Honorable Supreme Court had occasion to define the role of an
adjuster and the High Court put it in these words:
An insurance adjuster is ordinarily a special agent for the personor company for whom he acts, and his authority is prima faciecoextensive with the business entrusted to him. . .
An adjuster does not discharge functions of a quasi-judicialnature, but represents his employer, to whom he owes faithfulservice, and for his acts, in the employer's interest, the employer isresponsible so long as the acts are done while the agent is actingwithin the scope of his employment. (45 C.J.S., 1338-1340.)
This was Valentino Aboys role and as confirmed by the first witness,
Mr. Cabugan, Aboys company was there to survey the damage
caused to MCCI and to submit a report for insurance payment
purposes. Valentino Aboy was frank enough to admit this role, the
fact that the reports he identified were prepared by his own people,
and that he did not go to the site of the damage himself. Thus,
Valentino Aboy had nothing to testify on with respect to the
causation of the damage to the pier and to the vessel, much less on
the question of whether there was fault, negligence or force majeure.
Under this evidentiary situation, the plaintiff-appellant may
have established the fact of damage that MCCI suffered and its
33 Smith, Bell & Co. Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 110668. February 6, 1997.
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CA-G.R. CV No. 63146Decision
extent, but has done nothing more beyond this. To be sure, this type
of evidence may have been sufficient in a case by an insured against
his insurance company where the issue is the fact of damage and the
extent of the amount that the insured should recover. This type of
evidence, however, is fatally deficient in a quasi-delict case where the
plaintiff has to establish the element of causation and the existence of
fault or negligence through competent and admissible evidence. In
the context of the present case, the plaintiff has to show that the
resulting damage to MCCIs pier was caused by MV Sincere No. 5
and that there was attendant fault or negligence in causing the
damage. In the absence of competent proof establishing all these
elements, we see no need to discuss the issue of force majeure, a
defense that comes into play to show that the damage, even if caused
by the defendant, is excused by a cause (force majeure) recognized by
law. Thus, the dismissal of plaintiff-appellants appeal and of the
complaint are legally in order.
II. APPEAL FROM THE ORDERS DATED FEBRUARY 10, 1995,APRIL 25, 1995 AND OCTOBER 23, 1995
The appealed Order dated February 10, 199534 states: For
resolution is a motion to dismiss third party complaint filed by third party
defendants and the opposition thereat of the third party plaintiff, and after a34 Record, p. 185
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CA-G.R. CV No. 63146Decision
careful evaluation of their pleadings, the Court resolves to dismiss the third
party complaint for lack of cause of action against the third party
defendants. This dismissal was confirmed in the subsequent orders of
the lower court dated April 25, 1995 and October 23, 1995.
The third-party plaintiffs appeal from these orders under the
following -
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
1. THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED INHOLDING THAT THE THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINTDID NOT CLEARLY STATE THE ULTIMATE FACTSREQUIRED BY LAW FOR A COMPLAINT TO BEVALID.
2. THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOTHOLDING THAT IT CAN RENDER A VALIDJUDGMENT IN THE INSTANT THIRD-PARTYCOMPLAINT, IF THE ALLEGATIONS OF FACTSTHEREIN ARE HYPOTHETICALLY ADMITTED:HENCE, THE SAME STATES CAUSE(S) OF ACTION,AGAINST THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOTHOLDING THAT THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL ISDEFECTIVE IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE.
THE COURTS RULING
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We resolve to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
A third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may,
with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action,
called the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponents claim.35
A third-party complaint is actually independent of and separate and
distinct from the plaintiffs complaint. Were it not for the Rules of
Court, it would have to be filed independently and separately from
the original complaint by the defendant against the third-party.36
Based on this relationship, there are really two cases for which
separate judgments may be rendered in the action. Separate appeals
may be made which remedies may be separately treated by this
Court37 as we are doing in the present case.
A dismissal based on lack of cause of action brought through a
motion to dismiss before the lower court looks solely at the
allegations of the complaint and hypothetically admits all these
allegations to test whether a cause of action is alleged. Necessarily,
the consideration made by the court is purely legal since no
questions of facts are required to be passed upon. As held by our
Supreme Court, "a question of law exists when the doubt or controversy
35 Section 11, Rule 6, Rules of Court.36 Remedial Law, Herrera, Vol I, 2000 Ed., at p. 486.37 See: Benaza v. Bonilla, 1 SCRA 1154; Singapore Airlines, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.No. 107356. March 31, 1995
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CA-G.R. CV No. 63146Decision
concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of
facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being
admitted.38
There is purely legal consideration as well in the issue of
whether a set of allegations are allegations of ultimate facts and in
the issue of whether a resolution of dismissal is defective in form and
substance. In the first case, the question is whether the allegations
existing in the complaint are ultimate facts in legal contemplation;
in the second, the question is whether the given form and the
substance of the lower courts order satisfy legal standards. Thus in
both, no examination of evidence is required, only a consideration -
in light of existing law and jurisprudence - of the disputed complaint
or order that is before the court.
Under these legal situations, we have no option but to dismiss
the third-party plaintiffs appeal pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court since appeals of purely legal questions must be
brought, not to us, but to the Honorable Supreme Court.
38 Posadas-Moya & Associates Construction Co. Inc., vs. Greenfield Development Corporation, etal., G.R. No. 141115. June 10, 2003, citing Republic v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 102508, January 30,2002.
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WHEREFORE, based on the above premises, we hereby
DISMISS the appeal and AFFIRM the dismissal of the complaint in
Civil Case No. 93-64936. We likewise hereby DISMISS the third-
party plaintiffs appeal from the Orders dated February 10, 1995,
April 25, 1995 and October 23, 1995 for lack of jurisdiction. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
DELILAH VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS ELIEZER R. DE LOS SANTOS Associate Justice Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it ishereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision werereached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer ofthe opinion of the Court.
DELILAH VIDALLON-MAGTOLISAssociate Justice
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Chair, Fourth Division
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