March 2015 CONFIDENTIAL

Please see the end of this presentation for important disclosures.

LUV for Oil?

1 1

Summary

Current oil prices reflect the trough of a cycle. ROACE is at record lows, capital spending is being slashed, production growth is nonexistent within current cash flows and the marginal E&P operator is in need of capital to stay in business.

Much of the recent collapse in oil appears to be the result of a deceleration in demand and a strengthening of the USD. History suggests that a recovery from this trough will be demand-led and supply-supported.

Consensus expects a recovery in the second half of 2015. While this remains plausible, the risks appear to be to the downside, with a longer trough driven by a flood of new capital into the space and a weak macro backdrop.

The increased volatility and low commodity prices are likely to be positive for long-term oil prices, lowering confidence in investment, lowering planning assumptions and instilling capital discipline in a sector where it has been lacking. This appears similar to the events of 1998, which led to a multi-year bull cycle.

2 2

Kimmeridge Commodity Outlook Framework

Over the long term, oil and gas prices have trended in line with the capital intensity of the industry. Since 1998 the capital intensity of the industry has expanded circa 8% per annum on a per barrel basis, despite the shale revolution.

While prices have trended with the marginal cost, they have also been reflective of near-term supply/demand trends, such that when spare capacity is tight, operators earn outsized returns and are incentivized to add production. In contrast, when demand is low, prices tend to trend below the marginal cost, leaving the high-cost players to reduce volumes.

Today, oil and gas prices are trending below the marginal cost of supply, with prices having collapsed in the face of decelerating GDP and stable supply. Current pricing is unsustainable. However, the timing of a recovery is likely to be demand-led and later than consensus, driven by liquidity, lease dynamics and irrational operator behavior.

3 3

The Trend of Rising Capital Intensity Has Come from Moving Down the Resource Triangle

Capital employed per barrel of production has expanded for all companies. While XOM’s has risen from $30 per flowing barrel to $100 per flowing barrel, the US E&P group has gone from $78/boe to $212/boe.

0

50

100

150

200

250

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

CE/

bbl o

f pro

duct

ion

E&Ps XOM

Upstream capital employed per flowing barrel

4 4

Over the Long Term, Oil Prices Have Cycled Around the Marginal Cost

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

WTI

Oil

($/b

bl)

Oil Price Estimated Marginal Cost Estimated Cash Cost Estimated Price of DD

2010 to 2014 was unusual for the low level of volatility around the

marginal cost

In 2000 the marginal cost of supply began to

rise with the end of cheap oil and a reduction in global spare capacity

In 2008 the rapid growth in Chinese demand led

prices to trade above the marginal cost before collapsing with the

financial crisis

The current drop appears comparable to 1998 being demand led; while absolute prices differ, relative % drops are similar

Source: SCB, Kimmeridge

5 5

R² = 0.39

0.0x

0.2x

0.4x

0.6x

0.8x

1.0x

1.2x

1.4x

1.6x

1.8x

2.0x

0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0

Oil

Pric

e R

elat

ive

to th

e M

argi

nal C

ost

OPEC Spare Capacity (Mbpd)

Oil Prices Relative to the Marginal Cost

Oil prices have continued to trade around the marginal cost (adjusted for supply/demand). However, as fears grow about a deflating marginal cost and growing spare capacity, prices have trended below the line.

January 2015

Source: SCB, Kimmeridge

6 6

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

E

2015

E

Ble

nded

Rea

lizat

ion

$/bo

e

RO

ACE

%

The Rising Marginal Cost has Meant that Higher Prices have not Led to Higher Returns

If current pricing persists ($50/bbl and $3.5/mcf gas), then 2015 ROACE would be lowest for the peer group in 20 years, indicative of a cyclical trough.

7 7

Supply: Summary

While investors have focused on US supply growth as the cause of the collapse in crude prices, the reality is that total global supply growth is not abnormally high, due to weak non-OPEC/non-US supply.

The growth in US supply and the inability to export does however create the potential for significant “local” dislocations, including the risk that US inventories will become effectively full, putting pressure on WTI cash pricing.

OPEC growth has been significant, driven by the return of Libya. Risks exist on both sides of this equation with more supply likely in the event of an Iranian resolution and less supply possible due to political unrest in Libya/Iraq/Nigeria/Venezuela.

Long-term supply is likely to be negatively impacted by the return of volatility to the crude market. This was a meaningful outcome of the 1998 downturn and we would expect it to be repeated.

8 8

The US Flood

Investors are concerned about US volume growth for good reason.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Jan-

1920

May

-192

5Se

p-19

30Ja

n-19

36M

ay-1

941

Sep-

1946

Jan-

1952

May

-195

7Se

p-19

62Ja

n-19

68M

ay-1

973

Sep-

1978

Jan-

1984

May

-198

9Se

p-19

94Ja

n-20

00M

ay-2

005

Sep-

2010

Prod

uctio

n M

bpd

-0.4

-0.2

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1.4

1.6

Jan-

2010

May

-201

0

Sep-

2010

Jan-

2011

May

-201

1

Sep-

2011

Jan-

2012

May

-201

2

Sep-

2012

Jan-

2013

May

-201

3

Sep-

2013

Jan-

2014

May

-201

4

Year

ove

r yea

r gro

wth

Mbp

d

Source: EIA

9 9

The International Drought

Outside of the US, new exploration has been extremely limited.

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

# of

Not

able

(10+

Mbo

e) D

isco

verie

s by

Typ

e

Total DiscoveriesTotal OffshoreTotal Onshore

AAPG Explorer 2014 “The world did not see any surprising high volume discoveries”

AAPG Explorer 2013 “it was the Chinese year of the elephant but it wasn’t even the year of the Big Gorilla for exploration”

AAPG Explorer 2012 “shocking resurgence of oil production in North America was 2012’s leading energy story. Tight oil development, continued with discoveries in the Gulf of Mexico contributed”

AAPG Explorer 2011 “2011 may be seen as a year when frontier acreage, if not stealing the limelight, certainly earned the right to share center stage with unconventionals” AAPG Explorer

2010 “Brazil Discoveries Set 2010 Pace”

AAPG Explorer 2009 “Despite the low oil price impediments, the industry responded with a remarkable year especially in Brazil”

Source: AAPG, IHS

10 10

The Combined Non-OPEC Effect

However, overall, non-OPEC supply growth has been in line with history due to limited international growth.

-3%

-2%

-1%

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

E20

16

Non

-OPE

C S

uppl

y G

row

th

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

E20

1620

1820

20

Oil

Prod

uctio

n M

bpd

US Non-OPEC (ex US)

Source: EIA, SCB, Kimmeridge

11 11

The Near-Term Reaction to Price is Being Felt

The economics of drilling have been rapidly felt in a peer group with limited access to new cash flow sources. As a result, the rig count has collapsed and rates will follow supporting a 20% reduction in F&D.

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

3Q 1

995

3Q 1

996

3Q 1

997

3Q 1

998

3Q 1

999

3Q 2

000

3Q 2

001

3Q 2

002

3Q 2

003

3Q 2

004

3Q 2

005

3Q 2

006

3Q 2

007

3Q 2

008

3Q 2

009

3Q 2

010

3Q 2

011

3Q 2

012

3Q 2

013

3Q 2

014

Hig

h Pe

rmia

n R

ig R

ate

$/da

y 0

200

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600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

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1,800

7/17

/198

79/

16/1

988

11/1

7/19

891/

18/1

991

3/20

/199

25/

21/1

993

7/22

/199

49/

22/1

995

11/2

2/19

961/

23/1

998

3/26

/199

95/

26/2

000

7/27

/200

19/

27/2

002

11/2

6/20

031/

28/2

005

3/31

/200

66/

01/2

007

8/01

/200

810

/02/

2009

12/0

3/20

102/

03/2

012

4/05

/201

36/

06/2

014

Oil

Rig

Cou

nt

Kimmeridge day rate decline

projection

Source: Citi, Kimmeridge Source: Baker Hughes

12 12

How Much Can the US Grow When Living Within Cash Flow? Zero.

-50%

0%

50%

100%

150%

200%

250%

300%

- 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000

3-ye

ar P

rove

d D

evel

oped

Rec

ycle

Rat

io

Cumulative Production (mboepd)

From 2010-2013 (2014 data has yet to be reported) the peer group’s recycle ratio was 114%, implying 1.4% annual production growth ($95/bbl WTI and $3.50/mcf). However, the group also issued considerable debt allowing them to spend at an effective recycle rate of 131% to deliver 3% aggregate growth. Based on current commodity prices, even with a reduction in F&D of 20%, the peer group’s recycle ratio would be 88% (with no cost deflation it would be 70%), implying a decline in production of -1.2% to -3% (a swing of 575-850kboepd per year).

2011-13 Recycle ratio by operator (average 114%)

2015F Recycle ratio by operator (average 88%)

13 13

Demand: An Uneven Recovery

While the focus has been on US supply, the directional change in oil prices in 2014 appears to have been demand related, which has seen negative revisions since mid-year.

The IMF now expects global GDP growth to edge up only slightly from 3.3% last year to 3.5% in 2015. That is down from a 3.8% forecast for 2015 in its World Economic Outlook published in October. It forecasts growth picking up only slightly next year and cut its 2016 forecasts from 4.0% to 3.7%.

Historically (only one in nine times), have oil prices risen with GDP below 3%. For a material appreciation, yoy GDP growth has averaged 4%+.

14 14

Global GDP and the Demand Problem

Historically, oil prices have correlated closely with GDP growth with the exception of 2007 when prices dropped steeply in the face of strong growth.

-60%

-40%

-20%

0%

20%

40%

60%

-1%

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

1985

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E

YoY

WTI

Cha

nge

%

GD

P G

row

th R

eal %

GDP Growth % YoY Change in Oil

15 15

2600

3000

3400

3800

4200

4600

-30%

-20%

-10%

0%

10%

20%

30%Fe

b-00

Jul-0

0D

ec-0

0M

ay-0

1O

ct-0

1M

ar-0

2Au

g-02

Jan-

03Ju

n-03

Nov

-03

Apr-0

4Se

p-04

Feb-

05Ju

l-05

Dec

-05

May

-06

Oct

-06

Mar

-07

Aug-

07Ja

n-08

Jun-

08N

ov-0

8Ap

r-09

Sep-

09Fe

b-10

Jul-1

0D

ec-1

0M

ay-1

1O

ct-1

1M

ar-1

2Au

g-12

Jan-

13Ju

n-13

Nov

-13

Apr-1

4Se

p-14

Dis

tilla

te p

rodu

ct s

uppl

ied

(Kbb

l/d)

Load

ed im

boun

d co

ntai

ner g

row

th

3-month av. Y-o-y growth Inbound West Coast container TEUs

Trailing 13-week average distillate supplied

Decline in distillate demand coincides with a steep decline in loaded inbound container traffic

Recovery in both distillate demand and loaded

inbound container traffic in 2010

Distillate demand and inbound container traffic strong in 2013 and 2014,

although December container traffic shows a slowdown, but this could be impacted by strikes

US Demand Remains Strong Driven by Strong GDP

Source: US Dept. of Transport, EIA

16 16

And Falling Prices/Higher Employment

-10%

-8%

-6%

-4%

-2%

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

-60%

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60%

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/201

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1310

/1/2

013

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/201

41/

1/20

15

Mon

th o

n m

onth

cha

nge

in D

eman

d (L

agge

d 6

m &

Adj

fo

r em

ploy

men

t)

Mon

th o

n M

onth

Cha

nge

in G

asol

ine

Pric

e %

Price DemandSource: EIA, Bureau of Labor Statistics

17 17

International Demand has Decelerated

China Imports have been robust, up 10% or 600kbpd, but this is largely a result of storage growth.

18 18

China Underlying Demand has Been Weak (Up just 2-3%)

Last year China added 75-100mmbls to storage (200-300kbpd) supporting imports.

2015 demand is forecast at 4.0%, suggesting that if inventory build slows, imports could drop circa 100kbpd (yoy). January imports were weak (flat yoy and down 8% on December).

19 19

1.0

0.6

1.0 1.3

2.3

0.6

1.3

1.8

3.4

3.8

3.1 3.3

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0.4 0.6

-0.7

-0.3 -0.4

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0.3

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-0.9

-0.2

-1.8

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-2.9

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1.8

3.8

5.0

5.6

1.1

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-1.1

-0.4

-1.1

-0.7

0.1

1.4 1.3 1.1

0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4

-0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7

1.1 1.2

0.2 0.1 0.3

0.0

-0.2

-0.6 -0.3

0.1 0.0 0.1

-0.4 -0.7 -0.8

-0.4

-1.3 -1.6

-1.4 -1.4 -1.4 -1.5

-0.9 -0.5

-1.4

-1.9

-0.8 -0.6

-1.2 -1.2 -1.1

-0.5

0.2

0.6

2.0

1.1

1.6

2.5

-0.2

-0.6 -0.3

-0.1

-0.6

-1.0 -1.0

-0.1

0.3 0.3

0.9

1.4

0.4

0.8 0.9 0.8

0.2 0.1

-0.4 -0.1

0.6 0.8

-5.0

5.0

15.0

25.0

35.0

45.0

55.0

65.0

75.0

85.0

95.0

105.0

115.0

125.0

135.0

-5.0

-4.0

-3.0

-2.0

-1.0

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

1Q02

2Q02

3Q02

4Q02

1Q03

2Q03

3Q03

4Q03

1Q04

2Q04

3Q04

4Q04

1Q05

2Q05

3Q05

4Q05

1Q06

2Q06

3Q06

4Q06

1Q07

2Q07

3Q07

4Q07

1Q08

2Q08

3Q08

4Q08

1Q09

2Q09

3Q09

4Q09

1Q10

2Q10

3Q10

4Q10

1Q11

2Q11

3Q11

4Q11

1Q12

2Q12

3Q12

4Q12

1Q13

2Q13

3Q13

4Q13

1Q14

2Q14

3Q14

4Q14

1Q15

E2Q

15E

3Q15

E4Q

15E

2016

E20

17E

WTI

Pric

e $/

bbl

Wor

ldw

ide

Dem

and/

Non

OPE

C S

uppl

y M

bpd

IEA Oil Non-OPEC Supply & WW Demand Revisions Final #s -- Original #s vs. Oil Price

WW Demand Non-OPEC Supply12MF Oil Strip

The Deceleration in GDP and Demand has Led the Decline in Oil

Change in global GDP outlook will drive the recovery of the oil price, not supply reductions.

Source: IEA, Bloomberg

20 20

Currency, Interest Rates and Free Money

While historical and future oil prices are likely to be driven primarily by the marginal cost of supply and spare capacity (i.e. supply/demand), historical data suggests that currency/interest rates are an additional variable.

A leading factor in the crude downturn was the reversal from an accelerating GDP world (1H2014) to a decelerating one (2H2014). At the same time, the relative interest rate and exchange rate outlook for USD/EUR and USD to other currencies also reversed.

In the near term, dollar strength appears likely given the indications that the Fed will raise rates (at least a quarter this year). However, job and inflation data suggest that a moderation of this position (to no rate rise or further easing) isn’t impossible, which in turn may lead to dollar weakening and a modest recovery in crude.

21 21

Relationship of WTI to the DXY Index (2006-Present)

While the correlation is moderate, there is a clear directional relationship between currencies and crude.

R² = 0.4396

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

65 85 105

DXY

Inde

x

Oil (WTI $/bbl)

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

1/6/

2006

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2006

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2006

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/200

61/

6/20

074/

6/20

077/

6/20

0710

/6/2

007

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2008

4/6/

2008

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2008

10/6

/200

81/

6/20

094/

6/20

097/

6/20

0910

/6/2

009

1/6/

2010

4/6/

2010

7/6/

2010

10/6

/201

01/

6/20

114/

6/20

117/

6/20

1110

/6/2

011

1/6/

2012

4/6/

2012

7/6/

2012

10/6

/201

21/

6/20

134/

6/20

137/

6/20

1310

/6/2

013

1/6/

2014

4/6/

2014

7/6/

2014

10/6

/201

41/

6/20

15

DXY

Inde

x

WTO

I $/b

bl

Source: Bloomberg

22 22

Jobs Data and Impact on US Rate Decisions

The impact of the growing energy sector on the jobs market should not be underestimated and raises the possibility that the fall in unemployment stalls, further limiting inflation.

90

100

110

120

130

140

150

Jan-

05Ju

l-05

Jan-

06Ju

l-06

Jan-

07Ju

l-07

Jan-

08Ju

l-08

Jan-

09Ju

l-09

Jan-

10Ju

l-10

Jan-

11Ju

l-11

Jan-

12Ju

l-12

Jan-

13Ju

l-13

Jan-

14Ju

l-14

Empl

oym

ent I

ndex

ed to

Jan

200

5

North DakotaTexasRest of US

Employment growth in the rest of the US slower to recover post-financial crisis, but in Jun 2014 back

at peak 2007 levels

Note data ends in Jun 2014

Strong employment growth in North

Dakota and Texas driven by tight oil

boom and ancillary services

0

100

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1300

1400

Jan-

05Ju

l-05

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l-06

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l-07

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08Ju

l-08

Jan-

09Ju

l-09

Jan-

10Ju

l-10

Jan-

11Ju

l-11

Jan-

12Ju

l-12

Jan-

13Ju

l-13

Jan-

14Ju

l-14

Jan-

15

Oil

Prod

uctio

n In

dexe

d to

Jan

200

5

North DakotaTexasRest of US

Strong oil production growth in North Dakota

and Texas driven by tight oil production from the Bakken and Permian

Oil production in the rest of the

US has been broadly flat

Note data ends in Nov 2014

Source: EIA Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

23 23

What if Inflation Remains Non-Existent?

If US inflation remains limited and unemployment stagnates, a single interest rate rise may be realistic, with future easing raising the potential of USD weakening.

24 24

0

20

40

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140

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2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

WTI

Oil

($/b

bl)

Estimated Price of DD Estimated Cash Cost Oil PriceEstimated Marginal Cost Consensus

Source: SCB, Kimmeridge

Summary & Conclusions

Based on current conditions, Kimmeridge believe the risks to commodity prices versus consensus are negative in the 12-24-month time frame and positive in the 2-4 year outlook. Key factors that would alter this: • A return to easing in the US (hence large scale currency

movement), • Large economic stimulation packages in Europe, China, etc. • Political disruption, or • A sovereign/corporate high yield credit crisis (limiting new

distressed capital into the system)

25 25

Summary of Positive & Negative Factors

Influence Positive for Price Negative for Price

Marginal Cost Capital intensity continues to rise Material efficiency gains slowing impact of rig decline Service deflation bottoms Deflation in services/materials Low ROACE continue Technological evolution to improve EUR/well Supply Factors Reduction in US rig count, operators live within cash flow Iran nuclear deal Limited new liquidity (distress is the high yield market) Distressed capital flows into insolvent companies Distress in sovereign bonds (Venezuela/Russia) Stabilization in Iraq/Libya Supply interruptions (Libya, Iraq, Nigeria, Venezuela) "Full" storage Non-OPEC, Non-US continued decline OPEC decision to act

Export allowance/domestic growth (reducing WTI differential) Demand Factors Recovery in Global GDP Deceleration in US GDP China and RoW Stimulus Greek exit & Europe stagnation China SPR build China deceleration and/or credit crisis Negative Petro State revisions Industrial base expansion (Chemicals) Japanese stagnation Macro Dollar weakening Dollar strengthening

US return to easing RoW rate cutting/weakening and negative interest rates US deflation/rising unemployment

Source: Kimmeridge

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Disclosures

Offering by Fund Documents Only The material provided in this presentation is for informational purposes only. It does not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any securities relating to any of the products referenced herein, notwithstanding that any such securities may be currently being offered to others. Any such offering will be made only in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the Offering Memorandum pertaining to such Fund. Prior to investing, investors are strongly urged to review carefully the Offering Memorandum (including the risk considerations described therein), the Subscription Agreement and all related Fund documents (“Fund Documents”), to ask such additional questions of the Investment Manager as they deem appropriate, and to discuss any prospective investment in the Fund with their legal and tax advisers. In the case of any inconsistency between the descriptions or terms in this presentation and the Fund Documents, the Fund Documents shall control. Fund securities shall not be offered or sold in any jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful until the requirements of the laws of such jurisdiction have been satisfied. No person has been authorized to give any information or to make any representation, warranty, statement or assurance not contained in the Fund Documents and, if given or made, such other information or representation, warranty, statement or assurance may not be relied upon. Inherent Risks An investment in the Funds is speculative and involves a high degree of risk. Opportunities for withdrawal and transferability of interests are restricted, so investors may not have access to capital when it is needed. There is no secondary market for the interests and none is expected to develop. Leverage may be employed in the portfolio and the portfolio may be concentrated, which can make investment performance volatile. An investor should not make an investment unless it is prepared to lose all or a substantial portion of its investment. The fees and expenses charged in connection with this investment may be higher than the fees and expenses of other investment alternatives and may offset profits. There is no guarantee that investment objectives will be achieved. The past performance of the investment team should not be construed as an indicator of future performance. Kimmeridge Energy may modify its investment approach and portfolio parameters in the future in a manner which it believes is consistent with its overall investment objectives. This presentation is not intended for public use or distribution. Forward Looking Statements This presentation contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Section 27A of the Securities Act and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act. Forward-looking statements give our current expectations or forecasts of future events. They include statements regarding our anticipated future operating and financial performance. Although we believe the expectations and statements reflected in these and other forward-looking statements are reasonable, we can give no assurance they will prove to have been correct. They can be affected by inaccurate assumptions, by inaccurate information from third parties, or by known or unknown risks and uncertainties. You should understand that the following important factors could affect the Fund’s results and could cause those results or other outcomes to differ materially from those expressed or implied in the forward-looking statements relating to: (1) amount, nature, and timing of property acquisitions or capital expenditures; (2) the market for oil and gas acreage or properties; (3) drilling of wells and other planned exploitation activities; (4) timing and amount of future production of oil or gas; (5) quantities of discovered or probable, potential or proved reserves of oil or gas; (6) marketing of and market prices for oil, gas or oil or gas properties generally or in any particular location; (7) operating costs such as lease operating expenses, administrative costs and other expenses; (8) our future operating or financial results; (9) cash flow and anticipated liquidity; (10) the timing, success and cost of exploration and exploitation activities; (11) governmental and environmental regulation of the oil and gas industry; (12) environmental liabilities relating to potential pollution arising from our operations or the operations of acquirers of acreage positions we may purchase; (13) industry competition, conditions, performance and consolidation; (15) the availability of drilling rigs and other oilfield equipment and services; and (16) natural events. We caution you not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements. This presentation and all of the information contained in it, including without limitation all text, data, graphs, charts is the property of Kimmeridge Energy Management Company, LLC or its affiliates (collectively, “Kimmeridge”), or Kimmeridge’s licensors, direct or indirect suppliers or any third party involved in making or compiling any information and is provided for informational purposes only. The information has been derived from sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy and does not purport to be a complete analysis of any security, company or industry involved. The user of the information assumes the entire risk of any use it may make or permit to be made of the information. NONE OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDERS MAKES ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE INFORMATION (OR THE RESULTS TO BE OBTAINED BY THE USE THEREOF), AND TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW, EACH INFORMATION PROVIDER EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES (INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF ORIGINALITY, ACCURACY, TIMELINESS, NON-INFRINGEMENT, COMPLETENESS, MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE) WITH RESPECT TO ANY OF THE INFORMATION.

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