Lucky -- ECF Doc. 8 -- SA Zoo Motion to Dismiss

7/25/2019 Lucky -- ECF Doc. 8 -- SA Zoo Motion to Dismiss

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

JAMES GRAHAM,

ELIZABETH WYMER, and NOAH B. KHOSHBIN

Plaintiffs,

v. CIVIL NO. 5:15-cv-01054-XR

SAN ANTONIO ZOOLOGICAL

SOCIETY,

Defendant.

DEFENDANT SAN ANTONIO ZOOLOGICAL SOCIETYS

RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINTFOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Case 5:15-cv-01054-XR Document 8 Filed 12/23/15 Page 1 of 31


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .......................................................1

II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD..................................................................................... 2

III. PLAINTIFFS FACTUAL AND LEGAL ALLEGATIONS...................................................3

IV. ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................5

A. The conditions of animals held in captivity are governed by the Animal WelfareAct, which standards are not be enforced through ESA citizen suits...............................5

1. The ESAs Take prohibition does not generally apply to lawfully held

zoo animals..............................................................................................................6

2. The AWA comprehensively regulates conditions of zoo animals .......................... 9

3. The ESA does not permit citizen suits to enforce the AWAs standards

for animals held in captivity. Instead, USDA APHIS must consult with

FWS as to any endangered animal covered by an AWA license ..........................11

4. The ESAs own terms preclude factual and legal determinations in an

ESA citizen suit that the AWAs standards are being violated ............................. 13

5. Plaintiffs Complaint is the latest attempt to evade limits on judicial

review of zoos and aquaria holding of listed animals.........................................15

B. Plaintiffs have not alleged an actionable harm. ............................................................20

C. Plaintiffs cannot, as a matter of law, allege an illegal possession....................................23

D. Plaintiffs cannot allege a cause of action for forfeiture ................................................... 25

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER................................................................................................... 28

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE......................................................................................................29



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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

JAMES GRAHAM,

ELIZABETH WYMER, and NOAH B. KHOSHBIN

Plaintiffs,

v. CIVIL NO. 5:15-cv-01054-XR

SAN ANTONIO ZOOLOGICAL SOCIETY,

Defendant.

DEFENDANT SAN ANTONIO ZOOLOGICAL SOCIETYS

RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINTFOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE XAVIER RODRIGUEZ:

Defendant San Antonio Zoological Society (the San Antonio Zoo) respectfully moves

for dismissal of Plaintiffs James Graham, Elizabeth Wymer, and Noah B. Khoshbins

(collectively Plaintiffs) Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Lucky is a 56-year old Asian elephant who has lived for more than a half-century at the

San Antonio Zoo. Plaintiffs lawsuit seeks to pry her away from her home at the Zoo through a

novel forfeiture claim, or, alternatively, to judicially force what they perceive as improvements

to her enclosure at the Zoo.1 Plaintiffs seek these outcomes by claiming Endangered Species Act

(ESA) take violations based on allegations that Luckys enclosure is inadequate.

1

While Plaintiffs Complaint is directed at the San Antonio Zoo, the declaration of Plaintiffs

elephant expert reveals Plaintiffs much more fundamental and wide-reaching motivations



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Plaintiffs Complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because the ESA does not

regulate zoo animals living conditions through its citizen suit provision. Instead, the Animal

Welfare Act (AWA) regulates zoo animals living conditions. The AWA is administered by

the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

(USDA APHIS or APHIS). The AWA and USDA APHIS regulations require zoos to obtain

licenses to hold and exhibit animals in captivity and impose standards that govern all aspects of

the animals welfare in captivity. The AWA authorizes USDA APHIS to revoke licenses, seize

animals in danger, and take civil and criminal action against zoos for violations of the AWA.

But the AWA does not authorize citizen suits, thereby precluding judicial review of citizen

complaints that the conditions of zoo animals violate the AWAs standards. The Plaintiffs

Complaint must be dismissed because its allegations all concern the conditions of Luckys

captivity at the Zoo, which is the subject matter of the AWA and the regulations APHIS has

promulgated thereunder, and not the proper subject matter of an ESA citizen suit.

II.

MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

Motions to dismiss are generally limited to the factual allegations in the Complaint. See

Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565F.3d 228, 2512

(5th Cir. 2009) (In addition to accepting all

of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, courts must consider the complaint in its

entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6)

motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and

regarding all zoos. See Blais Decl. at 10 (There is a rapidly growing need for healthy

alternatives to zoos . . . . Zoo elephants are ailing, and zoos lack the space to adequately expandto meet these elephants needs.).

2Hyperlinking for case, Federal Register, and law review citations is to WestlawNext.

Hyperlinking for U.S.C. and C.F.R. citations is to the Legal Information Institute or the U.S.

Government Printing Office.

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matters of which a court may take judicial notice.). The Court must accept specific, non-

conclusory facts in the complaint as true. Those facts, however, must plausibly suggest a right to

relief. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (replacing the no set of facts

standard for 12(b)(6) motions with the plausible right to relief standard);Amacker v. Renaissance

Asset Mgmt. LLC, 657 F.3d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 2011) ([A] claim may be dismissed when a

plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts that, taken as true, state a claim that is plausible on its

face.). Here, even if Plaintiffs allegations are taken as true, they must be dismissed as a matter

of law because they do not form the basis of a legally viable ESA citizen suit. See Atchafalaya

Basinkeeper v. Chustz, 682F.3d 356, 360 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of

claim not authorized under citizen suit provision).

III.

PLAINTIFFS FACTUAL AND

LEGAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiffs allegations regarding Luckys enclosure. Plaintiffs ESA take allegations

all address the conditions in which Lucky is held by the Zoo.3 In Count I, Plaintiffs complain

that there has not consistently been a second elephant in Luckys enclosure with whom she can

bond following her long-time enclosure mates passing.4 In Counts II-IV, Plaintiffs complain

that Luckys enclosure is too small, offers nearly no shade from the sun, does not provide a pool

that is deep enough . . . and is made of unnaturally hard and species-inappropriate substrate.5

Plaintiffs harass claims. Plaintiffs allege the current lack of a companion and other

enclosure conditions fall short of generally accepted husbandry practice within the meaning of

3See Compl. (Dckt. # 1) at 1; see also id. at 13 (alleging that all of Plaintiffs aesthetic

injuries are caused by the Zoo and the ways in which it maintains Lucky).

4Id. at 1, 31-34, and Count 1 at 53-66.

5Id. at 35;see also Counts II-IV at 67-82.

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the ESA definition of harass as it applies to captive wildlife, citing 50 C.F.R. 17.3the Fish

and Wildlife Service ESA regulation that defines harass as part of take.6 However, the FWS

excludes from its definition of harass generally accepted animal husbandry practices that meet

or exceed the minimum standards for facilities and care under the Animal Welfare Act. See 50

C.F.R. 17.3. Plaintiffs evidently assert that the question of whether the Zoos care and

possession of Lucky meets the AWA standards is the proper subject of an ESA citizen suit. As

explained below, ESA citizen suits cannot be used to enforce AWA compliance.

Plaintiffs harm claims. Plaintiffs also make the cursory contention that these same

conditions constitute a harm in the definition of take. But any complaints about Luckys

maintenance at the Zoo are within the exclusive authority of USDA APHIS to determine within

its regulatory regime (which includes licensure, revocation, and civil and criminal punishment).

Moreover, Plaintiffs fail to allege (and could not possibly allege) an actual injury or death, which

is required to establish harm.

Plaintiffs illegal possession claim. Plaintiffs also contend the Zoo violates ESA 9s

prohibition on illegally possessing an endangered animal because Luckys conditions amount to

an illegal take.7

But the Zoos possession of Lucky is legal: it is licensed by the Secretary of

Agriculture under the Animal Welfare Act. Moreover, the ESA 9 possession prohibition

6Id. at 65, 72, 76 (citing to a USDA APHIS regulation for shade promulgated under the

AWA). Plaintiffs claim the lack of a companion and the enclosure conditions violate theAssociation of Zoos and Aquariums (AZA) standards, though Plaintiffs acknowledge that

AZA has provided the Zoo a variance from the requirement for multiple elephants. As Plaintiffs

also acknowledge, the AZA is a non-governmental trade organization whose standards are notincluded in any ESA provision or regulation and therefore provide no cause of action. Id. at 16

61 (The AZAs variance has no legal effect on the requirements of the ESA.).

7Id. at 22 (For the same reasons, the San Antonio Zoo is currently in possession of an

endangered Asian elephant who has been unlawfully taken, in violation of Section 9 of the ESA,16 U.S.C. 1538(a)(1)(D).).

https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/50/17.3https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/50/17.3https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/50/17.3https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/50/17.3https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/50/17.3https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/50/17.3https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/50/17.3https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/50/17.3https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/50/17.3


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applies only to animals who have been directly taken, not animals subject to an indirect or

incidental take, such as through habitat modification that constitutes harm or harassment.

Plaintiffs requested relief. Plaintiffs Prayer for Relief requests only general

injunctive relief against the conditions about which they complain (no companion elephant,

enclosure size, shade and surface) and, apparently, for forfeiture (which Plaintiffs

mischaracterize as injunctive relief: Plaintiffs request that this Court enter a judgment . . .

Enjoining the San Antonio Zoo from continuing to possess Lucky . . . .).8 Plaintiffs seek

forfeiture not to the government as the ESA contemplates in a government enforcement action,

but instead to one of two non-party, private, self-described sanctuariesThe Elephant

Sanctuary in Tennessee or PAWS in San Andreas, California.9

IV.

ARGUMENT

A. The conditions of animals held in captivity are governed by the Animal Welfare Act,

which standards are not to be enforced through ESA citizen suits.

Luckys living conditions at the San Antonio Zoo far exceed the minimum requirements

imposed by the Animal Welfare Act, but even assuming Plaintiffs false factual allegations are

true, they must be dismissed as a matter of law because the AWA rather than the ESA supplies

the legal standards and their enforcement with regard to Luckys conditions at the Zoo.

No authority supports an ESA Section 9 taking claim against zoos legally holding listed

animals in captivity pursuant to a USDA APHIS license issued under the AWA. Congress

plainly did not intend for all zoo animals who happen to be among ESA-listed species to be

subject to ESA take prohibitions based on their captivity; if Congress had intended that result, all

8Id. at 22-23.

9Id. at 2; see also page 5, fn. 2, and page 11 41 (There are only two GFAS-accredited

elephant sanctuaries in the United States, both of which are capable of providing Lucky a muchbetter home . . . .)



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zoos with an endangered animal would have been in violation of the ESAs take prohibition

since 1973 (when the ESA was passed). In recognition that Congress did not intend this result,

the Department of Interior, United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), as the agency

charged with implementing the ESA, exempted captive wildlife from ESA take claims (like

those raised by Plaintiffs) as long as the wildlifes living conditions meet the AWAs

requirements requirements that are determined by USDA APHIS during its mandatory

licensing process and are enforced through regular USDA APHIS inspections and license

renewals. The AWA does not permit citizen suits to enforce its standards. Therefore, the subject

matter of Plaintiffs Complaint is addressed not by the ESA and its citizen suit provision, but by

the AWA and its administrative licensing regime, which is described in detail below.

1. The ESAs take prohibition does not generally apply to lawfully held zoo

animals.

Congress passed the ESA primarily to protect the habitat and populations of endangered

and threatened species. 16 U.S.C. 1531(b) (purposes of ESA). Congress did not describe the

living conditions of zoo animals as an intended target of the ESA.

The ESA provides that with respect to any endangered species of fish or wildlife listed

[as endangered], the ESA makes it unlawful for any person . . . to . . . take any such species

within the United States . . . . 16 U.S.C. 1538(a)(1)(B) [ESA 9s take prohibition].

The ESA defines take to mean to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,

capture, or to attempt to engage in such conduct. Id. 1532(19) [ESA 3 Definitions].

The ESA authorizes civil and criminal penalties. It authorizes enforcement actions by the

federal government, including the Secretary [of the Interior], the Secretary of the Treasury, or

the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating, or all such secretaries.

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1531https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1531https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1538https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1538https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1532https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1532https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1532https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1538https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1531


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Id. 1540(e)(1) [ESA 11]. ESA 11 authorizes forfeiture to the United States, but does not

prescribe any private cause of action for forfeiture. Id. 1540(e)(4)(A).

The ESA authorizes citizen suits to (A) enjoin any person . . . who is alleged to be in

violation of any provision of this chapter or regulation issued under the authority thereof; or (B)

to compel the Secretary [of the Interior] to apply . . . the prohibitions set forth in or authorized

pursuant to . . . 1538(a)(1)(B).

Congress has charged the United States Department of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service

(FWS) with implementing the ESA. FWS has never interpreted the ESA either (i) to preclude

the holding by zoos of endangered animals, or (ii) to govern the conditions of the captivity under

which endangered animals live in zoos. See 63 Fed. Reg. 48634, 48635 (Sept. 11, 1998) (The

Service considers the purpose of the Act to be best served by conserving species in the wild

along with their ecosystems. Populations of species in captivity are, in large degree, removed

from their natural ecosystems . . . .).

In its rulemaking implementing the ESAs 9 take prohibition, FWS has addressed the

issue of the potential application of the ESA to exhibition animals lawfully living in captivity.

With respect to such animals, the FWS in 1998 amended the definition of harass in the take

definition to exclude captive animals held pursuant to the standards of the Animal Welfare Act:

Harass in the definition of take in the Act means an intentional or negligent actor omission which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to

such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns which

include, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding, or sheltering. This definition,

when applied to captive wildlife, does not include generally accepted:

(1) Animal husbandry practices that meet or exceed the minimum

standards for facilities and care under the Animal Welfare Act,

(2) Breeding procedures, or

(3) Provisions of veterinary care for confining, tranquilizing, or

anesthetizing, when such practices, procedures, or provisions are

not likely to result in injury to the wildlife.

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50 C.F.R. 17.3.

In that 1998 rulemaking, FWS explained its reasoning for deferring to the AWA to

determine the living conditions of ESA-listed animals held in captivity:

Harass under the definition of take in 17.3 is an act or omission that

creates the likelihood of injury by annoying wildlife to such an extent as to

significantly disrupt normal behavior patterns. The applicability of this concept tocaptive-held animals has been unclear, since human activities, including normal

husbandry practices, provided in caring for captive-held wildlife in all probability

disrupt behavior patterns.

In light of this, the definition of harass in 50 CFR 17.3 is modified

to exclude normal animal husbandry practices that are not likely to result in

injury such as humane and healthful care when applied to captive wildlife. While

no permit is required to possess lawfully acquired listed wildlife, a personcannot possess wildlife without doing something to it that might be construed

as harassment under a literal interpretation of the definition in use since

1979, e.g., keep it in confinement, provide veterinary care, etc. Under this

scenario, a person who legally possessed wildlife without a permit could be

considered in violation of the prohibition against harassment unless they obtaineda specific permit that authorized them to conduct normal animal husbandry

activities. Had Congress intended this result, the prohibition on possession in

section 9 of the Act would not have been limited to endangered species taken

in violation of the Act.

However, maintaining animals in inadequate, unsafe or unsanitary

conditions, physical mistreatment, and the like constitute harassment becausesuch conditions might create the likelihood of injury or sickness. The Act

continues to afford protection to listed species that are not being treated in a

humane manner.

63 Fed. Reg. at 48638.

FWSs exclusion of listed animals held in captivity under the AWAs requirements

recognizes that the captivity itself could constitute a take, but that Congress did not intend that

result. Id. ([N]o permit is required to possess lawfully acquired listed wildlife.). Thus, it has

been well understood since its enactment that the ESA does not prohibit possession of

endangered species. Id. Indeed, there are currently listed animals in zoos and aquaria across the

country, just as there were when the ESA was first enacted in 1973. Nor does the ESA dictate

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the conditions under which such animals held in captivity must live. Instead, because Congress

authorized USDA APHIS to enforce AWA standards for living conditions of animals in

captivity, FWS defers to that regime to ensure the humane treatment of endangered animals in

captivity.

2. The AWA comprehensively regulates conditions of zoo animals.

In passing the AWA, Congress found that it was essential to regulate, as provided in this

chapter, the transportation, purchase, sale, housing, care, handling, and treatment of animals by

carriers or by persons or organizations engaged in using them for . . . exhibition purposes. 7

U.S.C. 2131.

Congress authorized the USDA to implement regulations that insure that animals

intended . . . for exhibition purposes . . . are provided humane care and treatment. Id. 2131

and 2132(b).

Under the AWA, individuals and businesses who exhibit animals to the public, such as

zoos, are required to obtain a license from USDA APHIS. Id. 2132 and 2133. Before APHIS

will issue a license, the applicant and its facilities must be in compliance with all AWA standards

and regulations, which include by reference all federal laws. Id. 2133; see also APHIS

implementing regulations at 9 C.F.R. 2.11(a) (Alicense will not be issued to any applicant

who: (1) Has not complied with the requirements of 2.1 [Requirements and application], 2.2

[Acknowledgement of regulations and standards], 2.3 [Demonstration of Compliance with

standards and regulations.], and 2.4 [Non-interference with APHIS officials] and has not paid the

fees indicated in 2.6 [Annual license fees]; (2) Is not in compliance with any of the regulations

or standards in this subchapter; (3) Has had a license revoked or whose license is suspended . . .

.).

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2131https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2131https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2131https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2131https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2131https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2132https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2132https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2132https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2132https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2133https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2133https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2000-title9-vol1/xml/CFR-2000-title9-vol1-sec2-11.xmlhttps://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2000-title9-vol1/xml/CFR-2000-title9-vol1-sec2-11.xmlhttps://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2000-title9-vol1/xml/CFR-2000-title9-vol1-sec2-11.xmlhttps://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2133https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2132https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2132https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2131


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APHIS will issue a license only after it has performed an inspection of the applicants

premises and any animals in order to ascertain the applicants compliance with all AWA

standards and regulations. 9 C.F.R. 2.3(a)-(b). If the applicants animals, premises, facilities,

vehicles, equipment, other premises, or records do not meet the requirements of this subchapter,

APHIS will advise the applicant of existing deficiencies and the corrective measures that must be

completed to come into compliance with the regulations and standards. Id. 2.3(b). A licensee

must renew its license each year by certifying compliance with all AWA standards, submitting

an annual report detailing the number of animals held, and paying an annual fee. See generally

Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 789F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing 9

C.F.R. 2.2(b); 2.6; 2.7(d) and describing APHISs regulatory licensing regime).

The AWA covers elephants held in zoos. See 7 U.S.C. 2132(g) (The term animal

means any live or dead dog, cat, monkey (nonhuman primate mammal), guinea pig, hamster,

rabbit, or such other warm-blooded animal, as the Secretary may determine is being used, or is

intended for use, for research, testing, experimentation, or exhibition purposes, or as a pet . . . .);

id. 2132(h) (The term exhibitor means any person (public or private) exhibiting any animals,

which were purchased in commerce or the intended distribution of which affects commerce, to

the public for compensation, as determined by the Secretary, and such term includes carnivals,

circuses, and zoos exhibiting such animals whether operated for profit or not . . . .).

The AWA requires licensed exhibitors, including zoos, to provide their animals with

adequate care and treatment in all areas: handing, housing, feeding, watering, sanitation,

ventilation, shelter from extremes of weather and temperatures, and adequate veterinary care.

Id. 2143(a)(2)(A).

https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2000-title9-vol1/xml/CFR-2000-title9-vol1-sec2-3.xmlhttps://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2000-title9-vol1/xml/CFR-2000-title9-vol1-sec2-3.xmlhttps://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/Icfaf693513a111e5a807ad48145ed9f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=UniqueDocItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)&userEnteredCitation=789+F.3d+1206https://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/Icfaf693513a111e5a807ad48145ed9f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=UniqueDocItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)&userEnteredCitation=789+F.3d+1206https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2132https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2132https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2132https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2132https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2143https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2143https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2143https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2132https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2132https://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/Icfaf693513a111e5a807ad48145ed9f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=UniqueDocItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)&userEnteredCitation=789+F.3d+1206https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2000-title9-vol1/xml/CFR-2000-title9-vol1-sec2-3.xml


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To ensure that all licensed facilities continue to comply with the AWA, USDA APHIS

officials make unannounced inspections, including in response to public complaints. See 9

C.F.R. 2.3; 7 C.F.R. 1.133(a)(1) (authorizing public complaints of AWA violations to USDA

APHIS). If an inspection reveals AWA violations, APHIS can temporarily suspend a license

pending notice and hearing requirements, can require corrections, can impose civil penalties

(subject to administrative hearing), can pursue criminal penalties before United States magistrate

judges, and can confiscate animals that are suffering or in immediate danger. 7 U.S.C.

2149(a)-(d) (Violations by licensees).

The AWA regulations further provide that a license may be terminated during the

license renewal process or at any other time for any reason that an initial license application may

be denied pursuant to 2.11. 9 C.F.R. 2.12. Thus, if USDA APHIS determines at any time

that a zoos conditions fall short of generally accepted animal husbandry practices, it can

terminate the zoos license to hold the animal in question.

This AWA regime is regulatory; it does not include citizen suit enforcement. As

explained in the next section, myriad courts have rejected citizen attempts to judicially enforce

AWA compliance.

3. The ESA does not permit citizen suits to enforce the AWAs standards

for animals held in captivity. Instead, USDA APHIS must consult with

FWS as to any endangered animal covered by an AWA license.

As explained above, FWSs take regulations defer to the AWA as implemented by USDA

APHIS to ensure listed animals in captivity are held under the proper conditions. 50 C.F.R.

17.3 (excluding from the definition of harass animals held in captivity under the standards

imposed by the AWA). As explained above, this is necessary, reasoned the FWS, because any

conditions of captivity would otherwise constitute harassment and therefore a take, but it

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alone have the authority to limit USDAs license-renewal discretion in this matter and to demand

annual, substantive compliance with animal welfare standards.) (emphasis added).

4. The ESAs own terms preclude factual and legal determinations in an ESA

citizen suit that the AWAs standards are being violated.

The plain language of the ESA evinces Congresss intent to preclude private citizens

from seeking to enforce alleged AWA violations through the ESAs citizen suit provision. ESA

11(h) addresses Coordination with other laws and makes clear that the ESAs terms

including its citizen suit provisiondo not impinge upon the USDAs administration of its laws

and regulations:

Nothing in this Act or any amendment made by this Act shall be construed as

superseding or limiting in any manner the functions of the Secretary of

Agriculture under any other law relating to prohibited or restricted importations

or possession of animals and other articles and no proceeding or determination

under this Act shall preclude any proceeding or be considered determinative of

any issue of fact or law in any proceeding under any Act administered by the

Secretary of Agriculture.

16 U.S.C. 1540(h).

The ESA by this language precludes the statutes generalized application to USDA-

licensed possession of animals in deference to USDA APHISs administration of its licensing

regime. In other words, because USDA APHIS licenses and ensures zoos possession of animals

as compliant with the AWAs standards, the ESAs citizen suit provision cannot be used to gain

factual or legal determinations that the AWA standards are being violated.

Instead, as to zoo animals, the ESA applies administratively, and in coordination with

USDA APHISs authority to license possession of animals held in captivity. ESA 7(a)(1)

requires that [a]ll other Federal agencies shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of

the [FWS], utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of [the ESA] by carrying out

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programs for the conservation of endangered species and threatened species listed pursuant to

section 1533 of this title. 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(1).

Similarly, ESA 7(a)(2) requires that each federal agency in consultation with and with

the assistance of the [USFWS] insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such

agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or

threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of [critical habitat]. Id.

1536(a)(2). The ESA 7 consultation regulations define action to mean all activities or

programs of any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies

in the United States or upon the high seas. Examples include, but are not limited to: (a) actions

intended to conserve listed species or their habitat; (b) the promulgation of regulations; (c) the

granting of licenses, contracts, leases, easements, rights-of-way, permits, or grants-in-aid; or (d)

actions directly or indirectly causing modifications to the land, water, or air. 50 C.F.R.

402.02 (emphases added).

Thus, the ESA requires: (1) USDA APHIS to use its regulatory, licensing, inspection,

and enforcement authorities under the AWA to ensure that individuals who possess listed captive

animals employ animal husbandry practices that conserv[e] . . . endangered species. 16 U.S.C.

1536(a)(1); and (2) USDA APHIS to consult with FWS regarding licensure of zoos and

aquaria that possess and exhibit federally-listed endangered animals. Id. 1536(a)(2); 50 C.F.R.

402.02.

Accordingly, FWS implements the ESA with respect to animals lawfully held in captivity

by consulting with APHIS, but it does not itself administer animal welfare standards. As FWS

stated in its 1998 rulemaking: [t]o evaluate facilities and care provided to [captive bred wildlife

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1536https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1536https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1536https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1536https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1536https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1536https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1536https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012-title50-vol11/xml/CFR-2012-title50-vol11-sec402-02.xmlhttps://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012-title50-vol11/xml/CFR-2012-title50-vol11-sec402-02.xmlhttps://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012-title50-vol11/xml/CFR-2012-title50-vol11-sec402-02.xmlhttps://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012-title50-vol11/xml/CFR-2012-title50-vol11-sec402-02.xmlhttps://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1536https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1536https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1536https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1536https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012-title50-vol11/xml/CFR-2012-title50-vol11-sec402-02.xmlhttps://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012-title50-vol11/xml/CFR-2012-title50-vol11-sec402-02.xmlhttps://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012-title50-vol11/xml/CFR-2012-title50-vol11-sec402-02.xmlhttps://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012-title50-vol11/xml/CFR-2012-title50-vol11-sec402-02.xmlhttps://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012-title50-vol11/xml/CFR-2012-title50-vol11-sec402-02.xmlhttps://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012-title50-vol11/xml/CFR-2012-title50-vol11-sec402-02.xmlhttps://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012-title50-vol11/xml/CFR-2012-title50-vol11-sec402-02.xmlhttps://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012-title50-vol11/xml/CFR-2012-title50-vol11-sec402-02.xmlhttps://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1536https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1536https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012-title50-vol11/xml/CFR-2012-title50-vol11-sec402-02.xmlhttps://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1536https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1536


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permit] applicants, the Service will continue to consult with experts such as . . . [APHIS] which

is charged with administering the Animal Welfare Act. 63 Fed. Reg. at 48636.

In sum, under the ESA and AWA and their respective regulations, it is the AWA

administrative scheme which governs, and it is USDA APHIS which enforces the standards

applicable to listed animals held in captivity. Allowing Plaintiffs to use an ESA citizen suit to

enforce AWA standards would ignore Congresss carefully structured legislative and

administrative scheme. Further, as explained in the next section, Plaintiffs attempt to end run

Congresss intent to delegate AWA enforcement to USDA APHIS is a strategy that has been

rejected under strikingly similar facts. See Am. Socy For The Prevention of Cruelty To Animals

v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus [Ringling Brothers], 502 F. Supp. 2d 103, 113

(D.D.C. 2007).

5. Plaintiffs Complaint is the latest attempt to evade limits on judicial review of

zoos and aquaria holding of listed animals.

Because the AWA does not contain a citizen suit provision, animal rights groups

including the Animal Legal Defense Fundhave repeatedly attempted to enforce the AWA

indirectly through the citizen suit provisions of the ESA and other statutes. These attempts have

been rejected. This is because Plaintiffs face an insurmountable obstaclei.e., there is no

private cause of action available for alleged violations of the AWA.

It has long been widely understood that the ESA was never intended to protect captive

wildlife from AWA violations or, more generally, to regulate the conditions of captivity. Put

simply, zoo habitats are not the subject matter of the ESA. See, e.g., Geordie Duckler, Toward A

More Appropriate Jurisprudence Regarding the Legal Status of Zoos and Zoo Animals, 3 Animal

L. 189, 199-200 (1997) ([The ESA] has proven to be a vehicle used more to protect animal

habitats than animals themselves. The statutory scheme encompassing the ESA would be hard

https://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/I3C53244034CE11DAB1EA8A3AF7542D25/View/FullText.html?navigationPath=Search%2Fv3%2Fsearch%2Fresults%2Fnavigation%2Fi0ad6040c00000151d06d93d46e2d784b%3FNav%3DMULTIPLECITATIONS%26fragmentIdentifier%3DI3C53244034CE11DAB1EA8A3AF7542D25%26startIndex%3D1%26contextData%3D%2528sc.Search%2529%26transitionType%3DUniqueDocItem&listSource=Search&listPageSource=11891786833be8c68eef2389f37cc104&list=MULTIPLECITATIONS&rank=0&grading=na&sessionScopeId=2f9fd8556a6c06e6adb20a92180b51d3&originationContext=NonUniqueFindSelected&transitionType=UniqueDocItem&contextData=%28sc.Search%29https://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/I3C53244034CE11DAB1EA8A3AF7542D25/View/FullText.html?navigationPath=Search%2Fv3%2Fsearch%2Fresults%2Fnavigation%2Fi0ad6040c00000151d06d93d46e2d784b%3FNav%3DMULTIPLECITATIONS%26fragmentIdentifier%3DI3C53244034CE11DAB1EA8A3AF7542D25%26startIndex%3D1%26contextData%3D%2528sc.Search%2529%26transitionType%3DUniqueDocItem&listSource=Search&listPageSource=11891786833be8c68eef2389f37cc104&list=MULTIPLECITATIONS&rank=0&grading=na&sessionScopeId=2f9fd8556a6c06e6adb20a92180b51d3&originationContext=NonUniqueFindSelected&transitionType=UniqueDocItem&contextData=%28sc.Search%29https://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/I8a95f06651a811dcbd4c839f532b53c5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=UniqueDocItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)&userEnteredCitation=502+F.+Supp.+2d+103https://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/Ib9b461c15ca411dbbd2dfa5ce1d08a25/View/FullText.html?transitionType=UniqueDocItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)&userEnteredCitation=3+Animal+L.+189https://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/Ib9b461c15ca411dbbd2dfa5ce1d08a25/View/FullText.html?transitionType=UniqueDocItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)&userEnteredCitation=3+Animal+L.+189https://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/Ib9b461c15ca411dbbd2dfa5ce1d08a25/View/FullText.html?transitionType=UniqueDocItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)&userEnteredCitation=3+Animal+L.+189https://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/Ib9b461c15ca411dbbd2dfa5ce1d08a25/View/FullText.html?transitionType=UniqueDocItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)&userEnteredCitation=3+Animal+L.+189https://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/Ib9b461c15ca411dbbd2dfa5ce1d08a25/View/FullText.html?transitionType=UniqueDocItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)&userEnteredCitation=3+Animal+L.+189https://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/I8a95f06651a811dcbd4c839f532b53c5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=UniqueDocItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)&userEnteredCitation=502+F.+Supp.+2d+103https://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/I3C53244034CE11DAB1EA8A3AF7542D25/View/FullText.html?navigationPath=Search%2Fv3%2Fsearch%2Fresults%2Fnavigation%2Fi0ad6040c00000151d06d93d46e2d784b%3FNav%3DMULTIPLECITATIONS%26fragmentIdentifier%3DI3C53244034CE11DAB1EA8A3AF7542D25%26startIndex%3D1%26contextData%3D%2528sc.Search%2529%26transitionType%3DUniqueDocItem&listSource=Search&listPageSource=11891786833be8c68eef2389f37cc104&list=MULTIPLECITATIONS&rank=0&grading=na&sessionScopeId=2f9fd8556a6c06e6adb20a92180b51d3&originationContext=NonUniqueFindSelected&transitionType=UniqueDocItem&contextData=%28sc.Search%29


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pressed to apply to the complete populations of the nations zoological parks, primarily because

zoos are geographically independent of natural animal habitats.);see also In Def. of Animals v.

Cleveland Metroparks Zoo, 785F. Supp. 100, 103 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (in case challenging zoos

allegedly harmful transport of captive gorilla, plaintiffs did not allege nor could they allege, that

some provision of the [ESA] would be violated).

Advocacy groups have only recently sought to use the ESA to make federal courts the

policemen of zoo animals conditions. See Joyce Tischler,10

A Brief History of Animal Law,

Part II (1985 - 2011), 5 Stan. J. Animal L. & Poly 27, 68 (2012) (stating thatRingling Brothers,

502 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2007), discussed below, marks one of the first attempts by animal

lawyers to use the Endangered Species Act to protect captive wildlife and as such, is a portent of

possible future litigation). This Court should, as most other courts have done, reject that role.

Attack on captive bred wildlife permits through ESA: In Ringling Brothers, 502 F.

Supp. 2d at 111-112, the plaintiffs argued that a defendants failure to meet the AWA standards

mandated under a FWS-issued captive-bred wildlife permit was actionable under the ESA.

captive-bred wildlife permitees must comply with thesame AWA standards that apply to USDA

APHIS licensees, and which Plaintiffs here contend have been violated. See 50 C.F.R. 13.41.

The Ringling Brothers court held the ESA citizen suit provision did not authorize suits over

alleged non-compliance with the animal welfare requirements of a captive-bred wildlife permit.

[O]nly the government, through the Secretary of the Interior, could bring actions for violations

of a permit issued by FWS.11

Id.

10

Co-Founder and General Counsel of the Animal Legal Defense Fund.

11See also Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., C 04-04647 CRB, 2005 WL

3021939, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2005) (Plaintiffs may not seek [take] permit enforcement

directly under ESA . . . .); Atl. Green Sea Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, Fla.,

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requirements of care for animals held in captivity.13

This theory fails for the same reasons the

plaintiffs failed inRingling Brothers andALDF v. USDA. Just as only the government, through

the Secretary of the Interior, could bring actions for violations of a permit issued by FWS,

Ringling Bros., 502 F. Supp. 2d at 111-12, only USDA APHIS has discretionary enforcement

authority over alleged violations of AWA standards required under a USDA license,ALDF v.

USDA, 789 F.3d at 1210. Plaintiffs cannot use an ESA citizen suit to circumvent the USDA

APHISs licensure of zoos in compliance with AWA standards.

Plaintiffs attempt to bring the subject matter of the AWA and its regulations within the

scope of an ESA citizen suit should be rejected just as courts have rejected other attempts to

bring before the courts issues Congress has deemed to be regulatory and not the proper subject of

judicial review. See, e.g., Heckler v. Cheney, 470U.S. 821, 834-835 (1985) (agency decision not

to pursue enforcement action for violation of permit is not judicially reviewable); Atchafalaya

Basinkeeper v. Chustz, 682F.3d 356, 359-60 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (holding that Clean

Water Act 1344 permit violation is not actionable under citizen suit provision);Atl. Green Sea

Turtle, 2005 WL 1227305 at *14 (rejecting plaintiffs attempt to use ESA citizen suit to

enforce terms of incidental take permit). In Chustz, the Fifth Circuit noted the the Supreme

Courts warning to lower courts not to infer private rights of action from . . . oblique statutory

13It is worth noting that, if Lucky were born in captivity, she would be covered by the San

Antonio Zoos captive-bred wildlife permit (permit no. MA680140-0), and Plaintiffs suit would

be foreclosed just as in Ringling Brothers. By alleging that Lucky was born in the wild in

Thailand, Compl. at 29, Plaintiffs attempt to fit through a perceived regulatory loophole.However, this distinction is immaterial since the FWS expressly exempts allcaptive wildlife

not only captive-bredwildlifefrom the ESAs take prohibition. 50 C.F.R. 17.3; see also

63 Fed. Reg. at 48635 (describing Services intent to refer to captive wildlife, not captive-bred wildlife). Whether Lucky is covered by a captive-bred wildlife permit or a USDA APHIS

license, the result is the same: Plaintiffs are barred from using the ESAs citizen suit provision to

challenge alleged non-compliance with animal welfare requirements because enforcement ofthose standards is regulatory.

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interpretations. Where a statute has elaborate enforcement provisions, as does the [Clean

Water Act], the Supreme Court has warned that: [I]t cannot be assumed that Congress intended

to authorize by implication additional judicial remedies for private citizens. Chustz, 682 F.3d at

359 (quotingMiddlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Natl Sea Clammers Assn, 453 U.S. 1, 1415

(1981)). Here, Congresss carefully structured legislative scheme for enforcement of AWA

standards by USDA APHIS does not contemplate additional judicial remedies for private

citizens.

Further, Plaintiffs attempt to use one statutethe ESAin order to enforce the

provisions of another statute that does not allow a private cause of action or judicial reviewthe

AWAis a commonly used, but routinely rejected tactic. For example, in Salk v. Regents of

Univ. of California, No. A120289, 2008 WL 5274536 at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2008,

unpublished), plaintiffs alleged AWA violations through a state statute allowing taxpayer suits

over any illegal expenditure or waste of public funds. Plaintiffs asserted the holding of

[animals] was illegal because it violated the AWA standards. Thus, there, like here, the plaintiffs

attempted use of a broad citizen suit statute to assert alleged AWA violations. The Court

dismissed the complaint because [a] state action to enforce this federal law would violate the

congressional intent precluding a private right of action [under the AWA]. Id.

Outside of the AWA arena, numerous courts, including those in the Fifth Circuit, have

rejected similar tactics in connection with a wide variety of statutes. See, e.g., C&E Services,

Inc. of Washington v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 310 F.3d 197, 201-02 (D.C. Cir. 2002)

(dismissing Declaratory Judgment Act claim that defendant violated Service Contract Act

because this would constitute an end-run around Congresss clear intent that the Department of

Labor interpret and enforce the SCA in the first instance); Texas Med. Assn v. Aetna Life Ins.

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Co., 80 F.3d 153, 159 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act

does not provide appellants with a cause of action by which to enforce violations of or ensure

compliance with health insurance regulations, because state agency was solely responsible for

enforcing regulations and there was no private cause of action for enforcement); Morrison v.

Back Yard Burgers, Inc., 91 F.3d 1184, 1187 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting plaintiffs attempt to

plead violation of Federal Trade Commission Act, which lacks citizen suit provision, as part of

state common law fraud case because doing so would effectively extend[ ] a private cause of

action);Davis v. United States, 722 F.2d 1157, 1158 (4th Cir. 1983) (dismissing purported Tort

Claims Act action because the action was premised on alleged violations of the Clean Water Act,

which did not provide a private cause of action, and holding that the Tort Claims Act cannot be

used to circumvent the legislative scheme of the [Clean Water Act]); Gallier v. Woodbury Fin.

Services, Inc., CIV.A. H-14-888, 2015 WL 1296351 at *7 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2015) (Rosenthal,

J.) (rejecting plaintiffs attempt to recharacterize FINRA claims as breach-of-contract claims to

circumvent the absence of a private right of action for violations of FINRA rules); Grove Fresh

Distributors, Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 89 C 1113, 1989 WL 152670 at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29,

1989) (stating that plaintiff cannot base its Lanham Act claim upon the violation of the [Food,

Drug, and Cosmetic Act] because Congress has precluded private causes of action under the

FDCA).

B. Plaintiffs have not alleged an actionable harm.

Plaintiffs allegations of a take by harm fail for two reasons.

First, the harm allegations fail for the same reason their harass allegations fail: they all

concern the conditions in which Lucky lives at the Zoo as licensed by USDA APHIS under the

Animal Welfare Act. The ESA states that it will not supersede or limit in any manner the

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functions of the Secretary of Agriculture under any other law . . . . 16 U.S.C. 1540(h). This

includes the USDA APHISs licensure of zoos to exhibit animals under the conditions required

by the Animal Welfare Act, as described above. Any judicial finding that the Zoos conditions

harm Lucky would necessarily limit the functions of USDA APHIS to determine whether the

Zoos conditions meet the standards for humane captivity.

Moreover, in excluding animals licensed under the AWA to be held in captivity, FWS

intended to exclude such animals not just from harass but from take generallyas long as

USDA APHIS licenses the facility as compliant with the AWA.

In its 1993 proposed rulemaking, FWS stated [s]uch a construction of the concepts of

harass and takewould virtually result in a comprehensive prohibition on the possession of

listed wildlife species; mere possession of the listed species would then require the issuance of

Section 10 permits. If Congress had intended this result, the prohibition [on possession] in

Section 9 of the ESA would not have been limited to endangered fish or wildlife taken in

violation of the ESA. 58 Fed. Reg. 32632, 32635 (June 11, 1993) (emphasis added).

FWS repeated the point in the 1998 final rulemaking: Since Congress chose not to

prohibit the mere possession of lawfully-taken listed species in Section 9(a)(1) of the [ESA], the

[FWS] believes that congressional intent supports the proposition that measures necessary for the

proper care and maintenance of listed wildlife in captivity do not constitute harassment or

taking. 63 Fed. Reg. at 48636 (emphasis added).

For the reasons stated above, the facts of whether a particular zoo falls short of proper

care and maintenance of the animals it is licensed to possess is within the ambit of USDA

APHISs administrative licensing regime and not the ESA citizen suit provision.

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1540https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1540https://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/IAD2283103C3E11DAA009E92B16555DD2/View/FullText.html?navigationPath=Search%2Fv3%2Fsearch%2Fresults%2Fnavigation%2Fi0ad6040d00000151d0711297bf5556a5%3FNav%3DMULTIPLECITATIONS%26fragmentIdentifier%3DIAD2283103C3E11DAA009E92B16555DD2%26startIndex%3D1%26contextData%3D%2528sc.Search%2529%26transitionType%3DUniqueDocItem&listSource=Search&listPageSource=4f7e1da69c81e622c0a6d76fb956862a&list=MULTIPLECITATIONS&rank=0&grading=na&sessionScopeId=2f9fd8556a6c06e6adb20a92180b51d3&originationContext=NonUniqueFindSelected&transitionType=UniqueDocItem&contextData=%28sc.Search%29https://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/IAD2283103C3E11DAA009E92B16555DD2/View/FullText.html?navigationPath=Search%2Fv3%2Fsearch%2Fresults%2Fnavigation%2Fi0ad6040d00000151d0711297bf5556a5%3FNav%3DMULTIPLECITATIONS%26fragmentIdentifier%3DIAD2283103C3E11DAA009E92B16555DD2%26startIndex%3D1%26contextData%3D%2528sc.Search%2529%26transitionType%3DUniqueDocItem&listSource=Search&listPageSource=4f7e1da69c81e622c0a6d76fb956862a&list=MULTIPLECITATIONS&rank=0&grading=na&sessionScopeId=2f9fd8556a6c06e6adb20a92180b51d3&originationContext=NonUniqueFindSelected&transitionType=UniqueDocItem&contextData=%28sc.Search%29https://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/I3C53244034CE11DAB1EA8A3AF7542D25/View/FullText.html?navigationPath=Search%2Fv3%2Fsearch%2Fresults%2Fnavigation%2Fi0ad6040c00000151d06d93d46e2d784b%3FNav%3DMULTIPLECITATIONS%26fragmentIdentifier%3DI3C53244034CE11DAB1EA8A3AF7542D25%26startIndex%3D1%26contextData%3D%2528sc.Search%2529%26transitionType%3DUniqueDocItem&listSource=Search&listPageSource=11891786833be8c68eef2389f37cc104&list=MULTIPLECITATIONS&rank=0&grading=na&sessionScopeId=2f9fd8556a6c06e6adb20a92180b51d3&originationContext=NonUniqueFindSelected&transitionType=UniqueDocItem&contextData=%28sc.Search%29https://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/I3C53244034CE11DAB1EA8A3AF7542D25/View/FullText.html?navigationPath=Search%2Fv3%2Fsearch%2Fresults%2Fnavigation%2Fi0ad6040c00000151d06d93d46e2d784b%3FNav%3DMULTIPLECITATIONS%26fragmentIdentifier%3DI3C53244034CE11DAB1EA8A3AF7542D25%26startIndex%3D1%26contextData%3D%2528sc.Search%2529%26transitionType%3DUniqueDocItem&listSource=Search&listPageSource=11891786833be8c68eef2389f37cc104&list=MULTIPLECITATIONS&rank=0&grading=na&sessionScopeId=2f9fd8556a6c06e6adb20a92180b51d3&originationContext=NonUniqueFindSelected&transitionType=UniqueDocItem&contextData=%28sc.Search%29https://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/I3C53244034CE11DAB1EA8A3AF7542D25/View/FullText.html?navigationPath=Search%2Fv3%2Fsearch%2Fresults%2Fnavigation%2Fi0ad6040c00000151d06d93d46e2d784b%3FNav%3DMULTIPLECITATIONS%26fragmentIdentifier%3DI3C53244034CE11DAB1EA8A3AF7542D25%26startIndex%3D1%26contextData%3D%2528sc.Search%2529%26transitionType%3DUniqueDocItem&listSource=Search&listPageSource=11891786833be8c68eef2389f37cc104&list=MULTIPLECITATIONS&rank=0&grading=na&sessionScopeId=2f9fd8556a6c06e6adb20a92180b51d3&originationContext=NonUniqueFindSelected&transitionType=UniqueDocItem&contextData=%28sc.Search%29https://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/IAD2283103C3E11DAA009E92B16555DD2/View/FullText.html?navigationPath=Search%2Fv3%2Fsearch%2Fresults%2Fnavigation%2Fi0ad6040d00000151d0711297bf5556a5%3FNav%3DMULTIPLECITATIONS%26fragmentIdentifier%3DIAD2283103C3E11DAA009E92B16555DD2%26startIndex%3D1%26contextData%3D%2528sc.Search%2529%26transitionType%3DUniqueDocItem&listSource=Search&listPageSource=4f7e1da69c81e622c0a6d76fb956862a&list=MULTIPLECITATIONS&rank=0&grading=na&sessionScopeId=2f9fd8556a6c06e6adb20a92180b51d3&originationContext=NonUniqueFindSelected&transitionType=UniqueDocItem&contextData=%28sc.Search%29https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1540


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Second, Plaintiffs harm allegations fail because they do not allege an actual physical

injury or death. 50 C.F.R. 17.3 is the FWS regulation defining harm and provides: Harm in

the definition of take in the Act means an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act

may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures

wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or

sheltering. (emphasis added). In this rulemaking, FWS explained that this definition of harm

sought to preclude[] a taking where no actual injury is shown. 46 Fed. Reg. 54748, 54749

(Nov. 4, 1981).

The Supreme Court inBabbitt v. Sweet Home Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S.

687, 697 (1995), upheld this definition of harm as a permissible interpretation of the ESA.

The majority stated that every term in the regulations definition of harm is subservient to the

phrase an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Id. at 700. Justice OConnors

concurring opinion also made clear that the definition of harm is limited to significant habitat

modification that causes actual, as opposed to hypothetical or speculative, death or injury to

identifiable protected animals.Id. at 708-709 (OConnor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

The circuit courts have since dismissed cases alleging habitat modification or other

human activities that are likely to cause (but have not actually caused) actual injury or death. See

Am. Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163, 166 and n.5 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that harm is not

alleged by conditions likely to cause injury); Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204F.3d 920, 924

(9th Cir. 2000) (same).

Unlike harm, FWSs definition of harass includes acts that create a likelihood of

injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal behavioral

patterns.

50 C.F.R. 17.3 (emphasis added). Because Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that

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Luckys surroundings at the Zoo are likely to cause injury, and are disruptive to what they

would expect Luckys normal behavior to be, they are (at best) harass allegations.14

C. Plaintiffs cannot, as a matter of law, allege an illegal possession.

Plaintiffs allegations of an ESA 9 prohibited possession fails a matter of law, for at

least two reasons.

First, the Zoos possession of Lucky is lawful. The Zoo is licensed by the United States

government under the USDA APHIS license regime described above. The ESA does not

supersed[e] or limit[] in any manner the functions of the Secretary of Agriculture under any

other law relating to prohibited or restricted importations or possession of animals, including its

licensure of the Zoo to possess all of its animals. 16 U.S.C. 1540(h).

Second, Plaintiffs allege illegal possession because of a taking based on alleged

harm or harassment. This allegation makes no sense. By the plain language of the statute,

in order to be an ESA violation, the possession muststem from the take: [I]t is unlawful for

any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to . . . (D) possess, sell, deliver, carry,

transport, or ship, by any means whatsoever, any such species taken in violation of

subparagraphs (B) and (C). See, e.g., United States v. Hung Van Tran, 955F.2d 288, 289 (5th

Cir. 1992) (describing possession violation arising from shrimp fishermens illegal capture of

14See, e.g., Compl. at 16 63 (Lucky currently suffers from arthritis and other health issues

likely as a direct result of the inadequate conditions in which she is maintained at the Zoo) and

page 17 64 (alleging that keeping Lucky alone restrict[s] her incentive to move andcontributes to painful arthritis, which is a leading cause of death for elephants in captivity).

Plaintiffs also allege that each condition of which they complain (lack of a companion and shade,

not enough space and the allegedly hard surface) has caused Lucky to exhibit[] stereotypicbehavior: she engages in repetitive head-bobbing and swaying of her body back and forth. Id.

at 17 66. These are behavior disruptions which are (if anything at all) within the definition of

harass (a definition from which captive wildlife is exempt), but they are not actual injur

Documents

Lucky -- ECF Doc. 8 -- SA Zoo Motion to Dismiss