Luhmann, "What is the Case?" and "What Lies behind It?" The Two SOciologies and the Theory of Society.pdf

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"What is the Case?" and "What Lies behind It?" The Two Sociologies and the Theory of SocietyAuthor(s): Niklas Luhmann and Stephen FuchsReviewed work(s):Source: Sociological Theory, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Jul., 1994), pp. 126-139Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/201859 .

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"WhatIs the Case?"and "What Lies Behind It?"The TwoSociologies and The Theoryof Society*NIKLAS LUHMANN

Translated by Stephen FuchsUniversity of Virginia

Ever since the inceptionof its academic career, sociology has approached ts subject-matter n two differentways; onepositivist, the other critical. Important heories, suchas those of KarlMarx or EmileDurkheim,havealways emphasizedeitherone of theseperspectives, but could never completely ignore the other one. The result was that asan empiricalscience, sociology has beeninterested n latentstructures,whileas criticaltheory, it has pointed out that social reality is not what it seems to be. Therefore,allattemptsat building a unifiedtheory of society on the basis of the critical/positivistdistinctionhad to lead into the paradox of treatingappearanceand reality, or latentand manifeststructures,as one and the same thing. Thissituation is now changing inradical ways which sociology has yet to appreciate.I am referringto recent interdis-ciplinary discussions about theories of self-referential systems, autopoietic systemclosure, the second-ordercyberneticsof observing systems, and constructivistepiste-mology and informationprocessing. We can draw upon these recent discussions inorder to understandsociety as a self-observingsystem that defines its own identitywhile, at the same time, leaving an "unmarkedpace"for the possibility to describesociety in quite differentways.

I. THE PRECARIOUS UNITY OF SOCIOLOGYSociology has always been dealing with two very different questions. The first questionis: What is the case? The second question is: What lies behind it? The contrast betweenthese two questions has always obscured the unity of the field. From time to time,especially in the late 60s, it ignited a controversy that threatened to tear up the entirefield. In Germany, this controversy raged under the label of "Positivismusstreit," while inthe US, Merton (1972) wondered whether all theories had to chose either the perspectiveof the "inside" participant, or that of the "outside" observer.1This controversy is now old hat, of interest only to historians. But we may be forgettingthe central and long-standing problem of sociology altogether, which is precisely thetension between the two questions, What is the Case?, and What is behind it? Once thistension is lost, sociology will also have lost its most exciting problem. The machinery ofempirical research would continue believing that reality itself decided between true andfalse. For this very presumption justifies asking for more money and more positions to domore research. Likewise, critical sociology would continue to perceive itself as a success,but society as a failure.Some people suggested that systematic comparisons between theories could bridge the

* Translator'sNote: This is the translationof "'Was ist der Fall?' und 'Was steckt dahinter?'Die zweiSoziologien und die Gesellschaftstheorie,"which appeared1993 in Zeitschrift iir Soziologie 22:245-60. Thattext formedthe basis for ProfessorLuhmann'sfarewell lecturefrom The Universityof Bielefeld, Germany.I For a very biasedcollection and introduction ee Adornoet al. (1969).Sociological Theory 12:2 July 1994? AmericanSociological Association. 1722 N StreetNW, Washington,DC 20036

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THETWO SOCIOLOGIESAND THE THEORYOF SOCIETYgap between positivist and critical sociology, just as one might compare, say, elephantsand giraffes as big animalswith long necks or long trunks. But this attempthas failed,presumablybecausetherewas no larger heoretical rameworkorcomparing hose variousother theories.Still othertheoristscontinue to believe in interpreting ndreinterpretinghe classics asa remedyfor sociology's currentcrisis. Authorsturninto classics when theiranalysesofsociety become outmoded. When thathappens, one must invent a new reasonfor con-tinuingto read theirworks. This reasonis that one's fellow theoristsare still readingthemas well. Instead of dealing with contemporary ocial reality,these theoristsinterpret hepast. In this way, living theorists allow the absent and dead classics to dominate thepresentand living theorists.In this situation,one can draw criticismsimplyfor failing tocite some classical source in support or one's own observations.Interpretinghe classicsis actuallya form of ritualdeference.This threefold conflict between empiricalresearcherswho refer to the externalworld,criticaltheorists who reflect on themselves, andexegetes who interpret he past obscuresthe unity of the field. The presentconsensus is to stop searchingfor a way to describesociety as a whole, which would includeany suchdescriptions.This decision may indeedbejustified,even unavoidable.But it would also be impossiblethento distinguishbetweenthose two questionsthat have always definedthe unityof sociology: the questions,Whatis the case?, and, What lies behind it? For my part, I am not readyto stop askingthesequestions, and to give up the searchfor describingthe unity of society, including suchdescriptions hemselves.

II. A VERY BRIEFHISTORYOF PARADOXIt seemsparadoxical o restore heunityof sociology andsocietyby means of a distinction.Ourstartingpoint is indeeda paradox.Thatwhich is being distinguished,or the two sidesof the distinction,are one and the same thing. Theirunity is the unity of this distinction.What is more, this unity can itself be describedonly by means of another distinction,which must itself, at least for the time being, remaininvisible.But we cannotstop here. As logicians say, paradoxesmust be unfolded.They mustbedissolved into distinctionsthatcan identifyboth sides of the distinction. Left to itself, aparadoxsimply circles around ts own irresolvability.To become productive,paradoxesmustbe replacedby distinctions.Distinctionsmay alwaysbe returnedo theirparadoxicaloriginsby askingfor theirunderlyingunity. But this need not be done as long as using adistinctiongenerates useful results. However, retrievingand revealing the paradoxicalunity of a distinction must always remainan option, especially when it no longer doesgood work. This is why sheer paradoxesterminateall descriptionsand observations.A"paradox"s a pragmaticdevice for initiating, and terminating, ines of theory-drivenresearch.

Developing knowledge through unfolding paradoxes is not a novel idea, althoughmethodand theory construction extbooks still disdain them as logically unsound. Kantstill receives much praise for his conjecturethat antinomies announce the end of meta-physics. However, in theology, rhetoric,and aesthetics thereis a long traditionof puttingparadoxes into the service of rational thought. For example, medieval techniques ofinterrogationunfolded paradoxesthat requiredverbal communicationand some highermagisterial authoritydeciding when to quit investigating.The invention of the printingpress,however,putan end to thatpractice.As alogicalform,theparadoxwasrediscoveredand rehabilitated n the century of skepticism, the 16th century, but was relegated to

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rhetoricand poetry during the rise of the experimentaland mathematicalsciences.2 Atthattime, rhetoricandpoetrystill includedsociabilityandlove, but excludedall "serious"and "rational" ehavior.From thenon, Reason has been left alone with the difficulttasksof justifying itself, and, eventually,has become its own victim. It is precisely this moreand morepressingquestionof what makes Reason rational hatis currentlystimulatingarenewedinterestin the topic of paradox.3

III. THE ROLE OF PARADOXIN SOCIOLOGICALTHEORYLet us returnto sociology. The separationof our two questions, Whatis the case?, and,What ies behind t?, has madeit easierfor sociology to avoidconsidering ts own identity.To repeat, this is the identityof this very distinction.How, then, has sociology managedto deal with bothquestions,withoutreducing hemto one another,andwithoutconsideringtheirparadoxicalunity?There have been several fairly successful ways of doing this. The first and mostconsequentialattemptwas thatof KarlMarx. Contrary o what Peel and Cobdenclaim,the truereasonfor removingthe politicalcaps on wheatprices is not to lower the priceof bread, but, as Marxdeduces from his theory,to lower workers'wages. Before Marx,political economy was a naturalscience of rational economic behavior. Even today,theories of rationalchoice rely on mathematicalmodellingto gain solid empiricalknowl-edge about economic behavior. Marx asks: Whose knowledge is this knowledge? Fur-thermore:How do the producersof this knowledge manageto believe in it, and how dothey managenot to see whatcannotbe seen if one is a truebeliever?Marxturnsknowledgeinto ideology, and arguesthatthe reasonfor the ideological blindnessof the capitalististhat he would otherwiserealize his own doom. Or, as we would preferto say, he wouldrealize the paradox of capitalist growth eventually turninginto self-destruction.Marxformulated his theory in the context of dialectics, which was, at thattime, a novel ideasuggested by Kant and Hegel.4 Even if we no longer accept the conceptual decisionsunderlyingMarx's program,we remainimpressedby its awarenessof paradox.However, Marx's heirs have runinto many empiricaltroubles.Given the developmentof capitalism, it remainsto be seen if the distinctionbetween growthand destruction sindeedthe distinctionthatis able to reveal and, at the same time, conceal the paradoxofcontemporary ociety. Even if this were the case, the criticalproblemswill more likelybe ecological thaneconomic. Given these empiricalproblems,it is amazingto see Marx'sepigones experimentwith even weakerideas. This is truenot only for the transformationof Marxism nto a philosophyof the stateand an economicpolicy program,but also, andespecially, for leftist approachesin the social sciences. For example, "CriticalLegalStudies"claims to discern substantiveinterestsbehind the formalityof legal concepts,such as due process, but does not even makean effort anymore o place this idea into thecontext of a general theoryof society (Kennedy 1976). The criticalpose saves one fromhavingto disclose one's own interests.The irrationality f society is being exposed in thename of Reason.

2 See esp. Malloch (1956), Donne (1980), McCanless(1966), Collie (1966), and, for a contemporary ource,Lando(1545, n.d.).3 For a few examplessee SpencerBrown(1979), Lofgren(1978, 1979), Krippendorff1984), Rescher(1985),Lawson (1985), Genovese (1992), Geyer and Hagenbuchle(1992), and the contributions n GumbrechtandPfeiffer (1991). These studiesgenerallyarguethatsystemic operationscreateobservationsanddescriptions hatare based on, but not blocked by, paradoxes.4 The old notion of dialectics operatedwith a differentkind of paradox,i.e., the identityand nonidentityofthe idea of "form" eidos, then genos) in Plato;for starters ee Sophistes253 D. Platoreasonsthatthe identicalmust never be nonidenticalat the same time.

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THETWO SOCIOLOGIESAND THE THEORYOF SOCIETYIn a similar vein, the predominantlyBritish sociology of science dares to make thetrivialargument hat conflicts over the correcttheoryarereally conflicts between various

partieswho share an interest in establishingtheir own theory as the correct one (Bloor1976, Barnes 1977). This argument s extended to controversies n science, which arepresumedto be immune against the virus of ideology because of their empiricalnature(cf. Bramel and Friend 1981).The exhaustionof dialecticsis alreadyobviousin Horkheimer ndAdorno's "Dialecticsof Enlightenment"1981). For the modem dialectics of Kant, Hegel, and Marxrequiresa movementthroughnegations that eventuallycomes to rest in somethingthat may beaffirmed as good. As Adoro's theory of music shows in its insistence on Schonberg,such affirmationhas become increasinglydifficult. This can also be seen in so-called"discursive thics,"whichno longerhas a stomach or theproblemof dialectics.Therefore,discursive ethics can only be offered as a moralphilosophy.In his dissertationof 1893, De la Division du TravailSocial, and in his Suicide(1897),Emile Durkheim suggests a very different approach.The facts show an increase in"anomie." Traditionalmoral solidaritywith its collectively bindingnorms and values isgettingweaker. This observationhadalready ed Adam Smith to question hecompatibilityof moralityand modem commerce. The historicalbackground or this kind of reasoningis the transition from segmentaryto functional differentiation.This transitionexplainswhy the internalizationof traditionalmoral agreementsbecomes problematic,and whymodem society requiresa different level of moral integrationand solidarity.Durkheimbelieves thatthisrequirement an be metby an"organic"orm of solidarity hatgeneralizesmoralstandards,andso appealsto the consciencecollective,or thatpartof moralsentimentsharedwith others. In this way, even differentiatedmodem societies can developcomple-mentary, f not equal, expectationsthat are socially andmorally binding.Durkheim's heory,like Marx's has been adoptedby severalsuccessors,some of whomhave increased the theory's level of abstraction. For example, Talcott Parsons (1977)assumes that a general law of social evolution enables society to adapt to increasinginternaldifferentiationby generalizingits most basic moral values. Parsons thinks thatthese values allow society to continuerepresentingts unitydespiteincreasingcomplexity.There is an importantdifference in the level of abstractionbetween Parsons's theory,and the theories of Marx and Durkheim.Durkheimfelt obliged to facilitate the birthoforganic solidarity by an appeal to moral responsibility5,and the pendulumof Marxismswung between immanenthistoricalnecessity and collective action when discussing thecoming of the revolution. Parsons's theory, however, has no place for reintroducingtheoreticalknowledge into politicalactionandthe practicalaffairs of society. Thatwhichis latent in the workingsof society remainslatent, and serves only to interpret mpiricalreality.There is no Eleventh Thesis in Parsons!Our thirdcase is so-called "empiricalresearch."This technically sophisticatedkind ofwork makes up the bulk of all sociological research,andjustifies the discipline's claimto be a real science. The statistical evaluationof data, which are collected for that verypurpose, leads to insights that cannot be gained in any otherway. In Paul Lazarsfeld'swords, statisticalevaluationleads to the discoveryof "latentstructures."

We meet here again our now familiar distinction:There is that which is the case, thefacts of "raw data," and there are the latentrelationships hat can only be revealedby5 "Mais ce a quoi la reflexionpeutet doit servir,c'est a marquere butqu'il fautatteindre.C'est ce que nousavonsessaye de faire,"Durkheim 1973:406) insists in theclosing passages. See alsoWagner 1990). Translator'sNote: Union regulationsprohibittranslators rom translating wo languagesin the same article. But here it isanyway:"Reflectioncan and mustpoint out where the problem[of social order?] ies. But it cannotremove it.This requires hatwe act."

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complex statisticalanalysis. This approachcalls itself "empirical"n the assumption hatit can get to realityat both levels, and so refutefalse opinions. Empiricalresearchclaimsto discover latentfacts underneath he observedfacts. In this, it differsfromourpreviouscases, which claimed that observed facts concealed a more profoundand deeperkind ofreality.This difference s also apparentn thevariousexternalreferents.Marx's andDurkheim'stheories were both theories of society, while empiricalresearchprojects may start andfinishwithoutanytheoryof society.6Empirical esearch elebrates tspresumed deologicalneutrality.However, it cannot help but make implicit policy recommendations.Muchempirical research detects stratified distributions of such opportunitiesas good jobs,education, income, legal counsel, etc. When these are correlatedwith variables such associal class, sex, race, age, or cohort, pervasive inequalities emerge in a society that issupposedto provide equal opportunities or all. This contrastbetweenegalitarianpromiseand social facts relieves empiricalresearchfrom reflectingon the unity of this contrast,which is the unity of society itself.From Marx to Durkheimand beyond it was naturallyassumed that scientists had amoralobligationto contribute o the welfare of humankind n bothlevels of society. Thecurrentappealsto an ethics of science show that this obligationis no longer self-evident.In part, this is due to the failureto build a coherentethicaltheory.But, more importantly,high complexity, causal ambiguity,incalculablerisks, and the problemsof dealing withpeople who can't deal with themselves stand in the way of attemptsat scientificallyormorally regulatinghumanbehavior.In this situation,the link between theoretical nsightsandpractical ife can no longerbe established.

IV. PARADOXIN CURRENTTHEORIESOF SYSTEMSThis analysis of prominentsociological theories and philosophiesleads to an importantproblem. How and why should we try to bridge the gap between latent structuresandmanifestfacts? Some theoristswouldhave called this a problemof "dialectics."The ethosof moder science rules out the semantics of "secrets"to do this.7 But the differencebetween the questions,What is the case?, and, What lies behindit?, calls for some unity.Sociology is not alone with this problem, althoughits object, society, does add somespecial complexities. But mathematics,physics, biology, linguistics, even philosophy-to name but a few-also wonderwhat happensin and to the world when it contains anobserver.For example, the mathematicalcalculus Spencer Brown (1979) uses to reconstructarithmeticand Boole's algebraraises precisely thatquestion. This is a calculus in whichan observeroperateswith distinctions n orderto markone, and not the other,side of thedistinction.The processingof the calculus graduallyreveals that the observerhimself isa distinction,thatis, the distinctionbetweenhim and thatwhich he observes:

An observer, ince he distinguisheshe spacehe occupies,is also a mark.We see nowthat the firstdistinction, he mark,and the observerarenot only interchangeable,ut,in the form,identical SpencerBrown1979:76).

This is precisely the argumentLouis Kauffman 1987:53) makes to introducehis attemptat gatheringthe newer mathematicsand cyberneticsunder the notion of self-reference:6 For a criticalcommentarysee Tenbruck 1981:333-50, 1989:187-211).7 On archaic and high cultural raditionssee LuhmannandDe Giorgi (1992).




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THE TWO SOCIOLOGIESAND THE THEORYOF SOCIETY"Self-referenceand the idea of distinctionare inseparable henceconceptually dentical)."Recall that Fichte (1962) could only posit his "I"as an observerby distinguishinghimfrom an "Other."For SpencerBrown, the problemis one of "form."A "form" s a conceptualboundarythat is being imposed on a world that now has two sides to it. Next, the observer mustdecide on what side he wants to observe the facts, and on what other side he wants toobserve the underlyingreality. Continuing he critiqueof ontological metaphysicsstartedby Husserl and Heidegger, Jacques Derrida has suggested very similar ideas. Derridadeprives the notion of "form"of its object-like plasticity, and turns it into a trace thatleaves behind something no longer visible.8 This "form" itself can only capture themetaphysicsof presence. But the historical movement of metaphysicsinscribes a tracethatholds the key to what metaphysicshas left unsaid.In physics, the law of entropy predicts that all closed systems, including the world,tend to consume and level all differencesin energy. In the end, thereis stabilitywithoutany differences. Some people have wondered what would happenin such a world to anobserver who observes what happensbut does not like what he sees. Take Maxwell'sDemon who is capableof sortingeverything ntopositiveandnegativethings.The observermakes a difference because he can draw distinctions.Therefore,he may be able to stopentropy.But how costly will it be to link negentropy o his distinctions?Microphysics has suggested similar ideas. Physicists and their instrumentsobserveeverythingthat can be observed in physics. The problemis that their observationsarethemselvesphysical, and so changewhat is being observed. The worldproducesphysiciststo observe itself and the physicists. But what kind of world must draw such distinctionsto observe itself ? Is this world this distinction,or is it not, or both?Moreover,who couldobserve the distinctionbetween these two distinctions?In his efforts to constructa workingdialectics, GotthardGuntherhas run into similarproblems.ForGunther, heremust be certainpartsof the world thathave a highercapacityfor reflection than the totality of the world.9 But if such hot cells of reflectionactuallyexist, how can they reflect on the totality withoutbeing the totality, and how can theydistinguishthe totalityfrom that(what?)which it is not? Underwhat conditions can suchcells of reflection offer truepropositionsabout the world, given thatthey must inevitablyfail to capturethe unity of the world?Similarparadoxeshave plaguedthe sociology of knowledge going back to Mannheim.If the sociology of knowledge is no longerconcernedwith truthanderror,but only askswhich social groupsand stratabelieve in certain deas and doctrinesandwhy, whataboutits own knowledge?'1Is it true, false, both, or neither?Whathappenswhen social groupsand strata find out that what they think is just their ideas, nothing more? It is simplyimpossible to resolve the paradoxesof a self-observingobserverby means of classicalepistemologyandtwo-valuedlogic. Even Foucaultdoes not make theseproblemsexplicit.Finally, radical constructivismarguesthat all knowledgeis a constructionof the worldin the world. Of course, constructivismmustkeep the distinctionsbetween self-referenceandexternalreference,concepts andobjects, or analyticaland synthetictruths.However,these areseen as nothingbut internal distinctions hat structure he operationsof knowing.They can never leave the system which uses them to construct the world (von Foerster

8 See, in Greek, "ichonos,"and, in French,"trace" n Derrida's mportantnote 14 (1972, p. 206).9 "It standsto reason that these systems of self-reflectionwith centersof their own could not behave as theydo unless they are capableof 'drawinga line' betweenthemselves and their environment.We repeatthat this issomethingthe Universe as a totality cannot do. It leads to the surprisingconclusionthatparts of the Universehave a higherreflexivepower than the Wholeof it, as has been recognizedfor a long time"(Gunther1976:319).10Meja and Stehr(1982) document this discussion.

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1981, Schmid 1987, Luhmann 1988). The internal distinctionspresupposethe internaloperationalclosure of the system against the environment. That is, the differences thatcan be seen by means of these internaldistinctionspresuppose he system's indifferencetoward its environment.While traditionalskepticism complainedthat this was bad yetunavoidable,today we tend to thinkthat this is good. For open boundarieswould over-whelm the system with the impossible requirementsof point-for-pointcorrespondencewith all environmentalstates and events. But what kind of knowledge is it that mustrenounce all direct correspondencewith externalreality in order to know itself? Is thisknowledge againbasedon a distinction hatdividesthe world and makesits unityinvisible?

V. SUBJECTSAND OBSERVERSThese theoretical developments are separatedand isolated by disciplinaryboundaries.Even theoreticalsociology has not really noticed any of them. In sociology, empiricalresearch and theoretical nquiryremainseparated,preventinga discourseon the unity ofthe field. But once we realize thatthe distinctionbetweenthat which is the case, and thatwhich lies underneath t, is a distinctiondrawnby an observer,we can establish linksbetweenthe theoreticaldevelopmentsdiscussed above and sociology.What lies behindthe facts? What are the meta ta physika?It can no longerbe the truedivisions and categoriesof Being. It must be the distinctionsdrawnby an observer.Andso we return o a centralproblemin sociology: Who is the observer?"1Real observers observe the real world in the world. Therefore, observers must beobservablefor otherobservers, and so on. The observer, then, is a networkof observingobservations,or communication.Communicationalso takesplace in the real world.Historically,the observerwas seen as the consciousnessof a Subject. The cognitionsof the Subjectcannot change the world, but can only be trueor false. Both Descartes'sphilosophyof mind, and Port-Royal's(1662) logical theory, imaginea Subject becomingaware of Himself through cognition and language. This traditionwas continuedin Kantand Fichte's transcendentalEgo, and in the phenomenologyof the corporeal ndividual(Husserl, Merleau-Ponty).The currentdeconstructionof metaphysics, however, showsthat only objects can be subjects. These are observersobservingobservers. This insightcalls sociology into action.The Subjectcould posit Himself only by means of two-valuedlogic. He distinguishedHimself from the world of objects by His own distinctionsbetween true and false. TheSubject asserts Himself by actually drawinga distinction,and definingHimself by thisvery act. For it is this Subject,not someoneor somethingelse, thatdistinguishesHimselffrom the world of objects by distinguishingbetween variousobjects in the world. ThisSubjectexisted in a society that could not yet ascribe itself. For this was no longer theold hierarchical ociety. It was not even the transitional ociety of the bienseances. Sinceit was impossible to describe society as society, one could also neglect the problemof"intersubjectivity." or this problem would have led to the problem of society, whichcould not really be posed yet at that time, save ideologically. The questionof what liesbehindthe visible facts was almost, but not quite yet, the searchfor society.

VI. SOCIETALSELF-DESCRIPTIONSSociology can describe society only in society. It needs communication o do this-andjobs, researchfunds, access to data, and prestige. Sociology may not recognize its own

1 See, besides von Foerster(1981), Luhmannet al (1990) on the newer semanticcareerof this concept.




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THETWO SOCIOLOGIESAND THETHEORYOF SOCIETYknowledgein society, but such observationsbelong in scientific ournals,notbudget plansandfunding proposals(WingensandFuchs 1989).In any case, sociology only exists within society, not outside of society. To be moreprecise, sociology can only exist in society as a scientificdiscipline. It has no othermodeof being.12This fact explains the dual perspectiveof sociology. As a science, sociologygets at the facts. If it wants to learn somethingaboutthe realityunderneath he facts, itsexternalreferenceis society itself. That is, the differencebetween these two questionsisa difference n the externalreferencesof sociology. Sociologycan neithershed its scientificnor its social character. t is a science of the social system anda social systemof science.To make matterseven more complex, as a science and, as a social system, sociology isalso an internalobserverof whateversystem it participatesn.In any case, sociology can no longer use the distinctionbetween Subjectand Object,as if sociology was the Subjectand society, or the social system of science, the Object.The causal implicationsof sociologicalresearch,knownas self-fulfillingor self-defeatingprophecies, indicate its complex status as an internal observerof, and within, society,though these implicationsare still seen as primarilymethodologicaldifficulties (Simon1957:79ff., Merton 1957 421ff.). Like physics, sociology changes its object in the veryact of observation. This is truewhenever it recommendspolicies, criticizessomething,oralarmspeopleaboutsome problem.Whenever t communicates ts observations,sociologyis being observedas an observer.These observationshaveconsequences hat havenothingto do with the truthor falseness of these observations,althoughtruthandfalseness mayhave their own consequences. In sum, it should be clear that sociology can no longerview itself as an independentobserver that could enlightenor criticize society from theoutside.13This is only a small set of the problemsthat sociology is facing. Some of these mayactually be methodologicalproblems, to be handledby more sophisticatedtechniques.But we need to keep in mind thatsociology is observinga society thatis alreadyobserv-ing itself.14 These self-observationsmay guide sociology's own observations in waysthat are more adequate than, for example, the ambiguouscurrent discussions about"postmodernism."

At this point, the following observation(!) may be helpful. Any observer must use adistinction in orderto refer to one partof the distinction,not the other. In, and while,doing this, the observerbecomes an unmarkedspace that distinguishesitself from thatwhichis being observed.This meansthatsociety candescribe tself only by distinguishingitself fromthatwhich is not society. At the sametime, this self-descriptions the operationof a certainpart n society, which also distinguishes tself fromwhatever s beingdescribed.That is, any self-descriptionof society creates two unmarkedspaces: that which is notsociety (i.e., in systems-theoreticalerms, the environment),and that whichproduces thedescriptionwithinsociety.These are crucial insights. Let us ignore sociology for a moment. It seems that thatwhich is not society is nowadays being described n ecological terms. As a result, societyappearsas a system that ecologically endangers itself through technology, wars, andcommercialand industrial xploitationof natural esourcesand, last not least, demographicexplosions. Society is the system that explains, creates, and must react to these novel

12 This is evident in the tragic case of Helmut Schelsky, who was so disappointedby the lack of commonsense and by the public behaviorof the sociologists thathe finally presentedhimself as an "antisociologist"norderto warnthe public of sociology. As he knew himself, with this pronouncementSchelskywas still in linewith the decreasing reputationof the discipline, buthe could not find a suitableway of makinghis idea public.Therefore,he was left with nothingbutpolemics.13 For a recentdiscussionof this questionsee, for example, Scherr(1990).14 See Luhmann 1990), addressingAmericansociologists.

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dangers, possible accordingto a secularizedversionof a time of sins followed by a periodof fasting.Now, who is describingall this? The answeris: the mass media. The mass media selectcommunicationsaccording to the code information/non-information,r new/not news.The criteria or this selection are, of course, purelysocial ones, andthey arewell-known:novelty, drama, conflict, individualsuffering,deviance, local significance,to namebut afew. Social movementsare importantobserversas well, butthey areclosely linked to themedia, and would not even emerge without them. For they make and stage their newswith an eye toward the mass media. Even if the new social movements stage largedemonstrationswith lots of bodies in the streets-we know about it throughtelevision,and some movements, such as Greenpeace, arrange heir spectacularactions especially,and sometimesexclusively, for the media.The daily consumptionof news congeals into what can be called"commonknowledge."Communicationsbased on commonknowledgeare communicationsaboutalleged knowl-edge, even if communication s controversial.For example, almostdaily the mass mediareportaboutecological problemsas if they were scientificallyestablishedfacts. From theperspectiveof science, however, the ecological discourseis a discourse aboutignorance.This discourse can offer no predictionsand explanations,for its subject-matters muchtoo complex.Likewise, in decidinghow society will be observed,the mass mediathemselves remaininvisible. Even when recursive loops are built into the system, even when newspapersreportabout newspapersor television portraystelevision, there is no awarenessof thedistinctions hat determinewhatis being broadcastas news and whatis not. Thereis someresearchon this subject, even on how the mass media influence the way in which societyobserves itself (Heintz 1982). As long as it celebrated itself as the prime observer ofsociety, sociology had very limited interest in the mass media. There is some criticalresearchon how the mass media obstructsocietal enlightenmentand emancipation.Forexample, it has been found thatdaily reportsof smalleror largerdisastershave more ofa numbingeffect on people. For those disasters have happenedalready,and cannot bepreventedanymore.This kindof reportingneverzooms in on possiblydisastrousprocessesthatcould yet be stoppedor reversed(Lindner1990).Such findings typically provokea sociological "critique" f society and its tendencytocommercializethe mass media, and use themas agentsof "culturalhegemony."15But thiscritique does not provide an answer to the more fundamentalquestion of how societymanages to describe itself in the first place, and who does this describing. Sociologywould presumablyanswer that this was its own very job. But this answer would becuriouslyblind in regardto both of our questions:what is the case, and what lies behindit?

VII. THE SOCIOLOGYOF SELF-OBSERVINGSYSTEMSThis does not mean that sociology has nothingto offer. However, if sociology wants tobe the observerof society, it musttakeintoaccountthe fact thatsociety is a self-describingsystem. The first step would be to take notice of researchon how the worldmanagestoobserve itself. This researchcurrentlyproceeds on various levels, such as physical and

15 See Gitlin (1983), using Gramsci's concept. One could also call this a "structural oupling"of protestmovementsand the mass media.

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THETWO SOCIOLOGIESAND THE THEORYOF SOCIETYbiological levels, consciousness, or communication.The old philosophyof the Subjectarguedthat the Subjectreally existed, andthatit had certain concrete features.The nextproblemwas to find out what all empiricalsubjectshadin common. These commonalitiesdefinedthe a prioriconditionsof knowledge, behavior,andjudgment.In the last analysis,despiteits critiqueof metaphysics,anddespite its attemptsat sustitutingprocess-orientedfor essentialist approaches,the old philosophyof the Subjectwas caught in the idea ofan ontological Self. It proved impossible to apply this theoryto society, for this wouldhave led to positing a politicallyunacceptableCollective Subject.What is more, there isjust too much ontology andhumanism n the notion of the observeras Subject.16Therefore, we need to replace the philosophy of the Subject by a theory of self-describingsystems. It is easy to see thatthe formal architecture f such a theoryresemblesthe philosophyof the Subject. Self-descriptionsarepossible only if the observingsystemcan distinguishitself from others, that is, if it can distinguishbetween external and self-reference n its own descriptions.This is like the philosophyof the Subjectdemonstratingthat consciousness always simultaneouslyrefers to an object and to itself.17We need toextend this insightfrom consciousnessto communication.Communicationimultaneouslydistinguishesbetween externalreference, or information,and internalreference,or per-formance,and combines both in understanding.In this view, society is the all-encompassing system of all mutuallyaccessible com-munications.Internally,society uses the distinction between externaland self-reference.In performing ts actual operations,society is a closed system that does not presupposean externalobserver,such as God or an individualconsciousness. Even if there was suchan externalobserver,operationalclosuremeans thatsociety could have no access to him.Operationalclosure means that sociology is based on communications,and can offerdescriptionsonly from within society, not fromthe outside. For such an outsidepositionwould have to be and remain silent. For sociology, describingsociety as a self-observingsystem meansplacingitself squarelywithin its own object. It includes itself in thatwhichit observes. In this process, it deconstructsthe very distinction between Subject andObject. Sociology cannotbut apply its own observations o itself.18These theoreticalargumentsdo not precludesociology from establishingitself withinsociety as an external observer.However, it cannot do so for society as a whole, but onlyfor its subsystems,and for what is commonlycalled everydaycommunication.Sociologymust build a theoryof societal differentiationhat makes it possible to describescience,andsociology as one of its parts,as a specializedsocial systemthat describesothersocialsystems as part of its internalsocietal environment.Following GotthardGunther,thismeansconstructingsystems within society that have a highercapacityfor reflectionthansociety as a whole.19In this way, society creates internalpossibilitiesfor externalobser-vations. That is, society does not simply rely on the self-descriptionsof its subsystems,such as theology, pedagogics, legal theory,or economics, but confrontssuch descriptionswith externaldescriptionsthat are not boundby the institutionaldogmas reigningin thesubsystemsof society.There are now broad discussions aboutsuch externalobservationswithinsociety.20Forthe most part, sociology cannotyet competentlytheorizeabout the "indigenous heories"

16 MartinHeidegger (1949a and b) has written what is probablythe most famous critique. Later, Derrida(1972:129-164) surpasseseven Heidegger'scritique.17 Husserl theorized about this within the frameworkof his "Transcendental henomenology."18This argumentshould not be misconstruedto justify hasty moral conclusions. But there is one rule ofscienceethics thatwouldundermine hepositionof manyso-called "critics" f society.This is the ruleforbiddingthe self-exemptionof sociological arguments.19See the quotationabove, n.9.20 Forthe case of pedagogicssee the afterwordn Luhmannand Schorr 1988:363-81), andLuhmann1986b).

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of society's variousfunctionsystems, thatis, about suchtopicsas God, justice, education,or profit maximation. But it is clear that sociological observationsmay never claimprivilegedknowledge or criticism, for its is precisely such privileged metapositionsthatfunctionallydifferentiatedsociety can no longer afford. This leaves the possibility todescribethe functionsystems by meansof distinctions hatare not theirown. In this way,sociology could presentas artificialandcontingentwhat appears, n the functionsystems,to be necessaryand natural.In otherwords, sociology couldcreatea surplusof structuralvariations hat could induce the observed functionsystemsto consideralternatives o theirown modes of operation.This possibility,however, does not really solve the problemof how the unityof societycan be describedfrom within society. For such descriptionsmust inevitably change whatthey describe. In the case of consciousness, the distinctionbetweenoperationand obser-vation, i.e., between unreflectedand reflectedactivity, offers a possible solution. As ofnow, there is no comparable olutionin sociological theory.Thereis, however,the theoryof self-referentialsystems which makes some steps in the rightdirection.Self-reference means that systems are able to distinguishtheir own operationfromeverythingelse, and that a system can internallydistinguishbetween the system and itsenvironment.21t is possibleto communicate nside the systemaboutthisdifference.Then,the importantquestion is: how exactly is this done? Take the much discussed ecologicalproblemsof moder society. Fromthe perspectiveof self-reference,the centralproblemis how society can survive its own maladaptiono the environment.22On the same level,we can ask how society can survive its maladaptationo humanbeings who understandthemselvesas modem individuals,thatis, as self-observers.Self-reference leads to dramaticbreaks with the epistemologicaland cognitivist tradi-tion.23"Cognition"has nothingto do with adaptationo the environment,or with selectiveevolutionary mprovementsn adaptation.Foradaptationmustalreadybe takenforgrantedin the routineprocessing of cognition withinthe system. In this sense, cognition indeedpresupposesthe absence of any direct contacts with the environment.Cognition mayenable a system to temporarilyadaptto environmentaldisturbances y matching ncreasesin external with increases in internalcomplexity. But this never guaranteesimprovedadaptationor prospectsfor survival.Radical constructivismalso implies that each observationmust have a blind spot. Thisblindspot is the unityof the distinctionunderlyingany observation.Thatis, if somethingis the case, thensomethingelse must lie behind it. This"something"s that whichremainsunsaidif somethingis being said. Traditionally, his is known as "latency."But we aredealinghere not with structuralatency as some sort of hiddenontologicalarea, but withthe operational atency of a distinction that distinguishesthis-and not somethingelse.Von Foerster's (1981) recent cyberneticsrefers to this as second-orderobservation.Heunderstandsatencyas contingency,that s, as anunmarkedpacethatresultsfromdrawinga distinction that could have been drawn differently. Then, one may ask: why thisdistinction and not anotherone?This line reasoning implies radicalbreakswith traditions n two-valuedlogic, with theold ontology of Being/Non-Being, with classical epistemologyandmetaphysics,andwith"humanism."

21 In the formal language of Spencer Brown's (1979) matheaticaltheory, form "re-enters"orm, i.e., thedistinctionreturns nto thatwhich it has distinguished.22 Cf. Luhmann 1986a), and Luhmann 1992) on the ecology of ignorance.23 On biology see Moreno, FernandezandEtxeberia(1992).




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THE TWO SOCIOLOGIESAND THE THEORYOF SOCIETYVIII. PROSPECTSFOR A SOCIOLOGYOF SELF-REFERENCEThe theory of self-referentialsystems also breaks with the sociological tradition.Thisleads us backto the distinctionbetweenpositivistand criticalsociology, and to our initialdouble question:What is the case, and, What lies behindit? Some may suspectthatthetheoryof self-referentialsystems simply criticizes criticaltheoryand constructivisticallydeconstructspositivism. But this would underestimate he radicalnessof the theory.24Thistheory's answer to the question, what is the case?, is: that which is being observed,including he observationof observers. Thetheory'sanswer o thequestion,what is behindthe facts?, is: thatwhich the observation ails to observe. This "unmarkedpace"(SpencerBrown)results fromany distinctionmadeby any observer.The observercannot see whathe cannot see-and fails to see this as well. An observerof this observermay see whatthe firstobservercannotsee, but, at the same time, also fails to see whathe, the second-level observer,cannotsee, and so on.

This level of abstractionmay be uncomfortable or those who want to returnto soci-ology. Butwe're actuallynotfarfromsociologyatall. Theoperationof observingproducessocial systems and communication.Social systems are self-referential ystems, forced toobservethemselves andotherthings in the act of communication.Communication imul-taneouslyrefers to itself and its object.25Communicationmay be observedon a secondlevel. But it is importantto notice here that higher levels of reflexivity never lead tohigherlevels of insightaboutthe observedsystemor its world. Foran observercan neverobservehis unmarked pace, or the unityof the distinctionhe uses. This is possible onlyin the form of a paradox,which leads to an irritating nterruption f observation.Whenhe reaches a paradox,the observercan eitherquitobserving,or use a differentdistinctionwith a differentparadoxto observe somethingelse.It is possible to communicateeven about the inaccessibilityof the world. In Derrida's(1972:76-77) words, "la tracede la trace, la trace de l'effacementde la trace."However,theologiansremindus thatthis insightis possibleonly in paradoxicalerms.Forsociology,this means that it must begin with resolving the paradoxof observation,which alwaysdependson the contingentpoint of view of the observer.Up to now, sociology, insofar as it did not simply believe in its scientific character,linked inquiries into facts and inquires into their backgroundthrough the notion of"latency."However, latency itself had to remain latent. Latency implies a first-orderobserverwho cannot see what he cannotsee. Therefore,latency can only be noticed bya second-level observer,who destroyslatency in the very act of noticing it. Once socio-logical theorybecomes second-orderobserving,it can managewithoutthe old ontologicalidea of latency. Second-orderobservingtransformsatenciesinto contingencies.Eachandevery distinctionmust be understoodas contingent, that is, as somethingthat could bedifferent.Objectivelatenciesare then seen as implicationsof all observations hatcannotobserve themselves while observing something else. Realizing the contingency of alloperationswould bring sociology back in touch with one aspect of modem society, i.e.,the transformation f traditionaland organicsocial bonds into contingentselections.26If it is truethatmodem society operateswith contingentor second-order,observationsandcommunications, hensociologicaltheorymustcopy thiscontingentmode of operation24 This radicalnessis implied in the double meaning and connotationsof the phrase, "observing systems,"with whichvon Foerster 1981) describes the programof second-order ybernetics.Observations an themselvesbe observed.25 See Luhmann 1984).26 See Roberts(1991:150, 158). It is no accident that Robertsuses the example of modem and postmodernart. It is possible thatarthas reached a level of insightinto society thatsociology shouldtry to match.

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in its own operations, the truth of its assumptions would no longer consist of theircorrespondence with objects, but of this formal congruency between society's and soci-ology's modes of communication. Borrowing from the language of art, we could say thatsociology must become a "parody" of society.27 This is only possible, however, withinstrict and controlled limits, and in no way suggests that "anything goes." This is actuallya very challenging and serious program. Current sociological methodology has no ideajust what is implied here.28 Each concept that enters such a theory of modem society mustbe changed according to the specifications of this theory, while, at the same time,permitting maximum resonance with society. Such a theory would mirror or representnothing. It would not be formed according to the alleged "nature" or "essence" of itssubject-matter. But such a sociology would be a model of society in society that in-formsus about its uniqueness. It would offer novel possibilities for observation, independentfrom those in the function systems and everyday communication.If this program were successful, society would be able to describe itself by means ofsociology. What would lie behind this fact? Nothing at all!

REFERENCESAdorno,T.W. et al., 1969: Der Positivismusstreitn der deutschenSoziologie. Neuwied.Barnes, B., 1977: Interestsand the Growthof Knowledge. London.Bloor, D., 1976: Knowledgeand Social Imagery.London.Bramel, D. / R. Friend, 1981: Hawthorne,the Myth of the Docile Worker,and Class Bias in Psychology.AmericanPsychologist 36: 867-878.Colie, R.L., 1966: ParadoxiaEpidemica:The RenaissanceTraditionof Paradox.PrincetonN.J.Derrida,J., 1972: Margesde la Philosophie.Paris.Donne, J., 1980: Paradoxesand Problems,(Hrsg. Hellen Peters)Oxford.Durkheim,E., 1930: De la division du travailsocial, 2. Aufl. Neudruck1930, 9. Nachdruck1973, Paris.Fichte, J.G., 1794: Grundlageder gesamtenWissenschaftslehre,2. Aufl. 1802, in: AusgewaihlteWerkeBd. 1.Darmstadt1962.Foerster,H. von, 1981: ObservingSystems. Seaside Cal.Genovese, R. (Hrsg.), 1992: Figuredel paradosso:Filosofiae teoria dei sistemi 2. Napoli.Geyer, P. / R. Hagenbichle (Hrsg.), 1992: Das Paradox:Eine Herausforderunges abendlandischenDenkens.

Tubingen.Gitlin, T., 1983: The Whole World Is Watching:Mass Media in the Makingand Unmakingof the New Left.

BerkeleyCal.Guiinther, ., 1976: CyberneticOntology and TransjunctionalOperations, n: ders., Beitrage zur GrundlegungeineroperationsfahigenDialektik Bd. 1. Hamburg.Gumbrecht,H.U., 1992: Sign Conceptions in EuropeanEveryday CultureBetween Renaissanceand EarlyNineteenthCentury.Stanford:Ms.Gumbrecht,H.U. / K.L. Pfeiffer, 1991: Paradoxien,Dissonanzen,Zusammenbriiche:ituationenoffenerEpis-

temologie. Frankfurt.Heidegger,M., 1949a: Sein und Zeit, 6. Aufl. Tubingen.Heidegger,M., 1949b:Uber den Humanismus.Frankfurt.Heintz, P., 1982: Die Weltgesellschaft m Spiegel von Ereignissen.Diessenhofen, Schweiz.Horkheimer,M. / T.W. Adorno, 1947: DialektickderAufklarung, n: T.W. Adorno,GesammelteSchriftenBd.3. Frankfurt1981.Kauffman,L.H., 1987: Self-Reference and RecursiveForms. Journalof Social and Biological Structures10:

53-72.Kennedy,D., 1976: Formand Substance n PrivateLaw Adjudication.HarvardLaw Review 89: 1685-1778.Krippendorff,K., 1984: Paradoxand Information, n: Brenda Dervin / M.J. Voigt (Hrsg.), Progressin Com-municationSciences 5: 45-71.Lando,O., 1545: Paradossi,cioe sententiefuori del communparere . . Vinegia.

27 See Roberts(1991) on parody,a close relativeof paradox.For the theoryof the state see Willke (1992).28 This is obvious in the commoncriticismsof systems theory,see Munch(1992) or Rottleuthner 1992).

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Luhmann, "What is the Case?" and "What Lies behind It?" The Two SOciologies and the Theory of Society.pdf