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ORIGINALBEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
ONGRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE
OFTHE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
In Re:
Complaint against
Warren "Bo" PritchardAttorney Reg. No. 0008417
Respondent
Mahoning County Bar Association
Relator
11-0815Case No. 10-025
Findings of Fact,Conclusions of Law anRecommendation of th IFULEBoard of Commissione s onGrievances and Discip ne of MAY 1^ 20glthe Supreme Court of hio
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
This case involves 20 counts of alleged misconduct against Respondent, Warren "Bo"
Pritchard (0008417), who was admitted to practice law in 1982 and has no prior disciplinary
record. Respondent currently is serving an interim remedial suspension pursuant to Gov.Bar R.
V(5)(A), which the Supreme Court imposed on October 29, 2009.
The hearing panel in this case consisted of Patrick Sink, Janica Pierce Tucker, and panel
chair Paul De Marco, none of whom served on the probable cause panel for this case or resides
in the appellate district from which the complaint arose. The parties submitted stipulations of
facts and violations on January 5, 2011, and the panel heard testimony and arguments on January
13, 2011. David Comstock, Jr., Mahoning County Bar Association bar counsel appeared for
Relator. John Juhasz and Lynn Maro appeared for Respondent.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
{¶ 1} As to 18 of the 20 counts alleged in the amended complaint, the parties have
stipulated to a total of 83 disciplinary violations (attached). As to Count "Q," (Raub) the parties
1
have stipulated that Respondent did not violate any disciplinary rules and that the count therefore
should be dismissed. As to the remaining count (Count "L," Catterson), the parties have
stipulated to most of the conduct alleged, but have not agreed that the stipulated conduct
constitutes a violation of any disciplinary rule, leaving that determination to the panel. The
parties also have stipulated to the dismissal of 37 other alleged rule violations spread across the
20 counts.
COUNT "A": MARGARET A. BURY
{9[ 2} From May through July 2009, Margaret A. Bury paid Respondent $1,350 to file a
bankruptcy petition. Respondent never filed the petition, failed to respond to Bury's inquiries
about her case, and never returned any portion of the money she paid him. Bury hired another
attorney to file her bankruptcy petition.
,. {1[ 3} The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding Bury violated Prof.
Cond. R. 1.1 (competent representation), 1.15(d) (prompt delivery of client funds and full
accounting), 1.16(d) (protecting client's interest upon termination), and 1.16(e) (prompt return of
unearned fees). The panel finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent committed
these violations.
{9[4} The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of alleged violations of Prof. Cond. R.
1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 8.4. The panel accepts these stipulated dismissals and finds that these
violations have not been established by clear and convincing evidence.
COUNT "B": GERALD CENNENO
{9[ 5} In April 2008, Gerald Cenneno retained Respondent to file a complaint for breach
of contract against a church and paid Respondent a $1,200 retainer. Respondent filed the
complaint in July 2008. After the church filed a counterclaim, Cenneno met with Respondent,
2
who asked Cenneno for certain paperwork. Cenneno submitted the paperwork, which
Respondent promised. to file. Respondent never filed the paperwork and ceased all contact with
Cenneno, despite the latter's attempts to contact him throughout the remainder of 2008 and into
2009.
{y[ 6} In March 2009, the court granted the church a default judgment against Cenneno.
After the church's attorney notified Cenneno of the default, Cenneno attempted to reach
Respondent for approximately three consecutive weeks. When Cenneno finally reached him,
Respondent promised to talk to the magistrate and call Cenneno back later that day.
{'f[ 7} Respondent failed to contact Cenneno or return the latter's phone messages. On
occasion over the next several months, Cenneno was able to reach Respondent, who again
promised to talk to the magistrate but never did.
fl[ 8} In July 2009, Cenneno learned that Respondent had not requested relief from the
default judgment. After leaving more messages for Respondent and receiving no return phone
calls, Cenneno retained another attorney to seek relief from the default judgment entered against
him, but the court upheld the default judgment and scheduled a hearing on the church's damages.
{y[ 9} Respondent has not returned any of the funds that Cenneno paid him.
{9[ 10} The parties stipulated that Respondent's conduct regarding Cenneno's case
violated Prof Cond. R. 1.1 (competent representation), 1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness
in representation), 1.4 (keeping client reasonably informed), 1.15(d) (prompt delivery of client
funds and full accounting), 1.16(d) (protecting client's interest upon termination), and 1.16(e)
(prompt return of unearned fees). The panel finds by clear and convincing evidence that
Respondent committed these violations.
3
{,}[ 11} The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of alleged violations of Prof. Cond. R.
1.5 and 8.4. The panel accepts these stipulated dismissals and finds yhat these violations have
not been established by clear and convincing evidence.
COUNT "C": ESTATE OF STEVE YANCSURAK
{9[ 12} In 2009, while serving as counsel and court-appointed commissioner for the estate
of Steve Yancsurak, Respondent failed to attend two hearings despite the Columbiana County
Probate Court's orders to do so. The court found Respondent in contempt and a warrant for his
arrest was issued. The court ultimately ordered a recall of the warrant, but reported
Respondent's conduct to the Columbiana County Bar Association's certified grievance
committee, which referred the matter to Relator, since Respondent's office is in Mahoning
County,
{'l 13} The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding the Yancsurak estate
violated Prof Cond. R. 1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness in representation). The panel
finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent committed this violation.
{y[ 14} The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of alleged violations of Prof Cond. R.
1.1 and 8.4. The panel accepts these stipulated dismissals and finds that these violations have
not been established by clear and convincing evidence.
COUNT "D": WILLIAM DiRENZO
{'}[ 15) Respondent represented William DiRenzo between 2003 and 2009. During the
time Respondent represented DiRenzo, he reached an agreement to sell DiRenzo property owned
by Respondent's mother. Title to the property was transferred to DiRenzo in 2004. Respondent
owned 17 acres of land nearby.
{9[16} Respondent later agreed to sell two of the 17 acres to Carol Fye for $60,000. Fye
paid him half the purchase price and sought to obtain a survey. While Fye waited for the survey,
a foreclosure action involving all 17 acres was filed against Respondent. On March 31, 2006, a
partnership consisting of DiRenzo, Michael Dockry, and another person signed an agreement to
purchase from Respondent the 15 acres Fye had not purchased. Attempts to secure financing for
the sale of the 15 acres were unsuccessful.
{'ff 171 A sheriff's sale for all 17 acres was scheduled for November 28, 2006.
{y[ 181 On that date, DiRenzo provided a deposit of $28,000, making the check payable
to "Michael Dockry," his partner, who previously shared office space with Respondent.
DiRenzo then obtained an official check from Sky Bank for $28,000 and delivered it to Dockry
as requested by Respondent. Respondent added $1,500 of his own funds, for a total of $29,500,
and sent Dockry to the sheriff s sale.
{lf[ 19} Fye attended the sheriff's sale with $15,000. Fye knew that Dockry was there to
bid on the property on behalf of Respondent. At the sale, Fye and Dockry agreed to pool the
funds in their possession to bid on the property. They were successful.
{y[ 20} After speaking with Respondent, Fye placed the property in her own name, with
the understanding that Respondent would continue to seek financing to purchase it. When he
could not, Fye kept the $29,500 that Dockry had brought to the sheriff s sale, considering it
repayment for the $30,000 she previously had paid to Respondent for the two acres. Fye thus
obtained title to the other 15 acres for $44,500, despite putting up only $15,000 of her own
money.
5
{9[ 21} After Respondent informed DiRenzo that he could purchase Respondent's interest
in the property for $1,500, DiRenzo obtained a check for $1,500 and gave it to Respondent, who
cashed it on June 20, 2007.
{y[ 22} Despite the fact Respondent's client DiRenzo contributed a total of $29,500 to
secure the property, DiRenzo has nothing. to show for his contribution, Fye still holds title to the
property, and Respondent has been unable to secure a deed for DiRenzo or the partnership.
{y[ 23} Respondent testified that "a number of friends of mine joined a partnership to try
to get it refinanced." He admitted DiRenzo was not just his friend but also his client at the time.
He stated that he "tried to help Mr. DiRenzo get an attorney to represent him" after the fact, but
in effect admitted that came too late: "I should have sent each of them to another attorney to
review their position in those things." (Tr. 31)
24} The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding DiRenzo constituted an
impermissible conflict of interest in violation of DR 5-104(A) (entering into a business
transaction with a client with different interests where the client expects the lawyer to exercise
his professional judgment to protect the client) and Prof. Cond. R. 1.8 (entering into a business
transaction with a client). The panel finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent
committed these violations.
{1125} The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of alleged violations of DR 9-102 and
Prof. Cond. R. 8.4. The panel accepts these stipulated dismissals and finds that these violations
have not been established by clear and convincing evidence. The panel also recommends
dismissal of alleged violations of DR 1-102(A)(4) and Pro£ Cond. R. 1.15 inasmuch Relator did
not present proof or any stipulation as to these alleged violations.
6
COUNT "E": AMY AND JOSEPH DiDOMENICO
{y[ 26} In September 2007, Amy and. Joseph DiDomenico retained Respondent to file an
action on their behalf against a roofing company, agreeing to pay him an hourly fee. The
DiDomenicos paid Respondent an $850 retainer in 2007, followed by another $850 in fees
during 2008.
{y[ 27} Unbeknownst to the DiDomenicos and Respondent, another attorney already had
filed an action on their behalf against the roofing company (Case No. 1302). Unaware of that
case, Respondent filed another (Case No. 1478). When he learned of Case No. 1302 in July
2008, Respondent substituted for the other attorney and voluntarily dismissed the case about a
week later.
{'f[ 28} In September 2008, Respondent failed to respond to the court's request for a
status update in Case No. 1478, so the court dismissed it. Neither Respondent nor the
DiDomenicos received the status update request or notice of the dismissal.
{y[ 291 Over the next six months, the DiDomenicos had trouble reaching Respondent by
phone, so they stopped by his office on.March 6, 2009 and set up an appointment for the next
day. At the appointment, Respondent explained that he was going through a divorce and that his
files were disorganized. He promised the DiDomenicos he would attempt to reopen their case.
{y[ 301 Respondent filed a motion to vacate the judgment entry of dismissal twelve days
later, but because of trouble serving the defendant's counsel, the hearing on it was delayed until
August 14, 2009. Out of an abundance of caution, the DiDomenicos sent Respondent a certified
letter reminding him to appear, but the letter was returned unclaimed and Respondent did fail to
appear. Nevertheless, the magistrate judge scheduled a bench trial in 120 davs.
{9[ 311 In the meantime, Respondent received his interim remedial suspension and filed a
motion to withdraw based on it. The DiDomenicos' new counsel secured an order vacating the
dismissal and a new trial date. The case remains pending.
{9[ 32} The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding the DiDomenicos
violated Prof. Cond. R.1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness in representation) and 1.4(a)(3)
and (4) (keeping clients informed of case status and complying with reasonable information
requests). The panel finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent committed these
violations.
111331 The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of alleged violations of Prof. Cond. R.
1.1, 1.5, and 8.4. The panel accepts these stipulated dismissals and finds that these violations
have not been established by clear and convincing evidence.
COUNT "F": EVELYN SUE LORENT
{9[ 34} On Apri13, 2009, Evelyn Sue Lorent retained Respondent to provide her legal
advice regarding a probate matter and a possible bankruptcy, paid him $1,300, and provided him
the necessary paperwork. After furnishing Lorent a bankruptcy worksheet and developing a
strategy for weighing the benefits of bankruptcy, Respondent ceased working on the case and
Lorent could not reach him. Bankruptcy proved to be unnecessary, and another attorney handled
the probate matter.
{^[ 35} The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding Lorent violated Prof.
Cond. R. 1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness in representation), 1.4(a)(3) and (4) (keeping
clients informed of case status and complying with reasonable information requests), 1.15(d)
(prompt delivery of client funds and full accounting), 1.16(d) (protecting client's interest upon
8
termination), and 1.16(e) (prompt return of unearned fees). The panel finds by clear and
convincing evidence that Respondent committed these violations.
{1( 36} The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of the alleged violations of Prof. Cond.
R. 1.1. The panel accepts this stipulated dismissal and finds that this violation has not been
established by clear and convincing evidence.
COUNT "G": CAROL HOVANES
{9[ 37} After a bank filed a foreclosure action against Carol Hovanes in August 2008, she
retained Respondent to represent her in the action and in a possible bankruptcy. Over the next
month, Hovanes paid him $1,600 in advance legal fees and $300 for a bankruptcy filing fee.
Respondent performed no meaningful work on the foreclosure case, never filed a bankruptcy
petition, and failed to respond to Hovanes's phone messages and requests for information.
Hovanes retained new counsel, who filed the bankruptcy petition, automatically staying the
foreclosure action. Respondent has not returned either the legal fees or the filing fee that
Hovanes paid him.
{1[ 38} The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding Hovanes violated Prof.
Cond. R. 1.1 (competent representation), 1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness in
representation), 1.4(a)(3) and (4) (keeping clients informed of case status and complying with
reasonable information requests) and 1.16(e) (prompt return of unearned fees). The panel finds
by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent committed these violations.
COUNT "H": DUANE AND TRACIE CORLL
{9[ 39} Duane and Tracie Corll retained Respondent to file a bankruptcy petition and paid
him $1,300. Respondent filed the petition, but over time he became increasingly difficult for the
Corlls to contact and failed to submit the necessary paperwork, resulting in the dismissal of their
bankruptcy case. The Corlls are seeking new counsel to correct the deficiencies in Respondent's
handling of the case.
{y[ 401 The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding the Corlls violated
Prod. Cond. R. 1.1 (competent representation), 1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness in
representation), 1.4(a)(3) and (4) (keeping clients informed of case status and complying with
reasonable information requests), 1.15(d) (prompt delivery of client funds and full accounting),
1.16(d) (protecting client's interest upon termination), and 1.16(e) (prompt return of unearned
fees). The panel finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent committed these
violations.
{y[ 41} The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of the alleged violation of Prof. Cond.
R. 8.4. The panel accepts this stipulated dismissal and finds that this violation has not been
established by clear and convincing evidence.
COUNT "I": TINA MARIE BENSON
{9[ 42} In July 2009, Tina Marie Benson paid Respondent a fee of $1,000 to file a
bankruptcy petition. Respondent provided her a receipt indicating a balance due of $350.
Respondent never filed the petition, never responded to Benson's attempts to contact or see him,
and never returned any of the fees she paid. Another attorney filed the petition for her and
secured the discharge.
{y[ 43} The parties stipulated that Respondent's conduct regarding Benson violated Prof.
Cond. R. 1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness in representation), 1.4(a)(3) and (4) (keeping
client reasonably informed and complying with reasonable information requests), 1.15(d)
(prompt delivery of client funds and full accounting), 1.16(d) (protecting client's interest upon
10
termination), and 1.16(e) (prompt return of unearned fees). The panel finds by clear and
convincing evidence that Respondent committed these violations.
{y[ 44} The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of the alleged violation of Prof Cond.
R. 8.4. The panel accepts this stipulated dismissal and finds that this violation has not been
established by clear and convincing evidence.
COUNT "J": RICHARD BODENDORFER
111451 In October 2008, Richard Bodendorfer paid Respondent $750 to form a limited
liability corporation. After the Secretary of State's office twice rejected Respondent's attempted
filings, Respondent asked Bodendorfer for an additional payment of $250. Bodendorfer sent it in
February 2009, but Respondent took no further action on his behalf.
{9[ 46} The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding Bodendorfer violated
Prof. Cond. R. 1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness in representation), 1.4(a)(3) and (4)
(keeping client reasonably informed and complying with reasonable information requests),
1.15(d) (prompt delivery of client funds and full accounting), 1.16(d) (protecting client's interest
upon termination), and 1.16(e) (prompt return of unearned fees). The panel finds by clear and
convincing evidence that Respondent committed these violations.
{y[ 471 The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of the alleged violation of Prof Cond.
R. 8.4. The panel accepts this stipulated dismissal and finds that this violation has not been
established by clear and convincing evidence.
COUNT "K": DARLENE BURMAN
{9f 48} In early 2009, Darlene Burman retained Respondent to assist her in administering
her late brother's estate. Without court approval, Respondent charged the estate $15,028 in fees
and costs before filing the inventory. The probate court determined that Respondent had almost
11
completed the estate and that the amount he charged was less than he would have been entitled to
receive under the court's computation schedule. The court determined that Burman should retain
new counsel. Successor counsel completed the estate.
{1149} The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding Burman violated Prof.
Cond. R. 1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness in representation). The panel finds by clear
and convincing evidence that Respondent comniitted this violation.
{y[ 50} The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of the alleged violations of Prof. Cond.
R. 1.2, 1.4, and 8.4 in regard to Burman. The panel accepts these stipulated dismissals and finds
that these violations have not been established by clear and convincing evidence.
COUNT "L": JOYCE CATTERSON
{y[ 51} On January 20, 1997, Joyce Catterson was involved in an automobile accident.
'Thereafter; she retained Respondent to pursue a claim against the other driver. About a year
after Respondent filed her action, the defendant died, but his attorney inexplicably failed to bring
his death to the attention of the court or Respondent. Despite his non-disclosure, that attorney
was able to secure a dismissal of the case in March 2000, for failure to perfect service on the by-
then-deceased defendant. Literally the next seven years appear to have been consumed with
straightening out the tangled mess this dubious dismissal created, all to no decisive effect.
During that time, the parties engaged in motion practice and appeals regarding the dismissal, a
2003 reinstatement, and a second dismissal recommended by a magistrate in 2007. It appears the
trial court has never taken any action on the magistrate's decision. In February 2010, following
Respondent's interim remedial suspension, Catterson received notice that she would have a
reasonable time to secure new counsel.
12
{^f[ 52} Relator contends Respondent violated Prof. Cond. R. 1.4 by not keeping
Catterson informed of developments between the time of the magistrate's decision and his
interim remedial suspension. While the Catterson case reflects poorly on the legal system in
general, we do not find by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Prof. Cond.
R. 1.4 in handling that convoluted matter. He testified, without contradiction, that nothing
happened in the case during the period between the magistrate's decision and his interim
remedial suspension, that as a result there was nothing to tell Catterson, and that whenever he
"would run into her husband somewhere ... I'd tell him, you know, nothing is transpiring." (Tr.,
55-56) We know of no authority - and Relator has supplied none - suggesting that it is a
disciplinary violation for an attorney not to update a client on the status of his or her case when
in fact there is nothing happening in the case and therefore nothing significant to report. The
panel therefore recommends dismissal of this count in its entirety.
COUNT "M"c JENNIFER AND GORDON COYIER
{9[ 531 In 2006, Jennifer Coyier retained Respondent to handle a step-parent adoption and
paid him $200. Respondent never filed the adoption petition.
{y[ 54} Coyier and her husband, Gordon, also retained Respondent to file a breach of
contract claim against a home improvement company. Respondent did so, but failed to perform
any other work on the case, which the court dismissed in September 2009.
{^[ 55} The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding the Coyiers in 2009
violated Prof. Cond. R. 1.1 (competent representation), 1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness
in representation), 1.4(a)(3) and (4) (keeping client reasonably informed and complying with
reasonable information requests), 1.15(d) (prompt delivery of client funds and full accounting),
1.16(d) (protecting client's interest upon termination), and 1.16(e) (prompt return of unearned
13
fees). The parties also stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding the Coyiers in 2006
violated DR 6-101 (neglect of entrusted legal matter). The panel finds by clear and convincing
evidence that Respondent committed these violations.
111561 The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of the alleged violation of Prof. Cond.
R. 8.4 in regard to the Coyiers. The panel accepts this stipulated dismissal and finds that this
violation has not been established by clear and convincing evidence.
COUNT "N": EMIL FORISKA
{y[ 57} In January 2008, Emil Foriska retained Respondent to secure the reinstatement of
his Ohio driver's license. Respondent initiated but never completed the case and his inattention
resulted in its dismissal. Respondent also failed to respond to Foriska's attempts to reach him by
phone and mail.
{1158} The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding Foriska violated Prof.
Cond. R. 1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness in representation), 1.4(a)(3) and (4) (keeping
client reasonably informed and complying with reasonable information requests), 1.15(d)
(prompt delivery of client funds and full accounting), 1.16(d) (protecting client's interest upon
termination), and 1.16(e) (prompt return of uneamed fees). The panel finds by clear and
convincing evidence that Respondent committed violations of Prof. Cond. R. 1.3, 1.4(a)(3) and
(4), and 1.16(d).
{^[ 59} Because no evidence was presented with respect to fees Foriska paid, the panel
finds, despite the parties' stipulations, that the alleged violations of Prof. Cond. R. 1.15(d) and
1.16(e) have not been established by clear and convincing evidence.
14
{y[ 60} The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of the alleged violations of Prof. Cond.
R. 1.1 and 8.4. The panel accepts these stipulated dismissals and finds that these violations have
not been established by clear and convincing evidence.
COUNT "0": BETTY GARBACK
{y[ 61} In June 2009, Betty Garback retained Respondent and paid him $130 to transfer a
property interest. Respondent never completed the work, never responded to Garback's attempts
to contact him, and never refunded the money she paid him.
{1( 621 The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding Garback violated Prof.
Cond. R. 1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness in representation), 1.4(a)(3) and (4) (keeping
client reasonably informed and complying with reasonable information requests), 1.15(d)
(prompt delivery of client funds and full accounting), 1.16(d) (protecting client's interest upon
termination), and 1.1.6(e) (prompt return of unearned fees). The panel finds by clear and
convincing evidence that Respondent committed these violations.
{9[ 63} The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of the alleged violation of Prof. Cond.
R. 8.4 in regard to Garback. The panel accepts this stipulated dismissal and finds that this
violation has not been established by clear and convincing evidence.
COUNT "P": SAED KHATIB
{9[ 64} In 2008, Saed Khatib retained Respondent to represent him in Khatib's separate
lawsuits against April Ramahi and Jamal Saed El-Makdah.
{y[ 65} Respondent entered his appearance in the Ramahi case four days before the
scheduled trial and immediately moved to continue it. When neither party's counsel appeared
for trial four days later, the court dismissed the Ramahi case without prejudice. Over the next
seven months, Khatib tried without success to contact Respondent by phone and mail to discuss
15
the status of his case. He finally met with Respondent at his office on July 3, 2009 and asked
what it would take to refile his case. Khatib paid Respondent $200 to do so (in addition to $100
he previously had paid Respondent). Respondent never refiled the complaint, never responded
to Khatib's continual attempts to contact him, and never refunded the money Khatib paid him.
{'j[ 661 Respondent filed Khatib's complaint against El-Makdah on April 21, 2008. The
parties engaged in settlement discussions and briefing until the court granted El-Makdah's forum
non conveniens motion, dismissing the case without prejudice.
{'ff 671 The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct in handling Khatib's case against
Ramahi violated Prof. Cond. R. 1.1 (competent representation), 1.3 (reasonable diligence and
promptness in representation), 1.4(a)(3) and (4) (keeping client reasonably informed and
complying with reasonable information requests), and 1.16(d) (protecting client's interest upon
termination). The panel finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent committed
these violations.
{y[ 681 The parties also stipulate that Respondent's handling of Khatib's case against El-
Makdah did not violate any disciplinary rules and that these alleged violations should therefore
be dismissed. The panel accepts this stipulated dismissal and finds that the alleged violations
involving Respondent's handling of Khatib's case against El-Makdah have not been established
by clear and convincing evidence.
COUNT "Q": TERRI RAUB
{y[ 691 In October 2008, Terri Raub paid Respondent $100 to draft a will. The parties
stipulate to the dismissal of this count because Respondent has completed the work. The panel
accepts this stipulated dismissal and finds that the alleged violations regarding Raub have not
been established by clear and convincing evidence.
16
COUNT "R": ARTHUR TITUS
{1[ 701 In July 2009, Arthur Titus retained Respondent and paid him $450 to transfer to
Titus the title to property that he had given to his late son. Respondent never completed the
work, never responded to Titus's attempts to contact him, and never refunded the money Titus
paid him.
{9[ 71} The parties stipulate thatRespondent's conduct regarding Titus violated Prof.
Cond. R. 1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness in representation), 1.4(a)(3) and (4) (keeping
client reasonably informed and complying with reasonable information requests), 1.15(d)
(prompt delivery of client funds and full accounting), 1.16(d) (protecting client's interest upon
termination), and 1.16(e) (prompt return of unearned fees). The panel finds by clear and
convincing evidence that Respondent committed these violations.
72} The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of the alleged violation of Prof. Cond.
R. 8.4 in regard to Titus. The panel accepts this stipulated dismissal and finds that this alleged
violation has not been established by clear and convincing evidence.
COUNT "S": CLYDE WEIMER
{9[ 731 In 2006, Clyde Weimer paid Respondent $1,900 to represent him in connection
with a potential claim. Respondent filed the complaint but dismissed the case voluntarily in
April 2009 and refiled it a month later. A notice to take Weimer's deposition was filed with the
court, but neither Respondent nor his client appeared for the deposition. Weimer subsequently
replaced Respondent with new counsel.
{^[ 74} The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding Weimer violated Prof.
Cond. R. 1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness in representation). The panel finds by clear
and convincing evidence that Respondent committed this violation.
17
{T 751 The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of the alleged violation of Prof. Cond.
R. 1.1, 1.4, 8.4, and 1.16 in regard to Weimer. The panel accepts these stipulated dismissals and
fmds that these alleged violations regarding Weimer have not been established by clear and
convincing evidence.
COUNT "T": JOHN ZETTS
111761 In August 2009, John Zetts retained Respondent and paid him $550 to seek a
child support reduction. Respondent never completed the work, never responded to Zetts's
attempts to contact him, and never refunded the money Zetts paid him.
{9[ 77} The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding Zetts violated Prof.
Cond. R. 1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness in representation), 1.4(a)(3) and (4) (keeping
client reasonably informed and complying with reasonable information requests), 1.15(d)
(prompt delivery of client funds and full accounting), and 1.16(e) (prompt return of unearned
fees). The panel finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent committed these
violations.
LACK OF MALPRACTICE INSURANCE
(cj[ 781 The parties further stipulate that, during the representations mentioned in their
stipulations, Respondent failed to advise the clients that he did not have legal malpractice
insurance and that each instance of this violated Prof. Cond. R. 1.4(c). Although the panel could
find no mention of these alleged violations in the amended complaint, the panel accepts the
parties' stipulation of these overarching violations as equivalent to an added charge as to which
Respondent knowinglv has made a binding admission. See Dayton Bar Assn. v. Landon, 108
Ohio St.3d 173, 2006-Ohio-546; Disciplinary Counsel v. Bowman, 99 Ohio St.3d 244, 2003-
18
Ohio-3374. The panel finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent conunitted these
additional violations.
THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION
{9[ 791 Arriving at the appropriate sanction requires consideration of the attomey's
misconduct, the duties violated, the injuries caused, the attorney's mental state, and the sanctions
imposed in similar cases. Cleveland Bar Assn. v. McMahon, 114 Ohio St.3d 331, 2007-Ohio-
3673, ¶ 24. Before recommending a sanction, we also weigh the aggravating and mitigating
factors in the case, including not only those set forth in Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations
Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline ("BCGD Proc. Reg."), but all factors relevant to the case. Cincinnati
Bar Assn. v. Mullaney, 119 Ohio St.3d 412, 2008-Ohio-4541, ¶ 40.
{lff 80} The parties have stipulated to the following six aggravating factors: (1) dishonest
or selfish motive (BCGD Proc. Reg. 10(B)(1)(b)); (2) a pattern of misconduct{BCGD Proc. Reg.
10(B)(1)(c)); (3) multiple offenses (BCGD Proc. Reg. 10(B)(1)(d)); (4) lack of cooperation in
the disciplinary process prior to the institution of formal proceedings (BCGD Proc. Reg.
10(B)(1)(e)); (5) vulnerability of and resulting harm to the victims of the misconduct (BCGD
Proc. Reg. 10(B)(1)(h)); and (6) failure to make restitution (BCGD Proc. Reg. 10(B)(1)(i)). The
parties also have stipulated to the following five mitigating factors: (1) the lack of a prior
disciplinary record (BCGD Proc. Reg. l0(B)(2)(a)); (2) full and free disclosure of misconduct
(i.e., the stipulations) (BCGD Proc. Reg. 10(B)(2)(d)); (3) Respondent's cooperative attitude
toward these proceedings after the filing of the formal complaint (Id.); (4) evidence of good
character and reputation (BCGD Proc. Reg. 10(B)(2)(e)); and (5) Respondent's mental disability,
as determined by a qualified health care professional who found that it contributed to or caused
19
his misconduct, that he has undergone a sustained period of successful treatment, and that
Respondent will be able to return to the competent, ethical practice under specified conditions
(BCGD Proc. Reg. 10(B)(2)(g)(i)-(iv)).
{9[ 81} The panel accepts these stipulated aggravating and mitigating factors and takes
them into account in considering the duties Respondent violated, the injuries he caused, the
attorney's mental state, and the sanctions imposed in similar cases. Respondent repeatedly
violated duties to perform his clients' work competently, to keep them informed of the status of
their cases, and to return unearned fee payments or unused cost advances to them. His neglect of
these duties left many of his clients with profound legal difficulties to overcome and some with
potentially irreversible negative outcomes. Because Respondent had no malpractice insurance,
many of his clients have no genuine prospect for recovering their losses.
{182} As to Respondent's mental state, Dr. Nicholas Atanasoff, his treating psychiatrist,
submitted a report substantiating that Respondent suffered a major depressive disorder, that he is
in complete remission and no longer needs to be medicated, and that Respondent can resume the
competent, ethical practice of law. Paul Cami of OLAP testified that Respondent has been fully
compliant with his OLAP contract since signing it in November 2009.
A. The Parties' Positions on the Appropriate Sanction
{lf[ 83} Despite their stipulations as to aggravating and mitigating factors, the parties have
not agreed on a sanction. They agree that Respondent should be suspended, that he should
receive full credit for the interim remedial suspension he has served since October 29, 2009, and
that he should be ordered to fulfill the following seven requirements before being reinstated to
the practice of law: (1) he must provide proof of continuing mental health counseling and proof
that he is fully competent to return to the practice of law; (2) he must comply with all
20
requirements required by OLAP during the period of his suspension; (3) he must attend a course
in law office management approved by Relator; (4) he must comply with any and all mandatory
CLE requirements imposed by the Supreme Court; (5) he must pay the cost of this action as
required by the Supreme Court; (6) he must make a good faith effort to make full restitution to
his clients; and (7) upon reinstatement, he would be subject to a two-year probationary period,
during which he must (a) continue to abide by the foregoing requirements, (b) be monitored by
Relator, and (c) permit Relator to monitor his IOLTA.
{y[ 841 Despite these points of agreement, the parties disagree on the extent of the
suspension Respondent should be required to serve: Relator contends that Respondent's conduct
warrants an indefinite suspension, and Respondent argues for a two-year suspension.
B. The Panel's Recommendation on Sanction
85} The panel recommends that Respondent be suspended indefinitely. In making
this recommendation, we are conscious of the herculean strides Respondent has made in putting
his life back together. According to Paul Cami of OLAP, Respondent's compliance with his
OLAP contract has been not only consistent, it has been a model for other lawyers suffering from
depression and other incapacitating forms of mental illness. We also are conscious of the cases
(including those cited by Respondent) that suggest the Supreme Court has imposed two-year
suspensions (sometimes partially or completely stayed), as opposed to indefinite suspensions, in
instances where the Respondent had committed misconduct while in the throes of incapacity
(whether due to mental illness or substance abuse) and had been or was in treatment for it,
pursuant to an OLAP contract. See, e.g., Columbus Bar Assn. v. DiAlbert, 120 Ohio St.3d 37,
2008-Ohio-5218, ¶¶ 9-11; Disciplinary Counsel v. Blair, 128 Ohio St.3d 384, 2011-Ohio-767, ¶
21; Columbus Bar Association v. Ellis, 120 Ohio St.3d 89, 2008-Ohio-5278, ¶ 13; Disciplinary
21
Counsel v. Bowman, 110 Ohio St.3d 480, 2006-Ohio-4333, ¶ 39. But the instant matter cannot
reasonably be compared to those cases, given the sheer number of violations and victims
involved here. Respondent committed more than 80 disciplinary violations, harming at least 21
innocent victims, all of them clients whose interests he was bound to protect.. in some cases, his
conduct has subjected them to potentially irreversible legal hardships.
{J[ 86} This matter is also distinguishable froin those cases for two other reasons. First,
while much of Respondent's misconduct occurred during the time when depression brought on
by his marital problems and eventual divorce left him feeling overwhelmed and unable to attend
to his work - indeed unable even to leave his house for what seem like prolonged stretches - it
cannot be discounted that poor law office management also played a significant role. By the
time his marital troubles began, Responder,t had put and kept in place a case management system
that depended inordinately, indeed almost entirely, on the availability of his wife, who served as
his secretary, paralegal, and only assistant. As the number of clients affected here indicates,
Respondent's practice had become simply too large for a case management system that was
wholly dependent on the constant availability of his wife and that would.have faltered if she had
been rendered unavailable for a prolonged period, no matter what the cause.
11871 Respondent's clients had the right to assume he had established a case
management system with fail-safes that would permit him to carry on with their work despite the
temporary - or, as eventually occurred, the permanent - absence of his administrative assistant.
But the fact is he did not establish such a system. The design of this ill-conceived case
management system must be regarded as the product of conscious decision-making by
Respondent long before his marital troubles began. This fact is reason enough to distinguish the
cases cited above. It also is reason enough to require that he apply for reinstatement and in doing
22
so demonstrate compliance with stringent conditions calculated to ensure that in the future he
will adopt thoughtful case management procedures that are consonant with his workload and
have built-in safeguards.
{y[ 88} A second distinguishing feature of this matter is that Respondent committed other
misconduct that did not stem from either his poor case management system or his marital
troubles. By his own admission, for example, his conduct in the matter involving William
DiRenzo preceded his marital troubles and derived from his poor judgment in entering into
business dealings with a friend and client and in not making sure that DiRenzo had the benefit of
independent legal advice. His failure to advise clients he had no malpractice insurance preceded
his marital troubles, as did his failure to file the step-parent adoption for Jennifer Coyier.
{^[89} Stillothermisconduct-committedhy-Respondtntfits-arunsettlingpatterirofa -
different nature, equally separate from his depression: well into 2009, at a time when
Respondent contends he was either non-functional or minimally functional due to his depression,
he still was meeting with new clients, accepting money to do their legal work, failing to complete
the tasks entrusted to him, and retaining their money. The matters involving Evelyn Sue Lorent,
Betty Garback, Tina Marie Benson, Saed Khatib, and John Zetts all highlight this particular
feature of his misconduct, which cannot be characterized simply as a by-product of his
depression. If, as we believe Respondent plausibly contends, he was too debilitated to handle
legal work competently during the second half of 2008 and all of 2009, one naturally wonders
why he also was not too debilitated to accept new legal work and the money that came with it.
{J[ 901 For all of the above reasons, the panel concludes that an indefinite suspension is
appropriate.
23
{'f[ 911 The panel also recommends that, prior to reinstatement, Respondent be required
to demonstrate that he has fulfilled the following conditions: (1) he must provide proof of
continuing mental health counseling and proof that he is fully competent to return to the practice
of law; (2) he must comply with all requirements required by OLAP during the period of his
suspension; (3) he must attend a rigorous and comprehensive course in law office management
approved by Relator; (4) he must comply with any and all mandatory CLE requirements imposed
by the Supreme Court; (5) he must pay the cost of this action as required by the.Supreme Court;
(6) he must make full restitution to Bury, Cenneno, the DiDomenicos, Lorent, Hovanes, the
Corlls, Benson, Bodendorfer, Jennifer Coyier, Garback, Khatib, Titus, Weimer, and Zetts for any
unearned fees and unused cost advances, fulfillment of which must be certified by Relator;' (7)
Respondent shall not commit any further misconduct during the period of suspension; and (8)
upon reinstatement, he would be subject to a two-year probationary period, during which he must
(a) continue to abide by the foregoing requirements to the extent they are of a continuing nature,
(b) be monitored by Relator, and (c) permit Relator to monitor his IOLTA.
{y[ 921 Finally, the panel recommends that Respondent receive partial, not full, credit for
the interim remedial suspension served. Full credit would amount to about 19 months as of the
date of this report and could well amount to more than 24 months by the time the Supreme Court
acts on the Board's recommendation, in which event he would be immediately eligible to apply
I The panel cannot determine from the present record exactly how much of the following amounts paidby these clients to Respondent constitute unearned fees and unused cost advances: Bury ($1,350),Cenneno ($1,200), the DiDomenicos ($1,700), Lorent ($1,300), Hovanes ($1,900), the Corlls ($1,300),Benson ($1,000), Bodendorfer ($1,000), Jennifer Coyier ($200), Garback ($130), Khatib ($300), Titus ($450),Weimer ($1,900), and Zetts ($550). The correct amount that Respondent did not earn (or use, in the caseof cost advances) and should have returned to these clients may well be less than the total of thesepayments, $14,280. Because the panel simply cannot discern it, Relator is in the best position todetermine what constitutes fulfillment of this "full restitution" requirement and to certify to the Supreme
Court that Respondent has fulfilled this requirement.
24
for reinstatement. If all of Respondent's misconduct could be attributed to his depression, the
evidence from his treating psychiatrist Dr. Atanasoff that his illness is in complete remission
logically might have justified giving Respondent full credit for the interim remedial suspension,
given that his incapacity appears to have been the event that triggered the need for an interim
remedial suspension. But, as mentioned above, not all of his misconduct can be attributed to his
depression.
{II 93} As also mentioned above, depending on when the Supreme Court acts on the
Board's recommendation, giving Respondent full credit could make him eligible for
reinstatement as soon as, or almost as soon as, the effective date of an indefinite suspension
order. This result cannot be justified in this instance because, again, Respondent committed
significant misconduct not attributable to his depression and needs time to gain comprehensive
la-wo€fice management skills and to make restitution to his victims.2 Because the panel believes
the inisconduct not attributable to Respondent's depression would warrant actual suspension
time in its own right, the panel recommends that Respondent receive no more than three-fourths,
or 18 months, of credit (whichever is smaller) for whatever interim suspension time he has
served by the time the Supreme Court imposes a suspension. So, for example:
2 The panel is aware that the parties stipulated Respondent should only have to make a good faith effortat restitution prior to reinstatement and that both sides feel it would be difficult for Respondent to makefull restitution, given his current circumstances. In the Supreme Court's recent decisions imposingindefinite suspensions, however, requiring full restitution to victims (or, as the case may be,reimbursement of the Client Security Fund) prior to reinstatement appears to be the norm. See, e.g.,
Disciplinary Counsel v. Medley, 128 Ohio St.3d 317, 2011-Ohio-234, q 6; Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Gresley,
127 Ohio St.3d 430, 2010-Ohio-6208, '127; Disciplinary Counsel v. Doellman, 127 Ohio St.3d 411, 2010-Ohio-
5990, 9157; Disciplinary Counsel v. Bandman, 125 Ohio St.3d 503, 2010-Ohio-2115, Q 20. See also Akron Bar
Assn. v. Mudrick, (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 621, 623 (where Respondent already had made partial restitution,
the Supreme Court ordered full restitution as a condition of reinstatement).
25
. if, by the time the Supreme Court imposes a suspension, 20 months have passed
since Respondent's interimremedial suspension, Respondent's credit for time
served would be limited to 15 months; and
. if, by the time the Supreme Court imposes a suspension, 24 months have passed
since Respondent's interim remedial suspension, Respondent's credit for time
served would be limited to 18 months; and
. if, by the time the Supreme Court imposes a suspension, 30 months have passed
since his interim remedial suspension, his credit for time served likewise would
be limited to 18 months.
This recommended formula is intended to ensure that Respondent serves a period of actual
suspension after the Supreme Court acts on the panel's recommendation, which would serve the
dual purpose of protecting the public and allowing him time to comply with whatever conditions
forxeinstatement the Supreme Court imposes. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Freeman, 119 Ohio
St.3d.330, 2008-Ohio-3836, ¶ 22.
BOARD RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to Gov. Bar Rule V(6)(L), the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio considered this matter on April 8, 2011. The Board
adopted the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Panel. However, based on a record
replete with serious misconduct, the Board recommends that Respondent, Warren Pritchard, be
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law with no credit for time served and that he pay full
restitution. The Board further recommends that the cost of these proceedings be taxed to
Respondent in any disciplinary order entered, so that execution may issue.
26
Pursuant to the order of the Board of Commissioners onGrievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio,I hereby certify the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Recommendatio'ps as those of th^Board.
H W. ARSHABoard of Commissioners onGrievances and Discipline ofthe Supreme Court of Ohio
27
isefum #4t l3vttr# uf (llmMncisg'innersan (fimuttnr.m mai Disciplinm
of t4t ouprtme ltCrnu-t nf QDI#u
Complaint Against: }}
WARREN G. `Bo" PR1TCaASD }Registration Number 0008417 }296 North Canfield-Niles Road }Youngstown, Ohio 44515 }
} Case Ng 2010-025Respondent }
}}V.}
MAHONING COUNTY BAR ASS'N. }114 East Front Street, Suite 100 }Youngstown Ohio 44503 }
Relator }
STIPULATIONS OF FACTS
COME Now THE REI.AToIt, the MAHONING COiTNTY BAIi ASSOCIA-
TioN, and the Respondent, WARREN G. `Bo" PttrrCxARn, and stipulate
to the following in lieu of testimony touching such matters.
1
TASLE oF CoriTEE1VTs
I. Parties ..................................................4
II.Facts ....................................................4
A MaTgaret A Bury (Amended Complaint 114-10, 11291-298). ... 4
B. Gerald Cenneno (Amended Complaint 9[9[11- 30, 19[299-306). ... 6
C. Columbiana County Bar Asso©ation/Estate of Steve Yancsarak
( A m e n d e d C o m p i a i n t 9[Q31-34, 9[9[307-310) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
D. William DiR,en,b (Amended Coniplaint q9[3547, $9[311-314). .. 12
E. Amyand Joseph D iDomenico (Amended Complaint f(48-85, 315-
320) . ......................................... 16
F. Evelyn Suel-orent (Amended Complaint $186-89, 321-326)
.................................... .......22G. Caro1 Hovanes (Amended Complaint 9[9[90-104, 9[$327-331).... 24
H. Duane and Tracie Coril (Amended Complaint19(105-108, 332-338)
........................................ 27Tina Marie Benson (Amended Complaint 9[9[125-129, 339-344)... .. 31
J. Richard Bodendorfer (Amended Complaint $9[130-133, 345-350)
..............................................33K Darlene Bunnan (Estate of Ronald Papke) (Amended Coznplaint
9(9f 134-142, 11351-356) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
L. Joyoe Catfi,mon (Amended Complaint 11143-192, 9[$357-362). . 36
(Case No. 1999 CV 129) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
(Case No. 2002 CV 1468) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
M Jennifer and Goidon Coyier III (Amended Complaint 11193-204,
363370) .......................................44N. Emil Foriska (Amended Complaint 9[9[ 205-214, 9[9[370-376).. .. 47
0. Betty Garback (Amended Complaint 9[9[215-217, 19[377-382)
..............................................50P. Saed Khatib (Amended Complaint 11218-236, 11383-390). .... 52
2007 CV 3935 IDatib v. Ro,mahi :.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 522008 CV G 00597 If{atib v. El Makdah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2
Q. Terri Raub (Amended Complaint 11237-238, 391-396) ....... 56
R. Arthur Titus (Amended Complaint 9[9[239-242, 9[1397-402). ... 56
S. Ciyde Weimer (Amended Complaint 11243-265, 11403-408). .. 58
Case NQ 2006 CV 3691 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Case N° 2009 CV 1532 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
T. John Zetts (Amended Complaint 9[9[266-290, 11409-413). ..... 61
U. Lack of Insurance ................................... 62
III - DIsMIssAI.s .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
lV - AGGRAVATING ANI) MITIGATING FACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
A. Aggravation ........................................66
B.Mtigation . . .......................................66
C. Otb.er rnu*iiAhmPnt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
D. Punishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3
I. Parties
1. Relator is a local bar association which maintains a certified
grievance committee pursuant to Gov. BAR R. V, §3.
2. Respondent is an attorney at law and is duly licensed to
practice law in the State of Ohio. His bar registration number is
0008417.
3. Respondent's last known business address is 296 N. Can-
field-Nz1es Road, Youngstown, Ohio 44515. His current residence
address is 4531 Woodland, Apartment NQ 3, Youngstown, Ohio 44515.
4. Respondent was admiteed to the practice of law in Ohio on
May 5, 1982, and has been an attorney in good standing since that
date. The Respondent has no prior discipline.
II. Facts
A. Margaret A. Bury (Amended Complaint y[y[4-10,Q9[29X 298)
1. On May 27, 2009, grievant Margaret Bury ("Bury") met with
Respondent for the purpose of filing a bankruptcy petition on her
behalf.
2. On that date, Bury paid a partial payment of $300.00 to the
Respondent. Thereafter, on June 20, 2009, she paid another $500.00.
to Respondent. (See, Eshibit A 1.) On July 1, 2009, Bury paid $250.00
toward the fees that the Respondent required to file the bankruptcy
and for the fee required by the United States Bankruptcy Court (which
was $299.00). (See, Estnbit A-2.) Bur/s total payment to Respondent
was to be $1,350.00.
3. Respondent requested that Bury produce paperwork that
would permit him to Sle the banlcmptcy on Bury's behalf. Bury
produced the requested paperwork, and Respondent advised her that
he would file the bankruptcy petition.
4
4. On July 18, 2009, Bury met with the Respondent for a final
meeting to review her case prior to filing the bankruptcy petition. Since
that meeting, Bury called the Respondent on numerous occasions. The
Respondent failed to return Bury's calls.
5. On August 17, 2009, Bury telephoned Respondent and
received a recording that the telephone line had been disconnected.
6. On August 21, 2009, Bury again caIled Respondent's phone
and received the answering machine. Bury left two messages. To date,
Bury has never received a telephone call from Respondent or anyone
on his behalf.
7. On May 26, 2010, Bury, represented by Robert T. Bricker,
Esq., 106 South Broad Street, Canfield, Ohio 44406, filed a Chapter 7
Voluntary Bankruptcy Petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Northern District of Ohio (Youngstown), Case No.10-41986 kw,
and paid a filing fee in the amount of $299.00.
8. On September 22, 2010, a discharge was ordered by the
bankruptcy judge.
9. Respondent has failed to refund any portion of the fees for
legal services paid by her.
10. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes aviolation of Rule
1.1 (Competence) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which
provides that:
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to aclient. Competent representation requires the legal knowl-edge, sM thoroughness, preparation reasonably necessaryfor the representation.
11. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes aviolation of: Rule
1.15(d) (Safekeeping Funds and Property) which provides that:
(d) Upon receiving funds or property in which aclienti... has an interest, a lawyer shaII promptly notify theclient or third person. Except as stated in this rule orotherwise permitted by law or agreement with the client...,
5
confirmed in writing, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to theclient ... any fnnds... that the client... is entitled to receive.Upon request by the client..., the lawyer shall promptlyrender a full accounting regarding such funds ... .
12. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule
1.16(d) and (e) (Declining or Terminating Representation) of the Ohio
Code of Professional Conduct, which provides that:
(d) As part of the termination of representation, alawyer shall take steps, to the extent reasonably practicable,to protect a client's interest The steps include giving duenotice to the client, aIlowingreasonable time for employmentof other counsel, delivering to the client aIl papers andproperty to which the client is entitled, and complying withapplicable laws and rules. Client papers and property shallbe promptly delivered to the client. "Client papers andproperty" may include correspondence, pleadings, depositiontranscripts, eshibits, physical evidence, expert reports, andother items reasonably necessary to the client's representa-tion.
(e) A lawyer who withdraws from employment shallrefund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that hasnot been earned, except when withdrawal is pursuant toRule 1.17.
B. Gerald Cenneno (Amended Complaint f[$11• 30,f9[299-306)
1. On or about Aprll 17, 2008, Gerald Cenneno ("Cenneno")
retained Respondent for a breach of contract case against St. Anne
LAranian Byzantine Catholic Church. Respondent agreed to represent
Cenneno for a retainer of $1,200.00, and stated that he would file the
complaint against the church in the Austintown court system (Mahoni-
ng County Area No. 4 Court). Cenneno paid Respondent the required
fee in three separate payments.
2. Respondent prepared and filed the complaint on July 1, 2008.
Service on the defendant was completed on July 7, 2008.
6
3. On August 8, 2008, the defendant fled a "Cross Complaint/
Counterclaim" against Gerald Cenneno and John Doe, partner in
Howling Acres Kennels and Lawncare as additional defendants.
4. Cenneno had not heard from the Respondent between the final
payment of the retainer and the receipt by Cenneno of the new
pleadings on or about August 11, 2008.
5. Cenneno then met with the Respondent, who stated that he
needed to turn in some paperwork. Cenneno broughtto the Respondent
the requested papers, and Respondent stated that he would file them
with the court.
6. Cenneno then never heard from Respondent again. Cenneno
caIled many times throughout 2008 and 2009. Many messages were left
with the Respondent. No messages were returned
7. Discovery was issued to the other parties by the defendant
church. Thereafter, a motion to compel discovery was filed on behalf of
the church on November 10, 2008.
8.. On January 7, 2009, motions for default judgment and for
sanctions were filed against the other parties on behalf of the defendant
church.
9. On February 24, .2009, a request for a case status was
forwarded to the Respondent.
10. On March 2, 2009, the court granted default judgment in
favor of defendant St. Anne Ukranian Byzantine Catholic Church and
against Howling Acres Kennels and Lawncare, Gerald Cenneno, and
John Doe, Partner in Howling Acres Kennels and Lawncare.
11. On Apri19, 2009, a certificate of judgment was issued to the
counsel for the church, which was Sled with the Court of Common
Pleas on May 18, 2009. (See, Exhibit B-1.)
7
12. On or about Apri120, 2009, Cenneno received a letter from
St. Anne's attorney stating that Cenneno and Howling Acres had lost
the case by default. Cenneno claims that they were never notified by
either the court or Respondent of anyhearing orrequirement to appear.
13. When Cenneno received the letter from the church's counsel,
Cenneno telephoned the Respondent for approximately three weeks
straight until Cenneno was finally able to reach Respondent.
14. Respondent stated that he was never notified of any oourt
hearing, and that other clients had been placed in similar circum-
stanoes by the courL Respondent stated he would talk to the Magistrate
and would call Cenneno back that day.
15. Respondent never contacted Cenneno, so Cenneno continued
to call Respondent several times the followingweek. Messages were left
with the Respondent's secretary. Respondent never retarned any of
Cenneno's telephone calls.
16. Cenneno continued to telephone Respondent until he again
reached him. At that time, Respondent stated that the Magistrate was
on vacation and that the Respondent would see the Magistrate and
take care of it.
17. Cenneno continued to contact Respondent many times, and
continued to leave messages requesting that Cenneno be informed as
to the status of the case.
18. After several months, Cenneno finally reached the Respon-
dent, and was once again informed by Respondent that he would have
to see the Magistrate. Respondent stated that he would call Cenneno
on Friday or by noon that Saturday. Respondent never returned
Cenneno's telephone caIl.
8
19. Cenneno telephoned the Austintown court at the end of July,
2009. Cenneno was then informed by the court staff that no pleadings
had been filed on his behalf, and that he should speak to his attorney.
20. As a result, Cenneno again attempted to telephone Respon-
dent, and left several messages with Respondent's daughter. Respon-
dent never returned these calls.
21. Thereafter, Cenneno continued to telephone Respondent
many times, and again did not receive a response.
22. On November 30, 2009, Attorney Charles Dunlap entered an
appearance on behalf of Gerald Cenneno and others, and filed a motion
to vacate the order of default judgment.
23. The Magistrate sustained the motion to vacate in an entry of
February 1, 2010. Objections to the Magistrate's Decasion were filed on
February 12, 2010.
24. On April 21, 2010, County Court Judge David D'Apolito
overruled the Magistrate's recommendation, and upheld the default
judgment in favor of St. Anne's Church and against Howling Acres and
Gerald Cenneno. The Court thereafter set the matter for a hearing on
damages.
25. As of the date of this stipulation, a hearing on the issue of
damages was set for December 17, 2010 and the docket reflects no
disposition as yet.
26. The conduct ofthe Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule
1.1 (Competence) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which
provides that:
A]awyer shall provide competent representation to aclient. Competent representation requires the legal lmowi-edge, s1ciIl, thoroughness, preparation reasonably necessaryfor the representation.
27. The conduct of the Respondent cronstitutes a violation o6 Rule
1.3 (Di7igence) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which provides
9
that: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client."
28. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation oF Rule
1.4 (Communication) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which
provides that:
A lawyer shall: ... 3. Keep the client reasonablyinformed about the status of the matter; ... 4. Comply assoon as practicable with reasonable requests for informationfrom the client.
29. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of
Rule.1.15 (d) (Safekeeping Fnnds and Property) which provides that:
(d) Upon receiving funds or property in which aclient... has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify theclient or third person. Except as stated in this rule orotherwise permitted by law or agreement with the client...,confirmed in writing, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to theclient... any funds... that the client... is entitled to receive.Upon request by the client..., the lawyer shall promptlyrender a full accounting regarding such funds ... .
30. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule
1.16(d) and (e) (Declining or Terminating Representation) of the Ohio
Code of Professional Conduct which provides that:
(d) As part of the termination of representation, alawyer shaIl take steps, to the extent reasonably practicable,to protect a clienYs interest. The steps include giving duenotice to the client, allowing reasonable time for employmentof other counsel, delivering to the client aIl papers andproperty to which the client is entitled, and complying withapplicable laws and rules. Client papers and property shaIIbe promptly delivered to the client. "Client papers andproperty" may include correspondence, pleadings, depositiontranscripts, exhibits, physical evidence, expert reports, andother items reasonably necessary to the client's representa-tion.
(e) A lawyer who withdraws &om employment shallrefund_promptly any part of a fee.paid in advance that hasnot been earned, except when withdrawal is pursuant toRule 1.17.
10
C. Columbiana County Bar Associatfon/Estate ofSteve Yancsurak (Amended Complaint 9f9(3T-34,9ff307-3Z0)
1. Respondent was counsel and was appointed to be the
commissioner for the estate of Steve Yancsurak in the Court of
Common Pleas, Probate Division, of Columbiana County, Ohio. The
release for administration of the estate came before the court on May
14, 2009 pursuant to the court's orders of citation to show cause.
Appearing before that court was Donna Yancsurak, the applicant.
Respondent was also ordered to appear: Respondent failed to do so.
(See, Exhibit C-1.)
2. The court found that Respondent failed to appear for the last
two hearings and had been wamed that his failure to appear would
result in a finding of contempt and that appropriate sanctions,
including a warrant for his arrest, would be issued.
3. The court found Respondent in contempt of the court's order
for the Respondent's failure to appear for hearings and to timely
complete the release from administration form. A warrant was issued
for Respondent's arrest, declaring that upon apprehension, he was
subject to release upon posting a $2,500.00 recognizance bond with the
court; that he appear before the court as and when ordered for fnrther.
hearings; and that he advise the court at all times regarding his
cvrrent address apd mailfng address, as well as current telephone
number. A copy of the order was delivered to the Columbiana County
Certified Grievance Committee for further consideration. (See, copy of
Court's order of May 15, 2009 attached as Exhibit C-1 to the Amended
Complaint, and the Curfsbench warrant of May 15, 2009 attached as
Exhibit C-2 to the Amended Complaint.)
4. The Columbiana County Certified Grievance Committee then
forwarded the Court's order to Relator for further handling.
11
5. The Court has ordered a recall ofthe warrant, and has ordered
the payment of $45.00 in costs, which Respondent has paid. (See,
Exhibit (C-3).
6. The conduct of the Respondent wnstitutes a violation of Rule
1.3 (Diligence) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which provides
that: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client."
D. William. D%Renxo (Amended Complaant 9[135-47,9If31I-314)
1. Respondent served as the legal counsel for grievant William
DiRenzo ("DiRenzo°) from at least October of 2003 through May 8,
2009.2. During the period that Respondent served as DiRenzo's
counsel, DiRenzo learned that the Respondenfs mother, Catherine
Pritchard, had property for sale on State Route 46 in Austintown
Township, Mahoning County, Obio.
3. Thereafter, Respondent, on behalf of his mother, reached an
agreement with his client (DiRenzo) for the purchase of one lot known
as Permanent Parce1480400158000. (See, Eshfbit D-4.)
4. The lot was sold and title was transferred to DiRenzo on or
about September 1, 2004. (See, Vol. 005471, page 1425, Instrument No.
2004 00037392, Mahoning County Recordex's records.)
5. Respondent owned the remaining 17 acres of land on State
Route 46.
6. Respondent later agreed to sell 2 acres of the 17 acres to Carol
Fye, for $60,000.00. Ms. Tye made two payments toward the purchase
price, $5,000.00 and $25,000.00, leaving a balance of $30,000:00.
7. Respondent advised Fye that a survey needed to be done to
divide out the two acres that she was purchasing.
12
8. While waiting for the survey work to be performed, a foreclo-
sure action, involving all 17 acres, was filed against Respondent.
9. On March 31, 2006, after the foreclosure had been filed,
DiRenzo entered into a partnership agreement, forming 46 Partners
with two other individuals, Mr. Doclay and Mr. Pancoe. (See, Exln'bit
D-5.) The purpose of the partnership was the acquisition of the 15 acre
parcel of land owned by Respondent on State Route 46, to be held for
development or resale by the partners.
10. On October 1, 2006, DiRenzo and the other partners signed
a purchase agreement on behalf of 46 Partners to purchase the 15 aere .
tract from Respondent. In fintherance of efforts of 46 Partners to
obtain financing, DiRenzo provided financial information for a state-
ment. of assets and liabilities on October 22, 2006. (See, Exhibit D-6.)
11. Respondent attempted to obtain alternate fmancing for
himself or for 46 Partners, to save the property from foredosure, but
was unsuccessful.
12. A sheriffs sale was scheduled for November 28, 2006.
13. On November 28, 2006 Ddi.enzo provided a deposit of
$28,000.00 for the purchase of property on State Route 46. Direnzo
made the check payable to "Michael B. Dockry." Dockry is an attorney
licensed to prad3ce law in the State of Ohio, is the current Austintown
Township Administrator, one of the partners in 46 Partners, and
previously shared office space with Respondent.
14. DiRenzo then obtained an official check (No. 3687217) from
Sky Bank in the amount of $28,000.00, and delivered the check to
Michael Dockry on November 28, 2006 as requested by Respondent.
(See Exhibit D-1.)
15. Respondent added $1,500.00 of his own funds, for a total of
$29,500.00, and sent Michael Dockry to the Sheriffs sale.
13
16. Carol Fye was also at the Sheriff sale, with $15,000.00.
17. At the Sheriffs sale, Doelny and Carol F'ye agreed to pool
their funds to bid on the property. Ms.F^ye knew Doekry was there on
behalf of Respondent and knew that Dockrybrought funds to bid on the
property on behalf of Respondent.
18. F!ye and Dockry joined their funds together and purchased
the property at the Sheriff sale.
19. After speaking with Respondent, Fye placed the property in
her name, with the understanding that Respondent would continue to
seek financing to purchase the property and the title issues would be
resolved later. When Respondent could not obtain additional financing,
Fye kept the $29,500.00 that Doakry had brought to the Sheriff sale,
considering it repayment ofthe $30,000.00 payment she previouslyhad
made to Respondent, since she had not received a deed for the two
acres. Fye thus obtained title over the entire 15 acre pareel, and
whether she holds two acres in constructive trust for DiRenzo is beyond
the scope of this proceeding.
20. After Respondent informed DiRenzo that he could purchase
whatever interest Respondent had in the property for the $1,500.00
that the Respondent had pooled with Dockry, DiRenzo obtained a
check in the amount of $1,500.00, that was payable to Respondent and
was delivered to his office.
21. This check was cashed by Respondent on June 20,2007. (See
Exhibit D-3.)
22. While the real estate matters were ongoing, Respondent and
DiRenzo were involved in legal proceedings croncerning the death of
DiRenzo's spouse.
23. According to the information received from the Mahoning
County Sheriffs office and DiRenzo's bank, the $28,000.00 check that
14
DiRenzo had delivered to Doclay was negotiated by Dockry at First
Place Bank on November 28, 2006. First Place Bank then issued a
check (No. 3003382) in the amount of $29,500.00 payable to the
Sheriffs Department on November 28, 2006. That check showed "46
Partners" as the remitter.
24. Fye purchased at a Sheriffs Sale on November 28, 20061and
that included what DiRenzo had believed would be his two acres of
land.
25. At the time of the SheriSs sale Fye made a deposit of
$44,500.00, $29,500:00 ofwhich came from "46 Partners" and $15,000.-
00 came from Carol F^ye.
26, To date, Fye remains the owner of the entire 17 acre parcel
of property. Respondent has been unable to secure a deed for DiRenzo
or for 46 Partners, and neither Respondent nor 46 Partners have
returned the money to DiRenzo.
14. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes violations of:
DR-5-104(A) of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Limited
Business Relationship With A Client) which provides that:
A lawyer shall not enter in a business transactionwith a client if they have differing interests therein and iftheclient expects the lawyer to exercise his professional judg-ment therein for the protection of the client, unless the clienthas consented after full disclosure
and Rule 1.8 (Conflict of Interest: Current Clients: Specific Rules) ofthe
Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which provides that: "A lawyer shall
not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire
an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse
to a client"
15
E. Amy and Joseph DiDomenico (Amended Com-plaint ff48-85, 815-320)
1. On July 16, 2005, J & V Roofing and Home Improvement was
contracted to replace grievants Amy and Joseph DiDomenico
("DiDomenicos") roof because of its age and condition.
2. The DiDomenicos claimed that the roof replacement was
substandard and resulted in damages to their home. Thereafter, they
retained attorney Anthony Donofrio to file a complaint against J& V
for breach of contract, brea.ch of warranty, and violations of Ohio's
Consumer Sales Practices Act.
3. Mr. Donofrio did file a.complaint against J& V Roofing in the
Mahoning County Court Area No. 4 on August 30, 2007. (Case No.
2007 CVF 1302.)
4. Thereafter, the DiDomenicos decided to retain Respondent to
represent them in connection with their dispute against J& V. At the
initial meeting with Respondent on September 15, 2007, neither the
DiDomenicos nor Respondent were aware of the fact that Mr. Donofrio
had filed a lawsuit, numbered as Case No. 2007 CVF 1302.
5. Respondent agreed to represent the DiDomenicos on Septem-
ber 15, 2007. At that time the DiDomenicos paid a retainer fee of
$850.00.
6. On September 26, 2007, Respondent filed a complaint against
J& V Roofing in the Mahoning County Court, Area No. 4(Case No.
2007 CVF 1478 on that Court's docket). At the time of this filing, he
was unaware of the pending DiDomenico complaint in Case No. 2007
CVF 1302.
7. Respondent sent a letter to attorney Donofrio informing him
that Respondent had been retained and Respondent requested a copy
of Donofrio's file.
16
8. Upon receipt of Donofrio's file, Respondent became aware that
Donofrio had filed a complaint Case No. 2007 CVF 1302.
9. Respondent filed a notice of appearance in Case No. 2007 CVF
1302 on December 4, 2007. (See Exhibit E-1.)
10. Respondent was to perform work on an hourly basis. There
is no written agreement evidencing the hourly rate or other financaal
arrangements between Respondent and the DiDomenicos.
11. On January 27, 2008, the DiDomenicos paid Respondent
$250.00. Additional fees, in the amount of $600.00, were paid on July
19, 2008. The DiDomenicos elaim to have been told that fees paid on
July 19, 2008 were to cover witness/subpoena fees. Additional Court
costs of $20.00 were paid directly to Court No. 4 on June 30,2009. (See
Exhibits E-2, E-3, and E-4.)
12. On February 20, 2008, the case originally filed by Donofrio,
2007 CVF 1302, was called for a pretrial. Counsel for both the
DiDomenicos and J & V were present. The Court ordered that
discovery be eompleted in 90 days, and a dispositive motion deadline
was scheduled for 120 days thereafter. The trial to the bench was
scheduled for five months. The Court granted the plaintiffs' oral motion
to amend the compla.int. The motion to dismiss previously filed by the
defendant, which was set for a non-oral hearing, was continued pending
the filing of the amended complaint. The motion to dismiss asserted
that the defendants were not properly named in the complaint.
13. On May 7, 2008, the Court held another pretrial on th 2007
CVF 1302 case, and scheduled the c.ivil trial for Augast 8, 2008.
14. On May 9, 2008, the DiDomenicDs were to meet with the
Respondent at his office at 4:30 pm. Respondent did not appear for the
appointment at his office. The DiDomenicos sat at Respondent's office
17
parking lot for 45 minutes and then received a call from Respondent
eventually to cancel the appointment.
15. On July 23,2008, the DiDomenicos again contacted Respon-
dent and left a message. He did not return this call.
16 On July 28, 2008, the defendant's counsel in the 2007 CVF
1302 case fiied a motion to withdraw.
17. Because two lawsuits asserting the same c]aims against the
same party were pending and proceeding simultaneously, and there
were issues with how Mr. Donofrio named the defendant in 2007 CVF
1302, on August 6, 2008, Respondent voluntarily dismissed the 2007
CVF 1302 case without prejudice, pursuant to Oxio Civ. R. 41(A). The
Court closed its case on August 11, 2008. (See, Court docket, Exhibit
E-1.)
18. On August 7, 2008, the DiDomenioos contacted Respondent
to confirm the time and date of trial. At that time, Respondentinformed
the DiDomenicos that the orlginal Court date of August 8, 2008 was
cancelled.
19. On September 5, 2008, the Court forwarded a request for a
case status to Respondent for the sole pending case 2007 CVF 1478.
Not having received a response, the Court dismissed the case for failure
to appear and proceed, at plaintiffs' cost. Neither Respondent nor the
DiDomenicos received notice of either the hearing or the dismissal.
20. On September 11, 2008, the DiDomenicos telephoned
Respondent. Respondent's secretary said she would take a message and
have Respondent return the call. Respondent did not return the call.
21. On September 15, 2008, the DiDomenioos telephoned
Respondent and left a message. Respondent did not return this call.
22. On September 23, 2008, the DiDomenicos again telephoned
Respondent and left a message. Respondent did not immediately return
18
the call, but the DiDomenicros were able to reach Respondent by
telephone. When they did, Respondent stated that he was iIl and did
not have a secretary. In a second telephone conversation, Respondent
stated that he had a teenager at home who was ill and that he didn't
have a secretary anymore.
23. On March 6, 2009, the DiDomenioos stopped by Respondent's
office to ask if any progress had been made in refiling the case. An
appointment was scheduled for March 7, 2009.
24. On March 7, 2009, the DiDomenicos appeared at Respon-
dent's office for the scheduled appointsnent. At that time, they ques-
tioned Respondent regaxding his failure to appear at the prior hearing.
Respondent stated that he was going through a divorce, his wife had
left him, and his files were intentionally disorganized and/or tampered
with. Respondent advised that he would attempt to reopen the case.
25. On March 13, 2009, the DiDomenicos telephoned Respon-
dent. At that time, they left a message on his answering machine, but
did not receive a response.
26. On March 14, 2009, the DiDomenicos telephoned Respon-
dent. At that time, they left a message on his answering machine, but
did not receive a response.
27. On March 17, 2009, the DiDomenicos contactedRespondent's
office. At that time, they spoke to Respondent's son who advised that
he was acting as Respondent's secretary.
. 28. On March 19, 2009, Respondent filed a motion to vacate the
Court's judgment entry of dismissal of October 27, 2008. On the same
day, Respondent telephoned the DiDomenicos to advise that the
Magistrate was only in on Fridays. The Respondent advised that the
matter would proceed in front of the Magistrate, and he would make a
19
decision whether to reinstate the case or whether the DiDomenicros
would have to re-file the case.
29. On March 23, 2009, the Court gave notice to the parties that
a hearing on the motion would be scheduled for Apri124, 2009 at noon.
30. On Apri116, 2009, the D>Domenicos telephoned the Respon-.
dent to determine if he had sufficient paperwork to support their case.
Respondent returned the phone call and stated that the hearing was
non-oral and that the DiDomenicos need not appear.
31. In the judgment entry ofApri127, 2009, the Court noted that
the case had been caIled for a non-oral hearing on the plaintiffs' motion
to vacate the order of dismissal dated October 27, 2008. The Court
noted, however, that no attorney for the defendant had been served
with plaintiffs' motion, and therefore the Court continued the hearing
for 30 days.
32. On Apri130, 2009, Respondent was requested to bring $20.00
to the Court in order to permit service to proceed.
33. On June 24, 2009, the DiDomenicos telephoned the Court
Administrator, and at that time learned that the Respondent had not
paid the fee to perfect certified mail service:
34. At that time, the DiDomenicos called and spoke to the
Respondent's son who advised that Respondent was out of town and
that he would give him the message.
35. On June 29, 2009, the DiDomenicos went to the Court and
paid the $20.00 Court fee directly. (Respondent is not sure why this was
required, as service had already been made upon the defendant.)
36. Thereafter, the DiDomeni<ns called the Respondent several
times and received a busy signal at Respondent's office. They were not
able to leave a message on an answering machine.
20
37. On June 30, 2009, the Court scheduled a hearing on the
motion for August 14, 2009 at 9:15 a.m.
38. Successful service on the defendant was made on July 14,
2009.
39. On July 20, 2009, an attorney, James Wise, filed a notice of
substitution of counsel with the Court on behalf of the defendant.
40. On July 29, 2009, the DiDomenicos forwarded a certified
letter to the Respondent reminding him of the pending trial. The letter
was returned to sender unclaimed.
41. Respondent didnot appear for the Court's scheduled hearing
on August 14, 2009. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the
DiDomenicos call during Court to remind Respondent of the trial. The
DiDomenicos telephoned and reminded the Respondent that they had
forwarded to him a certified letter but received no response.
42. The Court treated the August 14 hearing as a pretrial, and
noted that discovery was to be completed in 60 days, and that dispositi
ve motions were to be filed in 90 days. The Court scheduled a trial to
the bench in 120 days.
43. On January 12, 2010, Respondent filed a motion to withdraw
based upon his interim suspension. This motion was granted by the
Court. This case remains pending.
44. On February 24, 2010, an attorney, Scott Cochran, filed a
notice ofappearance, motion to continue, and motion to oonvertthe trial
to a pretrial on behalf of the DiDomenicos.
45. These motions were granted. On July 1, 2010, Mr. Wise, on
behalf of defendant J & V Roofing and Home Improvement, filed a
motion to dismiss. A brief in response to defendanfs motion was filed
by Mr. Cochran on September 9, 2010. The matter was taken under
advisement by the Magistrate on October 1, 2010.
21 .
46. On October 14, 2010 the Magistrate granted the Plaintiffs
Motion to Vacate the Dismissal and denied the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss. The trial Court adopted the Magistrate's decision and the case
was placed on the trial schedule.
47. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule
1.3 (Diligence) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which provides
that: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client."
48. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule
1.4(ax3) and (4) (Communication) of the Ohio Code of Professional
Conduct which provides that: "A lawyer shall: ... Keep the client
reasonably informed about the status of the matter;" and "Comply as
soon as practicable with reasonable requests for information from the
client"
F. Evelyn Sue Lorent (Amended Complaint y[y(8&89,321-326)
1. On Apri13, 2009, Evelyn Sue Lorent retained Respondent to
provide her legal advice regarding the filing of a possible bankruptcy
and in relation to a probate matter.
2. Thereafter, Lorent met with Respondent on at least two other
occasions, the last of which was Apr.d 20, 2009.
3. Lorent paid to Respondent the total sum of $1,300.00, in three
separate payments. (See, Exhibits F-1, F-2, and F-3.) Lorent also
provided documents to Respondent necessary for him to review the
issues presented by Lorent.
4. Respondent fumished Lorent a bankruptcy worksheet form to
complete. Respondent developed a legal strategy that was designed to
weigh the competing interests of the filing of a bankruptcy against
Lorent's probate estate and life insurance issues.
22
5. Thereafter, Lorent attempted to contact the Respondent on
numerous occasions. Shewas unable to do so.
6. Lorent also forwarded a certified letter to Respondent
dismissing him as her counsel, but did not receive a response.
7. On September 21, 2009, Lorent filed a grievance with the
Mahoning County Bar Association because she had not heard from
Respondent in more than five months.
8. Respondent has failed to refund Lorent's payment for legal
services to be rendered by Respondent.
9. Lorent was involved in only one lawsuit concerning a medical
bill for her, not her deceased husband, a lawsuit that was filed in 2006.
10. No other lawsuits were filed against Lorent and Lorent did
not have to file bankruptcy.
11. Lorent's husband's probate estate was handled as a summary
administration by another attorney, Scott D. Hunter.
12. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule
1.3 (Diligence) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which provides
that: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client"
13. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule
1.4(axs) and (4) (Communication) of the Ohio Code of Professional
Conduct which provides that: "A lawyer shall: ... Keep the client
reasonably informed about the status of the matter;" and "Comply as
soon as practicable with reasonable requests for information from the
client."
15. The conduct ofthe Respondent constitutes a violation of: Rule
1.15 (Safekeeping Funds and Property) of the Ohio Code ofProfessional
Conduct which provides that:
Upon receiving funds or property in which a client..has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or
23
third person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwisepermitted by law or agreement with the client..., confirmedin writing, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client... anyfunds... that the client... is entitled to receive. Upon requestby the client..., the lawyer shall promptly render a fuIlacxounting regarding such funds...
16. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes aviolation of Rule
1.16 (Declining or Terminating Represmtation) of the Ohio Code of
Professional Conduct which provides that: _
As part of the termination of representation, a lawyershaIl take steps, to the extent reasonably practicable, toprotect a client's interest. The steps include giving due noticeto the client, allowing reasonable time for employment ofother cDunsel, delivering to the client all papers and propertyto which the.client is entitled, and cromplyingwith applicablelaws and rules. Cfient papers and property shall be promptlydelivered to the client. `Client papers and property' mayinclude correspondence, pleadings, deposition transcripts,exhibits, physical evidence, expert reports, and other itemsreasonably necessary to the client's representation.
A lawyer who withdraws from employment shallrefund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that hasnot been earned, except when withdrawal is pursuant toRule 1.17.
G Carol Hovanes (Amended Complaint f9I90-I04,U327-33I)
1. On July 21, 2008, Bank of New York filed a complaint in
foreclosure against Carol Hovanes ("Hovanes").
2. The complaint was served upon Hovanes on or about August
11, 2008.
3. Thereaftes, Hovanes cnnsulted with the Respondent for legal
advice relating to the foreclosure action, though she did not want to
save the home from foreclosure.
4. In addition to stating that he would protect Hovanes' interests
in the foreclosure matter, Respondent also recommended to Hovanes
that she file bankruptcy.
24
5. To represent Hovanes, Respondent charged $300.00 for the
foreclosure case, which was paid on August 16,2008; thirteen hundred
doIlars in legal fees for the bankrnptcy, and three hundred dollara for
the bankruptcy filing fee. The fees and filing fee were paid as follows:
$500.00 on August 29, 2008; $500.00 on September 13, 2008 and
$600.00 on September 26, 2008.
6. After being retained in the foreclosure case, Respondent filed
a motion for leave to move or plead on behalf of Hovanes on or about
September 8, 2008. This motion was grant,ed by the Court on Septem-
ber 23, 2008. No other document has been filed by the Respondent in
the foreclosure case.
7. Hovanes continued to be pursued by her creditors.
8. Hovanes contacted the Respondent regarding the status of her
bankraptcy.
9. Respondent advised Hovanes that he had not filed her
bankruptcy. As indicated on the information packet furnished by
Respondent to Hovanes, Hovanes was required to complete a debt
counseling course prior to filing her banlmptcy. Respondent's form,
given to Hovanes, provided:
Note: You must complete a Pre-Bankraptcy EducationCourse and submit your certificate to our o$'ice iDrior to filingyour bankruptcy. This certificate is required by the U.S.Bankruptcy Court, ...
10. Hovanes then enrolled in a consumer credit counseling
course.
11. Hovanes did not complete the required course until July 2,
2009.12. Upon completion, Respondent and Hovanes completed the
bankruptcy forms, but Respondent failed to file them with the
bankraptcy oourt.
25
13. Hovanes attempted to contact Respondent regarding the
status of her bankruptcy and foreciosure cases. Hovanes made
numerous and repeated telephone caIls to Respondent, sometimes
calling every day. No telephone call was ever returned by the Respon-
cient.
13. Hovanes also forwarded a letter to Respondent requesting a
status report regarding her cases. Respondent did not reply to this
lettzr.
14. To date, Respondent has failed to keep Hovanes. informed
regarding the status of her foreclosure case, has not filed a banluuptcy
petition, and has failed to respond to any collection inquiry by attorneys
or debt collectors. Respondent has failed to return to Hovanes the
original fee, or any part thereo£
15. Hovanes secared new counsel to represent her in connection
with her bankruptcy petition, who filed a petition for Hovanes on
January 22, 2010.
16. On February 18,2010, a notice of automatic stay was filed in
the foreclosure case as a result of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
17. The bankruptcy has been completed and the case closed as
of June 30, 2010, and the debts have been discharged, including the
debt to Countrywide for the mortgage on Hovanes' home.
18. The conduct of the Respondent as set above constitutes a
violation of Rule 1.1 (Competence) of the Ohio Code of Professional
Conduct which provides that "A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skiIl, thoroughness, preparation reasonably necessary for
the representation."
19. The conduct ofthe Respondent constitutes aviolation of: Rule
1.3 (Diligence) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which provides
26
that: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client"
20. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of: Rule
1.4 (Communication) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which
provides that: "A lawyer shall: *** 3. Keep the client reasonably
informed about the status of the matter; *** 4. Comply as soon as
practicable with reasonable requests for informatfon from the client."
21. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule
1.16 (Declining or Termfnating Representation) of the Obio Code of
Professional Conduct which provides that: "(e) A lawyer who withdraws
from employment shall refund promptly any part of a fee paid in
advance that has not been earned, except when withdrawal is pursuant
to Rule 1.17."
H. Duane and Tracfe Corll (Amended Complaint9[9[105:104 332-338)
1. In July of 2008, Duane and Tracie Corll ("Corlls") initially met
with Respondent. The purpose ofthe meeting was to discuss the Corlls'
financial status, and the potential filing of a bankruptcy petition on
their behalf:
2. Respondent informed the Cor1Ls that he would charge thexn a
fee of $1,300.00 for the bankruptcy case. The Corlls made an initial
installment payment at their first meeting, and by the end of August
2008, they had paid Respondent in fnIl.
3. During that period, the CorIls began completing information
forms fiunished by Respondent which was required for the bankruptcy
petition. The Corlls also took a credit counseling course which was
required prior to the filing of bankruptcy. Both the documents and
course work were completed by December of 2008.
27
4. However, because the CorAs were entitled to a tax refund for
tax year 2008 and had not provided everything to Respondent until
December 2008, Respondent advised them to wait to file their bank-
ruptcy.
5.. Over time, the Corlls had a more difficult time contacting
Respondent. When they were able to contact hnn again, Respondent
informed the Corlls that they needed to put the bankruptcy off until
after. they had filed their income taxes so that the refund would not be
lost to the bankraptcy estate. ,
6. At Respondent's suggestion, the Corlls waited to file their
bankruptcy. Though they filed their tax return before April of 2009, the
Corils are not certain when they filed.
7. ZYacie Corll spoke to Respondent in his office on May 19, 2009.
At that time, Trade asked again about filing the bankruptcy petition.
At that time, Respondent stated that he did not understand why it was
a problem because the Corlls were not paying any of their biIIs.
8. Following that conversation and the specific instructions by
Tracie that they wanted their bankruptcy completed, Respondent filed
the petition that same day (May 19, 2009).
9. The first hearing was scheduled on July 14, 2009 in the
bankruptcy oourt.
10. Respondent's bankruptcy client questionnaire advises his
clients that they wi71 need to produce income tax returns for Respon-
dent, and the form filled out by the Corlls indicated that they needed
to produce their 2006 and 2007 returns.
11. The Corlls had provided Respondent their 2006 and 2007
returns but not their 2008 returns.
12. Respondent contacted the Corlls the day before the bank-
ruptcy hearing to inform them that they needed their tax returns,
28
because Respondent's office did not have the returns to send to the
bankruptcy trustee.
13. The CorIls weren't able to retrieve their taxretarns before the
hearing and because of this fact the hearing was rescheduled.
14. A second hearing was scheduled on July 28, 2009. Respon-
dent failed to appear for this hearing. The bankruptcy court gave the
Corlls the option to go through with the hearing without Respondent
or to reschedule, and the Corlls chose to reschedule.
15. At the third hearing the baiilmiptoy was completed, except
for the post.hearing counseling. The Corlls completed the course but
could not deliver the paperwork to Respondent because they omxld not
contact him.
16. When the papers that proved the Corlls completed the
counseling were not turned in to the court, the court dismissed the case.
17. On October 3, 2009, the Corlls received a letter from the
United States Bankruptcy Court indicating that their case had been
dosed without discharge because the Corlls did not timely file a
statement ceiiafying completion of an instructional cwurse.
18. The Corlls bankruptcy petition has not been re-filed. While
the Corlls are seeking new legal oounsel to represent them in their
bankruptcy case, the Court records show that "If the debtor(s) subse-
quently file(s) the proper pleading, to allow for the filing of the
FSnancial Management Course Certificate, the debtor(s) must pay the
full filing fee."
19. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of: Rule
1.1 (Competence) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which
provides that "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a
client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, sldll,
thoroughness, preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."
29
20. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of. Rule
1.3 (Diligence) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which provides
that: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client."
21. The conduct ofthe Respondent constitutes a violation o£ Rule
1.4(W) and (4) (Communication) of the Ohio Code of Professional
Conduct which provides that: "A lawyer sh.aIl: ... Keep the client
reasonably informed about the status of the mAtter;" and "Comply as
soon as practicable with reasonable requests for information from the
client." 22. The conduct of the Respondentoonstitutes a violation of: Rule
1.15 (Safekeeping Funds and Property) of the Ohio Code of Professional
Conduct which provides that
Upon receiving funds or property in which a client...has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client orthird person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwisepermitted by law or agreement with the client..., confirmedin writing, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client... anyfunds.., that the client... is entitled to receive. Upon requestby the client..., the lawyer shall promptly render a fuIIaccounting regarding such funds... ,
23. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule
1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation) of the Ohio Code of
Professional Conduct which provides that:
As part of the termination of representation, a lawyershall take steps, to the extent reasonably practicable, toprotect a client's interest. The steps include giving due noticeto the client, allowing reasonable time for employment ofother counsel, delivering to the clientall papers and propertyto which the client is entitled, and complying with applicablelaws and rules. Client papers and property shall be promptlydelivered to the client. 'Client papers and property' mayinalude correspondence, pleadings, depositaon transcripts,exhibits, physical evidence, expert reports, and other itemsreasonably necessary to the client's representation.
A lawyer who withdraws from employment shallrefund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that has
30
not been earned, except when withdrawal is pursuant toRule 1.17.
Tiata Marie Benson (Amended Complaint f$125-129,339-344)
1. At a time prior to the events here described, Respondent
completed a barkruptcy for Dustin Benson.
2. On or about July 15, 20009, 'lina Marie Benson met with
Respondent for purposes of filing a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy petition.
ltespondent advised Ms. Benson that she would have to pay the sum
of $1,350.00 for the bankruptcy. Ms. Benson paid Respondent the sum
of $1,000.00 on July 15, 2009, and Respondent provided a receipt to
Benson, indicating a balance due of $350.00. (Exhibit I-1.)
3. At that time, Respondent provided paperwork for Ms. Benson
to complete in order to file the banlrnptcy. Included in that packet was
a notice that Respondent would not file a bankruptcy until aIl legal fees
and filing fees were paid.
4. Ms. Benson completed the paperwork and attempted to contact
Respondent on numerous occasions by telephone.
5: Ms. Benson leftmessages onRespondent's answeringmachine.
Eventually, the phone either rang busy or indicated that it had been
disconnected.
6. Ms. Benson also attempted to contact Respondent in person at
his offioe and left letters for Respondent at his off'ice.
7. Ms. Benson was never able to meet again with Respondent,
and acxordingly did not furnish Respondent the balance of the fees or
the papers-neeessary for Respondent to prepare a bankruptcy petition.
8. Respondent failed to meet again with Ms. Benson.
9. Ms. Benson contacted a new attorney who filed a Chapter 7
Bankruptcy for $1,100.00.
81
10. The discharge was final in April of 2010.
11. Respondent failed to return phone calls and has failed to
return the money paid to him by Ms. Benson.
12. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of: Rule .
1.3 (Diligenoe) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which provides
that: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client."
13. The mnduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule
1.4(aX3) and (4) (Communication) of the Ohio Code of Professional
Conduct which provides that: "A lawyer sha1L ... Keep the client
reasonably informed about the status of the matter;: and "Comply as
soon as practicable with reasonable requests for information from the
client."
14. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of: Rule
1.15 (Safekeeping Funds and Property) ofthe Ohio Code of Professional
Conduct which provides that:
Upon receiving fands or property in which a client...has an interest, a lawyer shaIl promptly notify the client orthird person. Escept as stated in this rule or otherwisepermitted by law or agreement with the client..., confirinedin writing, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the cfient... anyfunds... that the client... is entitled to receive. Upon requestby the client..., the lawyer shall promptly render a fullaccounting regarding such funds....
15. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule
1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation) of the Ohio. Code of
Professional Conduct which provides that:
As part of the termination of representation, a lawyershaIl take steps, to the extent reasonably practicable, to.rotect a_clie_nt's iaterest. The steps include giving due noticeto the client, allowing reasonable time for employment ofother counsel, delivering to the client all papers and propertyto which the client is entitled, and complyfng with applicablelaws and rules. Client papers and property shaIIbe promptlydelivered to the client: `Client papers and property' mayinclude correspondence, pleadings, deposition transcripts,
32
exhibits, physical evidence, expert reports, and other itemsreasonably necessary to the client's representation.
A lawyer who withdraws from employment shallrefund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that hasnot been earned, except when withdrawal is pursuant toRule 1.17.
J. Rich.ard Bodendorfer (Amended Complaint 9[$130•.
133, 345-350)
1. On October 14, 2008, Richard Bodendorfer paid Respondent
the sum of $750.00 to form a limited liability corporation. (See, Exhibit
J-1 attached to the Amended Complaint, receipt no. 340331.)
2: Respondent prepared the articles of organization and other
necessary documents for the formation of an LLC, Great Lakes
Communications, LLC; and, on October 15, 2008, a check in the
amount of $125.00 was issued from an suxount Payable to the Ohio
Secretary of State for the filing fee.
3. On October 20, Respondent received notice from the Ohio
Secretary of State that his Previously submitted filing was not .
acceptable because the chosen name was not available. (See, Exhibit J-
2).4. The same notice advised Respondent to contact Great Lakes
Communications, Inc., in Amherst, Ohio to obtain consent for use of the
name.
5. On October 31, 2008, Respondent sent a letter to Great Lakes
Communieations, requesting consent to use the name for the grievani's
purported LLC.6. On December 5, 2008, Respondent sent a follow-up letter to
Great Lakes Communications again requesting consent. Respondent
attempted to secure a waiver from the entity that had claim to the
name that Mr. Bodendorfer wished to use. Those efforts were unsuo-
cessful.
33
7. Respondent prepared new LLC documents with a new name
selected, and on January 30, 2009, Bodendorfer signed new articles of
organization with the new name of RDB Systems, LLC.
8. On Febrnary 4, 2009, the articIes were sent to the Ohio
Secretary of State with the requisite filing fee, but were rejected due to
changes in the Secretary of State's filing reqnirements (the office now
required that its form be used exclusively).
9. On or about February 6, 2009, the grievant sent, at Respon-
dent's request, an additional $250.00. Affter that date, Respondent took
no fiirFlier action on behalf of Mr. Bodendorfer.
10. The conduct of the Respondent oonstitutes aviolation oF Rule
1.3 (Diligence) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conductwhich provides
that "A lawyer shaIl act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client."
11. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of: Rule
1.4 (Communication) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which
provides that "A lawyer shall: ... 3. Keep the client reasonably
informed about the status of the matter; ... 4. Comply as soon as
practicable. with reasonable requests for information from the client."
12. The c:onduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of: Rule
1.15 (Safekeeping Funds and Property) of the Ohio Code of Professional
Conduct which provides that: "(d) Upon receiving funds or property in
which a client... has an interest, a lawyer shaIl promptly notify the
client or third person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwise
permitted by law or agreement with the client..., confirmed in writing,
a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client... any funds... that the
client... is entitled to receive. Upon request by the client..., the lawyer
shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such funds... ." ...
34
13. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule
1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation) of the Ohio Code of
Professional Conduct which provides that:
(d) As part of the termination of representation, alawyer shall take steps, to the extent reasonably practicable,to protect a client's interest. The steps include giving duenotics to the elient, allowing reasonable time for employmentof other counsel, delivering to the client all papers andproperty to which the clientis entitled, and complying withapplicable laws and rules. Client papers and property shallbe promptly delivered to the client. 'Client papers andproperty'may include correspondence, pleadings, depositiontranscripts, exhibits, physical evidence, expert reports, andother items reasonably necessary to the client's representa-tion.
(e) A lawyer who withdraws from employment shallrefund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that hasnot been earned, except when withdrawal is pursuant toRule 1.17.
K Darlene Burman (Estate of Ronald Papke)(Amended Complaint y(2134-142, 9(f351-356)
1. Respondent was retained for the purpose of providing legal
assistance to Darlene Burman, the fiduciary of the estate of Ronald
Papke, Ms. Burman's brother.
2. Respondent opened the estate for Ronald Papke, deceased,
Case No. 2009 ES 151 on the docket of the Probate Court of Mahoning
County, Court of Common Pleas, Ohio. The application for authority to
administer the estate was filed on March 18, 2009.
3. Respondent charged the estate $15,028.00 in fees and cwsts
before he filed the inventory. Though these attorney fees were not
authorized by the Court in advance, after a review of the file, the
Probate Court determined that the estate had been nearly completed
by Respondent and that the amount of compensation he received
without court approval was less than what he would have been entitled
to under the court's computation schedule.
35
4. After meeting with the Fiduciary of the estate, the Court
agreed that the Fiduciary should retain new counsel and proceed with
the completion of the administration of the estate. The Fiduciary was
the sole beneficiary andtherefore the only interested party. Because the
compensation was in accordance with court guidelines, the Probate
Court did not file or seek any oourt imposed sanctions against Respon-
dent.
5. The estate was completed in due course by successor counsel.
6. The conduct of Respondent violates Rule 1.3 (Diligencz) of the
Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which provides that: "Alawyer shall
act with reasonable diHgence and promptness in representing a client"
L. Joyce Catterson (Amended Complaint g9[143-192,y(f357-362)
(Case No. 1999 CV 129)
1. On January 20, 1997 Joyce Catterson was involved in an
automobile accident. She retained Respondent to pursue a claim for her
injuries and damages sustained against the tortfeasor, Albert Roskos.
2. On January 19, 1999, Respondent filed a oomplaint in the
Mahoning County Common Pleas Court against Mr. Roskos.
3. The summons and the complaint were served upon the
defendant by certified mail. The mail was returned on or about
February 2,1999. On February 18,1999, an answer was filed on behalf
of the defendant. On that same date, defendant forwarded to the
plafntiff interrogatories and requests for produdaon of documents.
4. On May 5, 1999, the trial court sent a scheduling order, setting
pretrial, discovery, and trial dates.
5. On February 29, 2000, the court scheduled the matter for
mediation, which was to occur on March 21, 2000.
36
6. On March 9, 2000, defendant Albert Roskos died. His defense
counsel did not file a suggestion of death upon the record pursuant to
Civ. Rule 25.
7. The mediation did not take place, and was cancelled at the
request of Respondent, although no suggestion of death of Mr. Roskos
was filed prior to March 21, 2000. At that time, neither the Court nor
Respondent were aware that Mr. Roskos had passed away.
8. On May 17, 2001, Respondent filed a voluntary motion to
dismiss the case. Mrs. Catterson was present at the final pretrial when
the dismissal was filed.
9. On May 24,2001, the Court sustained the plainti$s motion to
voluntarily dismiss the case which had been filed by Respondent. The
court dismissed the matter without prejudice.
(Case No. 2002 CV 1468)
10. On May 16, 2002, Respondent re-filed the complaint against
Albert Roskos on behalf of his client, Joyce Catterson, stiIl without
having been notified by Mr. Roskos' counsel that Mr. Roskos had died.
11. On May 22, 2002, the court issued the summons and copy of
the complaint to the named defendant by certified mail. On May 28,
2002, the court noted a failure of service upon the defendant, as the
postal service was not able to deliver the complaint upon the deceased,
and was unable to forward the summons or complaint either. Respon-
dent was notified of the failure of service on June 3, 2002.
12. On June 19,2002, Respondent filed written instructions with
the clerk to issue the summons and complaint by regular mail. The
clerk reissued the complaint for service by regalar mail on June 24,
2002.
37
13. On June 28, 2002, the clerk again noted the failure of service
onAlbert Roskos, as the mailwas returned "undeliverable as addressed
- unable to forward".
14. On November 8, 2002, the courtissued a judgment entry that
the case would be dismissed on December 18, 2002 for want of
prosecution, based upon the plaintiffs failure to obtain service on the
defendant or apply for a default judgment. This notice was served upon
the Respondent on November 14, 2002.
15. On December 13, 2002, Respondent again filed written
instructions to the clerk A copy of the complaint was then mailed my
regular mail to the defendant Albert Roskos, in care of Ms. Albert
Roskos, at an address set forth in the written instructions. The
summons and complaint were issued by the clerk on December 20,
2002. The summons and complaint were again returned for failure of
service on January 10, 2003.
16. On April 21, 2003, a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs
complaint was filed by the defendant's counsel, who stiIl had not
disclosed to the Court that the defendant had died more than a year
earlier. In the motion to dismiss, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff
had failed to perfect service on the defendant, who was dead, despite
the Court's order, in the prior case, of November 8, 2002.
17. On May 1, 2003, the court dismissed Catterson's complaint
without prejudice pursuant to the Ohio Rules of Superintendence. A
copy of the court's judgment entry was forwarded to Respondent on
May 2, 2003.
18. On May 28, 2003, Respondent, on behalf of his client, filed a
motion to vacate the court's entry of May 1, 2003. The court ruled on
this motion on May 27, 2003, and agreed to vacate its prior order. The
court ordered defendant's counsel to substitute the proper party in the
38
action because Albert Roskos, the named defendant, was dead as of
March 9, 2000, approximately one year and three months prior to the
plaintffs motion for voluntary dismissal. The court found that the
plaintiff and the court should have been informed at the time of Mr.
Roskos' demise, and the fact that he could no longer be a party to the
action. The Court also noted that Mr. Roskos should have been
substituted by his estate through the proper representative of same.
Copies of this entry were forwarded to Respondent on May 31, 2003.
19. On June 3, 2003, the court again considered the motion of
Albert Roskos for dismissal of the complaint based upon the failure to
prosecute. Despite its order six days earlier, the court found the
defendant's motion to be well taken and dismissed plainti8s action in
its entirety. (As a side note, the trial judge at that time was suffering
from Alzheimer's disease.) This entry was forwarded to all counsel on
June 4, 2003.
20. On June 9, 2003, the plaintiff filed a request with the court
that its June 3 order be vacated and that the court require a substitu-
tion of party through the proper representative. The court agreed to
vacate its order of dismissal and again required that the defendant
substitute the proper party.
21. On June 2, 2004, the plainto' was granted leave to file a
suggestion of death on the record. The plaintiff was then instructed to
follow-up as directed or suffer a dismissal of the case for failure to
prosecute. The court overruled the defendant's motion to dismiss.
22. On July 28, 2004, the defendant filed a motion for reconsider-
ation, or in the alternative, cexi5fication pursuant to Ohio Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(B).
39
23. On Septeinber 29, 2004, a motion to continue the hearing
scheduled for October 1, 2004 was filed by Respondent on behalf of the
plaintiff.
24. On October 1, 2004, the court granted Respondent?s motion
to continue the hearing which had been scheduled that same day.
25. On November 26, 2004, the court considered the defendant's
motion for reconsideration and overruled it. In its entry, the Court
noted that counsel for the defendant had failed to file a suggestion of
death as required by Civ. Rule 15(E). The court noted that on July 2,
2004, the eDurt issued an entry finding that defense counsel stiIl did not
file a suggestion of death and therefore placed the responsibility upon
the plaintiff to file a suggestion of death and a motion for substitution
of parties. The plaintiff was granted ten days to file a suggestion of
death and proceed accordingly.
26. On July 25, 2005, the plaintiff filed a suggestion of death
upon the record.
27. On August 16, 2005, the oourt scheduled a mediation
conference for January 18, 2006.
28. On January 18, 2006, the mediation proceeded. (A report of
the mediator was filed on January 19,2006.) The plaintiff attended the
mediation, but was not permitted inside by Respondent. At one point,
the Respondent advised Ms. Catterson that they were unable to make
any headway, and that they were going to leave the courthouse. Ms.
Catterson was never advised of the strengths or merits of her case by
the mediator, plaintiffs counsel, or her own counsel.
29. Respondent also filed a motion to compel on January 18,
2006. This motion was opposed by the defendant on January 27,2006.
30. On March 27, 2006, the defendant filed a motion to oompel
responses to discovery.
40
31. On Apri117, 2006, a status hearing was to be held. Respon-
dent was unavailable and the hearing was rescheduled for May 25,
2006. This entry was issued to the parties on April 27, 2006.
32. On April 27, 2006, the court issued an order (this order is
missing from the Clerk's file).
33. On June 2, 2006, the court noted in an order that "By
agreement of the parties, counsel wiIl submit a judgment entry finding
a final appealable order within seven days." A copy of this judgment
entry was mailed to the parties that same day.
34. On July 6, 2006, the court entered a judgment entry finding
that:
This matter came before the court on defendant's motion tocertify this court's order of November 26, 2004 as final andappealable. Upon review of the current. status of this case, itis hereby ordered this court's 2004 order is certified as the .final appealable order as of the date of this judgment. It is soordered.
35. On July 20, 2006, Respondent filed a notice of appeal on
behalf of Ms. Catterson. This notice was filed in the Seventh District
Court of Appeals, and was assigned Case No. 2006 MA 105.
36. On August 16, 2006, the appellate court, sua sponte,
questioned the appealability of July 6, 2006 judgment modifying the
November 26, 2004 judgment entry. The November 26, 2004 judgment
entry denied a defense motion for reconsideration of an earlier order
placing an obligation on the plaintiff to file a suggestion of death of the
defendant and moving for a substitution of the proper party. The
Appellate Court noted that it appeared from the docket statement that
the issues for the appeal would not only be the proper commencement
of a civil action but also a statute of limitations issue. The court noted
that these matters could be properly addressed at the conclusion of aIl
proceedings in the trial court, and the parties were granted thirty days
to file jurisdictional statements regarding the appealability of an order
41
of the Common Pleas Court entered on July 6, 2006 modifying the
order of November 26, 2004.
37. On September 15, 2006, the defendant filed his jurisdictional
statement.
38. On October 6, 2006, the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal
filed by Respondent for lack of an appealable order. Copies were mailed
to all counsel and to the trial court on October 10, 2006.
39. This case was then returned to the trial court.
40. On March 30, 2007, a notice to take the deposition of the
plaintiff was filed on behalf of the defendant.
41. On Apri120, 2007, the matter came before the trial court for
a final pretrial hearing. The court found that the parties had not
reached an agreement and scheduled the matter for trial on May 29,
2007.
42. On Apri127, 2007, the defendant filed a motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Civ. Rule 56. From the docket (only), it also
appears that a second motion was filed on May 7, 2007. Defendant
stated that. the action was originally commenced by the plaintiff on
January 19,1999. Plaintiffvoluntarily dismissed the complaint against
defendant on May 17,2001. On May 16,2002, the plaintiff re-iiled the
complaint. However, the defendant had died approximately fourteen
months earlier. As a result, the plaintiffwas unable to obtain service by
certified mail on May 28, 2002.
43. Thereafter, plaintiff was unable to obtain service by ordinary
mail on three separate attempts, due to the fact the defendant had
been deceased for approidmately two years. Defendant argued that
plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed based upon his failure to
prosecute the case, as well as the failure to commence a civil action
pursuant to the dictates of Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 3(A).
42
A.A. No response was filed by the defendant, and on May 23,2007
(sixteen days after the motion for summary judgment was filed), the
court found that there were no material facts in dispute and that the
defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The oourt
specifically found that since there had been no service of process
perfected against the defendant since the May 16, 2002 refiling of the
complaint, a civil action had not been commenced pursuant to the
dictates of Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 3(A). Additionally, the court
found that there had been a failure to prosecute the case. Therefore, the
Magistrate Judge granted the defendant's motion for suinmary
judgment. Copies of the judgment entry were forwarded to the parties
on May 24, 2007.
45. On May 29, 2007, Respondent filed a motion to continue and
request for an order for substitution.
46. On June 19, 2007, Respondent filed a notice of appeal in the
Seventh District Court of Appeals. The appeal was assigned Case No.
2007 MA 104.
47.. On July 11, 2007, the appeal was dismissed, sua sponte, for
lack of a final appealable order. The court held that the May 23, 2007
Magistrate's Decision was not a final order subject to review. Civil Rule
53(E) states the procedure in filing objections to a Magistrate's Decision.
There was no indication on the docket record that the court had taken
any action on the Magistrate's Decision. Copies of the July 11, 2007
judgment entry were mai'led to the attorneys, including Respondent, on
July 20, 2007.
48. OnJanuary 7, 2010, Respondentfiledhis notice of suspension
and motion to withdraw as counsel with the trial courL
49. On January 28, 2010, the court issued a judgment entry
noting that Respondent was presently suspended from the practice of
43
law on an interim suspension, and thereafter granted leave to Respon-
dent to withdraw as counsel for the plaintiff. The court fixrther granted
Ms. Catterson a reasonable time to secure substitute counsel. This
order was served upon Respondent and upon Ms. Catterson by the
clerk on or about February 1, 2010.
50. Mrs. Catterson says she was not informed of the develop-
ments of the case, but Respondent says that she was informed of the
case. Mrs. Catterson developed pancreatitis, and she informed
Respondent that the doctors were going to attribute that condition to
the accident, and Respondent was not prepared to proceed forward not
having the information relating to that causal connection. Moreover,
Respondent says Mrs. Catterson was present at the time that Respon-
dent put the dismissal on, which the docket reflects was at the time of
the final pretrial.
51. The parties do not agree as to whether there has been a
violation of Rule 1.4 (Communication) of the Ohio Code of Professional
Conduct which provides that: "A lawyer shall: ... Keep the client
reasonably informed about the status of the matter," and "Comply as
soon as practicable with reasonable requests for information from the
client"
M. Jennifer and Gordon Coyier III(Arnended Cvmplaint ff193-204, 383-370)
1. Jennifer Coyier retained Respondent to represent her in a
step-parent adoption in 2006.
2. Jennifer Coyier provided $200.00 to Respondent for the
adoption. Coyier provided Respondent with all of her originaUcertified
documentation to complete the adoption.
3. Respondent never filed the petition for adoption.
44
4. Respondent represented Mrs. Coyier in a pending case in
juvenile court where the issues were a claim for an increases in child
support and back child support, and the issue of the allocation of the
tax deduction was present at that time.
5. Respondent negotiated an agreement whereby the child's
father could take the tax deduction for previousyears, and he agreed
to consent to the adoption of Mr. Coyier, the child's stepfather.
6. Gordon Coyier retained new counsel to reverse the agreement
reached by Respondent.
7. No money has been refunded to the Coyiers by Respondent. .
8. In addition; Jennifer and Gordon A. Coyier III, retained
Respondent to represent them in connection with a contract dispute
with a home improvement company, Eneigywise Home Improvements,
Inc.
9. Respondent filed a complaint in the Youngstown Municipal
Court on behalf of Gordon A. Coyier III and Jennifer A. Coyier being
case no. 08-CVE-1240 on that Court's docket.
10. On May 6, 2008, defendants Energywise Home Improve-
ments, Inc. and Joseph Adams IV filed their answer to the Coyiei's
complaint.
11. A pretrial hearing was scheduled for Febraary 18,2009. This
hearing was continued at the request of the defendants, and resched-
uled for May 27, 2009.
12. On May 27, 2009, the civil pretrial was rescheduled for
September 2, 2009. Notice was provided to Respondent on May 27,
2009.
13. On September 2, 2009 the pretrial hearing proceeded. Neither
the Coyiers nor their counsel (Respondent) appeared.
45
14. Upon oral motion to dismiss raised on behalf of the defen-
dants, the plaintiffs' action was dismissed. A judgment was filed on
September 3, 2009 regarding this issue.
15: Respondent failed to advise the Coyiers of the dismissal of the
case. In fact, the Coyiers had no notification of any hearing in this
matter, and were unaware that the lawsuit had been terminated.
16. Subsequently, the Coyiers were sued by GE Money Bank, the
financing company related to the Energywise Home Improvements
transaction. This case was filed in the Youngstown Municipal Court
and was assigned case no. 10 CVF 170 on the docket.
17. GE Money Bank sought payment for unpaid funds relating
to the transaction which should have been addressed in the original
Energywise Home Improvements case. Subsequently, the Coyiers
settled with GE Money.Bank for the total sum of $1,200.00.
18. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of: Rule
1.1 (Competence) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which
provides that: "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a
client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness, preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."
19. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes violations of
DR-6-101 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Failing to Act
Competently) which provides that: "A lawyer shall not: ... Neglect a
legal matter entrusted to hfm" and Rule 1.3 (Diligence) of the Ohio
Code of Professional Conduct which provides that: "A lawyer shaIl act
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."
20. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule
1.4(a)93) and (4) (Communication) of the Ohio Code of Professional
Conduct which provides that: "A lawyer shall: ... Keep the client
reasonably infonned about the status of the matter;" and "Comply as
46
soon as practicable with.reasonable requests for information from the
client."
22. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of: Rule
1.15 (Safekeeping Funds and Property) ofthe Ohio Code ofProfessional
Conduct which provides that:
Upon receiving funds or property in which a client..has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client orthird person. Eacept as stated in this rule or otherwisepermitted by law or agreement with the client..., confirmedin writing, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client... anyfnnds..: that the client... is entitled to receive. Upon requestby the client..., the lawyer shall promptly render a fullaccounting regarding such funds...
23. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule
1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation) of the Ohio Code of
Professional Conduct which provides that:
As part of the termination of representation, a lawyershall take steps, tothe extent reasonably practicable, toprotect a client's interest. The steps include giving due noticeto the client, allowing reasonable time for employment ofother counsel, delivering to the client all papers and propertyto which the client is entitled, and complying with applicablelaws and rnles. Client papers and property shall be promptlydelivered to the client. 'Client papers and property' mayinclude correspondence, pleadings, deposition transcripts,exhibits, physical evidence, expert reports, and other itemsreasonably necessary to the client's representation.
A lawyer who withdraws from employment shallrefund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that hasnot been earned, except when withdrawal is pursuant toRule 1.17.
N. Emil Foriska (Amended Complaint I9[ 205-214fy(370-376)
1. Emil Foriska retained Respondent on January 9, 2008 for the
purpose of reznstating his Ohio driver's license. Mr. Foriska's license
had been suspended as a result of an issue involving the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania.
47
2. Thereafter, on or about February 6,2008, Respondent filed an
action in the Mahoning County Court, Area No. 4. The civil action was
filed against the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles. Service was completed
on or about February 14, 2008.
3. The court scheduled the matter for a hearing on or about May
7, 2008. On May 7, 2008, Respondent appeared with his client in court.
At that time, the trial judge informed the parties that he had questions
regarding the County Coures jurisdiction to hear the allegations. The
court filed a judgment entry indicating that: "Case to be reset in thirty
days for a status hearing. Counsel to investigate what this Court can
do or whether this matter must be transferred to Common Pleas Court.
Counsel to provide documentation to the Courv
4. Thereafter, the matter was rescheduled for a hearing on
August 27, 2008. On that date, Respondent again appeared and
requested a continuance for thirty days to investigate whether the
County Court had jurisdiction. The matter was rescheduled for October
8, 2008.5. On October 8, 2008, the Judge transferred the matter to the
Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas. The trisl judge did not
believe that he had authority to take any action as the plaintffs
driver's license had expired,
6. The Clerk of Courts for Mahoning County Court No. 4 then
transferred the entire file to the Clerk for the Court of Conunon Pleas
in Mahoning County, Obio. Upon receipt, the Common Pleas Court
Clerk forwarded a letter to Respondent adv9sing that he would have to
pay $200.00 for the filing fee in that court. The fee was never paid to
the Clerk of Courts, and the matter remains without a docket assign-
ment in the Common Pleas Court.
48
7. Thereafter, Mr. Foriska began caIling Respondent to find out
what was occurrin g with respect to his case. Respondent informed Mr.
Foriska that he had not been able to obtain a hearing date in Youngs-
town (Common Pleas Court).
8. Mr. Foriska continued to telephone Respondent. For more than
three months, Respondent failed to return any of Mr. Foriska's
telephone calls or respond tawritten letters that Mr. Foriska had left
in Respondent's mailbox.
9. hbentnally, Mr. Foriska was unable to contact Respondent
because his telephone voice-mail recording stated that the electronic
mailbox was full, and subsequently indicated that the telephone was no
longer in service.
10. Respondent has failed to return or respond to Mr. Foriska's
communications, and has failed to cause Mr. Foriska's driver's license
to be reinstated.
11. The conduct of the Respondent oonstitutes a violation of Rule
1.3 (Diligence) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which provides
that: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client."
12. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule
1.4(a) (Communication) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which
provides that: "A lawyer shall: ... 3. Keep the client reasonably
informed about the status of the matter; ... 4. Comply as soon as
practicable with reasonable requests for information from the client.°'
13. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of: Rule
1.15 (Safekeeping Funds and Property) of the Ohio Code of Professional
Conduct which provides that:
(d) Upon receiving funds or property in which aclient... has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify theclient or third person. Except as stated in this rule orotherwise permitted by law or agreement with the clieat...,
49
confirmed in writing, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to theclient... any funds... that the client... is entitled to receive.Upon request by the client..., the lawyer shall promptlyrender a fuIl aecounting regarding such funds... .
14. The conduct of the Respondent cwnstitutes a violation of Rule
1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation) of the Ohio Code of
Professional Conduct which provides that:
(d) As part of the termination of representation, alawyer shall take steps, to the extent reasonably practicable,to protect a client's interest. The steps include giving duenotice to the client, allowing reasonable time for employmentof other counsel, delivering to the client all papers andproperty to which the client is entitled, and complying withapplicable laws and rules. Client papers and property shallbe promptly delivered to the client. 'Client papers andproperty' may inelude correspondence, pleadings, depositiontranscripts, exhibits, physical evidence, expert reports, andother items reasonably necessary to the client's representa-tion.
(e) A lawyer who withdraws from employment shallrefund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that hasnot been earned, except when withdrawal is pursuant toRule 1.17.
0. Betty Garback (Amended Complaint 1$215-2I7,9[1377-382)
1. In June of 2009, Ms. Garback retained Respondent following
the death of her husband in 2005. Specifically, Ms. Garback paid
Respondent the sum of $130.00 on June 8, 2009 with the understand-
ing that Respondent was going to transfer back a life estate so that she
apply for the Homestead Exemption which Ms. Garback needed prior
to January of 2010.
2. Thereafter, Respondent failed to complete the work or
otherwise respond to any telephone calls or other communications by
Ms. Garback. To date, Ms. Garback has not heard from Respondent.
3. On November 16, 2009, approximately five months after
retaining Respondent, Ms. Garback went to the firm of Johnson &
50
Johnson to complete the requested legal work. Ms. Garback paid
Johnson & Johnson the sum of $150.00 to complete the unfinished
work.
4. Respondent has failed to refnnd any money to Ms. Garback.
5. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule
1.3 (Diligence) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which provides
that: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client"
. 6. The conduct of the Respondent constitut,es a violation o£ Rule
1.4(a) (Communication) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which
provides that: "A lawyer shall: ... 3. Keep the client reasonably
informed about the status of the matter;" and "4. Comply as soon as
practicable with reasonable requests for information from the client."
7. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of: Rule
1.15 (Safekeeping Funds and Property) of the Ohio Code of Professional
Conduct which provides that:
(d) Upon receiving funds or property in which aclient... has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify theclient or third person. Except as stated in this rule orotherwise permitted by law or agreement with the client...,confnmed in writing, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to theclient... any funds... that the alient... is entitled to receive.Upon request by the client.., the lawyer shall promptlyrender a fnll accounting regarding such funds... ."
8. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule
1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation) of the Ohio Code of
Professional Conduct which provides that:
(d) As part of the termination of representation, alawyer shall take steps, to the extent reasonably praeticable,toprotect a client's interest. The steps include giving duenotice to the client, allow_ m.-g- reasonable time for emp oymentof other counsel, delivering to the client all papers andproperty to which the client is entitled, and complying withapplicable laws and rules. Client papers and property shaIlbe promptly delivered to the client. "Client papers andproperty" may include correspondence, pleadings, deposition
51
transcripts, exhibits, physical evidence, expert reports, andother items reasonably necessary to the client's representa-tion.
(e) A lawyer who withdraws from employment shallrefund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that hasnot been earned, except when withdrawal is pursuant toRule 1.17.
P. Saed Khatib (Amended Complaint U218-23G,919f383-390)
2007 CV 3935 Kha,tib v. .Ramahi:
1. Saed Khatib retained an attorney, Dennis DiMartino, to
represent him in connection with a property dispute against April
Ramahi. Mr. Khatib alleged that the defendant vacated the premises
owned by him, and at that time removed the home's fnrniture, fixtures,
appliances, and dishes. He further aIleged that she converted his
property to her own use, and failed or refused to pay him.
2. Mr. Di1VIartino filed a lawsuit against Ms. Ramahi in the
Mahoning County Common Pleas Court on or about October 19,2007.
(Case No. 2007 CV 3935.) The case was continued on several occasions.
3. On April 14, 2008, the Court set a discovery schedule, and
further scheduled the trial of the case for December 9, 2008. Thereafter,
Mr. Khatl retained the services of Respondent to represent hun.
4. Respondent filed a notice of appearance on December 5, 2008.
On that same date, he also filed a motion to continue the December 9,
2008 trial date.
5. The Court did not rule on the motion to continue, but called
the matter for trial on December 9, 2008. Neither counsel for the
plaintiff nor the defendant appeared at the trial. As a result, the Court
dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. The dismissal was without
prejudice.
52
6. The docket for the case refleets that on December 11, 2008, the
Clerk sent the dismissal order by regular mail to Khatib, Saed do Mr.
Dennis DiMartino, 6004 Market Street, Boardxnan, Ohio 44512, as
apparently the Clerles office had not yet noted Respondent's notice of
appearance filed six days previously; and, to April Ramahi, do Carmen
Lamancusa, 414 N. Jefferson Street, New Castle, PA 16101.
7. FoIlowing the dismissal of the action in December of 2008, Mr.
Khati b telephoned the Respondent regarding. the status of his case. Mr.
Khatib did not receive a response.
8. In May of 2009, Mr. Khatib obtained from the Clerk a copy of
the dismissal entry.
9. From May to July 2009, Mr. Khatib continued to telephone the
Respondent regarding the status of his case. Respondent did not return
any of these telephone calls.
10. On July 2, 2009, Mr. Khatib forwarded another letter to the
Respondent. Again, Respondent did not respond to this letter.
11. On July 3, 2009, Mr. Khatib went to the Respondent's office
with the dismissal entry to speak to Respondent, who indicated that he
was never notified of the dismissal by the Court.
12. W. Khatib asked the Respondent what he would have to do
to rectify the situation. Respondent stated that he would have to re-file
the complaint in the Common Pleas Court. Therefore, on July 3, 2009
Mr. Khatib paid Respondent $200.00 in order to re-file the cATnplaint.
13. W. Khatib left the meeting with the understanding that the
complaint would be re-filed. From July 3 to August 30, 2009, Mr.
Khatib attempted to telephone Respondent re garding the status of the
case. Respondent failed to return any of his telephone calls.
14. On August 30, 2009, Mr. Khatib traveled to the Respondent's
office, and placed a letter in his mailbox regarding the status of the
53
case. Mr. Khatib also traveled to Respondent's house on that same
date.
15. At Respondent's residence, Mr. Khatib met the Respondent's
son who stated that his father was ill. Nonetheless, Mr. Khatib asked
Respondent's son for his file and a for refimd of his money. Respon-
dent's son stated that he would inform his father of the request.
16. From September 2 to October 15, 2009, Mr. Khatib continued
his efforts to contact the Respondent, mostly through telephone calls.
The Respondent failed to answer any of the requests left for him.
17. As of Apri113, 2010, Respondent has failed to return any of
the money ($300.00) paid to Respondent to handle his case, has failed
to respond to the status requests by Mr. Khatib, and has failed to re-file
the cromplaint on Mr. Khatib's behalf, nor has Khatib sought other
counsel.
2008 CV G 00597 Khatib v. El-Makdah
18. On April 21, 2008, Respondent filed a forcible entry and
detainer complaint against Jamal Saed El Makdah. This case was filed
in the Mahoning County Court, Area No. 2, and is case 2008 CV G
00597 on that Court's docket. El Makdah retained an attorney, Eric
Johnson, to represent him.
19. The case was continued several times, during which
Respondent and Mr. Johnson engaged in numerous and lengthy
settlement conferences, until a motionfor dismissalwas filed by counsel
for the defendant on October 23, 2008.
20. The case was caIled for review on November 3, 2008. At that
time, the Court noted that the defendant had previously filed a motion
to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens. The Magistrate found
the motion to be well taken, and ordered the case be dismissed without
prejudice at plaintiffs cost.
54
21. On October 4, 2008, the judgment entry of dismissal was
signed by Judge Joseph Houser. Mr. Khatib was present at the hearing
when the case was dismissed.
22. Respondent has not refunded any of the $700.00 paid to him
for this case and contends that all of it was earned.
23. With regard to Case No. 2008 CV G 00597, Respondent's
conduct does not violate the Code of Professional Conduct.
24. With regard to Case No. 2007 CV 3935 Khatib v. Rdmahi:
The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violatiori of Rule 1.1
(Competence) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which provides
that: "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires thelegalknowledge, slull, thorough-
ness, preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."
25. With regard to Case No. 2007 CV 3935, the conduct of the
Respondent constitutes a violation o£ Rule 1.3 (Diligence) of the Ohio
Code of Professional Conduct which provides that: "A lawyer shall act
with reasonable diligence and pramptness in representing a client."
26. With regard to Case No. 2007 CV 3935, the conduct of the
Respondent constitutes a violation o£ Rule 1.4(a) (Communication) of
the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which provides that: "A lawyer
shall: ... S. Keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the
matter; ... 4. Comply as soon as practicable with reasonable requests
for information from the client."
27. With regard to Case No. 2007 CV 3935, the oonduct of the
Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule 1.16 (Declining or Terininat-
ing Representation) of the Ohio Code of Professionat Conduct which
provides that:
(d) As part of the termination of representation, alawyer shall take steps, to the extent reasonably practica ble,to protect a client's interest. The steps include giving duenotice to the client, allowing reasonable time for employment
55
of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers andproperty to which the client is entitled, and complying withapplicable laws and rules. Client papers and property shallbe promptly delivered to the client. `Client papers andproperty' may include correspondence, pleadings, depositiontranscripts, exhibits, physical evidence, expert reports, andother items reasonably necessary to the client's representa-tion.
Q. Terri Raub (Amended Compla.int 11237-238, 391-396)
1. On October 25, 2008, Thomas Raub oontacted Respondent for
the purpose of drafting a will. Mr. Raub paid to Respondent the sum of
$100.00. (A copy of the receipt for $100.00 is attached to the Complauit
as Exln'bit Q-1.)
2. Thereafter, Respondent completed a will and Mr. Raub
executed the same.
3. The wiIl has been delivered to Mr. Raub.
4. The parties agree that this count should be dismissed.
R. Arthur Titus (Amended Complaint 9f9(239-242,y(9(397-402)
1. On July 25, 2009, Arthur E. Titus retained Respondent to
assist hun in cornnection with a probate matter.
. 2. Approximately three years earlier, Mr. rEtus gave a 16 foot
fishing boat, 6 hp motor, and trader to his son, Gary Lynn Titus.
3. Subsequently, Gary passed away, leaving only his parents as
heirs. Arthur Titus sought to have Respondent retitle the boat, motor,
and trailer in his name so as to permit Mr.l4tus to then transfer the
title to his son in law, Wilbur Wilson.
4. Mr. OYtus provided the necessary paperwork to Respondent to
effectuate the transfer, and paid to Respondent the sum of $450.00.
56
5. Thereafter, Respondent failed to take any action on Mr. Mtus's
behalf; and, has retained the papers relevant to the ownership of the
boat
6. Respondent has failed to return any telephone calls or letters
from Mr. Titus.
7. This matter has been resolved by a successor counsel, but
Respondent has not refunded any money to Mr. Titus.
8. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violati(m of Rule
1.3 (Diligence) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which provides
that: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client"
9: The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of: Rule
1.4(a)(3) and (4) (Communication) of the Ohio Code of Professional
Conduct which provides that: "A lawyer shaII: ... Keep the client
reasonably informed about the status of the matter;" and "Comply as
soon as practicable with reasonable requests for information from the
client"
10. The conduct ofthe Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule
1.15 (SafekeepingFunds and Property) of the Ohio Code of Professional
Conduct which provides that:
Upon receiving funds or property in which a client...has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client orthird person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwisepermitted by law or agreement with the client..., confirmedin writing, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client... anyfunds... that the client... is entitled to receive. Upon requestby the client..., the lawyer shall promptly render a fullaccounting regarding such funds...
11. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule
1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation) of the Ohio Code of
Professional Conduct which provides that:
57
As part of the termination of representation, a lawyershaII take steps, to the extent reasonably practicable, toprotect a client's interest. The steps include giving due noticeto the client, allowing reasonable time for employment ofother counsel, delivering to the client all papers and propertyto which the client is entitled, and complyingwith applicablelaws and rules. Client papers and property shall be promptlydelivered to the client. `Client papers and property' mayinclude correspondence, pleadings, deposition transcripts,exhibits, physical evidence, expert reports, and other itemsreasonably necessary to the client's representation. A lawyerwho withdraws from employment shall refund promptly anypart of a fee paid in advance that has not been earaed,except when withdrawal is pursuant to Rule 1.17.
S. Clyde Weimer (Amended Complaint 9ljr243-265;I9j403-408)
Case Ng 2006 CV 3691
1. Clyde Weimer retained Respondent for the sum of $1,900.00.
Mr. Weimer paid Respondent as follows:
•:September 8, 2006 $200.00 (balance owed under the $800.00 agreement)
•September 15,2006 $500.00
•Aprt124, 2008 $200.00
•September 15,2009 $1,000.00
2. This money was paid in connection with a potential claim
against Charles Herrholtz and James Herrholtz, Sr.
3. On September 21, 2006, Respondent Sled a complaint against
Charles Herrholtz and James Herrholtz, Sr. on behalf of his client,
Clyde Weimer. Successful service was completed by October 6, 2006.
4. On October 10, 2006 an answer was filed on behalf of the
defendants by Attorney Dennis Haines.
5. On February 26, 2008 the first pretrial was held. The court
ordered that all discovery by the plaintiff be completed by August 1,
2008, and the names and addresses of expert witnesses with a report
of their testimony be disclosed to defendant before August 1, 2008.
Dispositive motions were to be filed by October 1, 2008. The case was
58
referred to mediation on September 19, 2008. A final pretrial was
scheduled for January 9, 2009 at 10:00 a.m. before Magistrate Sarisky.
6. On or about September 19, 2008, Respondent cancelled the
mediation which had been set by the court.
7. On January 9, 2009, the parties consented to the Magistrate
presiding at the jury trial of the case.
8. On April 17, 2009, a motion to continue the trial which had
been scheduled for Apri121, 2009 was filed by Respondent. The motion
reeited that Mr. Weimer had been out of the County and unavailabie
for the months Febraary, March and part of Aprfl due to a family
illness. Respondent was told by the Court that the case would not be
continued and that his only option was to, dismiss the case voluntarily.
Respondent thereafter on Apri122, 2009 fiied a motion to dismiss the
case pursuant to Civ. Rule 41(A). The court ordered the matter
dismissed without prejudice, granting the p]ainti$'one year to re-file the
complaint pursuant to Ohio's Savings clause. A copy of this judgment
entry was served by the clerk upon the parties on May 7, 2009.
Case N° 2009 CV 1532
9. On May 5, 2009, Respondent, on behalf of Clyde Weimer, re-
filed the complaint against defendants Charles Herrholtz and James
Herrholtz, Sr.
10. Successful service was again made on both defendants, and
an answer to the complaint was filed on June 1, 2009.
11. On June 12, 2009, the case was transferred from Judge
Krichbaum to Judge Sweeney, the original trial judge presiding overthe former case.
12. On August 3, 2009, discovery was forwarded by the defen-
dants to the plaintiff. A notice of service was Sled by the defendants onthat date.
59
13. A notice of plaintiffs deposition was also filed on behalf of the
defendants on August 26, 2009 (which the elerk docketed in Case No.
2006 CV 3691).
14. On September 11, 2009, a copy of a hearing notiee was sent
by the court to all parties by regular mail.
15. On September 11, 2009, the deposition of plaintiff was to be
taken. Neither theplaintiffnorhis attorney appeared for the deposition.
See, Exlu"bit S-1.
16. On September 18, 2009, a motion to compel discovery, to
deem matters as admitted, and to compel plaintiffs attendance at a
deposition and for payment of expenses, request for hearing, and an
affidavit of counsel were filed by the defendants. However, this motion
was apparently never filed (or docketed) in Case 2006 CV 3691.
17. By December 2, 2009, the plaintiff had retained new counsel.
A notice of appearance was filed on his behalf by another attorney, R.
Allen Sinclair.
18. On January 15, 2010, an order was issued by Magistrate
Sarisky. The order stated that the matter would be set for a jury trial
before the Magistrate, and that it would be held on June 8, 2010 at
9:00 a.m.
19. The Court docket reflects that the case was scheduled for jury
trial on October 12, 2010.
20. The Defendants in the case filed a motion for summary
judgment, which was overruled by the Magistrate on November 24,
2010, and the triai court has granted the Defendants leave to object to
the magistrate's decision until December 15, 2010.
21. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violatioit of Rule
1.3 (Diligence) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which provides
60
that: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client."
22. Relator agrees to dismiss the charged violation of Rule 1.1
(Competence) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct.
23. Relator agrees to dismiss the charged violation of Rule 1.4
(Communication) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct.
24. Relator agrees to dismiss the charged violation of Rule 8.4
(Misconduct) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct.
25. Relator agrees to dismiss the charged violation of Rulel.16
(Decl^n^ or Terminating Representation) of the Ohio Code of
Professional Conduct.
T. John Zetts (Amended Complaint f1266•290,y[9(409-413)
1. On August 3, 2009 John Zetts retained Respondent to seek a
reduction in child support paid to Mr. Zetts' 25-year-old daughter, who
has a disability.
2: After reviewing the facts of the case, Respondent informed Mr.
Zetts that he would file a motion with a view to obtaining a reduction
in Mr. Zetts' support payments. Because Respondent believed that the
daughter was reoeiving social security disabifity, the chances of
reducing success were good.
3. Mr. Zetts paid to Respondent the sum of $550.00 for the legal
services.
4. Thereafter, Mr. Zetts attempted to contact Respondent
approximately ten times by leaving messages on his telephone
answering machine. Respondent has not returned any of Mr. Zetts'
telephone caIls.
5. Respondenthas not performed the servioes to whichhe agreed,
nor has he refunded Mr. Zetts' payment of $550.00.
61
6: The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of: Rule
1.3 (Diligence) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which provides
that: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client."
7. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule
1.4(a) (Communication) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which
provides that.
A lawyer shall: ... 3. Keep the client reasonablyinformed about the status of the matter; ... 4. Comply assoon as practicable with reasonable requests for informa-tion from the client.
8. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of: Rule
1.15 (Safekeeping Funds and Property) of the Ohio Code of Professional
Conduct which provides that:
(d) Upon receiving funds or property in which aclient... has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify theclient or third person. Except as stated in this rule orotherwise permitted by law or agreementwith the client...,confirmed in writing, a lawyer shall promptly deliver tothe client... any funds... that the client... is entitled toreoeive. Upon request by the client..., the lawyer shallpromptly render a full accounting regarding such funds...
9. The conduct of the Respondent constitntes a vioJ.ation of Rule
1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation) of the Ohio Code of
Professional Conduct which provides that
(e) A lawyer who withdraws from employment shallrefund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that hasnot been earned, except when withdrawal is pursuant toRule 1.17.
U. Lcick ofInsurance
1. Throughout his representation of the grievants set forth in
these stipulations, Respondent failed to advise the clients that he did
not have legal malpractice insurance.
62
2. The failure to advise the grievants regarding his lack of legal
malpractice insurance or his failure to have them aclmowledge the lack
of insuranc.e tbrough proper notification constitutes a violation of Rule
1.4(c) of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct.
III - DisNUSSats
1. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Margaret Bury,
the allegations of disciplinary violations in 9[9[293 (Rule 1.3, Diligence),
294 (Rule 1.4, Communication), 295 (Rule 1.5, Reasonable Fees and
Expenses), and 296 (Misconduct prohibited by Rule 8.4) are not
established by clear and convincing evidence and therefore are
dismissed.
2. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Gerald Cenneno,
the allegations of disciplinary violations in 9[9[303 (Rule 1.5, Reasonable
Fees and Expenses) and 304 (Misconduct prohibited by Rule 8.4) are
not established by clear and convincing evidence and therefore are
dismissed.
3. The parties agree that as to the grievance of the Columbiana
County Bar Association, the allegations of disciplinary violations in
9[9(308 (Rule 1.1, Competence), and 310 (Misconduct prohibited by Rule
8.4) are not established by clear and convincing evidence and therefore
are dismissed.
4. The parties agree that as to the grievance of William DiRenzo,
the allegations of disciplinary violations in 9[9[313 (DR 9-102, Preserving
the Identity of Funds and Property) and 314 (Misconduct prohibited by
Rule 8.4) are not established by dear and convincing evidence and
therefore are dismissed.
5. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Amy and Joseph
DiDomenico, the allegations of disciplinary violations in 9[9[316 (Rule
63
1.1, Competence), 319 (Rule 1.5, Reasonable Fees and Expenses), and
320 (Misconduct prohibited by Rule 8.4) are not established by clear
and convincing evidence and therefore are dismissed.
6. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Evelyn Sue
Lorent, the allegations of disciplinary violations in 1322 (Rule 1.1,
Competence) are not established by clear and convincing evidence and
therefore are dismissed.
7. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Duane and Trade
Corll, the allegations of disciplinary violations in 1338 (Misconduct
prohibited by Rule 8.4) are not established by dear and convincing.
evidence and therefore are dismissed.
8. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Tina Marie
Benson, the allegations of disciplinary violations in 1342 (Misoonduct
prohibited by Rule 8.4) are not established by clear and convincing
evidence and therefore are dismissed.
9. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Richard
Bodendorfer, the allegations of disciplinary violations in 1348 (Miscon-
duct prohibited by Rule 8.4) are not established by clear and convincing
evidence and therefore are dismissed.
10. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Darlene
Burman concerning the Estate of Ronald Papke, the allegations of
disciplinary violations in 9[9[353, (Rule 1.4, Communication), 354
(Misconduct proln'bitedby Rule 8.4), 355 (Rule 1.2, Scope of Representa-
tion and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer), and 356
(Misconduct prohibited by Rule 8.4), are not established by clear and
convincing evidence and therefore are dismissed.
11. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Joyce Catterson,
the allegations of disciplinary violations in 11358 (DR 6-101, Failing to
Act Competently and Rule 1.1, Competence), 359 (DR 6-101, Failing to
64
Act Competently and Rule 1.3, Diligence), 361(Misconduct prohibited
by Rule 8.4), and 362 (Misconduct prohibited by Rule 8.4), are not
established by clear and convincing evidence and therefore are
dismissed.
12. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Jennifer and
Gordon Coyier III, the allegations of disciplinary violations in 1369
(Misconduct prohibited by Rule 8.4) are not established by clear and
convincing evidence and therefore are dismissed.
13. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Emil Foriska,
the allegations of disciplinary violations in 9[9[371 (Rule 1.1; Compe-
tence), and 374 (14Iisconduct prohibited by Rule 8.4) are not established
by clear and convincing evidence and therefore are dismissed.
14. The parties agree that as. to the grievance of Betty Garback,
the allegations of disciplinary violations in 1380 (Misconduct prohibited
by Rule 8.4) are not established by dear and convincang evidence and
therefore are dismissed.
15. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Saed Khatib, the
allegations of disciplinary violations in 9[9[387 (Misconduct prohibited by
Rule 8.4), and 388 (Safekeeping of Funds) are not established by clear
and convincing evidence and therefore are dismissed
17. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Terri Raub, the
allegations of disciplinary violations in 9[9[392 (Rule 1.3, Diligence), 393
(Rule 1.4, Ccanmunication), 394 (Miseonduct prohibited by Rule 8.4),
395 (Rule 1.15 Safekeeping of Funds and Property), and 396 (Declining
or Terminating Representation) are not established by clear and
convincing evidence and therefore are dismissed.
18. The parties agree that as to the grievance ofArthur Titus, the
allegations of disciplinary violations in 1400 (Misconduct prohibited by
65
Rule 8.4) are not established by clear and convincing evidence and
therefore are dismissed.
19. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Clyde Weimer,
the allegations of disciplinary violations in 9[1404 (Rule 1.1, Compe-
tence), 406 (Rule 1.4, Communication), 407 (1Vfisconduct prohibited by
Rule 8.4), and 408 (Rule 1.16, DediningorTerminatingRepresentation)
are not established by dear and convincing evidence and therefore are
dismissed.
IV - AGGRAVATiNG AND MITIGATING FACTCRS
The Following Aggravating and Mitigating Factors Are Applica-
ble as Set Forth in Section X of the Rules and Regulations Governing
Procedure on Complaints and Hearing Before the Board of Commis-
sioners on Grievances and Diseipline of the Supreme Court:
A. Aggravation
1. Dishonest or selfish motive.
2. A pattern of misconduct.
3. Multiple offenses.
4. Lack of cooperation in the disciplinary process prior to the
institution of formal proceedings against the Respondent.
5. Vulnerability of and resulting harm to victims of the miscen-
duct.
6. Failure to make restitution.
B. Mitigation
1. The absence of prior disciplinary record.
2.Respondent's fnll and free disclosure toDisciplinary Board (as
set forth in these stipulations).
3. Respondent's cooperative attitude toward the proceedings after
the institution of the forxnal complaint.
66
4. Character and reputation as set forth in letters of reference
and testimony.
5. Mental disability, on the basis oE
a. Mental disability by qualified health care professional.
b. Determination that the mental disability contributed to,
or caused the misconduct.
c. A sustained period of successful treatment
d. A prognosis that the attoxney will be able to return to
competent, ethical practice under specified oondilaon.
C. Other punishment
1. Respondent is serving an interim suspension, during which he
has treated with OLAP.
D. Punishment
The parties do not agree on the length or severity of the
punishment, but do parties jointlyrecommend to the Board of Commis-
sioners that the Respondent shall be readmitted to the practice of law
only after he:
1. Provides proof of continuing mental health counseling and
proof that he is fizlly crompetent to return to the practice of law.
2. Compfies with aIl requirements required by OLAP during the
period of his suspension.
3. Complies with any and all mandatory continuing education
requirements imposed by the Supreme Court.
4. Attends a course in law office management approved by the
Mahoning County Bar Association.
5. Pays the cost of this action as required by the Ohio Supreme
Court.
6. Makes a good faith effort to make restitution to the clients.
67
JAN-04-2011 11:63, CS+W Co. LPA 330 746 4926 P.02
r^ eet fwth above; that he be subject to xuonitaring by
Relator dumg` the pavbationary period; and, that Iais IOLTA acecaunt
sBall also be s4ect to review by the Relator during the grobationar,y
V4U7A5),1Bar Counsel100 Federal Plaaa Ebst, Suite 926YoungstownjOhio 44503Telephone: ($30) 746-5645
ItONALD E.BarP.O. Baoc 48 8Y Ohio 44515
e: ( 0) 797-0088
77
^?-Iw
27081WeatttO ° a146
oimxlevard, Suite 4Ol^o 445120.758-7700
Couivsa. R^roivnErr
,^̂ /^ ^• ii
WAIUM G o!' PxirarMRespondent
Cti1lOkJ6J^tMIMtdMf# e 7^99^ ku Mwla.wptl
68
TOTAL P.02
Ne.f= t4t iuttb of Cvmtnissiunuersun (Grieumnces atud Bistiptine
of #4r Ouprerite (gmtr:E rrf (94inComplaint Against:
WARREN Bo P.R1TCHABURegistration Number 0008417296 North Canfield-Niles RoadYoungstown, Ohio 44515
Respondent
V.
MAHONING COiIIdTY BAB, ASS'N.114 East Front StreetYoungstown Ohio 44503
Relator }
NoTIcE To CoRRF.Cr REcoRD
COMES NoW THE PARTEE9, and give notice of correction of the
record by requesting that pages 67 and 68 of the stipulations, filed
contemporaneously herewith, be substituted for those that were
p)viously subn3itted at the time of the record hearing. The corrected
pages make no substantive changes whatsoever but simply correct the
record so that it reflects the parties' stipulations. The version of the
stipulations previously submitted contained electronic formatting errors
that caused the submitted version not to be an accurate reflection of
the stipulations. Substitution of the enclosed pages 67 and 68 will cause
the record to contain an accurate reflection of the parties'_stipulations.
This was discnssed at the record hearing on this matter.
JUMN BJUNdR • ATIOBNEYM'I.IW . LYNIVMApO • M17MOt8pf0[MNE[b.2459 9oa1 wwreovw"D.s^, . Youxosrowx.OxwIM614y^Teuwlox& 33o96&7700 • PMAMO8.350.96B.f7sf
Respectfully submitted,
LYN# IVIARO N°'005& Schoenike Co.
7081 West Boulevard, Suite 4Youngstown, Ohio 44512-4362Telephone: 330.758-7700Facsimile: 330.758.7757COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT
^AVm C. COMS'roCx, Jk-'(0040145)Bar Counsel .100 Federal Plaza East, Suite 926Yo , Ohio 44503Telephone: 746-5643
`'o^I P^4 (aA^. C 611-4)RRONALD E. SLIPSffi (0014404)Bar CounselP.O. Box 4338Youngstown, Ohio 44515Telephone: (330) 797-0086COUNSEL FOR RELA.TOR
(kMbDPoJBd\(SvillPrifdudB 8468\Pleadioge\NaBmmrrece rewrdwpd t Mer 19,2011
JuxNB.J^ • Arnouu6x.vM Iww • L»mAeew • Sfnxo 88exovmaCO.
24597081 WreeeBUmBrMn,8wte4 •YCUBasrowB,OmoM6IR.4569 2
44^vsuN& 868A66.7766 • B^ 368.75&7757
4. Character and reputation as set forth in letters of reference
and testirnony.
5. Mental disability, on the basis of:
a. Mental disability by qualffied health care professionai.
b. Determinataon that the mental disability oontributed to,
or caused the misoonduet.
c. A sustained period of successful treatment
d. A prognosis that the attorney will be able to retarn to
competent, ethical practice under speeified condition.
C. Of;her punisbnent
1. Respondent is serving an interim saspension, during which be
has treated with OLAP.
D. Punishment
The parties do not agree on the length or severity of the
punishment, but do parties jointly recommend to the Board of Commis-
sioners that the Respondent shall be readmitted to the practice of law
only after he:
1. Provides proof of oontinuumg mental health counseling and
proof that he is fully mmmpetent to return to the practice of law.
2. Complies with all requirements reqnired by OLAP dnring the
period of his suspension.
3. Complies with any and all mandatory centinuing education
requirements imposed by the Supreme Court,
4. Attends a course in law office managexnent approved by the
Mahoning Connty Bar Association.
5. Pays the oost of t1iis action as required by the Ohio Supreme
Court
6. Makes a good faith effort to make restitution to the clients.
67
7. Upon reinstatement, Respondent is or should be subject to a
two year probation.ary period, during which he must cmtinuewith the
requirements set forth above; that he be subject to monitoring by
Relator during the probationary period; and, that his IOLTA aocount
shall also be subject to review by the Relator duzing the probataonary
period.
lv=).^^^^Bar Counsel100 Federal Plaza East, Suite 926Youngstown, Ohio 44503Telephone: (330) 746-5643
pj."^E.
!, SRONALD (^'1"°`4404)Bar CounselP.O. Box 4338Youngstown, Ohio 44515Telephoae: (330) 797-0086
05214670ft West Boalevard, Suite 4Younggtown, Ohio 44512Telephone: 330.758-7700COiJNsEI. FOR RESSPONDENT
WnRREnr G. "Bo" PxrUHnxnRes,pondent
cMtohJBMM11P1¢dortl a 24596tpiSBVl Mu Ei9 wTOC.wpa
68