G.R. No. L-17757 May 30, 1962MAMERTA DE LA MERCED, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, EZEQUIEL M. SANTOS, and AMPARO MACAPAGAL, respondents.Meliton Pajarillaga for petitioner.Esteban C. Manuel for respondents.BARRERA, J.:This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the original decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija (in Civil Case No. 946), upholding the right of ownership of Ezequiel Santos over Lot No. 395 of the Rizal (Nueva Ecija) Cadastre.As may be gathered from the extant records, the facts of the case are:In a complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija dated May 3, 1952, which was later amended, Ezequiel Santos (and his wife) claiming ownership of Lot No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre by virtue of an adjudication of the cadastral court dated December 26, 1923, in favor of his father, sought recovery of ownership and possession thereof from the named defendant, and of the landlord's share in the harvests for the agricultural years 1950-1956.Defendants, in their answer, resisted plaintiffs' claim and asserted their ownership over said property as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 issued to their predecessor Juan de la Merced on October 10, 1931 and their continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years.In the course of the proceedings, Mamerta de la Merced, a legitimate daughter of Juan de la Merced, was allowed to intervene and make common cause with the defendants.On January 16, 1957, the court rendered a decision for the plaintiffs after making a finding that Lot No. 395 was part of the Original Certificate of Title No. 425 issued on May 30, 1916 in the name of the spouses Inocencio de los Santos and Victorina Macapagal, parents of plaintiff Ezequiel Santos; that in a decision rendered by the cadastral court on December 26, 1923 (Cad. Case No. 14, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 281), the said lot was also adjudicated in favor of the conjugal partnership of Inocencio de los Santos and Victorina Macapagal; that pursuant to said decision, the cadastral court issued on December 17, 1925 an order for the issuance of a certificate of title for the said property; that on December 8, 1926, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1971 was issued in the name of Ezequiel Santos in lieu of Original Certificate of Title No. 425 which was cancelled; that on December 28, 1926, the cadastral court declared lot 395 public land, as a consequence of which Juan de la Merced, after filing a homestead application therefor, was able to obtain Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 on October 10, 1931. Holding that the cadastral court had no jurisdiction to issue the order declaring the lot public land, and, therefore, the same as well as the certificate of title issued thereafter was null and void, the court ordered the cancellation of OCT No. 3462 in the name of Juan de la Merced; directed defendants to vacate Lot No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre and surrender possession thereof to plaintiffs; and to pay the latter as the landlord's share, 50 cavans of palay yearly for the agricultural years 1950 to 1956 or their equivalent, and costs of the suit; and the receiver to deliver to plaintiffs the palay in his custody representing the harvest for the agricultural years 1953-1955.Upon defendants' motion for reconsideration, however, the promulgation of the decision was ordered suspended and the case was re-set for hearing for reception of additional evidence.On August 6, 1957, the court amended its original decision, thus:The plaintiffs now admit that the litigated "Lot No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre, Nueva Ecija, is outside the parcel of land described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1971 and original Certificate of Title No. 425, both of which cover Lot 3-6". They, however, claim ownership over said Lot 395 by virtue of the decision rendered on December 26, 1923 in Cadastral Case No. 14, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 21, entitled "Government of the Philippines versus Justo Abacan, et al.," (Exh. A-1), and the other dated December 17, 1925 directing the issuance of a decree pursuant to said decision (Exh. V-2, p. 10, Rec. of exhibits).No decree has yet been issued pursuant to the said order, Exhibit B-2, much less was there a title issued in the name of the plaintiffs over the said lot.The defendants, on the other hand, predicate their claim of ownership over the said lot on Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 issued on October 10, 1931 in favor of Juan de la Merced, their predecessor-in-interest, pursuant to a homestead patent issued on September 15, 1931 (Exh. 1, for the defendants and intervenor), contending that the decision of December 26, 1923, adjudicating the lot to the plaintiffs, was still subject to review since there was no decree issued pursuant thereto.The position of the defendants and intervenor would have been correct if there was actually a petition for review of the decision of December 26, 1923, or a new trial or a reopening of the case concerning Lot No. 395. The fact of the matter is that Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 was issued pursuant to a homestead patent long after Lot No. 395 was declared a public land in a decision dated March 29, 1926 at Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and December 28, 1926 at Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and December 28, 1926 at Manila for Cabanatuan City (Exh. 4) states that Lot No. 395, together with Lots Nos. 394 and 2044, was declared a public land and was the object of a homestead application by the respective concessionaries (p. 21, rec. of exhibits). . . .It would seem that the cadastral court in the same cadastral case No. 14, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 281, entitled Government of the Philippines vs. Justo Abacan, et al., erroneously re-opened the hearing of Lot 395 which was already adjudicated in favor of the plaintiff by the decision dated December 26, 1923 (Exhs. A-1, and A-2, pp. 2 and 5, rec. of exhibits) and decreed that Lot 395 is public land. The same cadastral court should have taken judicial notice of the said decision and the other promulgated therein for the issuance of a decree in favor of the plaintiffs over lot 395 (Exh. B-2).While the court held that the land having ceased to be part of the public domain, the Director of Lands no longer had authority to grant the homestead patent over the same to Juan de la Merced, it declared nevertheless that, inasmuch as no title was actually issued therefor, the said lot may be acquired by adverse possession. And, as defendants had been in possession of the property for over 20 years, they were declared to have acquired the right over the same by prescription. The complaint was consequently ordered dismissed; OCT No. 3462 cancelled and a new one issued to defendants in lieu thereof; and plaintiffs were directed to vacate the one-third portion of Lot No. 395 occupied by them, and to pay the costs.Plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, in its decision of July 20, 1960, sustained the contention of appellants on the basis of the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abural (39 Phil. 997), that upon the finality of the decree by the cadastral court, adjudicating ownership of the land, the title thereto becomes incontrovertible and may no longer be acquired by prescription. And, as the land was no longer part of the public domain when the homestead patent was obtained by Juan de la Merced, the same can not prevail over the cadastral court's decree of registration of Lot No. 395 in favor of appellant Santos' predecessor.Hence, the filing of the instant petition for review of the aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeals.1wph1.tThe questions actually raised by the present appeal are: What is the effect of the order of the cadastral court of December 26, 1923 adjudicating the lot in favor of Santos, and the subsequent order dated December 17, 1925, directing the issuance of a certificate of title to Inocencio Santos? Did those orders constitute registration under the law even though the corresponding certificate of title has not been issued? In the affirmative, could the property thereby affected still be lost by adverse possession?For purposes of resolving the above questions, these salient facts must be considered:By virtue of the final decision rendered in Cadastral Case No. 14, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 21, dated December 26, 1923, Santos' title to Lot No. 395 was definitely confirmed as against the whole world, including the Government;That the same cadastral court issued a decree dated December 19, 1925 declaring its decision of December 26, 1923 final and directing the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the certificate of title to Inocencio de los Santos, although no such certificate was actually issued;That under date of December 28, 1926, the cadastral court, without reopening the case, declared the same Lot 395 public land as a result of which Juan de la Merced, after due application, was able to obtain therefor a homestead patent and OCT No. 3462 on October 10, 1931;That as found by the Court of Appeals, Juan de la Merced, until his death in 1931, was the overseer of Inocencio de los Santos for a big portion of land which included Lot 395 in question and was, therefore, a trustee for said lot at the time he applied for it as a homestead;That the complaint for recovery of ownership and possession was filed in 1952.There is no doubt that had the land involved herein been public, by specific provision of Act 496, the act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the same, and such registration shall be made in the office of the register of deeds for the province where the land lies. (Sec. 122, Act 496). In other words, in cases of public lands, the property is not considered registered until the final act or the entry in the registration book of the registry of deeds had been accomplished.With respect to private lands, however, the pertinent provisions of Act 496 are:SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exception stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern". Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgment or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree povided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)SEC. 40. Every decree of registration shall bear the day of the year, hour, and minute of its entry, and shall be signed by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office (now Land Registration Commissioner). . . . The decree shall be stated in a convenient form for transcription upon the certificates of titles hereinafter mentioned. (Emphasis supplied.)It is apparent from the foregoing provisions that a decree of registration and a certificate of title, under Act 496, are two different things. And it is the decree of registration, to be issued by the Land Registration Commissioner, which shall be the basis of the certificate of title to be issued subsequently by the corresponding register of deeds, that quiets title to and binds the land.But, it must be remembered that the abovementioned provisions apply only to voluntary registration under the Land Registration Act. With respect to lands titled through compulsory proceedings, the Cadastral Act prescribes:SEC. 11. The trial of the case may occur at any convenient place within the province in which the lands are situated or at such other place as the court, for reasons stated in writing and filed with the record of the case, may designate, and shall be conducted in the same manner as ordinary trials and proceedings in the Court of First Instance and shall be governed by the same rules. Orders of default and confession shall also be entered in the same manner as in ordinary cases in the same court and shall have the same effect. All conflicting interests shall be adjudicated by the court and decrees awarded in favor of the persons entitled to the lands or the various parts thereof, and such decrees, when final, shall be the basis for original certificates of title in favor of said persons which shall have the same effect as certificates of title granted on application for registration of land under the Land Registration Act, . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)Confronted with the question of when title to the land in a cadastral proceeding is vested, this Court, in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abural,1 said:After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. The first adjudicates ownership in favor of one of the claimants. This constitutes the decision the judgment the decree of the court, and speaks in a judicial manner. The second action is the declaration by the court that the decree is final and its order for the issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the Land Registration Office. Such order is made if within thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of the decision no appeal is taken from the decision. This again is judicial action, although to a less degree than the first.The third and last action devolves upon the General Land Registration Office. This office has been instituted "for the due effectuation and accomplishment of the laws relative to the registration of land." (Administrative Code of 1917, sec. 174.) . . . .The judgment in a cadastral survey, including the rendition of the decree, is a judicial act. As the law says, the judicial decree when final is the base of the certificate of title. The issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Office is a ministerial act. The date of the title prepared by the Chief Surveyor is unimportant, for the adjudication has taken place and all that is left to be performed is the mere formulation of technical description. . . .As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is final, conclusive, and indisputable, after the passage of the thirty-day period allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a copy of the judgment of the court adjudicating ownership without any step having been taken to perfect an appeal. The prevailing party may then have execution of the judgment as of right and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by the Chief of the Land Registration Office. The exception is the special provision providing for fraud.Under the foregoing pronouncement, the title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to appeal from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral court, without such an appeal having been perfected. The certificate of title would then be necessary for purposes of effecting registration of subsequent disposition of the land where court proceedings would no longer be necessary.As we have here a decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering the issuance to Inocencio de los Santos of the certificate of title over Lot No. 395 after the decision adjudicating ownership to him of the said property had already become final, and there being no imputation of irregularity in the said cadastral proceedings, title of ownership on the said adjudicatee was vested as of the date of the issuance of such judicial decree. The land, for all intents and purposes, had become, from that time, registered property which could not be acquired by adverse possession.WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner Mamerta de la Merced. So ordered.Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-19090December 28, 1964THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, AMANDO JOSON, VICTORIA BALMEO, ANTONIO BUSUEGO, and ROGELIO BUSUEGO, petitioners-appellants, vs.TEODORA BUSUEGO respondent-appellee.Florencio F. Talens for petitioners-appellants.Alfonso Espinosa for respondent-appellee.BARRERA, J.:Within one year from the issuance of the decree of registration of Lot No. 2497, Gapan Cadastre.1 in favor of Teodora Busuego pursuant to a decision2 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija (in Cad. Case No. 53 L.R.C. Cad. Rec. No. 1263), the spouses Amando Joson and Victoria Balmeo filed in the same proceeding, a petition for the setting aside of said decree and the cancellation of the certificate issued thereunder, on the ground that the decision ordering the decree was obtained by Busuego by misrepresenting herself to be the sole owner of the lot when in truth, petitioners, through their predecessor-in-interest, were owners of one-half thereof, having acquired the same by purchase from Teodora's mother, Fausta Busuego. In a separate petition, Antonio and Rogelio Busuego, children of a deceased brother of Teodora, also prayed for the same relief on the allegation that their father was an undivided co-owner (with Teodora) of one-half of Lot 2497, having acquired the same by descent from their father, Severino Busuego.In her answer to the petition of the Josons, respondent Teodora Busuego claimed that the alleged contract executed by her mother Fausta Busuego, for the sale of the latter's one-half share in the land, was obtained by petitioners' predecessors-in-interest through fraud and deceit. And, as regards the claim of her nephews, she contended that her brother Roman (Antonio and Rogelio's father) had already received his share on the inheritance and has no more participation in the Lot in question.By order of August 4, 1961, the court dismissed the said petitions for the reason that its jurisdiction as a cadastral court being special and limited, it has no authority to pass upon the issues raised in the pleadings. Hence, the present appeal by the petitioners.Apparently, the court a quo based its action on the provisions of Section 38 of the. Land Registration Act which, in part, reads:Sec. 38. ...Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. ... .It is not here disputed that the petitions filed with the cadastral court under the original proceeding were for the review and annulment of the decree of registration of Lot No. 2497 of the Gapan Cadastre in favor of Teodora Busuego and/or the cancellation of the original certificate of title issued in her name as a consequence thereof. Likewise, it is admitted that the same were filed within the reglementary period of one, year and that the petitioners charged registrant Teodora Busuego with having obtained the decree and certificate of title through actual fraud and misrepresentation. The only question raised by this appeal is, which court should take cognizance of the proceeding, the cadastral court that had issued the decree or the competent Court of First Instance in the, exercise of its general jurisdiction?It may be stated that we find no case squarely ruling on this particular point. The mere mention by the law that the relief afforded by Section 38 of Act 496 may be sought in "the competent Court of First Instance" is no sufficient indication that the petition must be filed in the Court of first Instance, exercising its general jurisdiction, considering the fact that it is also the Court of First Instance that acts on land registration cases. Upon the other hand, it has been held that the adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year from entry of the final decree, and that as long as the final decree is not issued and the period of one year within which it may be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may even set aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another.3... As long as the final decree is not issued by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office in accordance with the law, and the period of one year fixed for the review thereof has not elapsed, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision therein rendered continues to be under control and sound discretion of the court rendering it. Such is the ruling laid down in the case of De los Reyes vs. De Villa (48 Phil. 227), which was later reiterated in that of Roman Catholic Bishop of Cebu vs. Philippine Railway Co. and Reynes (49 Phil. 546). ... ( Afalla et al v. Rosauro, 60 Phil. 622).In the present case, as the petitions were filed within one year from the date of the issuance of the decree, pursuant to Section 38 of Act 496, the same are properly cognizable by the court that rendered the decision and granted the said decree.WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings pursuant to law. No costs. So ordered.Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

EN BANCG.R. No. L-25894 January 30, 1971QUIRINO BOLAOS, EDILBERTO ALEJANDRINO and DIOSDADO DE LOS REYES, petitioners-appellees, vs.J. M. TUASON & CO., INC. and PEOPLE'S HOMESITE and HOUSING CORPORATION, respondents-appellants.Pablo G. Macapagal for petitioner-appellee Edilberto Alejandrino.Diosdado de los Reyes for himself and A. M. Dizon for petitioner-appellee Quirino Bolaos.Sison and San Juan for respondent-appellant J. M. Tuason and Co., Inc.BARREDO, J.:Appeal by J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation from the order dated September 9, 1965 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, issued in LRC Rec. No. 7581, Quirino Bolaos, et als., petitioners, versus J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., et al., respondents, reading in full as follows:In their urgent petition dated March 17, 1965, the petitioner prayed that an order be published at the expense of the petitioners and addressed to all to whom it may concern enjoining all and sundry "pending the promulgation of the decision of the Supreme Court on any appeal which may be taken from the decision of this Honorable Court dated January 12, 1965" to desist from disturbing the physical possession of petitioner Quirino Bolaos of the parcel of land object of this case comprising 13.2619 hectares and included in the area covered by said TCT Nos. 37677 and 37686 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.It appears that in a case filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, entitled "J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., represented by its managing partner, Gregorio Araneta, Inc. versus Quirino Bolaos," the plaintiffs sought to recover possession of the parcel of land object of the present action from the defendant therein, and who is now one of the petitioners; that decision having been rendered in favor of the plaintiff in said case and against the defendant, defendant Quirino Bolaos appealed the case to the Supreme Court (Exhibits "B," "B-1," to "B-7") which rendered a decision (No. L-4935, May 28, 1954), affirming the decision of the lower court.In Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623 of this Court, Branch II, a decision was rendered on January 18, 1965, declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal as null and void. The petitioners made this decision as the basis of their action, alleging that the certificate of title covering the parcel of land now in litigation having been derived from Original Certificate of Title No. 735, it follows that these titles which were issued later should also be declared null and void in the event the aforementioned decision becomes final and executory, or the same is affirmed by the Supreme Court.The petition merely prays for an Order to be published at the expense of the herein petitioners to enjoin all and sundry from disturbing the physical possession of petitioner Quirino Bolaos of the parcel of land object of the petition and which is included in the property covered by TCT Nos. 37677 and 37686. It is not disputed that the petitioners were in possession of the parcel of land object of this petition at the time that the civil action before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, was instituted and up to the present time (Exhibits "B-2" to "B-5").lwph1.t The records show that the petition was published at the expense of the petitioners in the Daily Mirror in its issues of May 22, 29, and June 5, 1965 (Exhibit "A"). The decision of the Supreme Court in the aforementioned case was promulgated on May 28, 1954. Notwithstanding the lapse of more than ten years, it appears that said decision has not been executed and the defendant in said case, Quirino Bolaos, who is one of the petitioners in the present case, is still in possession of the parcel of land in question. In view of the decisions in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623 of this Court, Branch II, as already stated above, it would appear that the position of the petitioner that their possession should not be disturbed until said decision is reversed by the appellate court, is tenable.WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be well-taken, the same is granted, and it is hereby ordered that the respondents, their agents, and all persons acting for and in their behalf as well as all others are hereby enjoined from disturbing the physical possession of petitioner Quirino Bolaos of the parcel of land comprising 13.2619 hectares and included in the area covered by said TCT Nos. 37677 and 37686, said notice having been published in a newspaper of general circulation as already stated above.SO ORDERED.In their brief, appellants have assigned the following alleged errors of the lower court:ITHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITION IS ALREADY BARRED BY THE JUDGMENT IN G.R. NO. L-4935 ENTITLED J. M. TUASON & CO. INC., ET AL. VS. QUIRINO BOLAOS, PROMULGATED ON 28 MAY 1954 (95 Phil. 106).IITHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN PROCEEDING TO HEAR THE PETITION NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PETITION.IIITHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT THE DECISION IN G.R. NO. L-4935 HAS NOT YET BEEN EXECUTED AND THAT PETITIONER BOLAOS IS STILL IN POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION.IVTHE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ISSUING THE ORDER DATED 5 AUGUST 1965.As can be gleaned from the above-quoted order, the relief sought by appellees in their petition filed with the court a quo was virtually a general preliminary injunction against the whole world not to disturb their alleged possession of the parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 37677 and 37686 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued to appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. upon the ground that in the three other civil cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the same Court of First Instance of Rizal, the said court has rendered a decision, still pending appeal, declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 735 from which the two above-mentioned titles have been derived null and void, principally for want of jurisdiction of the court that issued said original title on account of defects in the publication of the notices of the proceedings for their registration, the injunction to last, per their prayer, until the decision of this Court in the said three civil cases, albeit the impugned order itself does not specify the period of its duration. Petitioners sought such relief notwithstanding the admitted fact that in a previous case filed by appellant Tuason against appellees for the recovery of the possession of said land, that of Tuason vs. Bolaos, 93 Phil. 106, wherein appellees had alleged among their defenses that appellant Tuason's titles were obtained "thru fraud or error and without knowledge (of) or notice, either personal or thru publication to" said appellees, this Court upheld the validity of the questioned titles and affirmed the decision of the trial court "declaring defendant (now appellee Bolaos) to be without any right to the land in question and ordering him to restore possession thereof to plaintiff (now appellant) Tuason." In the said decision of this Court, it was held:As the land in dispute is covered by plaintiff's Torrens certificate of title and was registered in 1914, the decree of registration can no longer be impugned on the ground of fraud, error or lack of notice to defendant, as more than one year has already elapsed from the issuance and entry of the decree. Neither could the decree be collaterally attached by any person claiming title to, or interest in, the land prior to the registration proceedings. (Sorogon vs. Makalintal, [90 Phil. 259] 45 Off. Gaz. 3819.) Nor could title to that land in derogation of that of plaintiff, the registered owner, be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. (Section 46, Act No. 496.) Adverse, notorious and continuous possession under claim of ownership for the period fixed by law is ineffective against a Torrens title. (Valiente vs. Judge of CFI of Tarlac, [80 Phil. 415.] etc., 45 Off. Gaz., Supp. 9, p. 43.) And it is likewise settled that the right to secure possession under a decree of registration does not prescribe. (Francisco vs. Cruz, 43 Off. Gaz., 5105, 5109-5110). A recent decision of this Court on this point is that rendered in the case of Jose Alcantara, et al. vs. Mariano et al., 92 Phil., 796. This disposes of the alleged errors V and VI.In these circumstances, the appealed order is entirely propless. Leaving aside all the other issues raised in appellants' brief about res adjudicata, conclusiveness of judgment and conclusiveness of the respondents-appellants' Torrens Titles, it is obvious that the subject matter of appellee's petition was clearly beyond the competence and jurisdiction of the trial court sitting as it did in this case as a land registration court, this, even on the assumption, which is most doubtful, that such a general against-the-whole world preliminary injunction could be sought in any court, it being axiomatic that an auxiliary remedy cannot be secured unless there is a principal remedy to which it pertains. Once a land registration proceeding is terminated and a corresponding decree has been issued, the only matter of possession of the land involved that remains within the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court is in regard to the issuance of the writ of possession, if one should be needed. No provision of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) or any other law has been cited by appellees and We know of none which authorizes the land registration court to resolve issues of possession, in any of its aspects, after the original registration proceedings have come to an end and a writ of possession has already been issued and implemented. Section 112 of Act 496 which is the only provision in the said law empowering the land registration court to issue post or after-registration orders refers exclusively to amendments and alterations of the title issued and has nothing to do with possession of the land at all.The theory of appellees is not clear in their brief. Seemingly, they are of the belief that since the above-mentioned Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which was annulled was issued in the same LRC No. 7581 in which the present petition was filed, it should follow that the court a quo may act on their petition. Appellees' position is not correct. The mere fact that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 has been voided in so far as the titles involved in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, derived from said original certificate of title, are concerned, does not mean that such declaration of nullity affects also the other titles, also derived from it but issued in the names of other persons who have neither been heard nor notified. This is elementary under the due process principle. Although incidents regarding any title derived from an original one are supposed to be filed in the same expediente or record of the original proceeding, the incidents regarding each title so derived constitute separate and distinct proceedings from those affecting the other titles derived from the same original title, and are, accordingly, always treated as such. Indeed, the very fact that ordinary civil actions had to be filed by the plaintiffs in those three civil cases relied upon by appellees proves that the relief sought by them in their petition in the court below may not be obtained in the form of a mere incident in the original registration proceedings or expediente. Besides, as already noted earlier, there is no showing that there is now pending in the lower court either an action or any kind of proceeding in which appellees are asking that Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 37677 and 37686 of appellant Tuason should be annulled, assuming without deciding that such a relief could still be available to appellees inspite of Tuason vs. Bolaos, supra. Such being the case, the trial court placed the cart before the horse in issuing its questioned order, for how could anyone be enjoined from disturbing the possession of somebody whose right to such possession has not even been alleged, much less established in an appropriate proceeding?Having come to this conclusion, We consider it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by appellants.WHEREFORE, the appealed order is declared to have been issued beyond the jurisdiction of the court a quo and it is hereby declared null and void and set aside, with costs against appellees.Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.Zaldivar, J., took no part.