Luhmann's General SociologyAuthor(s): Dag ØsterbergSource: Acta Sociologica, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2000), pp. 15-25Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4201179Accessed: 20/07/2010 03:02

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ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 2000

Luhmann's General Sociology

Dag 0sterberg

Department of Music and Theatre, University of Oslo, Norway

ABSTRACT The article deals with Niklas Luhmann's treatise Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, exposing it to a critique in terms of Luhmann's own criterion: plausibility. It is argued that both Parsons' general sociology and Marxism render more plausible accounts of modern society than does Luhmann's theory of autopoietic systems. It is asserted that the fundamental mistake in Luhmann's theory is his conflation of the concepts of differentiated social systems and autonomous social systems, a conflation that confers a

ring of the imaginary to Luhmann's treatise.

Dag 0sterberg, University of Oslo, Department of Music and Theatre, P.O. Box 1017, Blindem, N-0315 Oslo, Norway ? Scandinavian Sociological Association 2000

1. Introduction

Ten years ago, in a book on general sociology, I devoted a chapter to Luhmann's book Soziale

Systeme (1984). I concluded with a provisional epokj?, saying that it was too early for me to make up my mind as to the validity of this avant-

garde approach. Since then, Luhmann has carried out his entire programme. After publish- ing a series of monographs on particular social institutions, he crowned his life work in 1997 with a huge treatise on society as a whole, world

society - Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (1997). As an opportunity to concentrate on Luh- mann's work and take a stance towards it, the

present occasion is favourable. Mainly, I shall comment upon Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (GdG). This voluminous book contains much of

philosophical and meta-sociological concern -

considerations on non-Aristotelian logic, on the 'old European' ontology and how to transcend it, on the constructivity of science, etc. I shall, however, limit myself here to questions of a more straightforward sociological character. But in the first two sections, I comment on some aspects of Luhmann's writings, which somehow disturb the sociological reading, before turning to the real subject matter, 'die Sache selbst'.

2. The aggressively anti-left-wing tone of Luhmann's writings Luhmann's writings

Already in Soziale Systeme (1984), an anti-left-

wing attitude was discernible, in spite of the

extremely abstract or general tone of the discussions in the book. The reason for this was that left-wing political positions or activities were relatively often used as negative examples. In GdG this anti-left-wing attitude is sharper, as in others of his later writings. All over the thousand pages are sprinkled sarcastic or

condescending or polemical anti-left-wing remarks, which go beyond the mere refutation of a different, adverse doctrine.

It is hard to say whether this is incon-

sequential to Luhmann, considering that he

purports to transcend all sorts of politics and

moralizing. He poses as one who has pierced the illusions of his contemporaries, who are stuck in an outdated 'semantics' which does not suit what he calls 'modern society'. More than any other great sociologist of the past, Pareto is the one who comes to mind when reading GdG. He, too, liked or could not resist venting his political antipathies in the midst of a huge, learned and serious treatise on general sociology.

As one example, Luhmann writes (p. 613

in.) about 'Marx's trick' of describing society as

16 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 2000 VOLUME 43

constituted by two social classes. Now, as most

sociologists will know, Marx himself stated (in Das Capital, III. ch. 52) that capitalist society in his time was constituted by three classes, the

capitalists, the wage-earners and the land- owners. This error raises the suspicion that Luhmann's vast readings do not include Marx's Das Capital. But this is a minor point here. The issue is rather why Luhmann uses the word 'trick', thereby suggesting that Marx intended to deceive his readers.

Another example is Luhmann's section

(pp. 847 ?T.) on 'protest movements' - the

atmosphere is chilly, sarcastic, if not downright hateful. By ingenious theological reasoning -

Luhmann knows a lot about theology - he

manages to present the position of the protest movement as that of the Devil: just as the Devil

pretends to observe God from an independent position (which is 'impossible'), the participant of a protest movement, Luhmann asserts,

pretends to 'know better' than society, which is also impossible and at best ridiculous. Now, in

my own experience, protest movements do not

pretend to 'know better' than 'society', but 'better' than the political authorities, which is

quite another thing. Luhmann's diabolic inter-

pretation of protest movements is therefore unfounded. But he also goes on to assert that

'nothing' warrants the assumption that a

protest movement knows better than the authorities and their experts. Now, at least in

Norway, exactly this has happened several times.

A third example is found in Die Kunst der

Gesellschaft, wherein Luhmann refers in passing (p. 228) to Adorno's and Horkheimer's 'arro-

gant rejection' of mass culture. (It almost goes without saying that there are many other attacks on the Frankfurter School in his

writings.) Adorno was - in addition to a

professional philosopher - an outstanding musicologist and an expert on literature. He also wrote on film music together with Hans Eisler. Obviously he was entitled to have his own

opinion on 'mass culture', which he disliked.

Why does this dislike qualify as 'arrogance'? Why should we instead trust Luhmann's judg- ment on mass culture, and his judgment on Adorno? Luhmann entangles himself in self- contradictions. He states and repeats that one should not pose as a Besserwisser, as the Frankfurter School did and does - so why should he himself pretend to know better than Adorno and Horkheimer?

Aggressive remarks like these may be

subconscious slips of the pen; they reveal Luhmann's political stances, but, strictly speak- ing, should not occur within a sociological treatise on this level of abstraction and general- ity.

3. Platitudes and cynicisms

Platitudes of 'gesunde Vernunft' In Luhmann's writings, extreme radicalism goes together with a strong conformity and establish- ment attitude. His books abound with extremely common-sense remarks in favour of the Estab- lishment. Here follow a few examples to indicate what I have in mind.

In GdG, Luhmann writes (p. 492): 'Who- ever wants to abolish nuclear plants (Atom- kraftwerke) therefore will find himself con- fronted by the question: How, then, do we otherwise produce electricity?'. One response is that the consumption of electricity seems boundless today. Norway, with all its waterfalls,

imports electricity from Denmark. Examples of sheer waste can easily be given. Now, those who

oppose nuclear-driven plants very often oppose this boundless consumption of electricity, mak-

ing a plea for a diminished consumption of

electricity if necessary. This is not just a whim;

surveys in Norway strongly indicate that the

majority would prefer a simpler material life.

Besides, surely there are other possible energy sources: wind, sea waves, the sun. (In Norway, research on sea waves had a promising start around 1970, but was neglected by the authorities when the North Sea oil was dis-

covered.) Luhmann's remark trivializes the deep concern about the danger of nuclear energy; he takes for granted that nobody will renounce warm showers and drawing rooms (where the

temperature has risen from 18? to 24 ?C on

average in recent decades.) On p. 531 we read: 'In the meantime,

society has got habituated to technics', and on the next page we read that turning away from

technology 'is practically out of question'. This is true, but a platitude, a very boring remark. This boredom may be intentional; Luhmann - a

sociologist of unlimited imagination - pretends to be confined within extremely narrow bound- aries. Technology must be accepted - why? Because it has become a habit. But habits,

surely, can be changed? No, that is practically out of the question. But what does 'practically' mean in this context? Could it mean just that Luhmann feels comfortable with the present

Luhmann's General Sociology 17

^?mst?***^?;

level of technology in his everyday life? A few

pages earlier (p. 523), he states peremptorily: 'Since it is only too clear that life and survival

depends on technics, it becomes implausible 'to make the true human the contrary of technics". This, also, is a platitude, almost a tautology: our

present-day Western way of life depends on 'technics' for its survival. But that cannot mean that humanity as a whole cannot survive without technology; at any rate, this is not at all 'obvious' (?berdeutlich). On the other hand, what does seem obvious is that the population as a whole cannot adopt the Western level of

technology without the ecological system breaking down. For instance, not everybody can have a car. A reasonable conclusion to be drawn is that the West must considerably reduce its use of energy-consuming technology and chemical products, even if this change makes life materially less comfortable. Surely, Luhmann is acquainted with this simple reason-

ing; by ignoring it in his text, he tries to induce in the reader conformity to the Established order, which is still oriented towards technolo-

gical growth (pace the Brundtland Report). In Goffmannian terms, Luhmann's framing

of his texts, his context of plausibility, is very often that of the Establishment, of the liberal- conservative politics and ideology prevailing within the ruling and dominating circles. His

platitudes have this purpose: to make the reader take for granted the code of Establishment.

Cynicism and blas? attitude To exemplify Luhmann's cynicism, I shall comment upon a passage from ?kologische Kommunikation (pp. 212ff.). The topic is the role of values in contemporary political discus- sions, how decisions are increasingly under-

pinned by referring to 'values', which leads to an inflation of 'values'. Now, Luhmann has got an inkling ('man kann ahnen) that the discus- sions of ecology will contribute to this infla-

tionary process. In the first place, he surmises, pure air and water, trees and animals will attain the dignity of entering the 'list of values' (in the idiom of laconic German: they will become

Wertkatalogfdfhig). He then goes on: 'And since it is just a question of a list, one could extend it ad libitum: pandas, Tamils, women . . . '. The reader is prone to smile approvingly at this remark, but also feels that this kind of humour is an invitation to cynicism for several reasons. In the first place, one is supposed to endorse

('mitmachen) Luhmann's placement of animals and human beings on an equal footing.

Certainly, pandas are darlings, cherished ani- mals for campaigns of the World Wildlife Fund and similar organizations. But are we to think of Tamils as pandas? For one thing, Tamil Nadu is a state in India, with approximately 30 million inhabitants. To suggest that they should be included in a list of threatened species is to

suggest the possibility of exterminating them.

Perhaps Luhmann had in mind merely the Tamil refugees in Germany, but why suppose that they are more or less valuable than other human beings, candidates for a 'catalogue of values'? And then 'women': the suggestion seems to be that the various feminist move- ments, while claiming equality with men, will

go on and claim that women are more valuable than men, or that they feel threatened with extermination like pandas, which portrays the feminist movement as hysterical or extremely unrealistic. It also suggests that a woman is a

darling just like a panda, easily arousing our immediate compassion, which sort of sugges- tion should be resisted by sensible sociologists. Turn and twist it as you like, this kind of wit is

morally reproachable. Luhmann, presumably, is fed up with

playing the sociologist in the expected role as a goodie-goodie, backing every conceivable Good Cause, speaking for the wretched of the earth, for the underprivileged, for the oppressed, for aboriginal populations, for those who are Different as such. Instead, he opts for a certain

cynicism, emphasizing the modest role of

sociology in social life today. On this last point he may be right, but the situation does not call for cynicism. The lawyer is committed to Justice, the medical doctor is committed to Health, the teacher is committed to the Youth, etc. These are ethical professions that impose moral

obligations on those who have chosen them. The sociologist, too, may be under moral

obligations. But a commitment to make society better is not sufficient. What matters is the

professional achievement. The sociologists who make themselves spokesmen for groups who

justly feel that their social rights are being violated may appear to be goodie-goodies, but

only if they perform badly. If what they have to

say in public comes out as mere trivial outbursts of indignation, sociologists are useless. Their

specific, professional contribution is to underpin the moral standpoint with better arguments and research data than most non-sociologists could do, or to reformulate the moral protest within a more appropriate social context. In other words, the sociologist role is a moral or

18 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 2000 VOLUME 43

moralist one, just like that of the lawyer or medical doctor. This may sometimes be tiresome or cause uneasy feelings of hypocrisy. But that is no reason for the sociologist to opt for cynicism.

Let us leave all consideration of attitude and tone aside, since it disturbs the really important subject matter of Luhmann's work, i.e. his construction of an alternative to all

sociology up till now, to which I now turn.

4. Two basic tenets

Luhmann's two basic tenets are as follows:

1. 'Modern society' is above all characterized by ever-increasing 'differentiation' and 'com-

plexity'; 2. 'Modern systems theory' is best suited to

describe modern society in a scientific way.

By 'differentiation' Luhmann means a prolifera- tion of 'autonomous' or 'autopoietic' social

systems, each of them defined or constituted

by its own specific code or 'leading difference'.

Any social system deals with its surroundings -

its Umwelt - solely in terms of its specific code.

Therefore, it would be misleading to say that each social system is a Leibnizian 'monad', a 'world of its own', a solus ipse. On the contrary, any social system communicates with its

surroundings precisely by virtue of its closed- ness. Only, it communicates through its own code. Social systems are - according to Luh- mann - a subclass of communication systems. Therefore, sociology should be transformed into a branch of communication theory, or - what comes to the same thing - a branch of modern

systems theory. Modern systems theory - according to

Luhmann - has made considerable progress away from the systems thinking that influenced Parsons' and his school of functional sociology. While Parsons described 'social systems' in terms of 'adaptation', 'integration', 'equili- brium' and 'maintenance mechanisms', thus

presenting social life as by and large preoccu- pied with stability and self-preservation, the recent systems theory of Maturana and others

emphasizes wholly different characteristics.

5. Stratified and functionally differentiated societies

'The great transformation' according to Luh- mann is the shift from a society constituted by

social stratification to one constituted by func- tional differentiation. With him, the term 'stratification' seems to denote a system of estates or St?nde. Modern society is not without social stratification, but this is no longer an essential trait. One's social origin (Herkunft) 'hardly plays any longer a role within the functional systems' (p. 734). (This recalls the Linton-Parsonian distinction 'ascribed status- achieved status', and is probably meant as an

improvement on that.) Within functionally differentiated society, each 'function' corre-

sponds to or defines an autopoietic system, each with a specific leitdifferenz, communicating with the environment according to its code.

From Parsonian functionalism Luhmann makes a most important break - to him, 'the functional' is dissociated from all concerns with social 'integration' (though, as I shall argue later, he is inconsequential on this point). With Parsons, the functionally differentiated institu- tions contribute, each in its specific way, to the maintenance of society as a whole. Luhmann

expressly denies this.

In any case, one must give up the idea dominating the research on modernization after WWII, that is. the idea that modernization trends within the

particular functional systems - political democ-

racy, rule of law. research unhampered by dogmas, non-censured mass media, schooling of the whole

population according to their individual capacities etc. - will trigger off an impulse of development, where the achievement of each particular function

system would reciprocally support and affirm the other, (p. 568)

Precisely this was the presupposition of Parsons. Luhmann, by contrast, adds: 'Rather, the

opposite is probable' (ibid.) That is to say. the evolution of modern societies points towards dissolution and disintegration, if it has any direction at all.

Luhmann states that modern society is not

predictable, nor does he think that sociology can tell the truth about social life. By what criteria then are we to judge Luhmann's general sociology? His own criterion is plausibility: 'The semantics in question must be plausible and

appropriate (passen) to the structures of the social system' (p. 156). And: 'Every self-descrip- tion demands historical plausibility in the situation in which the self-description is

regarded as such' (p. 1137). In order to evaluate the plausibility of

Luhmann's sociology I begin by sketching two

pre-existing plausible accounts of modern

Luhmann's General Sociology 19

society, i.e. Parsonian and Marxist interpreta- tions.

6. The plausibility of Parsons' 'semantics'

In many ways, Luhmann's construction endea- vours to improve upon and supersede that of his former teacher, Parsons. One may therefore with good reason reflect on the plausibility of Parsons' interpretation of the contemporary world, especially as presented in his The System of Modern Societies from 1971. (This book,

together with its preceding companion volume, is an overview published when Parsons was 68

years old, and thus is a pendant to Luhmann's GdG, published when he was 70 years old.) Parsons describes modern society in terms of his action theory and its specification of various

types of action, chosen from a number of structural variables-universalism-particular- ism, specificity-diffuseness, etc. The modern world is characterized by the paramount importance of the universalism-performance- affect neutrality pattern-foreshadowed by the Calvinist type of the Reformation age. This

pattern is internalized as a prevalent personality type and institutionalized as a cultural pattern. But this value pattern, while dominant, is not the only one. On the contrary, it stands in a

complementary relation to other patterns, such as the pattern dominating within the family institution, and within institutions like science and art. Generally, modern society is charac- terized by advanced functional differentiation: each differentiated subsystem has its function within the system as a whole, which makes the

system as such highly flexible and adaptive. This is so, provided there is sufficient

integration of the system; i.e. the subsystems and their institutions - while having their own

'logic' or specific value pattern - must at the same time be functional to the system as a whole. The subsystems must be subordinated to the system, through value integration. This is what by and large has gone on over the centuries. Thus, one can follow the double

evolutionary process of differentiation and

integration since the age of the renaissance and reformation in Europe. The first stage was the differentiation of political and religious institutions; the next was the differentiation of

economy and household institutions; the third was the differentiation of professional life and educational culture. The leading societies of this evolution were England and Holland, but

around the turn of the last century, the USA became the lead society. It had become as democratic as France and as industrially advanced as England, combining these two features on a new level of integration and differentiation.

What makes the USA so markedly modern is first its absence of nobility and aristocratic culture. American culture is egalitarian, based

upon the value of work and individual achieve- ment. Next, it is the absence of religious persecution. Religious life in the USA is plural- ist; indeed, the emigration to America began as an escape from the horrors of religious intoler- ance in Europe. In the USA, religion is not part of the political constitution, but differentiated as

part of civil society. Third, the differentiation between daily community life and the legal institution is marked; the legal system is

important for integrating society as a whole,

regulating conflicts according to universalist

principles. Fourth, the political institution is

sharply differentiated from the economy, mak-

ing charges of 'corruption' very serious.

Early America was characterized by a multitude of different ethnic and religious groups. Their integration, socially and cul-

turally, has been going on by and large un-

interrupted. The evolutionary trend has been towards ever more widespread commitment to the dominant value system. Ethnic and other differences have been overcome through 'adap- tive upgrading' of the cultural and social

systems, through a parallel process of general- ization and differentiation. The functionality of this most modern of societies is shown by its

capacity to adapt to new challenges from the environment.

The conflicts within this modern society may be considerable, but they do not challenge the dominant cultural pattern as such. Left-

wing opponents comment harshly upon the

glaring inequalities and injustices of the system, but in doing so, they presuppose that very value

system. No alternative cultural and social model has been important in the USA. True, the Soviet Union has been a 'counterpart' model since the Cold War, at least. But closer scrutiny reveals that on many points, the Soviet Union repeats the modernization process of Western countries, and thus does not proffer an essentially different

type of society. Its lack of differentiation between the economy and the polity is a pre-modern trait, making the system less flexible and

adaptive than that of the USA. The prospect is that the Soviet Union will get more and more

20 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 2000 VOLUME 43

similar to the USA in the future. The same goes for other non-Western societies - Japan, China, etc.

Thus, a synthesis of Durkheimian and Weberian sociology is attained. With Durkheim, Parsons approaches modern society from the

perspective of social and cultural integration. Drawing on recent psychology and psychother- apy, he gives a better understanding of how the individual internalizes and adapts to his or her

society, and how personality conflicts have to do with conflicts and disintegrative features of the social groups to which the individual belongs. On the basis of recent, neo-evolutionary biology, he develops Durkheim's sociology of differentia- tion and integration, taking the 'cultural

symbol' as the sociological equivalent of the

biological 'gene', and stressing 'adaptive up- grading', thus meeting the objection that his

sociological theory is static. With Weber, Parsons stresses the impor-

tance of Western Rationality. He shows how the

professional in modern organizational life -

within business, politics, science, etc. - has internalized the value pattern that originated within English and Dutch Reformed Christian-

ity, stressing self-control, individuality, 'inner-

worldly asceticism'. Parsons combines neo- Freudian psychology with (neo)-Weberianism: the paramount role of the universalism- achievement-affect neutrality pattern entails considerable strain on the personality, threaten-

ing neurosis and mental disturbance. The function of modern family life is to counteract these tendencies; the value pattern of the modern family differs strongly from, say, that of the Wilhelmine era. In the modern American

family, affectionate relations are all-important, and the significance of marital sexual relations

paramount. The much-derided 'money/sex' preoccupation is therefore a case of adaptive upgrading, of counteracting disintegration by differentiation. Similar considerations pertain to the differentiation of the scientific subsystem in relation to religion, or the subsystem of art in relation to science, etc.

By an elaborate system of 'pattern vari- ables', combined with a refined theory of differentiation, integration, functionality and conflict, Parsons succeeds in giving a highly plausible account of modern societies. In fact, his

interpretation appears more plausible today than at the time it was published. For at that time, the Student and Counterculture movements had started, protesting against the achievement orientation of the dominant middle-class cui-

ture. This was the heyday of Marcues's Eros

philosophy (opposed to the 'sex-and-work'

pattern). Further, the USA's engagement in Vietnam was becoming more and more alarm-

ing, demonstrating violent and amodern

aggression as an aspect of American modernity, an aspect Parsons played down in his account.

In addition, Third World countries had

important liberation movements, fighting against capitalist imperialism, making a deep impression upon public opinion in the West. Also, the cultural revolution in China had many famous proponents. From this perspective, Parsons appeared as a model of the Apologist of his own society. Today, Parsons' anticipations have been confirmed to a large extent. Norwe-

gian society, for instance, has become more similar to the USA in recent decades. The modernization of Asia also goes on in an 'American way'. Even the core of the former

'counterpart', the Soviet Union, has developed a 'market economy' - and so on. The system of modern societies appears to be as well inte-

grated as ever, under the leadership of the USA -

at least from the viewpoint of a sociology of social integration and differentiation.

7. The plausibility of 'Marxism'

There has been a widespread flight away from Marxist doctrines in the last two decades,

especially after the dissolution of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, and the reunion

(Wiedervereinigung) of East and West Germany. These two momentous political events are often

presented as the reasons for a turning away from Marxist stances. This may hold true in some arenas, but from the standpoint of general sociology, Marxist interpretations of the world have not weakened during the 1980s and 1990s.

The mode of production characterizing Western societies is capitalist in the strict sense: it is defined by private ownership of the means of production and distribution, and this

property is administered as capital, i.e. as value to be augmented in the form of 'profit'. The

complement to capital is wage labour and the

wage labour-market. The market as an institu- tion makes for competition and non-co-opera- tion, thus making prices appear as the outcome of supply and demand. For this reason, the

capitalist mode of production and distribution is also called the 'market economy'.

The main cultural code defending and

Luhmann's General Sociology 21

legitimating this mode of production is Liberal- ism. It may be advocated in more or less good faith, more or less hypocritically. Liberalism celebrates the capitalist mode of production as the bulwark of Freedom for all, and also as conducive to economic or material Progress for all.

Liberalism defends the unalienable right of each individual to property and freedom, in the tradition of Locke. Its blindness has been

pointed out by both Conservative and Socialist

thinkers, countless times. Sociologically, it must be considered as a refuted doctrine. Notwith-

standing this refutation, Liberal thought con- tinues to dominate the cultural world of Capital, with its cult of individualism. On the philoso- phical or ideological level the prestige of neo- liberal economic theory and its ramifications

(game theory, economic theory of marriage, etc.) underpin the capitalist mode of production.

Through its 'materialist conception of

History' Marxist thought points out how the artefacts of human activities become a kind of 'actor' in social life, in addition to its human

participants. By generalizing the role of Capital as an acting historical force, one obtains the notion of a 'practico-inert field' (Sartre 1960) or a 'socio-material field', which makes possible a non-intellectualist doctrine of social action, thus

contradicting the Liberal doctrine.

Capitalist production and distribution tend to expand unceasingly, transforming more and more products and activities into 'commodities' and 'services', thus making money the general medium and mediator of relationships between human beings. Working activities are trans- formed into wage labour and profit-seeking, leisure time transformed into consumption of

capitalized entertainment such as 'tourist

packages' or the products of 'pop industry'. As Marx and Engels stated in the Manifesto, nothing is 'holy' for Capital.

The capitalist mode of production and distribution entails the division of society into two major classes - the capitalist class and the

wage labour class, or 'proletariat'. Owing to the

'permanent revolution' of the means of produc- tion ('technology'), there exists at any time a 'reserve army' of wage labourers. This reserve

army tends to exert pressure on the wage level,

making it descend towards a subsistence level. Hence, it is impossible for most wage labourers to accumulate capital and leave the wage labour class. On the contrary, the historical tendency is to transform small peasants, shopkeepers, etc. into wage labourers. The 'relative pauperiza-

tion' (Verarmung) of the wage labour class is a historical trend: the wealth of the great capital owners being vertiginous, the condition of the

ordinary wage labourer becomes relatively worsened.

Social life revolves around the capitalist mode of production and distribution and its inherent conflicts. The State charges itself with the task of ensuring 'peace in working life',

pacifying and neutralizing discontented groups, implementing schemes for welfare and social

security and protecting the regime of private property through the police apparatus and the

prison system. On the cultural level, legitima- tion of the capitalist economy goes on unceas-

ingly in the mass media, as testified by soap operas and the TV series of crime and action. This kind of entertainment is only intelligible provided the capitalist or market economy is taken for granted.

The so-called 'globalization' process implies the speeding up of capitalist expansion all over the world. The semi-corporate tendencies of the

postwar period have been counteracted since the 1980s for countries like Egypt, Indonesia and India as well for Western Europe. In

addition, the market economy is sought in Eastern Europe, even in the People's Republic of China. This globalization entails unfettered world markets - a process that considerably weakens the collective bargaining strength of trade unions and other wage labour interest

organizations. A world proletariat arises of hitherto unseen magnitude - millions and millions of wage earners working on or below subsistence level. They are badly organized, even disorganized - a condition upheld in many cases by the State's armed forces.

Precisely because Eastern Europe failed to construct an alternative economy, Marx and

Engels' interpretation accords better with plain facts than it has done for many decades. In order to defend Marxist doctrines in the period 1950-

80, one had to be subtler, one had to point out latent structures of oppression and domination,

showing that, contrary to appearances, capital- ist class society was still with us. Today, the basic traits of a society based upon a capitalist mode of production are quite manifest, even

openly declared and hailed as historical pro- gress. This, I presume, is one of the reasons why a Marxist interpretation has lost its spell for

many sociologists. Since it accords ('stimmt) so well with facts, it does not pose the same intellectual challenge as before; it cannot satisfy the need to be sophisticated and brilliant; a

22 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 2000 VOLUME 43

Marxist description has become plainly in accordance with facts, and hence banal.

True, on one essential point, the Marxist doctrine is not plausible, on the topic of the class

struggle. The class struggle does not evolve

according to Marxist interpretations. The labour movements in the West are weak at

present, and the huge masses of wage labourers in countries like South Korea, Thailand, the Small Tigers, etc. seem at least to live under the

sway of capitalist domination. If there is class

struggle, it seems that the rising class is rather the capitalists, not the proletariat.

Despite this, taken as a whole, the Marxist doctrine is quite plausible as an interpretation of world society today. This is so because it does -

just like Parsons' - base itself upon what Weber termed 'central cultural values'. Marxist doc- trine bases itself upon the fundamental notions of Modernity - Reason, individual liberty and historical Progress. The shortcomings of Liber-

alism cannot simply be regarded with forbear-

ance, since Liberal thought, too, is committed to

Modernity. Marxism, as the internal critique of Liberal thought, is plausible and important as

long as and in so far as Liberalism prevails in our culture.

8. The implausibility of Luhmann's semantics

The world is not acentric; it has one or more centres 'Functional society', Luhmann states, Operates without a top and a center' (p. 803). This is, he

thinks, one of the main reasons the protest movements are ill-conceived and doomed to

failure. But the statement is implausible; it even

goes against widespread experience. Luhmann

speaks of 'premature (vorzeitige) fixation of

ideas' (p. 540), which in fact applies in the

present case. According to the theory of

autopoietic systems, 'society' should be an

acentric system. But world society certainly has a centre, or at least, it is polycentric. The centre of the world is the leading strata of the

USA - it dominates the world economically,

politically, culturally and militarily. Several of the mega-cities of the world - New York, London, Paris, Tokyo - exert a strong influence

upon the rest of the world, an influence which is not reciprocated by the lesser agglomerations. There is not even a tendency in an acentric

direction; on the contrary, the concentration of

economie, political, etc. power has apparently become stronger recently.

The notion of an acentric world can be found in anarchist thinking, such as in Deleu- ze's philosophy of Difference. But this philoso- phical notion cannot support the statement that

today world society is acentric. That statement is simply wrong. Whoever goes outside the Western hemisphere will have the experience that people are, whether they want to be or not, 'other-directed', oriented towards the Western world and under its domination. It is almost

embarrassing to point out this fact.

World society does not become ever more

functionally differentiated One may venture the assertion that there exist

few, if any, autopoietic systems in social life. Again, modern systems theory, imported from biology into sociology, leads astray. To demonstrate this

may be embarrassingly trivial, all the more so as Luhmann himself addresses a list of weighty objections to his own thesis. Nevertheless, I make an attempt to point out the obvious,

beginning by commenting upon a couple of

quotations. Luhmann states: 'We have already empha-

sized that those who possess do not deserve more esteem (Achtung) than those who do not'

(p. 406). This does not demonstrate Luhmann's

personal attitude, but that of modern society. But as such it is plainly wrong. High income and wealth do in fact serve or function as status

symbols. This was pointed out long ago by functionalists (Sorokin 1927; Parsons 1940; Davis & Moore 1945). Thus, one of the main

justifications for income differentiation within

organizations is that those who fill the most

important positions should earn more than the rest as a kind of 'reward' and sign of esteem.

Luhmann states: 'Not even the very rich have for that reason political power or better artistic understanding or better chances to be loved' (p. 767). Once more, the incorrectness of this as a statement of fact is palpable. As for 'the chances to be loved', it is documented that very few rich men are not married, even if the

proverb says that love may befall upon dirt as well as upon a lily. That being rich does not influence social standards of art may perhaps be

defended, though investigations such as those

by Bourdieu clearly indicate that the opposite is

true. As for the political power of rich people as

such, this is almost true by definition. To be very rich cannot but have political consequences. Therefore the political and economic systems

Luhmann's General Sociology 2 3

must be taken as one politico-economic system. To conceive the economy as an autopoietic system, the code of which is 'pays/pays not', Luhmann makes the distinction between the 'achievement' (Leistung) of the economy and its

function, to 'secure future subsistence (k?nftige Versorgung)' (p. 758). Even so, the construction is awkward. Luhmann praises the 'money economy' as the most spiritual achievement of modern society (ibid.). However, the world

economy is not about money, but about

production and distribution of 'use values', about the 'metabolism with nature' (Marx), whereby humanity transforms the environment and thereby itself. Even within a capitalist economy, where financial capital plays an

important role, as is the case today, where

speculators all over the world can threaten national economies - even today business

people are preoccupied with 'real capital' as distinct from 'money assets'. Institutional eco- nomics has shown over and over again that the

economy is not autonomous - what, then, is

gained by characterizing economy as autopoie- tic? Mutatis mutandis, one could show that the other institutions of society, too, do not qualify as 'autopoietic' systems. As for the institution of Art, the autopoietic thesis may, at the very least, hold for a segment of the modern art institution, but not for the institution of art as a whole.

The class distinction is not replaced by an inclusion/exclusion distinction Luhmann himself emphasizes that 'social stra- tification is by no means abolished' in present- day society (p. 772). But he thinks that stratification - and a fortiori social class - is less important than the distinction between those who are included in society and those who are excluded. The inclusion/exclusion distinc- tion recalls that of the '2/3 society' image. Most of the population is integrated, they have jobs, satisfactory family or other primary relations, they take an interest in public matters, etc. A

minority is marginalized and excluded - the homeless, the junkies, the criminals, the hope- lessly poor, etc. This conceptualization induces one to think and feel that wage earners have more in common with the great capitalists than with the 'excluded' - 'after all, I have a home, a

job, I am included'. This is a comforting thought for 'the little man'. Der kleine Mann should not ask for too much, but must be content with little. In fact, the conflicts in modern society are still not constituted mainly by the exclusion/

inclusion distinction - but by class conflicts and similar interest group conflicts.

The notion of progress9 is not obsolete Luhmann discards the notion of 'progress' many times in GdG. For instance, he asserts that 'since the end of the 19th century one dares no longer (traut man sich nicht) presuppose progress' (p. 567). Luhmann may be thinking of Nietzsche or Georges Sorel, Max Weber, Spen- gler, etc., even the Dada movement - all of whom rejected the notion of Progress. But even so, there can be no doubt that the notion of

progress is still important within modern

society. Thus, the semantics of scientific pro- gress, or economic progress (Allianza para el

progreso, etc.) has permeated public discourse since 1945 until this very day. Those who follow, or have even heard of names like Koyr?, Kuhn, Foucault, or who know anything about

'paradigm shifts' constitute a dwindling minor-

ity.

9. The imaginary character of Luhmann's

sociology

Parsons' Empiricist and Positivist-minded adver- saries used to dismiss his general sociology as

empty verbiage, as words and utterances with no 'empirical reference', as mere thoughts. Parts of Luhmann's doctrine may provoke similar responses. But - except in the specific sense of Heidegger and Sartre -1 for my part do not accept that it is possible to think about

nothing. All thinking is about something in the world. Therefore, even if there may not be many autopoietic systems in the world, and world

society may not be structured by functional differentiation, Luhmann's general sociology cannot for that reason be rejected tout court. It remains to account for the delight of his texts, what makes them so fascinating and brilliant. The answer proffered here, is twofold. First, Luhmann's erudition makes his books highly valuable. In themselves all the bibliographical references make his books treasures for anybody occupied with the history of ideas and cultural

history. Also, his style of writing is fluent, light and elegant. Secondly, and more importantly, the fascination of a work like Die Gesellschaft der

Gesellschaft is one of the imaginary. Luhmann's

sociology is about society in an imaginary mode of being, as contrasted with society in the modus of the real. Here, as on many occasions before, I take the distinction between the real

24 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 2000 VOLUME 43

and the imaginary in the sense of Sartre, in his

phenomenological study from 1940, L'imagi- naire (Sartre 1940, published in English as The

Psychology of Imagination). While the real is characterized by a general causality, the ima-

ginary is not. Therefore, dreams are so hard to

retell; they seem to dissolve when we tell others about them, since they do not obey the general law of cause and effect. The imaginary is unreal, a specific attitude of consciousness towards the world.

Luhmann's writings often take on this

imaginary character. One sometimes gets the

impression that he is 'playing' at being a

scientist, for instance, when he writes about

choosing between different 'theoretical strate-

gies' or sets forth 'hypotheses' that are not

subsequently put to any test. The imaginary character of the treatise also stems from his

slippery use of biological metaphors. While Luhmann asserts that one should not think of

society in terms of biology, he time and again writes in a biological vein. Thus, he tells us

(p. 504) that Lamarck introduced the word

'irritabilit?' into biology. But he himself writes about modern society letting itself be 'irritated'

by the environment, and this time, he does not

mean 'irritation' in the sense that a person gets irritated with another. He suggests 'irritability' in the sense of Lamarck, that is, the capacity of

responding to a stimulus. By this perpetual

quidproquo and Vexierbild our image of modern

society becomes flimmery and dreamlike, i.e.

imaginary.

10. A fundamental objection: conflation of

differentiation and autonomization

The most serious error, it seems to me, is

Luhmann's abuse of, or an imaginary, equivocal use of the term functional differentiation. This

term has a clear meaning within the Durkheim/

Sorokin/Parsons perspective, where it gener- alizes the notion of 'division of labour'. The

socially functional is connected to what is

differentiated, and social differentiation is con-

ceptually connected to social integration, just as

the differential and the integral belong together in Mathematics. Sometimes Luhmann writes

about the functional in the above-mentioned, traditional sense as something that serves

(dient) general society, that is, contributes in a

specific way to its preservation. He also some- times partakes of the Durkheimian concern with social preservation, as when he uses his

favourite phrase, 'so geht es nicht weiter, it cannot go on like this any longer. Then he describes society as perpetually striving to obtain integration in a world of ever-increasing complexity. But elsewhere, Luhmann confers another meaning upon the term 'functional' -

every social system is functional by virtue of its

performance according to its specific code. Now, he describes society as a multitude of systems, each acting according to its own code. What he aims at is to generalize Weber's notion of mutually irreconcilable value spheres (the political, the

moral, the erotic, the religious, etc.). Weber

(1922) tends to present modern society as constituted by autonomous interest spheres -

where art challenges morality (instead of sup- porting it, as in Kant's Critique of Judgment and other idealist aesthetic doctrines); where the erotic challenges the political, and so on, in the famous 'demonic struggle' between value com- mitments. Weber's value spheres, owing to their

supposed autonomy, may serve as examples of

'autopoietic systems'. Moreover, Weber himself

very seldom writes about 'differentiation' of

these spheres, since 'differentiation' refers to the twin concept of 'integration'.

It seems to me that Habermas was the first

to blur the opposition between Durkheim/

Parsons and Weber, imputing to Weber a notion of modern differentiation which is foreign to his

thought (Habermas 1981). Luhmann appears to make the same mistake. This mistake is at the same time obvious and grave - differentiation and autonomization are opposite processes. They

point in opposite directions: differentiation towards integration, autonomization towards

disintegration and conflict. Luhmann conflates the perspectives of

Durkheim and Weber. But he leans more

towards Weber than Durkheim. His autopoietic conception of modern society emphasizes its

fragmented character, consisting of a multitude of autonomous contexts and groups trying to

maintain their autonomy. Within such a

picture, there is no place for the term 'functional

differentiation'. Society, as described by Luh-

mann, is not differentiating itself; therefore it is

misleading to designate the social systems as

'functional'. The fascination of Luhmann's

general writings partly stems from this con-

ceptual conflation; his synthesis is not real, but

imaginary. A possible rejoinder may be that,

after all, the proliferation of autopoietic systems

may 'serve' modern society by augmenting the

mass of alternatives to select from. To cope with

complexity, modern society then has at its

Luhmann's General Sociology 25

disposal an increasing complexity of alterna- tives - and to Luhmann, the functional con- notes alternatives. Possibly, this may be granted, but since the evolution of modern society -

according to Luhmann, by contrast with Parsons - has no direction, this functional

interpretation of autopoietic systems adds little to our understanding of world society - it reminds me of the mild optimism of classical Deism.

11. Final remark

By no means does this 'critical critique' intend to reject everything in Luhmann's sociology. His book on intimacy is an important contribution, as is much of his sociology of the art institution.

However, these and other fine contributions do not depend for their validity on the general theory of autopoietic systems, the specific doctrine of evolution, etc. What I oppose, in this comment, is Luhmann's most general tenets, as presented in Soziale Systeme and Die

Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft.

First version received May 1999 Final version accepted August 1999

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