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7/25/2019 Luther v. Lander, Alaska (2016)
1/22
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFICREPORTER.
Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email
THESUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATEOFALASKA
BONNIEL.LUTHER,
Appellant,
v.
STEVIEW.LANDER,
Appellee.
)) SupremeCourtNo.S-15588
SuperiorCourtNo.3AN-12-10439CI
OPINION
No.7103May13,2016
)))))
)))
AppealfromtheSuperiorCourtoftheStateofAlaska,ThirdJudicialDistrict,Anchorage,PaulE.Olson,Judge.
Appearances:KennethP.Jacobus,KennethP.Jacobus,P.C.,Anchorage, for Appellant. Kimberlee A.Colbo, Hughes
GorskiSeedorfOdsen&Tervooren,LLC,Anchorage,forAppellee.
Before: Stowers,ChiefJustice,Fabe,Maassen,andBolger,Justices.[Winfree,Justice,notparticipating.]
FABE,Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
InNovember2010StevieLanderwasunabletocompletearightturnon
anicyroad,andhervehicleslidintoacardrivenbyBonnieLuther.AlthoughLuther
reportednoinjuriesatthesceneoftheaccident,thateveningshewenttotheemergency
roomforheadandneckpain,andwithinweeksshebegantosufferfromlowerbackpain
thatpreventedherfromreturningtoherjobasaflightattendant. Lutherattributedher
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]7/25/2019 Luther v. Lander, Alaska (2016)
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pain to the accident and sued Lander for negligence in 2012. Lander admitted
negligenceandmadeanofferofjudgment,whichLutherdidnotaccept. Thecase
proceededtotrialin2014,andthejuryawardedLutheratotalof$3,259forpastmedical
expenses,pastwageandbenefitloss,andpastnon-economiclosses.
ThesuperiorcourtgrantedattorneysfeestoLanderunderAlaskaRuleof
CivilProcedure68(b)anddeniedLuthersmotionforanewtrial. Lutherappeals,
arguingthatthesuperiorcourterredbydenyingheranewtrialbasedoninadequate
damagesandbyexcludingevidenceoftheamountofpaymentsformedicaltreatment
madebyLuthersinsurer. Shealsochallengesthesuperiorcourtsdecisiontogrant
attorneysfeesbasedonbillingrecordsthatwerefiledunderseal. Weconcludethatit
waserrortoexcludeevidenceofpaymentsmadeforLuthersmedicaltreatmentbyher
insurer.Butbecausethaterrorwasharmless,weaffirmthefinaljudgmententeredby
thesuperiorcourt.
II. FACTSANDPROCEEDINGS
A. Facts
In November 2010 Bonnie Luther was stopped at a red traffic light,
travelingsouthboundonSpenardRoadinAnchorage. StevieLanderwastraveling
westboundonNorthernLightsBoulevardandattemptedtomakearightturn.Lander
wasunabletocompletetheturnontheicyroad,andherSUVslidintothefrontdrivers
sideofLutherscar.Photographicevidencerevealed that the accidentcausedonlyminor
damagetoLutherscar: asmalldentabovethefrontdriverssidetire. Andtherewas
nodamagetoLandersSUV. Theairbagsdidnotdeployineithervehicle.
Attheaccidentscene,Luthertoldapoliceofferthatshewasfineanddidnotrequiremedicalattention.Butshewenttotheemergencyroomthateveningbecause
herheadhurtandherneckwasfeelingtight. Atthehospitalshewasdiagnosedwith
acervicalstrain,prescribedpainmedication,anddischarged. Lutherdidnotcomplain
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oflowerbackpainonthedayoftheaccident,andnodiagnosiswasmaderegardingher
back.Luthertestifiedthatthesymptomssheexperiencedimmediatelyaftertheaccident
headpainandtightnessinherneckandshouldersubsidedwithinafewweeksto
amonth.
LutherhadworkedasaflightattendantforAlaskaAirlinessince2007,and
thoughshewasnotworkingatthetimeoftheaccident,asshewasrecoveringfrom
recentsurgery,shewasscheduledtoreturntoworkinDecember2010.Buttwodays
aftertheaccident,LutherwasflyingasapassengeronaflighttoHawaiiwhenshefirst
experiencedpaininherbackandintoherleftbuttock.WhenshearrivedhomeinAlaska
neartheendofNovember,Lutherwasdiagnosedaslikelyha[ving]amuscleand
ligamentstrainofherlowerback... [andhavingpossibly]wrenchedthesacroiliac
joint. An x-ray showed no evidence of fracture, and Luther was referred to
OrthopedicPhysiciansAnchorage. SharonSturley,aphysicianassistantatthepractice,
foundnoacutefractureordislocationandnotedthatthex-raysshowedevidenceof
milddegenerativediscandjointdisease.
LuthercontinuedtoexperiencelowerbackpainandtoseeSturleyfor
monthlyvisitsthroughNovember2011withlittlenotablechangeinhercondition.In
April2011,anorthopedicspecialistinthesamepracticeasSturleydiagnosedLuther
withasmallannulartearandatinydiscprotrusionbutnotedthatLuthersbigger
symptomswereduetotrochantericbursitisandirritationofhersacroiliacjoint. This
doctor did not comment on the cause of either condition and suggested a steroid
injection,which Lutherdeclined. BetweenNovember2011andJuly2012Luther
workedfortheStateofAlaskainJuneau,whereshecontinuedtoseeanorthopedicspecialist. She was againdiagnosed ashaving likely[sacroiliac] joint pain and
bilateraltrochantericbursitis.Thedoctordidnotstatethateitherafflictionwascaused
bythecaraccident,andLutheragaindeclinedarecommendedsteroidinjectioninfavor
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ofcontinuedphysical therapy. Throughouther treatment,Lutherwenttophysical
therapyandreceivedacupuncturetreatment,thoughherattendanceatphysicaltherapy
wassomewhatirregular. BothSturleyandtheorthopedicspecialistinJuneauprovided
LutherwithmonthlyworkstatusreportstobesubmittedtoAlaskaAirlinessothat
Luthercouldremainemployedwhileonmedicalleave.
InJuly2012LutherreturnedtoAnchorageandcontinuedherworkforthe
State. Luther was evaluated by James Glenn, another physician assistant in the
orthopedic practice, in December 2012. Glenn reported that he was somewhat
perplexedastowhyLutherwasstillpursuingtreatmenttwoyearsaftertheaccident
withoutseekingmoreaggressivemeasures. Hesuggestedvarioustreatmentoptions
includinginjections,anewMRI,andx-rays,andhenotedthatLuthermightconsidera
discreplacementinordertoreturntoworkasa flightattendant. Glennrefusedto
provideLutherwithaworkstatusreporttoindicatethatLutherhadafulldisability
thatpreventedherfromreturningtowork. AfterherappointmentwithGlenn,Luther
appearstohavestoppedseekingmedicaltreatment,andinDecember2012sheresigned
fromherpositionwithAlaskaAirlines.
B. Proceedings
InOctober2012Lutherfiledacomplaintinthesuperiorcourtallegingthat
Lander was negligent and thather negligence had caused Luther to incur injuries
resultinginongoingmedicalexpenses,lostwages,andpainandsuffering. Lander
admittednegligenceandinDecember2013servedanofferofjudgmentfor$28,500plus
prejudgment interest, allowable Alaska Civil Rule 79 costs, and Alaska Civil
Rule82(b)(1)attorneysfees.Lutherdidnotaccepttheoffer,andthecaseproceededtotrialinMarch2014.
Attrial,Luthertestifiedthattheaccidenthadleftherunabletoperformher
dutiesasaflightattendant,butshedidnotcallanyofherowndoctorsorotherexpert
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medicalwitnesses. Instead,Lutherreliedonherowntestimonyabouthertreatmentand
onhermedicalrecords. Insupportofherclaimfordamagesforpastmedicalexpenses,
Lutherintroducedevidenceofthetreatmentshereceivedaftertheaccident.Someofthe
evidenceshesoughttointroducerevealedthatLuthersinsurer,GEICO,paidsomeof
Luthersmedicalexpensesafter theaccident. ThesuperiorcourtgrantedLanders
requestthattheevidencebeexcluded. Thesuperiorcourtalsoexcludedallevidenceof
thecostsofthevarioustreatmentchargespaidforbyGEICO.ButLutherwaspermitted
tointroduceevidenceofthetreatmentsthemselves.
Luther testified that her total unpaid medical expenses amounted to
$6,745.86. Lander,relyingonthereportandtestimonyofDr.Bald,anindependent
medicalexaminerretainedbyLander,askedthejuryonlytoawardLuther$809forpast
medical costs, theamountLutherpaidfor treatmentincurredwith OrthopedicPhysicians
AnchorageinNovember2011andheracupuncturistinJune2011. Dr.Baldreported
thatLutherdidnotincuranythingmoresignificantthanamuscularstrain-typeinjury
asaresultofthecaraccidentandthatgiventhedelayintheonsetofsymptoms,the
accidentcouldnothaveinjuredhersacroiliacjointorherlumbarspine. WhileDr.Bald
believedthatthetreatmentLutherreceivedduringtheyearfollowingtheaccidentwas
reasonable, appropriate, and necessary for treatment of injuries incurred in [the]
accident, he concluded that it was improbable that Luthers persistent pain was
attributabletotheaccident.HealsofoundthatbythetimeheexaminedLutherin2013,
shewasdoingobjectivelyverywellandshouldhavebeenabletoreturntowork,and
thatLutherspre-accidentsurgeryandinconsistentattendanceatphysicaltherapycould
haveslowedherrecovery.Lutheralsoclaimedlostwagesandbenefitsofmorethan$50,000forthe
timebetweentheaccidentandNovember2011.Shetestifiedthatherbasepayforthe
relevanttimeperiodwouldhavebeen$28,872. ButaccordingtoherW-2s,shemade
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considerablylessthanthatintheyearsprecedingtheaccidentbecauseshewassubject
tofurloughsin2009and2010andwasonmedicalleavefromJuly2010throughthe
timeoftheaccident. Lutheralsoclaimedlossesforvariousbenefitsshereceivedasa
flightattendant,includingadditionalpay,anannualbonus,andflightbenefits forherself,
herfriends,andherfamily.Acknowledgingthatitwasdifficulttovaluethoseadditional
benefitsaccurately,Lutherestimatedtheirvalueatatotalof$15,100. Lutherclaimed
$7,150.52inpaymentsshemadeforCOBRAmedicalinsuranceandalsorequested
damagesfornon-economiclosses. Lutherdidnotclaimfutureeconomiclosses.
LanderarguedthatthemaximumLuthershouldbeawardedforlostwages
was$9,000,theaverageofLuthersannualearningsin2008,2009,and2010. And
Landerassertedthat,becauseLutherhadnotworkedenoughhoursin2010toqualifyfor
medicalinsurancecoveragefromAlaskaAirlines,shehadalreadybeenpayingfor
COBRAatthetimeoftheaccident. Landerarguedthateveniftheaccidenthadnot
occurredandLutherhadreturnedtoherjobasaflightattendantinDecember2010as
planned,shewouldhavetohavecontinuedpayingforherowninsuranceuntilshehad
workedlongenoughtoqualifyforcoverage.
Attheconclusionofthetrial,thejuryreturnedaverdictawardingLuther
$809forpastmedicalexpenses,$1,700forpastwageandbenefitloss,$750forpast
non-economiclosses,andnoamountforfuturenon-economiclosses,foratotalaward
of $3,259. Lander moved for attorneys fees under Alaska Rule of Civil
Procedure68(b)(2)1 andfiledherbillingrecordsunderseal. Thisdesignationwas
laterchangedtoconfidential.
1 Rule68(b)provides: Ifthejudgmentfinallyrenderedbythecourtisatleast5percentlessfavorabletotheoffereethantheoffer...theofferee...shallpayallcostsasallowedundertheCivilRulesandshallpayreasonableactualattorneysfeesincurredbytheofferorfromthedatetheofferwasmade.
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LuthermovedforanewtrialunderAlaskaRuleofCivilProcedure59(a), 2
arguingthatthejurysverdictwasmanifestlyunfair...undertheevidenceproduced
andthecircumstancesofthecase. Shearguedthatthejurysawardsforpastmedical
expensesandlostwagesandbenefitswereinsufficient,andshechallengedthejurys
awardforpain,suffering,andlossofenjoymentoflifeasridiculouslysmall. Luther
also contended that the jury should haveawarded her damages for future lossof
enjoymentoflifeandthecostofCOBRAinsurance.
ThesuperiorcourtawardedLander$8,590.75inattorneysfeesandentered
finaljudgment,offsettingLuthersdamagesawardandprejudgmentinterestsuchthat
LutherowedLanderatotalof$6,494.17. 3
Lutherappeals,arguingthatthesuperiorcourterredby(1)denyingher
requestforanewtrialonthegroundofinadequatedamages,(2)excludingevidenceof
$10,000inmedicalexpensespaidbyLuthersinsurer,GEICO,and(3)allowingLander
tofileherbillingrecordsunderseal.
III. STANDARDOFREVIEW
We review the superior courts evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion.4 UnderAlaskaCivilRule61,errorsintheadmissionorexclusionof
2 Rule59(a)provides: Anewtrialmaybegrantedtoalloranyofthepartiesandonallorpartoftheissuesinanactioninwhichtherehasbeenatrialbyjuryorinanactiontriedwithoutajury,ifrequiredintheinterestofjustice.
3 Onthesamedaythatthesuperiorcourtenteredfinaljudgment,thecourtalsoinadvertentlygrantedLuthersmotionforanewtrial. Uponreceiptoftheorder
grantingthenewtrial,Landerfiledamotionforreconsideration.Recognizingthatithadnotintendedtograntthemotion,thesuperiorcourtwithdrewitsordergrantinganewtrialondamagesandsubsequentlydeniedthemotion.
4 Noffke v. Perez,178P.3d1141,1144(Alaska2008)(citingBierria v.(continued...)
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evidencearegroundsforreversal only iffailuretoreverseappearsto[this]court
inconsistentwithsubstantialjustice.5 [W]emustdisregardharmlesserrorsthathave
nosubstantialeffectontherightsofpartiesorontheoutcomeofthecase. 6
Arefusaltograntanewtrialisreviewedunderanabuseofdiscretion
standard;accordingly,wereviewtherecordinthelightmostfavorabletothenon-
movingparty.7 Anabuseofdiscretionexistswhenevidencetosupporttheverdict
wascompletelylackingorwassoslightandunconvincingastomaketheverdictplainly
unreasonableandunjust.8 Wedisturbthetrialcourtsexerciseofdiscretiononlyin
themostexceptionalcircumstancestopreventamiscarriageofjustice9andwillnot
disturbaverdictunlesstheevidence...issoclearlytothecontrarythatreasonable
personscouldnotdifferintheirjudgment.10
4(...continued)
Dickinson Mfg. Co.,36P.3d654,657(Alaska2001)).5 Loncar v. Gray,28P.3d928,930(Alaska2001)(alterationinoriginal).
6 Pedersen v. Blythe,292P.3d182,184(Alaska2012)(firstcitingAlaskaR.Civ.P.61;thencitingCoulson v. Marsh & McLennan, Inc.,973P.2d1142,1146(Alaska1999)).
7 Getchell v. Lodge,65P.3d50,53(Alaska2003)(quotingBierria,36P.3dat656).
8 Id. (quotingBierria,36P.3dat656).
9 Id. (quotingBierria,36P.3dat656).
10 Pralle v. Milwicz,324P.3d286,290(Alaska2014)(omissioninoriginal)(quotingAlaska Democratic Party v. Rice,934P.2d1313,1320n.10(Alaska1997)).
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Wereviewthedecisiontoawardattorneysfeesforabuseofdiscretion
and[will]overturnitonlywheretheawardismanifestlyunreasonable.11However,
[t]heindependentstandardofreview...appliestoconsideringwhetherthetrialcourt
properlyappliedthelawwhenawardingattorneysfees.12
IV. DISCUSSION
A. TheSuperiorCourtsExclusionOfEvidenceOfLuthersTreatmentExpensesWasError,ButTheErrorWasHarmless.
1. Evidence of the full cost of Luthers medical treatment is
relevanttoadeterminationoftheseverityofherinjuries.
Lutherarguesthatthesuperiorcourterredbyexcludingevidenceofthe
costofhermedical treatmentpaidbyGEICO,Luthers insurer. Landersought toexcludetheevidenceofLuthersmedicalbillsonthegroundthatourdecisioninRuggles
v. GrowwouldpreventLutherfromrecoveringanyportionofthemedicalexpensespaid
byGEICO.13 Luthercounteredthatexcludingtheamountoftheexpenseswouldmislead
thejuryintobelievingthatLuthersinjurieswerelessseriousbecauseshehadincurred
fewmedicalexpenses. Toaddressthatproblem,Lutherrequestedajuryinstructionthat
wouldinformjurorsthatheractualmedicalexpensesexceededthoseclaimedattrialby
$10,000,theamountofmedicalexpensespaidbyherowninsurer.
Thesuperiorcourtruledontheissuefromthebenchatthebeginningofthe
trial,grantingLandersrequesttoexcludetheevidence. Thesuperiorcourtnotonly
11 Alaska Fur Gallery, Inc. v. First Natl Bank Alaska,345P.3d76,84(Alaska2015)(alterationinoriginal)(quotingWilliams v. GEICO Cas. Co.,301P.3d1220,1225(Alaska2013)).
12 Baker v.Ryan Air,345P.3d101,106 (Alaska 2015) (alterationsinoriginal)(quotingDeNardo v. Cutler,167P.3d674,677(Alaska2007)).
13 See Ruggles ex rel. Estate of Mayer v. Grow,984P.2d509,512(Alaska1999).
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prohibitedevidenceofthesourceofthepayments,butalsopreventedanyevidenceof
theamountschargedforLuthersvarioustreatments. Forinstance,oneofLuthers
exhibitswasachronologicaltreatmenthistorypreparedbyherorthopedicspecialist,and
thesuperiorcourtsrulingrequiredredactionofanytreatmentpaymentsshowninthat
exhibit that were covered by GEICO. Luther argued for either an exhibit or an
instructiondemonstratingwhatthecostswereforeachtreatmentandsuggestedthat
Luthersinabilitytorecoverthoseexpensescouldbeexplainedinajuryinstruction.But
thetrialcourtconfirmedthatpaymentsbyGEICO,costs,theamountofmoneypaidby
GEICO,billingspaidbyGEICO,mentionofinsurance,allthatisdisallowed.
Thesuperiorcourtdidnotelaborateonthebasisforexcludingeventhe
amountsofthetreatmentcosts,notingonlythatbaseduponthepreviousrulings[the
courthad]alreadymade,[theamountoftheGEICOpayments]shouldbetakenout.
Presumably,thesuperiorcourtwasmindfuloftherulewesetoutinRuggles v. Grow,
whereweheldthatonceaninsurerrequeststhataplaintiffnot...presentitsclaimfor
medicalexpenses,theplaintifflos[es]therighttopresenttheclaimbecausethe
subrogatedclaimbelongstotheinsurer.14 Insurersmaythereforeseekreimbursement
inoneoftwoways: Theinsurercanallowaplaintifftopursuethesubrogatedclaim
alongwiththeplaintiffsownclaimandthenseekreimbursementfromtheplaintiff,or
theinsurercanrequestthattheplaintiffomitthesubrogatedclaim,allowingtheinsurer
toseekreimbursementinseparatelitigation. 15
Inthiscase,thereisnoquestionthatGEICOrequestedthatLutherrefrain
fromincluding the insurers medical-payment claim inher lawsuit and thatunder
Ruggles,Lutherthereforecouldnotrecoveranyportionofthe$10,000paidbyGEICO.
14 Id.
15 Id.
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ButwhileLutherrecognizesthatshecouldnothaverecoveredanyofthe$10,000,she
contendsthatexclusionoftheevidenceofthecostofhertreatmentwasprejudicial
becauseitappeared[tothejury]that[Luther]onlyincurredmedicalexp[e]nsesinthe
amountof$809,theamountshepaidoutofpocket.Landerarguesthatevidenceofthe
costofLutherstreatmentpaidbyGEICOwasirrelevant,misleading,andunfairly
prejudicial.ButLuthermaintainsthatthecostincurredfortreatmentwasrelevantto
the jurys determination of the severity of Luthers injuries and that without that
information,thejurycouldhaveassumedthattheinjuriesmusthavebeenminor.
ThedefinitionofrelevantevidenceunderAlaskaRuleofEvidence401is
broad.16 Forevidencetobeconsideredrelevant,itneednotbedirectorconclusive;it
needonlyhavesometendencytoadvancethepropositionforwhichitisoffered. 17 The
amountexpendedonmedicaltreatmentafteranaccidentmaybearontheseverityofthe
plaintiffs injuries.Justasphotographicevidenceandtestimonyabout thelackofserious
damagetoLuthersandLandersvehicleswasrelevantaspotentiallyreflectingthe
severityoftheaccident,sotooistheamountofmedicalpayments. Itisthenforthejury
todeterminetheweighttobegiventhatevidence.
Courtsinotherjurisdictionshaveaddressedthisissueandconcludedthat
evidenceofmedicalexpensesisadmissiblewhenitisrelevanttotheseverityofan
injury. Forexample,theGeorgiaSupremeCourthasheldthattheamountofmedical
billsmaybeadmissibleonaclaimofpainandsufferingtoshowtheseriousnessofthe
16 Marsingill v.OMalley,128P.3d151, 158 (Alaska 2006)(citingVan Meterv. State,743P.2d385,392(AlaskaApp.1987)).
17 Id. (quotingMcLaughlin v. State,818P.2d683,687(AlaskaApp.1991)).
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injury.18 Thisistrueevenincasesinwhichth[e]expensesshouldnothavebeen
awardedasdamages.19 Similarly,theVirginiaSupremeCourtconcludedthatthetrial
courterredinexcluding[aplaintiffs]medicalbillswhentheplaintiffarguedthatthe
medicalbillswereofferedsolelytoshowthathewastreatedforphysicalinjurieswhich,
hecontends,support[]hisallegationthatheenduredpainandsuffering. 20 Thatcourt
recognizedthattheplaintiffdoesnotseekrecoveryfortheamountofthemedicalbills;
rather,heseeksrecoveryforthepainandsuffering. 21 AndtheMontanaSupremeCourt
reversedthetrialcourtsexclusionoftheamountchargedformedicaltreatment,holding
thatmedicalbillsreceivedbyatortvictimcanberelevantevidenceofissuessuchas
thenatureandseverityoftheinjuries. 22 Anumberoffederalcourtshavealsopermitted
evidence of the amount of medical expenses when introduced for the purpose of
demonstratingtheseverityofaninjury. 23
18 Warren v. Ballard,467S.E.2d891,893(Ga.1996)(citingMelaver v.Garis,138S.E.2d435,436(Ga.App.1964))(holdingthatadoctorsbillwasadmissibleasillustrativeofpainandsuffering).
19 College Park Cabs, Inc. v. Justus,488S.E.2d88,89(Ga.App.1997).
20 Parker v. Elco Elevator Corp.,462S.E.2d98,100(Va.1995).
21 Id.
22 Meek v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.,349P.3d493,495(Mont.2015)(citingChapman v. Mazda Motor of Am.,7F.Supp.2d1123,1125(D.Mont.1998)).
23 See, e.g.,Hannah v. Haskins,612F.2d373,375(8thCir.1980)(notingthatwhile[p]aymentsreceivedfromcollateralsourcesarenotgenerallyallowedtobe
introduced into evidence for purposes of reducing a damage award or showingwrongdoing[,] . . . [e]vidence relating to such payments . . . has been held to beadmissible for the purposeofestablishing the extent ofinjury)(internal citationsomitted);Brice v. Natl R.R. Passenger Corp.,644F.Supp.220,224(D.Md.1987)(holdingthattheamountofmedicalexpensesincurredbyaplaintiffinaworkplace
(continued...)
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We havenot directly considered the questionwhether the amount of
medicalpaymentsisadmissibleforthepurposeofdemonstratingtheseverityofan
injury.ButwepointedoutinRuggles v. Growthatalthoughthesuperiorcourtruledthat
theplaintiffsmedicalexpensesmustbedeductedfromherrecovery,itnevertheless
allowedevidenceofthetreatmentexpenses. 24 Thoughtheadmissibilityofthatevidence
wasnotatissueonappeal,werecognizedthatthepaymentshadbeenadmittedas
evidencebearingontheseverityof[theplaintiffs]injury. 25
InRuggleswewentontoholdthataplaintiffmaynotbringaclaimthatthe
insurersoughttocontrol.26 Buttoexcludeallevidenceofmedicalcostswhenaninsurer
hasmadepaymentsandsubsequentlyrequeststocontroltheclaimwouldcreatean
unintendeddichotomy. Plaintiffsinvolvedinlitigationinwhichtheirinsurersdonot
makesucha requestwould beable to introduceevidenceofall medicalexpenses
includedintheirclaims: Iftheinsurerdoesnotobject,theinsuredmayincludethe
subrogatedclaiminitsclaim....27 Butincasesinwhichaninsureractivelyrequests
thattheplaintiffnotpursuehersubrogationclaim,28aplaintiffwouldbeprohibitedfrom
23(...continued) accidentwasrelevanttothedeterminationofthefullextentandnatureoftheplaintiffs injuries).
24 Ruggles ex rel. Estate of Mayer v. Grow,984P.2d509,511(Alaska1999).
25 Id.
26 Id. at512.
27
Id.28 ODonnell v. Johnson,209P.3d128,135(Alaska2009)(holdingthatthe
commonfunddoctrine,whichallowsalitigantorlawyerwhorecoversacommonfundtoseekreasonableattorneysfeesfromtheentirefund,doesnotapplywhenaninsurer
(continued...)
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presenting evidenceof the expense of medical treatment. Ruggles should not be
interpretedtoproducesuchananomalousresult.
Becauseevidenceoftheamountofmedicalbillsisrelevanttotheseverity
ofaplaintiffsinjury,weconcludethatsuchevidencecannotbeexcludedsolelyonthe
groundthattheplaintiffcannotrecoverthemoney. Thus,ourdecisioninRuggles does
notprecludetheintroductionofevidenceoftheamountsofinsurancepaymentsforthe
purposeofdemonstratingtheseverityofaninjury.
2. TheprobativevalueoftheevidenceofLutherstreatmentcosts
isnotoutweighedbyanydangerofprejudice.
GiventhatLuthersevidenceoftheamountschargedformedicaltreatment
wasrelevant,thenextstepintheanalysisiswhethertheevidenceoftheamountofthe
paymentsshouldhavebeenexcluded[because]itsprobativevalue[was]outweighed
bythedangerofunfairprejudice,confusionoftheissues,ormisleadingthejury,orby
considerationsofunduedelay,wasteoftime,orneedlesspresentationofcumulative
evidence.29 Landerarguesthatto theextentthatevidenceofthecostofLuthers
treatmentsmayhavehadminimalprobativevalue,thatvaluewasfaroutweighedby
itsprejudicialeffectandtendencytoconfuseandmisleadthejury. ButLanderdoesnotexplainwhyadmissionoftheevidencewouldhavebeenprejudicialtoher.Landerwas
freetoargueattrialthatthetreatmentsLutherreceivedwereunnecessaryorwerenot
attributabletotheaccident;indeed,shedidpreciselythat.
28(...continued)activelyrequeststhataplaintiffrefrainfrompursuingasubrogatedclaim).
29 AlaskaR.Evid.403. Wehaveobservedthatthisbalancingtestmeasurestheprobativevalueoftheevidenceagainstitsdeleteriouseffects. Wheretheprejudicialeffectisdemonstrably greater,theevidencemustbeexcluded. Conley v. AlaskaCommcns Sys. Holdings, Inc.,323P.3d1131,1143n.3(Alaska2014)(emphasisadded)(quotingCommentaryAlaskaE.R.403).
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In support of her argument that the evidence could have misled and
confusedthejury,LanderreliesonourdecisioninLoncar v. Gray.30 Theplaintiffinthat
personalinjurycasesoughttointroduceevidenceofherownMedicareandMedicaid
paymentsinpartbecausesheclaimedtheevidencewasrelevanttoherdamagesbecause
she sufferedhumiliationfromacceptingpublicassistance.31 Thesuperiorcourtexcluded
theevidenceofhercoverage,notingthatwhiletheplaintiffcouldnotintroduceevidence
ofMedicaidpayments,shecouldtestifyabouthermedicalcondition,...her medical
bills[,]...herdifficultyinobtainingmedicalcare,...her bills and the amount that has
been run up withoutmentioninginsurance.32 Weaffirmed,reasoningthatevidenceof
Medicaidpaymentswouldhaveopened[thedoor]toevidencefrombothsidesonthe
largerissueofinsurancepaymentsandthispotentiallyverylargebodyofevidence
wouldcreatemoreconfusionoftheissuesthan...anyprobativevalueitmayhave. 33
But here, unlike the plaintiff inLoncar, Luther was prohibited fromentering into
evidenceeventheamounts chargedforhermedicaltreatment. Landersconcernsabout
confusingthejurycouldeasilyhavebeenalleviatedbypermittingevidenceregarding
theamountsofthemedicalbillswhileexcludingtheirpaymentsource.
Thesuperiorcourtcouldhavetakenseveralapproachestoensurethatthe
jurydidnoterroneouslyawardLutheranyportionofthesubrogatedclaim. First,the
superiorcourtcouldhaveinstructedthejurynottoawarddamagesforthemedical
expensesthathadalreadybeenpaidbyLuthersinsurer. Thiswastheremedythat
Luthersuggestedtothesuperiorcourt.
30 28P.3d928(Alaska2001).
31 Id. at933.
32 Id. (alterationomitted)(emphasesadded).
33 Id. (omissioninoriginal).
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Second, the superior court could have instructed jurors not to award
damagesfor treatmentundertakenafter a particular date, whichwouldnecessarily
preclude an award for expenses covered by the insured partys medical-payment
coverage.
Third,thesuperiorcourtcouldhaveallowedthejurytodeterminethetotal
medicalexpensesattributabletotheaccidentandthenreducedthatawardtoprevent
recoveryforpaymentsmadebyGEICO. Wehaveconcluded that thisapproach is
appropriateinthecontextofadamagescap. InKodiak Island Borough v. Roe,we
determinedthatthesuperiorcourtimproperlyinstructedthejuryonastatutorynon
economicdamagescapinanintentionaltortcase:While[t]helegislaturemaylimitthe
amountofdamagesthatcanbeawarded,...itisforthejurytodeterminetheextentof
theplaintiffsinjuryandthedamageawardthatwillmake[himor]herwhole. 34
Anyoftheseapproacheswouldallowaplaintifftointroduceevidenceof
thefullcostofmedicaltreatmentwithoutallowingtheplaintifftorecoveranycosts
precludedbyRuggles,leavingtheinsurerfreetopursueitsseparatelitigation.
3. Thesuperiorcourtsexclusionofevidenceofthefullcostof
treatmentwasharmlesserror.Havingconcludedthatthesuperiorcourterredbyexcludingtheevidence
ofthecostofLuthersmedicaltreatmentcoveredbyGEICO,wemustnextconsider
whetherthaterrorwarrantsanewtrial. Unlesswecandeterminethattheexclusionof
theevidencehadasubstantialeffectontheoutcomeofthetrial, 35wemustconclude
thattheerrorwasharmless. WhileLutherwasimproperlyprecludedfrompresenting
34 63P.3d1009,1016-17(Alaska2003).
35 Pedersen v. Blythe,292P.3d182,184(Alaska2012)(firstcitingAlaskaR.Civ.P.61;thencitingCoulson v. Marsh & McLennan, Inc.,973P.2d1142,1146(Alaska1999)).
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evidenceofallofhermedicaltreatmentexpensesbecausesomewerepaidbyGEICO,
Lutherwasfreetoadmithermedicalrecordsandtotestifyaboutthetypeofmedical
treatmentshereceivedfromthedateoftheaccidentthroughtrial. ItwasLutherwho
electednottopresentasinglemedicalexperttosupportherclaimthattheaccident
causedherpersistentlowerbackpain. Andthemedicalrecordsreflectedthateven
Luthers own orthopedic specialist found her continued need for treatment
perplex[ing]. Lander,ontheotherhand,presentedthetestimonyofDr.Bald,who
underminedanycausalconnectionbetweentheaccidentandLutherscontinuingpain,
alongwithevidenceindicatingthatLutherfailedtomitigateherdamages.
Inlightoftheevidencepresentedandthetrialstrategiesemployedinthis
case,wecannotconcludethatadmissionoftheamountoftheGEICOpaymentswould
havehadasubstantialeffectontheoutcomeofthetrial. Wethereforeconcludethatthe
errorwasharmless.
B. TheSuperiorCourtDidNotErrByDenyingLuthersMotionForA
NewTrial.
Lutheralsoarguesthatthesuperiorcourtshouldhavegrantedhermotion
foranewtrialbecausethejurydidnotawardadequatedamagesand[t]heresultreachedbythejurywasmanifestlyunfair.Butbecausetherewassufficientevidencetosupport
thejurysverdict,weaffirmthetrialcourtsruling.
Lutherhasfailedtoestablishthatthecircumstancesinthiscaseconstitute
thetypeofexceptionalcircumstancesinwhichwewillreverseatrialcourtsdenialof
anewtrialtopreventamiscarriageofjustice. 36 Wehaveheldthat[i]nadequacyof
ajuryverdictisgroundsforanewtrialincaseswherenegligenceisconcededorproved,
Getchell v. Lodge, 65 P.3d 50, 53 (Alaska 2003) (quotingBierria v.Dickinson Mfg. Co.,36P.3d654,656(Alaska2001)).
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butno damages are awarded.37 Butincaseswherethejurymakessome award...
where negligence is conceded or proved, we have not reversed that award as
inadequate.38 Here,thejurydidawarddamages. Becausereasonableminds[can]
differonthecausalrelationshipbetween[an]accidentand[aplaintiffs]injuries...[t]he
resolutionof[the]issue[ofdamages]turnsuponthecredibilityofthewitnesses.39
Here,thejurymaynothavebeenpersuadedthattheaccidentcostLutherasmuchasshe
claimedinmedicalexpenses,lostpay,andpainandsuffering.
Lutherreliesonseveraldecisionsinwhichwereversedasuperiorcourts
denial of a new trial because of inadequate damage awards, but those cases are
unpersuasivehere. Forexample,inPugliese v. Perdue,wereversedanawardofno
damageswhereevidencethattheaccidenthadcausedtheinjurywasindisputable. 40 And
inFancyboy v. Alaska Village Electric Cooperative, Inc.,thejuryawardeddamagesfor
property lossandmedicalexpensesarisingoutofafire thatwasdeterminedtobe
partiallycausedbythedefendant,but itgavenoawardfornon-economicdamages
despitethefactthattheplaintiffssufferedpainfulburnsand...lossofconsortium. 41
Buthere, thejurymadeawards forbothpastmedicalexpensesandnon-economic
damages. AndthecasescitedbyLutherinwhichweupheldasuperiorcourtjudges
37 Glamann v. Kirk,29P.3d255,263(Alaska2001)(emphasisadded).
38 Id.(emphasisadded);seealso Hutchinsv. Schwartz,724P.2d1194(Alaska1986)(affirmingajuryawardof$250forlostearningsratherthanthe$18,500the
plaintiff claimed; $0 instead of $75,000 for lost enjoyment of life and physicalimpairment;and$937forpastmedicalexpensesinsteadoftheclaimed$20,794).
39 Hutchins,724P.2dat1203.
40 988P.2d577,583(Alaska1999).
41 984P.2d1128,1136(Alaska1999).
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discretionarydecisiontogrant anewtrialonthegroundofaninadequateawardof
damages42 supportthepropositionthattheremustbeexceptionalcircumstances...
whichwouldrequireustooverrulethesuperiorcourtsdiscretionarygrantofanew
trial.43 Suchcircumstancesdonotexistinthiscasebecauseareviewoftherecord
revealsthattherewassufficientevidencepresentedtosupportthejurysaward.
First,Lutherchallengesthejurysdecisiontoawardheronly$809forpast
medicalexpenses,arguingthat sheshouldhavebeenawarded $1,578.86,theundisputed
totalof past medicals due for that year. But the jurywas free to make its own
assessmentoftheamountofmedicalexpensesthatwereattributabletotheaccident.As
Landerpointsout,Dr.Baldqualifiedhis statement thatoneyearwasa reasonable
treatmentperiodbyobservingthathewas[g]ivingMs.Lutherquiteabitofbenefitof
thedoubt. AndthejurycouldhavereliedonDr.Baldstestimonythathe[couldnot]
attribute[Luthers]complaintsofintermittentpaininherbuttockto[the]accident.The
jurycouldalsohavedeterminedthatLutherfailedtomitigateherdamages: Dr.Bald
testifiedthatLuthersfailuretoattendallphysical therapy sessions could haveprolonged
herpain,andLutherconcededthatshetwicerefusedsteroidinjectionsrecommendedby
herdoctors. Finally,wehaverecognizedthatwherethedamagetothevehicleisminor,
thatevidencecanbeprobativeoftheforcewithwhichtheaccidentoccurred[]andthe
likelihoodthatitcausedseriousharmtoaparty. 44Sothejurycouldhaveconsidered
thatevidenceinreachingtheconclusionthatLuthersharmfrom theaccidentwasminor.
42 See Buoy v. ERA Helicopters, Inc.,771P.2d439(Alaska1989);Sebringv. Colver,649P.2d932(Alaska1982).
43 Buoy,771P.2dat442.
44 Marron v. Stromstad,123P.3d992,1009(Alaska2005).
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Second,thejuryawardedLuther$1,700inlostwagesandbenefitsdespite
herclaimedlossof$51,122.52. GiventhevariablenatureofLutherscompensationas
aflightattendant,abroadrangeofawardscouldhavebeensupportedbytheevidence.
Weneedonlydeterminewhethertherewassufficientevidencetosupportthejurys
award,andweconcludethattherewas. Inlightofthetestimonyandevidencepresented
attrial,itisplausiblethatthejurysawardreflecteditsbeliefthattheaccidentdidnot
actuallypreventLutherfromreturningtoworkforthefullyear. Dr.Baldtestifiedthat
Luthercouldreturntowork[i]fshesodesired,andGlennrefusedtosignhertotal
disabilityworkstatusreports. Andagain, the jurymayhaveconsideredevidence
presentedbyLanderofLuthersfailuretomitigateandthepossibilityraisedbyLander
attrialthatevenifLutherhadreturnedtoworkinDecember2010,shecouldhavebeen
placedonadditionalfurloughs.Similarly,thejurysdecisionnottocompensateLuther
forherCOBRApaymentswassupportedbyevidencethathervariableworkschedule
maynothaveentitledhertoemployer-providedhealthinsurance. Thus,therewas
sufficientevidencetosupportthejurysawardof$1,700.
Finally,Lutherclaimsthattheamountawardedforherpainandsuffering
resultingfromtheaccidentwasinadequate. Butgiventhesubjectivenatureofajurys
awardofnon-economicdamages,wecannotconcludethattheawardwasunsupported
bytheevidence.WhileLuthertestifiedthatherinjurieshavecausedinterruptedsleep
andpainwhensittingforlongperiodsoftime,Dr.Baldtestifiedthatherexamination
wascompletelyandtotallynormal,andGlennwasperplexedbythefactthatshewas
stillrequestingdisabilitystatustwoyearsaftertheaccident.
Becausetherewasevidencetosupportthejurysawardof damagesandourprecedentdoesnotwarrantareversalofthesuperiorcourtsdenialofLuthersmotion
foranewtrial,weaffirmthatdenial.
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C. TheSuperiorCourtDidNotErrInItsOrderGrantingAttorneysFeesBecauseLutherHadAccessToAllOfLandersBillingRecords.
Finally,LutherarguesthatthesuperiorcourterredingrantingLander
attorneysfeesunderRule 68becauseLanderfiledthedocumentssupportingherrequest
forfeesunderseal. Butwhilethebillingrecordswerefiledunderseal,thecourt
promptlyredesignatedthemasconfidentialinApril2014,providingthepartieswith
accesstothedocuments.45 Andinanyevent,Landerprovidedallofthebillingrecords
insupportofhermotiondirectlytoLuther. Thus,Lutherdoesnotclaimthatshewas
denied access to the supporting billing documentation, and as Lander points out,
Luthersabilitytocontestorrespondtothe[motion]wasinnowayburdenedbythe
factthatthedocumentationwasfiledundersealanddesignatedasconfidentialbythe
court.
Luther makes a persuasive policy argument against the ability of a
prevailingpartytodesignateasconfidentialbillingrecordsinsupportofamotionfor
attorneysfees: Shearguesthatthispracticecouldplaceanundueburdenonparties
opposingthosefeesbypreventingthemfrommentioningtheconfidentialinformation
intheiroppositiontothemotion. Buthere,Lutherdidnotopposethereasonablenessofthehourlyratesortheamountoftimeexpended,andsheexpresslyallowedthatthe
awardofattorneysfeeswaswithinthediscretionof[thesuperiorcourt]. Thus,
Luthersargumentishypothetical,andwedonotneedtoconsiderithere.
Lutheralsoarguesthatasageneralprinciple,courtproceedingsareopen
andthatthereisnoreasondocumentssupportingamotionforattorneysfeesshouldbe
45 UnderAlaskaAdministrativeRule37.5(c),[c]onfidentialmeansaccesstotherecordisrestrictedto: thepartiestothecase;counselofrecord;individualswithawritten orderfromthecourt authorizingaccess;andcourtpersonnelforcaseprocessing
purposesonly,while[s]ealedmeansaccesstotherecordisrestrictedtothejudgeandpersonsauthorizedbywrittenorderofthecourt.
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treateddifferently. Shemaintainsthattheinformationshouldbepublicasamatterof
policybecauseknowledgeoftheprevailinghourlyrateforattorneysmaybeusefulin
futurecases. Thismaybetrue,butLutherdoesnotsuggestthatthetrialcourthas
consideredordeniedanyrequestforaccesstothesedocuments. Andthetrialcourt
may,byorder,limitaccesstopublicinformationinanindividualcaserecordbysealing
ormakingconfidentialthecasefile[or]individualdocumentsinthecasefile. 46 Absent
anyindicationthatLutheroranyotherpartyhasrequestedorbeendeniedaccesstothese
documents,wecannotconcludethatthesuperiorcourtabuseditsdiscretion.
V. CONCLUSION
Forthereasonsdiscussedabove,weAFFIRMthefinaljudgmentofthe
superiorcourt.
AlaskaAdmin.R.37.6(a).
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